

Responding to Deviance: Target Exclusion and Differential Devaluation

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Abstract:

Two studies explored responses to ingroup deviance. Group- defining opinions of prowar Republicans (Study 1) and prolife Christians (Study 2) were challenged by either an ingroup or outgroup deviate. Participants evaluated the deviate and structured the boundaries of their ingroup in counterbalanced order. Of importance, boundary structuring allowed participants to exclude deviates from the ingroup. Consistent with previous research, ingroup deviates were devalued relative to out- group deviates, but only when target evaluation was participants' first response option. Participants excluded deviates from the boundaries of their ingroup irrespective of measure order, and doing so eliminated differential devaluation when exclusion was participants' first response option. Exclusion decreased liking for outgroup deviates in Study 1 and increased liking for ingroup deviates in Study 2. The findings suggest that devaluation is an attempt to exclude deviates from the ingroup and that doing so reduces the threat otherwise experienced.

Keywords: deviance; rejection; group boundaries; black sheep; social categorization

Article:

Disagreement from within the ranks is seldom pleasant. Group goals may be thwarted and the validity and correctness of the group's opinions may be challenged (Festinger, 1950). Disagreement from other group members also may tarnish the social identity of the group by questioning its positivity and distinctiveness (Marques & Paez, 1994). These challenges may even go so far as to question the group's existence (Cartwright & Zander, 1968) . Behavior that challenges the norms and expectations of the group is often referred to as deviant (cf. Archer, 1985).

When deviance arises, group members respond. For example, opinion deviance within groups often results in communication directed toward deviates in an attempt to reduce disagreement (Festinger & Thibaut, 1951; Sampson & Brandon, 1964; Schachter, 1951). Our research focused on another possible response, devaluation of deviates. For example, research indicates that opinion deviates often are evaluated less favorably on ratings of sociometric choice and are given lower status roles within the group (e.g., Schachter, 1951). In contrast to typical displays of ingroup favoritism (e.g., Brewer, 1979), outgroup members who agree are often preferred over ingroup members who don't (Rokeach & Mezei, 1966; Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960; see also Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998) . Even outgroup members who disagree are preferred over ingroup members who hold these same discrepant views (Iwao, 1963; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Smith, Williams, & Willis, 1967). For example, Iwao (1963) found that divinity school students reacted to the critical and antinormative opinions of a fellow divinity student with more annoyance and evaluated him less favorably compared to when these same opinions came from a law school student. This finding converges with those of Marques and his colleagues, who have shown that unfavorable ingroup members are often derogated more harshly than unfavorable outgroup members (for a review, see Marques & Paez, 1994) .

These and other findings indicate that social categorization plays an important role in perceiving and responding to disagreement (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Hogg, 2001). Because norms and expectations vary across social groups, how one is categorized determines in part what is and is not acceptable. As noted above, when these norms are violated, efforts are undertaken to reestablish appropriate conduct (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Marques et al., 1998). Downgrading those who challenge the group's norms (and upgrading those who support

them) is one way to accomplish this goal. In this way, group expectations are communicated and enforced and the positivity and distinctiveness of the group is protected (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison, & Tendayi Viki, 2005).

However, the covariation of categorization and normative expectations implies another, more direct way of dealing with disagreement. By definition, group norms apply to those within the social category but not those outside it. Thus, one way to sustain the values and goals of the ingroup may be to exclude deviates from its boundaries (Festinger, 1950; Levine, 1989). In fact, target devaluation is often equated with such a process (cf. Israel, 1956; Orcutt, 1973). For example, Schachter (1951) considered assignment to low-status jobs within the group and unfavorable rankings from its members as examples of target rejection. Researchers investigating the black sheep effect have asserted this link more explicitly, arguing that “derogation of unlikable ingroupers is a cognitive-motivational strategy to purge from the group those ingroup members who negatively contribute to social identity” (Marques & Paez, 1994, p. 38). In both examples, devaluation is taken as an attempt to remove deviates from a shared social category.

The assumption that target devaluation is tantamount to group exclusion has not gone unchallenged. For example, Israel (1956) argued that overt hostility may indicate that the deviate has not been excluded. According to Israel, devaluation may instead be a negative sanction, an attempt to persuade the deviate to accept the standards of the group; only when these influence attempts fail should exclusion from the group occur (see also Orcutt, 1973). More recently, Abrams et al. (2005) made a similar point, arguing that derogation is not an attempt to exclude ingroup deviates from a shared social category but instead a means of sustaining the norms of the ingroup. Although we agree that normative expectations are communicated and enforced as a result of devaluation, we argue that this is because devaluation has as its goal the placement of deviates outside the boundaries of the group. As noted above, such a process often has been assumed and asserted—and occasionally challenged—but to our knowledge never tested explicitly. This was the goal of our research.

