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**Personality type, locus-of-control and sex role orientation as  
predictors within two moral perspectives among young adults**

**Ritchie, George Dewey, Ph.D.**

**The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1991**

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PERSONALITY TYPE, LOCUS OF CONTROL AND SEX ROLE ORIENTATION  
AS PREDICTORS WITHIN TWO MORAL PERSPECTIVES  
AMONG YOUNG ADULTS

by

George Dewey Ritchie

A Dissertation Submitted to  
the Faculty of the Graduate School  
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Doctor of Philosophy

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1991

Approved by

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The present study investigated the relationships between personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation and the levels of each of the care and justice perspectives in young adults. Subjects were 134 18 to 25 years old, male and female, caucasian, technical community college students who were enrolled in a college transfer curriculum. They were administered five paper-and-pencil instruments: the Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator; Rotter's Internal/External Scale; the Bem Sex Role Inventory; the Relationship Self Inventory; and the Defining Issues Test.

Separate multiple stepwise discriminant analyses were performed to test each of the hypotheses. The analyses provided partial support for three of the six hypotheses. Within the care ethic, individuals at the third level were found to be androgynous, externally controlled, and to value responsibility in relationships. Those at level two were masculine, internally controlling rule-followers. Care level one persons were feminine, internally controlling, who valued responsibility in relationships.

Within the justice ethic, individuals at the third level were found to be masculine, externally controlled, and to value responsibility in relationships. Those at level two

were internally controlling rule-followers with undifferentiated sex role orientations. None of the subjects were classified into level one of the justice perspective.

Five major conclusions were drawn from the findings:

- 1) Levels within two moral perspectives can be predicted by personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation;
- 2) The basis for grouping individuals according to moral perspective (by personality or locus of control) influences how they are characterized;
- 3) Care and justice ethical perspectives, are more likely to be related to locus of control orientation than sex role orientation;
- 4) Similarities between the perspectives obscure the distinctions between them; and,
- 5) Some differences between the moral approaches depend upon the ways in which moral reasoning is operationally defined and measured.

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION

Systematic scientific observations of personality over the past 100 years have contributed to numerous theoretical explanations of the psychosocial attributes which define the construct. Most have been established by meticulous, systematic procedural studies based on the experimental method. However, not all personality theorists agree that a rigorous scientific method is the best way to understand personality. It was on the basis of his clinical observations that Freud developed psychoanalysis and a theory of personality. Rather than using introspection merely to examine present-moment phenomena, he taught his patients to use it retrospectively in order to analyze past experiences. In this way Freud was able to investigate events that could not be elicited in a laboratory (Engler, 1991, p.4).

Not only have a variety of approaches been followed in developing personality theories, but theorists have chosen to emphasize a wide range of factors which influence the development of personality. Some have stressed early childhood experiences (Adler, 1917; Erikson, 1963) while others have accentuated heredity (Jung, 1936; Sheldon, Stevens, & Tucker, 1970). The diverse procedures that have been followed in assessing personality and the range of

emphases that have been considered have produced divergent opinions regarding most human behavior and its etiology. Moral reasoning, an integral behavioral component of one's personality, is a case in point.

#### The Problem

Numerous investigators have suggested the importance of moral perspective to human behavior (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan, 1988, 1982; Lonky et al., 1988; Brown et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Reinhart et al., 1985; Daniels, 1984). Other studies have been less supportive of the relationship (Walker, 1984; Gibbs et al., 1984). Together, this research provides the impetus for further examination of the moral perspective variable. Research has demonstrated a relationship between moral perspective and several personality attributes: 1) personality type (Tappan, 1985), 2) locus of control orientation (Gutkin & Suls, 1979), and 3) sex role orientation (Lonky et al., 1988). In addition, a review of the literature (Walker, 1984) has demonstrated that differences in moral perspective-taking are most often found among the young adult population since this developmental period is conceived as a transition from the egocentrism of childhood and adolescence to the moral maturity more often found in middle and late adulthood (Kohlberg, 1981).

The present study will investigate the relationship between three independent variables (personality type, locus

of control orientation, and sex role orientation) and moral perspective in young adults 18 to 25 years of age. The research question that is posed is: Can young adults be grouped with respect to moral perspective by personality, by locus of control orientation, and by sex role orientation?

### Hypotheses

Based upon the theoretical and research literature, the following six hypotheses were posited:

**Hypothesis I.** High "Primacy of Both Self and Other Care" scores will be associated with Empathist and Analyst personalities, with an internal locus of control orientation, and with feminine and androgynous sex role orientations.

**Hypothesis II.** High "Primacy of Other Care" scores will be associated with Empathist and Analyst personalities, with an external locus of control orientation, and with feminine and androgynous sex role orientations.

**Hypothesis III.** High "Primacy of Self Care" scores will be associated with Legalist and Realist personalities, with an internal locus of control orientation, and with masculine and androgynous sex role orientations.

**Hypothesis IV.** High "Postconventional" (or principled) scores will be associated with Empathist and Analyst personalities, with an internal locus of control orientation, and with masculine and androgynous sex role orientations.

**Hypothesis V.** High "Conventional" scores will be associated with Legalist and Realist personalities, with an

external locus of control orientation, and with masculine, feminine, and androgynous sex role orientations.

**Hypothesis VI.** High "Preconventional" scores will be associated with Legalist and Realist personalities, with an internal locus of control orientation, and with a masculine sex role orientation.

Several studies have suggested the importance of psychosocial attributes to moral reasoning. Tappan (1985) reported that certain vocational personality types were more strongly related to social-cognitive development in the domains of justice judgment and ethical evaluation than were others. This position was supported by Lifton (1982) who noted that individuals possessing a similar type of reasoning tend to be similar themselves.

In his humanistic personality theory, Rogers (1961) identified a self-actualizing tendency as the foundation of a person's personality. Self actualization, the culmination of the self-actualizing tendency, has been related to moral maturity, in particular to post-conventional moral reasoning, the highest level of moral development (Daniels, 1984).

The importance the locus of control orientation variable to moral perspective was supported by Gutkin and Suls (1979). These researchers found a significant relationship between advocacy of social responsibility, a care perspective quality, and an internal locus of control orientation.

An additional support for the relationship between locus

of control orientation and moral reasoning was the outcome of deductive reasoning. Numerous studies have indicated that affective involvement influences moral perspective (Lonky et al., 1988; Gilligan, 1982; Rybash et al., 1981; Lickona, 1978; Kohlberg et al., 1972). Research however, suggests that the relationship between affective involvement and moral perspective is not a simple one (Locke & Tucker, 1988). Race, for example, may be an important intervening variable. Locke and Tucker (1988) reported that Black and White subjects were differentially affected by emotional distance. Other research findings indicate that Blacks tend to exhibit an external locus of control orientation (Lefcourt, 1973). Collectively, these findings suggest that the influence that affective involvement has upon moral perspective-taking may be mediated by the degree of perceived control one possesses.

The relationship between sex role orientation and moral perspective is marked by inconsistent and contradictory research findings (Walker, 1984). Diverse findings may be due to the fact that gender has been typically indexed by biological sex. If moral perspective is influenced by socialization as suggested by Gilligan (1988, 1982), then indexing gender by psychological sex orientation would be the more appropriate procedure. Studies that have measured gender by psychological sex role have found a greater use of the care-based moral perspective among males with feminine sex role orientations (Lonky et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery,

1986).

The dependent variable, moral perspective, consists of two distinct orientations: 1) a care-based approach grounded in connectedness to and feelings of responsibility for others; and, 2) a justice-based approach founded upon rights and rules developed to guide behavior. The care perspective is conceived as a dimension with three hierarchical levels. In ascending order they are 1) Primacy of Self Care; 2) Primacy of Other Care; and 3) Primacy of Both Self and Other Care (Gilligan, Brown, & Rogers, 1990; Reinhart et al., 1985; Gilligan, 1982, 1977). The justice perspective is viewed also as a dimension with three hierarchical levels. In ascending order they are 1) Preconventional; 2) Conventional; and 3) Postconventional (Kohlberg, 1981).

The literature surrounding moral development, moral reasoning, and moral perspective demonstrates a plethora of ambiguities, contradictions and inconsistencies. As a result, there is a need to identify variables associated with morality which might be used to clarify current ambiguities and to resolve present inconsistencies.

#### Importance of the Study

Erikson (1963) suggested the existence of eight ages, or stages, through which humans progress. Each age is characterized by a specific task or challenge which must be addressed during that stage. Success at each age depends upon a person's adjustments to the demands in previous

stages.

During young adulthood, roughly between the ages of 18 and 25 according to Erikson and corresponding to his Stage 6, men and women must resolve the critical issue of becoming intimate with a member of the opposite sex. Marriage is usually the form that this resolution ultimately takes. Soon after marriage there usually follows the challenges of incipient parenthood. Failure to attain intimacy produces painful loneliness and a sense of being incomplete.

Young adulthood is also typically a time for attending college and for deciding and beginning career pursuits. It is a time for leaving the home of one's family of origin. Two major characteristics of the mature individual are the abilities to exercise self-sufficiency and to maintain self-direction (Wise, 1986, p. 357). These abilities are challenged extensively between the ages of 18 and 25. Altogether, young adulthood can be a period of stress, replete with conflicts within relationships brought about by that stress. Indeed, the highest percentage of divorces occur in the first few years of marriage (Reiss, 1980, p. 317).

Erikson's Stage 6 is genuinely a time of conflicting needs, desires, rights, and responsibilities in one's relationships to and dealings with others. Competing rights and needs are the bases for dilemmas used to assess moral perspective (Gilligan, 1988; Kohlberg, 1981). Thus, young

adulthood is a time during which one's moral perspective is often revealed.

Knowledge of one's own and others' moral perspectives can be seen as useful in conflict resolution. Studies of young adults may identify predictors of moral perspective. Reliable findings would serve as an important source of information in clinical and non-clinical settings which attempt the amelioration of the challenging and problematic issues of young adulthood. If shown to be predictive of moral perspective, personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation information would be useful in mate selection, career selection, and conflict resolution in both treatment and non-treatment situations.

The present study extended the current research literature on moral perspectives in two distinct ways. First, it examined the influence of psychosocial attributes upon moral perspective. The value of such an approach lay in its bringing about a fuller understanding of the moral perspective construct. Second, this study tested a relatively unexamined instrument, the Relationship Self Inventory (RSI; Reinhart et al., 1985). The RSI is a reliable measure of Gilligan's model of the connected self and orientation to care (Reinhart et al., 1985). The RSI was used to assess the three levels of the care perspective.

In summary, the current study attempted to clarify ambiguities and resolve inconsistencies in the moral

development literature as they relate to specific psychosocial attributes. In addition, since new experience has been shown to modify behavior, findings from the present research regarding correlates of moral perspective are valuable in potential attempts to alter moral perspective-taking in clinical and non-clinical settings. Such information also contributes to a more complete and, therefore, valid conception of the moral perspective construct.

#### Moral Perspectives Theory

Numerous studies have reported conflicting results regarding the moral reasoning of males and females. Kohlberg's approach (1963, 1981) to the study of moral development suggests a deficiency in the moral development of women relative to men since their judgments seem to exemplify the third stage of his six-stage hierarchy. At this stage, morality is conceptualized in interpersonal terms and goodness is identified with helping and pleasing others. Thus, the qualities that traditionally have defined the "goodness" of women, caring for and being sensitive to the needs of others, are the very same ones that classify them as deficient in moral development (Gilligan, 1982, p.18).

Gilligan (1982) has suggested that gender-related factors give rise to two separate and distinct approaches, or perspectives, to moral reasoning. One line of reasoning equates morality with justice, where a moral problem is

constructed as an issue of rights and rules. The other approach identifies morality with care and constructs a moral problem as an issue of connectedness to others and responsibilities in relationships. The justice perspective is subjectively associated with men, and the care perspective with women (Gilligan, 1988; 1982; Gilligan, & Attanucci, 1988; Brown et al., 1988). However, when comparative studies of moral development are made of males and females, statistically significant differences generally are not found (Gibbs et al., 1984; Walker, 1984). It should be noted that in these instances investigators typically have indexed gender by means of biological sex. When gender is measured via psychological sex role, gender differences are found (Lonky et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986).

The importance of moral reasoning to other elements of the personality suggested the need for studies which will: 1) clarify the bases for the contradictions and controversies within moral reasoning research; 2) consolidate overlapping concepts and constructs; and 3) offer direction for future investigations of moral reasoning. Integral to this end is the formulation of a conceptual framework which will encompass and integrate the divergent results and conclusions of the moral reasoning literature.

#### Conceptual Framework

Two divergent theoretical systems have significantly influenced the study of personality in adulthood: 1) the

psychoanalytic approach, and 2) the behavioral and social learning approach. The psychoanalytic approach has focused upon cognitive structures that are proposed as underlying overt behavior (Freud, 1940; Jung, 1936; Adler, 1927; Horney, 1950). According to Rosen:

The structuralist scans the surface manifestations of things or events and penetrates below these to grasp the underlying order and significance which form a meaningful pattern. The superficial detail and diversity that appear on the surface prove to be less significant than the coherent pattern of the deep structures which give rise to what is overtly perceived. The submerged patterned relationships of whatever is under consideration are what constitute the sources of reality and account for observed regularities, rather than the atomized surface details (Rosen, 1980, pp. 1-2).

By contrast, the behavioral and social learning approach has stressed the role of the environment in the influence and determination of behavior. The behavioral aspect of this theoretical body suggests that human behavior can be explained by a reciprocal determinism that involves behavioral and environmental factors (Skinner, 1953). The social learning aspect finds it desirable to introduce internal, cognitive variables. It holds that it is the subjective meaning and interpretation of the environment in conjunction with environmental reinforcement that actually regulates behavior (Bandura, 1977; Rotter, 1982, 1954).

Both Piaget (1973, 1965) and Kohlberg (1981, 1963) adhere to the structuralist theoretical position. Piaget's

theory of moral development served as a point of departure for Kohlberg's investigations into that field (Rosen, 1980). As structuralists they held a view that tends to minimize environmental effects, i.e., the effects of socialization. While Piaget suggested that new structures are continually under construction owing to the individual's interaction with the environment, he stressed the primary role of the existing structure in regulating environmental influence.

Gilligan, a social psychologist, adheres to the cognitive-behavioral-social learning approach. Her view emphasizes the role of socialization and the subjective meaning and interpretation of the environment. It minimizes the potential influence of inherent factors in the explanation of behavior. As such, she and Kohlberg appear to be at opposite ends of an epistemological continuum. The social learning perspective is in keeping with that of the present study.

#### Assumptions and Limitations

##### Assumptions

The primary assumption of the current study was that moral perspective can be identified and indexed within a young adult population. A care-based moral perspective was assumed to be an approach to moral reasoning that is grounded in interpersonal relationships and responsibility to others. A justice-based moral perspective was assumed to be an orientation founded upon rights specified by implicit and

explicit social rules. Furthermore, it was assumed that personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation are constructs which are stable over time and can be accurately indexed among a young adult population. In addition, the two moral perspectives were assumed to be linear with normal distributions and equal variances among all levels.

Personality type was assumed to be an accurate reflection of an individual's characteristic pattern of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that persist over time and situations. Locus of control orientation was assumed to be an individual's beliefs regarding the extent to which behavioral consequences from the environment are the direct result of forces within themselves or, conversely, are controlled by external, environmental forces beyond their control. Sex role orientation was assumed to reflect the degree of an individual's identification with stereotypical images of masculine and/or feminine personalities. Equal variances were assumed among the independent variables.

