
The purpose of the following analysis is to highlight rhetorical patterns common during wartime across multiple decades and forms of mass media communication, and to demonstrate how the technologies of media intersect with rhetorical patterns in the creation of collectives and countercollectives.

By drawing on and extending the theories of Kenneth Burke and Marshall McLuhan, I pinpoint the similarities and differences in persuasive strategies across shifting electronic mass media, noting how rhetorical appeals remain consistent though the forms they take and the modes in which they are delivered by rhetors changes with historical context and technological affordances. Historical accounts and primary sources provide the basis for such rhetorical analysis.

While the technology may change and become increasingly sophisticated in its affordances and accessibility, the rhetorical patterns of collectives and countercollectives remain similar, as strategic appeals to logos, pathos, and ethos are relied upon similarly by both pro- and antiwar collectives. The rhetorical analyses of the collectives and countercollectives across the four wars under investigation suggests useful strategies for rhetors of both present-day and future mass media communications.
COLLECTIVES AND COUNTERCOLLECTIVES: HOW THE RHETORIC OF
MASS MEDIA PERSUADES CITIZENS IN WARTIME

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of The Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Greensboro
2020

Approved by

______________________________
Committee Chair
To my late grandfather, John Wilder, who proudly told me I was smart.

To my late grandmother, Barbara Simmons, who encouraged me to write.

To my grandmother, Clara Wilder, who taught me the value of persistence.

To my grandfather, Terrell Simmons, who taught me to relish life.

To my parents, Teresa and Terry Wilder, for never giving up on me.

To my best friend and husband, Christopher Reed, for being my favorite everything.
This dissertation written by Stacy Reed has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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Date of Final Oral Examination
I owe many thanks to Dr. Nancy A. Myers, whose unwavering support, guidance, and kindness motivated me to continue pushing when I felt like giving up. I would also like to thank Drs. Risa Applegarth and Stephen R. Yarbrough for their ideas, feedback, and support throughout this process. I thank my entire committee for remaining on my team for the duration of this unexpectedly long journey.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: CONSUBSTANTIAL COLLECTIVISM

Rhetoric is an instrument of continuity and change, of tradition and of revolution.
Richard McKeon, *Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery* 2

Every new technology necessitates a war.

Iconic images of modern warfare have seared the minds of Americans, shaping what citizens know about humanity’s ability—and sometimes, penchant—for violent battle and *en masse* killing in the name of political advantage. Consider such examples as President Roosevelt’s December 8, 1941, radio speech that initiated American intervention in World War II; Morley Safer’s 1965 video footage of US marines setting fire to the huts of defenseless Vietnamese villagers; Saddam Hussein’s mingling with his “guests” who were being held hostage in 1990 during the Gulf War, and then, years later, his infamous Firdos Square statue being demolished on live television during the Iraq War in 2003. These captured historic moments serve as haunting reminders of a recent past filled with horror, heartache, and destruction resulting from political upheaval that, while undertaken in lands several thousands of miles from most American citizens, was directly shaped by those whom Americans voted into office. Often, these horrific moments and others like them, grew from days, weeks, and months of international
tension, political negotiation, and escalating events about which American citizens had much opportunity to learn and react.

React they did—some in peaceful support and others in contentious protest. The decision-making process as to whether to support or protest the nation’s war acts—and how citizens arrive at their decisions—fills the following pages. Insofar as one’s response to war takes shape through a process of negotiating intertwined ideological, social, economic, and various other mitigating factors, the decision-making process to support or protest any war is inherently a rhetorical one, influenced by multiple rhetorical actors creating and responding to often unforeseen rhetorical exigencies that can evolve over decades, or within just minutes. Within this context of international political tension, the rhetors are often government heads, delivering what they hope are persuasive messages to the citizenry audience. The messages such rhetors deliver intersect with citizens’ personal stances as shaped and influenced by an array of previous beliefs and experiences, all of which the rhetors must consider as they invent, arrange, stylize, memorize, and deliver their persuasive messages. Such a complex collision of current events, personal history, and national backdrop renders the process of convincing a nation’s people to support the war effort a delicate game of psychologically strategic persuasion, becoming civilian participants in what Kenneth Burke calls “the ultimate disease or perversion of cooperation” (Rhetoric 22). In other words, war is an inherently rhetorical situation for those initiating it, for those participating in it, and for those supporting or protesting it.
Deciding to support one’s country as it embarks in battle is often touted as the patriotic response to a grave situation. Labeling such support as patriotic is even more exaggerated when the war at hand is a hot one, a war that necessitates human combat, or a “boots on the ground” approach, as opposed to a cold war, in which economic policy and political sanctions take precedence as modes of accomplishing some larger goal. Even the fragment of society who did not vote for the acting presidential administration and congressional majority party likely feels more inclined to support their own country during wartime than the opposing country. The assumption of such support is common sense when war seems inevitable. Hot wars have a way of persuading even the originally unenthusiastic citizens to support a presidential administration they may have not otherwise, particularly if a clear case for national self-defense exists and citizens feel their safety or rights are compromised by a foreign enemy. However, there are those, too, who, regardless of their opinion for the acting presidential administration or congressional majority party, protest their country’s involvement in war. Individuals make such a decision for various reasons, but similar decisions by others result in a collective refusal to support the officially sanctioned national agenda, though such a stance does not necessarily equate to support for the opposing nation(s). In such moments, citizens are at odds with their own government, and typically at odds with most of their fellow citizens. To hold an often unpopular opinion during wartime suggests that some sort of convincing reasoning must lie behind the citizens’ protesting; in fact, such unpopular opinions are the result of rhetorical persuasion in many ways similar to the
rhetoric that convinces other citizens to support a war. Achieving polar opposite results via the same rhetorical strategies and stylings is further complicated by the creation, delivery, and propagation of war-centered rhetoric, as those means and modes shift constantly. The way that the technology both pro- and antiwar rhetors use impacts their message and its public reception appears to reveal an emerging pattern of increased democratic agency for the everyday citizen.

Whether supporting or protesting a given war, citizens exercise rhetorical agency as both consumers and producers of persuasive messages. In (dis)agreeing with the country’s official rhetors’ national agenda, citizens first listen to those messages sent from government heads which establish and then maintain an “us-versus-them” mentality by arguing why citizens should take the enemy's threats seriously. Deciding to either accept or reject the government’s claims, citizens become a powerful audience with the ability to resist the message, and to thus pressure the government into reconsidering the national agenda during (potential) wartime. The process of interpreting the official national message from a recognized government head, such as the president or military personnel, is an inherently rhetorical process, as the listeners must first receive, then interpret, and finally act on, the messages they hear. This requires recognition of the exigency of war itself, and, in some instances, agreement as to the identity of the enemy. Finally, citizens must then agree as to the best course of action—or at least agree to accept the government’s decision as to what it is. If citizens deviate from the official agenda at any point during this process of exigency recognition-enemy
identification-response, they can opt to pursue alternate paths to responding to the original exigency. Deviating from the government’s agenda provides opportunity for resistance *en masse*. Such resistance requires that the protesting collective recognize some exigency related to the official account, then identify the common “enemy,”⁠¹ then formulate an alternative set of responses to address the redefined exigency at hand. In order to survive as a collective of resistors, this opposing group of citizens must not only persuade the like-minded to vocalize their dissent, but it must also work to persuade those supporting the war effort to renegotiate their own stance and adopt another. Moreover, the resisters must establish whether they identify the enemy as another nation, their own government, or the proposed action of their own government, or any combination thereof.

Because resisting collectives are often the minority of American citizenry, they have historically tended to gain only negative press coverage, encouraging an unwanted, even deviant label for those who choose to exercise their constitutional rights and voice a dissenting and unpopular opinion. Supporting one’s nation during wartime is typically regarded as patriotic; dissenting is typically regarded as *un*patriotic. One need to only think for a brief moment about the commentary during the Vietnam War to imagine just how unpopular a war needs to be before protesting it becomes more accepted than supporting it. Such moments in the United States have been rare, but protesting, despite its often negative connotations, has in some instances proven ever so slightly popular.

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¹ Because the protesting collective resists the call to hot war, they may identify the enemy as some entity or ideological system other than that which the official agenda identifies. Thus, the “enemy” in many instances becomes the war itself as opposed to another nation or its leader.
If protesting a war (and, in essence, one’s own government officials or their suggested national plan of action) is usually an unpopular opinion, why have so many chosen to participate in protest movements throughout American history? A citizen’s wartime stance is often influenced by competing social narratives as to the motivations, causes, and anticipated results of any given war campaign. While it is understood that citizens initially approach their understanding of American conflict with other nations from a background characterized by their own political leanings, there is still much room for persuasion to operate. From a rhetorical perspective, the shift toward support or protest proves a fruitful ground for inquiry. How is it that citizens—especially those with well-established political beliefs and value systems—can be persuaded to modify their stance on war? What tactics can encourage revising former political beliefs in favor of adopting modified, or even totally rewritten, new ones? What medium or mode can produce such an effect? Who will use such medium or mode—and how? Given what we know about rhetorical technology use in previous wars, what might we anticipate in terms of rhetorical mass mediated communication in the future?

To be able to answer such questions—to even hypothesize and find significant patterns of correlation if causation cannot be definitively confirmed—could prove advantageous for those who desire to sway public opinion. The possibilities for those working in the fields of political policy, legislation, social justice, education, and even advertising are both endless and promising, assuming such patterns can be uncovered, rhetorically analyzed, and made replicable. Moreover, these patterns would need to be
flexible in a globalized world where international, national, and local relationships among citizens and political leaders are constantly shifting, and wherein technology continuously evolves at a rate that often outpaces humanity’s ability to fully understand its effects on the structure of daily life. Moreover, a clarified rhetorical explanation of how mediated mass communication, and especially communication concerning war support or protest, persuasively functions would serve American citizens and their leaders well by encouraging increased civil(ized) discussion about both current and future military endeavors abroad. At the very least, understanding the common rhetorical patterns that have accompanied hot wars in years past could aid in anticipating future citizenry response to international conflict, thereby granting national leaders a framework built from previous experience as to how best approach future wars—and what to avoid doing—when seeking citizen support.

By extending primarily the theoretical works of Kenneth Burke, Jürgen Habermas, and Marshall McLuhan, this dissertation examines the role electronic mass communication technologies have played in shaping and reflecting American collective rhetoric with respect to four modern wars: World War II, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War. This analysis of how collectives form uses Burke’s concept of identification, or consubstantiality, to explain the role electronic technology plays in solidifying mass identification on a national level. When identification links citizens and prompts social action, the impact of the public sphere becomes of prime importance for both the citizens within the sphere and for those they seek to add to their collective. A
modified, contemporary version of Habermas’ public sphere sheds light on how the social construct of consubstantial citizenry can spark structural political change from the bottom up when provided rhetorical space in which for individuals to engage with one another. Finally, McLuhan’s work on electronic technology explains how different wars, different eras, and different generations of citizens still experience the same rhetorical pressures via mass communication devices—and how that pressure is applied in remarkably similar ways despite appearing novel. Consider how each war saw a contemporary technological development that became the crux of relaying news, information, and perspectives about combat: the radio was instrumental during World War II (1939-1945), the television across the years of the Vietnam War (1955-1975) and the Gulf War (1990-1991), and the Internet during the Iraq War (2003-2011). These technologies played a pivotal role in shaping and reflecting collective discourse advocating the war efforts. This dissertation tempers and complicates the voices of the collective supporting the institution—those promoting the privileged discourses aligned with the government-backed war effort—with the rising vocalization of what I call the countercollective—all those citizens and collectives who resisted the privileged collective discourse and protested the war effort—through the same medium.² What results from collectivism and countercollectivism is a back-and-forth dialogue that is sometimes peaceful, sometimes contentious, but always creating, arguing, and publicly circulating

² My definition of a countercollective is based on Chesters’ and Welsh’s definition of counterculture as that which spurs and invites countermovements based on a collectiving of individuals with a collective identity (49; 53). The term “countercollective” as used here signifies individuals who identify with the counterculture and participate in its countermovements, whether on a short- or long-term basis.
multiple perspectives vying for citizen identification and support. This communication and public dialogue presumably creates democratic deliberations as [it] demands that agents respond to and/or anticipate the objections, alternatives and criticisms of their interlocutors, and, indeed, that they both seek out mutually agreeable premises upon which to construct their case and work logically from those premises. (Crossley 22)

What results besides discussion at the national level is, more foundationally, a set of rhetorical patterns characterized by “a transformation in the habits, including linguistic and basic domestic habits, that shape our everyday lives” (8). Although the details of these patterns are slightly modified across the investigated wars because of unique cultural backdrops and time periods, particular political contexts, and technological affordances and constraints, these patterns of appeals to logos, ethos, and pathos nonetheless persist holistically across wars and technologies, presenting valuable strategies that can be modified and applied in future wars. I identify those patterns and explore their role in contributing to both collectives’ and countercollectives’ actions and rhetorics in each of the four designated wars.

The rhetorical agency that American citizens internalize and then act on when presented a choice to either support or protest a war constitutes an important part of what it means to be a democratically involved citizen. When the definition of citizenship is further negotiated through a technological lens in addition to a public rhetoric lens, a shift occurs from private belief to public action and presence, from consumer to producer,
from mass acceptance or acquiescence to an opportunity for mass rejection as more and more citizens gain access to authorship within mass communication media. While protest movements have garnered more attention in recent decades due to their rejection of the status quo and more participation due in large part to increasingly sophisticated communication media beginning shortly before World War II, they have always existed throughout the nation’s history, although the level of citizen participation has increased notably since the 1940s. The electronic media culture that grew right along with the protest movements across recent American wars illustrates an emerging pattern in line with McLuhan’s theory of hot and cool media: the cooler the media, the hotter the audience's participation in interpreting the message. I suggest in the following pages that the cooler the media, the “hotter” the protest in the sense of increased citizen participation. The hotter the protest, the more involved the citizenry are in a diverse array of both private and public platforms by which they express their dissent, further tilting the ownership of public rhetoric toward the citizens rather than largely managed by national leaders. The more diversity in protest, the larger the protest may grow, thereby contributing to an even higher possibility for protest during the following war. What results is a redefined public sphere of consubstantial citizens who have harnessed new

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3 Social movement theorists such as Tarrow distinguish between social protest and social movement, noting that the former is an isolated event while the latter is a prolonged effort characterized by repeated interactions focused on a collectively agreed upon struggle against some opponent. However, the two terms are used interchangeably here with a modified definition: a social protest or movement for the sake of this study is action taken by a countercollective who makes its disagreement with national authority publicly known. Thus, the definition used here does not distinguish between members’ participation in isolated events and their participation within an organization over a prolonged amount of time; identification with and support of the countercollective suffices to categorize individuals as part of that countercollective for the sake of this study.
media in a way that challenges mainstream authority and increases citizen resistance to political endeavors across time.

Western culture’s shift from collective consensus to independently centered literate collective, and then to a hybrid platform for intertribal movement suggests a connection between the technology that conveys information and the people who both share it and are shaped by it. To understand how the technologies of mass communication are connected to public rhetoric and general opinion is to understand and even predict how the citizenry approaches, interprets, analyzes, and responds to a call to support or protest war. In short, the life of the body politic is one deeply intertwined with rhetoric and its vehicles of delivery.

**Consubstantial Collectivism and Technologies**

This study’s purpose is to better understand the process of consubstantial tribalization and to articulate what that process has looked like across different wars, time periods, and electronic media. Such investigation paints a clearer picture of how increasingly sophisticated technologies continue to expand the chances for citizens to exercise their own rhetorical agency and for individuals to participate in and contribute to that exercise as part of a collective, whether in support of or protest against the mainstream authority that is the government and its representatives. Further, it addresses how the American people can be of consubstantial collectives, how tribal identification and membership directs individual understanding of a wartime situation, and how individuals can be involved in multiple collectives simultaneously. Lastly, this
examination illuminates how the rhetorical power system of rhetor, counter-rhetor, audience, message, and medium converge and how that system can create a sense of tribalization with the increased use and sophistication of electronic technologies.

Particular terms have been specifically chosen to achieve these aims.

Several terms throughout this dissertation have been used in various academic disciplines and popular conversation alike; thus, they offer a host of nuanced definitions and criteria for application. However, their specific uses in the current context reflect the author’s orientation toward a McLuhan-framed approach to understanding collective public action that is conditioned by, and in turn conditions, current technological innovation. This approach is heavily influenced by the underpinnings of Burke, Habermas, and Walter Ong insomuch as the use of language and literacy draws people together in a public arena so that they can create a cohesive identity that allows them to exercise rhetorical agency as a collective. Because the argument of this dissertation rests on how citizens make use of technology to exercise their rhetorical agency, the interpretation and analysis of rhetorical patterns in citizen use of technology takes precedence over the defining of Burke’s, Habermas,’ and Ong’s, terminologies. Thus, the terms used in this dissertation neither directly reflect nor challenge those definitions posed by others, especially in the fields of social movement theory and political science, wherein terms such as “public,” “protest,” “collective,” and “countercollective” have seen much debate and redefinition over the years.  

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4 A cursory look through the works of Gerald A. Hauser, Hannah Arendt, and Nancy Fraser demonstrates how varied and nuanced the terminology of the public sphere is. While much could be said about the
In referring to the arena in which collectives and countercollectives contend with each other, the notion of Habermas’s “public sphere” is useful for situating civic discourse alongside citizen use of technology to build collectives with others. This dissertation expands the public sphere to a virtual arena of public discussion that is more accessible than the public sphere of centuries past, wherein traditionally white, educated, wealthier males participated while the rest of society was excluded. However, Habermas’s exclusionary definition of the public sphere does not fully serve the nuanced purposes of this dissertation, I have opted to use the term “collective” for those American citizens who supported the federal government’s prowar stance during each of the four conflicts this dissertation covers; I have opted to employ the term “countercollective” for those American citizens who protested and dissented the war. Countercollective, as used throughout this dissertation, signifies a collective of individuals, whether or not of legal voting age or status, who participate in social dialogue about the nation’s life, be it political, economic, cultural, or otherwise in nature. Like mainstream authority, individuals in the countercollective also have access to mass media technologies so crucial for public dialogue—particularly the radio, television, and Internet.

*Burke’s Identification and Consubstantiality*

Locating other individuals with whom one can identify suggests that two opposites can, and do, exist simultaneously: the potential for agreement and peace, and

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interpretation of the term itself, debating the merits of existing definitions and attempting to decide a definite definition is beyond the scope of this work.
the potential for disagreement and war. For every collective whose members identify and
agree with one another, there is some other collective with whom they are disagreeing,
with whom they are separated because of one or more geographical, physical, or
ideological reasons. If there were no differences separating these collectives and their
members, there would be no need for consubstantiality in the first place—and no need for
persuasion to negotiate between competing and coexisting collectives. In short, without
the possibility for both agreement and disagreement, there would be no need for rhetoric,
and no need for articulating the phenomenon of identification. When identification is
achieved, individuals feel bonded through their commonality, or what Burke defined as
“consubstantiality,” a state of social existence in which an individual identifies with a
collective that desires to enact some shared rhetorical motive and bring about desired
results (Rhetoric 21). While the individual is part of a collective, (s)he also possesses his
or her own individual will which (s)he, to some degree, conforms to the collective’s will.
In such an instance of conformity, the individual is not persuaded to wholly give up his or
her existence, but rather, to incorporate the collective’s identity as part of his or her own
individual identity, and to integrate their individual identity as a complement to that of
the collective’s. The individual is both a representative of him- or herself and of the
collective simultaneously:

In being identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than
himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives.
Thus, he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and
consubstantial with another. (21)
To be one’s own locus of motives while also a cooperative unit within a larger collective requires the individual to balance the microscopic self with the macroscopic collective; assuming no drastic ideological differences prevents the individual from blending her or his own motives with those of the collective, the individual and collective can—and must—be persuaded to identify with each other. Such persuasion is achieved through communication that convinces both parties of binding similarities, whether actual or perceived (20).

Consubstantiality is built largely upon one’s own feeling of cohesion with the rest of the collective members. First, the understanding that one is part of the collective must be communicated, and typically by an individual already in cohesion with the collective (Burke, *Rhetoric* 300). Then the potential collective member must communicate back to the rest of the collective that (s)he understands his or her identity as a collective member, and that (s)he upholds his or her collective member status by acting according to the collective’s principles and values. Burke equates consubstantiality with communication, as the former cannot exist without the latter. Because individual agency still exists even after becoming consubstantial with the collective, each collective member retains the ability to be both self and part of something larger than the self simultaneously. If no glaring differences between individual and collective exist, such consubstantiality will not elicit identity crises for either party.

Yet, even an individual who identifies both as an autonomous person and a collective member may also identify as a member of another collective also vying to
enact some different rhetorical motive. Each collective thus comprises individuals, each of whom possesses her or his own individual identity, but whose shared rhetorical motive moves them to act in unison toward accomplishing some goal. The commonality shared among members is stronger than individual will or distinguishing markers, making the cohesiveness of the collective stronger than any individual’s own identity and motives as far as accomplishing the collective will is concerned.\(^5\) Because the individuality—a result of print literacy, as Ong argues—that characterizes Western culture can never not exist once literacy has been introduced into a society, and because tribal affiliation as it was in ancient cultures cannot resurge and totally replace an increasingly post-literate society dominated by electronic technology, individual will can affect collective identification and membership in complex ways that were formerly unknown in pre-literate societies, and it remains to be fully understood how a cognitive revolution such as that brought on by literacy can and will affect collective identification and cohesion as the modes and media of communication evolve (Ong 175). For example, membership in collectives can overlap, thus creating not just consubstantiality within collectives, but also consubstantiality with those identifying as members of outside collectives; what results is a web of cohesive individuals across collectives, thereby linking collectives, even if only weakly. While McLuhan understands electronic media to bring people back together into a common kinship like that of ancient cultures—or a consubstantial cohesive if thinking along the lines of Burkean terminology—I instead argue that it is not really a

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\(^5\) This is not to say, of course, that personal identity does not take precedence within the private sphere of the home, or when not actively engaging in collective activities.
retribalization so much as a modified tribalization that could not exist without modern technology. Electronic media has supported consubstantial tribalization, and its presence in American society is continually morphing to match the nation’s needs, interests, and technological savvy.

Different collectives—or even factions within a single collective—find themselves at odds over some issue that prevents cohesion with one another; their differences outweigh their similarities. If disagreement arises and communication cannot persuade either or both parties to recommit to consubstantial identification with each other, the collectives could end up engaging in a power struggle. The greater the number of collectives that exist, the greater the chances are of them disagreeing with one another. Similarly, the larger a single collective is, the greater the chance that some small factions will form within the collective, creating opportunity for dissension and an ensuing power struggle within the collective. In other words, while consubstantiality can act as a cohesive agent, it can just as quickly become a divisive agent. When one is within a particular collective, they are also not within other collectives. Thus, consubstantial identification creates cohesion as it simultaneously creates division.

Burke emphasizes the necessity of division in order for consubstantiality—and with it, rhetoric—to exist, and acknowledges the naivety of failing to observe the effects

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6 Although inner-collective dissension can exist and has historically created multiple collectives that branched off from a larger original collective, this dissertation limits its focus to the dissension experienced and expressed between different collectives, rather than faction collectives within larger ones. For example, while several collectives existed that protested the Vietnam War, many different lines of reasoning served as the backbone for these collectives. Rather than examining the differences between these collectives, who all identified as “anti-Vietnam War,” I instead only focus on the anti-Vietnam War collective as a whole.
on human relationships and social order that exist only because of the presence of both cohesion and separation with and from others:

We need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, faction as a characteristic motive of rhetorical expression. We need not close our eyes to their almost tyrannous ubiquity in human relations; we can be on the alert always to see how such temptations to strife are implicit in the institutions that condition human relationships; yet we can at the same time always look beyond this order, to the principle of identification in general, a terministic choice justified by the fact that the identifications in the order of love are also characteristic of rhetorical expression. (Rhetoric 20)

Because disagreements and differences always exist and always separate collectives—even characterizing small factions within larger collectives—the limitations of consubstantiality’s swaying power have to be acknowledged, for it is at the threshold between identification (agreement with others) and the lack thereof that the power of rhetoric becomes evident. Choosing to focus on the unity experienced among those who find themselves identifying with one another—with those whom they are consubstantial—is what Burke calls a “terministic choice” (20). Terministic screens act almost as blinders; if one is looking at point A, then one is not looking at point B. Her screen maintains her focus on one thing at the cost of another. Choosing consubstantiality, or identification with others, is choosing to focus on the similarities with the collective and those within it, and to choose not to focus on what differences might exist between consubstantial members. At the same time, to become consubstantial with one collective means that one collective is focusing on their intracollective
similarities while separating themselves from the other collectives; this terministic screen means that non-cons substantial people and collectives focus on their differences rather than their similarities. Burke suggests here that terministic screens are, at least to some degree, enforced by one’s own choosing. With every act of identification, or consubstantiality, there is also an act of division. To participate in social life as a consubstantial member of any collective necessarily means not identifying as a consubstantial member of other collectives. An individual’s identification and consubstantiality is largely rhetorically determined, for without some persuasive element factoring into one’s social participation, one would be unable to identify with others at all.

However, consubstantial identification presents an opportunity for enough people to locate one another, to band together, and to either support mainstream authority and its desires, or to resist and protest that power structure that threatens the collective’s value system. When collectives, such as a mainstream collective and a counterculture collective, disagree over some point, they are promoting intracollective cohesion while emphasizing intercollective dissension. Upon first glance, this increasing role of difference appears problematic. However, it is necessary in order to maintain intracollective cohesion; there cannot exist as “us” if there is no “them” who are different from “us.” In fact, the very existence and progression of society is at least partially dependent on this dialogic relationship between sparring collectives: “For even antagonistic terms, confronting each other as parry and thrust, can be said to ‘cooperate’
in the building of an over-all [sic] form” (Burke, *Rhetoric* 23). Before collectives can express their differences and vie for cultural capital, though, they must first attract enough individuals with whom they share consubstantial identities. This process of attracting and maintaining such individuals to create the collective is accomplished through acts of pure rhetorical dialogic, and often at a national scale—such as leading up to and during times of war.

The existence of consubstantial collectives, or tribes, is an anticipated trait of any system of power, of any organized system that structures a society. If a public rhetor is a member of the mainstream authority, such as the federal government, and if his or her message to a particular audience—the American public—or, more specifically, the consubstantial collectives comprising the American public—then the mass media is the vehicle through which the mainstream authority delivers its message to its audience. Because electronic technology has become increasingly sophisticated, no longer is mainstream authority the only voice being heard across the media, reaching the consubstantial collectives of the American people. Now the consubstantial collectives of the American people can use the same media to talk back to mainstream authority. Often consubstantial collectives feel unease or express dissent toward mainstream authority due to some ideological difference. Now the collectives can make their voices heard and exercise their rhetorical agency using the same media as the authority. What results is bidirectional communication for older media such as the radio and television and multidirectional communication for newer media such as the Internet where mainstream
authority is talking to the countercollective and the countercollective talks back to mainstream authority. Further resulting is a version of Habermas’s salons where people could come together for civil debate, but one updated and now taking the form of an increasingly accessible—and potentially more democratic—public forum. The modern Habermasean parlor or salon appears quite different from what Habermas described and defined as the public sphere, but the communicative space remains similar in that citizens can still come together for dialogue, though the demographics of people now granted access to the conversation are those who would not have had access to the same public platforms in the past. Currently, an increasing number of citizens not only have access to electronic media so as to create collectives, consubstantial communities where kinship is felt, but they are also able to express their voices and command a sense of authority which they formerly did not possess. As a result, mainstream authority is now constantly having to validate and fight for their authority. What was traditionally a power structure dominated by traditional hegemonic patriarchy is now being contested by individuals who occupy a wide range of demographic positions.

In fact, these collectives can disagree with mainstream media (which is typically controlled by the majority or those in a place of privilege who align to some degree with government leaders) just as easily as they can disagree with one another. I would argue that a positive correlation exists between the increasing modes and media of communication, the number of distinct consubstantial collectives, and the amount of protest, dissention, and tension that exists in a community. Ong suggests such a
correlation by positing that with the spread of textual literacy comes the ability for further stages of human consciousness to evolve (178). With the more sophisticated development of human consciousness comes more in-depth and abstract self-examination about the nature of oneself and one’s position within society:

“The evolution of consciousness through human history is marked by growth in articulate attention to the interior of the individual person as distanced—though not necessarily separated—from the communal structures in which is person is necessarily enveloped. (178)

In oral cultures, people communed with their tribe using spoken and gestural communication that inherently required an audience to receive the communication, interpret and analyze it, and then respond to it. However, with the invention of writing and then the later mass production of print-based texts, communication became more individualized and asynchronous, and thus the communal bonds centered on communication weakened (or were at least drastically reformed). This type of tension would not have existed in the oral cultures of ancient traditions. Even individuals who may have felt unease with their society would not have been able to be part of a collective in which the entire collective could come together as a kindred unit to resist mainstream authority because the collective will was one and the same as individual will and the individual will was the collective will, as McLuhan noted when he argued that “Phonetic letters and numbers the first means of fragmenting and detribalizing man” (Understanding Media 148).
McLuhan’s notion of retribalization reflects the social trend instigated by electronic media whereby citizens of literate, and thus highly individualized and visually oriented, societies abandoned the more asynchronous pattern of public life brought into existence by print culture in favor of increased sensory experiences that blend multiple modes of communication. Thus, after developing increasingly advanced individualized consciousness, individuals then recreated the social connections of tribal culture, and could now share these individualized, idiosyncratic points of view with one another. The media of mass communication—first oral, then written and printed, then a combination of orality and print literacy—provided opportunities for people to connect with one another, share their opinions, shape others’ opinions, and decide whether or not to move forward as a single tribal unit or to differentiate into multiple collectives with varying—and sometimes competing—agendas.