To test whether devaluation is an attempt to remove deviates from the ingroup, we relied on the concept of substitutability (Lewin, 1935; Tesser, 2000). Put simply, the substitution of one strategy for another implies that their goal was the same. For example, Steele and Liu (1983) found that an opportunity to affirm an important value kept those who were induced to behave inconsistently in an unrelated domain from changing their attitudes to be consistent with their behavior. Self-affirmation eliminated the usual means of dissonance reduction, suggesting that the threat to inconsistency involved a more general threat to self-worth. Similarly, Eidelman and Biernat (2003) found that an initial opportunity to disidentify with one’s social category eliminated the relative devaluation of unfavorable ingroup members. Because group disidentification was conceptualized as a uniquely individualistic strategy, its substitution for ingroup derogation implied that the motivation behind both strategies also was individualistic (i.e., ingroup derogation was not geared toward group protection but instead was a general distancing strategy undertaken to reduce the possibility of being associatively miscast).

In the present research, we provided participants with a direct means of excluding deviates from the ingroup and then measured the effect of exclusion on the relative devaluation of ingroup deviates. We reasoned that if this relative devaluation was eliminated by an earlier exclusion of the deviate from the group, this would imply that target exclusion itself was the goal. But arguing this point requires another step—target devaluation must not substitute for target exclusion. In other words, devaluation of ingroup deviates should not eliminate the propensity to place deviates outside the social category; to do so would suggest that the goal of target exclusion was simply another form of target devaluation. Thus, we predicted a form of asymmetrical substitution, where exclusion from the ingroup reduced target devaluation but target devaluation did not reduce target exclusion. Together, this pattern would suggest that the goal behind the relative devaluation of ingroup deviates was their removal from the social category.

These ideas were tested in two studies. In Study 1, prowar Republicans (in the weeks prior to the United States’ entry into war with Iraq in 2003) read an antiwar editorial and evaluated it and its writer. In Study 2, pro-life

Christians evaluated the writer of an essay favoring abortion. We compared responses to ingroup and out-group targets, both of whom were deviant relative to the opinions of our participants. In Study 1, the antiwar editorial writer described himself as being either a Republican (ingroup member) or Democrat (outgroup member). In Study 2, the proabortion essay writer identified herself as either a fellow Christian (ingroup member) or an Atheist (outgroup member). We also manipulated whether participants could exclude the deviate from the ingroup before or after target evaluation. All participants indicated the range of acceptable beliefs members of their social group should have regarding group-defining social issues. Participants then placed the deviate within or outside this range. In this way, participants could psychologically exclude the deviate from the ingroup (cf. Festinger, 1950; Newcomb, 1959). This technique also allowed us to measure what effect our independent variables had on the boundaries of the group as well as on the distance the target was placed from these boundaries.

Consistent with the findings of others (Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Iwao, 1963; Marques & Paez, 1994; Smith et al., 1967), we predicted that deviant opinions would be more threatening coming from an ingroup target than from an outgroup target, resulting in relative devaluation of the ingroup deviate. However, we expected this pattern to only hold when target evaluation was participants' first means of responding to this threat. For the reasons noted above, we predicted that (a) participants would exclude deviates from the ingroup when this opportunity was available and (b) an initial chance to exclude a deviate would eliminate the need to subsequently devalue him or her relative to an outgroup deviate. Thus, measure order was predicted to moderate the differential devaluation of ingroup deviates but not the exclusion of deviates from the ingroup.

STUDY 1

In Study 1, prowar Republicans participated in a study about "current events in the media." At the time of our study, the United States was caught up in an internal debate over the possibility of a second war with Iraq. Most Republicans supported war, whereas most Democrats did not. We took advantage of this association between party membership and attitudes toward the war by presenting our participants with an ingroup (Republican) or outgroup (Democrat) target who opposed war with Iraq. We then provided participants with two response options—target evaluation and target exclusion via boundary structuring, presented in counterbalanced order. We predicted that participants would differentially devalue an ingroup deviate by evaluating him less favorably than an outgroup deviate, but only when target evaluation was the first response option. We expected participants to structure the boundaries of the group in such a way as to exclude the deviate and that target exclusion would eliminate the differential devaluation otherwise found.

Method

Participants and design. Thirty-five introductory psychology students¹ were selected to participate based on questionnaire data collected at a mass-testing session earlier in the semester. Only strongly identified Republicans (> 4 on a 1-7 scale) who favored war with Iraq (> 5 on a 1-7 scale) were recruited. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (target: ingroup or outgroup member) x 2 (order of measures: target evaluation first or boundary structuring first) between-subjects design. Participants received credit toward a course requirement in exchange for their participation.

Procedure. Participants were run in small groups. An experimenter explained that the study was about current events in the media and that soon they would each be randomly assigned to read an editorial taken from the campus newspaper. They were told that questions about the editorial would follow and that they should form an opinion of the editorial and its writer (the target) while they read. Packets containing the editorial and all dependent measures (described below) were randomly distributed and participants worked independently. When finished, they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Editorial. All participants read an editorial opposing war with Iraq, written by a target who identified himself as either a strong Republican (ingroup member) or Democrat (outgroup member). The editorial, an indictment of the proposed war, argued that supporters were motivated by profit and politics. The editorial writer opined that "If we wish to secure peace, abolish terrorism, and protect individual freedom—all goals of the GOP

(Democratic Party) and the American people—we must find a solution to the current crisis that doesn't involve contradiction.” The editorial included a quote, attributed to either Dwight Eisenhower (correctly) or John Kennedy (incorrectly): “I think that people want peace so much that one of these days Government had better get out of the way and let them have it.” The editorial ended by urging President Bush to put an end to his propaganda and adopt a page from Ike's (Kennedy's) book. Because the editorial writer strongly opposed war with Iraq—and the opinions of our participants—we assumed he would be considered deviant.