#### Limitations

Several limitations of the current study are acknowledged. First and foremost is the issue of representativeness. Generalizability is limited to a population similar to the one which will form the sample to be investigated in the present study. Another limitation is that the causal nature of any observed correlations can not

be specified. Also, the data consist entirely of self-reported responses which have limited objectivity. In addition, there exists the possibility that other independent variables not included in the current study might be able to account for more unexplained variance in the dependent variable, moral perspective, than the independent variables selected for study. Finally, the fact that responses were collected in a classroom context raises the question of the degree of ecological validity of the current investigation.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Literally speaking, conscience means "together" (con) and "to know" (scire). Eby and Arrowood (1940, p. 15), therefore, define conscience as an "ideal of conduct that the individual implicitly agrees with others to maintain and chooses himself to observe." This Latin formulation replaces an earlier Middle English derivation meaning "knowledge within" (Webster's, 1978). Thus, most people think of conscience as an internal feeling of right and wrong. The first definition emphasizes the influence of the external world in the formulation of morality while the second focuses upon the influence of the internal cognitive world. Early studies of conscience, and theoretical formulations served as a springboard into recent investigations of moral development, moral reasoning, and moral perspective (Wise, 1986, p.358).

#### Theoretical Background for Moral Perspective Studies

Freud was one of the first modern researchers and theoreticians to examine conscience. He suggested the existence of an internal mental structure, the superego, which continually monitors a person's behaviors and motives (Freud, 1938). Although Freud acknowledged the influence of one's social context by noting that the superego is shaped by

primary socializing agents in the environment, he emphasized the primacy of the innate cognitive structure.

In contrast to Freud's psychoanalytic theory of conscience is that of social learning theory (Bandura, 1973). Although both emphasize the central role of identification in conscience development, the social learning theory stresses modeling and imitation, that is to say the environmental context, to a greater degree. It also stresses subjective meaning and interpretation of the environment, but gives greater emphasis to the overt moral behavior than does the psychoanalytic theory.

Piaget's cognitive theory (Piaget, 1973,1965) also addresses the development of moral abilities. It focuses upon the influence of cognitive development upon moral development. Little emphasis is given to the environmental context, that is to moral instruction or parental influence. Piaget suggests that parents designate rules and children respond to them based upon their own level of cognitive development (Wise, 1986). Whereas social learning theory is aligned with psychoanalytic theory due to a common tenet, the role of identification in moral development, cognitive theory can be seen as being more closely aligned to it. Both cognitive and psychoanalytic theories are structuralist theories. They share the fundamental theoretical notion of positing underlying cognitive structures that, although responsive to environmental influences, retain a sense of

primacy owing perhaps to their innateness (Rosen, 1980).

The psychoanalytic (Freud, 1938), social learning (Bandura, 1973), and cognitive (Piaget, 1973, 1965) bodies of theory regarding conscience and moral development comprise the range of theoretical underpinnings for current investigations of moral perspective. The three bodies are not mutually exclusive in that some doctrines are held in common by some subset of the three, or by all three (Wise, 1986). All accept the notion that moral behavior depends upon the cognitive development of the individual, but cognitive theory conceives of it as a more central idea than do the others. All designate the importance of internalization of parental values, in one form or another, to the process of moral development. Psychoanalytic and social learning theories alone emphasize the role of identification in conscience development.

While the three theories can be grouped in a number of ways according to specific tenets, it is the grouping determined by their fundamental theoretical assumptions regarding: 1) the existence of innate cognitive structures underlying overt behavior, and 2) the relative influence of internal processes versus environmental socialization upon moral development that creates the greatest contrast among the three (Engler, 1991; Wise, 1986; Rosen, 1980). The psychoanalytic and cognitive theories are structuralist theories while, strictly speaking, social learning theory is

not. These structuralist theories emphasize the primacy of internal structures, mediated by environmental influences, in determining moral development. Social learning theory emphasizes the primacy of socialization, mediated by perceptual processes, not structures, which give subjective meaning to and interpretation of the environment in determining moral development. The position is taken in the current study that it is this fundamental theoretical divergence that is the source of the controversial dichotomization of positions regarding moral perspective.

#### Moral Development Theory and Moral Perspective

##### Kohlberg and Moral Development

Lawrence Kohlberg has been an eminently stimulating influence in the investigation of moral development. His theory (Kohlberg, 1963; 1981) has pre-empted other models such as Peck's (Peck, 1960) and Piaget's (Piaget, 1965). He classified moral development into three levels with each level further divided into stages. The levels and stages form a hierarchy which describes the developmental sequence of moral development (Wise, 1986).

The earliest, and lowest, level of moral behavior is egocentric. Morality is determined by the consequences of an action to the actor. This level, the Preconventional level, is divided into three stages. At Stage 0 whatever is wanted and liked is deemed moral. At Stage 1, typically attained by age 3, actions are based on fear and the avoidance of

punishment. At Stage 2, attained by age 4, actions are based upon the existence of positive consequences.

At the second level, Conventional, moral behavior is determined by an awareness of social rules and conventions. At Stage 3, at about 7 to 8 years of age, behavior is influenced primarily by a desire for approval. At Stage 4, at about age 10, moral behavior is guided by established authority. Rules are obeyed because they are rules.

At the third and highest level, the Preconventional level, principles are the basis of moral decisions. At Stage 5 rules are interpreted as social contracts with specific purposes. Therefore they are not arbitrarily imposed and may at times even be suspended. At Stage 6 an individual has a fully internalized set of ethical principles which preclude purposeful harm to self and others, and may at times supercede rules of civil authority which are inconsistent with his or her ethical value system. These internalized principles are most often conceptualized by the individual as universal. At Stage 7, a theoretical stage, behavior is influenced by an awareness of an eternal, cosmic order. Since it is believed that so few people achieve Stages 6 and 7, these stages are typically excluded in investigations of moral development (Wise, 1986).

Kohlberg's theory is based in large part upon Piagetian cognitive theory. Both Piaget and Kohlberg adopted the theoretical position of structuralism which is an assumed

procedure for analyzing and understanding phenomena. Both believed in the existence of deep universal structures within the human organism which account for formal patterned regularities in moral development and moral reasoning. The surface manifestations of overt moral reasoning or its environmental influences were considered less significant than the coherent pattern of the underlying substrate of structures which give rise to the perception of action or its context (Rosen, 1980). The ultimate focus of the structuralist in studying moral development is not upon the individual's moral reasoning behavior nor upon the perceiving involved in that moral reasoning. It is the submerged universal structures which are credited as the source of both the perceiving processes and the moral reasoning processes which are the events typically examined in the study of moral development. In contrast, a social learning theorist, such as Carol Gilligan, focuses upon the roles of socialization and internal, interpretative perceptual processes, not structures, in the investigation of moral development.

#### Gilligan and Moral Perspective

Gilligan (1982) has proposed that moral development is a multi-dimensional construct that is experienced differentially by individuals owing to some gender-related factor or factors. She suggests that this gender influence is probably determined by masculine and feminine socialization and by the perceiving processes involved in

psychological sex role orientation-taking. She concludes that it generally leads men and women to assume divergent perspectives when confronting moral issues. While men and women can and do assume both perspectives, there is typically differential perspective-taking along gender lines (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988).

The moral perspective orientation associated primarily with women, the care perspective, is grounded in connectedness to and feelings for others with which one is in relationship. This perspective would hold that, theoretically, one is in relationship with every human. The orientation associated primarily with men, the justice perspective, focuses upon individual rights and the socially determined rules used to guide behavior in protecting those rights. This perspective implies a respect for the social structure and social stability produced by rule-following.

Research suggests that the gender-related factor influencing the selective assumption of moral orientations is a "self-in-relation-to-others" construct (Gilligan, Brown, & Rogers, 1990; Gilligan, 1982). This construct refers to the ways in which persons define their ego boundaries. The connected/relational self is determined by one's connectedness to others and is characteristic of, but not unique to, women. The separate/objective self is grounded in an "objective reciprocity in relationships and upon one's individual, separate activities and achievements; it is

characteristic of, but not unique to, men" (Strommen et al., 1987). Psychoanalytic theory, which is structuralist in nature, suggests that separation from others, a process Jung termed "individuation", is essential for healthy identity formation (Freud, 1940); Jung, 1936). Gilligan (1982), as a proponent of social learning theory which stresses the role of environmental socialization and the role of subjective meaning and interpretation of the environment, argues that remaining connected to others is not only healthy, but also may be necessary for the development of self-concept.

#### Personality Type and Moral Perspective

##### Theory-based Literature

Numbers of personality theorists have found it useful to classify individuals according to one or more behavioral traits (Jung, 1933; Horney, 1937; Rogers, 1961; Sheldon et al., 1970; Cattell, 1965; Eysenck, 1970). One of the earliest typologies was developed by Jung (1933). Jung suggested that people can be divided into two general attitudinal types: introverts and extroverts. Introverts are conceived as being concerned with their own inner worlds. They tend to be unsociable and to lack confidence in their dealings with others. Conversely, extroverts are more concerned with the external world. They are especially interested in other people and in the events going on around them. They tend to be "joiners", fulfilling a need to affiliate themselves with others (Morris, 1988).

Jung further differentiated people into rational and irrational categories (Jung, 1933). Rational individuals guide their behavior by the use of the psychological functions of thinking or feeling. In making some decision, they will be regulated either by logical reasoning or by emotional factors and value judgments. In contrast, irrational individuals regulate their actions by the use of the psychological functions of sensing or intuiting. Decisions are made based on perception that comes through the senses or through the unconscious (non-verbal) process of intuition (Morris, 1988).

Most individuals exhibit all four psychological functions, but according to Jung, one or more of them is usually dominant. Thus, a thinking person is rational and logical and decides upon the basis of facts. The feeling person is sensitive to his or her surroundings, acts tactfully, and has a balanced sense of values. The sensing type relies primarily on surface perceptions and rarely uses imagination or deeper understanding. And the intuitive type sees beyond obvious facts to predict future possibilities (Morris, 1988, p.465).

Jung (1933) also divided people in terms of their preferences for a) making judgments about the world based upon a minimum number of observations versus b) merely observing the world while making a minimum number of judgments about their observations. The former he described as judging and the latter he designated perceiving. Thus, according to Jung, an individual's personality type is

determined by the references he or she has along four separate dimensions: 1) extroversion-introversion, 2) sensing-intuiting (irrational category), 3) thinking-feeling (rational category), and 4) judging-perceiving. Therefore, a person's personality type will be the combination of four preferences. He or she will be either extroverted or introverted, and either sensing or intuiting, and either thinking or feeling, and either judging or perceiving. Keirsey and Bates (1984) expanded Jung's theory. They suggested that the irrational category differentiates individuals more so than any of the remaining dimensions. Thus sensors and intuitives are the most different of all the pairs. Furthermore they note that among sensors the greatest differences are observed in relation to the perception-judging dimension. Thus for sensors, the greatest differences appear between those who prefer simply observing the world around them compared to forming judgments or conclusions about what is observed. In contrast, among intuitives the greatest differences are observed in relation to the thinking-feeling dimension, that is, in terms of the basis upon which judgments or conclusions are formed, via reason and logic or through values and feelings. Thus for intuitives, the greatest differences appear between those who prefer to form judgments based upon logical reasoning or upon feelings and values. The authors suggest that these four resulting groups represent four fundamental

psychological temperaments: Dionysian, Epimethean, Promethean, and Apollonian.

Keirsey and Bates (1984) suggested that Dionysians are individuals who make decisions based on information that comes through the senses (sensing) and who prefer to merely observe the environment while making few judgments about it (perceiving). In contrast, Epimetheans are individuals who make decisions based on information that comes through the senses (sensing). They prefer to make judgments about the environment based upon a minimum number of observations of it (judging).

Prometheans are individuals who make decisions based on information that comes through the unconscious (non-verbal) process of intuition (intuiting). They prefer to make judgments about environmental observations based upon logical reasoning. In contrast, Apollonians are individuals who make decisions based on information that comes through the unconscious (non-verbal) process of intuition (intuiting). They prefer to make judgments about environmental observations based upon feelings and values.

RoBards (1986) replaced the Greek mythological-based names for the Keirsey and Bates' four fundamental temperaments with a nomenclature that is more readily understood by readers not well-versed in the heroic Greek myths. Thus the Epimethean, the Apollonian, the Dionysian, and the Promethean temperaments were renamed the Legalist,

the Empathist, the Realist, and the Analyst, respectively.

According to RoBards (1986) the Legalist temperament is conservative, serious, responsible, and a rule-follower. The Empathist is warm, communicative, and interested in values based on responsibility within relationships. The Realist is physical, spontaneous, and game-playing. The Analyst is logical, competent, and theoretical. Behavioral descriptions of the Legalist temperament, and to a lesser extent the Realist temperament appear to correspond to the justice-based moral perspective. Behavioral descriptions of the Empathist temperament, and to a lesser extent the Analyst temperament appear to correspond to the care-based moral perspective.

#### Research-based Literature

The research literature demonstrates that while psychologists often are at odds over the definition, underlying processes, and procedures used to investigate moral development, they agree that individuals possessing a similar type of moral reasoning tend to have similar personalities (Lifton, 1982). This position was supported by Tappan (1985) who investigated adult social cognition in the domains of justice judgment and ethical evaluation and their relationship to personal and vocational interests. Results indicated that certain vocational personality types (health service workers, religious workers) were more strongly related to social-cognitive development in the domains of justice judgment and ethical evaluation than were others

(electrical technicians, clerical machine operators).

A variety of personality constructs have been found to be related to moral reasoning and moral development. Of these constructs, self-concept is the most important. Personal identity plays an integral role in determining the quality of interpersonal relationships (Mussen, 1974). Individuals with more negative self-concepts view themselves as inferior and may be more inclined to follow group consensus in reasoning over some moral issue. Those with more positive self-concepts are less likely to show undue submission to authority or overdependence on the approval of others (Wise, 1986).

Rogers' humanistic theory of personality (1961) identified a self-actualizing tendency as the driving force in personality development. This tendency is defined as a drive to fulfill one's self-concept. It is suggested that just as there appears to be a natural inclination to fulfill innate biological potentials, so too is there a tendency to live out the images one has formed for himself or herself. Self-actualization, the culmination of the self-actualizing tendency, has been related to postconventional moral reasoning, the highest level of moral development (Daniels, 1984).

#### Locus of Control and Moral Perspective

##### Theory-based Literature

Social learning theory has posited the existence of

three interrelated psychosocial components: a cognitive, mediating perceptual process; generalized expectancy; and locus of control orientation (Rotter, 1966). This framework stresses the importance of perception in providing meaning to and interpretation of one's contextual environment.

Perceptual processes provide the mechanism whereby causal or contingency relationships in the environment may be identified. Causal perception, or generalized expectancy, is the basis for the locus of control orientation construct. Thus, one may conclude that a causal relationship exists between forces beyond one's control and rewards, and therefore be identified as believing in external control. In contrast, one might conclude that rewards are contingent upon personal behavior, and consequently be designated as possessing an internal locus of control orientation. An external locus of control orientation appears to correspond in general with a justice-based moral perspective's emphasis upon external society-based rules. An internal locus of control orientation appears to correspond in general with a care-based moral perspective's focus upon individual responsibility in dealing with others.

#### Research-based Literature

The research literature has suggested both a direct and an indirect association between locus of control orientation and moral perspective. Gutkin and Suls (1979) reported a significant relationship between advocacy of social

responsibility and an internal locus of control orientation. Subjects who showed greater tendencies toward social responsibility also tended to show more internal locus of control. Social responsibility corresponded to responsibility in relationship to others which is a defining characteristic of the care-based moral perspective.

Locus of control also appears to be indirectly associated with moral perspective. Numerous studies have indicated that affective involvement influences moral perspective (Lonky et al., 1988; Gilligan, 1982; Rybash et al., 1981; Lickona, 1978; Kohlberg et al., 1972). Investigators generally have examined affective distance by having subjects place themselves in the role of the primary character in a moral dilemma. Research, however, suggests that the relationship between affective involvement and moral perspective is not a simple one (Locke & Tucker, 1988). Race, for example, may be an important intervening variable. Locke and Tucker (1988) gave both Black and White college students either the usual form of Rest et al.'s Defining Issues Test (DIT; 1974) or an adapted DIT in which the characters were Black. This racial manipulation affected the emotional distance of Black, but not White, subjects. This finding, along with other research findings which indicate that Blacks tend to exhibit an external locus of control orientation (Lefcourt, 1973), suggests that the influence that affective involvement has upon moral perspective-taking

may be mediated by the degree of perceived control one possesses.