*McLuhan’s Tribalization and Hot and Cold Media*

*Tribalization*, McLuhan’s term for what this dissertation refers to as collectivism, is both the cause and result of technology’s growing prevalence and use in American society. According to McLuhan and his student Ong, collectivism is a social condition in which an entire community shares a common identity, or collective consciousness, built around shared values, ideologies, goals, and perhaps even customs and rituals (McLuhan, *Understanding Media* 169-70). Typically found in ancient cultures, collectives comprise oral peoples who rely on close proximity to one another, on orality and on shared experiences in order to participate in a common identity. What is known as individual
will or individual identity closely aligns with the collective’s shared ideologies and value systems—the collective’s identity. No major difference exists between the individual and the collective, so the collective consciousness dictates that of the individual. Ong realizes that only those cultures who were preliterate could truly be oral cultures, and that only oral cultures experience true collective consciousness, thus true tribalization. These cultures had a different understanding of time and space than do literate peoples, as those who were preliterate experienced life non-linearly through acoustic space. They did not possess the sense of linearity, whether in time or space, that print literate humans would later have (200-01). The mentality of oral cultures—because they share a sense of close proximity in this acoustic space—is “we” and “us.” Individual will is the same as collective will. Collectivism contributes positively to society because it enables individuals to do collectively what they cannot do independently. What results is a sum greater than its parts; this sum—or collective—possesses the power to take actions and shape society in ways sole individuals cannot, suggesting there is rhetorical power in numbers. Sociologist Emile Durkheim wrote about collectivism’s effects in his 1895 Rules of Sociological Method:

An outburst of collective emotion in a gathering does not merely express the sum total of what individual feelings share in common, but is something of a very different order...It is a product of shared existence, of actions and reactions called into play between the consciousnesses of individuals. If it is echoed in each one of

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7 “Print literacy” throughout this dissertation refers to the first known phonetic alphabet that included both consonants and vowels. The ancient Greeks, particularly the Athenians, created this alphabet after its precursor, the Phoenician alphabet, made its way through trade to Greece. Because the Phoenician alphabet lacked vowels, the Greeks modified the Phoenician alphabet to include vowel sounds. Thus, the alphabet as Western culture knows it was born.
them it is precisely by virtue of the special energy derived from its collective origins. If all hearts beat in unison, this is not as a consequence of a spontaneous, pre-established harmony; it is because one and the same force is propelling them in the same direction. Each one is borne along by the rest. (60)

This passage demonstrates what can result from the stirring of the collective consciousness and how a shared consciousness moves from the common identity that binds and maintains a set of individuals toward some action. Nearly twenty years later, Durkheim elaborated this collective identity theory further and gave it a name: “collective effervescence.” In his 1912 book *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, he outlines the ways that the collectivity of individuals cooperating for some common goal, or sharing some common value, create collective effervescence—a sense of communion with others that amplifies one’s own sentiments. When acting within a collective of like-minded others, a person is susceptible to being “caught up in the moment,” or is prone to this collective effervescence that spurs the individuals in the collective to take part in actions they otherwise would not have. Durkheim hints at the drawbacks of individualization which prevents the phenomenon of collective effervescence:

> In the midst of an assembly animated by a common passion, we become susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our own forces; and when the assembly is dissolved and when, finding ourselves alone again, we fall back to our ordinary level, we are then able to measure the height to which we have been raised above ourselves. (209-10)

Although Durkheim examined the rhetorical power of people within collectives from a sociological perspective, and although his observations are rooted in his specific time and
space, his notion of collective effervescence is essentially a rhetorical positive feedback loop: all people identifying as part of a collective urge one another on to further intermingle individual identity with collective identity, and because these individuals are now even more enmeshed within the collective, they urge one another to continue doing so. With collective effervescence, all members of the collective, are both rhetors and audiences. The collective is thus its own self-perpetuating power structure that can take action by persuading its own members and potential recruits, as well as action in support of or in protest against other collectives. The ultimate goal of collectivism, however, is sheer survival. The longevity of the collective becomes more important than the activities or well-being of any one member. During wartime, the health of the collective takes precedence over all else, pressuring members to loyally contribute to the collective well-being, potentially at the cost of the individual. On a national level, such an approach results in a “country-over-self” mentality. At a collective level, such an approach can result in a “party-over-self.” Should the collective and the country conflict, such an approach can result in “party-over-country.”

What makes this type of collective arrangement so beneficial in oral cultures is its relative ease of establishment and membership. Before alphabetic literacy and the introduction of mass literacy via the printing press centuries later, individuals only had to physically be together to locate their tribal counterparts. For example, in ancient Athens, one only had to walk to the agora to find other like-minded individuals; when these people presented themselves before some rhetor in the city center, they had the power to
urge one another on in response to the rhetor, be it in acts of support or protest. Audience response to the rhetor was instant, just as tribal formation was. All those in attendance knew immediately who supported the rhetor, who dissented against the rhetor, and who looked uncommitted either way, and thus vulnerable to persuasion from either side. This example is simplistic in assuming that only two sides to an issue would have existed, and only two tribes, or collectives, would have formed in response. Of course, this was not necessarily always the case, and numerous collectives could have arisen as a result of any given rhetor’s message. The number of collectives created in this moment does not alter the pattern of behavior or thought by which collectives formed.

With the developments of the alphabet and writing and as they grew in use, these oral cultures with their reliance on orality and acoustic space evolved into linear communities. With alphabetic literacy taking root in ancient Athens in approximately 700-500 BCE, collectivism gradually disintegrated and was replaced with individualization (Enos 6). McLuhan notes that “The alphabet (and its extension into typography) made possible the spread of the power that is knowledge and shattered the bonds of tribal man, thus exploding him into an agglomeration of individuals” (Understanding Media 48). The notion of collective will gave way to individual desires, wants, and ambitions as print literacy grew in popularity and accessibility. Collectivism no longer existed in the same sense. Upon the invention and spread of alphabetic literacy, people were no longer required to physically gather together in the same space to hear the same message and thus, they no longer shared the same experiences—even if they were
reading the same text and the same messages and communications individually. The sense of the collective mentality began to dissolve when individuals could take messages and consume them independently.

In the nineteenth century, with the Industrial Revolution and the mechanization processes of many factories, the need for collective communication, collective will, and collective effort was isolated into individual bits, pieces, and units. No longer were craftspeople, communities, and families creating and making the objects. Women no longer spun thread, wove cloth, and stitched clothing. Men no longer heated and beat the metal of plowshares, swords, and silverware. In factories across Western nations, workers experienced the alienating effects of creating only specific pieces of a product; the agency to create, for example, an entire table was not common in this era of machination. Karl Marx theorizes that such mechanization would not only alienate man from his work, but from himself and his peers:

An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species-being, is the estrangement of man from man…. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to the other man’s labour and object of labour…The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man [stands] to himself, is realized and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men. (24)

Just as workers no longer participated in the full creation of a product from beginning to end, no longer were they participating in the full embodied experience of community and the formation of collectives around common interests. Instead, they acted as part of a
machine or as a cog in a machine without the ability to affect other cogs, or people. While people did still function as part of a whole and thus appeared as a collective, because it was economically necessary to work for living wages, these people of the Industrial Revolution did not constitute a true collective—they were motivated more so by the common driving force of financial capital, but beyond that, there was no collective consciousness or identity built around common values or ideologies. Yet, individuals were interdependent, relying on one another to actively participate in their social role so that commodities could continue to be made, sold, and purchased, so that the government and other forms of communal organization could continue existing, and so that life could progress for all. While solidarity among individuals still existed, it was not the type built around collective consciousness, and thus genuine tribalization did not exist.

With a rhetorical stance, McLuhan makes similar observations of the Industrial Revolution’s negative effect on tribalization:

A tribal and feudal hierarchy of the traditional kind collapses quickly when it meets any hot medium of the mechanical, uniform, and repetitive kind. The medium of money or wheel or writing, or any other form of specialist speed-up of exchange and information, will serve to fragment a tribal structure. *(Understanding Media 53)*

Because mechanization was just such a medium—mechanical, uniform, and repetitive—the tribal structure broke down when the Industrial Revolution introduced factory settings and workers were driven by Taylorism to complete tasks rather than
achieve collectively-decided-upon goals. This breakdown was not just apparent in the workplace, but extended into the home and social lives of individuals as well.

Even outside the industrialized workplace, people no longer needed to be physically together to learn of current social events which would invite participation; instead, people could leave their workplaces to return to their own homes, where they could then read the daily newspaper alone, even if surrounded by family members. In other words, those individuals who would have grouped together at the agora to discuss pertinent social matters and act accordingly with their fellow collective members were now working alone and reading alone, even if others were physically nearby. Collectivism seemed to exist no more.

However, during the twentieth century electronic media promised something new. With the rise of electronic media—such as radio, television, and the Internet—certain parts of collectivism returned. Although McLuhan observes how the hot media involved with the Industrial Revolution threatened the tribal structure, he also foresees hope for the return of communal social life:

...a very much greater speed-up, such as occurs with electricity, may serve to restore a tribal pattern of intense involvement such as took place with the introduction of radio in Europe, and is now tending to happen as a result of TV in America. Specialist technologies detribalize. The nonspecialist electric technology retribalizes. (Understanding Media 53)

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8 Taylorism refers to Frederic W. Taylor's approach to simplifying and speeding up industrial workplace practices. This approach assigns workers repetitive movement using a limited skill set; the combination of all workers' efforts produce a final product. See Jan Rehmann's work for a description of Taylorism in the workplace.
If mechanization was hot media, then electronic technology was relatively cool and resembled the instantaneous connection between human beings that had existed in places such as ancient Athens. Ong draws a similar conclusion about technologies such as the radio and telephone when he highlights that by 1982, when his *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* was first published, electronic technologies were bringing people back together in ways resembling the social conventions of ancient Greece (11). In other words, tribalization and post-mechanization electronic technologies are tribal-friendly since they require synchronous physical presence or can simulate synchronous physical presence, respectively. While these bits and pieces of tribalization that began to reappear with electronic media did not quite resemble the sense of tribalization once seen in oral cultures, enough of it came back that the individual will and the individualization that accompanied print literacy was now being questioned for its potentially negative effects on community relationships. Collectivism captures this difference between pre-literacy oral cultures and post-industrial literate cultures in that while tribalization suggests more or less permanent membership with virtually no overlap into other tribes, collectivism is more fluid. Collectives can now form, shift, dissolve, and reform as members identify with multiple collectives simultaneously. Modern collectives are more dynamic than pre-literate tribes.

McLuhan notes that electronic media, such as the radio or television, brought people back together to experience an acoustic—and now visual—space, the same messages, the same experiences, and the same pieces of communication often at the same
time, and he labels this “retribalization.” This term is a misnomer because tribalization as
he explained it in early cultures is not what happened in the twentieth century. Ong points
out that once print literacy destroyed the old notions of tribalization and its emphasis on
communal identity, there could not be a direct return to oral culture and the consequential
tribalization. Labeling cultures such as ancient Athens’ “primary orality” and cultures
such as Western society’s print literate ones “secondary orality,” he distinguishes the
processes of tribalization before and after alphabetic literacy. Because of advances in
electronic technologies and their abilities to bring more instantaneous communication
than was possible before their inventions, this turn still resembled ancient tribalization to
a degree due to increased speed in social connection: in “present-day high-technology
culture, in which a new orality is sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other
electronic devices that depend for their existence on writing and print,” people could
communicate with one another more quickly than they had been able to since
synchronous physical presence of oral society (Ong 11). Ong also argues that this
“return” was not a true return because once consciousness has been shaped by print
literacy and the linearity inherent in its design, the “allatonceness,” as McLuhan calls it,
could not exist; time and space could never be truly collapsed as they had been before the
introduction and widespread use of alphabetic and print literacy. Ong claims that

Today primary oral culture in the strict sense hardly exists, since every culture
knows of writing and has some experience of its effects. Still, to varying degrees
many cultures and subcultures, even in a high-technology ambiance, preserve
much of the mind-set of primary orality. (11)
He later goes on to emphasize that while “Literacy can be used to reconstruct for ourselves the pristine human consciousness which was not literate at all…we can never forget enough of our familiar present to reconstitute in our minds any past in its full integrity” (15). In other words, while words provide a way to talk about the impacts of both orality and literacy, a truly oral culture as of pre-literacy days cannot exist again, as humankind’s consciousness has been permanently affected by literacy. This inability to capture and recreate the past social condition of an oral culture means that retribalization is thus impossible, though we may get close to it via certain technologies that allow for citizen participation similar to that of oral cultures. Rather than “retribalization,” then, what has dominated the twentieth century is what I refer to as a “consubstantial collectivism.” Consubstantial collectivism allows for a regrouping of individuals into tribes while accounting for multiple factors that have influenced the nature of thought and social existence, such as linearity of thought produced by print literacy and the nature of human relation to work and its influence on social order produced by the Industrial Revolution. Currently, I argue that hyperlinearity characterizes collectivism to the point that neither time nor space constrict identification and affiliation. While literate individuals can differentiate between past and present, their ability to return to “allatonedness” via the Internet deflates the separation of past from present, as well as individual from individual due to the ability to instantly communicate globally. Linearity, as well as cause-and-effect, are weakened in hyperlinear existence, and thus a modified form of tribalization results—consubstantial collectivism.
In the midst of war, a nation’s citizenry is more likely to pay attention to the political decisions and military action rather than the medium through which they receive that news. Yet, the medium plays a much larger role than it has previously been given in either academic or popular conversation. According to McLuhan, “the medium is the message” (Understanding Media 23). The message, in turn, influences the public to believe, think, and behave in particular ways, even as the medium is itself in turn shaped by the public. While scholars have spent decades exploring McLuhan’s work in an effort to understand how his theories treated technologies of both past and present, they have yet to begin work exploring a central tenet of McLuhan’s later theories: the act of retribalization. McLuhan argues in War and Peace in the Global Village that “Man-made environments are always unperceived by men during the period of their innovation” (17). He maintains in this text, as well as throughout several of his works, that the influence of the medium is initially overlooked and regarded only insofar as its novelty. Its persuasive power in shaping culture is only fully observable in hindsight: “When they [man-made environments] are superseded by other environments, they tend to become visible” (17).

Throughout this dissertation, I make visible the link between the man-made environments of dominant electronic technologies and the American wars during which they played a pivotal—though initially unseen—role in shaping the public’s response to both pro- and antiwar rhetoric.

While propagandistic technologies have always existed in some form, electronic means of supporting or protesting government and military action proved invaluable in
shaping the public’s perception beginning with World War II. President Roosevelt’s *Fireside Chats* series took a sharply prowar stance following the December 1941 attack of Pearl Harbor, though his radio program had conditioned the American public to support his political agenda beginning in the first week of his administration. Yet, Roosevelt’s prowar sentiments were not the only opinions expressed across the airwaves and into the homes of millions of Americans during the war; antiwar figures with their own radio programs disseminated an opposing interpretation of government and military action. These dissenters, while often overlooked in historical accounts of World War II and radio’s relationship to the American public, nonetheless played a role in shaping American public opinion—even if they only served to reinforce war supporters’ beliefs. Notably, antiwar figures’ responses to prowar figures often took (and still do take) similar forms through the same media to persuade the countercollective. Whereas militaries research the weapons and strategies of their enemies, so too do rhetors (McLuhan, *War and Peace* 125).

Similar pro-and antiwar rhetors rose to public prominence during the following American hot wars: the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War. These rhetors and the collectives and countercollectives they inspired not only shared a common cultural moment, but common rhetorical strategies to convince the public of their own stance and to attract more members to their collectives and countercollectives. Shaping these strategies were the dominant media of the day. Though the radio was eventually succeeded by the television, and then television by the Internet, the role this electronic
technology played in preparing the public for a future of wars mediated through increasingly sophisticated, non-print means is monumental.

McLuhan understood technology as inherently rhetorical, unconsciously shaping culture as it both reflects and shapes human communication and interaction. His communication, technology, and social interaction theories suggest one means of interpreting how rhetorical strategies work within human interaction aided by electronic devices. His theories are especially useful when considering how new technologies work over the human psyche by playing on usage patterns of previous technologies, and how those previous technologies are then supplanted by newer forms of technology that retain some trace elements of their predecessors but take on new methods of persuasive communication. Generations of media consumers are thus constantly bombarded by increasingly sophisticated forms of technology that serve purposes similar to older technologies, but in new, and sometimes difficult to define, ways. According to McLuhan, the ability of electronic technology to persuade consumers—and most often without their conscious realization of this persuasive process happening at all—speaks to the supreme importance of understanding how that technology comes by this power.

The medium itself even determines how much interaction citizens can take in receiving and responding to mass mediated messages. McLuhan theorized media interactivity as either “hot” or “cold”—the more audience participation that was involved, the colder the medium (Understanding Media 139). When individuals fill in the gaps of a message with their own analysis, they become active, and the need for additional
information from the mediated message becomes less. Hot media, on the other hand, supplies all needed information, and one can think of the medium’s temperature rising as it works overtime to supply each and every thought the audience should have in response, according to the rhetor. In a similar vein, the wars investigated in this dissertation work much the same way as the technologies they were characterized by. A “cold war” is one in which military action is limited or non-existent. Rather than guns and bombs, countries prohibit trade and employ other sanctions to force negotiations. In a “hot war,” soldiers go to battle, and bloodshed follows. Whereas cold war asks leaders to actively participate in analysis of conflicts, hot war relies on weaponry to do the heavy thinking. The research discussed in this dissertation suggests that the hotter the war, the hotter the media.

Yet, discerning hot and cold media during any war is often not straightforward, as the flurry of current events can confuse and distract citizens in the moment. McLuhan’s analysis of technology’s role in shaping culture suggests that most of the rhetorical work of any given electronic form is performed subconsciously and, often, only understood in hindsight: “Man-made environments are always unperceived by men during the period of their innovation. When they have been superseded by other environments, they tend to become visible” (War and Peace 17). Only once a piece of technology has been supplanted by its predecessor is its power and capabilities truly understood—an understanding which comes with analysis of the technology as humans seek to design, implement, and strategically make use of newer ones. For instance, consider the radio:
while used to mostly entertain leading up to President Roosevelt’s administration and the United States’ entrance into World War II, its use as a powerful, efficient, and popular form of newscasting came to be regarded as revolutionary after it had been supplanted by the television, which then took over newscasting and proved critical during the following war in Vietnam.

Though a scholarly examination and analysis of electronic technologies often happens once a newer form has supplanted its predecessor, the effects of the technology take root on a social, public scale much more quickly. Consider how the technology of online shopping has impacted the success (or failure) of brick-and-mortar stores or how the circulation of print newspapers has dramatically decreased since the availability of online news websites. Careers now exist due to technologies that did not exist just years ago—and yet all of these changes influence how people interact with one another, and thus influence the very composition and functioning of society. Examining this technological influence upon society from a perspective of McLuhanist collectivism suggests that, with each new electronic technology, there comes a shift in the degree of tribalization and, with ever-increasing forms of technological communication, there is increasing tribalization that resembles that of pre-literate society.

Although the majority of his scholarly work was published before the Internet became a household commodity, McLuhan notes that “civilization is entirely the product of phonetic literacy, and as it dissolves with the electronic revolution, we rediscover a tribal, integral awareness that manifests itself in a complete shift in our sensory lives”
(War and Peace 25). A return to the sensory life is a return to when the human body was synesthetically involved in existence—when the senses of sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell mixed together in a way that involved all (or at least most) to some extent. Literacy, however, privileges the sense of sight at the expense of the other senses. However, though the connectedness and increased collectivism resembles that of pre-literate society, the majority of the American public is still literate. Thus, the current age is a resemblance of an ancient social structure constructed by futuristic technology that both shapes and is shaped by the people who are themselves structures of and structured by the ancient element of tribalization.

**Technology’s Mediation of Public Dialogue**

As electronic mass media technologies have become increasingly affordable and accessible, more citizens have gained opportunities to make public use of them, leading to a similarly increased public dialogue pertaining to political developments such as war. In such a case as the Internet, where many representatives of the collective and countercollective can participate in public discussion, a tripartite model of participants are in dialogue: the mainstream authority, the collective made up of the public supporting mainstream authority, and the countercollective resisting the appeals of the mainstream authority. In addition, a fourth participant influences and shapes the access, agency, and rhetorics of the other three in this dialogue. The mass media technologies of the radio, television, and Internet that convey this dialogue directly affect the frequency and timing of the rhetors, allowing for or limiting engaged participation by the American public. As
electronic mass media technologies grow increasingly sophisticated and as more individuals take advantage of their rhetorical agency to participate in the countercollectives, the amount of back-and-forth discussion similarly increases.

Whereas with the radio during World War II the government had most rights and most authority to it and individual people only a little, with television, ownership of the media widened, allowing more private individuals to have access to this medium and control its content. More consubstantial collectives—whether they supported or contested the mainstream authority—could exercise rhetorical agency by influencing what messages were conveyed to the wider public via this medium. The Internet allows for an expanded participation of consubstantial collectives, both in support and protest, who can now own media and practice rhetorical agency. As the technology of the media continues to grow increasingly sophisticated, the number of consubstantial collectives may increase as well. The more collectives that exist, the more the mainstream power system is threatened by the dissenting public.

This evolution of technology is not always just a story of protest, dissent, or contest. With increasingly sophisticated electronic technologies, citizens can locate those with whom they agree, and they can become parts of communities that they would otherwise never have been able to become part of without the affordances of electronic media. While some collectives consent and while others protest, what the media is also doing is allowing for a sense of returned tribalization—a sense that is felt within, among, and between consubstantial collectives who share overlapping values. Although modern
tribalization looks different than it did before literacy became the dominating cultural characteristic of advancing society, the sense of relationship, community, and accountability to other citizens marks a vast and important turn in Western—particularly American—history and rhetoric. This turn is due largely to increasingly sophisticated electronic media acting as a bridge between those who govern and those who are governed. Additionally, these media allow for citizens to talk back to their government (though not necessarily always in a hostile or contentious manner, but sometimes in such a way as to inform the government what the desires of the public are). The media also grants the government a way to speak directly back to the masses concerning these desires, while also making the desires of the ruling authority system known. In other words, media does not just allow for contest, dissent, or protest, but also allows for healthy relationships to develop through open (and often nearly instantaneous) communication in a way that has not existed since orality dominated Western culture. Tribalization, then, is much different than it was in the pre-literate oral cultures, hence the use of “collectivism” rather than “tribalization.”

While this healthy sense of communication might be a possibility, it seems that, more often than not, the communication that electronic technologies enable is instead a vehicle of dissatisfaction, dissent and protest. While the media do allow people to locate other like-minded citizens to build communities and to create consubstantial collectives, at the same time government—the previously mainstream authority—finds itself increasingly at the will of these consubstantial collectives and their growing influence
over other collectives and, thus, over one another as individual citizens. The government then finds itself answering to multiple collectives with multiple desires and wishes. Often, the mainstream authority is unable to please all these collectives simultaneously. What results are many issues that draw into question who really holds power in society and if that power is ever stable or if it is always contested.

Consider a case study of this tripartite dialogue through radio exchanges during World War II. The dominant mainstream authority rhetors during this time were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his administration, and additional government agencies and offices that followed his directives regarding American involvement in the escalating war. His audience was the American people. The medium was the radio, a technological staple among many American homes and a source of both entertainment and news, though its use as news conveyor took on marked significance during the war due to Roosevelt’s rhetorical use of it to communicate events to the public. The radio, as informative as it proved to be, operated only through the transmission of information: the representative of the mainstream authority power system could speak directly to the American citizens, but those citizens had no way to speak directly back or to speak directly over the same medium to other citizens. While Roosevelt could host his series of *Fireside Chats* and ask the public for support going into the war, most Americans did not have the same type of access to talk either to him or to their fellow citizens. While any interested or concerned citizen could write to the White House and make his or her concerns known to the administration, that citizen still could not reach out to the rest of
the American public as Roosevelt could via the radio, and that citizen definitely could not reach such a mass audience in real time, such as in a thirty-minute radio broadcast heard nationally and on a weekly basis. The government owned all the syndication rights at this time, so the government owned this medium—not the citizens. On smaller levels, there were counter-rhetors, such as Father Coughlin, who had his own radio broadcast which he often used to contest Roosevelt’s agenda. However, Coughlin’s show was mostly local, and though it did grow to eventually become regional, and for a short time, even nearly national with syndication, it was still not heard by nearly the same number of citizens as Roosevelt’s *Fireside Chats*. Additionally, while Roosevelt could take to the microphone at any time and speak as he pleased, Coughlin’s broadcast access was limited to certain days and times, and his messages eventually had to be submitted to his superiors—both within the Church and the government—for prior approval. During World War II, the government’s authority, while contested, would not be threatened in the same way it would be during later wars. Yet, it was during this era that the tradition of using electronic media to create community during wartime began. Electronic media began proving itself invaluable to the potential formation of consubstantial collectives who could exercise their rhetorical agency to contest, dissent, protest, and in other ways voice their dissatisfaction with mainstream authority.

This example demonstrates how rhetorical power systems during wartime operate both with the collectives and the countercollectives. Even in its limited counter responses, this relationship and this two-way communication exists because of the media. As the
media becomes increasingly sophisticated, it increases the possibility that consubstantial collectives develop protests, further organize countercollectives, and create a sense of threatened power structures. What we see is patriarchal structure and power systems that have dominated American culture for so long now being threatened by what, upon first glance, looks to be a retribalization of the masses. However, a deeper investigation reveals that this is not the retribalization anticipated by McLuhan and Ong, but something similar to it: consubstantial collectivism.

Social movement theory explains why individuals persistently collectivize despite changes to social structure and order that often bring about the weakening or dissolution of collectives and countercollectives. George Herbert Mead says that a stimulus, once recognized by an individual as a stimulus, becomes an object. The individual must be cognizant that 1) there is a stimulus, and that 2) (s)he is able to respond to the stimulus (has agency to do so). The link between social movement theory and rhetoric becomes clear: if the stimulus is recognized as a stimulus, it must, then, be rhetorical. If it were not rhetorical, it would not elicit recognition of its nature nor evoke a response of any degree or manner from the individual. It acts as an argument, as an exigence. Once an individual has perceived the stimulus exists, and that it can and should be responded to, the individual can then choose how, if, and when to respond, basing decisions concerning these factors on kairotic options available. The response options available span a spectrum, ranging from feasible, practical, and even expected, to unfeasible, impractical, and unexpected or novel. If a message (stimulus) is received by an audience as a stimulus
and then acted upon (whether in thought, feeling, or action), the message has the opportunity to produce some type of response which, when external to the individual, is socially rhetorical; when internal, even an individual response is still rhetorically socialized, as it is conditioned and molded by societal norms and mores.

But how can a message be successfully interpreted as a rhetorical stimulus if the message’s vehicle is so novel as to distract the audience and detract from its a) recognition of the stimulus as stimulus or b) understanding of the stimulus, message, and possible responses to it? A message cannot purposefully be acted on and responded to if the message is too poorly understood. When a medium of message delivery is too novel, it most likely prevents the audience from realizing its purpose, and thus from acting on it accordingly. In this case, the medium overrides the message, rendering the message ineffective. Is the medium the message? In some instances, yes—it can be. But the medium is not always the message. While they are not synonymous, they are highly codependent. If the vehicle attracts all the attention, the message is misunderstood at best, and overlooked at worst. If the medium, though, is familiar to some extent, the medium then becomes as natural to the message’s landscape as water to a fish. The audience can then focus their attention on the message in a more purposeful way. The medium, to be the most effective for message delivery, must be a vehicle whose novelty is not the primary focus of the communication. However, the medium must also not be outdated, lest it attract the same degree of vehicle attention, though with a potentially more negative connotation or awareness than a novel medium.
While the administration uses the new technology for calls to the collective to support the war, the countercollective experiments with the new medium, revises its use, and publishes their own anti-call to see if it has a similar, but opposite effect. In this way, the countercollective’s experimentation with the new technology is never quite “new,” but a revisited and revised form of experimentation with the same rhetorical appeals to the audience through the novel medium. The countercollective have a better chance of success because they have already witnessed successful—and less successful—uses of the medium. If a similar lesson is to be learned from revised uses of technology, the call-to-war pro-government rhetor has to use it in volley. This means that rather than the initial use of the technology necessarily being successful, the prowar rhetor has to see what revisions the countercollective make, then adjust his or her own rhetoric accordingly. In addition, the prowar rhetor has to discover a new rhetorical strategy to counteract the countercollective’s rhetoric. This creates a constant sense of struggle to redefine how the medium or technology can be used as well as the most sophisticated rhetorical approaches through that medium.

Chapter Summaries

The following chapters investigate the aforementioned wars and their corresponding technology, and each chapter considers how the dominant technology of that particular war came to replace its predecessor. The political role of the new technology and the means by which both pro- and antiwar figures made use of technology provide a cultural and historical backdrop to this rhetorical evaluation. Lastly,
each chapter concludes by offering an observation of how social movement theory indirectly draws on McLuhan’s work, though often applying different terminology.

Chapter 2 examines the use of the radio as the main technological means for spreading mass communication during World War II. While President Roosevelt’s *Fireside Chats* are often remembered as the prime radio broadcasts that presented war-related news to the American collective, other, less well-known radio broadcasts—such as Father Coughlin’s weekly radio program—contributed to social unrest concerning American involvement in World War II, though the countercollective Coughlin helped foster remained rather small. Regardless, the role of the radio in providing an opposing narrative to the one promoted in mainstream society suggests that technology could be used to create an environment wherein like-minded people could find fellow supporters or dissenters and wherein citizens could hear opposing accounts of current events. These affordances reflect McLuhan’s notion of retribalization, even if only faintly. Moreover, the radio allowed for citizens to start distancing themselves from the linearity of print in that by hearing reports of war, the sense of space was deflated; citizens listened to reports as if they were present with the reporter himself, and the sense of immediacy that is a necessary component of collectivism took root. Spatial deflation and immediacy proved to be important rhetorical criteria for increasing collectivism during the following war in Vietnam.

Chapter 3 focuses on the Vietnam War and is significant for at least two reasons: 1) of the four wars discussed, this war was the longest, lasting twenty years and running
through the administrations of four different American presidents, and 2) this war was the first to be televised directly into the homes of citizens, allowing them to witness firsthand the harsh realities of combat, though the war was taking place across an ocean, in a country that had, up until the post-World War II fear of spreading Communism, remained little discussed in American politics.

As with the radio during World War II, television sets were present in the majority of American homes during the war, allowing for a maximum of citizens to stay informed of developing military operations in Southeast Asia. However, unlike the radio during World War II, television involved more than just the aural sense: war was now both aural and visual. Adding an additional layer of sensory investment results in a higher degree of synesthesia—the blending of senses. Increased synesthesia means a feeling of increased personal involvement, or so McLuhan argues.

This chapter first explores the similarities between the radio and the television, noting the rhetorical continuance of these technologies in terms of their affordances and constraints. The conversation then shifts to focusing on the main difference and advantage of the television to invite citizens into vicariously participating in combat events through both sound and sight. Next, I note how synesthesia compels citizens to identify their own value systems, relate them to others in their (potential) collectives by means of developing a collective consciousness, and then, perhaps, escalating that collective consciousness into collective effervescence by means of rhetorical action designed to persuade firstly mainstream authority power structures, but countercollectives
as well who may not share a high degree of said collectives’s consciousness. The act of
collectivizing, then, became more likely with the development and accessibility of news
programming that highlighted war developments, and thus encouraged more Americans
to form collectives based on their stance regarding war than had taken place during
World War II. The prowar collective could hear the countercollective protesting through
on-air interviews, as well as how the authorities responded to them.