Target and editorial evaluation. After reading the editorial, participants responded to two sets of dependent measures, presented in counterbalanced order. One set of measures asked participants about the editorial writer (target) and the editorial itself. Eleven items measured evaluations of the writer. Ten of these items were traits, six positive (considerate, good, helpful, intelligent, kind, and warm) and four negative (bad, cold, self-centered, and selfish). Participants were asked whether they thought the editorial writer possessed these traits on 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*) Likert-type scales. An additional item (“Overall, I like this person”) measured global liking on the same scale. Negative trait items were reverse-scored and all 11 items were combined to form a target evaluation index ($\alpha = .82$). Another 3 items gauged evaluations of the editorial. Participants rated how well-written, persuasive, and fair the editorial was, all on 9-point Likert-type scales, where higher values indicated that the editorial was better-written, more persuasive, and more fair. These 3 items were combined to form an editorial index ($\alpha = .65$). Because the target evaluation and editorial indexes were highly correlated ($r > .56, p < .0005$), we combined all items from these measures into an overall evaluation index ($\alpha = .85$).

Boundary structuring and target exclusion. A second measure provided participants with the opportunity to structure the boundaries of the group “Republicans” and to exclude the target from these boundaries. Participants were presented with a 144-mm line referencing acceptability of war with Iraq. The left-most endpoint of this line (0 mm) was labeled “War with Iraq is not right” and the right-most endpoint of the line (144 mm) was labeled “War with Iraq is right.” Participants were first asked to place two Xs along the line to indicate the range of acceptable beliefs they thought Republicans should have regarding a war with Iraq. Participants then placed a hash mark along the line to indicate what they thought the target believed. In this way, participants could (psychologically) exclude the target from the group “Republicans.” As noted, this opportunity preceded or followed the target and editorial evaluation measures, depending on experimental condition.

Other items. On the last page of their questionnaire, participants answered some exploratory measures and a manipulation check—whether the editorial writer considered himself to be a Republican (1 = *absolutely not*, 9 = *absolutely*).

Results

Manipulation check. To confirm that participants noticed the group membership of the editorial writer, a 2 (target) x 2 (order) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on our manipulation check. Only a main effect for target group membership emerged, $F(1, 31) = 189.24, p < .0001$. Participants indicated that the editorial writer did not consider himself to be a Republican in the outgroup (Democrat) condition ($M = 1.11, SD = .47$) compared to the ingroup (Republican) condition ($M = 7.47, SD = 1.84$).

Boundary structuring and target exclusion. Participants' indications of the group boundaries (what Republicans should believe regarding a possible war with Iraq) were measured in millimeters, as was the position of the target relative to these boundaries. Our main interest was determining whether targets were excluded from the boundaries of the group, but these measurements also allowed us to determine the most antiwar and prowar boundary that participants found acceptable of Republicans, the overall range between these points, and the distance the target was placed from the left-most (antiwar) boundary.

All participants excluded the target from the acceptable range of beliefs fellow Republicans should have. Clearly, participants took the opportunity to exclude from the ingroup someone who disagreed with them—even

a fellow ingroup member. We also investigated the distance the target was excluded from the left-most (antiwar) boundary. Because the extremity of this boundary constrained how far targets could be placed from it, we first divided our distance measure by the left-most boundary before submitting it to a Target x Order ANOVA. Neither the main effects nor the Target x Order interaction were significant (all $F_s < 1$).

To determine whether the absolute placement of the left-most (antiwar) boundary, right-most (prowar) boundary, and the range between these points were affected by our manipulations, separate Target x Order ANOVAs were calculated for each measure. A marginal effect for order emerged on the antiwar boundary, with participants making this boundary less open to antiwar sentiment when this was the first measure completed ($M = 75.82, SD = 20.35$) compared to when it followed target evaluation ($M = 64.06, SD = 15.22$), $F(1, 29) = 3.96, p < .06$. A significant effect for order emerged on the prowar boundary as well, with participants indicating that Republican group membership included more extreme prowar stances if this measure was completed first ($M = 136.64, SD = 5.55$) compared to when this measure followed target evaluation ($M = 131.06, SD = 9.28$), $F(1, 29) = 4.50, p < .05$. Main effects for target and the Target x Order interactions were not reliable (all $p_s > .14$). No significant effects for the range measure were found, all $p_s > .28$. Overall, there was some evidence that boundaries became more restrictive of dissenting opinions when this exclusion process was the




Figure 1 Target devaluation as a function of group membership and response order: Study 1.

first response option, although none of these effects were moderated by the group membership of the deviate.

