

METROPOLITAN FRAGMENTATION AND SUBURBAN GHETTOS: Some Empirical Observations on Institutional Racism

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Abstract:

Are citizens in predominantly black neighborhoods or communities better off with public services provided by a consolidated government where blacks are in the minority than when they control municipal government in an autonomous suburban setting? This paper reports using a comparison group design to investigate four hypotheses: that blacks in predominantly black suburbs in a fragmented environment (1) enjoy more services, (2) evidence lower dissatisfaction with services, (3) are less disaffected, and (4) participate more than minorities in a consolidated government. Contrary to public choice expectations, the findings indicate substantial evidence for traditional reformers' beliefs in the advantages of consolidated government.

Article:

CONTROVERSY OVER INSTITUTIONS AND RACE

In the longstanding disagreement between those advocating consolidated urban-county governments and public choice proponents advocating governmental fragmentation, there is no more sensitive issue than the relationship between institutional structure and racial inequality. To supporters of consolidation, postwar suburbanization has been a vehicle for perpetuating segregation. Thus, Norton Long (1967, p. 254; Hill, 1974) noted: "The suburb is the Northern way to insure separate and unequal." Under fragmented arrangements, this view asserts, the poor and blacks are segregated in central city and suburban ghettos primarily due to zoning restrictions and land use controls employed by autonomous, suburban governmental jurisdictions (Danielson, 1976; Hamilton, Mills, & Puryear, 1975; Mills & Oates, 1975).

Supporters of fragmentation responded with a number of counterclaims, including: (1) challenges of the assumption that fragmentation implies segregation with the growth of black suburbs serving as the primary evidence for the challenge (Farley, 1970; Connolly, 1970; Guest, 1978; Rose, 1976; Lake, 1981), (2) assertions that consolidated governments equally discriminate against minorities (Aberbach & Walker, 1970; Schuman & Gruenberg, 1972; Durand, 1976; Brown & Coulter, 1983; McDougall & Bunce, 1986; Zimmerman, 1970; Lineberry, 1977; Jones, Greenberg, Kaufman, & Drew, 1978; Jones, 1980; Mladenka, 1981), and (3) the claim that if blacks are discriminated against in central cities, then majority black suburbs within the context of fragmentation offer certain efficiency and empowerment gains for minority suburbanites (Ostrom 1983, p. 92; Ostrom, Bish & Ostrom, 1988; Bish & Ostrom, 1973, p. 27; Frederickson, 1973; Kotler, 1969; Goel, Lovett, Patten, & Wilkins, 1988; Ostrom & Whitaker, 1974).

As indicated in the citations above, a number of these arguments have been subject to empirical investigation. Unfortunately, the studies often bear only indirectly on the central issue of how consolidated or fragmented structures influence citizen perceptions of government. By focusing on comparisons of central cities and suburbs, virtually none of these studies compared consolidated government with fragmented systems. While useful, their findings apply more to judging the relative merits of large and small cities under fragmentation rather than to the merits of fragmentation per se. For example, Logan and Schneider (1982) systematically excluded all SMSAs with fewer than ten suburban political jurisdictions. Ostrom and Whitaker's (1974) analysis

implies that any consolidation of government's services would mirror those of downtown Chicago in 1970, ignoring the implications of fragmenting Cook County into hundreds of jurisdictions and the unique character of Mayor Daley's police services.

Thus, our question remains unanswered: Are black citizens better off with public services provided via consolidated government, where blacks are in the minority, or when they control municipal government in an autonomous, suburban setting? We explore this question via four hypotheses: that blacks in predominantly black suburbs in a fragmented environment (1) enjoy more services, (2) evidence less dissatisfaction with services, (3) are less disaffected, and (4) participate more than those living within a consolidated government within which they are a minority. These hypotheses are examined using a comparison group design of two sunbelt metropolitan areas. While this focus necessarily restricts our generalizations, though perhaps no more so than most of the research cited here comparing, for example, Chicago with its suburbs, such a direct comparison of consolidated and fragmented settings should offer useful insights to the central issue of race and urban institutions.