#### Sex Role Orientation and Moral Perspective

##### Theory-based Literature

Social learning theory suggests that the acquisition of gender-consistent behavior is based upon selective reinforcement of behaviors considered to be gender-appropriate by relevant others in the surrounding environment. Appropriate behavior is initially prompted through the process of modeling. Imitation, in turn, leads to identification with one's own gender. Any behavior which is differentially reinforced for the separate genders will be incorporated into behavioral repertoires along gender lines (Mischel, 1970).

Socialization is a primary construct in social learning theory and refers to the process by which children learn the behavior and attitudes appropriate to their society (Bandura, 1973). Societies selectively encourage males and females to adopt somewhat different attitudes and behavior patterns because it is believed to reflect inherent differences between the sexes (Deaux, 1985). Differential moral perspective-taking by men and women is thought to be the result of gender-specific socialization (Gilligan, 1982).

##### Research-based Literature

Gilligan (1977, 1982) suggested that an interpersonal orientation, sensitivity and caring for others, primarily

observed in women and apparently the result of feminine socialization, influences one's moral perspective. This perception has prompted an abundance of studies examining the relationship between gender and moral perspective (Vasudev, 1988; Gilligan and Attanucci, 1988; Walker, 1984; Gibbs et al., 1984). Results generally have been contradictory. Inconsistent findings may be due to the fact that gender has been typically indexed by biological sex. If moral perspective is influenced by socialization as suggested by Giligan, then indexing gender by psychological sex orientation would be the more appropriate procedure. Studies that have measured gender by sex role have reported a greater use of the care-based moral perspective among males with feminine sex role orientations (Lonky et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986).

#### Summary

Theory-based literature has posited the logical relationship between the constructs to be examined in the current study. Behavioral characteristics of personality temperaments appear to differentially correspond with those of individuals associated with different moral perspectives. Legalists and Realists appear to correspond with a justice perspective, while Empathists and Analysts appear to correspond with a care perspective. In addition, an external locus of control orientation appears to correspond with a justice-based moral perspective, while an internal locus of

control orientation appears to correspond with a care-based moral perspective. Finally, a masculine sex role orientation appears to correspond with a justice-based moral perspective, while a feminine sex role orientation appears to correspond with a care-based moral perspective.

### CHAPTER III

#### METHOD AND PROCEDURES

The purpose of this research was to investigate the relationship between the independent variables of 1) personality type, 2) locus of control orientation, and 3) sex role orientation and the dependent variable of interest, moral perspective. The association between each of the independent variables and each of two moral perspectives, the care perspective and the justice perspective, was examined.

#### Sample Selection

Subjects for the study consisted of 243 male and female undergraduates enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course at Guilford Technical Community College (GTCC), Jamestown Campus, Jamestown, North Carolina. Only the data from 134 subjects who were caucasian, between the ages of 18 and 25, and who were college transfer students were included in the analyses. Data collected from students enrolled in technical curricula were saved for later analyses. College transfer students were more likely to possess similar goals and interests compared to students enrolled in the diverse technical curricula at GTCC. Therefore, they were likely to represent a more homeogeneous population.

A review of the moral perspective literature suggested

that it is among young adults that one is most likely to observe gender-related differences in moral reasoning orientations (Walker, 1984). Therefore, data analyses in the present study were limited to that obtained from students who were between 18 and 25 years of age.

Research suggested that race may be a possible intervening variable between one of the predictors, locus of control, and moral perspective (Locke & Tucker, 1988). However, for purposes of the statistical analyses an insufficient number of Blacks existed in the sample to be studied. Analyses in the current study were performed upon a homogeneous sample of White subjects. Data collected from Black students were saved for later analyses.

#### Measurement

Data were collected using a group- and individually-administered questionnaire (Appendix). The questionnaire consisted of six sections: I. Demographic Information; II. Relationship Self Inventory; III. Defining Issues Test; IV. Myers-Briggs Type Indicator; V. Rotter's Internal-External Scale; and the VI. Bem Sex Role Inventory. The questionnaires were distributed to undergraduate students enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course taught by the researcher. The questionnaire took one and one-half 50-minute class periods to complete. These classes augmented a section of course material that discussed psychological experimentation. Almost all of the questionnaires were

completed during the two presentation times. Subjects who were absent during class presentations were allowed to complete the questionnaire and return it to the investigator.

### Dependent Measures

The dependent variable, moral perspective, was measured by two instruments. The care-based moral perspective was indexed by the Relationship Self Inventory (RSI; Reinhart et al., 1985). The justice-based moral perspective was measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest et al., 1974).

Relationship Self Inventory. The Relationship Self Inventory was used to measure the care-based moral perspective. The RSI measures Gilligan's "connected self-in-relation-to-others" construct (Gilligan, 1982; Reinhart et al., 1985). An individual's perceptions of being connected in his or her relations to others are based upon an orientation to the care of oneself and others. Gilligan's model suggests that manifestations of the connected self are associated primarily with women. The RSI consists of 27 potentially self-descriptive statements arranged in four scales which are internally consistent, acceptably reliable at all ages, and measure Gilligan's model of the connected self and orientation to care. The four scales are:

- 1) Primacy of Self Care;
- 2) Primacy of Other Care;
- 3) Primacy of Both Self and Other Care;
- and the 4) Connected Self.

All four scales were administered in the present study. However,

the fourth scale, Connected Self, was not necessary for the purposes of the present study. Data regarding the Connected Self scale were saved for later analyses. Scale reliability for the Primacy of Self Care scale is .74; that for the Primacy of Other Care scale is .64; that for the Primacy of Both Self and Other scale is .65; and that for the Connected Self scale is .75 (Reinhart et al., 1985). The possible score range for the Primacy of Self Care scale is 0 to 25. Possible scores for the Primacy of Other Care scale range from 0 to 35. The possible score range for the Primacy of Both Self and Other Care scale is between 0 and 40. That for the Connected Self scale is between 0 and 35.

As a psychological construct, the connected self is formed on the basis of an orientation to care of self and others. Relationships are viewed as being engaged in through activities of care in response to others, which stems from a belief in the interconnectedness of people. Gilligan's research (1982) suggests that for women whose self is developed through connection with others, there are three groups who are differentiated by three meanings of care of self and others: 1) Caring for oneself is necessary because others will not care; 2) Caring for others takes precedence over caring for oneself; and 3) Caring for all, including self, is important. These three meanings reflect three different forms of the connected self and serve as the basis for three of the four RSI scales (Reinhart et al.,

1985). The three meanings also reflect the three levels of the care perspective of moral reasoning.

Within the lowest level of the care perspective, Primacy of Self Care, moral reasoning reflects a deep and concerted interest in insuring that one's own needs are met first before other's needs are addressed. At the second level, Primacy of Other Care, moral reasoning is based upon the notion that one must address the needs of others prior to addressing one's own needs. At the highest level of the care perspective, Primacy of Both Self and Other Care, moral reasoning indicates an awareness of the necessity of addressing one's own and others' needs with equal consideration. Because the three RSI scales index the three levels of the connected self, it was used to measure the care-based moral ethic in this study.

Defining Issues Test. The Defining Issues Test was used to assess the justice-based moral perspective. The DIT is a widely used objective test of moral reasoning in which subjects are requested to isolate the critical issues in six dilemmas, each of which describes an interpersonal problem encountered by a hypothetical other. In addition to scores which reveal the level of moral development, the DIT provides a P-score that measures the degree to which subjects consider principled, Level 3, responses important in resolving moral problems (Lonky et al., 1988). The objective in the DIT is to pick the issue that makes the most difference in deciding

what action one ought to take in response to a moral dilemma. The basis for this procedure is that people's judgments of the crucial issue of moral dilemmas change with development as does their moral reasoning itself (Rest et al., 1974). In the current study, the DIT was used to determine subjects' level of moral reasoning. Possible scores range from 0 to 95 for each of the levels of moral development.

The correlation between the DIT P-score and Kohlberg's Postconventional stage score is .68 (Rest et al., 1974). However, the DIT has come to be the standard objective pencil-and-paper instrument used to assess moral development (Locke & Tucker, 1988; Lonky et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Rybash et al., 1981). The DIT P-score has a test-retest Pearson correlation of .81 (Rest et al., 1974).

As a psychological construct, the justice-based moral perspective orientation is divided into three hierarchical levels. At the Preconventional, the first and lowest level of justice-based moral reasoning, the moral quality of an activity is determined by what the action will do for the protection of one's rights which are based upon explicit or implicit social rules. Within the second level, Conventional, moral decisions are made on the basis of established authority which has determined rules for the protection of the rights of all members of their society. At this level, morality is demonstrated by obeying the law that governs every citizen's behavior in its efforts to protect

every citizen's rights. At the highest level of the Justice Perspective, Postconventional, the basis for moral decisions are principles. Deduced by the individual, these principles reflect a concern for the rights of all living beings to dignity and to acceptable levels of welfare. Together the three levels comprise the justice perspective.

#### Independent Measures

The present study investigated the relationship between three independent variables (personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation) and moral perspective. Personality type was assessed by means of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Locus of control orientation was measured via Rotter's Internal-External Scale. Sex role orientation was indexed by the Bem Sex Role Inventory.

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. The self-scoring Short Form G of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was used to index personality type (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). The MBTI measures responses on four scales and identifies one as having one of sixteen specific personality types. The MBTI is based upon Jung's theory of psychological types (Jung, 1933). This instrument divides personalities into sixteen types based upon four pairs of interactive factors:

- 1) extroversion or introversion;
- 2) sensing or intuiting;
- 3) thinking or feeling; and,
- 4) judging or perceiving.

Each pair of factors is conceptualized as a dimension with the two factors within a pair serving as its extremes. Individuals

are conceived as having preferences for engaging in activities related to one extreme in a dimension more so than its opposite.

Internal reliability derived from product-moment correlations of continuous scores of traditional college students with Spearman-Brown prophesy formula correction are .83 for the extroversion-introversion (E-I) scale; .82 for the sensing-intuiting (S-N) scale; .81 for the thinking-feeling (T-F) scale; and .86 for the judging-perceiving (J-P) scale. Twenty-one month test-retest reliability for the E-I scale is .78; .73 for the S-N scale; .67 for the T-F scale; and .64 for the J-P scale (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Neither individual scale reliabilities nor overall test reliability could be computed for the responses of subjects in the present study due to the transformations that were performed in determining the final personality types.

The MBTI typology was simplified by reducing the sixteen types to four temperaments, the Epimethean, the Apollonian, the Dionysian, and the Promethean which are based upon Jung's (1933) four orienting functions (Keirsesey & Bates, 1984). The Greek mythological-based temperaments were renamed the Legalist, the Empathist, the Realist, and the Analyst, respectively for further simplification (Robards, 1986). Each of these temperaments can be expressed as four separate specific personalities. Robards' (1986) method was used to transform the MBTI results into individuals' specific

personality type. Statistical analyses were used to determine the relationship between personality type and moral perspective.

Rotter's Internal-External Scale. Locus of control orientation was measured by Rotter's Internal-External Scale (I/E Scale). The I/E scale was devised to assess an individual's degree of perceived control within his environment. Rotter (1966) noted that the effect of a specific reinforcement depends upon whether or not the individual perceives a contingency relationship between his response and the reinforcer. This perception was identified as "generalized expectancy", conceptualized as a belief in internal as opposed to external control over reinforcement. Perceived control is formulated as a continuum with the constructs "internal control" and "external control" as its extremes. Individuals who are identified as having internal control over reinforcement perceive that their own actions control the consequences that they experience and are identified by low I/E scores. On the other hand, persons who perceive that consequences are determined by forces beyond their control are classified as externals and are identified by high I/E scores. According to Rotter (1973), reliability coefficients using the Kuder-Richardson formula range from .70 to .76. One month test-retest reliability ranges from .60 to .83. Individual scale reliabilities were computed for the I/E instrument in the present study. Cronbach's

alpha for the internal scale was .72; that for the external scale was .69.

Locus of control was determined by the I/E Scale as follows. Subjects were presented 29 pairs of statements and asked to select the one within each pair that they consider to be more true. A pair consisted of a statement which reflected an orientation toward external control and one which reflected an orientation toward internal control. For example, one pair of statements which was presented to subjects was: A) Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.; and B) People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. A subject's score was his or her total number of external choices. A belief in external control was indicated by high scores whereas a belief in internal control was indicated by low scores. Statistical analyses were used to determine the relationship between locus of control orientation and moral perspective.

Bem Sex Role Inventory. Sex role orientation was determined through the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI). The BSRI was designed as a means of indexing individuals by gender using psychological sex role rather than biological sex. It consists of sixty personality characteristics, 20 of which are considered "masculine", 20 that are considered "feminine", and 20 that are considered neutral, but socially desirable. According to Bem (1974), internal reliability of

scores for the three BSRI scales: 1) Masculinity; 2) Femininity; and 3) Social Desirability (Bem, 1974). Results indicated that all three scales are highly reliable (Masculinity = .86; Femininity = .80; Social Desirability = .75). The one-month test-retest reliability also is high (Masculinity = .90; Femininity = .90; and Social Desirability = .89). Individual scale reliabilities were computed for the masculine scale was .85; that for the feminine scale was .83; and that for the social desirability scale was .49.

The BSRI identified individuals through self-description as either Masculine, Feminine, Androgynous, or Undifferentiated. Individuals indicated an identification with descriptors which are stereotypically associated with males or with females. Persons who showed a predominant identification with stereotyped masculine descriptors were identified as having a masculine sex role orientation. Similarly, individuals who indicated a marked identification with stereotyped feminine descriptors were viewed as having a feminine sex role orientation. Persons who showed a strong identification with both masculine and feminine descriptors were labelled Androgynous. And those who indicated a weak identification with both masculine and feminine descriptor were designated as Undifferentiated. The value of the BSRI lies in its ability to reflect gender differences that may be the result of the influence of social learning. Statistical

analyses were used to determine the relationship between sex role orientation and moral perspective.

#### Statistical Analysis

Each of the six hypotheses was tested by multiple discriminant analyses. Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique in which linear combinations of variables are used to differentiate two or more categories or groups. In the present study linear combinations of personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation were used to distinguish between the two moral perspectives. Due to the exploratory nature of the current study, the stepwise method was used to select the linear combination that best discriminated between moral perspectives (Nie et al.1975). The default tolerance level (.001) for inclusion of a variable in the stepwise method was used. All variables were tested against this level prior to inclusion. The tolerance of a variable in the analysis at any given step was the proportion of its within-groups variance not accounted for by other variables in the analysis.

The data were inspected to determine that two important assumptions of multiple discriminant analysis were met: 1) the assumption of comparable group sizes; and, 2) the assumption of no unacceptable outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1983, pp. 335-340). An examination of sample variances for the ten predictor variables revealed no large discrepancies.

Discriminant analysis procedures are robust enough to handle observed discrepancies. Data for twelve subjects at the care ethic and four subjects at the justice ethic were eliminated by casewise deletion because of missing information. For purposes of the multiple discriminant analyses, the major variables in this study were addressed in the following ways:

Dependent Variable

There were two distinct moral perspectives to be examined by this investigation: a care-based moral perspective (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan, 1982) and a justice-based moral perspective (Gilligan, Brown & Rogers, 1990, Kohlberg, 1981). Each perspective consisted of three hierarchical levels contained within it. Each of the six levels was analyzed by a discriminant procedure.

Care Perspective. The care perspective was assessed by Reinhart et al.'s (1985) Relationship Self Inventory. The three levels within the care-based perspective from lowest to highest level are: 1) Primacy of Self Care; 2) Primacy of Other Care; and 3) Primacy of Both Self and Other Care.

Justice Perspective. The justice perspective was measured by Rest et al.'s (1974) Defining Issues Test. The three levels within the justice-based Perspective from lowest to highest are: 1) Preconventional; 2) Conventional; and 3) Postconventional.

