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
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
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**Sex roles and moral reasoning: The relationship between moral
orientation and the social domain**

Moore, Marvin Lynn, Ph.D.

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1988

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SEX ROLES AND MORAL REASONING: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MORAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL DOMAIN

by

Marvin L. Moore

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APPROVAL PAGE

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One purpose of the study was to examine the suggestion about moral reasoning put forth by Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1986) that there are two perspectives of a moral dilemma which are gender related. The second purpose was to extend current knowledge about the relationship between moral reasoning and sex-role orientation by moving away from the much studied psychological measures of sex roles and concentrating on the sociological measures of social conventions and decision-making in the societal domain (Turiel, 1978).

Subjects were 87 graduate student volunteers from two states in the eastern U.S. Fifty-two females and 35 males were in the sample. All of the females and all but two of the males were white. Data were collected using four questionnaires. Analysis of the data showed the sample to be high in moral maturity, "modern" in sex-role orientation, and to place a strong emphasis on both the "rights" and "care" moral orientations.

Three null hypotheses were proposed to test Gilligan's (1977, 1982, 1986) theorizing. Data analysis revealed no support for a difference between men and women on their use of the two moral orientations and some support for a relationship between moral maturity and moral orientation. There was no difference between men and women on level of moral maturity.

Six null hypotheses were proposed to test sex-role, researcher's notions and to examine the relationships among

moral orientation, moral maturity, and decision-making in the societal domain. The results showed no difference between men and women on sex-role orientation, a significant relationship between moral maturity and sex-role orientation, no relationship between moral maturity and decisioning about sex-role orientation, a significant relationship between moral orientation and sex-role orientation, and no relationships between moral orientation or sex and decisioning about sex-role orientation. Implications for moral reasoning research and sex-role research were discussed.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Recently much attention has been given the possible relationships between gender and moral reasoning. Following Kohlberg's (1966) suggestion that sex role and moral development parallel cognitive development, many studies have examined the links between sex-role self-concept, as measured by psychological scales such as Bem's Sex Role Inventory, and stage of moral reasoning, as defined by Kohlberg (e.g., Leahy & Either, 1980; Pratt & Royer, 1982; Pratt, Golding & Hunter, 1984). They generally suggest a change from stereotypic sex-role beliefs to an integration of sex roles (androgyny) as one moves toward the postconventional or principled level of moral reasoning.

Some of these and other studies (Pratt & Royer, 1982; Pratt, Golding, & Hunter, 1984), have also examined the relationship between moral orientation, as defined by Kohlberg's "rights/justice" and Gilligan's "care/responsibility" modes, and sex-role self-concept. These studies have generally shown complex and inconsistent patterns of relationships between these variables.

Still another approach has been to concentrate on the relationship between moral orientation and self-concept (Gilligan, 1982; Lyons, 1983; Ford & Lowery, 1986). Findings from these studies suggest a connection between modes of defining the self and

modes of decision-making in the moral domain. In short, researchers have tried to ascertain whether those who view themselves from Kohlberg's "justice/rights" orientation and those who view themselves from Gilligan's "care/responsibility" orientation will approach decisions in the moral domain in a manner consistent with these perspectives.

As this summary suggests, current research has concentrated on the psychological dimension of sex-role beliefs and decision-making in the moral domain. Sex roles have generally been defined by looking at psychological personality traits. Little attention, however, has been given to sex-role preferences as defined by sociological measures of social conventions and decision-making in the societal domain. The current study was an attempt to explore these areas. The focus was on the possible relationships among level of moral maturity and mode of moral orientation, as defined by Kohlberg and Gilligan, and sex-role preferences in the societal domain (Turiel, 1978).

Gilligan has taken issue with the reasoning behind Kohlberg's (1971b) suggestion that women typically fall in stage three (good defined as what is pleasing to and approved of by others) of his six stages of moral development, whereas men typically are found at stage four (law and order). Kohlberg did not believe this situation to be the result of innate differences between men and women. Rather, he believed it to be the result of women not being allowed the same level of social participation that men have enjoyed.