TABLE 1

Summary of Survey Site Households, Telephones Surveyed, and Response Rates

| Consolidated (Con.)/ Fragmented (Fra.) Government Research Sites | Characterization | N of House- holds with Listed Phone # | N of House- holds with Valid Phone # | N of Completed Inter- views |
|---|---|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| Con.: Blueberry | Moderate to Low SES, More Familistic, | 310** | 259 | 211 (81.5%)* |
| Fra.: Minor Lane Heights | Younger, Mostly White | 307** | 240 | 157 (65.4%) |
| Con.: Chinoe | Moderate to Low SES, Elderly, Less Familistic, | 753† | 329 | 225 (68.4%) |
| Fra.: Beechwood Village | Mostly White | 497† | 303 | 188 (62.0%) |
| Con.: Stonewall | Moderate to High SES, Middle Age, More Familistic, | 661† | 319 | 254 (79.6%) |
| Fra.: Barbourmeade | Mostly White | 290** | 254 | 173 (68.1%) |
| Con.: Crestwood/Shadeland | Moderate to High SES, Elderly, Less Familistic, | 858† | 316 | 253 (80.1%) |
| Fra.: Windy Hills | Mostly White | 657† | 301 | 181 (60.1%) |
| Con.: Green Acres | Moderate to Low SES, Younger, More Familistic, | 302** | 268 | 208 (77.6%) |
| Fra.: Newburg | Mostly Black | 891† | 278 | 166 (59.7%) |

* Percentages indicate the percentage of valid telephone numbers called that resulted in completed interview.

** Indicates that all households with telephone numbers listed in the municipal directory were defined as a universe to be surveyed.

† Indicates that a random sample of approximately 300 households was drawn from the list of all households with telephone numbers listed in the municipal directory.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

County Surveys: Lexington-Fayette and Louisville-Jefferson

To test the hypotheses, we employ a design that in part reflects a "most similar systems" research strategy. Five basic types of socioeconomic communities defined in terms of age, income, family, and racial characteristics, including two majority black sites, were surveyed in two metropolitan areas, one of which has a fragmented and the other a consolidated government. Thus, a total of ten surveys was conducted (Table 1). The two research sites are Louisville-Jefferson County and Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky. Louisville-Jefferson County, with a 1980 population of 685,004, contains more than 90 units of general purpose local governments, i.e., incorporated municipalities. On the other hand, the Lexington-Fayette County (1980 population of 204,000) setting, with its 18-year-old consolidated city-county government, is the antithesis of the Tiebout model. To assess whether the five sets of socioeconomic communities selected on the basis of 1980 census data had generated comparable pairs of research sites, tests of the differences of means between each consolidated site and its fragmented government counterpart were performed on a number of demographic variables. For the most part, the differences were small and nonsignificant (Lyons & Lowery, 1989b, p. 543).

While numerous comparisons can be made between and among black and white sites within both the consolidated and fragmented settings, our primary focus will be on the two black communities. It is on this

comparison that our design reflects a "most similar systems" research strategy. Our selection of these sites was predicated on the limited number of predominantly black cities in Jefferson County. Despite the noted trend of black suburbanization (Clark, 1979; Farley, 1970; Lake, 1981), most of the incorporated municipalities in the Greater Louisville area had only a handful of black residents. Only three suburban cities had significant black populations at the time the surveys were completed in late 1986, and only Newburg, where 93% of our respondents were black, represented the kind of predominantly black city at issue.

Newburg was incorporated only a few years before our survey and race played a key role in its founding. An interview with James Jones (personal communication), the former City Clerk and Treasurer, indicated that a group of residents sought incorporation as a wholly residential municipality following considerable discussion and an agreement with the nearby business community. In exchange for removing them from the incorporation petition, the businesses promised to help fund a library for the new city and provide jobs for its residents. As a result, Newburg was born as an entirely residential city.

There had been two competing incorporation petitions at the time Newburg was created. The one filed by local business owners sought to create a city to be named Newburg encompassing only the business district. The other, filed by the residents of the predominantly black area outside the City of Louisville, sought to incorporate both the residential and business areas into a city to be named Petersburg after they learned that the name Newburg had already been used in another petition. Following considerable discussion, a compromise was reached in which the business owners' petition was withdrawn in exchange for removing the business district from the residents' petition. In addition, the residents were able to use the name Newburg.