Chapter 4 highlights the complicated television coverage of the Gulf War.
Television continued to play a prominent role in informing the public—as well as
prompting them to question their stance on government activity—during the Gulf War
fifteen years after the Vietnam War officially ended. The Gulf War presented an
interesting compromise between the freedom of media coverage experienced during the
Vietnam conflict and that of the more scripted nature of radio broadcasts during World
War II. Although news media did not have the ease of access to the front lines as
reporters and photojournalists did in Vietnam, they still had access to key figures behind
the war effort. Yet, coverage was filtered and limited in many ways, and became
increasingly dictated by the personal preferences and leanings of those who owned the
media. While CNN was able to broadcast footage of Saddam Hussein treating American
hostages in a friendly manner, the channel was still only granted limited access to facts
and figures, and it was not at liberty to join front line efforts as photojournalists and
reporters did in Vietnam. Media personnel were also not as intimately familiar with the
weaponry, plans of actions, or front-line soldiers as they had been during the previous
conflict. Ideological partisanship was also a determining factor in what news channels broadcasted, and political angles were adopted that defined and set apart stations such as CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and CBS. When these restrictions and ideological leanings are combined, the result is a distinct lack of accurate information that influences the actions of the collective and countercollective alike.

It was during this war that citizens took to live news programming in real time thanks to call-in shows on news networks. The national platform became more accessible for citizens across demographics, and advancing television technology created a rhetorical space for the average citizen to be heard. While media conglomerates still owned the networks and could limit the amount of call-in opportunities made possible to citizens, the 24/7 broadcasting of real-time events, combined with call-in shows, created more public dialogue regarding unfolding war developments than had previously been possible. Citizens were now hearing for themselves the voice of their peers who represented both pro- and antiwar stances.

Chapter 5 examines how the latest American war effort demonstrated the importance of electronic technology for informing and persuading citizens. Moving from the television age to the Internet age is the most significant technological advancement of all of these four wars. While citizens’ reliance on traditional modes of journalism had been suffering for decades, the events of September 11, 2001 revived the importance of reporters and their access to sources unavailable to the average citizen. An increasing percentage of the American population began looking to newspapers and news broadcasts
for information, including segments of the population that had never shown much interest in doing so before. However, because mainstream news sources were now accommodating their journalistic work for print, televised, and web-based platforms, a new opportunity for a previously non-existent discourse community opened up: that of the virtual synchronous and asynchronous parlor, as it were, of websites and chatrooms.

Affordances offered by the Internet allow citizens to directly communicate with one another both synchronously and asynchronously; moreover, citizens can communicate with mainstream authority as well. The introduction of “viral” web-based texts introduces a significant expansion of rhetorical platform, allowing citizens to reach others far beyond the ideological borders of their own collective. The Internet, then, is presently the most capable of all technology examined in this dissertation to collapse time and space. What results from such a collapse is the increase in palpable results of citizens’ and collectives’ rhetorical acts in support or protest of mainstream authority. Moreover, the Internet has provided space for nuanced collectives to form based on multiple consubstantial identifications, multiplying not only the number of pro- and anti-war collectives, but also allowing for members to simultaneously operate in numerous collective spaces and claim membership in co-existing—and sometimes even competing—collectives. What remains to be seen is how multi-collective membership could weaken loyalty by pulling membership too thinly between competing collectives.

The conclusion highlights the implications of this study and the methodology and concepts developed within, specifically the ways this argument extends McLuhan and
Ong and further complicates Warner’s and Hauser’s definitions of the public sphere.

While no analysis of historical accounts can necessarily accurately predict the rhetorical trends of the future, informed estimates can be made regarding the most likely use of both persuasive strategies and electronic mass media communication technologies.
CHAPTER II

WORLD WAR II: RADIO AS THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT

World War II: a radio war of decentralization concluded by the Bomb.

The United States’ entrance into World War II followed on the heels of the Great Depression, when citizens were largely focused on simply surviving. With public morale at a low point prior to the outbreak of war and with domestic financial matters consuming political discussion, there seemed little impetus for American citizens to support involvement in a largely European war. Yet, when the need to defend the nation became painfully clear after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American citizens demonstrated a very Burkean response in creating a strong national identity with one another, and against those forces that threatened the American way of life—the American identity. Such an identity would have struggled to exist at all had it not been for a key invention that made its major rhetorical debut during the years of World War II, and which set the stage for the creation of an electronically-mediated political culture in the United States: the radio.

Using radio programming to spread news reports and analyses of current events, key figures during the late 1930s and early 1940s persuaded American citizens to either
support or resist the war. The number of weekly listeners such programming drew in suggests that both the pro- and antiwar rhetors who took to the airwaves were persuasive in their attempts to convince Americans to take a firm stance in the face of global warfare. As a result, the programming that centered on the war also contributed to the creation of domestic collectives, with the prowar collective proving historically dominant over the antiwar countercollective. The radio allowed the prowar message to spread by capitalizing on particular rhetorical appeals—primarily ethos—as well as the affordances offered through aurality’s persuasive impact on listeners. While some countercollective radio programming also drew in audiences, it paled in comparison to that produced by the prowar collective, resulting in a larger and more noticeable national support for the war rather than against it.

Up until Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inauguration in March 1933, radio had been used primarily as a form of entertainment, with news segments occupying some limited evening hours. During Roosevelt’s presidency, the radio became, according to the first chief commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission, a fusion of all the most popular and significant social institutions of the day. It encompassed and reflected the interactions that took place in schools, churches, and other public forums (Hilmes 1). By late 1941, it is estimated that 90% of American households owned at least one radio and that the average American listened to it for approximately four hours each day (Craig 9). Because the radio was a household staple for millions of Americans between the 1920s and 1950s, it played a pivotal role in shaping social consciousness and public opinion
while simultaneously conflating other media—the newspaper, the town hall meeting, and the theater, among others—into a single electronic medium that spoke directly into the living rooms of the public (1). However, the Great Depression and Roosevelt’s plans for combating its fallout shed new light on the previously untapped capabilities and usefulness of this technology. The radio’s affordances posed new possibilities for direct communication on the national level regarding both domestic and international politics. Roosevelt’s numerous *Fireside Chats* demonstrated how easily the president could now reach the citizens of the entire country in one fell swoop. Rather than holding press conferences or in-person speeches where only a limited few would be able to attend, and rather than gambling on the portrayal of his speeches as presented in strategic rhetorical frames of carefully-chosen paraphrases by various local, privately-owned newspapers, Roosevelt smartly seized the opportunity to make his agenda known to the nation directly and synchronously. He no longer had to rely on reporters, newspapers, or citizens’ word of mouth to announce his aims and plans for the country. By bypassing a middle agent to relay his administration’s goals, Roosevelt harnessed his own rhetorical agency in educating Americans about, and garnering support for, his policies. Moreover, as the highest-ranking government official in a medium whose ownership was largely still privatized yet sympathetic to the Roosevelt administration, the president found himself in a covetable position as he promoted policies concerning his New Deal programs. While he did harness the radio’s powerful affordances to reach the masses directly during the banking crisis and other particularly troublesome moments during the Great Depression,
his handling of Pearl Harbor and his radio-aired congressional address to solicit a
declaration of war the following day became his most well-known use of radio for
presidential and political speech delivery. At the hands of the president and a select few
key figures, the nature of radio changed drastically leading up to and during World War
II.

However, the president was not the only voice occupying the airwaves. Although
Roosevelt’s presence on the radio became commonplace and lasted throughout the
duration of his presidency, the entertainment sector still accounted for a large part of the
programming. When call-in radio programs took to the airwaves in the 1930s and 1940s,
average citizens suddenly found themselves with opportunities to be heard across their
own communities, and sometimes even further. While most call-in shows during these
decades were for entertainment purposes, talk radio and programs where citizens were
interviewed on a range of pertinent topics became increasingly popular. The potential for
radio’s constitutive power was already at play: “On many of these talk and interview
programs, the voice of the people spoke in performative utterances; like opinion polls,
these programs helped to create the publics they simply claimed to represent” (Loviglio
90). While the Habermasean notion of the public sphere did not exist in American culture
during this time, a new form of that sphere was taking shape in the United States, and
was created, in part, by the radio’s reflection of the public it also created (90). This
collective of citizens coming together over the radio would prove absolutely vital for the
prowar collective called for by the President of the United States via this medium.
Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, radio airtime gradually became less dominated by entertainment and local news segments and began sharing broadcast space with national and international news concerns. As Americans processed the attack on Pearl Harbor and listened to the President’s declaration to Congress about the need to get more involved with the war effort, they were also audience to the ongoing solicitations for support through Roosevelt’s *Fireside Chats*. *Fireside Chats* heavily influenced citizens as they formed their opinions on whether or not American intervention was necessary in the European war to check Hitler’s campaign. The radio would also prove instrumental in updating American citizens as to the war’s progress during the following years. Because of the radio’s unprecedented importance as a vehicle of news delivery leading up to and during the war, World War II is often deemed the “radio war” (Douglas 10).

However, Roosevelt did not stand alone as the voice of wartime radio following the attack on Pearl Harbor; he was often discredited, fought against, and even ridiculed on the airwaves by a few key figures who vehemently opposed American intervention in what they considered a European war. Some of these isolationists had opposed Roosevelt’s national policies before December 1941, but it was not until Japanese Imperial Forces attacked the naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 that isolationists’ opposing viewpoints presented the possibility of sparking a national identity crisis that would ask citizens to either support or oppose American entrance into World War II. What resulted was a nationwide civil battle fought over the airwaves to determine
America’s extent of involvement, if any, in the war. However, this technologically-enhanced debate between interventionists and isolationists also created a surprising result: a unification of the public on a scale grand enough to warrant consideration of it as a return to tribal consciousness, even despite the division between the two domestic camps. Both the collective (the interventionists) and the countercollective (the isolationists) used radio air time to share ideologies and sentiments in hopes the public would adopt their particular view and act accordingly. Citizens identifying as prowar and antiwar could tune into certain programs to hear the voices of the like-minded—often citizens they would otherwise have never met or with whom they would have had an opportunity to discuss politics. While the radio was heavily dominated by the interventionist approach and agenda, the rhetorical seeds were being sown during World War II that would later grow into a more apparent and powerful phenomenon threatening to shake up the power structure typically owned and regulated by the government—the primary interventionist. Without radio, the multiplicity of voices would not have reached Americans with the same velocity and impact, and the effects of rapid mass mediated communication would have failed to stir citizens into action. Electronic technology’s affordances are what created a public that had the possibility to separate into multiple collectives spanning the country, each with their own desires concerning the war. Moreover, these multiple collectives also had the possibility to make their desires nationally known, to all citizens simultaneously. What resulted was both collectivism of those for and those against American involvement in the war, but also a national identity
of Americans as distinct from citizens of other nations. In other words, both McLuhanist
collectives and Burkean consubstantial identification accompanied this new electronic era
of the radio.

The Collective

The prowar collective dominated the airwaves shortly before and during
American involvement in World War II. One of the most popular entertainment radio
programs during this timeframe was the variety show *Vox Pop*. With a name that literally
translates to “the voice of the people,” and with a format that sent hosts out on the streets
to interview the average citizen about an assortment of topics, the public was led to
believe that this program represented what other citizens just like them were thinking
regarding entertainment, the economy, politics, or the more mundane aspects of daily life.
Yet, a show that suggests with its title that it belongs to the opinions of its listeners was
more deeply affected by the Roosevelt administration than most citizens perceived.
Owners of local stations who aired the national program were held under pressure to
present only content that encouraged agreement with the government’s official agenda
concerning war. While the average citizen’s opinion could still be heard when discussing
Hollywood, fashion trends, or dinner recipes, only opinions respecting Roosevelt’s stance
toward fellow Allied powers and against Axis powers were to be shared—lest station
managers and other stakeholders risk losing their source of income in a still-precarious
economic moment. As the war progressed, so did the show’s support of the war effort.
During the war
*Vox Pop* refashioned its quest for the voice of the people...part of the networks’ dramatic commitment to the war effort. By July 1941 the show had converted to full-time war mobilization, traveling every week between military bases and defense plants, conducting personal interviews with servicemen and women, black and white, of every stripe, and from many backgrounds. The voice of the people, first assumed to reside in the randomness of the people, then in their ‘averageness,’ now was sought in the exemplary ‘Americanness’ of those working for the nation’s defense. Heard on the Armed Forces Radio Service as well as on network radio, *Vox Pop* became an important link between the home front and soldiers abroad. (Loviglio 101)

*Vox Pop*, then, blurred the lines between entertainment and support for a particular political agenda, which in turn created a subconscious message that supporting the war effort was as natural as enjoying the entertainment one found in listening to a popular radio program. If so many listeners were tuning in to *Vox Pop*, then the voice of the people seemingly supported the government’s agenda regarding the war.

*Vox Pop* drew on the public’s pathos as it appealed to the sense of belonging—of making each individual citizen feel part of the unified, patriotic collective. The show also suggested that in identifying as an average citizen, listeners collectively formed the backbone of the nation. Even those citizens who spent most of their time in their own homes, such as homemakers, could identify at least in part with those other listeners coming over the airwaves and into their living rooms. Listeners knew that even if they were unable to share physical proximity with others who shared their opinions on political, economic, or social issues, there were at least those who did share their opinions somewhere in the nation—which they knew because they had heard these others on the radio.
As radio broadcasting continued to develop alongside an impending global war, interview-based programs such as *Vox Pop* focused on the average American citizen and their feelings of both civic and personal efficacy during a trying depression and upcoming military conflict: “*Vox Pop*...revealed a public mind overwhelmed by the blooming, buzzing confusion of public life and ruled by essentially private, psychological motivations,” and coalesced those private beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of the individual citizens “into an unprecedented national audience” which spoke with a singular public voice (Loviglio 97). Listeners were participating in a modern, electronic version of what could be considered a type of Habermasean public sphere. Though the traditional sense of a parlor debate was not as practical in 1930s and 1940s America, the idea of engaging with other citizens to hear out their opinions, and then considering again one’s own opinions, served as the work of Habermas’ parlor. The radio took what was no longer practical and reinvented it in an electronic medium, and in doing so enriched citizens' feelings of democratic agency. Americans, then, were engaging in public life, even from the comfort of their private spheres. Ultimately, individuals could feel part of something larger than themselves and could identify with their peers even if they never came face to face with them in such civic or political discussions. The ease with which the radio was able to appeal to listeners’ sense of pathos, which was itself fueled by a desire to be an active participant in public life, demonstrated its power as a rhetorical vehicle when strategically implemented by an equally strategic rhetor. While World War II-era studies on public reception of radio programming are limited, *Vox Pop*’s historical success is
evidenced in its syndicated sixteen-year run over the airwaves (108). Despite the dearth of hard evidence or validated concrete numbers of listeners, the persuasive impact of *Vox Pop* can be assumed from its decade-plus, coast-to-coast lifespan. Listeners of this famed show would have undoubtedly felt pressure to accept and conform to those public opinions they heard so often repeated on the show. Disagreeing with the prowar agenda routinely expressed on *Vox Pop* would imply that one was not part of the rest of American society, but instead stood at odds with his or her fellow citizens. To disagree with the overtly prowar agenda expressed on the show would further imply that a citizen's individual rhetorical agency was weaker than that of others, as antiwar sentiments were not expressed publicly. To feel as though one belonged to the collective of American society, and to thus experience a sense of personal efficacy, one would most likely stand in agreement with the prowar agenda shared by the collective of *Vox Pop*’s national audience base.

Not every radio-based rhetor sought to persuade American citizens in the same way as *Vox Pop*. While the popular radio show relied heavily on an appeal to pathos via focusing on members of the Armed forces and fostering a sense of belonging among citizens, other radio programming adopted a more logos-centered approach to promote the war effort. The Office of War Information (OWI), a government agency created by Roosevelt for the sole purpose of relaying critical and officially approved war news to the public, relied on what can be termed the “strategy of truth”⁹ to convince radio-listening

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⁹ The “strategy of truth” reflected only news accounts favorable to the government, specifically to the Roosevelt administration. The “truth” part of the strategy was not, therefore, totally exempt from bias.
citizens that supporting the war was the most logical and practical approach to halting the escalating global violence, and to protect the United States from becoming a victim of the Axis powers (Brewer 81). The idea was simple in theory, and resembled Roosevelt’s usual approach when addressing the public: if American citizens were given the facts of the war in a plain, straight-forward manner, then they would make a rational, informed decision about what needed to be done concerning the war in Europe. The Office of War Information limited radio discussion of the war to only what it officially approved, acting as a check on freedom of speech in the interest of national security (Jowett and O’Donnell 257). The reality, however, became murky when issues of national security and less-than-flattering stories of activities undertaken by American and allied troops surfaced or a less than fully supportive attitude became evident on the airwaves. Such instances compromised both the veracity of the official reports as well as the logical appeal of the government’s agenda moving forward (81). When the complete truth became a liability for ensuring public support, the OWI opted instead to present an image more favorable to the Roosevelt administration’s cause by strategically omitting unsavory details that contradicted what the OWI wanted the official narrative to be. What was said mattered just as much as what was left unsaid, and how what was said was conveyed to the public. In other words, an appeal to logos was still the official appeal to the people, though the people were largely unaware that they were receiving only a carefully selected portion of the truth, and therefore they were working on a diluted version of logos. One  

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More than just diluting the truth of the facts, the OWI tampered with and falsified their own ethos, unbeknownst to the American citizens.
of the most persuasive strategies in swaying the masses toward intervention in Europe meant “blurring what was true with what people wanted to believe was true”—even if that required selective media coverage of some military activities and omission of others (81). Presumably, most American citizens were unaware they were being told only selected portions of the truth; however, even if they had known, there was little they could have done in that moment because the average citizen did not have access to airtime on the radio, and would have been unable to secure airtime during which to voice an antiwar stance, as call-in shows were notoriously prowar. Those who owned radio stations and had access and opportunity to voice antiwar sentiments were more likely to cooperate with the government than point out the half-truths or selected accounts because cooperation with the government proved critical for the survival of local radio channels:

Fearing a repeat of the World War I government takeover of the airwaves or some other incursion into their profitable hold on most of the North American airwaves, the networks worked closely with OWI [Office of War Information] and other agencies, starting as early as 1940, to create programming sympathetic to administration interests. (Loviglio 102)

Interventionists (and isolationists alike) quickly realized how essential a strategically crafted rhetorical approach was to garnering citizen support while also maintaining profitability for those citizens who owned the media of mass communication—and what could happen to both media owners and media users if they deflected the official government agenda during war time. Collectivism in support of the war, then, took root across the airwaves.
With the help of popular radio programming like *Vox Pop* and the myriad radio-delivered addresses crafted by the OWI, the Roosevelt administration heavily influenced national opinion regarding the war, but still faced two pressing tasks: strategizing the American military response to the war should conscription go into effect as it had with the previous world war, and strategizing his public, domestic response to the war in a way that would encourage American citizens to support him in ordering a military response, even if that meant calling their loved ones into active combat. If *what* was said mattered every bit as much as *how* it was said, then the president needed to craft carefully planned messages in such a way that would convince the public to abandon fears related to the Depression which the country was still struggling to overcome, and to negate their fears of what the future might hold if the United States engaged in a European war that had as of yet been unstoppable to the nation’s allies (Brewer 82). Paying attention to these apprehensions, Roosevelt gathered his mass audience with a “galvanizing rhetorical invocation of ‘the forgotten man’ as inheritor of a revitalized democratic government and a more unified nation” and rather than speaking only to those who could offer much support, called on everyone to contribute in even the smallest of ways (Loviglio 94). For example, rather than asking for political and military help only from those who could afford to provide such, Roosevelt tapped into the financial frustrations so many citizens felt as a result of economic hardship extending from the 1930s by reminding them that despite the turmoil of the Great Depression, democracy was still worth protecting in all financial states—that if one could practice patriotism
while economically comfortable, then one could also practice patriotism while economically uncomfortable.

Shortly before beginning his first presidential term, Roosevelt delivered a broadcasted speech as the Governor of New York on behalf of the Democratic Party during the Lucky Strike Radio Hour on April 7, 1932 wherein he coined the term “forgotten man,” and during which he noted that as a public servant—and not as a partisan politician representing just a single party or even those citizens he hoped would vote for him in November of that year—he was concerned with the 50-60 million farmers who depended on a revitalized purchasing power in order to survive (“Forgotten Man”). He emphasized his care for all citizens, regardless of social class or economic standing, as equally important in restoring America’s national and economic lifeblood via a bottom-up approach: “Main Street, Broadway, the mills, the mines, will close if half the buyers are broke” (“Forgotten Man”). Roosevelt saw the farms as supporting the factories, who relied on raw goods for production. In the same breath, Roosevelt also drew attention to the importance of keeping citizens in their own homes and preventing foreclosures. He then continued up the social ladder of American jobs and worked his way up to bankers and those responsible for implementing policies that directly affected citizens’ ability to purchase commodities needed for both survival and a higher quality of living (“Forgotten Man”). In his appeal to citizens across various economic strata, Roosevelt played on his listeners’ sense of ethos as he presented himself as a politician who cared for the entirety of his constituents, regardless of how much they could
contribute to his campaign. This very public broadcast ensured that Americans from coast to coast heard the same version of Roosevelt as everyone else and suggested that he was comfortable with being transparent about his political ambitions and concerns as he sought the presidency. The “Forgotten Man” speech was both informative regarding his political platform, and rhetorical as a device for persuading American citizens that he was the type of politician others supposedly were not: one concerned with the prosperity and well-being of all Americans. This speech, made shortly before he was elected president for the first time, was arguably a persuasive tactic that persuaded Americans to vote Roosevelt into the Oval Office. It reasons to assume that if citizens could trust his ethos as he worked to dig the nation out of the economic hardships of the Great Depression, then they could also trust him as he considered the best course of action in the global war that would soon begin unfolding overseas. One need look no further into the past than to the “Forgotten Man” speech to recognize when Americans started putting their trust in him as a veritable leader through the toughest of times.

Such one-off speeches attracted a wide audience, but the most persuasive means of radio persuasion in support of the war was undeniably President Roosevelt's Fireside Chats. Although the radio as a source of news did exist prior to World War II, its use as the leading official news medium did not begin until Roosevelt took office in 1933. Within one week of assuming executive power, he began his Fireside Chats series. Initially designed to promote his New Deal agenda and explain political and economic happenings during the Great Depression in a way the average citizen could easily digest,
Fireside Chats served the purpose of unifying the American public in their support for Roosevelt and his initiatives. Moreover, addressing the public directly cut out the need for the media middleman of newspaper journalists who would condense, summarize, and potentially alter Roosevelt’s words en route to the public’s eyes. The more direct radio strategy proved effective for Roosevelt, as he was “voted the most popular personality on the radio,” and did not have to worry what part of his messages that citizens had heard, and whether or not it had been taken out of context (Buxton and Owen 85). Such a direct approach to addressing the American public—straight from the White House to the suburban living room—was a rhetorical move rooted in logos for Roosevelt but worked as an appeal to pathos on the listening citizens. Being called to the radio by the President, sharing in the most critical national updates, and hearing current affairs directly from the Commander in Chief assigned every American a privileged place in the political realm, at least in appearance and sentiment. Upon hearing the national and global news directly from Roosevelt himself, and in such a way that could be easily understood by the layman, American citizens were much more likely to feel a sense of political efficacy than they had in years previous, as economic circumstances spiraled out of control in complex ways understood by few outside the circles of Washington or Wall Street. Hearing the state of the nation from the one making the most important decisions created an aurally-transmitted sense of democratic possibility and need for participation than citizens would not have acquired from simply reading a condensed version of such news in the papers; the president now beckoned directly to the people, not to the reporters who
relayed information to the masses. The average citizen was now deemed important to the president, as evidenced by the fact that he requested their direct attention each week in his *Fireside Chats*.

President Roosevelt carefully constructed, developed, and maintained a specific ethos during his presidency, but it was through the radio that this ethos most notably took shape. He presented himself as an average citizen, despite his privileged background and upbringing. He opened his *Fireside Chats* by addressing American citizens as his “dear friends,” inviting them in for discussion as a caring peer rather than an authoritative, out-of-touch politician. He carefully avoided words and phrases that would alienate the common listener, focusing instead on digestible, simple wording that broke down the complicated processes and events impacting all sectors of American society, including economic, militaristic, social, and even religious (Fried 155). He was also careful to avoid taking too extreme a stand for fear of losing citizen support, especially when it came to his decision to intervene in a global war (156). By paying close attention to how he presented himself and explained his rationale for taking certain actions, Roosevelt cultivated a seemingly transparent ethos that easily garnered trust and support from the majority of American citizens who were overwhelmingly desperate in a time of depression and yet another impending world war. Had Roosevelt chosen to deliver his radio broadcasts as a member of the Washington elite, he would have failed to create such trust with his listeners—and thus, with his citizenry. Because Americans could access and understand the news Roosevelt delivered, they most likely felt little resistance
to agreeing to his future war plans, as he had presented himself as someone who seemingly told the truth, held nothing back, and most importantly, had nothing to hide.

Toward the close of the decade, as war broke out in Europe, Roosevelt’s attention during his weekly *Fireside Chats* shifted toward increasing attention to international affairs in addition to the emphasis he sustained on domestic issues. As he realized the probability of the United States’ intervention in the war, he simultaneously realized his responsibility to drum up public support for it. He had already created an ethos as a leader who embraced the challenges of the Great Depression, and he used this rhetorical reputation he had created for himself as a base on which to build logos-centered war support. A turn toward logos only took a slight comparison to those European nations falling victim to Axis conquest to remind the American public that not all people were even given an option to decide for themselves whether to support their country’s military agenda (Brewer 81). By reminding Americans that democracy itself afforded them the privilege to support their nation, Roosevelt strategically positioned citizens to either support a war to protect democratic freedom (or at least, the illusion of it), or compromise that very freedom and become the equivalent of one of Hitler’s conquests. By presenting citizens with two options—support and prosper, or do not support and risk your life and freedom—Roosevelt framed adopting a prowar stance as the only logical choice a citizen might make.

If an appeal to logos for the “forgotten man” allowed for an individual to contribute despite economic hardship and if s/he was able to do so in the name of
preserving democratic freedom, then both Roosevelt and the OWI’s strategy had to be focused on what the individual could contribute to the war effort; in other words, if average citizens were being incited through radio-delivered messages to contribute to the war effort, then they also needed to be given options that would feasibly allow them to do so despite any financial limitations they might have been facing. Roosevelt and the OWI encouraged citizens to enlist in the armed forces, purchase war bonds, ration goods, and when possible, become increasingly self-reliant for everyday necessities rather than purchasing them (such as by growing one’s own vegetables or recycling clothing) (Brewer 80). Citizens with more social and financial capital—such as those who owned or had access to airtime on the radio—were asked to support the war effort. If all citizens could contribute by buying into these same practices, then all citizens could be called out to and appealed to via the radio—and addressed as the collective “forgotten man” whose hardships would no longer be ignored or discredited by the political machine that was Washington. The “forgotten man,” then, became the stand-in for the entirety of the listening radio public—in short, for the entirety of the American public, as citizens across all demographics had suffered some degree of stress during the Depression.

Such a massing together of all citizens from across social strata further served to increase national unification and support for the war because underneath the appeal to logos was an appeal to pathos—that of being recognized and valued, and of belonging to a collective. To make American citizens feel invited and welcomed into his circle, Roosevelt strategically chose simple, common words and avoided political jargon; he
kept his speech general and somewhat vague rather than specifically speaking to particular people or aspects of the convention itself; he spoke slowly enough to be easily understood by those who only had the affordance of hearing, and not for those who had the affordances of both hearing and seeing. His audience awareness, coupled with and influenced by technological awareness, ultimately worked to produce feelings of fondness and trust from a listening nation. American citizens may have felt forgotten during the Great Depression, but now it was their individual contributions that the president—that friendly, familiar voice from the radio—was calling upon to fuel the nation through war. The forgotten man became the most pivotal resource for achieving global military victory.

Extenuating circumstances, and Roosevelt’s response to them, would prove more than enough reason for the forgotten man to contribute to the war effort. Heavily appealing to both his own ethos and the pathos of a shocked nation, Roosevelt petitioned both Congress and American citizens for support to engage in a hot war on December 8, 1941. In a radio-aired Congressional address, President Roosevelt asked for permission to enter the United States in World War II, risking economic strain on a nation still reeling from the collapse of its financial infrastructure over a decade prior. Yet, the relationship Roosevelt had built with citizens through his weekly radio broadcasts—a relationship built on a truthfully genuine and caring ethos—proved much stronger than the nation’s understandable hesitancy to entangle the United States in what was until that moment a European affair. While Roosevelt’s ethos may have been enough to draw support for the
war effort—a support that was enthusiastically backed in the form of Congressional approval to formally enter the war—Roosevelt did not have to rely solely on his person for military backing. Due to the dramatic and traumatic nature of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt naturally drew on pathos as a mechanism of soliciting an overwhelming American support for retaliation and the pursuit of justice against those who had, for the first time in decades, threatened American soil with an act of war. By addressing Congress within twenty-four hours of the attack, Roosevelt drew emotional support when citizens’ emotions were still raw, in shock, and least prone to being tempered by logos—instead of by offering a more careful consideration of what the road ahead may have looked like for a financially struggling country to engage itself in a global war that showed little sign of ending in the foreseeable future.

While the Roosevelt administration did make smart use of the radio to directly speak to citizens, one cannot ignore the role the government played in determining what could and could not be aired during radio programming. Because the medium’s use as a type of newspaper for the ears was still in its infancy, the idea that the government’s role should be limited as it relates to the press was not yet a topic of discussion amongst the public. As a result, the Roosevelt agenda was able to significantly filter what was said about politics on national radio programming—and to a heavy extent, what was said on local programming as well. As the war dragged on and the United States eventually engaged in combat, the need to maintain national security through monitoring radio programming took an even stronger hold: “It is nearly impossible, after all, to tell the
story of radio broadcasting during this period without acknowledging the steadily increasing dominance of...the government’s heavy-handed influence on broadcasting during the war” (Loviglio 92). In what proved to be a highly strategic move, the government kept quiet about its role as radio authority, meanwhile giving the impression that this mostly-entertainment, sometimes-news source was more democratic than it actually was. At its foundation, radio was a heavily co-opted medium guarded by Roosevelt himself and the OWI department he created, though the former’s appeal to pathos and ethos effectively prevented too much suspicion of this government-media relationship at the public level. The government even allowed a limited voicing of opposition to the Roosevelt administration on the radio, further disguising its role in media ownership at the time.

Roosevelt did not stand alone as the singular voice of wartime radio; he was often discredited, fought against, and even ridiculed on the airwaves by a few key figures who vehemently opposed American intervention in what they considered a strictly European war. This camp of protestors—the countercollective known during this time as isolationists—often waited for Roosevelt and other interventionists to publicize prowar sentiments before they took to their own radio programs in denouncement of those very sentiments. While the countercollective had opposed Roosevelt’s national policies—both war-related and not—before December of 1941, their focus on dismantling popular opinion in support of Roosevelt or American involvement in a global war did not gain much momentum until the Japanese Imperial Forces attacked Pearl Harbor on December
7, 1941—an event after which many Americans declared themselves interventionists due to a feeling of justification for retaliation, or just simply for maintaining national security and defense in a war that the United States neither instigated nor rushed to join. Not surprisingly, what resulted was a nationwide civil battle fought over the airwaves to determine America’s extent of involvement in World War II. However, this technologically-enhanced debate between the collective and countercollective also created a surprising result: a unification of the public on a scale grand enough to warrant consideration of it as a return to tribal consciousness. In the post-industrial age, this unified response illustrates a consubstantial collective.