Gilligan agreed that, given equal social experiences, men and women will reach comparable levels of moral development. She asserted, however, that women are judged unfairly by Kohlberg's theory of moral development. This happens, she suggested, because women, as a result of the socialization process, tend to use a different approach when solving moral dilemmas. Gilligan has suggested that women are judged to be on a lower level of moral reasoning because they use a moral orientation based on a concern for the welfare of others and an emphasis on maintaining personal relationships, rather than the concern for "justice" identified by Kohlberg as the universal principle of morality.

A specific purpose of the study was to examine these suggestions about moral reasoning put forth by Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1986). Rather than defining stages, as is the result of Kohlberg's interview technique, moral maturity was defined as a continuous variable ranging from "low" to "high." Moral orientation, or the overall approach one takes in solving moral dilemmas, was defined as either the concern for "justice" and "rights" described by Kohlberg, or the concern for "care" and "responsibility" defined by Gilligan. It was measured using responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas.

A second purpose was to extend current knowledge about the relationship between moral reasoning and sex-role orientation by moving away from the much studied psychological measures of sex roles and concentrating on the sociological measures of social conventions and decision-making in the societal domain (Turiel,

1978). The social convention of sex-roles was defined by examining responses to statements about desired behavior for men and women. The responses were placed on a scale ranging from "traditional" to "modern." Decision-making in the societal domain was defined by analyzing responses to statements about the roles of men and women in society. The responses were analyzed for the moral orientation used in making decisions about the desired behaviors for men and women.

Theories of Moral Reasoning

The dominant theory of moral reasoning originated with Piaget (1928) and was further developed by Kohlberg (e.g., 1981) over a period of more than twenty years. The theory describes the process of moral development as one of moving through stages that are sequential, invariant, irreversible, and universal. In his view, all people move, to varying degrees, through six stages of moral development that represent three perspectives of morality.

In the pre-conventional stages, morality is based on obedience of authority and adherence to rules in an effort to avoid punishment or to make fair deals in terms of social agreements. In the conventional stage, law and socially constructed rules become the guide for moral behavior. The emphasis is on playing a good (nice) role or doing one's duty to society. In the highest level, the post-conventional or principled stages, morality as social convention is replaced by a reflective understanding of human rights. The individual is able to look back and analyze social convention from

his/her own individual perspective. It implies the recognition that ethical principles may exist outside social convention.

In Kohlberg's view, movement through the six stages is the result of a working out of solutions to the many moral dilemmas one faces. A moral dilemma is defined as any situation involving two or more people with competing claims or conflicting rights. Moral development is defined as:

. . . the expanding conception of the social world as it is reflected in the understanding and resolution of the inevitable conflicts that arise in the relations between the self and others. The moral judgement is a statement of priority, an attempt at rational resolution. (Gilligan, 1977, p. 483)

In all of this system the core of principled morality is seen as "justice." Kohlberg (1981) suggested that even though other concerns are present at lower stages of reasoning (role-taking and empathy), only justice "takes on the character of a principle at the highest stage of development . . . and takes precedence over law and other considerations, including welfare" (p. 176).

From this perspective, morality can be seen as a state of "knowing what is right" or "what should be done." Morality thus becomes "a discrete moment of rational choosing" (Lyons, 1983, p. 132). It is a system of morality that gives the individual, and individualism, the highest priority. In further describing morality, Rest (1986) developed a four-component model. He suggested that for the person to behave "morally" at least four psychological processes must have been performed:

1. The person must have been able to make some sort of interpretation of the particular situation in terms of what actions were possible, who (including oneself) would be affected by each course of action, and how the interested parties would regard such effects on their welfare.
2. The person must have been able to make a judgement about which course of action was morally right (or fair or just or morally good), thus labeling one possible line of action as what a person ought (morally ought) to do in that situation.
3. The person must give priority to moral values above other personal values such that a decision is made to intend to do what is morally right.
4. The person must have sufficient perseverance, ego strength, and implementation skills to be able to follow through on his/her intention to behave morally, to withstand fatigue and flagging will, and to overcome obstacles. (p. 3-4)

Kohlberg developed his theory from a longitudinal study of a group of boys. Since other researchers have suggested different approaches to morality by women (Piaget, 1966; Freud, 1925; Erikson, 1968), the absence of females in Kohlberg's work has produced questions as to the theory's adequacy for representing the complete picture of human morality (Gilligan, 1977; Golding & Laidlaw, 1979; Pratt, Golding, & Hunter, 1984). Much of the debate has focused on whether women are judged fairly by Kohlberg's scoring system.