### Independent Variables

Personality. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) was used to determine subjects' personality type. Subjects' responses on the MBTI designated them as extroverted or introverted, and sensing or intuitive, and thinking or feeling, and judging or perceiving. The MBTI score was a four letter designation which identified each subject's specific MBTI personality type. Subjects were then classified according to Robards' (1986) personality typology (Legalist, Empathist, Realist, Analyst). Thus, individuals who were intuitive and feeling were indexed as Empathists; those who were intuitive and thinking were categorized as analysts; persons who were sensing and judging were grouped as Legalists; and, subjects who were sensing and perceiving were classified as Realists.

Each of the four possible personality temperaments were dichotomized into a dummy variable, e. g. as represented by the quality or not. The referent variable was having the personality temperament. This process resulted in four dummied variables: Empathist, Analyst, Legalist, and Realist. In the first, second, and fourth analyses, Empathist, Analyst, and Realist were coded 1 and the referent, Legalist, was coded 0. In the third, fifth, and sixth analysis, Legalist, Realist, and Analyst were coded 1 and the referent, Empathist, was coded 0.

Locus of Control. Locus of control orientation was measured by Rotter's Internal-External Scale (I/E). A belief in external control was indicated by high scores whereas a belief in internal control was indicated by low scores.

Sex Role Orientation. The Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974) was used to measure sex role orientation. Subjects' responses on the BSRI identified them as having a masculine, a feminine, an androgynous, or an undifferentiated sex role orientation. Each of the four possible psychological sex roles was dummy coded. The referent variable in each case was having, versus not having, the sex role orientation. There were a total of four dummied, dichotomized sex role orientations: masculine, feminine, androgynous, and undifferentiated. In the first and second analyses, feminine, androgynous, and undifferentiated were coded 1 and the referent, masculine, was coded 0. In the third, fourth, and sixth analyses, masculine, androgynous, and undifferentiated are coded 1 and the referent, feminine, was coded 0. In the fifth analysis, masculine, feminine, and androgynous were coded 1 and the referent, undifferentiated was coded 0.

## CHAPTER IV

### RESULTS

The first part of this chapter includes descriptive data of the young adults who comprised the research sample for the study. These data are followed by the results of the discriminant analyses performed for each of the six hypotheses.

#### Description of the Sample

The demographic data for 134 subjects out of the original research sample of 243 are presented in Table 1. As noted in Chapter II, only the data obtained from white college transfer students between the ages of 18 and 25 were appropriate for the purposes of the present study. Data for the remaining subjects will be saved for later analyses.

The mean age of the final sample group of 134 was 20 years (Table 1). Women comprised 53 percent of this sample, and men 47 percent. Ninety-four percent were single, 4 percent were married, and 2 percent were divorced. Eighty-seven percent were employed. The mean range of hours worked each week was from 20 to 30 hours. Eighty-four percent lived with parents or family. Of these, forty-five percent relied upon parents or family for more than one-half of their financial support (not shown in Table 1). Eighteen percent reported that they did not have enough money for necessities;

fifty-seven percent said they had enough if they were careful; twenty-five percent reported having enough money for everything they needed. The mean level of subjects' mothers' education was one year of college. The mean level of subjects' fathers' education was two years of college. The mean range of household income was \$41,000 to \$55,999.

Table 1

Selected Demographic Characteristics of Young Adult Sample

(N = 134)

| Characteristics | <u>n</u> | <u>%</u> |
|-----------------|----------|----------|
| <b>Age</b>      |          |          |
| 18              | 26       | 19.4     |
| 19              | 34       | 25.4     |
| 20              | 32       | 23.9     |
| 21              | 15       | 11.2     |
| 22              | 8        | 6.0      |
| 23              | 4        | 3.0      |
| 24              | 9        | 6.7      |
| 25              | 6        | 4.4      |
| Total           | 134      | Mean Age |
|                 |          | 20       |
| <b>Gender</b>   |          |          |
| Men             | 63       | 47.0     |
| Women           | 71       | 53.0     |
| Total           | 134      |          |

Table 1 (continued)

| Characteristics              | <u>n</u> | %    |
|------------------------------|----------|------|
| <b>Marital Status</b>        |          |      |
| Single                       | 126      | 94.0 |
| Married                      | 6        | 4.5  |
| Divorced                     | 2        | 1.5  |
| Total                        | 134      |      |
| <b>Employment Status</b>     |          |      |
| Employed                     | 117      | 87.3 |
| Unemployed                   | 17       | 12.7 |
| Total                        | 134      |      |
| <b>Hours Worked Per Week</b> |          |      |
| None                         | 17       | 12.7 |
| 0 - 20                       | 39       | 29.1 |
| 21 - 30                      | 49       | 36.6 |
| 31 - 40                      | 23       | 17.2 |
| More than 40                 | 5        | 3.7  |
| Missing Data                 | 1        | .7   |
| Total                        | 134      |      |
| Mean Hours                   | 21 - 40  |      |
| <b>Living Arrangements</b>   |          |      |
| With Parents or Family       | 112      | 83.6 |
| Alone or With Roomate(s)     | 22       | 16.4 |
| Total                        | 134      |      |

Table 1 (continued)

| Characteristics                   | <u>n</u>                 | %    |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|------|
| <b>Discretionary Funds</b>        |                          |      |
| Not Enough for Necessities        | 24                       | 17.9 |
| Enough for Necessities if Careful | 77                       | 57.5 |
| Enough for Necessities            | 33                       | 24.6 |
| Total                             | 134                      |      |
| <b>Parents' Education</b>         |                          |      |
| <b>Mothers' Education</b>         |                          |      |
| Below 9th grade                   | 2                        | 1.4  |
| Completed 10th grade              | 5                        | 3.7  |
| Completed 12th grade              | 56                       | 41.8 |
| Completed 1 year college          | 17                       | 12.7 |
| Completed 2 years college         | 22                       | 16.4 |
| Completed 4 years college         | 24                       | 17.9 |
| Beyond 2 years college            | 8                        | 6.0  |
| Total                             | 134                      |      |
| Mean Mothers' Education           | Completed 1 year college |      |

Table 1 (continued)

| Characteristics                | <u>n</u>                  | %    |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|------|
| <b>Fathers' Education</b>      |                           |      |
| Below 9th grade                | 3                         | 2.2  |
| Completed 10th grade           | 11                        | 8.2  |
| Completed 12th grade           | 37                        | 27.6 |
| Completed 1 year college       | 13                        | 9.7  |
| Completed 2 years college      | 15                        | 11.2 |
| Completed 4 years college      | 34                        | 25.4 |
| Beyond 4 years collegee        | 24                        | 17.9 |
| Missing Data                   | 2                         | 1.5  |
| Total                          | 134                       |      |
| Mean Fathers' Education        | Completed 2 years college |      |
| <b>Annual Household Income</b> |                           |      |
| Below \$10,000                 | 13                        | 9.7  |
| \$10,000 - \$25,999            | 19                        | 14.1 |
| \$26,000 - \$40,999            | 22                        | 16.4 |
| \$41,000 - \$55,999            | 24                        | 17.9 |
| \$56,000 - \$70,999            | 21                        | 15.7 |
| \$71,000 - \$76,000            | 5                         | 3.7  |
| More than \$76,000             | 13                        | 9.6  |
| Missing Data                   | 17                        | 12.7 |
| Total                          | 134                       |      |
| Mean Household Income          | \$41,000 - \$55,999       |      |

Table 2 presents a summary of the classification of subjects with respect to the independent variables (personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation) and the dependent variables (care-based moral perspective and justice-based moral perspective) in the study. Nineteen percent of the subjects had Analyst personalities; 25 percent were Empathists, 25 percent were Realists; and 31 percent were Legalists. Thirty-six percent had external locus of control orientations, while 64 percent were internals. Thirteen percent were masculine; 16 percent had a feminine sex role orientation; 70 percent had an androgynous sex role orientation; and 1 percent had an undifferentiated sex role orientation.

Results indicated that 25 percent reasoned morally at the first level of the care-based moral perspective ("Primacy of Self Care"); 62 percent reasoned at the second level ("Primacy of Other Care"); and 4 percent reasoned morally at the third level ("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care"). Seventy-five percent were reasoning at the second level of the justice-based moral perspective (Conventional) while 25 percent reasoned morally at the third (Postconventional). None of the subjects in the study reasoned at the first level of the justice moral perspective. Thus, subjects were approximately 1/2 men (47%) and 1/2 (53%) women (Table 1), but nearly 3/4 (70%) had androgynous sex roles. In addition, they were nearly evenly distributed among the four

personality types, but nearly 2/3 (64%) had internal, as opposed to external (36%), locus of control orientations. Also, the Relationship Self Inventory (used to index the care ethic) is more sensitive than the Defining Issues Test (used to index the justice ethic) in measuring the lowest levels of moral reasoning. However, the DIT is more sensitive than the RSI in measuring the highest levels of moral decision making.

Table 2

Classification of Subjects According to Personality Type, Locus of Control Orientation, Sex Role Orientation, and Care-based and Justice-based Moral Perspectives

| Variables                           | <u>n</u> | %    |
|-------------------------------------|----------|------|
| <b>Independent Variables</b>        |          |      |
| <b>Personality Type</b>             |          |      |
| Analyst                             | 25       | 18.7 |
| Empathist                           | 34       | 25.4 |
| Realist                             | 34       | 25.4 |
| Legalist                            | 41       | 30.5 |
| <b>Locus of Control Orientation</b> |          |      |
| External                            | 48       | 35.8 |
| Internal                            | 86       | 64.2 |

Table 2 (continued)

| Variables                              | <u>n</u> | %    |
|--|----------|------|
| <b>Sex Role Orientation</b>            |          |      |
| Masculine                              | 18       | 13.4 |
| Feminine                               | 21       | 15.7 |
| Androgynous                            | 94       | 70.1 |
| Undifferentiated                       | 1        | .7   |
| <b>Dependent Variables</b>             |          |      |
| <b>Care-based Moral Perspective</b>    |          |      |
| Self Care-Level 1                      | 34       | 25.4 |
| Other Care-Level 2                     | 83       | 61.9 |
| Self and Other Care-Level 3            | 5        | 3.7  |
| Missing Data                           | 12       | 9.0  |
| <b>Justice-based Moral Perspective</b> |          |      |
| Preconventional-Level 1                | 0        | 0.0  |
| Conventional-Level 2                   | 96       | 71.6 |
| Postconventional-Level 3               | 34       | 25.4 |
| Missing Data                           | 4        | 3.0  |

#### Predictors of Levels of Care-based Moral Perspective

The similar nature of Hypotheses I and II allowed the testing of both with one stepwise discriminant analysis. Hypothesis I predicted that persons classified at the third level of the care-based moral perspective ("Primacy of Both

Self and Other Care") would have Empathist and Analyst personalities with an internal locus of control orientation, and with feminine and androgynous sex role orientations. Hypothesis II predicted that individuals classified at the second level of the care-based moral perspective ("Primacy of Other Care") would have Empathist and Analyst personalities with an external locus of control orientation, and with feminine and androgynous sex role orientations.

#### Hypotheses I and II

Hypotheses I and II were partially confirmed by the first stepwise discriminant analysis. The overall  $F$  for the model was significant,  $F(8, 232) = 4.50, p < .001$  (Table 3).

Group classification results of the discriminant analysis testing Hypotheses I and II are presented in Table 4. Approximately 60 percent of all grouped cases were correctly classified by the discriminant model. Forty-seven percent of the subjects in the group reasoning at level one ("Primacy of Self Care") of the care-based moral perspective were correctly predicted. Sixty-four percent of those reasoning at the second level ("Primacy of Other Care") were correctly predicted. Eighty percent of those subjects reasoning at the third moral level ("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care") were correctly predicted. Thus membership at the third moral reasoning level could be better predicted than membership at the second or first levels, while that at the second could be better predicted than that at the first.

Table 3

Standardized Discriminant Coefficients (By Function)  
Distinguishing Levels of the Care-based Moral Perspective by  
Personality Type, Locus of Control, and Sex Role Orientation

| Functions                    | Explained Variance<br>% | Discriminant<br>Coefficients |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Function 1                   | 70.61                   |                              |
| Personality Type             |                         |                              |
| Analyst/Legalist             |                         | -.88                         |
| Empathist/Legalist           |                         | .58                          |
| Sex Role Orientation         |                         |                              |
| Androgynous/Masculine        |                         | .52                          |
| Locus of Control Orientation |                         |                              |
| External/Internal            |                         | .28                          |
| Function 2                   | 29.39                   |                              |
| Locus of Control Orientation |                         |                              |
| External/Internal            |                         | -.81                         |
| Sex Role Orientation         |                         |                              |
| Androgynous/Masculine        |                         | .67                          |
| Personality Type             |                         |                              |
| Analyst/Legalist             |                         | .52                          |
| Total                        | 100.00                  |                              |

$F(8, 232) = 4.50, p < .001.$

Table 4

Group Classification Results:Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypotheses I and II;Levels of Care-based Moral Perspective

| Levels of<br>Care<br>Perspective | <sup>a</sup><br>No. of<br>Cases | Predicted Groups |      |          |      |          |      |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|------|----------|------|----------|------|
|                                  |                                 | Level 1          |      | Level 2  |      | Level 3  |      |
|                                  |                                 | <u>n</u>         | %    | <u>n</u> | %    | <u>n</u> | %    |
| Level 1                          | 34                              | 16               | 47.1 | 12       | 35.3 | 6        | 17.6 |
| Level 2                          | 83                              | 23               | 27.7 | 53       | 63.9 | 7        | 8.4  |
| Level 3                          | 5                               | 1                | 20.0 | 0        | 0.0  | 4        | 80.0 |

Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified = 59.8%

<sup>a</sup>  
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there were complete data.

A summary of the canonical discriminant functions evaluated at the group means (group centroids) is presented in Table 5.

Table 5

Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means or Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypotheses I and II

| Levels of Care-based Moral Perspective      | Functions |      |
|---|-----------|------|
|   | 1         | 2    |
| Primacy of Self Care-Level 1                | -.12      | -.48 |
| Primacy of Other Care-Level 2               | .18       | .17  |
| Primacy of Both Self and Other Care-Level 3 | -2.16     | .41  |

Functions. Two functions were identified by the first multiple discriminant analysis (Table 3). The first function was the more important of the two. It explained approximately 71 percent of the total variance explained and distinguished subjects at level three from those at levels one and two of the care-based moral perspective. Persons at level one were distinguished from those at level two by this function, but by relatively little and appeared to be very similar (Table 5).

Function one variables, as shown in Table 3, in order of their discriminating abilities (standardized discriminant coefficients) were the Analyst versus Legalist personality type (-.88), the Empathist versus Legalist personality type

(.58), and the androgynous versus masculine sex role orientation (.52). This function distinguished between subjects at different levels primarily on the basis of personality type, to a lesser degree on the basis of sex role orientation, and to a much lesser degree by locus of control orientation.

The second function explained approximately 29 percent of the total variance explained by the model and distinguished between subjects at levels one and three of the care-based moral perspective. Persons at level two were distinguished from those at levels one and three, but to a lesser extent (Table 4).

Function two variables in order of their discriminating abilities were locus of control orientation (-.81), androgynous versus masculine sex role orientation (.67), and the Analyst versus Legalist personality type (.52). This function distinguished between subjects at different levels primarily on the basis of locus of control orientation and to a lesser degree on the basis of sex role orientation and personality type.

Hypothesis I. Hypothesis I predicted that persons classified at the third level of the care-based moral perspective ("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care") would have Empathist and Analyst personalities with an internal locus of control orientation, and with feminine and androgynous sex role orientations. Function one offered

partial confirmation of this hypothesis. According to this function, persons at level three (those concerned with the welfare of both self and others) were distinguished from those at level one (those concerned with their own welfare) and those at level two (those concerned primarily with the welfare of others) primarily on the basis of personality type and sex role orientation, and to a much lesser degree by locus of control orientation. These results indicated that individuals at level three rather than those at levels one or two were Analysts (logical, theoretical, intuitive, and creative) and Empathists (warm, having values based upon responsibility in relationships) as opposed to being Legalists (conservative, conceptually restricted, and rule-followers).

In addition, subjects at the third rather than the first or second levels tended to identify with an androgynous as opposed to a masculine sex role orientation. However, according to function one, persons at level three as opposed to levels one or two had external rather than internal locus of control orientations. This finding was contrary to the expectation posited in Hypothesis I. Function one failed to provide support for the expectation that individuals at level three would have feminine sex role orientations. The feminine versus masculine variable was not a significant discriminator in this function.