Target and editorial evaluation. To determine how the writer and his editorial were evaluated, and if an earlier opportunity to exclude the deviate from the group affected this pattern, we submitted the evaluation index to a Target x Order ANOVA. A main effect for order indicated that the target was evaluated more harshly when participants first had the opportunity to exclude him, $F(1, 31) = 5.31, p < .03, M_s = 3.83$ and $4.63, SD_s = .92$ and 1.26 , in the structure boundaries-first and evaluation-first conditions, respectively. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant Target x Order interaction, $F(1, 31) = 7.16, p < .03$ (see Figure 1). Ingroup targets ($M = 4.00, SD = 1.10$) were evaluated more harshly than their outgroup counterparts ($M = 5.27, SD = 1.13$) when the evaluation measure came first, $F(1, 31) = 6.41, p < .02$, but this pattern was non-significantly reversed when participants first had the opportunity to exclude him from the ingroup ($M_s = 4.12$ and $3.57, SD_s = .84$ and $.94$, in the ingroup and out-group conditions, respectively, $p > .23$). Evaluation of the ingroup deviate did not differ in the evaluation-first and structure-first conditions, $F < 1$, but evaluations of the outgroup deviate significantly decreased following his exclusion, $F(1, 31) = 12.71, p < .002$.

Correlations. To explore the relationship between evaluation and the various boundary/distancing measures, we computed correlations between target evaluations and the antiwar group boundary, the distance the target was placed from this boundary, and the range between the anti- and prowar boundaries. Only the relationship between evaluations of the target and the distance he was placed from the antiwar boundary was significant, $r(33) = -.42, p < .02$. Although cell *ns* were too small to draw any firm conclusions regarding correlations within each experimental condition, one pattern is noteworthy. In all conditions, the relationship between target evaluation and the distance he was placed from the antiwar boundary was negative (*rs* ranged between $-.45$ and $-.75$) except when the ingroup deviate was first excluded from the group ($r = .13$).

Discussion

After indicating the acceptable range of opinions fellow Republicans should have regarding war with Iraq, participants—all in favor of war—were given the opportunity to exclude an antiwar target from this range. In this way, participants were able to exclude an opinion deviate from their ingroup. Of importance, all participants did so, and with consequences for target evaluation. Consistent with the findings of others (e.g., Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Iwao, 1963; Marques & Paez, 1994; Smith et al., 1967), ingroup deviates were judged more harshly than their outgroup counterparts. However, this pattern of differential devaluation was moderated by the order of our dependent measures. If first excluded from the ingroup, evaluations of deviates did not differ based on their group membership. In other words, once exclusion was accomplished, there was no subsequent devaluation of the ingroup deviate relative to his outgroup counterpart.

All participants placed deviates outside the boundaries of their ingroup. In other words, whether exclusion occurred did not vary as a function of our independent variables. This suggests that exclusion was not simply another means of devaluing the ingroup deviate. Because target exclusion substituted for the differential devaluation of ingroup deviates, we believe this pattern is best explained as a process of asymmetrical substitution; target exclusion eliminated differential derogation but differential derogation did not eliminate whether or not exclusion occurred. This pattern provides support for our contention that the goal of target devaluation was removal from the social category. Similarly, the degree to which deviates were excluded from the ingroup (i.e., the distance he was placed from the antiwar boundary) was not affected by our independent variables. However, the placement of group boundaries was modestly affected by the order of our dependent measures (but not the group membership of the deviate), indicating that less deviance was tolerated (the antiwar boundary became more restrictive) when exclusion was participants' response option. Together, Study 1 indicated that deviates were excluded from the ingroup.

Of interest, changes in relative devaluation were driven by responses to outgroup deviates, whose evaluations became less favorable following exclusion from the boundaries of the ingroup. One possible explanation is that increased devaluation may have justified outgroup deviates' exclusion from the group (Lauderdale, Smith-Cunnien, Parker, & Inverarity, 1984; see also Davis & Jones, 1960). Of course, this explanation is unsatisfying because one might expect more justification following the exclusion of ingroup members. A more likely possibility concerns the context in which our study occurred. Study 1 was conducted in the weeks prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. As noted, political party membership and attitudes toward the war were strongly linked, and the majority of Americans favored the invasion. Accordingly, the outgroup deviate—a Democrat who disagreed with the attitudes of our participants—may have been particularly threatening given the salience and reality of the political climate at the time of our study.

As a whole, the findings of Study 1 provide some initial support for the proposition that devaluation of ingroup deviates may be an attempt to exclude them from the ingroup. Ingroup deviates were devalued more than their outgroup counterparts, but only when target devaluation was participants' first response option; relative devaluation diminished when targets were first excluded from the ingroup (although this difference appeared to be driven by changes in evaluations of out-group deviates). This substitution was asymmetrical in that target devaluation did not substitute for whether (or the extent to which) deviates were placed outside the boundaries of the group. However, these findings must be considered in light of the fact that cell *ns* were small (seven to

nine per experimental condition). Data collection for Study 1 was cut short when American President George W. Bush declared war on Iraq in March 2003. With war no longer a possibility but instead a reality, we felt that attitudes toward the war and its dissenters might shift, affecting the responses of future participants. Instead of continuing with data collection, we opted to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a different social issue and a larger sample. We shifted our focus from politics to religion and from war to abortion.