Recently, Gilligan (1977, 1982) proposed a different view of the perceived problem. While noting that Kohlberg's theory adequately illuminated a view of morality based on "justice," she suggested that it failed to capture a second possible perspective based on "care and responsibility." Through three studies of

women's decision-making, Gilligan found support for a connection between one's self-concept and morality. She suggested that Kohlberg's principle of "justice" was based on a concept of self as separate and autonomous: whereas, a self-concept based on a sense of connectedness and an emphasis on relationships, produced a second view of morality as "care and responsibility." Unlike Kohlberg's image of the moral individual standing alone at a discrete moment of rational choosing, Gilligan's orientation produces an alternative image of someone aware of and connected to others. In this image, morality becomes a type of consciousness. It is an ethical perspective that suggests that "self and others will be treated as of equal worth, that despite differences in power things will be fair; the vision that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left out or hurt" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 63).

Two Perspectives of Moral Dilemmas

Gilligan (1986) suggested that the "justice" and "care" orientations are, in reality, two perspectives on morality that can be located in the developing child's awareness of self in relation to others. She thinks the two perspectives to be present in males and females and to be shaped by two dimensions of the child's early relationships with others. First, a dimension of inequality that is reflected in the child's awareness of being smaller and less capable than those around him/her. Second, a dimension of attachment that is reflected in the child's awareness of having the capacity to care for, and to be cared for by, others. According to Gilligan, it is

through the socialization of the child that these two perspectives develop. An emphasis, through socialization, on the first dimension produces a moral orientation focusing on the striving for equality or "justice," whereas an emphasis on the second dimension develops a moral orientation based on concern for others or "care."

Although Gilligan (1982) called the two perspectives "differences of theme" rather than differences by sex, she went on to suggest that among men the "rights/justice" perspective is dominant, while the "care/responsibility" perspective is more characteristic of women's thinking. Lyons (1983) described the distinction as follows:

In contrast to the man's notion of morality — as "having a reason," "a way of knowing what's right, what one ought to do" — is the woman's sense of morality as a type of "consciousness," "a sensitivity" incorporating an injunction not to endanger or hurt other people. (p. 126)

From this research, then, two distinct modes of reasoning or ways of making moral choices have been defined. Each of these "moral orientations" can be defined as a "global framework or perspective for organizing and understanding the moral domain," and should be seen as being "conceptually independent of level of moral reasoning" (Walker, 1986, p. 115).

Following Gilligan's writings, researchers have examined both sex differences in moral level attainment and sex differences in modes of moral reasoning. Most recent studies have shown little difference in the stage levels obtained by women and men (Brabeck, 1983; Kohlberg, 1982; Walker, 1984). In Walker's article, for

example, 108 studies that, in various ways, examined the purported sex-bias in Kohlberg's scoring of moral reasoning stage level were reviewed. This survey found only eight studies that supported the notion that women systematically scored on a lower level of reasoning than men on Kohlberg's scale. Walker concluded from his review that there was no support for a sex bias in Kohlberg's theory.

These findings do not, however, preclude possible sex differences in modes of reasoning rather than stage level attainment differences. For example, Walker (1984) made it clear that even though men and women could be judged to be on the same level of moral reasoning, this did not preclude possible differences in the content of their reasoning within the stage levels. Support for the differences in content of moral reasoning has been found by many researchers.

Coleman (1980) studied sex differences in conflict resolution with female authority figures. Testing 56 10th to 12th graders, she concluded that although conflict resolution for males and females follows a cognitive developmental sequence, there are also notable differences in the approaches to conflict resolution used by the two sexes.

Using a modified form of Rest's Defining Issues Test, Pratt and Royer (1982) examined sex and sex role patterns in moral reasoning. Modifying the Defining Issues Test to produce a score corresponding to either a "rights" or "responsibility" orientation, the

researchers found that women with more traditionally feminine ideal self-concepts were more likely to respond to moral problems from a "responsibility" orientation. The study additionally supported a stronger link between moral reasoning and psychological sex role than between moral reasoning and sex.