Function two also offered partial confirmation of Hypothesis I. According to this function, persons at level three were distinguished from those at level one and those at level two primarily on the basis of locus of control orientation and sex role orientation, and to a lesser degree by personality type. These results indicated that individuals at level three rather than those at levels one or two had internal rather than external locus of control orientations. They tended to believe that personal consequences are determined by personal behavior as opposed to external, environmental forces. This indication contrasted with that of function one which differentiated groups primarily on the basis of personality type.

Function two suggested that individuals at level three rather than at level one tended to identify with a masculine as opposed to an androgynous sex role orientation. This finding was contrary to the expectation posited in Hypothesis I. Function two failed to provide support for the expectation that individuals at level three would have feminine sex role orientations. The feminine versus masculine variable was not a significant discriminator in this function.

Function two also indicated that individuals at level three rather than at levels one or two were Legalists as opposed to being Analysts. This finding also was contrary to the expectation posited in Hypothesis I. Function two failed

to provide support for the expectation that individuals at level three would have Empathist personality types. The Empathist versus Legalist variable was not a significant discriminator in this function.

In summary, the main findings of the first analysis supported the expectations of Hypothesis I. The data showed that young adults at level three of the care-based moral perspective were more likely to be distinguishable by personality type and sex role orientation than by locus of control orientation. Under this distinction they were likely to be Empathists and Analysts rather than Legalists. In addition they were likely to have androgynous as opposed to masculine sex role orientations. They were also likely to be externally rather than internally controlling.

On the other hand, and to a lesser extent, when reasoning at level three rather than at levels one or two was primarily a function of locus of control orientation, young adults were likely to be Legalists rather than Empathists or Analysts. They were likely to have masculine as opposed to androgynous sex role orientations. In addition they were likely to be internally rather than externally controlling.

Finally, no support was found for the expectation that young adults with feminine sex role orientations would reason morally at level three of the care perspective.

Hypothesis II. Hypothesis II predicted that individuals classified at the second level of the care-based moral

perspective ("Primacy of Other Care") would have Empathist and Analyst personalities with an external locus of control orientation, and with feminine and androgynous sex role orientations. Function one failed to offer support for the second hypothesis. According to this function, persons at level three (those concerned with the welfare of both self and others) were distinguished from those at level one (those concerned with their own welfare) and those at level two (those concerned mainly with the welfare of others) primarily on the basis of personality type and sex role orientation, and to a much lesser degree by locus of control orientation. The first function indicated that persons at level two rather than those at level three were Legalists (conservative, conceptually restricted rule-followers) as opposed to being Analysts (logical, theoretical, intuitive, and creative) or as to being Empathists (warm, communicative, and interested in values based upon responsibility within relationships). This finding was contrary to the expectation posited in Hypothesis II.

According to function one subjects at level two rather than those at level three tended to display masculine as opposed to androgynous characteristics. This finding was also contrary to the expectation posited in Hypothesis II. Function one failed to provide support for the expectation that individuals at level three would have feminine sex role orientations. The feminine versus masculine variable was not

a significant discriminator.

Function one also indicated that individuals at level two as opposed to level three were internally rather than externally controlled. This finding was also contrary to the expectation posited in Hypothesis II.

Function two also failed to provide support for Hypothesis II. According to this function, persons at level three were distinguished from those at level one and those at level two primarily on the basis of locus of control orientation and sex role orientation, and to a lesser degree by personality type. It distinguished between subjects at levels one and three of the care-based moral perspective (Table 5). Since Hypothesis II posited predictions about level two, function two of the first model failed to address any of its posits.

In summary, the first discriminant analysis failed to support Hypothesis II. The data showed that young adults at level two of the care-based moral perspective were more likely to be distinguishable by personality type and sex role orientation than by locus of control orientation. When grouped by personality individuals at level two were likely to be Legalists rather than Empathists and Analysts. In addition they were likely to have masculine as opposed to androgynous sex role orientations. No support was found for the expectation that young adults with feminine sex role orientations would reason morally at level two of

the care perspective. Also, when classified by personality type, persons were also likely to be internally controlling rather than externally controlled.

### Hypothesis III

Hypothesis III was partially confirmed by the second discriminant analysis. Table 6 indicates that the overall  $F$  for the model was significant,  $F(10, 230) = 3.62, p < .001$ .

Group classification results of the discriminant analysis testing Hypotheses III are presented in Table 7. Approximately 62 percent of all grouped cases were correctly classified by the discriminant equation. Fifty percent of the subjects in the group reasoning at level one ("Primacy of Self Care") of the care-based moral perspective were correctly predicted. Sixty-six percent of those reasoning at the second level ("Primacy of Other Care") were correctly predicted. Eighty percent of those subjects reasoning at the third moral level ("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care") were correctly predicted. Thus, membership at the third moral reasoning level could be better predicted than that at the second or first levels. Membership at the second level could be better predicted than that at the first level.

Table 6

Standardized Discriminant Coefficients (By Function)  
Distinguishing Levels of the Care-based Moral Perspective by  
Locus of Control, Sex Role Orientation, and Personality Type

| Functions                    | Explained Variance<br>% | Discriminant<br>Coefficients |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Function 1                   | 69.62                   |                              |
| Personality Type             |                         |                              |
| Analyst/Empathist            |                         | -.84                         |
| Sex Role Orientation         |                         |                              |
| Androgynous/Feminine         |                         | .55                          |
| Function 2                   | 29.39                   |                              |
| Locus of Control Orientation |                         |                              |
| External/Internal            |                         | .83                          |
| Sex Role Orientation         |                         |                              |
| Masculine/Feminine           |                         | .70                          |
| Androgynous/Feminine         |                         | -.64                         |
| Personality Type             |                         |                              |
| Legalist/Empathist           |                         | .64                          |
| Analyst/Empathist            |                         | -.54                         |
| Total                        | 100.00                  |                              |

$F(10, 230) = 3.62, p < .001.$

Table 7

Group Classification Results:Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis III;Levels of Care-based Moral Perspective

| Levels of<br>Care<br>Perspective | <sup>a</sup><br>No. of<br>Cases | Predicted Groups |      |          |      |          |      |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|------|----------|------|----------|------|
|                                  |                                 | Level 1          |      | Level 2  |      | Level 3  |      |
|                                  |                                 | <u>n</u>         | %    | <u>n</u> | %    | <u>n</u> | %    |
| Level 1                          | 34                              | 17               | 50.0 | 12       | 35.3 | 5        | 14.7 |
| Level 2                          | 83                              | 21               | 25.3 | 55       | 66.3 | 7        | 8.4  |
| Level 3                          | 5                               | 0                | 00.0 | 1        | 20.0 | 4        | 80.0 |

Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified = 62.3

<sup>a</sup>  
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there were complete data.

A summary of the canonical discriminant functions evaluated at the group means (group centroids) is presented in Table 8.

Table 8

Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means or Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis III

| Levels of Care-based Moral Perspective      | Functions |      |
|---|-----------|------|
|   | 1         | 2    |
| Primacy of Self Care-Level 1                | -.12      | .49  |
| Primacy of Other Care-Level 2               | .18       | -.17 |
| Primacy of Both Self and Other Care-Level 3 | -2.16     | -.42 |

Functions. Two functions were identified by the second discriminant analysis (Table 6). The first function was the more important of the two. It explained approximately 70 percent of the total variance explained and distinguished subjects at level three from those at levels one and two of the care-based moral perspective. Persons at level one were distinguished from those at level two by this function, but by relatively little and appeared to be very similar (Table 8).

Function one variables (Table 6) in order of their discriminating abilities were the Analyst versus Empathist personality type (-.84), and the Androgynous versus Feminine sex role orientation (.55). This function distinguished

between subjects at different levels of the care-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of personality type and to a lesser extent on sex role orientation.

The second function explained approximately 30 percent of the total variance explained by the model and distinguished between subjects at levels one and three of the care-based moral perspective. It also distinguished persons at level two from those at levels one and three, but to a lesser extent than it did in distinguishing individuals at levels one and three (Table 8).

Function two variables in order of their discriminating abilities were locus of control orientation (.83), masculine versus feminine sex role orientation (.70), androgynous versus feminine sex role orientation (-.64), the Legalist versus Empathist personality type (.64), and the Analyst versus Empathist personality type (-.54). This function distinguished between subjects at different levels of the care-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of locus of control orientation and to a lesser degree on the basis of sex role orientation and personality type.

Hypothesis III. Hypothesis III predicted that persons classified at the first level of the care-based moral perspective ("Primacy of Self Care") would have Legalist and Realist personalities with an internal locus of control orientation, and with masculine and androgynous sex role orientations. Function one offered partial support for this

hypothesis. According to this function, persons at level one (those concerned with their own welfare) were distinguished from those at level three (those concerned with the welfare of both self and others) primarily on the basis of personality type and sex role orientation, and to a much lesser degree by locus of control orientation. These results indicated that individuals at level one rather than at level three were Empathists (warm, having values based upon responsibility in relationships) rather than Analysts (logical, theoretical, intuitive, and creative) or Legalists (conservative, conceptually restricted, and rule-followers). These findings were contrary to the expectations posited in Hypothesis III. Function one failed to provide support for the expectation that individuals at level one would have Realist personality types. The Realist versus Empathist variable was not a significant discriminator in this function.

In addition, persons at the first level rather than at the third level tended to identify with feminine rather than either androgynous or masculine sex role orientations. These findings were contrary to the expectations posited in Hypothesis III. However, persons at level one had internal rather than external locus of control orientations. This finding was consistent with the expectation posed in Hypothesis III.

Function two also offered partial support for Hypothesis III. According to this function, individuals at level one were distinguished from those at level three primarily on the basis of locus of control orientation and sex role orientation, and to a lesser degree by personality type. These results indicated that persons concerned primarily with their own welfare (level one) rather than those concerned with the welfare of others as well as their own (level three) had internal rather than external locus of control orientations. They tended to believe that personal consequences were determined by personal behavior as opposed to external, environmental forces. This support for Hypothesis III was consistent with that of function one which differentiated groups primarily on the basis of personality type.

Function two also showed that subjects at level one as opposed to level three identified with feminine rather than masculine or androgynous sex role orientations. This finding was contrary to the expectations posited in Hypothesis III and consistent with the results indicated by function one.

In addition function two indicated that young adults at level one rather than level three tended to be Empathists as opposed to Analysts or Legalists. These findings were also contrary to the expectations posited in Hypothesis III and consistent with the results indicated by function one. Function two failed to provide support for the expectation

that individuals at level one would have Realist personality types. The Realist versus Empathist variable was not a significant discriminator in this function.

In summary, the second discriminant analysis offered partial support for Hypothesis III. The data indicated that young adults at level one of the care-based moral perspective were more likely to be distinguishable by personality type and sex role orientation than by locus of control orientation. However, when grouped either by personality or sex role, individuals at level one were likely to have internal rather than external locus of control orientations. Also, when classified either by personality or sex role, and contrary to expectations, young adults at level one were likely to be Empathists rather than Analysts or Legalists. No support was found for the expectation that individuals with Realist personalities would reason morally at level one of the care perspective. Finally under both distinctions, and also contrary to Hypothesis III, persons at level one identified with feminine rather than masculine or androgynous sex role orientations.

#### Predictors of Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective Hypothesis IV

Hypothesis IV was partially supported by a third stepwise discriminant analysis. The overall  $F$  for the third stepwise discriminant analysis was significant,  $F(5, 124) = 4.77, p < .001$  (Table 9).

Group classification results of the discriminant analysis testing Hypothesis IV are presented in Table 10. Approximately 69 percent of all grouped cases were correctly classified by the discriminant equation. Seventy-two percent of the subjects in the group reasoning at level two (Conventional) of the justice-based moral perspective were correctly predicted. Sixty-two percent of those reasoning at the third moral level (Postconventional) were correctly predicted. Thus membership at the second moral reasoning level could be better predicted than that at the third level.

Table 9

Standardized Discriminant Coefficients Distinguishing Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective by Personality Type, Sex Role Orientation, and Locus of Control Orientation

| Function                  | Explained Variance<br>% | Discriminant<br>Coefficients |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Discriminant Function     | 100.00                  |                              |
| Personality Type          |                         |                              |
| Empathist/Legalist        |                         | -.96                         |
| Realist/Legalist          |                         | .80                          |
| Sex Role Orientation      |                         |                              |
| Undifferentiated/Feminine |                         | .58                          |
| Masculine/Feminine        |                         | -.69                         |

Table 9 (continued)

| Function                     | Explained Variance<br>% | Discriminant<br>Coefficients |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Locus of Control Orientation |                         |                              |
| External/Internal            |                         | .36                          |
| Total                        | 100.00                  |                              |

$F(5, 124) = 4.77, p < .001.$

Table 10

Group Classification Results:

Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis IV;

Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective

| Levels of<br>Justice<br>Perspective                       | <sup>a</sup> No. of<br>Cases | Predicted Groups |      |          |      |
|---|------------------------------|------------------|------|----------|------|
|   |                              | Level 2          |      | Level 3  |      |
|   |                              | <u>n</u>         | %    | <u>n</u> | %    |
| Level 2   | 96                           | 69               | 71.9 | 27       | 28.1 |
| Level 3   | 34                           | 13               | 38.2 | 21       | 61.8 |
| Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified = 70.8% |                              |                  |      |          |      |

<sup>a</sup>Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there were complete data.

A summary of the canonical discriminant function evaluated at the group means (group centroids) is presented in Table 11.

Table 11

Canonical Discriminant Function Evaluated at Group Means or Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis IV

| Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective | Discriminant Function |
|---|-----------------------|
| Conventional - Level 2                    | .26                   |
| Postconventional - Level 3                | -.73                  |

Function. Only one function was identified by the third multiple discriminant analysis (Table 9). Therefore this one function explained 100 percent of the explained variance in the model. It distinguished subjects at level two from those at level three of the justice-based moral perspective. None of the 134 young adults were classified as reasoning at level one of this moral perspective (Table 11).

The function variables (Table 9) in order of their discriminating abilities were the Empathist versus Legalist personality type (-.96), the Realist versus Legalist personality type (.80), the masculine versus feminine sex role orientation (-.69), the undifferentiated versus feminine

sex role orientation (.58), and locus of control orientation (.36). This function distinguished between subjects at levels two and three of the justice-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of personality type, to a lesser degree on the basis of sex role orientation, and to a much lesser degree on the basis of locus of control orientation.

Hypothesis IV. Hypothesis IV predicted that persons classified at the third level of the justice-based moral ethic (Postconventional) would have Empathist and Analyst personalities, with internal locus of control orientations, and with masculine and androgynous sex role orientations. The function offered partial confirmation of this hypothesis. According to the function, based primarily upon personality type, young adults classified at level three (those concerned with universal principles) rather than at level two (those concerned with following social rules) were Empathists (warm, having values based upon responsibility in relationships) as opposed to being Legalists (conservative, conceptually restricted, and rule-followers). In addition, subjects classified at level three rather than at level two tended to identify with masculine as opposed to feminine characteristics. These findings were consistent with the expectations posited in Hypothesis IV.

This function failed to support expectations posited in Hypothesis IV that Analyst personality types or those with androgynous sex role orientations would be classified as

reasoning at the third level of the justice-based moral perspective. Neither the Analyst versus Legalist variable nor the androgynous versus feminine variable were significant discriminators. The function also indicated, contrary to expectations, that individuals at level three as opposed to level two had external rather than internal locus of control orientations.

In summary, the third discriminant analysis offered partial support for the expectations of Hypothesis IV. The data showed that young adults at level three of the justice-based moral perspective were distinguishable primarily by personality type and to a lesser extent by sex role orientation. When classified by personality, individuals at level three were likely to be Empathists, rather than Legalists, and to identify with masculine, rather than feminine, sex role orientations. On the other hand, results indicated that persons at level three were likely to be externally rather than internally controlling.