This outcome is not unusual, given the many wholly residential cities in Jefferson County, including all of our predominantly white research sites, but it was to be a source of continuing fiscal problems for Newburg. The residential petitioners were apparently willing to exclude the businesses and, thereby, limit the tax base exclusively to modest residential housing because they wanted to create a black city. Their pride in the claim that it would be the largest black suburban city east of the Mississippi led them to proceed despite the new city's inability to provide much in the way of independent services. After five years, however, harsh fiscal realities, including declining tax collections and a \$30,000 legal fee resulting from the initial incorporation effort, resulted in Newburg's disincorporation in 1988.

At the time of our surveys, Newburg was midway through its existence. The responses of the citizens of Newburg were based on their recent experience of founding a new city. If anything, we expect the unique timeframe to bias our results in favor of the public choice expectations. That is, this was a new city established in some controversy by its largely black residents. We would expect a honeymoon period to be operative in respondents' evaluation of their new government and for the experience of incorporation itself to heighten their levels of political participation and civic attachment. Perhaps an even better justification for our examination of Newburg is that it effectively constituted the universe of black independent cities in the fragmented setting of Jefferson County. Both the excitement and difficulties of establishing a low to moderate income residential city with a limited fiscal base do not seem especially unique when compared to other efforts to establish predominantly black suburban cities (Goel, et al., 1988).

The Green Acres neighborhood was selected as our matched consolidated government site and is a majority black community (88% of our respondents) somewhat removed from the center of Lexington. Before consolidation, Green Acres was located near the periphery of the old city of Lexington. Like Newburg, Green Acres is a newer subdivision adjacent to older, black, low income neighborhoods in the central city. As such, both of these communities could be considered central city spillover suburbs (Lake, 1981). There were no statistically significant differences between the two predominantly black sites in age, education, income, racial makeup, occupation, homeownership, or numbers of children. In short, these two communities are the most similar black majority communities in Kentucky that still vary in terms of their fragmented or consolidated local government.

Variables and Operationalizations

Our hypotheses address four purported advantages of fragmentation. First, the number and quality of services is addressed through examination of actual service provision patterns of 11 services (Table 2) typically provided by local government. We will not, however, be able to consider the specific, objective quality or level of any individual service, focusing instead on service delivery patterns in our two sets of sites.

The remaining three hypotheses address attitudes and behaviors that our survey is well suited to address. Thus, our measure of dissatisfaction with city government is based on responses to two questions: (1) Would you say that you are currently very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way (name of city government) is doing its job? and (2) In general, how good a job do you feel (name of city government) is currently doing in providing services—would you say that it is doing an excellent, good, fair, or a poor job? Since the items were moderately correlated ($r = .67$), the responses were inversely scored and combined to form a seven-point dissatisfaction index, ranging from zero, for low, to six, for high dissatisfaction. The combined measure taps a very general impression of the effectiveness of city government as well as a general impression of how well the city is doing its specific job of service provision. Separate analyses of each component question generated nearly identical findings.

Turning to disaffection, urban scholars generally distinguish between general and local frames of reference, although no measurement convention has emerged. Our measure follows the lead first suggested by Balch (1974), who directed attention to a particular government in the traditional efficacy scale as developed by Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954). Thus, disaffection consists of responses to four questions asking respondents to strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree to statements that: (1) The (name of city government) doesn't care about people like me; (2) I don't care what happens in (name of city government) government or politics as long as things are OK for me and my family; (3) It's not worth paying attention to issues facing the (name of city government) because all the local politicians care about is serving their own interests; and (4) When there are problems like garbage in the streets or potholes in the road, it is useless to complain to officials (name of city government). The resulting 13-point index (reliability $\alpha = .69$), ranges from zero for low to 12 for high disaffection.