The Countercollective

World War II has gone down in modern American memory not only as the radio war, but also as “the good war.” It has become fictionalized as this moment in time when the men were brave, the women supported them, and the nation rallied together as a homogeneously unified mass to defeat the forces of evil (Bodnar 2, 35, 193-94, 200-01). Culturally and historically, the conflict has been entombed in a rhetoric of justification, necessity, and glamorized victory. However, critical positional voices and moments are largely ignored in this common narrative, and the reality of a conflicted public is easily overlooked.

In his study of public memory, John Bodnar notes “that the memory and the meaning of that war was actually a matter of contention among Americans who lived through those times” (1). Yet, despite this nostalgic take on historical events, the facts
still exist: the war was also fought for additional ulterior motives, and the American 
forces entered it too much later after other Western nations to claim that a moral 
obligation to check a tyrant was the guiding factor for involvement—or else the nation 
would have acted as soon as political allies came under attack. Mixed feelings associated 
with every stage of the conflict were muddied and contested among citizens. Bodnar 
notes that the overall feelings of the war were decidedly antiwar for quite some time due 
to public memory of the devastating human and financial cost of World War I (11). In the 
time between the end of World War I and America’s entrance into World War II, antiwar 
citizens had banded together to create the America First Committee. This group took an 
adamant stand against involvement in international conflict, and particularly dedicated 
itself “to resisting Roosevelt’s efforts to confront Hitler’s power” (11). Key figures stood 
out during the Roosevelt years as voices against intervention, and though they may go 
unnoticed or discredited in modern memory of the war, their opposition to Roosevelt’s 
call for support demonstrated the rhetorical and technological savvy of the 
countercollective, which would come to shape future protest rhetoric and use of mass 
media. Two men in particular—Father Coughlin and Huey Long—made their opposition 
to Roosevelt well-known and made strategic use of the radio to garner support from 
American citizens who also found themselves unhappy with the President’s plans. Their 
brazen calls to form a protest against Roosevelt influenced the use of the radio as a 
national medium and citizens’ responses to Roosevelt right before and during the war. 
The scope and long-lasting influence both men exerted on the national level was the
result of a highly strategic rhetoric that involved charisma, brash ambition, and a public call to defend the “threatened values and institutions” of the ordinary citizen (Brinkley 143). As opponents to Roosevelt, these men shared ideologies for the future of America that involved a return to individual security and wealth, a collective uprising against federal powers that wielded too much control, and a returned focus to the stability of the United States rather than shifting the focus to a global war (143-44).

One of the most prominent antiwar figures plaguing Roosevelt both before and during the war was Father Charles Coughlin, a Catholic priest based near Detroit, Michigan. His weekly broadcast, The Hour of Power, began as a religiously-based radio program designed for Catholic listeners wishing to learn more about the faith. However, it became clear rather quickly that Father Coughlin’s political leanings would heavily influence his programming, and eventually came to characterize the show completely. By the early 1930s the show was predominantly political in nature (Brinkley 83). The Hour of Power, while initially pro-Roosevelt due to a brief political alliance, eventually took a sharp turn against Roosevelt and adamantly propagated an isolationist approach in direct opposition to that which the president requested from the public. While Coughlin’s broadcast was originally only heard by those in his local Michigan community, his popularity increasingly grew to encompass the surrounding Midwest region. CBS later picked up his program and aired it nationally, though it was not long before his show was cancelled because of his criticism of Roosevelt and the potential ramifications CBS faced from the OWI if they continued to allow Coughlin’s isolationist rhetoric air time.
Coughlin’s ethos in his specific time and place played an undeniably important role in securing an audience base. Had Coughlin not been based in a dominantly Catholic area of the country during a time when Christian church membership was more common than not, Coughlin’s appeal to listeners would most likely have meant very little. Had Coughlin begun his radio program while based in a church outside the Catholic stronghold of the Midwest (which also reached listeners in the Northeast, another stronghold of the Catholic faith), few may have noticed or cared for his religious views—and thus would not have been introduced to his political ones. However, those Catholic listeners who first became acquainted with Coughlin during the early days of his radio program—which did not veer from traditional tenets of the Catholic faith—would have had little reason to resist his political agenda, especially if such an agenda were couched within the context of Coughlin’s religious ethos. If he had not failed them in the religious arena after so long, why would he prove inaccurate or wholly erroneous now? If he had suspect political leanings, why would he have been so favored for so long, and by so many? Coughlin’s political broadcasts followed on the coattails of a religious reputation he had already cultivated, thereby granting him a wider realm of influence than he would have had otherwise. Time and place—1930s and 1940s Midwest—were the linchpins in creating this reputation in the first place.

As arguably the strongest opponent of Roosevelt and his wartime agenda, Father Coughlin’s appeals to logos secured his followers’ acceptance of his political stance more strongly than would have been possible with just his appeals to ethos alone. If listeners
first tuned in for Coughlin’s ethos as a religious figure, then it was his logos that cemented listeners’ agreement with this controversial antagonist. In fact, his introduction first as a religious leader, then as a logical, critical thinker with strong political opinions demonstrates such logos itself and was undoubtedly a carefully constructed approach on Coughlin’s part.

Coughlin’s appeal to his listeners’ logic began well before the United States’ entrance into World War II, and only increased in importance as Coughlin sought to maintain momentum and the support of his loyal listeners. His critical questioning of Roosevelt’s approach to the economy during the 1930s challenged the government’s official agenda for re-stabilizing the nation as international tension was mounting in Europe. Coughlin sharply disagreed with Roosevelt’s complete overhaul of certain economic structures that struck the priest as a threat to the capitalist ideals he supported. As Roosevelt worked incrementally to repair the economic damage wrought by the stock market crash of 1929, Coughlin noted it was never quite enough to truly fix the disastrous effects—Roosevelt’s measures were consistently too conservative (Brinkley 114). In fact, from the beginning of Roosevelt’s presidency, Coughlin proved a thorn in his side: “Nothing...troubled members of the [Roosevelt] Administration in its first months as Coughlin’s intervention in a major banking controversy in Detroit just after the inauguration. It was an episode that earned Coughlin national publicity” (192-93). This moment simultaneously marked Coughlin as no longer simply a religious figure, but as a political analyst with access to technology that would carry his voice across a region.
Because he had already presented logical evidence as to why certain—but very crucial elements—of Roosevelt’s plans for the nation were ill-conceived and would also prove ill-executed, it logically followed (to those who supported Coughlin’s stance) that his argument against Roosevelt as the possibility of war loomed was also logically sound and could be trusted.

Father Coughlin’s appeal to the masses did not end with his credentials as a religious leader, or with his analysis of political and economic events; he also cultivated quite the reputation for his emotional delivery of both religious and political convictions. As a priest, an appeal to emotion is expected to some degree. Persuading parishioners of their need to repent, to support the local church, to seek out religious authority figures for confession, and to tithe regularly depends on one’s ability to convince people that their very souls rely on such devotion. Because religious matters are often not up for empirical debate (which would rest more on logos than pathos), Father Coughlin had much experience and expertise in flexing his emotional muscle—and persuading his congregation to comply with the wishes he made from the pulpit. When the United States deliberated on an appropriate level of involvement in Europe’s ongoing war, Coughlin seized the opportunity to use his position as a religious official who was expected to incorporate an element of pathos; in this way, Coughlin presented his countercollective stance as a matter of such passion that he was inclined—even morally and spiritually so—to discuss such issues with his parishioners and listeners. As a devoted congregation, his followers must have interpreted his political discussions as divinely inspired; if some
supernatural power had not inspired the priest to speak of such matters, then why would
this trusted religious official do so? In this way, their understanding of and dedication to
their faith rested in part on not just tolerating Coughlin’s political talk, but even accepting
and practicing it themselves. To do anything else would have created a cognitive
dissonance that brought their faith into question.

Beyond his motivation for discussing political matters, Coughlin capitalized on
his listeners’ sense of pathos in the mannerisms of his speech. Coughlin was
well-rehearsed in using his voice to elicit a particular emotional response. Knowing the
affordances and limitations of his medium, Coughlin emphasized key traits in his voice
that would work to soothe listeners and make them feel comforted and secure; thus, they
would feel confident trusting Coughlin’s advice. By playing on a deep, masculine voice
with strategically timed tonal inflections, “Coughlin retrained a trace of an Irish brogue,
which he often exaggerated for effect...to add warmth and color” to a voice well-known
and an accent comforting to those of the traditional Irish Catholic faith and
community—the base of his listeners, at least initially (Brinkley 92).

Because Coughlin was the only major figure—and the only syndicated one,
though briefly—to make use of regular radio programming to combat Roosevelt’s
agenda, the novelty of the countercollective using this electronic medium to challenge the
government’s decisions drew much attention, and made citizens aware that they could
hold opinions and ideologies that differed from that of the prowar collective and of the
traditional power structure that was the American government. Although Coughlin was
eventually taken off the air because his censures posed too much of a threat to prowar
morale, the seed of protest had been planted: the public now realized they could use the
same technology to speak out when they disagreed with their government.

Coughlin did not stand alone in his criticism of Roosevelt’s policies. Huey Long, a Senator from Louisiana, also proved a formidable antagonist to the Roosevelt
administration and drummed up much unrest with the federal government leading up to
his 1935 assassination. While he did not live to see the attack on Pearl Harbor or
America’s entrance into war, Long’s influence on citizen support would outlive him. His
questioning of the government’s intentions and (lack of) concern for the
public—especially for the common man struggling to rebuild after the Great
Depression—created a political environment in which citizens were prompted to
critically question the government’s policies on all fronts, including decisions regarding
global war.

In a similar manner to Father Coughlin, Huey Long capitalized on his
longstanding ethos as a public figure who had both time and experience in the public
arena. Long was in some ways the political equivalent of Father Coughlin—he was well
known to his constituency, he was respected in his field, and he used his public platform
to openly criticize Roosevelt’s agenda. As a popular favorite of Louisiana voters, Long’s
ethos was built partly on his larger-than-life reputation—as suggested by his nickname
“The Kingfish”—as well as his quick ascent from local politician, to senator, to state
governor. Such notoriety and quick succession to increasing levels of power implied
Long possessed the authority and credibility to be in such positions in the first place—and if he deserved to be in these positions, then it would follow, at least in the minds of many voters, that Long could be trusted, or else he would not have been elected to these positions of political power and influence in the first place.

Long had developed a reputation for being loud, strongly opinionated, and unabashed in his political ambition (Brinkley 28). Like Roosevelt and Coughlin, Long was highly effective in his strategic use of radio to both inform citizens and to garner support, and he was one of the first politicians to make use of radio technology on the campaign trail (26). He realized early in Roosevelt’s administration how critical the radio would be for both men’s political careers, and

Five days after Franklin Roosevelt delivered his first ‘Fireside Chat’ over the radio to explain the provisions of the Emergency Banking Act, Long took to the air himself [and] delivered the first of what was to become a three-year series of folksy radio addresses to move himself to the forefront of the popular consciousness. (62)

In one of his earliest radio rebuttals to Roosevelt, Long strategically framed his concern with the Emergency Banking Act as a need to assist the President, as he would be unable to accomplish the task alone. In suggesting public support, Long presented his strained relationship with the President as friendly, even supportive—a move noted by some political rhetoric scholars as “cagey” (62). To the average citizen, though, such a rhetorical move might suggest a man of character who wanted to help the nation move on from the turmoil of the Great Depression. This same rhetorical move could have also
struck listeners as one of logos, as Long suggested that the massive overhauls to
American infrastructure could not be accomplished without some sense of teamwork. In
his rebuttal broadcast to Roosevelt’s first radio chat, Long disguised his concern by
implying to listeners that Roosevelt sought a financial plan to rebuild an economically
depressed America in much the same way Long sought—a plan which was much more
radical than anything Roosevelt desired to do. Thus, Roosevelt would ultimately
disappoint those who had been led to expect from him something similar to Long’s
financial plans for redistributing wealth, so citizen unrest would increase with Roosevelt.
This disappointment—Long hoped—would put the Louisiana Senator in a more
favorable position with his constituents who viewed him as the common man’s ally rather
than a cog in the federal political machine (62).

As Long established himself as a state and then national political figure, he
simultaneously established himself as a radio celebrity. Like Roosevelt, he began relying
on the radio to “bring his voice to millions of Americans so that, using his considerable
broadcasting skill, he could soothe their fears about him and exhort them to ever greater
efforts on his behalf,” which led him to become a major contributor for NBC by 1935
(Brinkley 71). While his flamboyant, even aggressive, demeanor was often considered
professionally inappropriate, Long’s concern remained from the inception of his political
career on the common citizen—the one whose own autonomy had been compromised by
a federal government too big for its own good. Long sought to repair local governments,
returning power to the voters rather than taking from them and redistributing their wealth
to a concentrated power structure in Washington (148). In fact, this power structure became one of the most popular tenets on which Long built his career. Though he died six years before the United States entered World War II, Long’s impact on Roosevelt’s reputation worked against the president, leading many citizens, mostly in the Southern states, to question Roosevelt’s intentions, motivations, and rationale for both his sweeping social restructuring program of the New Deal, as well as his later call for Congressional approval to go to war.

Father Coughlin and Huey Long are well remembered for their opposition to Roosevelt and his collective, yet during the 1930s and 1940s, public opinion of the president was also swayed by a highly notable celebrity who is often overlooked when examining the political events of this time period. As a third outspoken critic of Roosevelt's interventionist agenda, Charles Lindbergh commanded a considerable amount of media attention due to his public fame as a celebrated aviator. On September 15, 1939, he delivered a radio-broadcasted speech as a leader of the foremost isolationist network in the nation, the America First Committee. His speech was aired on all three major radio networks and was heard nationally. In a second radio-broadcasted speech on October 13, 1939, he clarified that he understood that entering the war for political reasons was unproductive and ill-advised. However, he personally wanted to get involved in the entire affair only because he felt the white race was being threatened overseas (David S. Wyman Institute). While he minimized this latter point, Lindbergh’s appeal to the public was not based on logos to begin with, so he did not actually need an intricate
logos-backed argument in order to persuade citizens to consider the countercollective's point of view. As a national hero and celebrity for his daring aviation feats, Lindbergh capitalized entirely on his ethos to persuade his audience. Like Father Coughlin and Long, Lindbergh relied on his reputation as a professional in his field and on the character his listeners assumed he possessed because of it.

The collective and countercollective clashed and fought for the minds of citizens via radio broadcasts, spreading ideologies and sentiments in hopes the public would adopt their view and act accordingly. While the radio was heavily dominated by the interventionist approach of the collective, the seeds were being sown during World War II that would later grow into a more apparent and powerful phenomenon threatening to shake up the power structure with nationwide protests during the following heavily mediated war. Without radio, the multiplicity of voices would not have reached Americans with the same velocity and impact; electronic technology’s affordances are what created a public that had the possibility to separate into multiple collectives, each with their own desires concerning the war. Moreover, these multiple collectives also had the possibility to make their desires nationally known, to all citizens simultaneously.

But the “conversation” enabled by radio was not a two-way street, as the government still held syndication rights, making all radio programming subject to their approval. It was their disapproval of Father Coughlin’s program that eventually took him off the air, stripping the countercollective of their most popular and only truly nationally-heard representative. In this instance, the prowar collective retained their
power and upheld the traditional power structure of the nation, with the president and his administration still controlling the agenda and what citizens heard. Coughlin’s loss of airtime privilege—and the fact that airtime was a privilege at all, not a right—significantly weakened the potential threat the countercollective posed to the traditional power structure of the American government. Because the government still controlled syndication, the only way for citizens to express dissatisfaction or disagreement—or even satisfaction and agreement—was to write letters to the radio stations themselves or the White House directly. Though this often did nothing, as the stations were held by law and subject to the government, and they might still choose not to discuss countercollective sentiments mailed to them. While these letters may have influenced radio programming to some degree, they were not shared with the rest of the nation. So, while citizens across the country heard collectivist programming, only those working for the radio stations and the government had access to read the letters sent in from citizens who identified as part of the countercollective. The only nationally-heard conversation was not a conversation at all, because it was dominated by prowar efforts, creating the illusion that the collective voice was the only voice.

The Medium and The Public

The uneven power struggle of the airwaves created tangible results in how American citizens responded to the war effort. With the majority of radio programming supporting the collective agenda, it is no surprise that history has not noted any major upheaval or resistance to World War II on the part of American citizens, save for those
few key figures previously discussed. The radio as a technological medium of mass communication possesses a power that had not been tapped into during the previous war world, and its use as both collective and countercollective unifier was unanticipated. Marshall McLuhan considered radio a unifying medium that worked its technological magic to bring individuals back together following the prevalence of the written word: “Radio affects most people intimately, person-to-person, offering a world of unspoken communication between writer-speaker and listener...The subliminal depths of radio are charged with the resonating echoes of tribal horns and antique drums” (Understanding Media 401). His argument hinged on radio functioning as an extension of the human central nervous system, with the power to “create depth involvement for everybody” who shared in a common listening experience (400). In a literate society where citizens were accustomed to reading newspapers independently, and often in the privacy of their own homes, the importance of radio during World War II, as well as in the years leading up to American involvement in it, deeply impacted the social structure of both citizen support and protest as a return to some degree of retribalization began to take hold. People were not reading separate newspapers at separate times in separate locations during this war; they were collectively tuning into Roosevelt’s live Fireside Chats at the same time, on the same day. They knew they were collectively participating in an activity. While they still may have been in their individual homes, the power of radio’s immediacy and synchronicity brought people a step closer when learning national and global news in a way that they had never before experienced.
The radio created a common national identity for American listeners largely through the technological affordance of information centralization: “radio’s centrality to national identity, its powerful claims on public and private registers of experience, and its displacement of older social institutions” brought the mass public together in a way previous media had been unable to (Hilmes and Loviglio xi; Loviglio 89). As the public began tuning in to popular radio programming in larger numbers, broadcasters picked up on the rhetorically effective strategy of reflecting the “American identity” back to the listeners by “reformulating American history to stress ordinary people, rather than powerful and wealthy politicians and business leaders, as the inventors and sustainers of American democracy” (Smith 210). This tactic of reflecting the identity of the collective also encouraged citizens who disagreed to remain relatively quiet. As the minority, the countercollective would have felt pressured to reconsider their own stance or to at least visibly conform to social expectations regarding war support, as potential ostracization from the rest of the collective may have been a consequence that persuaded dissenters to refrain from speaking out against the war too loudly (Jowett and O’Donnell 184). In fact, faction among citizens was more or less quelled if judged by radio programming: “radio waves and their impervious mobility across social boundaries […] served as an ideal symbol for national togetherness” (Hilmes and Loviglio xi). By all appearances, a collective of supporters had been brought together by a centralized medium.

Understanding the impact the radio had on the nation involves more analysis than that of the messages themselves; beyond the words spoken, the medium itself shaped how
American citizens responded to the war effort. McLuhan notes that “It’s not the message itself that’s important in the electric age—it’s the effect it creates, the change it instigates” (Understanding Media 43). According to McLuhan, the radio served to centralize the public into a singular collective where “social interaction [is] characterized by the intense mutual involvement of the members of the community and [is] the opposite of the detached individualism and private identities characteristic of a literate culture under mechanical technology” (567). The home was no longer a private dwelling once the voices of Roosevelt and Coughlin were invited in; they now spoke, in real time, directly to Americans as they appealed for support either for or against the war. McLuhan suggested that the “person to person directness that is private and intimate” is what created a sense of identification between American listeners and the voices they heard on the radio (The Book of Probes 188).

Beyond the words spoken and their effect of creating the collective and countercollective, the radio’s success in restructuring the nature of society in wartime lies in part in its quick delivery. The speed-up in dispersion of information and opinion-formation demonstrates how instantaneous the radio was in shaping Americans’ responses to these figures and their respective collective or countercollective. In fact, McLuhan suggested that the radio was, in some sense, a violent means for creating a collective and countercollective consciousness. Though rather than one unified national collective, American citizens found themselves choosing between two camps: “Just before the war, Roosevelt discovered the means of making the radio fireside chat a kind
of firing line, a new kind of political violence to recover the sense of identity” (*War and Peace* 134). Coughlin, Long, and Lindbergh, too, discovered that they could use the radio as their own firing line. With one hour each week, both the collective and countercollective fought for the attention and sympathies of the American public, suggesting that war was taking place both in Europe and at home. The radio itself was a battleground.

Beyond the creation of a collective and countercollective centralized through the radio, McLuhan’s framework also draws attention to the role the ear played in engaging citizens politically and publicly in a way it had not since pre-print literacy days. The way the brain interprets information as internalized through the ears rather than through the eyes changes the way individuals respond and the cues to which they respond. Print sources presented information linearly, asynchronously, and statically. Radio programming, however, was not held to linearity, was synchronous in presentation (Roosevelt always spoke at ten o’clock on Sunday evenings, for example), and it was dynamic, as broadcasters could change their scripts at a moment’s notice based on incoming information. In her argument that radio played an even more pivotal role than television in shaping American culture during wartime, Susan J. Douglas mentions that part of what made this medium so persuasive in capturing citizens’ attention was “the bringing of national and international news, with the actual sounds of political rallies, air-raid sirens, or gunfire, right into people’s living rooms, bedrooms, and kitchen...Listeners were transported to different places and times by radio” (162).
Douglas also notes that while informational news broadcasting has always had a reputation as being delivered in flat tones, that broadcast journalism—which was itself a novelty in the late 1930s and early 1940s—emphasized a more imaginative delivery that can best be described as “dimensional listening, as people were compelled to conjure up maps, topographies, street scenes in London after a bombing, a warship being dive-bombed by the Luftwaffe” (163). In other words, the radio afforded citizens a chance to “participate” in what felt, to some degree, like a conversation that included them in real time, and even in “real place,” as they were led to imagine the scenes being reported as if witnessing them for themselves. Moreover, reporters played a role in helping listeners set up these imaginative scenes by subtly influencing their interpretation of the events and places being reported. In her examination of news reports during wartime, she notes a pattern of “certain radio reporters subtly leading public opinion toward a less isolationist stance, a worldview more sympathetic to mobilization and, eventually, engagement” (163).

While history may focus primarily on the justification and support of the Good War, the time period leading up to the conflict and the four years of American active engagement in it were not unmarked by a protest movement. The radio played a key role in American protest during World War II, though both collective and countercollective radio programming was ephemeral and many of the broadcasts were not recorded for posterity. From the extant broadcasts that do survive, it can be noted that the same qualities that made the radio apt for creating a patriotic, war-supporting national identity
also lent themselves to the creation of a countercollective: “Radio often played with the subversive potential of unseen voices, challenging and even mocking conventional social norms. It also allowed specialized arenas of American culture to reach a wider public,” including providing a wider public platform from which minorities—especially of the political nature—could vocalize their messages to the wider public (Hilmes and Loviglio xiii; Hilmes 3).

Although radio was still technically a unidirectional form of communication in that the public was the audience, listening to the speaker without a chance to directly talk back, the radio rhetorically worked to increase tribalization across America in two significant ways: it necessitated the sense of hearing which had taken a back seat in a highly literate society, and it accommodated a wider audience in any given moment than its major competitor for newscasting, the newspaper, as many people could gather around a single radio set to listen to the same program at the same time, and newspapers were not easily shared by multiple readers at once. These changes suggested to radio listeners that what they encountered on the radio was somehow more interactive, more immersive, than reading a paper. McLuhan argues that the radio was itself a “hot medium,” meaning that it provided all the necessary information for listeners by “extend[ing] one single sense in ‘high definition’” or emphasizing its use more than that of other senses (Understanding Media 39). In comparison to later media such as the television and Internet, the radio is indeed a hot medium, as it does not allow for the same type of interactivity of multiple senses. However, compared to the previous most popular news source—the
newspaper—the radio is cooler in that it presents its content as if it were a conversation, though listeners cannot respond directly back to the voice on the airwaves. Its “aliveness” made the radio appear more participatory than it actually was. Its novelty as the leading news source combined with that “aliveness” created an environment wherein citizens felt more engaged in discussion concerning the war, thus contributing to a feeling of collectivism and active engagement in public matters.

World War II truly was the radio war. A vehicle of entertainment by day and wartime news informer by night, the radio introduced the nation to a novel sensory experience that intrigued the brain by way of ear—and in turn created a new social structure that encouraged participation in a more communal way than the newspaper ever did. What is more, the accessibility of the radio, with its mass production and relative affordability, created an environment in which the public en masse could virtually come together over the airwaves in their role as audience when the president or his critics delivered their messages concerning the nation’s next steps. While rhetors have always sought public audiences, the use of the radio as the prime medium changed the landscape of mass communication because it permeated the traditional civic boundaries, moving now through both the public and private spheres. The technology was ripe for rhetorical ownership, and Roosevelt and Coughlin most notably made strategic rhetorical use of this new technology. However, it was Roosevelt who proved most savvy with his appeals to the public, as not only did the nation indeed engage in war, but the public at large responded with overwhelming support. Yet, Roosevelt’s detractors proved no small
challenge to the charismatic and persuasive president; indeed, Father Coughlin, Huey Long, and Charles Lindbergh paved the way for protestors in the electronic age by modeling an intelligent strategy for inciting protest. By mimicking the rhetorical stylings of President Roosevelt, Coughlin and his peers competed with the official prowar agenda in a most subtle way—by conveying messages laden with ethos and pathos that were so similar to those they were countering. Their strategy ultimately fell short, as the protest movement against the prowar agenda failed to take hold in a meaningful way on the national level. Albert Fried argues that this shortcoming was due largely because “Roosevelt knew America to its depths, and his enemies and critics and the leaders of radical movements and sects did not” (9). While both Roosevelt and his detractors knew how to speak to the public, Roosevelt proved to be the most adept at also knowing what to say that would convince his listeners most assuredly. Roosevelt offered what his critics could not: a political ethos that overrode the religious and otherwise fame-backed ethos of figures like Coughlin, Long, and Lindbergh; a logos entrenched in military, financial, and international policy that provided certain action plans for the present and future of America; and a pathos that pitted Americans against the antiwar agenda as a means of safety, security, and national and cultural preservation following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
CHAPTER III

THE VIETNAM WAR: AMERICA’S FIRST TELEVISION WAR

A new form of “politics” is emerging, and in ways we haven’t yet noticed. The living room has become a voting booth. Participation via television in Freedom Marches, in war, revolution, pollution, and other events is changing everything.

Marshall McLuhan, The Medium is the Massage 22

From 1955 to 1975, the United States fought a highly controversial war that carried a price tag of 58,220 American bodies (National Archives). The Vietnam War began quietly, dragged on languidly, and ended, as T.S. Eliot would have said, “not with a bang but with a whimper” (65). The generation of soldiers who had fought and won World War II for the Allied forces now watched as their children enlisted—and later, were drafted—into a major conflict that, if not won, posed an ominous future for the rest of the globe. Fearing the Communism that had been spreading in Asia, the United States proactively engaged in a conflict to prevent domination by outside forces so as not to present an opportunity for the world’s next Hitler. No clear victory—at least for the United States—has become evident in the four decades that have passed since.

The conflict in Vietnam was shaped by, and in turn shaped, particular events that produced an experience drastically different from that of World War II. The newest, most popular form of mass media communication was the television, where the war would play out in front of the American public. Citizens read and heard about—and for the
first time in history, saw—the war from afar, in their own homes. Television programming showed prowar messages via presidential addresses and newscasts that often relied on logos and ethos, but countercollective views subtly crept in and raised questions about both the success and ethics of American military action in Vietnam, often expressing frustration with the war via pathos-infused demonstrations. Unlike the days of World War II, those of the Vietnam War saw more citizens questioning the government they had trusted just twenty years earlier as the public at large became increasingly exposed to the dark realities of war of which they had not been privy to during the Good War.

For it was the Good War that created a widespread belief that because the government had acted justly in retaliating against Axis forces, it could be trusted as an institution to judiciously choose when and how to engage in military action (Hamilton 11). In fact, the overwhelming public support for World War II has been argued as the historically “best example of wartime consensus in this country” because the public had been convinced that war was the only logical response to the Axis threat (Gustanis xv). This public sentiment persisted through the 1950s, but began to erode in the 1960s due to rising political tensions as American body counts continued to grow when no end for the Vietnam War seemed to be in sight. This tension took on a heightened degree of seriousness in 1968 when American forces were caught off guard and their security dramatically compromised during the Tet Offensive (Hamilton 299; Moorcraft and Taylor 82). The myth that Vietnam was a winnable war shattered following the Tet
Offensive; no longer did the American public by and large buy into the official story being told to them by the government (Cumings 83). This atmosphere of domestic unrest following the attacks readied a portion of the American public to participate in protests the likes of which had been unheard of during World War II.

However, the public’s frustration with the war had been mounting even before the Tet Offensive. The military-press relationship had been strained since the Eisenhower administration, which had created an atmosphere of distrust and persuaded many citizens that the government either withheld information about, or misrepresented, American military action abroad (Wyatt 33). Multiple mishandlings of media relations on the part of four American presidents continued to mar the public’s perception of the war. However, the military-press relationship, political missteps, and rising causality numbers may have been better received by the public had not one particular force been present to make sure American citizens kept talking about Vietnam (and particularly about its increasing drawbacks)—the television.

The Vietnam War escalated during the Kennedy administration and drew more domestic and international attention than it did at its start during the Eisenhower administration, forcing Kennedy to create a media policy that would prove effective and favorable for his own administration, as well as for the unfolding international relations between the Free World and the Communist Bloc. In attempting to attract domestic

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11 As Wyatt points out, the press had a relationship with both the government and the military. Though these are two separate entities, their stance is always the same in terms of actions in Vietnam. Thus, for the sake of convenience, I will refer to the relationship among all three as simply the military-press relationship, with “military” connoting both itself and the government.
support while also keeping the Vietnam conflict from escalating any further, Kennedy designed a strategic plan to use the media in a way that would shed favorable light on his administration and policies when they proved successful, while simultaneously framing more negative results (or total failings) as unforeseeable, unpreventable situations set in motion before he took office. By the time Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency, the Vietnam War had escalated to a point that was nearly impossible to hide from the media, though Johnson tried to keep a tight rein on reporters and journalists. The limitations put on media personnel by the American government—orders often coming directly from the sitting president—ultimately created an atmosphere of distrust between the military hosting the press, the press itself, and the public (Paul and Kim 36). This tense relationship played a more rhetorical role than has been given treatment previously.