No support was found for the expectations that young adults reasoning at level three of the justice perspective would have Analyst personalities or identify with androgynous sex role orientations.

#### Hypothesis V

Hypothesis V failed to be supported by a fourth stepwise discriminant analysis. Table 12 indicates that the overall  $F$  for the model was significant,  $F(3, 126) = 7.82, p < .001$ .

Group classification results of the discriminant analysis testing Hypotheses V are presented in Table 13. Approximately 71 percent of all grouped cases were correctly classified by the discriminant model. Seventy-four percent of the subjects in the group reasoning at level two (Conventional) of the justice-based moral perspective were correctly predicted. Sixty-two percent of those reasoning at the third level (Postconventional) were correctly predicted. Thus membership at the second moral reasoning level could be better predicted than membership at the third level.

Table 12

Standardized Discriminant Coefficients Distinguishing Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective by Personality Type, Sex Role Orientation, and Locus of Control Orientation

| Function                     | Explained Variance<br>% | Discriminant<br>Coefficients |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Discriminant Function        | 100.00                  |                              |
| Personality Type             |                         |                              |
| Realist/Empathist            |                         | .81                          |
| Sex Role Orientation         |                         |                              |
| Masculine/Undifferentiated   |                         | -.43                         |
| Locus of Control Orientation |                         |                              |
| External/Internal            |                         | .35                          |

$F ( 3, 126 ) = 7.82, p < .001.$

Table 13

Group Classification Results:Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis V;Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective

| Levels of<br>Justice<br>Perspective                       | ~<br>No. of<br>Cases | Predicted Groups |      |          |      |
|---|----------------------|------------------|------|----------|------|
|   |                      | Level 2          |      | Level 3  |      |
|   |                      | <u>n</u>         | %    | <u>n</u> | %    |
| Level 2   | 96                   | 71               | 74.0 | 25       | 26.0 |
| Level 3   | 34                   | 13               | 38.2 | 21       | 61.8 |
| Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified = 70.8% |                      |                  |      |          |      |

~  
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there were complete data.

A summary of the canonical discriminant function evaluated at the group means (group centroids) is presented in Table 14.

Table 14

Canonical Discriminant Function Evaluated at Group Means or Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis V

| Levels of Justice-based<br>Moral Perspective | Discriminant<br>Function |
|--|--------------------------|
| Conventional - Level 2                       | .25                      |
| Postconventional - Level 3                   | -.72                     |

Function. Only one function was identified by the fourth multiple discriminant analysis (Table 12). It therefore explained 100 percent of the explained variance in the model. It distinguished subjects at level two from those at level three of the justice-based moral perspective. None of the subjects were classified as reasoning at level one of this moral perspective (Table 14).

The function variables (Table 12) in order of their discriminating abilities were the Realist versus Empathist personality type (.81), masculine versus undifferentiated sex role orientation (-.43), and locus of control orientation (.35). This function distinguished between subjects at levels two and three of the justice-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of personality type, and to a much lesser degree on the basis of sex role orientation and locus of control orientation.

Hypothesis V. Hypothesis V predicted that young adults classified at the second level of the justice-based moral perspective (Conventional) would have Legalist and Realist personalities, with an external locus of control orientation, and with masculine, feminine, and androgynous sex role orientations. The discriminant function failed to support this hypothesis. According to the function, based primarily upon personality type, individuals who reasoned at the second, Conventional level (based on social rules) rather than at the third, Postconventional level (based on universal

principles) of the justice-based moral perspective were Empathists (warm, and interested values based upon responsibility in relationships) as opposed to being Realists (observant, non-judgmental, physical, and spontaneous. In addition, individuals at level two as opposed to those at level three tended to identify with undifferentiated sex role orientations (having neither many masculine nor feminine characteristics) rather than having masculine sex role orientations. Persons at level two versus level three also were internally versus externally controlling. These findings contradicted the expectations posed by Hypothesis V.

This function failed to support expectations posited in Hypothesis V that Legalist personality types or those with feminine or androgynous sex role orientations would be classified as reasoning at the second level of the justice-based moral perspective. Neither the Legalist versus Empathist variable, the feminine versus undifferentiated variable, nor the androgynous versus undifferentiated variable were significant discriminators.

In summary, the fourth discriminant analysis failed to provide support for the expectations of Hypothesis V. The data showed that young adults at level two of the justice-based moral perspective were distinguishable primarily by personality type. Under this distinction they were likely to be Empathists rather than Legalists, to identify with an undifferentiated rather than masculine sex role orientation,

and to be internally rather than externally controlling.

No support was found for the expectations that young adults reasoning at level two of the justice perspective would have Realist personalities or identify with feminine or androgynous sex role orientations.

#### Hypothesis VI

Hypothesis VI failed to be supported by a fifth stepwise discriminant analysis. The overall  $F$  for the fifth multiple discriminant analysis was significant,  $F(4, 125) = 5.88$ ,  $p < .001$  (Table 15).

Group classification results of the discriminant analysis testing Hypotheses VI are presented in Table 16. Approximately 69 percent of all grouped cases were correctly classified by the discriminant model. Seventy percent of the subjects in the group reasoning at level two (Conventional) of the justice-based moral perspective were correctly predicted. Sixty-eight percent of those reasoning at the third level (Postconventional) were correctly predicted. Thus membership at the second moral reasoning level could be slightly better predicted than membership at the third level.

Table 15

Standardized Discriminant Coefficients Distinguishing Levels  
of Justice-based Moral Perspective by Personality Type,  
Sex Role Orientation, and Locus of Control Orientation

| Function                        | Explained Variance<br>% | Discriminant<br>Coefficients |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Discriminant Function           | 100.00                  |                              |
| Personality Type                |                         |                              |
| Realist/Empathist               |                         | .81                          |
| Sex Role Orientation            |                         |                              |
| Masculine/Feminine              |                         | -.70                         |
| Undifferentiated/Feminine       |                         | .59                          |
| Locus of Control Orientation    |                         |                              |
| External/Internal               |                         | .35                          |
| Total                           | 100.00                  |                              |
| <hr/>                           |                         |                              |
| $F ( 4, 125) = 5.88, p < .001.$ |                         |                              |
| <hr/>                           |                         |                              |

Table 16

Group Classification Results:Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis VI;Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective

| Levels of<br>Justice<br>Perspective                       | No. of<br>Cases | Predicted Groups |      |         |      |
|---|-----------------|------------------|------|---------|------|
|   |                 | Level 2          |      | Level 3 |      |
|   |                 | n                | %    | n       | %    |
| Level 2   | 96              | 67               | 69.8 | 29      | 30.2 |
| Level 3   | 34              | 11               | 32.4 | 23      | 67.6 |
| Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified = 69.2% |                 |                  |      |         |      |

<sup>a</sup>  
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there were complete data.

Table 17 presents a summary of the discriminant function evaluated at the group means (group centroids).

Table 17

Canonical Discriminant Function Evaluated at Group Means or Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis VI

| Levels of Justice-based<br>Moral Perspective | Discriminant<br>Function |
|--|--------------------------|
| Conventional - Level 2                       | .26                      |
| Postconventional - Level 3                   | -.72                     |

Function. Only one function was identified by the fifth multiple discriminant analysis (Table 15). It therefore explained 100 percent of the explained variance in the model. It distinguished subjects at level two from those at level three of the justice-based moral perspective. None of the subjects were classified as reasoning at level one of this moral perspective (Table 17).

The function variables (Table 15) in order of their discriminating abilities were the Realist versus Empathist personality type (.81), masculine versus feminine sex role orientation (-.70), undifferentiated versus feminine sex role orientation (.59), and locus of control orientation (.35). This function distinguished between subjects at levels two and three of the justice-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of personality type, to a lesser degree on the basis of sex role orientation, and to a much lesser degree on the basis of locus of control orientation.

Hypothesis VI. Hypothesis VI predicted that young adults classified at the lowest level of the justice-based moral perspective (Preconventional) would have Legalist and Realist personalities, with an internal locus of control orientation, and with masculine sex role orientations. Only one function was identified by this analysis. It indicated that all grouped subjects fell into either level two (Conventional) or level three (Postconventional) of the justice-based moral perspective. Therefore this analysis

only differentiated between subjects at level two and level three of the justice-based moral perspective (Table 16). Thus, this analysis failed to support any of the expectations posited in Hypothesis VI since it was entirely predictive of grouping into level one.

In summary, the fifth discriminant analysis failed to provide support for the expectations of Hypothesis VI. The data showed that the young adults in the study were classified either into level two or level three of the justice-based moral perspective. This analysis could not address any of the expectations posited in Hypothesis VI since it made predictions regarding only level one.

CHAPTER V  
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The first part of this chapter includes a summary of this investigation. The summation is followed by a discussion of the findings. The discussion includes a description of young adults who reason morally at the different levels of each of the two moral perspectives, care and justice. It also describes how the findings of this study provide support for the moral perspective construct. This discussion is followed by the major conclusions from this research and the proposed direction for future investigations of moral perspective-taking.

Summary

Carol Gilligan, in 1982, suggested that males and females take separate and distinct approaches when making a moral decision. Other investigations (Walker, 1984; Gibbs et al., 1984) have failed to support the relationship between gender and moral perspective. These findings have called into question the validity of the moral perspective-taking construct. Together, this contradictory research provided the impetus for further examination of the moral perspective variable.

Research has demonstrated a relationship between moral perspective and personality type (Tappan, 1985), locus of

control orientation (Gutkin & Suls, 1979), and sex role orientation (Lonky et al., 1988). In addition, a review of the literature (Walker, 1984) shows that differences in moral perspective-taking are most often found among the young adult population. This developmental period is conceived as a transition from the egocentrism of childhood and adolescence to the moral maturity more often found in middle and late adulthood (Kohlberg, 1981).

The present study investigated the relationship between three independent variables (personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation) and moral perspective in young adults. Subjects were 134 18 to 25 years old, male and female, caucasian, technical community college students who were enrolled in a college transfer curriculum. They were administered five paper-and-pencil instruments: the Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator (to index personality type); Rotter's Internal/External Scale (to index locus of control orientation); the Bem Sex Role Inventory (to index sex role orientation); the Relationship Self Inventory (to index the care-based moral perspective); and the Defining Issues Test (to index the justice-based moral perspective).

Six hypotheses were formulated based upon social learning theory, Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral development, Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral perspectives, and moral reasoning research literature. Each hypothesis

predicted that a particular combination of personalities, sex role orientations, and locus of control orientation would be associated with a specific level of a particular moral perspective. Within the care ethic, individuals at the third, and highest level were predicted to be feminine, internally controlling, and to value responsibility in relationships. Those at level two were expected to be similar in personality and sex role to those at level three but posited to be externally controlled. Persons at the first level of care were predicted to be masculine, internally controlling, and rule-followers. Within the justice ethic, individuals at the third, and highest level were expected to be masculine, internally controlling, and to value responsibility in relationships. Those at level two were predicted to be externally controlled, masculine and feminine rule-followers. Persons at level one were posited to be masculine, internally controlled rule-followers.

Separate multiple stepwise discriminant analyses were performed to test each of the hypotheses. The analyses provided partial support for three of the six hypotheses. Within the care ethic, individuals at the third, and highest level were found to be androgynous, externally controlled, and to value responsibility in relationships. Those at level two were found to be masculine, internally controlling rule-followers. Care level one persons were found to be feminine, internally controlling, and to value responsibility

in relationships.

Within the justice ethic, individuals at the third, and highest level were found to be masculine, externally controlled, and to value responsibility in relationships. Those at level two were found to be internally controlling rule-followers with undifferentiated sex role orientations. None of the subjects were classified into level one of the justice perspective.

This study tested a relatively unexamined instrument, the Relationship Self Inventory (Reinhart et al., 1985), which was designed to measure the care-based moral perspective. The results of this study showed personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation to be predictive of moral perspective. Altogether, results from this investigation contribute to a more complete and, therefore, valid conception of the moral perspective.

#### Discussion

This study provides support for the importance of psycho-social attributes to moral perspective-taking in young adults. It shows that young adults can be grouped with respect to moral perspective primarily by personality type or locus of control orientation, and to a lesser extent by sex role orientation.

#### Levels of Moral Perspectives

This investigation shows that young adults can be grouped according to either of two moral perspectives, one

based upon responsibility in relationships and the other grounded upon rights based upon laws and principles.

#### The Care-based Moral Perspective

Young adults can be characterized at each care ethic level, i.e., "Primacy of Both Self and Other Care", "Primacy of Other Care", and "Primacy of Self Care" in terms of: 1) their personalities; 2) their beliefs about who or what controls life's events; and 3) their identification with a gender role. Personality is more than twice as likely as locus of control or sex role to distinguish among young adults who reason morally based upon an awareness of responsibility to self and others.

#### "Primacy of Both Self and Other Care" - Level Three.

When classified by personality, young adults who care equally for self and others (care level three) are most likely to be androgynous, externally controlled, and to value responsibility in relationships. The current study's expectations that they have Empathist personalities and androgynous sex role characteristics are supported. However, its prediction that they believe they control their life's events is not.

When these individuals are grouped by locus of control orientation, they are most likely to be masculine, internally controlling rule-followers. This study's posit that they believe they control their consequences is borne out. However, its predictions pertaining to personality and sex

role are not supported.

"Primacy of Other Care" - Level Two. When grouped by personality, young adults who are primarily concerned for others (care level two) are most likely to be masculine, internally controlling rule-followers. This study's predictions that they have Empathist personalities and androgynous gender roles, and believe that they are controlled by fate are not supported. When classified by locus of control orientation, these persons are not sufficiently distinguished from those who are primarily concerned about their own welfare or those who are equally concerned for their own and others' needs to allow characterization regarding their personalities, gender roles, or beliefs about internal versus external controlling forces.

"Primacy of Self Care" - Level One. When individuals are grouped by personality type, those who are primarily concerned for their own needs (care level one) are most likely to be feminine, internally controlling, and to value responsibility in relationships. The current investigation's prediction that they believe they control their lives is borne out. However, its posit that they have Legalist personalities and masculine gender roles is not upheld. The observed characteristics of these individuals are similar whether they are classified by personality or by locus of control orientation.

### Support for the Care Moral Perspective Construct

This study shows that, when young adults are classified according to the care ethic by personality, the relationships between their personalities, gender roles, and locus of control orientations are generally consistent with Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral perspective-taking. This theory suggests that individuals who use the care perspective are most likely to value responsibility in relationships (Empathists), to identify with feminine qualities (which includes androgyny), and to be internally controlling.

Consistent with that theory is the observation that individuals at the lowest ("Primacy of Celf Care) and highest ("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care) levels of the care approach value responsibility in relationships rather than being rule-followers. However, those at level two ("Primacy of Other Care") are legalistic rule-followers as opposed to being guided by responsibility in relationships. The latter characterization, inconsistent with Gilligan's theory, appears to be related to sex role orientation. In the current study, whether classified by personality type or locus of control orientation, when young adults are identified as Legalists they are also observed to identify with masculine sex roles. In each instance where they were identified as Empathists, they were seen to have feminine or androgynous gender role orientations.

The observation that Empathists, as opposed to Legalists, reason at the highest care level supports previous findings that occupational personality types (health service workers, religious workers) show stronger development in the domain of ethical evaluation than do others (electrical technicians, clerical machine operators) (Tappan, 1985). In the same vein, Lifton (1982) reported that individuals who reason morally in similar ways also have similar personalities. The present study shows that Legalists, rather than Empathists, reason morally at the middle care level while Empathists, rather than Legalists, reason morally at the lowest level.

Also consistent with Gilligan's theory is the observation that, when they are grouped by personality, young adults who mainly care for their own needs and those who primarily care for others needs are internally controlling. However, those who care for the needs of both are externally controlled. This latter characterization, inconsistent with Gilligan's theory, appears to be related to the level of moral reasoning used. In this study, only young adults who reasoned at the highest levels of each moral approach are characterized as externally controlled. Those reasoning at the lower two levels of both perspectives are identified as internally controlling. Thus the level of moral reasoning attained appears to be associated with beliefs about who or what controls life's events.