STUDY 2

For Study 2, we chose a social issue less salient in the public mind at the time of data collection and where support for one of two sides was more evenly divided. Pro-life Christians read an essay in favor of abortion, ostensibly written by a fellow Christian (ingroup target) or an Atheist (outgroup target). After reading this essay, participants evaluated the target and structured group boundaries in counterbalanced order. We again predicted that participants would devalue ingroup deviates relative to outgroup deviates, but only when target evaluation was participants' first response option. We expected participants to exclude deviates from the ingroup when this option was available and that doing so would substitute for the differential devaluation of ingroup deviates. Thus, we predicted that substitution would be one-sided, that is, exclusion would substitute for devaluation but devaluing deviates would not substitute for their exclusion.

Method

Participants and design. Fifty-six introductory psychology students (29 women, 25 men, and 2 gender-unspecified)³ were selected to participate based on questionnaire data collected at a mass-testing session earlier in the semester. Only strongly identified Christians (> 5 on a 1-7 scale) who opposed abortion (> 5 on a 1-7 scale) were recruited. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (target: ingroup or out-group member) x 2 (order of measures: target evaluation first or boundary structuring first) between-subjects design. Participants received credit toward a course requirement in exchange for their participation.

Procedure. Participants were run in small groups. An experimenter explained that the study was about "perceptions of social beliefs" and that soon they would each be randomly assigned to read one of several essays (ostensibly) written by other participants earlier in the semester. They were told that questions about the essay would follow and that they should form an opinion of the essay and its writer (the target) while they read. Packets containing a photocopy of a handwritten essay and all dependent measures (described below) were randomly distributed and participants worked independently. When finished, they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Essay. All participants read an essay written by a target who identified herself as either a strong Christian (ingroup member) or Atheist (outgroup member). The essay writer also indicated that she was in favor of abortion and criticized the pro-life movement for its self-righteousness and hypocrisy. For example, she noted the contradiction between some churches' opposition to both birth control and abortion. The essay ended by scolding the pro-life movement for its inability to empathize with those who wanted to terminate a pregnancy.

Target evaluation. After reading the essay, participants responded to two sets of dependent measures presented in counterbalanced order. One set asked participants about the essay writer. The same 11 items used in Study 1 (6 positive and 4 negative traits and 1 global evaluation item) measured evaluations of the writer. Negative trait items were reverse-scored, and all 11 items were combined to form a target evaluation index ($\alpha = .81$). In Study 2, we did not ask questions about the target's essay.

Boundary structuring and target exclusion. A second measure provided participants with the opportunity to structure the boundaries of the group "Christians" and to exclude the target from this group. Instead of focusing exclusively on the social issue participants read about, we provided Study 2 participants with three 144-mm lines, each linked to a different group-defining social issue. This was done in an attempt to capture the norms (and boundaries) of participants' ingroup more generally than had been done in Study 1. The first line referred to abortion and had endpoints labeled *abortion is always acceptable* (0 mm) and *abortion is never acceptable* (144 mm). The second line referred to school prayer and had endpoints labeled *school prayer is always accept-*

able (0 mm) and *school prayer is never acceptable* (144 mm). The last line referred to doctor-assisted suicide and had endpoints labeled *assisted suicide is always acceptable* (0mm) and *assisted suicide is never acceptable* (144 mm). Participants were first asked to place two Xs along each line to indicate the range of acceptable beliefs they thought Christians should have regarding each issue. Next, participants placed a hash mark along each line to indicate what they thought the target believed. In this way, participants were able to (psychologically) include or exclude the target from the group “Christians.” As noted, this opportunity preceded or followed the target evaluation measures, depending on experimental condition.

Other items. On the last page of their questionnaire, participants answered some exploratory measures and a manipulation check—whether the essay writer considered herself to be a Christian (1 = *absolutely not*; 9 = *absolutely*).

Results

Manipulation check. To confirm that participants noticed the group membership of the editorial writer, a 2 (target) x 2 (order) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on our manipulation check. Only a main effect for target group membership emerged, $F(1, 31) = 189.24, p < .0001$. Participants indicated that the editorial writer did not consider himself to be a Republican in the outgroup (Democrat) condition ($M = 1.11, SD = .47$) compared to the ingroup (Republican) condition ($M = 7.47, SD = 1.84$).

Boundary structuring and target exclusion. Participants’ indications of the group boundaries (what Christians should believe regarding each of the three social issues) were measured in millimeters, as was the position of the target relative to these boundaries. As before, these measurements allowed us to determine whether the target was excluded from the group, but also the most proabortion, anti-school prayer, and prodoctor-assisted suicide boundary; the most antiabortion, pro-school prayer, and anti-doctor-assisted suicide boundary; the range between these points; and the distance the target was placed from the most antinormative (proabortion, anti-school prayer, and pro-doctor-assisted suicide) boundary.