Lyons (1983) studied the relationship between self-concept, in terms of "rights" or "responsibility" and morality. She used a five part, open-ended interview to collect data on modes of self-definition and modes of response to real-life moral choices. The study first revealed that, in describing themselves, women more frequently used a connected self orientation, while men more frequently used characteristics of a separate/objective self. It should be noted, however, that these characteristics were not exclusive. Some men and women used elements of either mode in describing themselves, thus supporting Gilligan's (1982) claim that the two orientations are one of theme and not exclusively by sex.

Lyons next examined the relationship between modes of self-conception and modes of moral choices. Again, in support of Gilligan, she found that:

. . . regardless of sex, individuals who characterized themselves predominantly in connected terms more frequently used considerations of response in constructing and resolving real-life moral conflicts; and individuals who characterized themselves predominantly in separate/objective terms more frequently used considerations of rights.
(p. 141)

Using Kohlberg's standard interview measure, Pratt, Golding, and Hunter (1984) also examined the connection between moral

judgements and moral orientation. The authors found, in support of Gilligan, that "for both sexes, a moderate level of self-perceived agency is linked to certain individual difference factors in moral judgement orientation" (p. 337). They also found no differences in moral orientation until individuals reached the principled, postconventional stage. The authors suggested that "sex differences in moral orientation may emerge only following the reflective examination of one's moral judgement patterns that accompanies transition to the principled stage" (p. 335).

Ford and Lowery (1986) used self report questionnaires on moral dilemmas to get at the relationship between sex and moral orientation. In place of the commonly used standardized dilemmas, the subjects were questioned about self-selected moral dilemmas. In support of Gilligan's ideas, the authors found that the care orientation was a consistent consideration for women, and the justice orientation a consistent consideration for men.

Moral Reasoning and Self Concept

Another area of study has been the relationship between level of moral reasoning and psychological sex role self-concept (ideas about masculinity and femininity). Researchers in this area have suggested that one's view of one's self, in terms of sex roles, will change as the ability to reason morally develops. Leahy and Either (1980), for example, examined these relationships. Using Rest's Defining Issues Test, they tested 116 respondents from 13 - 20 years of age. Although the results were more consistent for females

than for males, the study supported a connection between the two concepts. Generally, those at higher levels of moral reasoning (more principled) were more androgynous in their sex role self-concept. The results of this study and others (Pratt, Golding, & Hunter, 1984; Brock's, 1973; Robinson & Green, 1981) indicate that "subjects giving greater emphasis to post-conventional moral judgments have self-images that are more related to universal role-independent qualities and less determined by conventional stereotypes of sex roles" (Leahy & Either, 1980, p. 369).

Taken together these studies show several interesting relationships among moral reasoning, moral orientation, and sex role self-concept:

1. Not much support has been found for a difference in the moral stage levels attained by males and females. Interestingly, Thoma (cited in Rest, 1986), in a meta and secondary analysis of 56 studies using the Defining Issues Test, found that, in contrast to assertions by Gilligan and others, females consistently scored higher than males. It should be noted, however, that the size of the difference was small enough to be considered inconsequential.

2. Support for a consistent relationship between level of moral maturity and psychological sex role self-concept has been found. These studies indicate a movement towards less conventional psychological sex role beliefs (androgyny) as one moves upward through the levels of moral reasoning as elaborated by Kohlberg and Gilligan. It seems that as one leaves the conventional level of

reasoning and moves into the post-conventional level, thinking about sex roles is more loosely tied to the conventional beliefs of society and more open to the individual's own interpretation of the social convention.

3. Much support has been found for the two distinct modes of, or approaches to, moral reasoning. These studies have supported Gilligan's notion that two modes of reasoning exist, one based on a concern for individualism and justice and another based on a sense of connectedness and care for others and relationships, and that these modes cut across levels of moral reasoning. Although Gilligan and others have tied these two orientations to males and females, the research seems to indicate that, as Gilligan (1982) suggested, the differences are one of theme and not sex. In describing their own findings Ford and Lowery (1986) put it this way:

Though this study indicates there may in fact be some differences in the moral orientations of men and women, the investigator agrees with Brabeck that Gilligan's significant contribution may not be in suggesting that men and women differ in their orientations to moral conflict, but in broadening our definition of what constitutes an adequate description of the moral reasoning process. (p. 783)

In her 1983 study described earlier, Lyons, in accordance with previous conclusions, found support for differences in male/female uses of the two moral orientations and a connection between moral orientation and decision-making in the moral domain. She went on to suggest that "research is needed to test the possibility that

patterns of decision-making in areas other than moral choice may also be related to these modes of self-definition" (p. 141).