TABLE 2

Services in Lexington-Fayette and Jefferson County Sites

| | Lexington-Fayette Neighborhoods | | | | | Jefferson County Cities | | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-----|---------|-----|-----|-------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Police Protection | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | City | City | City | City | County |
| Trash Collection | — | UCG | — | — | UCG | City | City | City | City | — |
| Street Lighting | UCG | UCG | — | UCG | UCG | City | City | City | City | City |
| Parks & Recreation | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | — | City | — | — | County |
| Road Maintenance | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | City | City | City | City | City |
| Public Transportation | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | — | — | — | — | County |
| Public Health | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | County | County | County | County | County |
| Sanitary Sewers | UCG | UCG | 1/2 UCG | UCG | UCG | MSD | MSD | — | — | MSD |
| Planning & Zoning | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | County | County | County | County | County |
| Storm Sewers | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | MSD | — | — | — | County |
| Social Services | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | UCG | County | County | County | County | County |
| Total services | 10 | 11 | 8.5 | 10 | 11 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 10 |
| City services | 10 | 11 | 8.5 | 10 | 11 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 2 |

1. UCG is Urban County Government. City is city government and County is county government. MSD is the Metropolitan Sewer District. The respective research sites are numbered in the order they appear in Table 1, except ordered within consolidated/fragmented sets.

To assess levels of political participation, respondents were asked if they had: (1) ever attended a meeting or meetings called to discuss problems in your neighborhood or local community; (2) ever belonged to any organization attempting to solve problems in your neighborhood or local community; (3) ever helped to organize a petition drive regarding problems in your neighborhood or local community; (4) ever telephoned or written to an elected official or agency of the (Name of Local Government) regarding problems in your neighborhood or local community; (5) ever signed a petition regarding any particular problem in your neighborhood or local community; or (6) ever met informally with neighbors to work on solving problems concerning local government services in your neighborhood or community? Positive responses, coded one, were combined to form a zero-to-six participation index (reliability alpha = .68).

In regard to independent variables, we have two main effects and their interaction to measure. The first main effect concerns the predominant racial composition of the community about which there is little controversy between supporters of fragmentation or consolidation. Both would expect, all other things being equal, that the predominantly black communities in both institutional settings will exhibit greater dissatisfaction, higher levels of disaffection, and lower levels of participation. We measure the predominant racial makeup of the communities via *black*, a dummy variable scored one for Newburg and Green Acres respondents and zero otherwise.

The second main effect addresses the consolidated or fragmented government structure of the communities. All other things being equal, public choice scholars would lead us to expect less dissatisfaction, lower disaffection, and greater participation in fragmented communities, while traditional civic reformers would lead us to expect the reverse. These expectations are tested with *fragmented*, a dummy variable scored one for the Greater Louisville respondents and zero for the Lexington-Fayette respondents.

Both of these schools imply some form of interaction between fragmented and black. That is, if blacks are discriminated against in central cities, public choice proponents would argue that they might have more to gain than whites from moving to and/or organizing independent suburban governments in which they are in a majority. Conversely, traditional civic reformers suggest that blacks will be victimized to an even greater extent in independent cities than in central cities. Thus, both schools suggest that their respective hypotheses about our second main effect will be intensified for respondents in predominantly black communities, hypotheses that we assess with a *black*fragmented* interaction term.

While these variables are our primary concern, several control variables were included in the regression results to be presented. Controls probably add little to our fragmented contrast beyond what we could discover through differences of means test because, as a result of the most similar systems component of our design, we are comparing across communities that were well matched on many socioeconomic traits. To assess the impact of *black* and *black*fragmented*, we necessarily draw contrasts across the predominantly white and black communities which are not matched. Therefore, the regressions include a number of individual level variables to control for differences on age, gender, education, income, and homeownership. Each is measured in the same manner as in Lyons and Lowery (1989a). Even with the controls and the interaction term there was little evidence of collinearity as none of the independent variables generated a tolerance score below .53.

Findings

The issue of numbers of services and differences in patterns of service delivery is addressed with data provided in Table 2, which outlines the service packages provided by the Urban County Government (UCG), in the case of Fayette County, and the Cities, County, and Sewer District in the Jefferson County cases. The fifth neighborhoods/cities in the set are Green Acres and Newburg, the two predominantly black sites. There are only small differences in the total number of services received by the two black communities. Green Acres, the consolidated government site, has one more service than Newburg: trash collection. Otherwise, it appears that both sets of citizens receive the full range of services. The black communities, taken together, do not seem disadvantaged relative to the eight predominantly white sites. Green Acres is one of only two of the five consolidated research sites receiving the full 11 services. Similarly, Newburg was one of the two fragmented

government cities receiving the highest level of service, with ten of the 11 being provided by some government, whether city, county, or district. Thus, no sharp differences appear between the fragmented black community and its consolidated counterpart, nor overt discrimination against the two black communities in the form of reduced number of services.