All participants excluded the target from the acceptable range of abortion beliefs Christians should have. Just more than 70% excluded the target from the range of acceptable beliefs Christians should have regarding school prayer, and more than 90% excluded the target from the acceptable range of beliefs Christians should have regarding doctor-assisted suicide. Exclusion on the assisted suicide issue did not vary based on the order of response measures, but exclusion on the school prayer issue did vary. The deviate was excluded by more than 84% of the participants when target evaluation preceded the boundary structuring measure, but only 55% of participants excluded the deviate when the boundary measure came first, $Q^2(53) = 5.30, p < .03$. Thus, although order of response options affected whether deviates were excluded from the boundaries of the ingroup on the issue of school prayer, this pattern indicated that exclusion increased following target evaluation. We again concluded that participants excluded deviates from their ingroup.

The distance the target was placed in relation to the left-most (proabortion, anti-school prayer, pro-assisted suicide) boundary was averaged across all three social issues after adjusting for the extremity of each relevant boundary. This measure was then submitted to a Target x Order ANOVA. No significant effects emerged (all $F_s < 1$). Similarly, no significant effects (all $p_s > .27$) were found when the absolute placement of the left-most and right-most boundaries and the range between these points were submitted to the same analysis (after reverse-scoring responses concerning school prayer) or when any of these analyses were computed for each social issue separately (all $p_s > .18$). Replicating Study 1, there was no evidence that the degree to which the target was excluded varied based on our independent variables.

Target evaluation. A Target x Order ANOVA was calculated for the target evaluation index. Only the




Figure 2 Target devaluation as a function of group membership and response order: Study 2.

interaction was significant, $F(1, 51) = 5.35, p < .03$ (see Figure 2). Ingroup deviates ($M = 3.95, SD = 1.06$) were evaluated more harshly than their outgroup counterparts ($M = 4.81, SD = .99$) when the evaluation measure came first, $F(1, 31) = 5.23, p < .03$, but this pattern was nonsignificantly reversed when participants could first exclude the deviate from the ingroup ($M_s = 4.79$ and $4.43, SD_s = 1.13$ and $.60$, in the ingroup and outgroup conditions, respectively, $F < 1$). Unlike Study 1, evaluations of the ingroup deviate significantly increased following her exclusion from the ingroup, $F(1, 51) = 5.19, p < .03$; evaluations of the outgroup deviate did not, $F < 1$.

Correlations. The relationship between evaluation and the various boundary/distancing measures was explored with correlations computed between target evaluations and the average of the three antinorm boundaries, the average distance the target was placed from each of these boundaries, and the average range between anti- and pronorm boundaries. Overall, deviates were evaluated more negatively the more restrictive (e.g., less tolerant of abortion) the antinorm boundaries, $r(54) = -.32$, and the smaller the range of acceptable beliefs, $r(54) = .33$, both $p_s < .05$. When looked at within each target condition, these relationships remained significant when the deviate was an ingroup member ($p_s < .05$) but were nonsignificant when the deviate was an outgroup member ($p_s > .38$).

There was no relationship between target evaluation and the distance she was placed from the antinorm boundaries of the group ($r = .09, ns$). However, when correlations were computed separately for each group by order combination, one pattern relevant to the argument advanced in this article stood out. In the evaluation-first condition, ingroup members were placed further from the average antinorm boundary the more they were devalued ($r = -.51, p < .08$), but this relationship became nonsignificant and positive when participants first structured the boundaries of the ingroup ($r = .13, ns, z = 2.05, p < .09$, two-tailed).

Discussion

Similar to prowar Republicans in Study 1, prolife Christians excluded an opinion deviate from the range of acceptable beliefs they thought ingroup members should have. All participants excluded the target from the range of acceptable beliefs regarding abortion, the topic of her essay. Exclusion on the other two issues, also relevant to Christianity, paralleled those of the abortion issue, although exclusion rates for ingroup deviates were lowest on the social issue most removed from the essay topic participants read about (school prayer). Given the opportunity, participants excluded deviates from the ingroup.

Also consistent with the findings of Study 1, ingroup deviates were derogated more than their outgroup counterparts, but only when target evaluation was participants' first means of responding to the deviance. If the opportunity to exclude deviates from the ingroup preceded target evaluation, differential devaluation of ingroup deviates was eliminated. Of importance, this substitution was again asymmetrical; all participants excluded deviates from the acceptable range of abortion beliefs they thought fellow Christians should have, and the majority excluded deviates from the two other boundaries that were presented. Thus, we concluded that target devaluation did not substitute for target exclusion, implying that the goal of exclusion was distinct from target devaluation. In Study 2, there was no evidence that the boundaries of the group shifted in response to either the order of our dependent measures or the group membership of the deviate. This finding provides further support for the claim that boundary structuring (and target placement relative to these boundaries) was not simply another form of target evaluation. In all, and similar to Study 1, the substitution of boundary structuring and target exclusion for differential devaluation in Study 2 suggests that the relative derogation of ingroup deviates was an attempt to remove them from the ingroup (Marques & Paez, 1994; Schachter, 1951).