Moral Reasoning and Sex Roles

As suggested by the studies cited above, much is known about moral orientation and the relationship between moral reasoning and psychological sex roles, but little emphasis has been placed on sex roles as behavioral expectations or social conventions. The present study was an attempt to follow Lyon's suggestion and extend the knowledge into this area, decision-making in the societal domain.

The specific concern here, in light of the research presented, was the relationships among level of moral maturity, moral orientation, and sex-role preferences in the societal domain. Following the work of many sex role researchers (e.g. Scanzoni, 1975; Tomeh, 1978; Osmond & Martin, 1975), sex-role preferences were defined as variables that "indicate the strength with which actors prefer the sets of rewards and costs that flow from current patterns of gender stratification and division of labor" (Scanzoni & Fox, 1980, p. 744).

These researchers have generally described sex-role preferences as falling on a scale ranging from "modern" to "traditional." The definition of these is typified by Scanzoni (1975) in a description of how the wife's preferences were measured:

Greater role modernity is indicated or defined as stronger preferences for the wife's individualistic interests. Role traditionalism is defined as weaker preferences for wife's individualistic benefits and, instead, greater concern for the interests of husband and children (or familistic interests). (p. 131)

Taking this approach, possible connections emerged among sex-role preferences, mode of moral orientation, and level of moral maturity. In describing Tomeh's reasoning about her scale, Smith and Bonar (1984) stated: "The moral stance was that 'nontraditional' was higher moral thinking because it reflected flexibility and role-sharing. It also reflected equal significance of wife, husband, and children" (p. 10). In essence, "modernity," defined by Tomeh as concern for individualistic interests, appeared to be aligned with Kohlberg's principled level of moral reasoning and with Kohlberg's emphasis on the "rights/justice" perspective. At the same time, "traditionalism," defined as prescribed roles with the male as automatic head, appeared to be aligned with Kohlberg's mid-range stages of conventional law abiding. However, when studying it from a different perspective, individualistic interests could be a lower level of moral reasoning if concern for others was not also a part of the decision.

In a series of recent studies, Turiel (1978) presented a different view of the relationship between sex-role preferences and moral reasoning. Making a distinction between morality and social convention, he suggested three distinct domains in which all people operate. Describing the developing child, he characterized the domains thus:

The psychological domain refers to the child's developing concepts of the person (self and other), for example, causes and predictions of behavior, identity, and inferences about psychological attributes. The societal domain refers to the

child's developing concepts of stable systems of interactions between persons, for example, groups social organizations, and social structure. The moral domain refers to the child's developing conceptions of justice and fairness. (p. 49)

In essence, the societal domain is based on conventions that are arbitrary and particular to the social situation in which they are found. They deal with socially correct rules that are meaningful and followed only because the members of society have agreed that they are proper patterns of behavior. As Turiel (1978) described it:

Social conventions are behavioral uniformities that coordinate the actions of individuals participating in a social system...Social conventional acts are somewhat arbitrary in that they do not have an intrinsically prescriptive basis...although social conventions often have a specifiable function within a given social context, their significance (unlike that of moral regulations) derives solely from that particular context. (p. 51)

In contrast, morality deals with concepts of fairness that transcend social convention. They are rules that have meaning in themselves and would operate to control behavior even in the absence of social conventions. "In contrast to convention, moral considerations stem from factors intrinsic to actions: consequences such as harm inflicted upon others, violation of rights, effects on the general welfare" (Turiel, 1978, p. 51). No culture-specific information would be needed to understand and apply moral concepts.

Carter and Patterson (1982), in a study of 97 children at five grade levels, found support for Turiel's notion that sex-role

beliefs are a part of the societal domain and considered social conventions and not moral imperatives as Kohlberg (1966) suggested. In short, they found that "changes in children's conceptions of sex-role stereotype flexibility occurred concurrently with changes in social-conventional flexibility but were unrelated to changes in children's conceptions of the natural law" (p. 812). In their view, the children realized the distinction between arbitrary conventions and relatively unchanging natural laws such as moral imperatives.