The observation that young adults who tend to both their own and the needs of others also believe that fate controls the events in their lives fails to support previous findings that subjects who showed greater tendencies toward social responsibility also tended to show more internal locus of control (Gutkin and Suls, 1979). These characterizations of the current study may have been produced by some intervening variable, such as affective distance (how closely involved an individual is to the consequences of his/her moral decision), which was not investigated. Numerous studies have indicated that locus of control orientation is indirectly associated with moral perspective through a third factor, affective involvement (Lonky et al., 1988; Gilligan, 1982; Rybash et al., 1981; Lickona, 1978; Kohlberg et al., 1972).

Likewise supportive of Gilligan's theory is the observation that young adults at the lowest care level have feminine sex roles and those at the highest care level have androgynous ones. However, contrary to her theory, persons at level two have masculine, rather than androgynous, sex roles. The latter appears to be related to personality type. At each level of the care perspective, whether classified by personality type or locus of control orientation, where young adults are identified as Legalists, they were also characterized as identifying with masculine gender roles. In each instance where they were identified as Empathists, they were characterized as having feminine or

androgynous sex role orientations.

The observation that feminine (as opposed to masculine) sex roles are associated with the lowest care level, and that androgynous (as opposed to masculine) sex roles are associated with the highest care level is consistent with previous research (Gilligan, 1982; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; and Lonkey et al., 1988) which reports that feminine qualities generally correspond to the care ethic. In addition, observing that androgyny, but not strictly feminine, characteristics are associated with the highest care level is consistent with the contradictory results of previous research reported by Walker (1984).

Inconsistencies in the Literature. This study predicted that young adults who are concerned for the welfare of others above their own (level two - "Primacy of Other Care") would be externally controlled. However, Gilligan's (1982) theory and the research literature suggest that an internal locus of control orientation corresponds in general to the care ethic's focus on individual responsibility in dealing with others. Her suggestion appears to contradict social learning theory's notion that individuals tend to maximize their own benefits in the absence of social consequences to modify inherent self-interest (Bandura, 1977; 1973). Therefore, it was deduced that individuals who would subjugate an inherent concern regarding their own welfare to a concern for that of others would do so on the basis of perceiving that external

society-based rules dictate such behavior.

In the present investigation, young adults who are concerned primarily for the welfare of others believe they should make their own independent decisions. This observation fails to support this study's expectation, but is consistent with Gilligan's (1982) theory. It is also consistent with the research literature which indicates that subjects who show greater tendencies toward social responsibility also tend to show more internal locus of control (Gutkin & Suls, 1979). Young adults who are concerned more about the needs of others than their own do not perceive that external society-based rules are dictating their behavior.

The finding that those who are primarily concerned with the care of others (level two), based primarily on personality, are masculine in orientation, as opposed to feminine, and rule-followers, as opposed to being guided by values based upon responsibility in relationships, does not support Gilligan's suggestions. However, the fact that such individuals believe they make their own moral decisions supports her theory.

The characterization of young adults who subjugate their own needs to those of others as masculine oriented legalistic rule-followers appears to be related to their beliefs about locus of control. It is reasoned that an apparent contradiction exists in social learning theory suggestions

that, while an internal locus of control orientation is believed to correspond to the care ethic's focus upon individual responsibility in dealing with others, it is also believed that this perspective develops through social conditioning. Thus, according to social learning principles, attitudes regarding "individual responsibility in dealing with others" are initially externally dictated, but come to be controlled by internal processes. Therefore, legalistic, rule-following young adults, who are nevertheless internally controlling, may be internally controlling in general. However, they may not have had internalized social expectations to the point of possessing personal values based upon responsibility in relationships.

This study also predicted that young adults who are more concerned about their own needs than the needs of others (level one - "Primacy of Self Care") would be conceptually restricted and rule-following (Legalists) rather than be influenced by values based upon responsibility in relationships (Empathists). This posit was made despite theoretical (Gilligan, 1982) and research (Tappan, 1985) suggestions which would link Empathist personalities to the care perspective in general.

It was reasoned that level one of the care ethic exists as an apparent hybrid. On the one hand, "Primacy of Self Care" can be viewed as one extreme of a dimension of "self and other care", opposite the other extreme, "Primacy of Both

Self and Other Care" (Gilligan, 1988). On the other hand, level one of the care perspective can be viewed from the perspective of "man-as-an-island", i.e., as "self-not-in-relation-to-others", or "self-care-from-need" (Reinhart et al., 1985). Therefore, it was deduced that individuals whose personalities which stress values based upon responsibility in relationships (Empathists) would not be more concerned about their own needs than the needs of others. It was more likely that personalities concerned about their rights relative to the rights of others (Legalists) would prove to be primarily concerned with their own needs as well.

In the current study, young adults who are concerned primarily for their own welfare are characterized by personalities which stress values based upon responsibility in relationships. This observation fails to support this investigation's prediction, but is consistent with Gilligan's theory. Young adults at even the lowest care level do not have rule-following personalities.

This investigation also posited that young adults who mainly care for their own needs would identify with masculine psycho-social sex roles. This expectation was made on the basis of an apparent contradiction in Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral perspective-taking. On the one hand, females are thought to make greater use of the care perspective in general, including the lowest level. However,

the theory also suggests that concern for one's own rights, as opposed to others' rights, is a legalistic, male trait. Therefore, despite Gilligan's suggestion that feminine sex role orientations are associated with the care ethic in general (including level one), it was anticipated that masculine sex role orientations would be associated with this level due to its legalistic nature.

In this study, young adults who are concerned primarily for their own welfare identify with feminine qualities. This observation fails to support the prediction of this investigation, but is consistent with Gilligan's theory. Young adults who are concerned more about their own needs than those of others do not have masculine traits.

The inconsistent findings of previous studies which examined the relationship between gender (in which gender was indexed biologically) and moral perspective (Vasudev, 1988; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Walker, 1984; Gibbs et al., 1984) prompted the suggestion that gender be indexed by psycho-social sex role orientation (Lonkey et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986). When so done Lonkey et al. (1988) and Ford and Lowery (1986) reported a greater use of the care perspective among males with feminine sex role orientations. They present their results as support for the notion that feminine sex role orientations are associated with use of the care perspective. The finding of the current study that only individuals who identified with both feminine and

masculine qualities reason at the highest level of the care perspective indicates that their findings are possibly the result of having used male subjects.

The current findings re-emphasize the fact that the relationship between sex role orientation and the care-based moral perspective is not a simple one. Results from this study and those from previous investigations (Lonkey et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986) indicate that a combination of feminine and masculine qualities characterize individuals who utilize the care-based perspective in making moral decisions.

Prior findings may be due to the influence of locus of control orientation. Such reasoning is based upon the apparent contradiction in social learning theory suggestions. On the one hand, an internal locus of control orientation is thought to be connected to the care moral perspective. On the other hand, individuals who would subjugate an inherent concern regarding their own welfare to a concern for the welfare of others are thought to perceive that external society-based rules dictate such behavior. Therefore, the major distinction between the two moral perspectives may not be based primarily upon sex role orientation, as suggested by Gilligan. It may be more fundamentally a matter of locus of control orientation.

#### The Justice-based Moral Perspective

Young adults can be characterized at both the highest (Postconventional) and middle (Conventional) justice ethic

levels in terms of: 1) their personalities; 2) their beliefs about who or what controls life's events; and, 3) their identification with a gender role. None of the subjects were classified at the lowest (Preconventional) level. Young adults can be classified according to the justice-based moral perspective only on the basis of personality type.

Postconventional - Level Three. Young adults who are guided in making moral decisions by internalized principles which preclude purposeful harm to self and others (justice level three) are most likely to be masculine, externally controlled, and to value responsibility in relationships. The current study's predictions that they have Empathist personalities and masculine gender roles are borne out. However, its expectation that they believe they control their lives is not.

Conventional - Level Two. Young adults who are guided in making moral decisions by social rules and conventions (justice level two) are most likely to have undifferentiated sex roles, to be internally controlling, and to value responsibility in relationships. This study's expectations that they have Legalist personalities and masculine gender roles, and believe that others have control their fate are not supported.

Preconventional - Level One. None of the subjects were classified as reasoning on the basis of the anticipated consequences of the decision (justice level one). This

outcome was not entirely unexpected. Individuals usually progress beyond level one of the justice-based moral perspective by 7 to 8 years of age (Wise, 1986). Therefore, the multiple stepwise discriminant analysis did not characterize level one regarding personality type, locus of control orientation, or sex role orientation.

#### Support for the Justice Moral Perspective Construct

This study shows that, when young adults are classified according to the justice ethic by personality, the relationships between their personalities, gender roles, and locus of control orientations are generally inconsistent with Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral perspective-taking. This theory suggests that individuals who use the justice perspective are most likely to be rule-followers (Legalists), to identify with masculine qualities, and to be externally controlled.

Inconsistent with that theory is the observation that individuals at the middle (Conventional) and highest (Postconventional) levels of the justice approach are influenced by values based upon responsibility in relationships (Empathists) rather than by a tendency to be rule-followers (Legalists). This characterization suggests that Kohlberg's and Gilligan's interpretation that persons reasoning morally according to the justice ethic base their judgments on external rules and internal principles may be flawed. Instead, they are based on an internal feeling of

connectedness to others and the internal awareness of responsibility which grows out of relationships. Thus, young adults who appear to be guided by social rules or by internalized principles are influenced by values based upon responsibility in relationships rather than by a tendency to follow rules.

This characterization appears to be related to how moral decision making is operationally defined. Gilligan suggests that moral reasoning is based upon an internal feeling of responsibility in relationships. On the other hand, Kohlberg suggests that it is based upon an awareness of external rules which may become internalized principles. Thus, locus of control is a salient component in conceptualizing moral reasoning.

The observation that young adults who are morally guided by internalized principles are Empathists is consistent with some, and inconsistent with other, previous research findings that occupational personality types (health service workers, religious workers) show stronger development in the domain of justice judgment than do others (electrical technicians, clerical machine operators) (Tappan, 1985). However, Lifton (1982) reported that individuals who reason morally in similar ways also have similar personalities. The observation that Empathists reason morally at both justice levels two and three contradict Lifton's observations. This result appears to be related to caring for others which is

the element common to both these levels.

Consistent with Gilligan's theory is the observation that persons at the highest justice level are externally controlled. This characterization points to one of the major distinctions between Gilligan's and Kohlberg's conceptualizations about moral reasoning. In contrast to Gilligan, Kohlberg suggests that individuals at this level of moral reasoning are guided by internalized principles. Observations of the highest level of justice reasoning supports Gilligan's views.

Inconsistent with both Gilligan's and Kohlberg's theories is the observation that individuals at the middle justice level are internally controlling. Young adults who are supposedly guided by external rules (middle justice level) are, paradoxically, internally controlling. This observation appears to be related to sex role orientation. In the present study, the Empathist personality characterizes young adults at both the middle and the highest justice levels. However, young adults are internally controlling at the middle level, but externally controlled at the highest. Similarly, they have undifferentiated sex role orientations at the middle justice level, but have masculine sex roles at the highest one.

The observation that individuals who are guided by internal principles believe that others control their life events is consistent with some, and inconsistent with other,

research findings. The external locus of control is linked to the justice ethic in general (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). However, Gutkin and Suls (1979) reported that subjects who show greater tendencies toward social responsibility also tend to show more internal locus of control. As is the case of individuals at the highest care level, persons at the third justice level are externally controlled while those at the second level are internally controlling. This observation, likewise may have been produced by some intervening variable, such as affective distance (the degree to which a person's moral decisions affect him/her), which was not investigated.

Also supportive of Gilligan's theory is the observation that young adults at the third justice level have masculine, as opposed to feminine, sex roles. However, contrary to her theory, persons at level two have undifferentiated, rather than masculine sex roles. This observation appears to be related to locus of control orientation. In the present study, the Empathist personality characterizes young adults at both the middle and the highest justice levels. However, young adults have undifferentiated sex role orientations at the middle level, but have masculine sex roles at the highest. Similarly, they are internally controlling at the middle justice level, but externally controlled at the highest one.

Observing that young adults who are guided by internalized principles have masculine (as opposed to feminine) sex roles is consistent with previous research (Gilligan, 1982; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; and Lonkey et al., 1988) which connects this gender role with the justice ethic in general. In addition, observing that undifferentiated orientations, rather than masculine, characterize persons who are guided by external rules and conventions is consistent with the contradictory results of previous research reported by Walker (1984).

Inconsistencies in the Literature. This study predicted that young adults who made moral decisions on the basis of an internalized set of ethical principles (level three - Postconventional) would be warm and possess values based upon responsibility in relationships (Empathists) rather than conceptually restricted, and rule-following (Legalists). This posit was made despite theoretical (Gilligan, 1982) and research (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) suggestions which would link Legalist personalities to the justice perspective generally. Level three of the justice perspective exists as an apparent hybrid of justice and care ethics. Kohlberg (1981) suggested that individuals at this level have an internalized set of ethical principles which preclude purposeful harm to self and others. These principles may at times supercede rules of civil authority which are inconsistent with the individual's ethical value system.

Therefore, it was deduced that individuals who are conceptually restricted rule-followers (Legalists) would not have an internalized set of ethical principles which would: 1) preclude purposeful harm to self and others; and 2) at times supercede rules of civil authority if they were inconsistent with their ethical value systems.

Observing that young adults who are guided by internal principles are Empathist (as opposed to Legalist) supports this study's expectation. Therefore, this finding is not consistent with the conceptualizations posed by Gilligan's theory that individuals who use the justice ethic are legalistic thinkers. Young adults who are guided by internalized principles do not have rule-following personalities.

This investigation also predicted that young adults who are guided by internalized principles would be internally controlling. This expectation was made on the basis of the hybrid nature of the conceptualization of the third level. Kohlberg's (1981) characterization of level three justice-based moral reasoning (precluding purposeful harm to self and others) closely resembles Gilligan's (1982) depiction of level three care-based moral reasoning (equal concern for the welfare of both self and others). Social learning theory suggests that an internal locus of control orientation corresponds to the care perspective's focus upon individual responsibility in dealing with others. Therefore, it was

reasoned that individuals who show concern for the well-being of both self and others (level three of both moral perspectives) would be internally controlling as opposed to externally controlled by rules. However, young adults guided by internal principles believe that their lives are in the hands of the external world. While not supportive of this study's prediction, this observation is consistent with the conceptualizations posed by Gilligan's theory. However, it is inconsistent with the research literature which indicates that subjects who show greater tendencies toward social responsibility also show more internal locus of control (Gutkin & Suls, 1979). Young adults who are guided by internalized principles, paradoxically, have an understanding that external society-based rules dictate such behavior.

This study also predicted that young adults who are guided by rules and conventions would believe that surrounding social institutions controlled them. Social learning theory and previous research (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) suggest that an external locus of control orientation corresponds, in general, to the justice ethic's emphasis upon external society-based rules. However, these young adults believe they control their fates. The expectation of this study is not supported, and characterizations of persons at level two are not consistent with the conceptualizations posed by theory or research. Young adults who make moral decisions on the basis of social

rules and conventions, paradoxically, do not perceive that external, society-based rules dictate such behavior.

The present investigation posited that young adults who make moral decisions on the basis of social rules and conventions (level two) would identify with stereotypically masculine characteristics. Observing that undifferentiated sex role orientations are associated with the second level of the justice perspective failed to support this expectation.

This observation is neither consistent with the propositions put forth by social learning theory and Gilligan's theory of moral perspective-taking, nor is it consistent with the research literature (Gilligan, 1982; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; and Lonkey et al., 1988) which connects this gender role with the justice ethic in general. This result appears to be related to locus of control orientation. In the present study, the Empathist personality characterizes young adults at both the middle and the highest justice levels. However, young adults have undifferentiated sex role orientations at the middle level, but have masculine sex roles at the highest. Similarly, they are internally controlling at the middle justice level, but externally controlled at the highest one. Therefore, again, the major distinction between the two moral perspectives may not be based upon sex role orientation, as suggested by Gilligan. It may be more fundamentally a matter of locus of control orientation.