While many studies of the military-press relationship exist, they typically examine the issues between freedom of information and military security. Emphasis has previously centered on the way the media portrayed the war itself, but not necessarily the domestic fallout that was a very real part of daily life during combat time. Such previous studies have also not produced much by way of explaining how this military-press relationship psychologically impacted the way the American public received news of the war or how the public then used that news to shape their own responses—including antiwar responses such as protests. In short, the rhetorical impact of the Vietnam War reporting on the American public has been historically overlooked. Such a rhetorical analysis is important, though, as the Vietnam War era experienced the novelty of the television as a war news
medium. The television’s affordance to show images of combat reality directly to American citizens undoubtedly worked as a rhetorical vehicle to persuade individuals into certain frames of understanding and reacting to the Vietnam War. While there is a dearth of extant research to prove such causation, logical assumption suggests a correlation between the press coverage of the war and the increasing waves of protests as compared to American’s involvement in World War II.

Antiwar protest did not begin immediately with televised combat coverage; to be persuaded to dissent the government’s wartime decisions would have been too extreme a step to make in a single bound, especially following the victorious Good War and the overwhelming public support given for it. Rather, dissension among citizens grew gradually as strains in the military-press relationship became increasingly evident. Media coverage of Vietnam began so quietly that most citizens did not even notice, occupying only a few minutes (if any at all) to brief the nation on political developments as read by a news anchor (Gustanis xv). Coverage also began not with television, but through radio and newspapers, and only gradually shifted to television. Thus, the early stages of the Vietnam War seemed much like a watered-down version of previous wars and focused mainly on political negotiations void of violent combat. The American public interpreted the Vietnam discussion as largely innocuous and, therefore, had no reason to panic or protest at the beginning. In fact, this conflict was presented to the public not so much as war but as a preemptive means of avoiding future hot wars and potential Communist domination. During a press conference in 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose
own ethos as a World War II general bolstered citizens’ confidence in his knowledge of how to handle such a situation, urged American involvement (though minimal) because of the “domino theory.” He expressed concern that if Communist forces were not suppressed in Vietnam, that country would fall to those forces, and then the remainder of the Asian countries would as well (Gustanis 9). Eventually, Communism could pose a viable threat to the United States itself. The American public largely appeared to support involvement in Vietnam because of this theory, which they mainly heard about over the radio waves or read about in newspapers. Initially, this war looked more like a way to prevent another Pearl Harbor more than it did the beginning of a long drawn-out conflict, and the media felt no pressing need to relay information that seemed mostly like security patrol of Southeast Asia; thus, little to no television coverage treated the conflict. Television’s ability to relay news as the primary information conduit, and its ability to encourage mass dissent, still lay years ahead.

For the first few years of the conflict, media coverage was virtually nonexistent and remained confined mainly to newspaper reporting. While the Kennedy administration did appear to grant the press freedom to ask questions and request information about Vietnam, the White House still fed the media its content and carefully managed the image the public received about the success of American military action (Wyatt 30). Following Kennedy’s assassination, the White House’s stance on the press remained seemingly open, manufactured though it was. The amount of coverage increased following the Gulf of Tonkin incident and as the press began to see the difference in their
goals for coverage and those of the White House. The accounts provided by reporters and
the accounts detailed by the White House differed enough that the public began to notice
that what the reporters said was happening in Vietnam and what President Johnson
reported were happening in Vietnam were at drastic odds (Gustanis vxi). If “honest”
reporting of the events were what the public sought, then both media personnel and
government personnel were going to have to either agree to what the truth of the conflict
was, or they would have to compete for the support of American citizens.

The Collective

Five presidential administrations exercised their authority during the twenty-year
long conflict, and, while each administration made use of the media in idiosyncratic
ways, some notable patterns emerged as each of the presidents rallied troops and courted
citizens to support the war. As the first president to engage in what would become a
seemingly unending war, Eisenhower did not anticipate the Vietnam conflict growing
into something that would dominate American media, and he likewise could not have
predicted the attention that both supporters and protesters would receive via the
television. Because Eisenhower’s presidency covered only the initial years of the
conflict—before it became a hot war—and because televisions were not nearly as
common in American households as they would be by the end of the war, Eisenhower's
rhetoric was not created to reach audiences via a visual medium, but rather, an aural one.
Eisenhower strategically mirrored Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of the radio by employing
the same brand of ethos that Roosevelt often used: prophetic dualism (Wander 343). This
persuasive strategy invokes religious tradition by appealing to the Protestant background of the United States. During the early stages of the Vietnam conflict, there was a prominent and recurring argument supporting American policy in Vietnam [that] concerned America's moral or spiritual superiority. Religious faith, moral insight, a respect for the laws of God formed a set of virtues attributed to the nation which...could be called upon not only to explain why those in power deserved to be there, but also why the United States should engage in certain kinds of action abroad. (342)

By framing a call to war in terms of submitting the nation to a higher power’s design for the country, government leaders who choose this method to garner support play into a time-proven effective rhetorical strategy of aligning their own agendas with that of divine providence. Debating the nation’s most prominent and widely practiced religious tradition during the 1950s was so uncommon on mass media channels that little protest would have been expected—and little protest to such rhetoric was noted. Rhetoric steeped in religious tradition offers both a sense of familiarity and belonging to the audience, but also suggests a particularly trustworthy ethos of the speaker. Eisenhower’s use of prophetic dualism helped him create a reputation as a chosen leader with wisdom beyond that which the “ordinary” citizens might possess—possibly even a supernaturally granted wisdom—and thus resisting his agenda was un-Christian as well as un-American.

While prophetic dualism might have appealed to the nation’s historical religious ties, it also reached into the secular arenas of American society by emphasizing a humanitarian desire for peaceful international cooperation—cooperation that directly
involved American citizens just as much as it involved Eisenhower himself.

Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” campaign following the death of Joseph Stalin highlighted his adamance in denying Communism an opportunity to thrive in the free world (Parry-Giles 118). Rather than adhering to a policy that merely contained Communism in its previously existent countries, Eisenhower’s policy following Stalin’s death grew into a more aggressive call to eliminate Communism altogether so as to protect global peace (120-21). His public rhetoric matched this shift of increasing attention to the Communist threat and how this form of government lacked the humanitarian goals upon which American culture was supposedly founded, ones which Americans had fought to defend in World War II. In turn, Eisenhower primed the American nation to condone—though gradually and under the premise of ensuring long-term peace—participation in a conflict that would ultimately grow into the Vietnam War.

After establishing his religiously-grounded ethos as a humanitarian and Protestant, Eisenhower created a feeling of community across the nation via his appeal to citizens’ pathos. On the evening of April 7, 1954, Eisenhower delivered a radio address from the White House that invited Americans to consider their role—alongside his own—in creating a world where good (read: the United States and allies) triumphs over evil (Communist nations). In this address, Eisenhower asked Americans within the first four sentences to reflect on what they could do and what he could also do, to ensure military, economic, intellectual, and spiritual strength remained strong (“The Domino
Effect’). These four particular areas of national life stood in stark contrast to those of Communist nations, were military participation was expected in a way unlike it was in the United States, where economic equity differed from the market competition of capitalism, where intellectual endeavors tended to trail behind other industrialized nations by a matter of years or even decades, and where spiritual independence was limited in favor of a state-sponsored belief system. Moreover, Eisenhower was prompting American citizens to consider how they might support one another in the face of a Communist enemy. Such support, of course, could take the form of military service, or encouraging others to engage in it. Based on the lack of protest or citizen rebuttal of action in Vietnam during Eisenhower’s presidency, one can assume his rhetorical strategies proved effective in creating a sense of national support for preventing the spread of Communism.

When President Kennedy’s term began and the Vietnam conflict continued to escalate, the ethos-based prophetic dualism of Eisenhower was replaced with logos-based “technocratic realism”—a manner of persuasion that “finds the modern world much too complex for old time religion. Not the prophet, but rather a skilled, tough expert is what is needed...one who is wise, analytical, precise” (Wander 349). Kennedy’s rhetorical approach re-examined the conflict as one in which two nations disagreed about the values that shaped each other’s driving belief systems. He thus presented the war as one in which America would compromise not as a religious superior suddenly proven mistaken about its belief in favor from a higher power, but rather as an entity that could calculate the need, cost, and outcome of war and could also justify the need to at least attempt
negotiation. In reframing the conflict’s narrative as one in which the United States could—and even should—take a calm, logical, and calculated approach to its continuing involvement, Kennedy moved to quell emotional responses from citizens at a time when emotions would have proven a hindrance to advancing the government’s agenda. After all, if the Vietnam situation had only been escalating since the Eisenhower administration and showed no signs of becoming a total American victory, then how could citizens justify their support for such an endeavor? Eventually the emotional fuel of pathos appeals would run dry, and citizens would be left frustrated at the lack of a clear victory. Introducing discourse centered on progressive advancement of technology, international relations, and scientific possibilities would be the new rhetorical pathway to securing public support. Kennedy, then, de-emphasized appeals to pathos and ethos (though they were still present to some degree) and emphasized appeals to logos.

Upon his inauguration, Kennedy set a straightforward, no-nonsense tone for his presidency that clarified for both the nation and the world what his goals were for his time in office. In one of the opening lines of his televised inaugural address, Kennedy asserted some of the major problems threatening the United States, whether directly or indirectly (through their existence in other nations): poverty, lack of liberty, tyranny, war, and disease (Brands 175). He offered a simple solution, though “simple” does not necessarily equate to “easy”: “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty” (“Inaugural Address”). Kennedy seized this opportunity, only minutes into his
presidency, to set a logical, goal-oriented tone for the country that relied on practical hard work in addition to a spiritual source of power, thereby linking his own presidency with the ethos of his predecessor. While Kennedy did still appeal to the religious tradition upon which the country’s founding documents allude, his initial appeal to logos before pathos or ethos suggested a rhetorical shift as he prepared to confront the growing challenge ahead of him. Yet, knowing that his inauguration alone was not enough to ensure bipartisan support when dealing with any political situations—especially a cause like Vietnam—Kennedy still infused his inaugural address with religious undertones, and strategically decided against privileging or isolating any particular mode of persuasion.12

Following his inauguration, Kennedy oversaw an administration that heavily engaged in the Space Race and that sought to solidify the United States’ position as an industrialized world leader via stronger scientific advancements. He adamantly advocated for the nation’s need to approach domestic and international problems alike through a problem-solving akin to the scientific method. Although he never delivered an address specifically focused on the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, his approach to another international situation highlighted his logos-based rhetoric when informing American citizens of the Communist threat in Cuba. In his September 1962 speech at Rice University, Kennedy clearly stated that decisive action was necessary when combating the threat from the Soviet Union as it co-opted Cuba as a missile base. One of Kennedy’s earliest hints that the situation in Vietnam could erupt into something more

12 Kennedy’s caution in using religious rhetoric reflects his recognition and careful handling of being the first Catholic president elected to office—a controversial factor during his campaign.
than just a possible threat requiring sanctioning was expressed in his Rice University
address as he emphasized the logical reasoning behind taking a defensive stance against
the Soviets in Cuba: American

history—unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II—demonstrates
that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our
system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to
living daily on the Bull’s-eye [sic] of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R or
in submarines. (“Quarantine against Cuba”)

Reflecting a small degree of the “us versus them” mentality his presidential predecessor
had exercised in the years before, Kennedy combined that well-known rhetoric of
defending against a threat to launch his own logos-based approach to potential combat
with Communist forces. While his speech at Rice University is most remembered for
marking the start of the Space Race, it is Kennedy’s tone in this address that contributes
to its memorable quality. His tone denoted the shift in national thought—and in
presidential rhetoric—that Communist forces needed to be met with force because of the
threat they posed. Absent in his speech were emotional diatribes against the enemy;
rather, Kennedy focused on the tangible future improvements the United States could
contribute, rather than emphasizing feelings of anger or fear as the nation moved forward
scientifically: “We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with weapons of mass
destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding” (“Quarantine against
Cuba”). Even when reinforcing the need to confront the Soviet Union about their threat to
the United States, Kennedy framed that conflict as one that needed to be approached
through science, as he noted how the United States was accumulating more knowledge of space than the Soviet Union—and, according to Kennedy, more knowledge of space, the next frontier ripe for exploration, equated to more power to reset the state of international relations. The American conflict with the threat of spreading Communism was going to be solved through a knowledgeable, objective, and scientific approach. Kennedy’s Rice University speech, then, marked both the start of the Space Race and the beginning of the shift in American presidential rhetoric concerning Communism; it was now a task to be logically undertaken and a threat to be battled because it was objectively unproductive, even dangerous, for the United States.

While Kennedy has a convoluted relationship with the press, his influence on American citizens suggests his rhetorical appeals for support in combating Communism were answered positively (Heyse and Gibson 26-28). Extant research examining the correlation between his speeches and public response is limited; however, contemporary examinations of his lasting legacy suggest a largely supportive public. Without a strongly positive acceptance during his presidency, it is unlikely his posthumous reputation would be as positive as it is today, despite unsavory and controversial facts that have come out since his death (Brinkley, “The Legend”). While no firm causation can be concluded between what he said and did while in office and the public’s perception of him, a correlation can be suggested that his speeches, such as his inaugural speech and the one he gave at Rice University in the fall of 1962, prompted American citizens to support his plans concerning Communism and mainly through appeals to logos. However, American
military action in Vietnam was still in the developing phases of a hot war, and the American people were not as concerned with this conflict as they would be during the next presidential administration.

It was not until Johnson’s presidency that the situation in Vietnam escalated into a full-blown hot war that dominated newspapers, televised newscasts, radio programming, and public conversation. As he inherited a challenge that had been years in the making, Johnson stuck closely to the same logos-based rhetoric that his predecessor and presidential running mate had, opting to emulate Kennedy’s practical approach to problem-solving when addressing the public on the Communist threat in Southeast Asia. In his televised speeches regarding the war, Johnson often focused on the facts and figures of war and used military strategy to explain the current state of war while predicting the effects of the next move. In his televised April 1965 speech “Peace with Conquest,” Johnson explained the Vietnam War with matter-of-fact and straight-to-the-point reasoning, explaining to the American public why the United States was involved in the conflict, how it had been unfolding, and what could be expected next if the US was to win the war. By describing the objective of the war as securing freedom for the South Vietnamese and preventing the fall of all of Asia to Communism, Johnson reiterates the logic that had been offered by both Eisenhower and Kennedy before him (Johnson). If three presidents had all felt the same way regarding the importance of preventing a domino fall to Communism, then there must have been a logical reason for continuing to support the war. Based on the information in his speech, citizens were led
to infer that active combat in Vietnam was the only logical option for quelling the spread of Communism.

Although stoic in appearance and often characterized by his appeal to logos rather than pathos, Johnson did sometimes defer to an appeal to emotions to persuade American citizens to support the war—or at the very least, to support whatever decision the American government made concerning the war. While mostly logos-based, his “Peace with Conquest” speech did also make use of an appeal to pathos. Johnson opened by calling on Americans to choose the path they wanted to walk in light of the growing casualties in Southeast Asia. He framed this call almost as a plea to Americans, as if what they wanted—to stop the deaths he had just mentioned—was what could be, regardless of military developments, political ramifications, and the impracticality of immediately withdrawing troops. However, to prevent what began as an apparent incongruity in reason, Johnson quickly shifted to how despite what the publics of both the United States and Vietnam wanted—an end to the countless deaths—the “sons” of the nation were overseas, in unfamiliar guerilla territory, defending the traditions and principles upon which the nation was founded. Moreover, he used descriptors such as “young” and “bursting with opportunity and promise” when referring to the soldiers who were valiantly fighting a “dirty and brutal and difficult” war (Johnson). Invoking death and then the valor of American soldiers, Johnson opened his speech by first softening his audience with the awareness of the human cost of war in hopes that if they recognize how American lives are already at risk, they will naturally support whatever cause will bring
those soldiers home safely. The most obvious way to bring them home, of course, was to quickly win the war. While an appeal to pathos was not Johnson’s go-to rhetorical device, he did incorporate it with logos, at least in some moments, to ensure he reached as many American citizens as he could.

As late as the spring of 1968, public opinion polls reflected citizen support for Johnson and his handling of Vietnam; however, the media’s emphasis on the unexpectedly long duration of the war overshadowed both Johnson’s public rhetoric and the support he successfully garnered from Americans (Schandler 194). Unfortunately for Johnson, his ability to solicit citizen support for the Vietnam War dwindled as the war continued, eventually resulting in his decision not to seek re-election, announced on television in March 1968. His decision reflected a dramatic historical shift in public support for a presidential administration during wartime that was notably not characteristic of American society during World War II: the voice of the collective, and its presidential leader, was taken over by the voice of the countercollective.

The Countercollective

During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, news coverage of the war reflected only the official, government-backed account of political and military events, though the practice of formal censorship was officially rejected by the White House multiple times (Pach, Jr. 451; Wyatt 7). Because there was no initial reason to suspect any falsehood in these accounts, citizens were apt to believe them. Soon, though, the façade started cracking, and the limitations became clearer—most noticeably following
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester’s failed attempt to conceal American involvement in supplying the South Vietnamese forces with weapons early in the war (Pach, Jr. 451). Additionally, news coverage produced by a few key reporters on location in Vietnam chipped away at the government’s official story (451). Once such footage of the war aired and the public saw the reality of the war, they began questioning why the film reels contradicted the comparatively tame reports they had been receiving from the government about American military action. A noticeable pattern emerged: when reporters were prohibited by the White House from airing their footage of events in Vietnam, public support remained relatively stable; when reporters were able to air their footage, public support began dropping. Not only was the public losing trust in their government, but so were the reporters who realized the charade of which they had been a part before capturing and sharing the controversial reality of the war (Paul and Kim 37).

While the complexities of countercollective responses to the Vietnam War involve much more than just the televised press accounts that countered the official Vietnam narrative, the television’s presence as a new rhetorical agent with persuasive psychological consequences on the American public is undeniable and served to further undermine the tension-filled military-press relationship. Several key figures of the countercollective exercised persuasive influence over American citizens in part due to their ability to report their accounts on television to the entire nation.

The most infamous of these reporters was arguably Morley Safer of CBS. His 1965 segment of American soldiers in action appealed to citizens through a combination
of pathos and logos that showed the cruel reality of war, which in turn elicited an emotional response. Safer’s footage depicts American marines needlessly burning the Southern Vietnamese village of Cam Ne, destroying approximately 150 homes (Pach, Jr. 451). As they ignited the huts, screaming families fled from them, looking back in horror as their homes and all their possessions burned to the ground. Safer’s footage captures women, children, and elderly villagers escaping with their lives, defenseless and scared. Compounding the shock of the fires themselves and their vulnerable victims was the startling—and painfully obvious—fact that the marines were not under fire from the enemy when they set the houses ablaze. These villagers were not armed, had not instigated a confrontation, and pleaded in their own language for what can be assumed to be an end to the attack. This footage illustrated for the public not only the fires and the newly homeless families, but also the unethical actions in which American troops were apparently accustomed to taking in the name of “war” (451-52). Particularly damaging to the collective’s support for this war was Safer’s opening line of the footage: “This is what the war in Vietnam is all about” (451).

Safer’s coverage contributed to both presidential and public reaction. Johnson was so infuriated with Safer’s coverage that he personally called the president of CBS to complain and questioned Safer’s possibly Communist intentions (Dallek 286). Johnson knew that with increasing coverage like that of Cam Ne came decreasing public support for the war—even increasing support for protest of it. Numerous antiwar groups did indeed rally against military action in Vietnam. These countercollective groups amassed
for various reasons, ranging from environmental protection in an age of nuclear capability to moral and religious beliefs against violence. Regardless of any particular group’s motive, what came to be the aggregate countercollective pushed for an alternative national message regarding war and eventually threatened government decision-making through the electorate when sympathetic individuals took office and revised policies regarding Vietnam (Chatfield 399).

Although the multitude of countercollective groups lacked a singular organization and represented an array of issues prompting dissent, several notable groups comprised college students and other young adults. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) stood out as one of the most successful countercollectives during the Vietnam War. This group, though relatively small, was deemed as the most impactful collective to challenge traditional government authority (Hamilton 292). While this politically unaffiliated group originally grew from the League for Industrial Democracy for the purpose of pursuing an agenda focused more on civil rights issues than labor union ones, SDS eventually developed into the most well-known of the Vietnam War countercollectives (Hamilton 292). What solidified their place in American history as one of the most powerful antiwar protest groups was their Washington, DC march in April 1965 that brought together approximately 25,000 protesters (292). By the end of that year, SDS boasted over 4,000 members across 124 college campus chapters (293). However, despite the promise for this group’s longevity predicted by the April peace demonstration, SDS failed to gain much more traction following 1965 because of its lack of centralized leadership. Because
SDS allowed its college campus chapters to determine their own agendas, SDS’s group identity remained fragmented, stunting its overall long-term productivity beyond what was accomplished at Washington, DC. Yet, SDS stood apart from other countercollectives because it drew the attention of a large base of young adults and subsequently gave rise to smaller protest groups that splintered off from SDS, such as Weather Underground and Third World Marxists (292).

While SDS did make socially accepted strides in publicly speaking against the war, the group also enacted extreme theatrics that demonstrated an appeal to the nation’s sense of pathos—and sometimes violently. While SDS’s reputation as a countercollective is to an extent marred by how it “got carried away with leading students in power tantrums,” the focus of the group was always to enact social change on multiple levels, but with resisting the Vietnam War in particular (Adelson ix). Because of the numerous chapters of SDS that existed at colleges and universities across the country, it is difficult to pin down any particular rhetoric that could be said to characterize the entire group. However, the Port Huron Statement emphasized the group’s premise and goals as a singular countercollective. The Statement appeals largely to pathos in its opening paragraphs, noting how the America these students had known as children either no longer existed or potentially never did. While the problematic elements of American society discussed in the Statement are factual (such as racial discrimination and inequity, unchecked nuclear power and its threats, etc.), the message of the document is itself meant to move one’s emotions, to lament the current state of affairs, and to wish for a
different reality. SDS called for the valuing of human life and a participatory democracy and challenged economic restructuring so that life had meaning beyond financial and social incentive. With such ambitious aims, SDS’s Port Huron Statement served to attract other progressive thinkers, even if it did fall short of proposing practical guidelines for accomplishing the stated aims.

Veterans Against the Vietnam War (VVAW) was another key countercollective that challenged the collective’s prowar agenda. As a group often compared to the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), VVAW shared a common goal with SDS in that both organizations sought an end to war by relying on the determination and grit of its (typically) young adult members. Whereas the SDS began on college and university campuses, VVAW comprised soldiers who had experienced the war firsthand. These veterans described the brutal realities of combat, often highlighting the seemingly unwinnable nature of the war. One of the most prominent figures of VVAW was John Kerry, who delivered a televised speech before the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations in April 1971. Speaking as a soldier who had direct information regarding the war, Kerry wasted no time in establishing his ethos and opened his speech by citing the war crimes that he knew to be true based not only on what he had witnessed himself, but what “over 150 honorably discharged, and many very highly decorated” soldiers had also reported (Kerry). While his testimony was highly emotionally charged, such an appeal to pathos would likely have fallen flat without the ethos Kerry carried as a veteran of the Vietnam War. Throughout his speech, he details the gruesome activities of war that he
and his fellow soldiers experienced, noting that the American public—and maybe even the American government—did not truly know what was happening in Vietnam:

In our opinion, and from our experience, there is nothing in South Vietnam, nothing which could happen that realistically threatens the United States of America...I want to relate to you the feeling that many of the men who have returned to this country express because we are probably angriest about all that we were told about Vietnam and about the mystical war against communism. (Kerry)

Kerry continues his testimony to Congress by explaining the realities of the war: how the Vietnamese people were engaged in a civil war as well as one against colonization, including from the United States and how soldiers returning from war were looking for strong national leadership that they felt had failed them overseas. While some of his statements produce emotional reactions and while all of his historical accounts of the war are arguably based in fact, the entire testimony rested upon one key component—Kerry’s ethos as a veteran.

While few countercollective figures or groups were treated with much sympathy by the silent majority of Americans who supported the war, none was treated with the same degree of criticism as were the Weathermen, a radical countercollective group who drew attention to the violence of war by employing violence themselves. Their extreme tactics capitalized on destruction of property and threatened citizens’ safety. In fact, their ethically suspect activities set them apart from other countercollectives who did not wish to be conflated with this particularly subversive subset of the protest movement. The
Weathermen’s message of violence’s total disruptive power and its unethical use in Vietnam was overlooked as newscasters were more concerned with trivial, superficial characteristics of this, and other radical groups:

Critics of the war hardly fared as well [as supporters]...reporters concentrated on the number of demonstrators of their appearance, rather than the arguments they made against US involvement in Vietnam…Radical critics got treatment that was far more brusque (Pach, Jr. 453).

However, while the Weathermen and other protesters may have been criticized by voices of the prowar collective, the fact that the countercollective existed at all and received media attention is significant, as even the most extreme antiwar demonstrations suggested to citizens nationwide that dissent was indeed an option and that if others were protesting, so too could they.

**The Medium and the Public**

Such public dissent was demonstrated by the 1967 march on the Pentagon and the 1970 protest at Kent State University, which both drew heavy media attention (Hallin 163; Hoerl 108-09). Moreover, participants in these demonstrations had the opportunity to speak directly to the American public via on-camera interviews or through picketing posters or simply through their presence, now televised directly into the homes of the public and reaching potential protesters. Rather than just *hearing* about these protesters, American citizens were afforded the opportunity to *see* them as they staked their case against American involvement in Vietnam. This new widespread level of visibility acted
as retribalization device by depicting a collective communicating with one another and with those they wished to draw into their ranks. Unfortunately, as Neil Hamilton notes, no statistics were recorded during the Vietnam War that offer an explicit analysis of the scale of impact television had during the 1960-70s (300); however, the number of antiwar demonstrations that took place following televised reports of such events as the Tet Offensive and the shootings at Kent State University suggest that the medium played enough of a role to at least agitate the public to the point of questioning their support for American involvement in Vietnam.  

Growing public agitation signaled a shift in the American public, as the nation was not wholly unified in support of the war as it had arguably been during World War II. According to Kenneth Burke, war is the ultimate manner of creating a sense of unification, or collectivism (*Rhetoric* 22). If one can identify those with whom (s)he disagrees, then so too can (s)he identify those with whom (s)he agrees. During times of war, the government’s official agenda seeks to unite citizens on the grounds that their commonality of citizenship is enough to bond them into a collective that remains united in the face of war, even though individual citizens may have various reasons for doing so. However, the Vietnam War presented a predicament for the creation of this type of unification. With the military body count constantly increasing, tragic casualties being

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13 Daniel C. Hallin notes that 20% of CBS’ coverage of the Vietnam War centered on the antiwar movement.
14 Of course, not every American citizen supported military engagement in World War II, and a countercollective did exist, though small. Boadnar notes in his 2010 *The “Good War” in American Memory* that initial protest to American involvement was much more popular than history would have us think, and such sentiment was eventually overshadowed by the lasting narrative of World War II as justified and heroic.
discussed on television regularly, the impossibility of a clear victory, and the growth of the countercollective, the unification the collective agenda sought to procure dramatically weakened. In protesting the war, citizens could identify themselves as both against the war, but in support of one another, and in the values they established as the protesting group: a desire to avoid apparently needless death, to resist being conscripted into violent military service, and to shift the national political agenda to one that focused more on the welfare of humanity than establishing or maintaining authority over other nations. Rather than forcing global peace through war, this particular segment of the American population sought to win global peace through peace—a move drastically different than their predecessors were called to do during World War II. Ultimately, identification as a dissenter lured enough young Americans to rally behind the protest movement rather than the national agenda of voluntarily (or, for some “draft dodgers,” involuntarily) serving in the war. In identifying with one another, protestors identified an anti-governmental agenda as antiwar, but were in some cases labeled anti-American (Hallin 198-200). Regardless of negative labels they may have received, as a unified collective of citizens who identified with one another as antiwar, members of the countercollective identified and bonded with one just as those in the collective did.

Finding like-minded individuals with whom to identify is part of the rhetorical process involved in supporting or opposing a war. During the Vietnam War, watching television to learn more about both groups became commonplace—so much so that this war is typically discussed in the framework of its televised nature (Hallin 11). When
watching televised protests during the Vietnam War, citizens—potential protestors—are inherently involved in the events they witness as they are called on to supply their own reactions and understanding to their fellow citizens’ actions. Watching a televised protest event also electronically situated the viewer into a position where (s)he could imagine his or her own involvement in what (s)he witnessed on screen. A feeling of identification, whether in agreement or disagreement with the televised protest, draws the viewer into fulfilling their role as audience, as public citizen, and as either a supporter or protestor of the war. The television aided identification by supplying information on what to do and with whom to identify.

Marshall McLuhan identified television as a cool medium, where audience participation is required by their supplying of information or by providing those assertions and logical chain of thought as they read between the lines. What makes television cool is that the amount of physical sensory input required by the viewer is higher than for other, hotter media (such as radio, where all information is audibly presented and listeners are not asked to infer in the same way). The way this medium worked on the psyche of American citizens demonstrates its rhetorical power to impact the political atmosphere by drawing in audiences with a sense of tactility, yet also with a lack of explanation and analysis; in other words, the sensory stimulation is high, but the content is limited (McLuhan, *War and Peace* 76-77; Hallin 109). Citizens could hear about and see the war as it unfolded, but even news reports could not fully explain lingering questions many citizens had about the necessity of the war, especially as it
dragged on and produced no clear signs of victory for either side (Hallin 109). In an attempt to make sense of an apparently senseless war, Americans devoted more intellectual energy to finding the answers than they would have needed to do during World War II, when Roosevelt fed answers to citizens in language they could understand on a weekly basis. The coolness of the television medium left open room for individual interpretation, analysis, and response; in doing so, the American citizenry created both the collective and the countercollective.

This, then, is the difference between the “radio war” and the “television war”: tactility. McLuhan argued that cooler media were more characterized by their synesthesia, or use of multiple senses, than their technological predecessors. Vietnam War news reports involved the newscaster describing the situation as the most current, up-to-date images appeared on citizens’ screens, illustrating violence, suffering, and death. If images are tactile, then the combination of spoken word reporting and visual images together resulted in synesthesia; war felt much more real when delivered through the television as opposed to its radio predecessor. Citizens would have felt more involved in war they had seen and heard than a war they had only heard. Without being fully aware of what was taking place, says McLuhan, Americans were beginning to feel the distance between themselves and war—even a war fought on the other side the globe—as less distance than it actually was and less distance than they felt during the radio broadcasts’ coverage of the London Blitz or Dresden bombings (Understanding Media 80-81). The jungles of Southeast Asia were now in American living rooms. This
decreasing sense of distance resulting from increased synesthesia was what McLuhan termed the “global village.” When citizens feel themselves part of the global village, they participate in retribalization or a new configuration of their loyalties into a collective or countercollective (78).