Following Turiel's reasoning, two possible associations between moral reasoning and sex-role preferences may be expected. First, the relationship between moral maturity and sex-role preferences described by the sex-role researchers should not necessarily emerge. If the two domains are indeed separate the movement from a low level of moral maturity to a high level should not necessarily parallel a movement from "traditional" to "modern" sex-role preferences. In essence, individuals at any level of moral maturity could hold "traditional" or "modern" sex-role preferences (Smith & Bonar, 1984). Second, in terms of moral orientation, one can expect those using either the Gilligan concern for "care/responsibility" or the Kohlberg concern for "rights/justice" to be found at all levels of the "traditional" to "modern" sex-role orientation scale.

As Lyons suggested, studying the relationships between the moral orientation and the societal domain would be an important extension of present knowledge. This study was an attempt to examine these relationships. To carry out the study, modes of moral

orientation and level of moral maturity were defined and then examined for their possible relationships to decision-making in the societal domain about the conventions of sex-role preferences.

Research Questions

Based on the literature, these research questions seem warranted. Given that Gilligan theorizes that there are two modes of moral orientation that are differently socialized for men and women, is there a sex difference in moral orientation? Would there be a relationship between mode of moral orientation and moral maturity for men and women? Since real life problems may show different moral modes and moral maturity levels used by men and women, would there be a difference in the societal domain of sex-role orientation in family issues? The purpose of this research is to answer these questions.

CHAPTER II
METHODS AND PROCEDURE

The purpose of this research was to study the relationships among mode of moral orientation, moral maturity, and decision-making about sex-role preferences in the societal domain. These relationships were examined from two theoretical viewpoints. Gilligan's theory about two moral orientations was examined.

Statement of Hypotheses

The objective of this part of the study was to examine the relationships among sex, moral maturity, and moral orientation. To fulfill this objective, three null hypotheses were employed:

1. There will be no relationship between sex and moral orientation (care vs. rights).
2. There will be no relationship between sex and level of moral maturity.
3. There will be no relationship between level of moral maturity and moral orientation.

The second part of the study extended the current knowledge about decision-making in the moral domain to decision-making in the societal domain of sex-role preferences. The first objective was to examine the relationship between sex-role preferences expressed and level of moral maturity. The second objective was to examine the relationships among mode of moral orientation, level of moral

maturity, and mode of moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role preferences.

Six null hypotheses were employed to carry out the objectives concerning the moral and social domains.

4. There will be no relationship between the sex of the respondents and their sex-role orientation.

5. There will be no relationship between level of moral maturity and sex-role orientation.

6. There will be no relationship between level of moral maturity and moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role orientation.

7. There will be no relationship between the moral orientation exhibited by an individual and his/her sex-role orientation.

8. There will be no relationship between moral orientation measured by hypothetical dilemmas and moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role orientation.

9. There will be no relationship between the sex of the respondents and the mode of moral orientation used in decisions about sex-role orientation.

Subject Selection

Subjects for the study were selected on the basis of previous research. Since Gilligan has suggested that there are two moral orientations and that, although they are used by both sexes, males are socialized to use the "rights/justice" orientation and females are socialized to use the "care/responsibility" orientation, it was

imperative that both male and female subjects be included in the study.

Based on Kohlberg's theorizing, several studies have shown that postconventional reasoning is marked by an ability to separate social conventions from moral imperatives (Leahy & Either, 1980; Brock, 1973; Pratt, Golding & Hunter, 1984; Robinson & Green, 1981). Thus, postconventional individuals may view their sex-role behaviors as being less bound by stereotypic social convention. Basic to Kohlberg's theory is also the notion that movement through the stages of moral development is the result of the encountering and working out of moral dilemmas faced by each individual. As a result, men and women will only reach similar levels of moral reasoning when their opportunities for social interaction and responsibilities for decision-making are similar (Kohlberg, 1971). In addition, Walker (1986) found education to be an important predictor of moral maturity. His analysis showed that no one without post-secondary education attained a stage 4 level of moral reasoning.

In keeping with these notions, it was decided that the sample must include both men and women who were likely to have had significant and similar opportunities for social interaction and decision-making. The accessible population that fit these criteria were graduate students. It was expected that men and women at this level of educational achievement would have been exposed to, at least, somewhat comparable opportunities for social interaction and

decision-making and would thus be at a high level of moral reasoning. The selection of these subjects would also allow an examination of Gilligan's (1982) suggestion that women will consistently reason from a perspective of care and connectedness regardless of achievement levels or occupation.