The most striking result in Table 2, however, is the large number of services for Newburg residents provided by the county, rather than the municipality, in comparison to the predominantly white fragmented cities; only street lighting and road maintenance were city services in Newburg, only half the number of city services provided by three of the other Jefferson County cities. This result is not surprising from a public choice perspective. As can be seen on the municipal service row of the table, all the Jefferson County suburbs receive some county services and each has a different array of service providers. This conforms to the ideal fragmented model in that a combination of services at different government levels is presumed to promote greater efficiency in service delivery (Parks & Oakerson, 1989). In addition, county provision of many services may facilitate the incorporation of poorer areas like Newburg without having to provide the full range of services themselves, as occurred in the Lakewood Plan in Los Angeles County (Miller, 1981).

This does not mean, however, that Newburg received the level of services desired by the community. With heavy reliance on the county, Newburg residents had little control over many local services. This is especially true for police services, which continued to be provided by Jefferson County. This is the one service, given the findings of McDougall and Bunce (1986) and Ostrom and Whitaker (1974), for which we would expect incorporation as a independent black city to produce the most dramatic improvement in citizen evaluations. Yet, the weak fiscal base of Newburg did not allow it to accrue this advantage. More generally, it seems unlikely that all county services are equally substitutable for city provision. That the four majority white cities in Jefferson County established some level of municipal police service when the option of continued county service was equally available to them, for example, suggests that city provision provides enhanced policing. Newburg, with its limited tax base, lacked the same opportunity to secure this higher level of service.

In contrast, the black neighborhood of Green Acres was one of the two full service districts of the five Lexington-Fayette County sites. Barring discriminatory provision of such services, for which there is little supporting evidence in the literature, this suggests that minority neighborhoods in the consolidated government had full access to the highest level of services. In sum, while reliance on multiple service providers in a fragmented setting does allow poor, predominantly black suburbs to provide some level of access across most of the service universe examined here, fragmentation may produce inequities. By segregating tax bases, fragmentation creates differential opportunities to substitute city for county services, an outcome that produces inequity when such substitution implies enhanced service levels.

Given these service patterns, are there differences across the two sets of communities in dissatisfaction, disaffection, and political participation? We address these questions in the regression results presented in Table 3. We should note that the R^2 values in these models are quite small. This is expected since our specifications do not try to account for individual level variation on the dependent variables, but focus instead on mean differences among the four types of racial composition and government structure conditions. The individual level controls in the models only serve to account for systematic socioeconomic differences along the racial composition dimension of the analysis in the same manner that our use of matched settings does for contrasts on the government structure dimension.

As seen in Table 3, the regression results provide little support for the public choice hypotheses and some support for supporters of consolidation, at least in regard to minorities. Looking across the first row of the table, our relatively noncontroversial hypotheses about the impact of black majority status of the research settings met with very mixed results. Only the disaffection model generated a black coefficient (.430) that was in the expected direction and statistically significant. In contrast, the black coefficient (.080) in the dissatisfaction model, while having the expected sign, was smaller than its standard error. Most surprising, the black coefficient (.445) in the participation model is positive, indicating higher levels of political activity in the black

majority communities, and is highly significant. While these results are quite mixed, our central controversy concerns the other main effect and the interaction of black and fragmentation.

TABLE 3

OLS Tests of the Impact of Racial Composition and Government Structure on Dissatisfaction, Disaffection, and Political Participation

| Independent Variable | Dependent Variables | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Dissatisfaction | Disaffection | Participation |
| Black | .080 (.129)† | .430*** (.158) | .445*** (.167) |
| Fragmented | .063 (.078) | -.063 (.096) | -.125 (.101) |
| Black*Fragmented | 1.697*** (.196) | .548** (.240) | .060 (.254) |
| Gender | -.103 (.071) | .067 (.087) | .090 (.092) |
| Homeownership | .154 (.121) | -.107 (.148) | .878*** (.157) |
| Education | -.045* (.024) | -.130*** (.029) | .203*** (.031) |
| Age | -.012*** (.002) | -.005* (.003) | .010*** (.003) |
| Income | .047** (.020) | -.029 (.024) | .124*** (.026) |
| Constant | 2.841 | 4.896 | .128 |
| R ² | .126 | .065 | .109 |
| n | 1431 | 1431 | 1431 |

* = p < .10

** = p < .05

*** = p < .01

† The figures in parentheses are standard errors.