The emotions of war—in regards to both support and protest—always run high. The television aided emotional responses, and potentially even exacerbated them, by showing (rather than just simply telling) the gruesome horrors of war. Hearing about the wounded and dead is quite a different experience than seeing the wounded and dead. The way that the comparatively more synesthetic response to the cooler medium of television resulted in collectivism in that like-minded people—whether in support or in protest—connected and banded together to share, interpret, analyze, and respond to the events of the Vietnam War. Protestors in particular benefitted from television’s ability to visually portray war’s atrocious costs, and the visual affordance of this medium suggests a reason as to why a countercollective existed during the Vietnam War that did not during World War II, when citizens heard, but did not see, the facts of war. While the footage of ransacked villages, injured soldiers, and murdered peasants was often limited by the government’s pressure and restraints on the media, the reality of war was still enough to inspire a protest movement that eventually grew to characterize the Vietnam War more so than national support for it. The Vietnam War’s televised nature would heavily affect how both the collective and countercollective responded to the following mass mediated war.
CHAPTER IV


The most effective censorship of all is not the deleting of words, sentences, and paragraphs but the denial of access.

Hedrick Smith, *The Media and the Gulf War* xi

The Gulf War is among one of the shortest-lived international conflicts, spanning only from August 1990 to February 1991. Though this war looked quite different from World War II and the Vietnam War in many ways, it shared with these predecessors a co-opting of the latest electronic mass media communication technology to influence both what citizens knew of the war and how they responded to it. While the Gulf War was later noted to be largely one-sided and more of a heavy-handed slaughter than battle, the White House and the Pentagon sought to control media depictions of the activities in Iraq in large part due to anxiety over repeating the media mistakes of the Vietnam War, with its resultant losses of public morale and trust in the government’s wartime decision-making. While these two wars were fought for drastically different purposes, in drastically different settings, and facing drastically different enemies, their shared use of television-as-educator for the public threatened the government with the possibility of repeating negative press coverage as took place during the Vietnam War—especially since the sour taste of media repression following Vietnam had persisted in the mouths of
journalists throughout the conflicts in Grenada and Panama. Thus, tension between reporters and the government continued to swell following the Vietnam War; the Gulf War was an apt moment for this tension to resurface. The tug-of-war between the Pentagon and the media represented the conflict between the collective and the countercollective. The drama between these parties would play out, yet again, on television.

To preemptively counter the possibility of engaging in a war that the public would not support, and to prevent the formation of countercollectives such as had marked the Vietnam War era, the Pentagon adopted a more authoritative, ethos- and logos-based role in their dealings with the media, which the White House supported. Rather than allowing the media the same freedom of access they had during the Vietnam War and rather than completely shutting the media out as they did during the conflicts in Grenada and Panama, the US government struck a more balanced approach with the use of the media pool system, wherein small groups of reporters would cycle in and out of allotted zones during combat. While the government saw the pool system as a gesture of goodwill in that they were permitting the media access to military personnel, events, and reports, journalists and news stations regarded the pool system as censorship, and questioned whether the government was trying to hide facts from the public. As a result, the Gulf War became characterized more by the protest of reporters, and to a smaller extent, citizens, against media censorship than against the premises of the war itself. If the Vietnam War was the television war, then the Gulf War was the state television war.
Media outlets had comparatively little freedom to join the front lines of battle, to document firefight directly, or to relay unedited, uncensored information to the public. Failure to adhere to the Pentagon’s wishes compromised a reporter’s invitation to participate in the pool system, and thus threatened their respective news outlet’s profitability as it would be unable to publish stories from the battlefield. To maintain their position in the pool, reporters had to play by the government’s rules—to document and publish the need for the United States’ intervention and to refrain from documenting that suggested otherwise (Ottosen 139). In order to gain entrance into the pool system, journalists had to agree to a list of rules and guidelines which dictated that upon their registration into the pool system. These rules dictated that they would work under the guidance of a pool commander from the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), that they would submit their products to the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) for review (and possible censorship if the products contained sensitive information), and that they would refrain from carrying a personal weapon (Williams 8). “Sensitive information” related to anything that identified military plans, specific details of casualties, information describing how (in)effective enemy tactics had proven, methods and outcomes of information and data collection about the enemy, specific locations of military units and personnel, and the number of military troops present in any given location or operation (7-8). Reporters were also instructed not to participate in “spontaneous interviews with servicemen and women in the Gulf; off-the-record interviews with troops in the field” because of fear they would leak sensitive information
to enemy forces (Taylor 35). Reporters were also prohibited from filming or taking photographs of injured, traumatized, shocked, and deceased soldiers so as to prevent a loss of public morale akin to that which took place during the Vietnam War (35). As a result, the public voice of the government—particularly the Bush administration and the Pentagon—was a louder one than that of the countercollective during the Gulf War, as it was this official voice that dictated what information had the possibility of being transmitted from the warzone.

Such restriction (if one adopts the government’s agenda) or censorship (if one adopts the media’s agenda) undoubtedly influenced public collectivism during the conflict, as it raised questions about two simultaneous conflicts: that of the United States versus Iraq and that of the United States government versus the media and its claim to freedom of press. Identifying with the countercollective would negatively shape one’s opinion of the war—if a citizen felt that the government was hiding potentially unethical, inhumane acts committed against Iraq, then how could (s)he support the war itself? Thus, one could identify with the countercollective, in favor of the media and against the war, or one could identify with the collective, in favor of the Pentagon and in favor of the war. To support the countercollective could be seen as a stand for freedom of speech and press; to identify with the collective could be seen as a stand for military and national security over personal and press freedoms. Simply put, the Gulf War was fought between two nations, but also between citizens negotiating the boundaries between national security and citizens' constitutional right to freedom of the press.
Doris Graber notes in her examination of media’s role in contemporary wartimes that the context provided, the questions asked, and the stories covered are selected by participatory audiences and not handed to them by reporters who often cover what media channel owners dictate (451). These characteristics first became apparent during the Gulf War. Major networks like CNN created a particular version of the Gulf War by featuring live coverage and moment-by-moment documentation of events happening in the Middle East. Citizens were invited to call in and express their views on what they were watching, and could comment on the views expressed by other callers. However, all day, everyday, news coverage was not nearly as democratic and unbiased as it appeared on screen. While the most logical presupposition is that with more coverage comes more diverse viewpoints and a fuller picture of reality, this does not appear to be the case with American reporting of the Gulf War. Rather, the most publicly popular televised news stations—CNN—proved to be a case of an elite source privileging very particular information, while also staying in line with the official government agenda, and also using twenty-four-hour coverage to create the image of unbiased reporting (Vincent 181-82). At the expense of American citizens, media information was so suppressed and limited leading up to, during, and for some time after the war that an even relatively unbiased, mostly accurate portrayal of the war and its casualties has been prevented from being shared with the mainstream American public, though the public thought otherwise as the Gulf War unfolded (Ottosen 137). Additionally, the news media proved ineffective as a tool of strengthening true participatory democracy. Audiences were being handed
information on a constant and rolling basis, but not participating much, though the nature of around-the-clock broadcasts suggested to viewers that they were actually participating somehow, as they were under the impression that they knew all there was to know regarding the war’s development the moment any event took place. Citizen participation during the Gulf War retained some similarities from their counterparts during the Vietnam War, but diverged significantly in the expanded scope of possibilities afforded to citizens through developments in television.

Ultimately, what several scholars have concluded is that this type of coverage, though seemingly helpful on the surface, in reality only served to fill a good amount of air time with repeated information and little analysis of the causes and consequences of events. Moreover, its bias prevented a good deal of fact from reaching the public, and in turn fostered an environment of involuntary ignorance. However, the role of newscasters, reporters, and journalists during the Gulf War was limited not by their own choosing; while CNN’s coverage proved biased and limited, the Bush administration’s and the Pentagon’s orders provided few other options if the media desired to relay any coverage at all. This limitation was the direct result of lessons learned during the Vietnam War, when journalists had more freedom to report what they saw, but at the cost of public support for the official government agenda. If television’s use during these two wars suggest anything, it is that it is potentially impossible to balance accurate war coverage and media freedom simultaneously. The impossibility of such a balance is reflected in the formation and rhetoric of both the collective and countercollective.
The Collective

The government and the media shared a stressed relationship before troops were committed to the Persian Gulf on August 7, 1990. The media sharply criticized the government’s decision to strictly limit media access to near-nothing during the Invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989-1990. While the government claimed such secrecy was in the best interest of military operations and safety, the media questioned whether or not the government had been truthful with them—and with American citizens. When tensions began arising in the Middle East with Iraq’s accusations against Kuwait in July 1990, the government and media again had to negotiate how much information to share with the public and how much to withhold for national security purposes. Though many figures played some degree of importance in determining how the media would be allowed to interact with the military (and vice versa), several figures proved pivotal in designing and implementing the rules and guidelines by which the media was contractually obligated to report: President George H. Bush, General Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams, and Commanding General of Operation Desert Storm Norman Schwarzkopf. In addition to creating the rules by which reporters had to play if they were to be allowed access to the combat zone, these men also shaped public opinion by how they carefully chose to deliver their media rules and guidelines to the public. When reporters cried foul and implied censorship that had not been seen since Senator McCarthy’s Red Scare, these four figures exercised strategic rhetoric to convince their audience of the American
public—as well as media outlets and reporters—that the military operations were ethical, transparent, and in the best interest of all involved. Of these key collective figures, Cheney and Williams stood out as rhetors who routinely addressed the public concerning both collective goals for the war and countercollective protest about it.

The government—particularly the Pentagon and Defense Secretary Cheney—was overly cautious about how much access they granted the press due to the flagging citizen support during the Vietnam War, and the extent to which the media influenced civil unrest with military operations in Southeast Asia. Cheney reported that protecting the government’s ethos was one of two main principles by which he designed the media policy during the Gulf War, highlighting how starkly different the press would be allowed to interact with the military’s efforts in the Persian Gulf (Cheney 31). Ethos, in fact, became arguably the most critical and strategic rhetorical appeal which the government constantly stressed as they explained both the decision to actively combat Hussein’s Iraqi forces and the decision to limit the media by dictating they operate in pools and under certain rules and guidelines.

Secretary of Defense Cheney realized early in the conflict how far ethos could carry a rhetor into his audience’s good graces. He noted at the very onset of the ground conflict that he both recognized and respected the government’s obligation to keep citizens informed of military developments (Cheney 27-28). Such an explicit acknowledgement in his statement to the press on the first day of the ground war suggested that Cheney could be trusted as a component Secretary of Defense—one who
knew he operated not just as military personnel, but as someone in service to American citizens. In fact, Cheney appeared to take this responsibility very seriously, as he repeated this sentiment again at the close of his statement to the press when he noted that keeping the public abreast of ground developments would be second only to ensuring the success and safety of the troops involved in the newly-forged ground war (32). While Cheney more often relied on an appeal to logos than to ethos, his early use of ethos helped to portray him as honest and fair as the outset of the war—an image that Americans could appreciate in itself, and because it also implied his assistant, Williams, operated under the same ethical principles.

Williams, as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, delivered many news briefings related to both the war itself, as well as to the relationship between the military and the media. His reliance on ethos was consistently seen in his attempts to be transparent with the public as to what rules and guidelines for the media had been put in place and why they had been instituted in the first place. In February 1991, Williams delivered a statement to the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding the pool system he and Secretary of Defense Cheney had designed especially for the Gulf War (DeParle 20; Williams 33-45). Williams even noted that while he and Cheney firmly believed in the pool system, it was not necessarily foolproof; he quoted Henry Tomlinson’s observation that “The war the generals always get ready for is the previous one” (Williams 33). Yet, he and Cheney designed the best plan they possibly could, according to knowledge that could only be gained in hindsight after the conflicts in
Vietnam, Korea, Grenada, and Panama. Acknowledging that there was no way to
absolutely determine the best plan of action for either military or media in the current
conflict in Iraq, Williams used an appeal to his character as a transparent and honest man
in order to elicit a degree of understanding and support from those Americans attuned to
his statement on C-SPAN or from those who would read the reports written of it in the
nation’s leading newspapers the next day.

In fact, Williams noted how pervasive and transparent such media outlets could
be—and quickly emphasized how such transparency could damage the war effort. He
noted in his nationally televised statement before the Senate that enemy forces had access
to CNN and could see the same live updates that Americans could. This potential threat
to military operations and personnel could instantly and completely upend the carefully
laid plans to keep the Gulf War quick and relatively painless (Williams 33). Yet, despite
the risks, Williams still made it clear that in his role in the Pentagon, he wanted to ensure
that the media still had enough access to provide “as much information as possible to the
American people about their military without jeopardizing the lives of the troops or the
success of the operation”—a goal which was identical to his predecessors during both
World War II and the Vietnam War (33-4). By aligning himself with reporters in such a
way as to highlight their importance, while also maintaining his own role as one who held
responsibility for ensuring that the media and military did not compromise each other’s
safety, Williams placed himself in a sympathetic position as a man who, unable to please
one side or the other completely, could at least please both to some degree by designing
the compromise of the press pool. In admitting that he wanted both sides to be safe and satisfied, Williams portrayed himself as a relatable figure—not as an extremist in a sense, for he was neither a rigid military figure nor a military-bashing journalist. He was stuck in the middle—a position to which many citizens can presumably relate.

Moreover, Williams smartly emphasized how dedicated he was to maintaining the integrity of the freedom of the press as was reasonable in a war situation by recounting the events of sending the first pool of reporters to the combat zone: “I took them to the Saudi embassy myself that afternoon, where the appropriate staff had been brought in to issue the necessary visas. One reporter had run out of pages in his passport, so we carried it across town so that the State Department could add some more” (Williams 35). Not only was Williams supportive of the reporters in principle, but he was actively engaged in ensuring they were able to get to Saudi Arabia in the first place, though it required him to go beyond the duties of his office. As a finishing polish to his account of that day, he added the fact that this particular group of reporters flew from Washington, DC to Florida, where they briefly spoke with General Schwarzkopf, who had not yet left the United States for Saudi Arabia (36). Williams implied that his commitment to upholding the rights of the press to access the war zone could be trusted because he even went as far as to fly the reporters to Riyadh before the commanding general arrived there. The reporters, then, were granted privileges and accommodations so as to better perform their jobs. However, when situations arose in the war zone that prevented journalists from traveling or interviewing independently, Williams assured both Congress and the public
that the reporters understood why the rules and guidelines were in place and that the
dedication to safety and security the military expressed was also shared by the media
(39). Moreover, Williams assured his audience that the reporters were operating under a
military policy that had been set during previous wars in an effort to protect all
involved—not a policy designed to prevent reporters from publishing stories that might
embarrass the military or draw their motives and actions into question as unethical or
unpatriotic (38). According to Williams, safety and security were the first priority, though
journalists' access was a close second. In fact, their access to unfolding events was so
important to the Pentagon, according to Williams, that they had been granted the ultimate
decision to publish any given story even if the military pool escorts suggested revision
(39). To demonstrate to the public his serious commitment to providing as much agency
to the reporters as possible, and thus to imply his own trustworthy character and that of
the military he represented, Williams noted that

The reporters covering World War II wrote their stories and submitted them to a
military censor. The censors cut out anything they felt broke their rules and sent
the stories on. The decisions of the censors were final. There is no such system of
censorship in Operation Desert Storm. There is, instead, a procedure that allows
us to appeal to news organizations--before the harm is done--when we think
material in their stories would violate the ground rules. And the final decisions
belong to journalists. (39)

By drawing a distinction between military policy of the past and present, Williams
strategically pitted himself as a more open-minded supporter of journalists—even
allowing them to make the final judgment about their stories—than his predecessors who
oversaw the media during the last major war overwhelmingly considered victorious. How then, could the American public distrust such a military official who desired journalistic freedom and agency almost as much as military safety and security? With his ethos-centric line of reasoning during his statement before the US Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs, Williams portrayed himself as a bureaucrat who could be trusted. If he could not be trusted, then why was he choosing to be so transparent?

While ethos may have been Williams’ first choice of rhetorical appeal, no person employed in the Pentagon and charged with the task of delivering news briefings to the American public can completely forego their responsibility to appeal to logos, for it is the explanation rooted in fact that often takes precedence in military strategizing, political negotiating, and historical accounts. Williams simply delivered facts to the public, often choosing to do so with brief, unadorned statements. Consider when, during his statement to the U.S Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs, he explained that a major reason for employing the pool system was due to location. Because reporters and military alike were stationed in Saudi Arabia, they had to play by their host country’s rules. Saudi Arabia had not yet made a decision as to how many reporters they would house, and thus Williams and Cheney decided to activate the pool system (Williams 34). While citizens may have been simultaneously hearing complaints from reporters and journalists regarding the constraints of the pool system, Williams’ simple explanation as to the reasoning behind needing to use the system made logical sense and was difficult to counter.
In an additional appeal to logos, Williams noted during his statement to the Senate in February 1991 that seventeen reporters were in Saudi Arabia as of August 1990; by December, that number had grown to 800 (Williams 36). Even if one had found reason to dispute Williams’ appeals to ethos, it is difficult to imply he was not supportive of providing reporters with opportunities if he had been willing to send nearly one thousand of them to the war zone—even if they did have to operate in pools. Moreover, as logical proof that Williams, and the military on behalf of which he spoke, supported the journalists’ endeavors were some well-chosen examples of how the military had provided for and accommodated the reporters. While Williams had described at one point in his statement before the Senate Committee how he had personally ensured a reporter who needed more passport pages was still able to fly to Saudi Arabia, this initial example came at a point in his discussion when he was building his own ethos and credibility—ensuring the public knew he was determined to help the reporters nearly as much as he was to secure victory and safety for the troops. When he later provided a second example of how far out of their way the military had gone to accommodate reporters, it added to his logos as a tangible fact that could be validated by others.

Williams explained that

A U.S. Air Force C-14 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force base on January 17, the morning after the bombing began, with 127 news media personnel on board. That plane left at the onset of hostilities, during the most intensive airlift since the Berlin blockade. The fact that the senior military commanders dedicated one of their cargo airplanes to the job of transporting another 127 journalists to Saudi Arabia demonstrated the military’s commitment to take reporters to the scene of the action so they could get the story out to the American people. (37)
By emphasizing that he was reiterating a “fact” and stressing that the cargo plane was carrying “another 127 reporters,” Williams strategically suggests that the military was willing to treat the media as part of their own body, accommodating wave upon wave of them with their own modes of transportation. How could the public hear such facts and remain unconvinced that the military had done much to help the media capture the stories they wanted and needed?

Williams also laid bare some key facts regarding the actual access journalists had to war zone events when he compared and contrasted the initial assumptions the media made to the pool system as it actually operated. Whereas the news organizations were concerned they would not be able to gather enough accurate information to release substantial stories, Williams asserted that the reporters were among the first to not only know, but also witness, even the earliest combat actions:

as viewers, readers, and listeners know, we had the pools in place before the operation started. Reporters were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea to witness the launching of air strikes, onboard a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the first cruise missiles ever used in combat, on the air force bases where the fighter planes and bombers were taking off around the clock, and with several ground units in the desert. (Williams 40-41)

Because these initial moments of the war and their own access to them were difficult, even impossible, to contradict—as they had been made public—reporters, as well as the American public, had to admit that despite being mandated to work within the pool system, the news media had been granted necessary access to wartime events so as to
relay information to their audiences. Williams admitted he both knew about and understood how frustrating the pool situation was for the journalists, but when balancing their frustration with the facts of a need for safety and security, as well as their firsthand experiencing of the outbreak of war, it becomes logically difficult to criticize Williams’ or the Pentagon’s actions in the matter.

In military matters, an appeal to logos can often carry a rhetor’s argument further than any other appeal might. Williams provided statistics about how little the military impeded the media in a clear and convincing argument that the Pentagon was doing more than was expected of them in light of the fact that they were inviting as many media members as they could process while still maintaining safety and security of the troops. As of his statement before the US Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs on February 21, Williams explained that 820 print news stories had been written by the pool since the onset of the war. Of that 820, only five had been flagged by the Pentagon; of those five, only one had gone so far as prompting the Pentagon to call a media outlet’s editor-in-chief to discuss the report. In this particular case, the editor-in-chief agreed with the military that too many sensitive details had been included in the report, thereby compromising the outlook of the mission. The editor-in-chief agreed with the military, and the details were revised—and the story still made publication. In this specific scenario, Williams highlighted how little the military actually interfered with media reports, and thus announced those who criticized the military’s rules and guidelines as unnecessarily critical, even to the point of exaggerating militaristic censorship. By
emphasizing how the facts had been misconstrued, Williams not only reasserted his own logos-centered approach, but simultaneously drew the ēthē of some dissenters into question.

While his reliance on an appeal to logos provided statistics and facts that were both hard to dispute and convincing, Williams also demonstrated his rhetorical savvy by intertwining logos and his lesser-used choice of appeal, pathos. As he explained the reasoning behind designing and implementing the ground rules and regulations of the pool system, Williams also ingratiated himself with reporters and their sympathizers by noting that

> Most of the reporters, the good ones anyways, want to be out there where the action is, just as they’ve done in previous conflicts. But with hundreds of fiercely independent reporters seeking to join up with combat units, we concluded that when the combat started, we’d have to rely on pools. (Williams 40)

In this statement, Williams not only articulated that he understood what reporters desired—easier and closer access to the action—but that he even expected it of them because they wanted to be the best reporters they could be. The same reporters who may have criticized the pool system for its seeming restrictions on their agency were the same ones Williams was indirectly complementing before Congress and the American public. Such a statement was arguably designed to place reporters in a position of cognitive dissonance: how could they continue to critique and complain about the pool system when Williams was acknowledging that in order to do their job well, they would most
likely, and very understandably, critique and complain. Yet, the facts of the situation remained unchanged; reporters could not risk their own safety or that of the military, and especially not the victory against Iraqi forces. In Williams’ use of both logos and pathos, he is soothing the media’s unrest by reminding them that they, much the same way as the military, are called to sacrifice in the nation’s time of need.

Williams again turned to pathos during his February 1991 statement before the US Senate, when he made his respect for reporters publicly known by celebrating their commitment to professional and ethical standards: “American reporters understand the reasoning behind these ground rules. They are patriotic citizens, and they don’t want to endanger lives” (Williams 39). While making such a statement may have generated a friendly reception from his audience, and even possibly softened the criticisms of the reporters who often critiqued the pool system, Williams was simultaneously challenging the reporters to live up to that ethical, patriotic standard by encouraging cognitive dissonance if they did not. In this brief statement, he then accomplished those two tasks of endearing himself to the public and issuing a call for reporters to consider how ethical and patriotic their service was as they reported potentially sensitive information to the public—and to enemy forces.

The Countercollective

Due to the swift nature of the war, the public had relatively little time to learn about the conflict in detail and then make a concerted antiwar effort; thus, the number of Gulf War protestors were comparatively fewer than those of the Vietnam War. In such a
situation as this, those who spoke most loudly against the war proved to be those who were speaking the most about the war as they explained it to their fellow citizens in the first place: wartime reporters. During and following the Gulf War, press members spoke against the war in two notable ways: to critique and question military action as it unfolded, and to critique and question the government's actions taken against the press and, in their understanding, against the freedom of speech.

The most vocal countercollective figures during the Gulf War were, unsurprisingly, reporters. Peter Arnett and Walter Cronkite proved to be among the most vocal and recognized critics of the military’s media policy in the Middle East. Throughout the war they attempted to gain greater access to the combat zone and to publicly question the military’s seemingly unreasonable secrecy, which itself drew further questions about the war’s premises and ethics. Major news networks that featured such reporting—particularly CNN and C-SPAN, similarly attracted citizen-viewers during the Gulf War because of their reputation for delivering facts as well as a platform for Americans to discuss current events. Additionally, Saddam Hussein, though he led the enemy forces, publicly shared his take on what was happening overseas. His interpretation and depiction of the conflict drew enough media attention so as to become a memorable moment of public rhetoric that led some citizens to question their stance on the war—or at least the tactics being used to carry it out and report on it. These voices,

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15 Cronkite’s identification with the countercollective during the Gulf War reflected his experience during the Vietnam War, which he publicly supported until the late 1960s. His distrust of government accounts of military action during the Vietnam War influenced his stance on the Gulf War.
though they represent only a handful of countercollective examples, demonstrated the
distrust and criticism against which the American government’s collective agenda fought.

Demonstrating an ethos as professionals who could be trusted with informing the public while maintaining military security and national secrets proved to be the most important task for reporters. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Williams simply stated that while journalists were bothered by the many rules and guidelines they felt limited the amount of quality news reporting they were allowed to deliver from the battlefield, Williams and the Pentagon “never considered them equal partners” (Williams 26). Such a statement contradicts the front of ethical transparency Williams often presented during news briefings and in his prepared statement before the US Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs in February 1990, lending credibility to the complaints of journalists that they were not being treated fairly. Moreover, journalists presented themselves as playing by the Pentagon’s rules, as strict as they were, thus deserving respect for conducting themselves ethically, even when they had more news they could have chosen to report. Consider CNN reporter Arnett’s description of how he balanced his own responsibility to provide information about the war while simultaneously maintaining military security, establishing his ethos as well as indirectly suggesting that other reporters shared it: “I was risking my life in Baghdad, but I was not prepared to risk my credibility. I accepted the limitations of military security...but I needed the freedom to better explore the phenomenon of being in a capital of war” (“Why I Stayed” 310). While the Pentagon may have assumed that reporters were more
concerned with getting the most information at the quickest speed so that their network could be the one to break the headline, they forgot the other part of the ethos equation that Arnett hints at in his statement. American reporters were on live television defending two ethical at the same time: that of reporter and that of American. To break all news would have meant to risk one’s perception of being patriotic and that was not a hit any reporter—or their employing news stations—would have wanted to risk. Because of their responsibility to both their profession and their country, it is likely that had reporters been granted the freedom they were seeking to travel outside the pools, they would have still maintained the type of security the military desired them to, regardless of whether or not the stories were being reported live or went through a censorship process first.

However, this same duty to patriotism that Arnett describes in the form of maintaining military security was drawn into question when he sat down to interview Hussein. Arnett articulated in his own description of the interview that he felt he needed to talk about the war with the leader of the enemy forces in order to shed light as to why the war had to happen in the first place. While this could have made both Arnett and CNN look sympathetic to the enemy, Arnett felt Hussein owed the world answers (“Why I Stayed” 312). Because this was such a rare moment and because Hussein had not granted any such interview to American media before, Arnett jumped on the opportunity, and live news feeds were a major reason he was able to conduct the interview as he did. He noted that one of his concerns was delivering the tape of the interview before the Iraqi officials changed their minds and decided to withhold the tapes from him (313). In fact,
the Iraqis did prolong the process of reviewing the tapes before giving them to Arnett because they were concerned the Americans would track the satellite and bomb the interview’s—and Hussein’s—location (313). While Arnett could have potentially provided the American forces with sensitive information regarding Hussein from this interview, including the location, his responsibility to journalism dictated that he not, and thus he maintained his professional ethos. In this moment, he may have been more loyal to his profession than to his country, but he was not disloyal to his country, either. However, the Pentagon, as it is directed by responsibility to country first and blends dedication to the job with dedication to the nation, would have been suspicious of Arnett’s intentions to interview the enemy. Thus, while Arnett’s ethos was intact in the opinion of journalists and many American citizens, this moment of ethos on display could have just as easily been interpreted as unpatriotic by the military, thereby decreasing their compassion for journalists’ pleas to be granted more freedom from the pools. To the countercollective of reporters and their supporters, Arnett proved trustworthy; to the collective, he could have come across as slightly treasonous.

Another of the most respected and well-known reporters, Cronkite, could have drawn listeners in with his ethos alone, but would have not delivered much of a convincing argument as to why the press needed greater access to the combat zone without a supplemental dose of logos. In his statement before the US Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs, and in rebuttal to Williams, Cronkite called out to the American public by reminding them the government owed them—the voters—honest,
accurate, and thorough explanations as to what was happening overseas; the voters thus had a stake in this debate between Williams and Cronkite, between the military and the media. Cronkite’s line of reasoning was that the citizens voted for the president, the president asked Congress for a declaration of war, Congress, also elected by citizens, granted the declaration, and now that war was being carried out overseas in the name of the American citizens. Therefore, the public were owed the information the military was denying them (Cronkite 45). Additionally, according to Cronkite, the Pentagon really had nothing to fear in allowing reporters more access: “The Pentagon is acting on a generally discredited Pentagon myth that the Vietnam War was lost because of the uncensored press coverage. The military would do better to pattern its PR after its handling of the press in World War II, a war we won” (45).

Much like military personnel, reporters often rely more on appeals to logos and ethos than they do appeals to pathos; a critical tenet of objective journalism requires the reporter minimize feelings and privilege facts then deliver those facts honestly. However, also much like military personnel, reporters are not totally immune from capitalizing on an appeal to pathos for additional support of their typically logos- and ethos-heavy arguments. Such an appeal to pathos can be a risky rhetorical strategy, but can prove successful if the reporter has the ethos to support it. For example, Cronkite incorporated an appeal to pathos into his statement before the US Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs, in response to Williams’ claims that the media had more than enough accommodation to do their job thoroughly. Cronkite suggested that the military employed
the pool system to keep secret their potentially unethical, even illegal operations, by comparing the US military to one that globally elicits negative emotions: that of Nazi Germany. Cronkite stated that

After World War II most Germans protested that they did not know what went on in the heinous Nazi concentration camps. It is just possible that they did not. But this claim of ignorance did not absolve them from blame: they had complacently permitted Hitler to do his dirty business in the dark. They raised little objection, most even applauded, when he closed their newspapers and clamped down free speech. Certainly our leaders are not to be compared with Hitler, but today, because of onerous, unnecessary rule, American are not being permitted to see and hear the full story of what their military forces are doing in an action that will reverberate long into the nation’s future. (Cronkite 45)

While such a comparison between Nazi Germany and the United States may have seemed far-fetched, Cronkite pitted the two as analogous because in both cases, the citizens overwhelmingly supported the government’s (potentially extreme) takeover of the press (45). He even argued that such censorship was both unheard of in the United States and the result of an arrogant government (45). With his sharp words and implications that the government was moving toward media control like that of a dictator the United States had fought to eradicate, Cronkite appealed to the nation’s pathos with this shocking similarity, in hopes to startle citizens into understanding the seriousness of the situation as he and his colleagues understood it.