Subjects for the study were students in various graduate classes who volunteered to participate in the study. Before receiving the questionnaires the subjects were informed of the nature of the study and told that if for any reason they did not wish to participate in the study they were free to decline. They were also informed of this choice in the written introduction that accompanied each questionnaire. To be included in the study, the subjects needed to be graduate students and American citizens who had been reared in the United States.

Description of the Sample

The study sample consisted of graduate students from three states. In one state (northeastern), 98 questionnaires were distributed and 45 were returned. The return rate was 46%. In the two southern states, 130 questionnaires were distributed and 46 returned for a return rate of 36%. Overall, 228 questionnaires were distributed and 91 (87 of which were usable) were returned for a return rate of 40%. The sample was made up of 52 women and 35 men. Of the women, 27 were from the northern state and 25 were from the southern states. For the men, 17 were from the northern state and 18 from the southern states. Two of the returned questionnaires

were eliminated because they were from men who were citizens of another country and who had spent the majority of their lives in that country. Two of the questionnaires from females were returned incomplete and were therefore eliminated from the study.

To further describe the group under study, information for six demographic variables was collected: age, college major, state, race, country of citizenship, and country in which the respondents had spent the majority of their lives. This information gave a more detailed picture of the sample. First, the average age (31.7) of this group of graduate students was higher than the age of the typical sample of college students. Second, 15 specific college majors were reported. These 15 majors were categorized into six general areas: music (24), education (20), business (15), social science (16), science (5), and liberal arts (7). Third, the sample came from two states in the Eastern United States, one being in the northeast and one in the southeast. Fourth, race was nearly a constant. All of the women sampled were caucasian, whereas, among the men there were two blacks and no other minorities represented. The last two variables were also constants. As specified in the research design, only respondents who were citizens of the United States and who had lived the majority of their lives in this country were included in the sample.

Instruments and Scoring

In this section, the four questionnaires used in the study are described. Included for each questionnaire is general background

information on the development of the instrument, a description of how each was used in this study, and the specific scoring procedure used.

Mode of Moral Orientation

Mode of moral orientation was determined using a procedure, developed by the researcher, that was a variation of Pratt and Royer's (1982) methodology (Questionnaires 1A - 1D, Appendix A). Four dilemmas from Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) were used. Subjects were first asked to read the moral dilemma. Next, for each dilemma, the subjects rated each of the 9 items for its importance in their decision-making. Alterations made to the DIT by the researcher were designed to allow the subjects to choose between alternatives that emphasized a concern for individual rights and a concern for care and responsibility toward others. One item from the original DIT scale representing each of the top four levels of moral reasoning (levels 3 to 6) was altered to represent either a "rights/justice" moral orientation (Kohlberg) or a "care/responsibility" orientation (Gilligan). Since the subjects in this study were expected to be at a high level of moral maturity and Pratt and Royer (1982) found no stage effects or interactions in their study, it was decided to use items from the four top stages. Thus, for each stage level, the same statement was included in two forms so as to give the subjects a choice between the two perspectives. For example, in the "Doctor's Dilemma" one item read, "Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible way to care for

someone and protect them from harm?" when representing the "care" mode, and "Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible way to protect the rights of a member of society?" when representing the "rights" mode. In an attempt to assess construct validity, the items on the four scales were examined by three reviewers who were familiar with the DIT and the two moral orientations being measured.

The rating scale for each item contained five possible choices ranging from "none at all" to "great." The choices were assigned numbers ranging from 1 for the "not at all" response to 5 for the "great" response. The responses to "care" and "rights" items for each dilemma were totaled separately to produce a score for each moral orientation. The scores for the four dilemmas were then totaled to produce an overall score for each orientation. Scores for each orientation ranged from 4 to 20 on the individual dilemmas. Total scores across the four dilemmas ranged from 16 to 80 for each orientation.

Two reliability checks were also included. First, one grand sounding but meaningless item from the original test was included for each dilemma. "These items do not represent any stage of thinking but rather represent a subject's tendency to endorse statements for their pretentiousness rather than their meaning" (Rest, 1983, p. 3.3). Following Rest's instructions, those who consistently rated these distractor items high were eliminated from the study. Second, after rating the nine statements, the subjects

were asked to select, in order, the four most important items from the list of nine. If the ratings of the nine items were inconsistent with the four most important selections on two of the four stories, the subject was eliminated from the study. Using these criteria, two of the female's questionnaires were eliminated from the study.