Of importance, Study 2 provided evidence that the elimination of relative devaluation was due to concerns raised by ingroup deviance. In addition to correlational evidence indicating that devaluation of ingroup (but not outgroup) deviates was related to more narrow and less tolerant group boundaries, mean evaluations of ingroup deviates significantly increased following their exclusion from the ingroup. Exclusion of ingroup deviates was not justified by more derogation (cf. Davis & Jones, 1960; Lauderdale et al., 1984; see also Israel, 1956, p. 156). Instead, they were evaluated more favorably following their removal from the shared social category. This finding supports the assertion that social categorization plays a central role in interpreting and responding to group deviance (see Marques, Abrams, Paez, et al., 2001); when categorization was removed, evaluations became more favorable. Study 1 also demonstrated changes in relative devaluation following exclusion from the ingroup, but these changes were driven by the less favorable evaluations of outgroup deviates. What accounts for this inconsistency? We speculate that the concerns raised by deviance in Study 2 were less consequential to participants compared to those of Study 1. With the possibility of war looming, and the majority of Americans sharing the opinions of our prowar participants, outgroup deviance may have been more disconcerting, that is, it was a greater threat to the goals of our participants. In contrast, the implications of outgroup deviance in Study 2 were likely to have been trivial, relatively speaking (i.e., the United States was not on the verge of overturning its abortion laws while data collection for Study 2 proceeded). As a result, prolife Christians could focus their attention (and ire) on deviant ingroup members. Comparisons across studies must be made cautiously, but the fact that overall evaluations were lower ($M = 4.20$) and the distance deviates were placed from the adjusted outer boundary greater ($M = .86$) in Study 1 compared to Study 2 ($M_s = 4.51$ and $.28$, respectively) supports this reasoning. Of course, such speculation awaits a direct test.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Groups prefer consensus (Festinger, 1950), and when consensus is disrupted, group members respond (Levine, 1989; Levine & Thompson, 1996). Our research focused on two possible responses, exclusion of the target from the boundaries of the ingroup and target devaluation. Consistent with previous research, we found that ingroup deviates were devalued more than their outgroup counterparts (Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Iwao, 1963; Marques & Paez, 1994; Smith et al., 1967). Prowar Republicans in Study 1 and prolife Christians in Study 2 both reacted more negatively to the deviant opinions of a target when he or she indicated sharing group membership with participants than when he or she did not. When challenged with opinions divergent from their own, shared categorization appeared to threaten participants more than when these opinions came from a member of a different social category. However, this increased threat seemed to wane when participants were first given the opportunity to exclude deviates from the boundaries of the ingroup. When exclusion via boundary structuring was participants' first means of responding to ingroup deviance, differential devaluation of ingroup deviates ceased. This exclusion resulted in the relative upgrading of ingroup deviates (compared to their outgroup counterparts) in Study 1 and to both their relative and more direct (compared to ingroup deviates in the evaluation-first condition) upgrading in Study 2.

The elimination of differential devaluation following target exclusion implies that target exclusion substituted for target devaluation. Similar logic has been advanced by others (see Lewin, 1935; Tesser, 2000; see also Kruglanski et al., 2002). For example, Steele and Liu (1983) argued that the substitution of self-affirmation strategies for the typical means of dissonance reduction implied that each shared a common goal; in this case, some form of esteem protection as opposed to the threat of mere inconsistency. Tesser (2000) made a similar point, noting that processes of self-evaluation maintenance substitute for both self-affirmation and dissonance processes. Engaging in one of these strategies reduced or eliminated the propensity to engage in the others, implying that each was serving the same goal. In the present study, excluding deviates from the boundaries of the ingroup substituted for their devaluation. At the same time, devaluation did not substitute for target exclusion. We believe this pattern helps us to understand the underlying motive behind each strategy. Because substitution was asymmetrical, with boundary structuring (and target exclusion) eliminating differential devaluation but not vice versa, we believe that in our studies the goal of target devaluation was to exclude deviates from the social category (Marques & Paez, 1994; Schachter, 1951; cf. Abrams et al., 2005; Israel, 1956).

The Importance of Categorization

What was the goal of target exclusion? We maintain that this strategy was a means to psychologically remove deviates from a shared social category (cf. Festinger, 1950; Newcomb, 1959). In other words, boundary structuring and target exclusion from these boundaries allowed participants to cognitively recategorize deviates as outgroup members. The role of categorization in the perception and evaluation of deviance is well established; ingroup deviates are judged more harshly precisely because they are ingroup members (Marques, Abrams, Paez, et al., 2001; Marques et al., 1998). This implies that the alteration of social categorization should suffice as a fairly direct means of dealing with such threats. In earlier research, we found that the opportunity to disidentify with one's ingroup reduced the differential devaluation of ingroup deviates otherwise found; disidentification allowed participants to change their own social categorization (or, at least, its importance), thereby reducing the threat of an unfavorable association (Eidelman & Biernat, 2003). The present research provided participants with the opportunity to alter the social categorization of the deviate. By redefining the deviate's group membership, the deviance could be recast as coming from outside the boundaries of the ingroup, thereby reducing any threat posed to group goals, values, and/or distinctiveness. These ideas align with those of Festinger (1950), who argued that communication directed toward deviates should cease once exclusion from the group occurred (see also Schachter, 1951). We believe that these ideas also are supported by our data because removal from the social category eliminated the differential devaluation of ingroup deviates.