Looking across the second row of the table, it is clear that the simple impact of fragmentation is far smaller than expected by either public choice proponents or traditional civic reformers. None of the fragmented coefficients are significant at even the .10 level. Still, two of the three estimates, those in the dissatisfaction (.063) and participation (— .125) models, are incorrectly signed from a public choice perspective, leaving only the nonsignificant fragmented coefficient (— .063) in the disaffection model to provide some support for the expected benefits of governmental fragmentation.

Do institutions not matter? The answer is clearly that they do, though in a more complex manner than usually thought. As seen in the third row of Table 3, two of the three black fragmented interactive terms are highly significant. The positive and significant black fragmented coefficient in the dissatisfaction model (1.700) indicates that respondents in the our black majority and fragmented setting of Newburg were on average far more dissatisfied with their local government than respondents in any of our other research settings. Similarly, the positive and significant black fragmented coefficient in the disaffection equation (.549) suggests that the Newburg respondents were on average far more disaffected than respondents in the other research settings. This is balanced somewhat by the positive (.060) coefficient in the participation model which suggests that political activity is somewhat higher in Newburg than in the other nine settings. This advantage is modest at best, given that the estimate is not significant.

We can better assess the overall or joint impact of these findings by constructing means by first setting age, homeownership, education, income, and gender at their mean levels and manipulating the values of the black*fragmented, fragmented, and black dummies. These values can then be multiplied by the coefficients reported in Table 3 to produce conditional means, which indicate what the mean value of our three attitudinal variables would be in four communities that share the same mean values of age, gender, income, education, and homeownership, but differ on the two dimensions of majority racial composition and governmental structure. As seen in Fig. 1, expected mean dissatisfaction in the white consolidated, black consolidated, and white fragmented conditions differ very little (2.28, 2.36, and 2.35, respectively). In contrast, the conditional mean for Newburg, our fragmented government, black majority site is substantially higher (4.12). Similarly, the conditional mean of disaffection is much greater for Newburg (4.76), though the difference between the black and white majority settings in the consolidated government conditions is somewhat greater for this variable than

for dissatisfaction. The major surprise concerns the conditional means for participation. Though not a central concern of this analysis, it is interesting to note that once we control for the individual level demographic factors, both black majority communities evidence higher mean participation (3.35 for the consolidated setting and 2.96 for the fragmented condition) than their corresponding white majority settings (2.89 and 2.78, respectively), with the black consolidated setting evidencing the highest level of participation.




FIGURE 1
Conditional Means of Dissatisfaction, Disaffection, and Participation for Four Racial Composition and Structure Combinations

In sum, these results provide strong support for expectations of civic reformers in regard to minorities. The very weak results for fragmented indicate that fragmented or consolidated institutional structures have little direct impact on dissatisfaction, disaffection, and participation for majority white communities. Thus, the more general expectations of both schools are not supported by these results. The positive and significant black fragmented coefficients in the dissatisfaction and disaffection models indicate that fragmentation has a large negative impact on citizens' evaluations of their local government in black majority settings. Moreover, the potential advantages of consolidation for such citizens would come at little cost, given that institutional structure seems to have only a marginal impact of levels of political participation by minorities.

SUMMARY AND CAVEATS

Blacks fared worse in Newburg than in Green Acres both in objective numbers of services and the more subjective perceptions of services and government. Can these cases shed light on the larger question of the role of metropolitan institutional structure in reducing or fostering racial inequity? We must be cautious in our generalizations. First, our cases are selected from a border state, where discrimination in both settings might be expected. While we cannot present firm evidence on this, we suspect that Kentucky is not unusual. Indeed, fragmentation is usually viewed as the North's tool of racial segregation. Still, these results need to be replicated in other settings.