The current findings re-emphasize the fact that the relationship between sex role orientation and the justice-based moral perspective is not a simple one. Results from this research and those from previous investigations (Vasudev, 1988; Gibbs et al., 1984; Walker, 1984) indicate that the gender role identification associated with the justice perspective is unclear.

These findings may be due to the influence of locus of control orientation. Such reasoning is based upon the apparent contradiction in social learning theory suggestions. On the one hand, an internal locus of control orientation is thought to be connected to an awareness of responsibility in relationships. On the other hand, individuals who are guided by universal principles are thought to have internalized and extrapolated them from external society-based rules. Therefore, the major distinction between the two moral perspectives may be more fundamentally a matter of locus of control orientation rather than sex role orientation per se.

#### Conclusions

Five major conclusions may be drawn from the findings of the present investigation: 1) Levels within two moral perspectives can be predicted by personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation; 2) The basis for grouping individuals according to moral perspective (by personality or locus of control) influences how they are characterized; 3) Care and justice ethical perspectives, are

more likely to be related to locus of control orientation than sex role orientation; 4) Similarities between the perspectives obscure the distinctions between them; and, 5) Some differences between the moral approaches depend upon the ways in which moral reasoning is operationally defined and measured.

#### Prediction of Moral Perspectives

The present study indicates that individuals can be identified at each of the three levels of the care-based moral perspective and the two higher levels of the justice-based moral perspective according to their personality types, locus of control orientations, and sex role orientations. Distinctions at level one of the justice ethic are less clear because none of the young adults in this study were classified at this level. For example, individuals usually, but not necessarily, progress beyond level one of the justice-based moral perspective by 7 to 8 years of age (Wise, 1986).

#### The Basis for Classifying According to Moral Perspective

The results of this study would predict that young adults could be classified at the different levels of the care-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of their personalities, and to a lesser extent, on locus of control orientation. However, individuals could be classified at the different levels of the justice-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of personality type only.

The current study indicates that the basis for classifying young adults within moral perspectives (by personality type or by locus of control orientation) influences the specific combinations of personality types, locus of control orientations, and sex role orientations which characterize these individuals. The three psycho-social variables are associated with the care perspective, but have differential predictive powers. Therefore, the basis for grouping individuals must be considered when positing expectations regarding their personalities, locus of control orientations, or gender roles.

Furthermore, results showed that neither of the bases for classifying young adults within the care perspective yielded a constant characterization across all levels. Differing combinations of personality types, locus of control orientations, and sex role orientations characterize the three levels of the care ethic. Likewise, when classified according to the justice ethic by locus of control, young adults indicated that varying combinations of personalities, locus of control orientations, and psycho-social sex roles characterize the higher two levels of the justice ethic.

#### Moral Perspectives and Locus of Control Orientation

Gilligan (1982) suggested the existence of two separate and distinct approaches, or perspectives, to moral reasoning.

Furthermore, these two perspectives reside in each person but may not be equal in their influence on a person's thoughts and actions (Gilligan, 1988). One moral reasoning approach equates morality with justice, where a moral problem is constructed as an issue of rights and rules. The other approach identifies morality with care and constructs a moral problem as an issue of connectedness to others and responsibilities in relationships. The apparent distinction is between rights (based upon external rules) and responsibilities (based upon an internal recognition of connectedness to others). However, social rules designate not only one's rights but also responsibility to the needs of others. Traffic laws state that one has a right to pass through an intersection if s/he has a green light. However, they also state that the individual has a legal responsibility to stop at the intersection if s/he has a red light. Therefore, the critical distinction between these two approaches appears to rest upon the locus of control factor as opposed to simply rights versus responsibilities.

Locus of control orientation as an integral factor in moral perspective-taking is further supported by findings pertaining to personality type. Personality type was the primary basis for classifying young adults within the levels of each of the care and justice ethics. When so classified, individuals at the second and highest levels of both perspectives had Empathist personalities. However, young

adults at the second levels of both approaches were internally controlling, while those at both of the highest levels were externally controlled. Thus, moral reasoners at the highest levels of both perspectives were characterized by values based upon responsibility in relationships (Empathists), but influenced by external rules and conventions. Therefore, the highest levels of moral reasoning involve responsibility dictated, but not necessarily internalized, by external rules.

The between-perspective differences are primarily related to sex role orientation. However, the between-level differences appear to be related to locus of control orientation. These observations suggest that identification with sex roles is associated with an identification with locus of control orientation. They indicate that internally controlling individuals reason at the second levels of both perspectives, while externally controlled persons reason at the highest levels of both approaches. This observation contradicts Kohlberg's model which suggests moral reasoning is first under the control of externally based rules which then come to be internalized by the individual.

The observation that internally controlling persons reason at the middle levels of both approaches may be due to developmental characteristics of the subjects chosen for investigation. Young adults were selected in order to maximize the possibility of detecting sex role differences in

moral perspective-taking. However, thoughtfully deducing universal concern for the welfare of others is considered a behavior more closely associated with the middle and later years than with young adulthood. Young adults are thought to be influenced to reason morally by externally based rules. Individuals who indicated universal concern for others as well as for themselves may have been influenced to do so by an understanding that such a position is dictated by social convention. The fact that young adults reasoning at the second levels were internally controlling indicates that they may have already internalized society's rules by this point in their life-spans.

While the between-perspective differences are primarily related to sex role orientation, the findings suggest that identification with sex roles is associated with an identification with locus of control orientations. Again, the critical distinction between these two approaches appears to depend at least as much upon the locus of control factor.

Indeed, the distinction between moral perspectives may be viewed as a matter of focus. Kohlberg's model focuses upon externally based rules (established by authorities to maximize the gratification of all group members' needs) which are thoughtfully internalized and logically extrapolated to apply universally. The controlling force in his model is the rule or the principle, whether it exists externally or has been internalized. Gilligan's model emphasizes the internal

feeling of connectedness to others and the internal awareness of responsibility which grows out of relationships. The controlling force in her model is the feeling of care, even if it has been learned and internalized (according to the processes described by social learning theory).

#### Similarities Between Moral Perspectives

A major finding of this study was that persons at the two highest justice levels had Empathist, not Legalist, personalities. Levels two and three of the justice perspective may be viewed as an apparent hybrid of justice and care considerations. Kohlberg (1981) suggested that individuals at level three have an internalized set of ethical principles which preclude purposeful harm to self and others. These principles may at times supercede rules of civil authority which are inconsistent with the individual's ethical value system. They are thoughtfully deduced by the individual, reflect a concern for the welfare and dignity of all living beings and are capable of universal application. Individuals at the second level are aware of and appreciate the needs and desires of others as well as their own and interpret rules as having been established by authorities for the good of all society's members (Wise, 1986).

Indeed, the care ethic and the justice ethic are not dissimilar. Findings from the current study allow comparisons between the two highest levels of each perspective. Individuals at the highest levels of both

approaches were quite similar. They were externally controlled Empathists. They differed in terms of sex role. Justice-based moral reasoners had masculine sex roles, while care-based moral reasoners had androgynous sex roles. Persons at the second levels of both approaches were also similar. They were internally controlling Empathists, also differing in terms of sex roles. Care-based moral reasoners had feminine sex roles, while justice-based moral reasoners had undifferentiated sex roles.

#### Operationally Defining Moral Perspectives

The difference between Gilligan's and Kohlberg's placement of emphasis is an outgrowth of the primary difference in their theoretical foundations. Kohlberg (1981, 1963) adhered to the structuralist theoretical position which focuses upon cognitive structures that are proposed as underlying overt behavior. Structuralism tends to emphasize the potential influence of inherent factors (structures) in the explanation of behavior. It tends to minimize environmental effects, that is to say, the effects of socialization. While structuralists suggest that emerging structures are continually under construction owing to the individual's interaction with the environment, they stress the primary role of the extant structure in regulating environmental influence.

By contrast, Gilligan adheres to a cognitive-behavioral-social learning approach which stresses the role of the

environment in the influence and determination of behavior. It minimizes the potential influence of inherent factors in the explanation of behavior. The behavioral aspect of this theoretical body suggests that human behavior can be explained by a reciprocal determinism that involves behavioral and environmental factors (Skinner, 1953). The social learning aspect finds it desirable to introduce internal, cognitive variables. It holds that it is the subjective meaning and interpretation of the environment (behavior) in conjunction with environmental reinforcement that actually regulates behavior (Bandura, 1977; Rotter, 1982, 1954).

The social learning perspective is in keeping with that of the present study. "Inherent structures" are considered to be hypothetical constructs with limited heuristic value. It is logical and parsimonious for the behavioral sciences to focus upon behaving rather than upon abstract hypothetical constructs (such as rules, laws or principles) used to describe, prescribe, or predict behavior, even though such conceptualizations are productions of human behavior. Findings from this investigation support the social learning perspective. The internal awareness (behavior) involved in identifying with a particular personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation was associated with the internal awareness (behavior) involved in identifying with a particular moral perspective.

In addition, a paradox regarding locus of control orientation exists at the center of the propositions of each perspective. These paradoxes may be the genesis of much of the controversy regarding whether or not two separate and distinct moral perspectives exist, and if so, whether or not they are distinguishable by sex role orientation. Gilligan indicates Kohlberg's developmental model is a legalistic one resting primarily upon externally based rules and conventions. However, Kohlberg suggests his model defines moral reasoning as an inherent, internal cognitive ability (structure) modifiable by experience. It indicates that the structure is initially under genetic control and not under the control of one's own conscious volition. This structure is modified by social rules at which time it is under the control of external factors. The modification of the structure is the internalization of the external, social rules. However, when the external rules are internalized, they are then exercised volitionally, i.e., they are under the conscious control of one's own will. Thus, the major controlling forces throughout this developmental process can be seen to be internally located (first genetically, then volitionally) which is contrary to Gilligan's suggestion.

Gilligan's model rests upon a social learning perspective. However, it presents moral reasoning as initially an innate, conscious, volitional, internal behavioral awareness of a need for self-care. This

behavioral awareness is modified by external socialization regarding connectedness-to-others and responsibility in relationships during which time it is under the control of external factors. However, once the behavioral awareness is modified to include awareness of responsibility in relationships, it is once again under conscious, volitional, internal control. Thus, the major controlling force can be seen as internal, contrary to Gilligan's social learning perspective.

Findings in the current study suggest that, at least among young adults, control begins internally, stays internal through the second levels, and ends with external control at the highest levels. These results fail to support either Gilligan's or Kohlberg's theoretical conceptualizations. In both of their perspectives, control is initially internal, then becomes external during socialization or "structure" modification, and finally comes to be internal at the highest levels of moral reasoning. Thus, once again, the locus of control factor may have been an extraneous variable in prior studies giving rise to the many inconsistent findings.

In addition to problems associated with operationally defining the different levels of moral reasoning, moral perspective research suffers the problem of not possessing a sufficient variety of well-tested instruments to measure the care perspective. The scale reliabilities for the three Relationship Self Inventories used in the current study are

.65 (care level three), .64 (care level two), and .74 (care level one). These reliabilities are near the low range of acceptability in social science research. Further refinement and utilization of the RSI will better determine its validity and reliability.

#### Recommendations

The findings of the present investigation offer direction for future research and theory building on moral perspective-taking. Research should address and elaborate a better understanding of all the psycho-social attributes involved in moral perspectives, especially locus of control orientation. Such research should address the relationship between sex role orientation and locus of control orientation in their association with moral perspective-taking.

Future studies need to clarify the relative importance of psycho-social variables to moral perspective with other multivariate models. The heuristic value of the current study's results are limited by the nature of the correlational statistics (multiple discriminant analysis) used in the analyses. Subsequent research should investigate whether a path model can be identified which will indicate any moderating effects that locus of control orientation may have on moral perspective outcomes.

Finally, there is a need to determine whether or not a conceptual framework can be devised which will synthesize both the similarities and the distinctions between the two

moral ethics. Such a comprehensive framework would include, as suggested by Gilligan (1988), a synthesis of the conceptions pertaining to moral reasoning based upon human behavioral awareness of responsibility in relationships and those based upon the influence of abstract laws and principles.

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APPENDIX  
Questionnaire



6. How many hours per week do you work at a job?

13

- 1 None
- 2 0 - 10
- 3 10 - 20
- 4 20 - 30
- 5 30 - 40
- 6 More than 40

7. What kind of work do you do at your job?

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8. How much money do you earn in an average week?

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9. Which of these best describes your living arrangements?

14

- 1 Live alone; completely self-supporting
- 2 Live alone; rely upon parents/family for less than one-half my financial support
- 3 Live alone; rely upon parents/family for more than one-half my financial support
- 4 Live with roommate(s); rely upon parents/family for less than one-half my financial support
- 5 Live with roommate(s); rely upon parents/family for more than one-half my financial support
- 6 Live with parents/family; rely upon them for less than one-half my financial support
- 7 Live with parents/family; rely upon them for more than one-half my financial support

10. Which of these best describes how far your money goes? 15
- 3 You have enough money for everything you need
  - 2 You have enough money if you're careful
  - 1 You do not have enough money for things that you need
11. Which of these best describes your MOTHER'S level of formal education? 16 17
- 1 Below 8th grade
  - 2 Completed 8th grade
  - 3 Completed 9th grade
  - 4 Completed 10th grade
  - 5 Completed 11th grade
  - 6 Completed 12th grade
  - 7 Completed 1 year college
  - 8 Completed 2 years college
  - 9 Completed 3 years college
  - 10 Completed 4 years college
  - 11 Completed 1 year graduate school
  - 12 Completed 2 years graduate school
  - 13 Completed 3 years graduate school
  - 14 Completed 4 years graduate school
  - 15 Beyond 4 years graduate school

12. Which of these best describes your FATHER'S level of formal education?

18 19

- 1 Below 8th grade
  - 2 Completed 8th grade
  - 3 Completed 9th grade
  - 4 Completed 10th grade
  - 5 Completed 11th grade
  - 6 Completed 12th grade
  - 7 Completed 1 year college
  - 8 Completed 2 years college
  - 9 Completed 3 years college
  - 10 Completed 4 years college
  - 11 Completed 1 year graduate school
  - 12 Completed 2 years graduate school
  - 13 Completed 3 years graduate school
  - 14 Completed 4 years graduate school
  - 15 Beyond 4 years graduate school
13. What is your MOTHER'S occupation? Be specific as to the type of work she does. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
14. What is your FATHER'S occupation? Be specific as to the type of work he does. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
15. If you are married, what is your SPOUSE'S occupation? Be specific as to the type of work he/she does. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

16. If you are single, living alone or with roommates, which of the following best describes your annual 20 income? Exclude financial help from parents/family.

- 1 Below \$5000.00
- 2 \$5000 - \$10,999
- 3 \$11,000 - \$15,999
- 4 \$16,000 - \$20,999
- 5 \$21,000 - \$25,999
- 6 \$26,000 - \$31,000
- 7 More than \$31,000

17. If you are single and live with parents/family, or if you are married, which of the following best describes your household income?

- |    |                     |    |                      |           |
|----|---------------------|----|----------------------|-----------|
| 1  | Below \$10,000      |    | <u>21</u>            | <u>22</u> |
| 2  | \$10,000 - \$15,999 |    |                      |           |
| 3  | \$16,000 - \$20,999 |    |                      |           |
| 4  | \$21,000 - \$25,999 |    |                      |           |
| 5  | \$26,000 - \$30,999 |    |                      |           |
| 6  | \$31,000 - \$35,999 |    |                      |           |
| 7  | \$36,000 - \$40,999 |    |                      |           |
| 8  | \$41,000 - \$45,999 |    |                      |           |
| 9  | \$46,000 - \$50,999 |    |                      |           |
| 10 | \$51,000 - \$55,999 |    |                      |           |
| 11 | \$56,000 - \$60,999 | 16 | \$81,000 - \$85,999  |           |
| 12 | \$61,000 - \$65,999 | 17 | \$86,000 - \$90,999  |           |
| 13 | \$66,000 - \$70,999 | 18 | \$91,000 - \$95,999  |           |
| 14 | \$71,000 - \$75,999 | 19 | \$96,000 - \$100,000 |           |
| 15 | \$76,000 - \$80,999 | 20 | More than \$100,000  |           |