Cronkite not only opened his rebuttal against Williams with an appeal to pathos, but he also brought his argument full-circle by ending on the same emotional note as that with which he opened. Though between his opening comparison of the United States and
Nazi Germany Cronkite made other claims and drew on evidence not so rooted in pathos, he returned to this appeal by again implying that much like German citizens during World War II, Americans were owed an explanation as to why the military refused the press the open coverage they desired. He drew attention to such a measure’s suspicious nature, asserting that the military would allow greater ease of access in the combat zone if they had nothing to hide—a claim which Cronkite used to blend logos into his pathos-laden argument and thereby make it appealing on multiple rhetorical levels. Such a move also worked because it retains the attention of those in the audience who may not be so inclined to pathos. He then ended his argument with this pathos/logos blend by reminding his listeners—the US Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs, the Pentagon and military, and the American public—that such a move against the freedom of the press would only end badly:

What are they trying to hide?...the fact that we don’t know, the fact that the military apparently feels there is something it must hide, can only lead eventually to a breakdown in home-front confidence and the very echoes from Vietnam that the Pentagon fears the most. (Cronkite 47)

A great deal of Cronkite’s, and other journalists’ frustration, was that the press briefings the Pentagon offered were not sufficient and lacked the meaningful information reporters sought. He even suggested the Iraqis knew more of the war developments than did American reporters operating in the pool system (46). By emphasizing that some information was common sense almost immediately following an incident, Cronkite
implied the military was withholding information for more sinister purposes, or else there
would be no need to attempt to regulate the reporters so rigidly anyway: “The gulf
briefings are ridiculously inadequate. Why should we not be told what bridges have been
hit? Don’t the Iraqis know?” (46-47).

Individual reporters appealed to the American public largely through ethos and
logos, but the media conglomerates for which such reporters worked exercised a fair
amount of ethos as well. As two of the most-watched news channels during the Gulf War,
both CNN and C-SPAN exercised ethos as a trustworthy source so viewers continued
watching. In her article about mediated experiences of war, Jean Seaton notes that

The journalism that presents us with the suffering of others is already a more
complete act of witnessing...as it both observes and articulates the condition of
distance victims. Thus many of the processes of news-making are really
concerned to secure the trust of the audience in its accounts—and this is important
because of how unreliable we all know witnesses can be, motivated by their own
interests or simply confused about what they have seen. (47)

Choosing to tune in to televised news coverage demonstrates the American public’s trust
in the stations and journalists reporting the news—and it is logical to assume that the
names of Arnett and Cronkite were enough to entice viewers to take their accounts of
combat events as honest and authentic. In other words, the very act of watching a
newscast illustrates a belief in the ethos of those presenting the news.

While unrest among reporters created much of the objection to the government’s
official agenda and accounts of events in the Middle East, there was an additional source
of counterargument against American actions overseas. While neither the begrudged reporters or this second source of an alternative opinion looked much like the protest scenes of the Vietnam War, they did contribute to feelings of questionable motivations and unethical actions that drew the government's official account into question. As a second source of an alternative opinion, Hussein himself took to televised events to share his side of the war and to explain what he understood as the reality of war. While he may have been seeking feelings of sympathy from American viewers, his co-opting of the American-based CNN news network and his holding of American hostages did little to inspire such feelings. In fact, these moments worked more against him than for him, so one of the most notorious sources of counterargument or alternative opinion about the war eventually contributed to more support for it, at least in the understanding of the American public. Andrew Hoskins notes that Hussein’s attempts to direct information regarding his motives and reputation were too easily used against him:

He is probably the most demonized leader of the television age but also one whose own use of television often gifted propaganda to the West. From the display of his greeting the so-called “human shields” in August 1990 through to images of the captured Coalition pilots in January 1991...there appeared a series of misjudgments in his use of television, if courting world opinion was ever his aim. (Hoskins 107)

While Hussein may have grossly miscalculated how his televised actions would be interpreted (or in the event that he did understand, but was actually attempting to solidify for himself a global reputation as a powerful dictator), American televisions co-opted
mediated images of Hussein to fuel the prowar agenda, featuring his appearance alongside words, phrases, and pronouncements associated with his evil nature. In a moment that could have proven productive for a counterargument, or a weaker form of counterargument against the official prowar agenda in the form of an alternative opinion, Hussein’s rhetorical tactic to garner feelings of sympathy failed, and the appeal to pathos was instead transformed into yet another moment when the government pushed its own agenda further. While there was no comparable media co-opting during the Vietnam War, there were analogous televised protests against the war that were used to illustrate to the “silent majority” how unpatriotic, depraved, and even evil protestors were. While the miscommunication and unplanned consequences of media use to spread a counterargument were similar in both wars, the enemy force’s leader commanding such a media co-opting was novel, and thus memorable.

One of Hussein’s most memorable, and also controversial, uses of a televised platform to attempt to appeal to the sympathetic feelings of Westerners was his August 1990 detaining of hostages, or “human shields” whom he considered “guests” (Hoskins 110). Hussein seemingly wanted to portray his hostages as the lucky recipients of a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to meet a world leader who was, as he hoped they would see, much more pleasant and hospitable than they had been led to believe. He was essentially attempting to rewrite his own ethos. By providing a sociable and welcoming persona, Hussein hoped to sway Western audiences into questioning if war was necessary against someone who was not as sinister as the media had previously reported. However,
he failed to convince the American public that this was the case, and his televised actions were what gave his miscalculation away:

the screening of the hostages with Saddam spectacularly backfired. The Iraqi President explained through an interpreter to his ‘guests’ the reasons for their internment and even asked them questions, although barely pausing to allow for their responses. (110)

Such interactions with non-military citizens introduced a very different, and apparently recently contrived, version of Hussein; his regularly expected presentation of himself involved a “khaki uniform complete with army beret and big shoulder lapels and accompanied by officials all also dressed in military attire” (113). After having seen countless images of Hussein dressed in military attire, interacting with his armed forces with stern expressions, seeing him in a casual business suit among Western citizens did little to invoke feelings of understanding or sympathy from the American public; the attempt to present himself as friendly and likeable was much too little, too late. Any potential counterarguments against the American invasion of Iraq dramatically fell flat due in part to Hussein’s own misguided rhetorical attempts to persuade Western audiences that the version of him they had been shown was inaccurate. In fact, the American media used the more expected images of Hussein in his military attire to constantly remind the public of the real global leader against whom the war was waged—and thus actively worked against Hussein’s attempts to portray himself in any other way, particularly in a way that might pressure Americans to see him as relatable,
even humane. While a one-time attempt to rewrite his ethos seemed like a smart strategy to this countercollective figure, he could not stop the media—itself a countercollective figure—from exposing the faults in his argument.

**The Medium and The Public**

As C-SPAN and CNN ran constant newsfeeds, both mainstream stations employed a strategic rhetorical move in addition to the logos of the facts and the ēthē of reporters. They also kept their audience engaged, giving the audience a chance to be a quasi-rhetor by voicing opinions on live television and contributing to the formation of a public collective. After military developments, news briefings, or discussions in Congress, news anchors and hosts would ask citizens to call in and discuss their take on the recent events. Private citizens with little or even no military or political experience could now be heard on a national level, setting them apart from those citizens during World War II who could listen to radio programming hosts, but could not themselves become (guest) hosts unless they had the means to buy air time or had connections to those with access. Citizens could hear the perspectives of other citizens who were supposedly just like them, which created a sense of identification with these on-air, non-specialist voices. The call-in affordance created a new debate platform that was widely accessible and novel.

Identification with the prowar collective proved to be the majority response to the Gulf War, much unlike its televised predecessor of the Vietnam War. Identification was a naturally logical response to the televised war for at least two reasons: 1) prowar
government officials had pitched the need for war as a logical response to Hussein’s unethical and dangerous actions, which could be repeated and analyzed ad nauseum on television, and 2) televised coverage of smart bombs hitting very specific targets suggested to the American public that the casualties were low, so there was little reason not to pursue a Middle Eastern dictator with the potential to become the next Hitler. What citizens did not see were the messier moments—when bombs missed their targets or when Iraqi civilians became casualties. Because the press traveled in pools and live coverage was limited to places safe enough for reporters to occupy, the logic of the televised war implied a more sanitized version of what actually took place. However, the sanitized version was digestible for the public, and thus adopting the “us-versus-them” mentality and supporting the war effort to destroy the “them” seemed logical. Moreover, the war itself took place so quickly that a good deal of events were not known until later, despite claims that the media could deliver minute-by-minute commentary: “the Gulf War was over before much actuality (non-pool) footage could contaminate the stylistic endeavors of network television” (Hoskins 24). Overwhelming, highly visual stylistics, as previously mentioned, lend themselves to overwhelming the viewer with information, and giving the appearance and feeling of knowing everything that is happening, when in fact that information has been carefully chosen and crafted. For example, Hoskins notes that there were even instances during the early stages of the war when news stations used images, colors, and representations of the physical layout of Iraq to demonstrate facts about the war, such as when ABC News used a horizon image with a setting sun to track
the impending deadline President Bush gave Hussein to comply with the United Nations resolutions (27).

Another element of televised war that promoted prowar collective identification through logos was the use of graphics, such as maps and graphs, to explain events when televised coverage was limited, inappropriate, or too dangerous to capture (Hoskins 25). Such tactics provided citizens an opportunity to learn more details about the war—from locating Iraq on a map to understanding the complexities of United Nations resolutions that had been violated—and thus contributed to feelings of confidence in supporting (or, more rarely, protesting) the war.

While constant live coverage of the war kept the public abreast of military and political developments, such twenty-four-seven updates and call-in news programming created the illusion that American citizens were more involved than they actually were. While citizen-viewers could learn about and discuss events, they were still only seeing what they were permitted to see, and there is no evidence that even the most informed, intelligent discussion from citizens during call-in segments reached government officials or shaped their politics. However, the television’s importance during the war was not so much in what actually happened, so much as what citizens felt was happening—if they felt they were participating, then to them, that was reality. Such a feeling of involvement was at least partially due to the highly visual nature of reporting by one of the most dominant wartime channels, CNN. This station in particular created a complex display of information that lent itself to a feeling of news omniscience—if there was anything to
know about the war, CNN suggested it had that information. This look, argues Hoskins, was created by strategic visual cues that rhetorically worked to persuade the American public viewers that they were “in the know.” One of CNN’s signature visual traits were the “banks of monitors and screens-within-the-screen and the production of simultaneity through multiple satellite feeds distributed to different visual frames that split the screen into desktop-sized fragments of different times and places” (25). As viewers watched around-the-clock news coverage with such imagery, they became well acquainted with the regular news anchors and reporters. The combination of a fast-paced, highly visual aesthetic with the familiarity of the same group of anchors and reporters lent itself to an atmosphere ripe for identification. Not only were viewers informed, but they were now part of the war process—they could know all about the developments just as the military did and could listen to anchors analyze each event as if they were friends discussing the news with American citizens, right in their homes. If televised news coverage during the Vietnam War proved how powerful television is during wartime, then the same medium during the Gulf War combined that power with a more participatory democracy wherein average citizens could now speak back on a national level—or at least felt that such was the case.

As citizens contributed to what appeared to be a form of participatory democracy, the media ensured their continued attention with the simultaneous use of carefully crafted visual and audio material to produce a more engaging, interactive feel. Hoskins details this strategy in his recount of how the audio file of CNN’s Arnett was dubbed over top
the visual footage produced by ITV and ABC (30). Pairing the most compelling audio
file with the most compelling visual file was a rhetorical choice to draw the news
audience in, providing an increased synesthetetic experience that involved both hearing and
seeing, making viewers at home feel they were part of the action. They were watching the
war live with one another, talking live on-air with one another, feeling as if they were
there in the midst of battle or in the newsroom. Identification was thus encouraged
through the aural and visual, as well as through a novel increase in instantaneous
communication with other citizens across the nation. Because all of these elements took
place synchronously, the feeling of identification was indeed a more powerful one than
had been electronically produced and experienced during both World War II and the
Vietnam War.

As citizens identified with their peers and felt engaged in the news, the shape of
the public sphere, and what that meant for participatory democracy, shifted in part
because of the technology itself. McLuhan argues that television is a cool medium,
asking the audience to participate by supplying their own understandings and
interpretations of what they see and hear (Understanding Media 39). While small clips of
war coverage may have reinforced this notion of television as cool media during the
Vietnam War, I would argue that the coolness of television became slightly warmer
during the Gulf War because of the twenty-four-hour, around-the-clock coverage, but
was balanced out by the coolness of the call-in opportunities offered by outlets such as
CNN and C-SPAN, which asked citizens to create conversations and supply their own
responses. However, even the most articulate and productive conversations produced by call-in viewers were still tempered by the relatively little room dedicated to such calls compared to the news content being fed to them by the channels themselves. In previous wars, radio and news broadcasts eventually came to end—after anywhere from fifteen to sixty minutes on average. This relatively small time frame left most of a person’s waking hours available for him or her to reconsider what they had heard and seen, to debate it with others, and to search out additional information from other sources. In all of these options, participation was still required and active effort necessary. However, if news coverage never ends, then the audience becomes a de facto captive audience to a media that does not need any input—there is no opening for such input anyway aside from the dedicated timeframes when viewer calls were being accepted and aired.

Yet, there is a complicating factor that accompanies immediate, live coverage of a war: overextended news. Because there can be downtime during wars where no shellings, bombings, or other developments are taking place, reporters may find themselves struggling to provide novel content. Such moments turn into apt opportunities to analyze—and over analyze—every detail of recent events, to invite both expert and amateur guests onto the show, and to project potential future events—all of which can lead to muddied or even biased interpretations of events. To keep an audience engaged, reporters must continually report news, so when news is lacking, they must find a way to create a sense of urgency, as well as identification with their particular brand of reporting, that encourages viewers to stay tuned. McLuhan noted in *The Gutenberg Galaxy,*
television—particularly live television—does not have the luxury of “downtime”: “The elementary and basic fact about the TV image is that it is a mosaic or a mesh, continuously in a state of formation by the ‘scanning finger.’ Such a mosaic involves the viewer in a perpetual act of participation and completion” (286-87). In other words, the audience must be continually engaged, as they are needed for their participation—their identification—around a shared interpretation of the news as it unfolds. If news becomes stale and is delivered too late, then identification cannot take place because it would be in response to past events rather than current ones, and there would be no need to band together in response to the event that has already passed. Alternatively, citizens could access the news elsewhere and buy into another outlet’s interpretation and identify with it instead. In order to remain relevant, news stations had to remain current with their up-to-date information. When the audience can participate by seeing and hearing their peers, calling in themselves, and experiencing live coverage of developments together, it is much more likely that they feel that they are part of the event itself and are connected to other citizens through such shared participation. Identification during the Gulf War was largely possible due to the electronic synesthesia created by televisions’ timeliness, audio, and visual advantages.

The television coverage of the Gulf War’s voices, both of support and protest, was markedly different than that of the Vietnam War. While the Vietnam War grew from a quiet start, gradually dominating news hours, the Gulf War essentially began—and ended—on television (Taylor 31). The American public first witnessed missile launches
during the evening news hours on January 16, 1991, and watched the entirety of the conflict play out television via live-action footage and ceaseless commentary from CNN and C-SPAN, most notably. Even commercial breaks were done away with in favor of news footage (34). The entire experience of the Gulf War was mediated through the television, marking it apart from its television predecessor of the Vietnam War. The television’s role as collective-enhancer suggested that this medium was much more than a vehicle of entertainment or news delivery; it became an identification device that enabled a form of participatory democracy where it had not existed before, and in such a way that had never existed before. American citizens now knew they could use the same medium that delivered the news they consumed, to act as a producer and sharer of public opinion. The trend of citizens’ harnessing mass media technology and transitioning from solely “consumer” to also “producer” would continue, and be greatly enlarged, during the following war in the Middle East.
The United States declared war on Iraq for the second time on March 20, 2003 following a period of intense political, public, and—maybe most importantly—rhetorical discussion stemming from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The rhetoric thrown about in the media immediately following the September 11 attacks to justify engaging in hot war reflected a mixture of residual reservations about Saddam Hussein that still lingered in the public consciousness following the Gulf War, accompanied with the newfound outrage toward those who had in any way contributed to the recent terrorist attacks. The technology relaying news of the unfolding situation represented a mixture of the old and the new as well. Updates were broadcast via television programming that in many ways resembled news of the previous war; however, the newer Internet technology provided an additional outlet for citizens to keep abreast of current affairs while affording them increased participation in both reflecting and shaping public opinion. The new technology of an interactive platform for the masses enabled public sphere discussion during wartime in a way never experienced before on a national—or international—level. The Internet provided a space in which both collective and countercollective voices stated opinions and reached global audiences in record time. American citizens accessed war news from multiple political, cultural, and demographic perspectives in real time, and
restrictions on access and public opinions placed by the prowar collective were fewer and more difficult to implement than with previous wartime media. The Internet effectively combined all previous media, both electronic and otherwise, into a multisensory public platform that dramatically reshaped the role of the average citizen in discussing and debating within the public sphere.

Just as with television—but, I argue, to a greater degree and in a much more dramatic fashion—the Internet transformed the way in which official government decisions were both supported and resisted by the public. The tenor of public sphere conversations were now more unfiltered and unrestricted than ever before thanks to a virtual platform that could be accessed for multiway communication nearly anywhere, including the home. More citizens had access to a public discourse platform than in previous generations and wars. This shift to more publicly accessible conversation confronted traditional media owners—those who owned and ran radio stations, news channels, and even newspapers and other print sources—with the challenge to adapt their news delivery to the emerging medium of the Internet. Though the Internet had not completely erased or replaced the older forms of media, it did converge multiple media in a way that demanded the remixing and restructuring of the old forms into something new—something multisensory, something with the ability to be both synchronous and asynchronous, and something compatible with other forms of technology, such as the radio and television that were so vital for wars past. Moreover, the Internet simultaneously acted as a great electronic archive, keeping records of news articles,
videos, and images, as well as the public discussions hosted online. The very makeup of mass communication and persuasion continued to shift during the Iraq War, and in turn, affected American citizens’ identification with the countercollective yet again.

The Collective

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 marked the first large scale domestic attack by a foreign enemy since the attacks on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. As sitting president, George W. Bush learned of the events seemingly in stride, as he remained calm when learning of the events from his staff as he sat in a classroom of kindergarteners that morning during their reading lesson (Choi). From the public perspective, civilian and government buildings had been attacked, though it took several days to uncover the persons responsible and their motives for carrying out such massive destruction. As the nation waited to understand what had happened, and if the likes of it would happen again, Bush stepped in to rhetorically comfort and encourage the nation through carefully chosen words and phrases that would serve to explain the events of 9/11 while simultaneously setting the rhetorical stage for the Iraq War.

President Bush quickly crafted a highly distinct ethos as a sort of political cowboy, determined to save the nation—and even the world—from the “bad guys” responsible for the September 11 attacks, while simultaneously drumming up fear of the enemy to ensure that the threat was felt nationwide. As Susan A. Brewer notes in her study of war propaganda, Bush’s ethos strongly lay in his “us-versus-them” depiction of the United States—the epitome of civilization, as popular opinion would

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suggest—against those responsible for terrorist undertakings—the barbarians (230).

During the previous conflict with Hussein roughly a decade earlier, President Bush’s father relied on a similar strategy of highlighting the cultural differences—and indirectly, the supposed cultural superiority of American society—to persuade civilians to support the war effort. These three components—an us-versus-them mentality, a feeling of cultural superiority, and a similar approach to conflict as his father had made during a war that proved to be an “easy win” for the United States—all worked in tandem to produce a persuasive appeal to the ethos of both American culture and ideals in general, but more importantly, to the ethos of President George W. Bush.

Ethos may have played a role in persuading American citizens that their leader was capable of responding to the terrorist attacks, but ethos alone may not have sufficed to persuade citizens to support actual war. The Iraq War was largely created and based in a pathos-laden response to the devastating September 11 terrorist attacks. The events of that single day that arguably triggered the Iraq War, whether logical or not, worked extensively through an appeal to the American pathos. The 9/11 attacks themselves elicited understandably emotional responses from across the globe, but especially from Americans who watched their nation under a large-scale foreign attack for the first time since Pearl Harbor. As sitting president during the catastrophic events of September 11, Bush acknowledged the predictable feelings Americans were presumably feeling immediately following the attacks. In his address to the nation on the evening of September 11, he almost immediately noted the nation’s horrified response to “The
pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge—huge structures collapsing [which] have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger” (“Statement by the President”). Although Bush would continue in his speech to highlight how these initial feelings were quickly replaced with resolve to defend the nation, Anthony R. DiMaggio notes that the strand of pathos-fueled messages continued after the address and into the Iraq War months later and did so with the help of mainstream media: “Fearful messages were filtered through a compliant media to a susceptible public that already shared fears of terrorism after September 11” (59). Brewer argues that this “culture of fear” was a necessary “emotional framework for preemptive war against Iraq” (234). Much like a wounded animal responds to pain with violence toward those who may try to help it, Bush suggests that the United States locate not only the terrorists responsible for the attacks but also those who harbor them (and presumably, who also support them—with or without harboring them) (Bush “Statement by the President”). The alternative approach—to opt for war as a last resort and to pursue diplomatic retaliation in the form of policies, trade restrictions, and other economic and political sanctions—took a backseat to the idea of a physical, violent, and active hot war. In fact, it was on the evening of 9/11 that Bush first used the phrase “war on terrorism” when, immediately following his gratitude to the members of Congress for banding together in bipartisan national support as well as to world leaders who had contacted the president to discuss aid following the events, he confidently and authoritatively stated that the American people would “stand together to win the war against terrorism”
(“Statement by the President”). The Bush administration also depicted the war “like a new reality show in which the entire country had been given a part to play. With its logos and theme music, media coverage featured decisive leaders, authoritative anchors, courageous war correspondents, ramrod straight military briefers, can-do troops, and the folks at home displaying flags and yellow ribbons” (Brewer 234). Thanks in part to the successful creation of a culture of fear, American citizens compulsion to participate in their role as dutiful patriots proved strong, and persuasion to support the war—or whatever actions the sitting president may choose to take—seemed the antidote to quelling the fear of an uncertain future.

While none of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks hailed from Iraq, the question of who harbored whom led to accusations against Iraq for its potential aid in the Taliban’s activities. By noting the United States’s rocky past with Iraq’s Hussein and emphasizing a national distrust of the dictator, Bush reignited a convenient sense of fear by reminding Americans that mass threats still existed and could instantly destroy lives just as the 9/11 attacks had:

From 2002 to 2003, Bush embarked on one of the largest prowar public relations campaigns in history. This campaign ended successfully with public support galvanized behind Bush’s war agenda. The president stressed Iraq’s alleged WMDs and ties to terrorism. (DiMaggio 59)

Fear played the prime role in both prodding citizens to band together as one and in encouraging them to follow their leader into a war fueled by the need for retaliation, even
if that war sought to attack a different nation, leader, and citizens than those responsible for harboring the terrorists. For President Bush, the bottom line was thus: fear sells.

However powerful fear or retaliation tactics may be, they will not ultimately be successful if they are the only emotions called on when supporting any national agenda. As time between the terrorist attacks and government action increased, citizens' sense of normalcy returned and the initial fear induced by the confusion of 9/11 subsided. To maintain momentum for his impending war, Bush capitalized on hope and how despite the evil in the world—evil which had struck American soil in the recent past—Americans still hoped to create a safe and peaceful world. Hope, then, is a more ongoing emotion that while not as jarring as the immediate fear that occurs in the direct aftermath of a large-scale attack, it does sustain itself by begging the question of what the future may hold. In other words, while Americans would not always feel, or even remember, the distinct brand of visceral fear they felt as they learned about the terrorist attacks of 9/11, they can always access their own ideas and desires for what the future of the nation and the world could look like. DiMaggio notes that “Along with cultivating fear, the Bush administration sold the promise of hope that the United States would take action to rid the world of the ‘butcher of Baghdad,’ and roll back the terror threat” (59). In ridding the world of such a threat, Americans could sleep easy knowing that the sources of evil they saw in late 2001 were being weeded out and destroyed, thereby ensuring increased safety.

However, because idealistic hope for a better future does not attract nearly as much attention or support as panic-stricken fear, Bush’s tactic to appeal to the former unaided
by the latter did not last long, and his support for engaging in the Iraq War would circle back to fear even several months after the 9/11 attacks. As Americans’ emotional reactions leveled out and proved more difficult for Bush to capitalize one, a third rhetorical appeal pushed the prowar collective’s agenda through the ranks of Congress and throughout the public.

Engaging in a hot war requires some degree of logos lest the militaristic component of the war be unfounded or too weakly supported once the public’s emotional reaction fades. In order to placate the legal and constitutional requirements of initiating or participating in war and to encourage citizens to continue supporting military intervention, a president must pitch wartime involvement in such a way that garners both congressional and public support while also appearing objective and rooted in fact. Possibly the biggest concern for the Bush administration was combating “Vietnam syndrome”—“the term for American reluctance to go to war” following the deadly prolonged and largely unproductive war decades before (Brewer 231). Recognizing the pivotal role the media played in both Vietnam and the Gulf War, the Bush White House seized media control as much as possible and, as early as possible, following the September 11 terrorist attacks. In dictating the narrative of the official government response to the terrorist attacks, the Bush administration created a specific patriotic message that would prove difficult to unravel or contest in the immediate aftermath of September 11 and into the early months of the following year as the nation prepared for formal entrance into a hot war. Brewer suggests that such a controlled and systematic
approach to how the conflict in the Middle East unfolded in front of American citizens was in fact highly dangerous and only partially rooted in truth:

Proud of their ‘iron message discipline,’ officials used facts, lies, and patriotic symbols as well as censorship to conduct ‘perception management.’ In a time of bitter rivalry between Republicans and Democrats, [the Bush administration] did not benefit from the bipartisan consensus of the Cold War era, but instead manufactured the appearance of consensus. (232-33)

While partisan debate may have existed in congressional meetings and sessions, the American public received mediated messages of a uniform government that sought to destroy an enemy who, although elusive, could somehow be pinpointed in Hussein’s Iraq, as he represented the base from which such terroristic threats were spawned, whether such a claim was logical and based in fact or not. Fed by a steady diet of “infoganda,” the American public appeared to accept the heavily spun version of reality portrayed to them by the Bush administration, at least in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks.

When he was interviewed on Meet the Press five days after the September 11 attacks, Vice President Cheney also relied on the government’s brand of logos as he explained how combating a terrorist organization like al-Qaeda would require long-term effort due to the difficulty of identifying a covert cell of terrorists as opposed to focusing on a particular nation and ruler (“The Vice President Appears”). While Hussein’s name was linked to the terrorist attacks, his factual link to them did not exist, and thus Cheney, as well as the rest of the Bush administration, focused instead on al-Qaida when discussing retaliation, using their secretive operations and possible locations as part of the
reason to invade Iraq—or anywhere else nearby that could potentially harbor terrorist
cells. In doing so, Cheney used this platform to prepare the American people for a
conflict that could range not only across geographical space and national borders, but
across time: “It’s...important for people to understand that this is a long-term
proposition...I think this is going to be a struggle that the United States is going to be
involved in for the foreseeable future” (“The Vice President Appears”). In this televised
appearance, Cheney mentioned President Bush’s initiative to retaliate against both
terrorists and the nations that harbored them, specifically naming Saudi Arabia and
Afghanistan as potential targets of what he said would be “the full wrath of the United
States of America” (“The Vice President Appears”). By basing the prowar agenda’s
rationale on what appeared to be fact-based reasoning, it would seem the Middle East
could easily be turned into a singular “enemy,” and conveniently glossed over the
complexities and nuances of the boundaries between Hussein, Iraq as a country, and the
likes of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. However, Bush and Cheney’s use of
logos—though faulty and incomplete—combined with the overwhelming appeals to
pathos immediately following the terrorist attacks proved effective in encouraging a
degree of public support for the war.

The Countercollective

Even if the lack of logos from the collective, prowar agenda were overlooked, and
even if their appeals to pathos were effective in reaching American citizens, the
countercollective’s rebuttals to both the war’s premises and rhetorical appeals to support
it were difficult to discredit and nearly impossible not to hear. The Internet afforded the countercollective an opportunity to project their own perspective of the war without relying on filtration through mainstream (and prowar) media, and could thus reach American citizens through their own websites, videos, and publications hosted online. The battleground for public opinion as to how to respond to the 9/11 attacks was particularly volatile because of how much of a role the rhetorical stylings of a few key figures played and of how they spun and delivered their version of reality:

the news of who was responsible for the WTC attack involves assertions, opaque and amorphous, grounded in words...Lacking pictures for evidence, and relying exclusively on words, the world remains divided about who carried out the WTC attacks. It depends on which proposition (reality) you want to believe and who you want to believe. (Gladney 24-25)

With the Internet as their widely accessible platform, the countercollective could now shape and define reality like the collective had been able to do since World War II, using an electronic mass medium to communicate the particular message that would create a counter-collective of citizens who identified with one another and who sought to strengthen their tribe with even more members. In doing so, the countercollective exercised rhetorical savvy to attract citizens and international onlookers alike, highlighting the growing audience for American wartime rhetoric in the process.

Much like George W. Bush’s cowboy ethos was one of the first rhetorical appeals to become publicly apparent following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ethos was also at the forefront of the countercollective’s dissent. To argue that one of the most strident voices
opposing the war—Hussein’s—carried ethos with most American citizens would be grossly misdirected. However, the voice of the other whom Hussein represented proved a challenge to ignore during the Iraq War. As the political antithesis to a capitalist democracy such as the United States, Hussein’s dictatorship in an Arab nation stood starkly opposed to the ideals upon which Americans had traditionally prided themselves. However, it was not Hussein’s politics per se that invited protest to the war—it was his representation of a form of government, and even of cultural existence, different from that of popular Western beliefs that suggested the United States was attempting to discredit and even smother the potential for a nation to operate in a manner which looked so unlike that of the American way of life. The countercollective line of reasoning questioned whether the United States was trying to play the role of neoconservative “super police,” exercising undue control over another nation's functioning (Holloway 35).

Thanks in part to the Internet, American citizens were able for the first time to break from mainstream media and to hear the unfiltered perspectives of citizens from Iraq, as well as from other Arab nations, as they interpreted and shared their understanding of the war. For those Americans who were receptive to reading, watching, and listening to these othered voices, the motivations and pragmatics of American liberation of Iraq became suspect (Holloway 74). While Hussein did not appear in American media the way he had during the Gulf War, when he hosted “guests” (or took “hostages”), he represented the countercollective other who was often demonized, and rarely understood, by mainstream, prowar collective media.
Like the collective, and President Bush in particular, relying on ethos was only a small component of the rhetorical tactics to attract American citizens to the cause. The appeals to logos presented by the countercollective may have proven to be the strongest appeals against the war. The lack of weapons of mass destruction, the fact that none of the September 11 terrorists hailed from Iraq, and the need for oil from the Middle East all served as reasons many Americans—as well as citizens from around the globe—criticized the Bush administration’s persistence in initiating the war. A perceived lack of logos to support engaging in a hot war with Iraq prompted many American citizens to look to a news source that may have otherwise been an unlikely outlet for information: an Arab-centric website featuring content written by and for citizens in the “enemy” region of the Middle East. One of the main countercollective voices throughout the Iraq War was aljazeera.net, a website carrying news written by reporters representing Arab cultures and often intended for Arab audiences. About a year after the September 11 attacks, and only months before the war officially began in 2003, Al Jazeera published a version of its Arabic site for its English-speaking audience (Azran 103). The English version of the website was created to give the American public an opportunity to hear about the events of the Iraq War from the “enemy’s” perspective—from those on the receiving end of the smart bombs and missiles often lauded in mainstream American news (103). Such a move was unprecedented—never before had American audiences had easy access to news reports and accounts from the opposing side of the war. Access to a translated news source such as aljazeera.net meant that American citizens could compare
accounts of the war as they were represented and interpreted through both American and Arab perspectives.