Second, our results say little about the quality of specific services under consolidated or fragmented governmental structures. As we noted, it is reasonable to expect that police services, for example, might be more efficiently and responsively provided by city governments under a fragmented institutional arrangement. Therefore, just as one cannot infer that overall service satisfaction is higher under conditions of fragmentation from evidence only on police services, we cannot make valid inferences from our general results to individual services. Our results apply only at the level of general dissatisfaction, disaffection, and participation. Related to this, the conclusions of this study rely on two major data sources, numbers of services provided and the perceptions and attitudes of citizens, which only indirectly tap objective service efficiency and effectiveness.

Third, our majority black sites were purposively selected. In the Newburg case, we were highly constrained by the limited universe of black majority cities in Jefferson County in selecting our research site. Our comparison

group design constrained us to select Green Acres as our consolidated government research site. Lexington-Fayette County may be an unusually successful case of consolidation, though we see no reason to believe so. More likely, Newburg may have been an unusually dismal experiment in fragmented government, but was it unexpectedly dismal? We believe that, while somewhat unusual in the brevity of its life span and the degree of problems it faced, Newburg was not unrepresentative of the experience of suburbs populated by economically disadvantaged minorities within the kinds of fragmented systems proposed by public choice proponents. Whether these Kentucky suburban areas are representative of those in other larger metropolitan areas like New York or Los Angeles remains to be determined, although Newburg and Green Acres appear to have some characteristics in common with cases and types of black suburbs discussed in the literature (Goel, et al., 1988; Lake, 1981; Rose, 1976).

Rather than dismissing problems of segregation and racial inequality as issues that are at best only indirectly related to the structure of metropolitan government, as Ostrom (1983, p. 107) does, we believe that Newburg's problems may illustrate the direct role of fragmentation in perpetuating inequality. As we have noted, very few of the suburbs in Jefferson County have sizable black populations. Even without recourse to illegal forms of housing discrimination, fragmentation provides the largely white suburbs the necessary tools of zoning restrictions and land use controls to enforce de facto economic segregation (Clark, 1979; Danielson, 1976; Hamilton, et al., 1975; Mills & Oates, 1975). Indeed, many observers (Harrington, 1989, pp. 284-302; Wood, 1966, p. 95-98; Fainstein & Fainstein, 1980, p. 259) have concluded that the suburban enclaves of fragmented metropolitan areas exhibit a politics of exclusion. To these analysts, such de facto segregation is vitally and inherently dependent for its means of enforcement on the fragmentation of governmental power.

Given the reality of substantial segregation on economic and/ or racial criteria, Newburg illustrates the limited range of options for economically disadvantaged minorities: to live in the core city of the metropolitan area or in an unincorporated area in the county. A third option found in Ostrom's (1983, p. 92) hope that racial discrimination will be overcome by offering minorities the same benefits flowing from small localized government now available to whites is quite limited. Indeed, the fact that Newburg was the only predominantly black city of Jefferson County and one of only three with sizable minority populations may be as telling a claim against the public choice model as its specific history. Such areas lack the tax base to take advantage of Ostrom's option. Thus, the ultimate failure of Newburg may illustrate the difficulties minority low income residents have in establishing municipalities in a fragmented setting. Its failure might suggest that blacks may become ghettoized in the suburbs, locked in unincorporated areas in which they receive few municipal-type services, continue to be a small minority within a mainly white suburban area, and yet unable to form their own governments. In contrast, the Green Acres results suggest that consolidated governments may lead to less dissatisfaction and disaffection on the part of minority citizens.

Proponents of fragmentation might finally argue that fragmentation allows for higher levels of metropolitan government such as councils of governments (COGs) to address such metropolitanwide issues (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1987, pp. 43-47). Such solutions certainly did not work for Newburg. More generally, COGs typically employ constituent-unit representation and, as a result, have proven largely incapable of overcoming the veto power of wealthier, predominantly white suburbs in addressing issues of redistribution (Harrington, 1989, pp. 345-347). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Minneapolis-St. Paul's tax base sharing experiment remains unemulated after nearly two decades. Again, the empowerment of localities within the metropolitan area that is the hallmark of fragmentation effectively precludes this response to racial disparities.

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