Of course, if exclusion from a shared social category reduces the threat of ingroup deviance, the opposite also should hold; forcing a shared categorization with an unfavorable target should increase threat and disfavor (Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Lerner & Agar, 1972; Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986; Taylor & Mettee, 1971). If true, important implications follow. For example, the Common Ingroup Identity Model of prejudice reduction maintains that recategorizing individuals from opposing social groups into one superordinate category reduces ingroup bias and intergroup hostility (Gaertner, Dovidio Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). Although research supports this claim (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), our findings suggest an important moderating variable: the a priori dislike for individuals from the opposing group. If out-group members are initially perceived as violating important group-relevant values (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; McConahay, 1986), or are simply disliked—as is often assumed (cf. Brewer, 1999), such a strategy may backfire. Our findings suggest that merging one's own group identity with that of an opposing, unfavorable group may actually increase devaluation of and hostility toward (former) outgroup members. Thus, whether recategorization as a shared, superordinate category is effective may depend on the initial favorability of the particular outgroup in question.

Other Strategies

Group members have many ways of dealing with the threat of ingroup deviance besides the two strategies explored in our study, and we acknowledge that devaluation and exclusion are not likely to be chosen as first resorts. Instead, communication may be the initial response to ingroup deviance in an attempt to persuade

deviates away from their antinormative position (Darley, 2001; Festinger, 1950; Israel, 1956; Orcutt, 1973). Should communication fail, still other means exist as ways to change the composition of the group, thereby reducing the threat of ingroup deviance. For example, group members may emphasize heterogeneity within the group (e.g., Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997), or the proto- or nonprototypicality of normative and antinormative group members, respectively. The standards associated with group membership—who is and isn't a member, as well as what is expected of them—also may shift. Our first study found some, albeit modest, support for this proposition; what prowar Republicans thought other group members should believe regarding war in Iraq tended to become more restrictive when confronted with an ingroup deviate (and when boundary structuring was participants' first response option). Similarly, Marques, Abrams, and Serodio (2001) found that generic norms regarding student initiation practices became more restrictive (i.e., they set a higher threshold for rejection) when this norm was undermined by other ingroup members compared to when the norm was supported by ingroup members or undermined by outgroup members.

Future research should explore these alternative means of responding to ingroup threats and should specify the factors that determine which strategies are likely to be chosen. For example, Kruglanski and his colleagues (2002) have argued that the subjective utility associated with different means is one consideration; strategies seen as most likely to secure desired ends should be favored. These researchers also note that utility may vary across contexts and with relevant subgoals (e.g., efficiency or impression management). For example, in our studies, group exclusion may have been a stronger means of rejection than derogation, making it the preferred (dominant) response option. As such, our strategies may have differed in degree as well as in kind.

Limitations

Besides restricting the response options available to participants, other limitations of our research are worth noting. Our studies focused exclusively on antinormative opinion deviance. Future research could investigate other forms, including deviance that is consistent with group norms but differs in its extremity (e.g., Abrams, Marques, Brown, & Henson, 2000). Another limitation of our research concerns the precise nature of the threat evoked. It may be that Republicans in Study 1 felt that opinion deviance regarding war with Iraq threatened the goals of the group, whereas Christians in Study 2 were more likely to perceive the values of the group as being under attack (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Festinger, 1950). Finally, we note that participants' predicament, although not unlike those experienced every day, may be somewhat limited in its scope. Our findings should be extended to situations that involve actual contact and interaction among group members, situations that also would allow researchers to track changes in responses over time.

Concluding Remarks

We believe our findings are significant in several respects. We showed substitution with a group-based social motive and believe the nature of this motive became clearer due to the asymmetry of its substitution. To our knowledge, use of this inferential strategy is novel. Similarly, we believe that our measure of boundary structuring is unique and offers the advantage of measuring several other variables of interest (e.g., the range of and distance from the boundary's endpoints). But most significantly, our findings offer an important theoretical contribution. Devaluation—at least in our study—seemed to be an attempt to exclude deviates from the ingroup. These findings support the early assertions of Festinger and Schachter and challenge early (Israel, 1956) and recent (Abrams et al., 2005) arguments to the contrary. Of course, we acknowledge that these findings may be bound by the measures used, including our operationalization of exclusion. At times, devaluation may sanction deviance and exclusion may be justified by more devaluation. Substitution should be a helpful tool in uncovering these circumstances.

NOTES

1. Due to an oversight, participant gender was not recorded in Study 1.
2. The predicted Target x Order interaction was significant for both the target and editorial indexes when separate analyses were conducted.
3. Participant gender did not moderate any of the effects reported in the text.

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