However, many Western audiences—including Americans—found aljazeera.net’s content helpful in understanding the war from the other side—the side often demonized in prowar statements released by the American government and often fueled by vindication of the September 11 deaths rather than for liberation of those suffering under tyranny. Besides being an alternative to mainstream media in that it is an English version of an Arabic news source, Al Jazeera’s role as an antiwar, and even anti-American, news source that relayed a different narrative than that of the American government capitalized on providing another version of the facts, appealing to American citizens’ sense of logos as well as through an appeal to ethos, as Middle Eastern reporters were living in the war zone and experiencing the reality of combat firsthand. These logos- and ethos-based accounts bothered President Bush to the point that he considered bombing its headquarters during the Iraq War due to its perceived threat as a propagandist outlet for Bin-laden. However, British Prime Minister Tony Blair dissuaded Bush from doing so (Ayish 132). It is apparent that Bush understood the power an alternative news source had and the potential ramifications of the sway on American citizens of the countercollective.

The controversial news source was not the only clue that American citizens joined millions of other individuals worldwide in questioning the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq. In fact, domestic unrest and criticism of the war began even earlier
than Al Jazeera’s initial recognition in the United States. Analyzing the now-defunct Worldwatch Institute’s website, Yahya R. Kamalipour notes how the language of war begins permeating throughout collective consciousness well before the first military boots hit the ground (96). Likewise, antiwar language permeates the collective consciousness as well, though it may struggle to be heard. The February 15, 2003 protest demonstrated the extent of civil rejection of the notion that the war in Iraq was necessary, fruitful, or even justified. Protests took place across the nation (as well as the globe), ranging from small neighborhood endeavors to takeovers of large urban centers in what turned out to be the largest protest movement seen on American soil since the Vietnam War era (Verhulst 1). Like the other notable voices of the countercollective, those associated with the February Protest relied on a rhetorical strategy that mirrored the antiwar collective’s dissatisfaction with the prowar agenda’s overreliance on pathos and minimization of logos.\textsuperscript{16}

The sheer number of coordinated players involved in organizing the February Protest suggests a strength in participants’ ēthē that is compounded as other groups and organizations participate side-by-side. Lobby and advocacy groups as well-established and notorious as the National Organization for Women (NOW), and as newly emerging as MoveOn.org, partnered together under the umbrella advocacy groups ANSWER (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) and United for Peace and Justice in the wake of

\textsuperscript{16} Multiple protests took place both domestically and internationally in response to the United States’ decision to declare war on Iraq. The scope of this dissertation cites only the domestic protest of February 15, 2003 for rhetorical analysis, as it was this protest that was most coordinated across several cities in the US. When referring to this particular American protest, I use the singular “February Protest” nomenclature, though there were in fact several antiwar protests over a longer period of time, both within and without the United States.
increased political and social tension following the September 11 terrorist attacks and its fallout both domestically and internationally (Verhulst 10). As fifty advocacy groups collaborated to coordinate and produce the February Protest, potential citizen-participants of the countercollective recognized the power of fifty ēthē combined, and the persuasive sway of such a monumental collective ethos convinced an estimated 2,500,000 American citizens to protest the Iraq War on that designated day (10, 17). Much of the coordination efforts took place online through advocacy groups’ websites, email chains, and online news outlets. Often groups would speak of one another and provide hyperlinks to the websites of other antiwar coalition members (Verhulst 13). As electronic communication protesting the war spread across the nation, it continued garnering support from citizens who banded together with international protestors, suggesting a powerful distinction between the collective ēthē of the antiwar movement and the ethos of the Bush administration: while the prowar effort appeared to have few supporters, the countercollective appeared to grow daily (11). The resulting ethos that this countercollective boasted sharply contrasted the lack of ethos behind the limited support for war both at home and abroad.

**The Medium and The Public**

The online public sphere, in addition to hosting the collective that has traditionally had access to mainstream media, now also hosts the countercollective on a scale much more encompassing and public than in years past, promising an increased potential for viewpoints that run counter to the most popular to be expressed, heard, and
even taken seriously, especially as forms of alternative media grow in readership: “The participatory nature and the focus on democratic process characteristic of alternative media provide additional means for proactive resistance” (Fontes 159). Proactive resistance, then, lends itself to the creation of a new social organization that revolves around competing voices and viewpoints often encountered on websites where citizens routinely read, discuss, and share with others their thoughts on the political climate of the nation (and even the rest of the world), as well as engage in conversations that reflect, and ultimately shape, American culture. The public sphere is not so much a Habermasean parlor where educated, wealthy men discuss the merits of the political, economic, and cultural structure of the country; it is now a digital, virtual environment wherein all manner of citizens (and even non-citizens) can debate amongst themselves those same merits with people they would probably never encounter in a non-digital space. Because the space of the parlor has taken up residency inside the Internet and is now housed on millions of websites worldwide, so too has the conversation of the public sphere shifted. The conversations and debates now take the multimodal forms of text, video, imagery, and sound. Even memes can act as rhetorically strategic agents that compel people to take part in discussion. While the term “democratic” is never totally appropriate for Internet-fueled conversation and while not all voices will be given equal credence in the virtual public sphere, the flexibility and increasing access of this potential for an enlarged public dialogue can at least be considered a positive advancement toward a more equitable public sphere—one where those who never would have been physically
included in Habermas’s parlors can now engage in virtual domains (Hauser 20; Rahman and Ramaprasad 73). If the Greek demos cannot feasibly be replicated in modern culture, at least the idea that culture is closer now to that type of potential than it has been since industrialization holds the promise of inviting more citizens into political debate and social conversation.

However, hosting an array of value systems and ideological stances is not the sole reason the countercollective sphere exists online—a sense of unease and mistrust of the collective’s mainstream media contributes to the rise of the countercollective’s virtual presence. In his study of public use of mass media, Tal Azran posits that the differences of belief and opinions created room for mistrust of the collective, encouraging those who were already skeptical of the mainstream media to propagate their feelings toward it while inviting others to consider the same. Azran notes that such news consumers are highly selective and share a pattern of comparing news stories from various sources both via television and the Internet, though their information diet from the Internet outweighs that from television (104). He suggests that mistrust of mainstream media is likely the most prominent determining factor in the number of increased Internet news sources (106). In all its previous forms, the public sphere in America has never been so friendly to the skepticism and information sharing that it now is, largely due to the nature of the Internet. Such countercollective skepticism shows up on the Internet in alternative media sites that offer a key advantage over mainstream media: “it has been argued powerful social institutions (particularly corporations) control mainstream media that seek to
reinforce elite hegemony and hierarchical social relationships...In contrast, alternative media are structured” to disrupt that pattern by privileging the underrepresented voices (107). Because both the collective and countercollective are necessary for the closet depiction to the truth that can exist, Americans’ relatively new habit of comparing mainstream and alternative media accounts of news stories suggests a national trend toward hunting for the “complete picture” rather than trusting a one-sided account, and Al Jazeera became one primary outlet for completing this picture during the Iraq War (112).

Citizens can find nearly countless sites that deal with a host of political opinions with even the most cursory online search. Though the wide spectrum of various, even competing, sources represent fragments of the larger society and suggest a disintegration of collectivism, they actually work to suggest just the opposite. Websites as different as VICE News and Fox News may imply that the United States is a hodgepodge of disagreeing citizens, but it is actually more collectivist than during previous eras and is much more unified than it may have been had not electronic technology—particularly the Internet—intervened. Rather than being handed some generalized account of events with which everyone is expected to agree, citizens can now find others who share their ideological views and connect with them, and then pursue the actions they find most appropriate with other citizens. Without such mass mediated connections, citizens would be prompted to accept the official, government-backed interpretation of events, and public dialogue of dissent would be relegated to the margins of society, and the potential
for a countercollective formation would be much more unlikely. Now, the possibility of finding one’s collective, no matter how far from mainstream public opinion that tribe stands, continues to grow as the Internet becomes the go-to medium for news and political information—and at the cost of older, more traditional media such as the newspaper and television (Dizard, Jr. 1). However, the new medium of the Internet should not be seen as a competitor of the older media, as it is rather an extension of older media’s affordances.

The Iraq War expanded the technological affordances of wartime reporting that were pioneered during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars. Showing and telling citizens what was happening on the warfront meant a play on multiple senses simultaneously. Specifically, the Internet combined the visual and auditory depictions of combat and the pressing urgency of real time, around-the-clock updates with the ability for citizens to respond both synchronously and asynchronously. The style of participation with mass mediated communication altered Marshall McLuhan’s “hot and cold” theory as to what engages citizens in the creation of tribalization, or consubstantial collectivization:

The rise of Web-based media outlets has called into question the viability and relevance of traditional linear and inverted-pyramid styles of news reporting in a new, visually rich, interactive communication environment where the audience itself can participate...While the conventional paradigm governing the relationship between mass media and audience was characterized by minimal audience control over a one-way communication process, the new Web-based communication environment has empowered users to engage in information selection and search from a wide range of multimedia elements converging into a single operational platform. (Ayish 128)
The mainstream and alternative media outlets popular during the Iraq War demonstrated both the inversion of traditional media power structures by granting individuals more control of the content discussed in the news, as well as encouraged higher participation in selecting content from an ever-increasing number of online sources. The term “new media” has embodied multiple definitions, often overlapping to some degree, but most often used in reference to the Internet and its capacity for hyperlinking, hosting audio and visual content mixed with print text, and both synchronous and asynchronous communication. Ralph D. Berenger offers a checklist of characteristics that capture well the traits which set “new media” apart from “old media”; new media is convergent, ubiquitous, agenda-setting, credible, interactive, and transferrable (26-28). If new media needs its own definition to separate it from old media, then it also requires a new approach in terms of its hot-cool designation.

McLuhan argued that the cooler the media, the more audience participation is required (Understanding Media 39). Because it was characterized by more participation and direct citizen-to-citizen interaction in wartime, the Internet thus became a cooler medium than the preceding technology of the radio. Increased participation and access to public multilogue encourages the formation of multiple collectives of like-minded members who can find one another in virtual space, can band together, and can decide what action their collective or countercollective wants to take in a matter. These types of activities, which were not afforded by the radio, inherently demand interaction and engagement on the part of the technology users. Even locating such websites requires that
individuals participate in such a way that makes the Internet a cool medium. The more audience participation that is required, the more important it is for citizens to supply their own understanding of events and people—their own understanding of the context, message, rhetor, and purpose. The more of a rhetorical understanding of any given situation they create on their own, the more likely they are to seek out those who share their ideas. This rhetorical analysis and consubstantial identification thus creates camps who have, to some degree, created a shared (virtual) reality that could look very different from the other camp’s agreed-upon shared reality, which is itself hosted on various websites within the same virtual space. In essence, collective and countercollective participants are actively creating a rhetorical reality and are increasingly being prompted to do so as the technology becomes cooler. Thus, it is not just the Burkean identity that sets collectives and countercollectives apart, or even brings them together—it is also the media itself, and how it is employed by a collective or countercollective’s members. The cooler the medium—the more interaction that is required from citizens—the more citizens search out those with whom they identify, and with the affordances of online communication, the more they are able, and thus likely, to participate in reality-building with one another.

However, with the chance to create reality came the chance to create a fictitious reality that attracted those who already wanted to buy into it, whether or not it was truthful or logical. Choosing a version of news—and thus, of reality—is an affordance of cool media that actually works against its coolness. The drawback of an expanded
(virtual) public sphere wherein users can create content (and thus, reality) at will is that news consumers may only pay attention to those sources which strengthen and reinforce their own liking, leaving as little room for critical questioning as possible. Choosing one’s own version of reality is much like putting on blinders that block out those viewpoints different from one’s own, thereby escalating the degree of collectivism or countercollectivism they feel with other like-minded citizens, but also limiting the conversations across collectives and countercollectives. Such a rhetorical move makes a medium hotter, as users are not critically participating and creating so much as uncritically consuming. If a plethora of available sources exist and news consumers can identify which sources are most similar to their own viewpoints, they are reinforcing likelihood of exposure to the Rashomon effect, “a widely recognized English term referring to significantly different perspectives of the same dramatic event by different eyewitnesses” (Blair et al. 1). Gladney points out the Rashomon effect affects individuals, but also larger scales of people—including news organizations and even entire nations. Based on one’s rhetorical identity (Burkean—us vs. them), we can expect an individual to participate in a collective or countercollective Rashomon effect, sharing the same interpretation as those with whom (s)he identifies. One’s understanding and interpretation of war is both affected by and affects his or her identity, which is rhetorical. Media serve as shapers and reinforcers of both identity and the Rashomon effect and encourage collectivism. Since World War II, citizens’ access to a plethora of news sources with various interpretations of news events has steadily increased with
technological advancements. As concrete evidence of the powers of consubstantial identification and the use of technology to further their own understanding of reality, consider the very different news accounts aired during the Iraq War. Arab and European news showed horrific images of the Iraq War, while American news showed more sanitized versions of reality, focusing on soldiers as liberating a dominated and oppressed people. The media worked in tandem with the government to create a version of reality the citizenry bought into, possibly unknowingly. Those who suspected something different than what was shown on newscasts created another domestic camp: those who opposed the war and looked to outside sources for news. They were, in a sense, siding with those nations with whom America stood opposed because they saw the victimization of Middle Eastern citizens at the hands of the American military that most US citizens did not see if they were only paying attention to prowar national news.

Even if citizens went out of their way to ensure they were exposing themselves to multiple news sources and viewpoints, sources were not always transparent about their ideological stances. Then, even if ideological affiliation was made clear, certain online users may not have had an equal opportunity to participate in the discussion due to forum rules and expectations, or even because they could not afford a membership to a particular site, thus being relegated to the role of observer only rather than active participant. Additionally, sites owned or operated by media conglomerates could limit discussion by not even allowing an opportunity for site users to leave feedback on articles or postings, to create their own discussion forum topics, or to even know about other
users of the site. Moreover, a media conglomerate could own or operate a site while concealing their identity as owners; in turn, users may have thought they were participating in a publicly created and run forum that was in fact inherently and clandestinely biased. Limitations such as these suggest that even if a medium is somewhat cool, that does not guarantee access or a critical understanding of media use on part of the consumer, and thus the ideals of the collective or countercollective can become muddied.

The coolness of the Internet rested in its affordances to host multiple competing spheres, but it could have been much cooler if all content had been equally accessible and equitably understood by all users. While the Internet provided increased technological and (virtual) social capacity for the formations of multiple public spheres cooperating and competing under the umbrella of American civil society, the medium itself still posed risks that mitigated its strengths as a more democratic option for public deliberation on any matter, including politics. Just as Gerald Hauser notes how the 1920s saw an increase in public communication to the point of information overload so too did the Internet present citizens with such a multitude of options for news sources that it is unreasonable and impractical to assume that any one layperson was ever completely up-to-date on political goings-on or possessed the technical knowledge needed to comprehend the matters that affected citizens and should have thus been a discussion item within the public sphere (25). As a result, many citizens who could not keep pace with the specialized political information—as well as the sorting through the biases of news
sources—often became passive consumers of “news” rather than critical thinkers who participate in public forum discussions, thereby increasing the temperature of the medium as it told audiences what to think and believe. It was easier to digest summaries of current events from lobbies and other biased sources, but this overreliance on the compacted forms of news came at the cost of a truly egalitarian democracy “in which the strongest ideas carry the day” (29). Moreover, the bias of any particular online source would have been difficult to determine, as the cognitive energy necessary to analyze sources often proves too time-consuming for most citizens. Biased news, then, may have become the main information diet of most Internet consumers and even other news sources who look to inherently biased sources for their own research, creating a feedback loop of suspect “news” (Rahman and Ramaprasad 77-78). Even if bias could have been detected and citizens made aware of it, they may have still preferred to rely on it as a means of minimizing not only the output of cognitive energy, but also as a means of minimizing cognitive dissonance (Stroud and Muddiman 10).

The Internet, then, was not as cool as television, wherein citizens often had to supply their own analysis of events and consider context as they made their judgements about what they had seen. The Internet was also not as hot as the radio, which allowed for minimal citizen-to-citizen interaction and conversation. Thus, to situate the Internet within McLuhan’s hot-cool theory requires a slight modification: rather than occupying one polar end of a dichotomy, the Internet is better understood as occupying a position on the middle of a temperature spectrum, as its blend of multiple affordances and constraints
makes it more lukewarm than either hot or cool. Its lukewarm nature became evident
during the Iraq War as citizens engaged with one another frequently, and in ways never
before exercised during wartime, yet the limitations they (unknowingly) faced created
multiple realities that spread through competing collectives virtually unchecked. The
future of wartime news and media invites the public to participate but also suggests a
future of competing realities, and thus, competing collectives. If use of the Internet during
the Iraq War suggests anything, it suggests that the American public can expect to see an
increase in the strength and number of countercollective.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Socially, it is the accumulation of group pressures and irritations that prompt invention and innovation as counter-irritants. War and the fear of war have always been considered the main incentives to technological extensions of our bodies.

Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media* 69

Across World War II, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War, American citizens gained more technological affordances that granted them opportunities to both interact with and create widely distributed messages concerning military involvement and citizen support or protest of hot wars. With technological advancements came an expanded public multilogue wherein a greater percentage of average citizens could learn of others’ war stances and create collectives with those who shared similar perspectives, thereby producing consubstantial identification within the collectives.

While the affordances granted to collectives may not have been rhetorically analyzed to much extent during the peak of their use in wartime, a historical analysis of how rhetors, whether individuals or groups, used electronic media and styled their electronically mediated messages suggests strategies that could prove useful in future instances of mass mediated communication, whether in wartime or otherwise.

Identifying rhetorical strategies helps us see forward rather than only backward. Marshall McLuhan argued that we always understand technology’s impact by looking
through the rearview mirror, but this dissertation argues that we can identify how certain rhetorical appeals affect people based on what sensory affordances that technology offers and predict how those affordances will most likely influence society as a whole during wartime (The Medium 75). Rather than wait to look backward only once a newer technology has appeared, we can understand the present better and maybe even prepare for future social movements or attitudes by thinking about how the senses respond to technology. We can use public response to mass mediated wartime rhetoric to engage technology, and one another, in future moments of war, national crisis, or other moments that call upon the public at large to act.

This type of information can serve individuals representing an array of personal and professional interests: media and technology companies with how they reach consumers; political campaigners with their appeals to voters’ sense of ethos, pathos, and logos; citizens with how they communicate with one another as they debate the merits of a political stance; collectives of citizens as they assess similarities and differences amongst themselves in larger civil actions. If a person can, for example, predict that citizens will respond to pathos more if they can visually see an argument rather than only hear it, then (s)he knows when to tap into certain styles of argument, and when not to. If one has a fifteen-second radio commercial, the present study suggests that (s)he should aim to appeal to ethos rather than pathos. If one is producing an Internet ad, (s)he might aim for pathos, especially on video-like platforms where both sound and image are expected. However, when working with sites that are more visually-oriented and thus
where people might keep sound off, such as Facebook or Twitter, then ethos may be more useful, especially as such platforms can capitalize on the ethos of its posters, as in the case of celebrity users. This rearview mirror study of how media have rhetorically worked in the past can thus serve to inform how to strategically prepare rhetorical messages for the future, by knowing in advance the likely outcome such messages will have on the citizenry.

The stakes for content producers are just as important for content consumers. If a consumer can understand how a message affects him or her and why, that analysis can help the consumer identify weak spots in an argument (s)he may have otherwise missed. For example, if a television viewer turns off the sound of an ASPCA commercial featuring the song “Angel” performed by Sarah McLachlan, (s)he will not hear the melancholic sound or the disturbing facts about animal abuse, though (s)he will still see the images of suffering animals. However, by eliminating one of the sensory affordances of the television, (s)he may not be as heavily affected as (s)he would have been with the sound on and with multiple senses intertwining to produce an amplified response to an amplified message. To the average citizen, such rhetorical and strategic use of technological affordances may seem like a trick to induce subliminal responses, but such strategies can be understood if citizens use the rearview mirror, so to speak, to prepare for and predict the future uses of mass mediated messages and the ways they attempt to draw in citizens whether or not the latter is even aware. Critical awareness of these strategies is key for citizens to be informed consumers, voters, and creators.
The current study is a historical appraisal of how rhetorical strategies affected a large body of very diverse people over the course of four American hot wars. By nature, this dissertation’s methodology is based on correlation rather than causation. Because not many extant studies exist from these four time periods that asked citizens specifically about connections they experienced between rhetorical argumentation and political belief, much of this previous five chapters’ material is inherently informed and researched, but still an overview. The rhetorical trends, however, are there: citizens have consistently increased their pro- and antiwar activities and collective and countercollective formations throughout the decades since World War II; American society is constantly moving toward more citizen participation via electronic media, not less. This means that the aurality of radio will most likely never reign as it did in the 1940s—too many individuals now have that same type of reach and public platform as only a few did back then. There is also a higher expectation of sensory involvement in political messages because of citizens’ exposure to increasingly sophisticated technology. Radio advertisements for a political candidate might help his or her cause, but television and Internet advertisements with both sound and image are more likely to leave a longer lasting impression on citizens.

The parameters of the current study are limited, in some ways, by the qualitative nature of rhetorical analysis and its basis in understanding the psychological influence on a historical population. Moreover, there are limited surveys, polls, and studies taken of public response to mass mediated messages during the four wartime periods under
investigation. This dissertation is focused on only the United States and its history of technology use during specific moments. The same methodology of historical rhetorical analysis may not prove as useful when applied to other nations where access to technology for reasons like economy or government control of media color citizens' use of mass media. Such methodology may also prove less effective when analyzing how citizens respond to mass mediated messages in nations where government structures are far removed from the republic nature of the United States.

Across the four wars discussed in this dissertation, the formation and activities of collectivism and countercollectivism consistently increased, with the latter group seeing particular growth and becoming more accepted as a participant in public discourse during wartime. Burkean rhetorical theory suggests that this is the case because citizens share feelings of consubstantial identification with one another. However, the ability to locate others with whom one might identify was severely limited during World War II, when only a small segment of society—notably, prowar figures often representing the government—had access to public mass media technologies. Average citizens, then, were more or less relegated to the role of consumer. This role was possibly more passive than active because citizens were hearing carefully crafted rhetorical messages that were designed specifically to sway listeners and because contradictory messages via the mass communication medium were rare. However, as Father Coughlin demonstrated, those with opposing viewpoints were heard, though in much more limited fashion and constantly facing the threat of being sanctioned or taken off the air completely.
The average citizen had increased opportunity to become more active as a critical viewer during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, when television provided both audio and visual and when the actions of citizens, both soldiers and protestors alike, were filmed and shared publicly. While the government did not own or control television networks in the same way it did the radio during World War II, most Americans still had little power to control what was shared on television, relying on extreme “newsworthy” events to be recorded and broadcast. Though arguably a small change in audience participation, the ability for non-collective, antiwar citizens to express countercollective viewpoints to a national audience illustrated the power of technology to provide a higher degree of democratic involvement and public response to war activities. The debate as to how much public opinion and television are to blame for the outcome of the Vietnam War remains to be settled, though popular opinion suggests that television most definitely posed a risk to the military successes of the prowar collective.

The Iraq War, more so than any previous American war, demonstrated the risks associated with the collision of electronic technology and the public sphere. Travis N. Ridout notes that partisan news sources took hold of the nation as traditional print news declined, and as a result, Americans have been able to selectively attend to media sources that most align with their individual political ideologies—a selection citizens make easily by choosing to only visit particular websites (1). However, the invention of the Internet and its accessibility at the household level is not solely to blame for biased news consumption. He notes that although electronic media in the form of televised news
existed during wartime during the Vietnam War era, it was not until the Gulf War of 1991 that news coverage of war presented a partisan dilemma to the American public. He argues that the nature of televised news shifted in the 1980s “toward a more interpretive style of reporting” that lent itself toward partisan politics at the expense of objective reporting (1). The dilemma the public faced, then, was what to do in light of differing accounts of the same political situations and even war.

Marshall McLuhan may not have lived to see the role the Internet would play during the Iraq War of 2003-2011 or even the shift that television made to expand the public sphere during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Nevertheless, he predicted the way citizens would respond as mass media technologies became increasingly sophisticated and more accessible to users. Specifically, he suggested that the differences in hot and cool media would not only affect citizens differently, but that as technologies became colder, people would become more actively involved in the construction of mediated messages (Understanding Media 39-40). He also predicted that any technology’s impact on the human psyche would be difficult to interpret until it was replaced with an even newer form of technology (564). Just as a fish does not realize it is surrounded by water, people do not always see the way the media shapes them or the way they shape it. Yet, his theories must be expanded upon to accommodate the way technology has continued influencing individuals and society at large.

McLuhan differentiated between hot and cool media, but did not account for the way the Internet would encompass both. Hot media are those forms of communication
that do not require much engagement from the listener/viewer/user; cool media require more engagement (*Understanding Media* 39). McLuhan noted the radio as a hot medium, and the television as a cool medium, yet the Internet contains both sound clips and visuals (both still images and moving images with sound). Such a combination mitigates both temperature extremes and produces a lukewarm medium—one characterized by traits of all the media it contains. When multiple forms of media interact and involve multiple senses, individuals move closer to experiencing synaesthesia, which results in the feeling that they are involved as participants in a situation. Although McLuhan argued that cool media would elicit more involvement, I contend that the synaesthesia produced by the lukewarm Internet elicits more because it is fuller, encompassing all previous forms of mass media.

When sorting through resources online, individuals act as news consumers, choosing which links to click, which stories to read, which to ignore, and which to share—and thus which angle to adopt as reality. Because one can choose his or her collective and their agreed-upon version of reality and because there are an increasing number of versions of reality available because access to communication within and among collectives has increased with more accessible technology, there exists thus an increased number of battles vying for citizens' participation, asking them to choose which mediated context within which to participate. In short, more participatory technology such as the Internet offers a multitude of communities within which to participate, and more citizens today have access to such participation than ever before. It is common
sense, then, that the number of disagreements among collectives will increase as they both multiply in number and their interactions with one another. Their messages and rhetors are different, but it is through interaction—and especially through disagreements—with other collectives that each learns their own view of reality is different from another’s. What happens that may be hard for tribal members to spot is that their own camp is creating a unique version of the context, interpreting it through their own biased lens. If analyzed through a Burkean framework, identity with one necessarily separates a collective from another, though each collective will understand their reality as the truest.

Yet, despite its immersive and interactive content delivery, the Internet poses a serious problem for the existence of an objective, rational public sphere. Tal Azran notes that Western-based alternative media organizations originated from the recognition that the mainstream media are restricted or controlled by a concentrated number of agents or corporations that hold a similar socio-political ideology” and while countercollective sources are certainly not immune from bias, they nonetheless serve as a counterbalance of viewpoints to the mainstream media often projected through a two-party lens as is popular in the United States (107). However, this counterbalancing role may not be as effective as one would hope. Natalie Jomini Stroud and Ashley Muddiman point out that selective exposure to news based along party affiliation or other ideological positions prevents citizens from encountering information that runs counter to their own beliefs, and that as a result, many American citizens have surrounded themselves with a bubble
of likeminded news sources in an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance (10). When one has the option to choose which version of mediated reality (s)he wants to watch, hear, and internalize, (s)he creates a one-sided version of the war. This can be great for strengthening identity with others in the same collective, but it can also lead to increased tension and more numerous, prolonged wars among collectives. This could suggest that cool media like the Internet, where much participation is required of the audience, can actually cause more wars. Maybe not all of them will be hot wars that involve formal, government-sanctioned declarations of war, but division within communities and nations, and between nations, will increase, as will the number of camps or factions. People will have the ability, via the technology, to seek out those who are like-minded on nearly every debate and can thus constantly regroup themselves with their collectives as the issues and their own perspectives shift. Additionally, sophisticated algorithms have already been employed by corporations, businesses, and social media sites that strategically suggest or otherwise make readily available connections to those people with whom they most identify, thereby increasing a limited, focused, and likeminded experience online (Tufecki).

The rhetorical strategies used to create collectives and countercollectives during hot wars, if understood critically, can explain how these collectives form, operate, and expand—or even disband—during other events and in other arenas. Consumerism’s reliance on mass media technologies to persuade potential buyers has long capitalized on rhetorical appeals to sell a host of products and will undoubtedly continue to do so. With
economic uncertainty following natural disasters, political upheavals, global pandemics, and other catastrophic events, the economic sector relies on rhetoric to keep businesses afloat and to encourage citizens to continue acting as consumers. A historical rhetorical analysis of how companies appeal to consumers and encourage spending, especially in the midst of an economic bear market, would be useful in alleviating sustained periods of financial depression.

An additional area of focus that would benefit from a similar approach as the current study would be age-based examinations of voter registration. As the large segment of society’s baby boomer generation passes away, the younger electorate will begin carrying an increasing percentage of voters. Studying age-specific domains of the population could reveal to campaigners what rhetorical appeals and strategies, including which technological vehicles, appeal most to certain age brackets.

Alongside citizen groups whose response to rhetorical appeals can be observed and studied are also those who are underrepresented or marginalized. Those without access to mass media communication technologies, those who are illiterate (whether in regards to reading or technology), and those who are by law unable to participate in social activities, such as the incarcerated and physically or mentally disabled, also suggest an area of focus that would be productive for future study of rhetorical appeals. While consumerism and political participation may or may not be a primary concern for such individuals, vital information regarding their own well-being or that of society would still be pertinent and would need to be shared. Consider, for example, a person
who can neither read nor write, and thus cannot easily search the Internet for information. In the midst of a global pandemic such as COVID-19, how does (s)he learn critical information about social distancing and other measures that should be taken to maintain his or her own health? How can local authorities and health officials create a message to reach such a person while being persuasive enough to this person so as to influence his or her behaviors?

Electronically mass-mediated communications continue to influence American society’s interpretation of reality and response to situations ranging from hot war, to economic downturn, to global pandemics. While the nature and content of a message might look nothing like the messages rhetorically analyzed in this examination, the strategies used to influence Americans in years past are still as effective today. By approaching and interpreting these messages through a critical lens, message producers can more effectively persuade their audience and citizens can more effectively adopt or resist messages based on their own stance and understanding. In short, rhetorical analysis of electronically mass-mediated messages produces a more informed American citizenry.
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