Since these scales were altered forms of Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT), the face validity of each was tested using three judges who were familiar with the concepts and theories being tested. Each judge was asked to read the statements under the four dilemmas and to indicate whether they represented a "rights/justice" or a "care/responsibility" moral orientation. From these scores, interjudge reliability was measured using the phi coefficient and the percentage of agreement. The values of the correlation and percentages of agreement between the three judges were as follows: judges 1 and 2 = .93 (97%); judges 1 and 3 = .69 (84%); and, judges 2 and 3 = .73 (88%).

Moral Maturity

To measure level of moral maturity the Hogan and Dickstein (1972) Maturity of Moral Judgement scale (MMJ) was administered (Questionnaire 2, Appendix A). The scale was created as a "briefer and more readily scorable test which nonetheless elicits a full range of moral responses" (Hogan & Dickstein, 1972). In a test of four measures of moral reasoning, Wilmoth and McFarland (1977)

found the MMJ to be a "quick, reliable, and valid index of mature moral thought" (p. 400).

To administer this scale, a series of statements was given with each posing a moral issue. The subjects were asked to read the 15 statements, assuming they had been made by someone with whom they were having a conversation. They were then asked to give a reaction to each statement. The responses were rated according to four elements: (a) concern for the sanctity of the individual; (a) judgements based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law; (c) concern for the welfare of society as a whole; (d) capacity to see both sides of an issue. The specific scoring procedure was described by Hogan and Dickstein (1972):

A response was assigned 2 points if any one of the four scoring elements was clearly present. An answer was given 1 point if any of the four scoring elements could be easily and readily inferred. A response was given 0 points if none of the scoring elements was present in the reply. Each of the 15 items could receive a maximum of 2 points. Thus, scores on this procedure could range from 0 to 30. (p. 211)

It should be noted that these criteria do not represent stages of moral reasoning. They were given equal value in measuring moral maturity and produced a continuous measure without differentiating the stage levels identified by Kohlberg.

Following the Hogan and Dickstein procedure, three raters scored each item using the procedure described above. The scores given to each person were then averaged to produce a final score of maturity of moral judgement.

Sex-Role Orientation

To measure sex-role orientation Tomeh's (1978) Sex-Role Orientation scale (Questionnaire 3, Appendix A) was used. The scale consists of twenty-four items designed to elicit the subject's attitudes toward the social roles of men and women. To develop her scale Tomeh built upon previous sex-role scales developed by Brogan and Kutner (1976), Scanzoni (1975), and Osmond and Martin (1975). The items on the scale were designed to elicit information about three categories of sex-role beliefs: (a) the "Nontraditional Wife-Mother Role"—defined by Tomeh (1978) as "representing an emphasis in which the interests of husband and children are neither of greater significance than nor are they placed ahead of those of the wife or mother" (p. 342); (b) the "Nontraditional Husband-Father Role"—which was seen as a "departure from the orientation of patriarchy in which the greater significance of the husband-father's interests and authority are based on the exclusive ascribed status of sex" (p. 342); and (c) "Problematic Husband-Wife Alterations"—that involve "an emphasis on the husband's interests which basically remain ahead of or more significant than those of the wife, with the real possibility of temporal and tentative sacrifices in the husband's interests to accommodate those of the wife" (p. 342).

To test the reliability of the scale, Tomeh correlated each item with the total score of the scale within which it appeared. The results of Pearson's r for each of the three categories of the

overall scale were significant at the .001 level. Since the scale was based on Scanzoni's Sex-Role Preference Scale, which was subjected to a factor analysis, construct validity was assumed for the Sex-Role Orientation Scale.

To complete the scale, subjects were asked to read each statement and then to indicate, on a four point Likert-type scale, the response that most closely described their beliefs. Possible responses ranged from "definitely not" to "definitely so." The responses were scored from 0 to 3. The scores for the individual items were totaled to produce an overall score. Total scores on the scale could range from 0 to 72. Using this score, each subject was placed on a scale of sex-role preferences ranging from "traditional" to "modern." As suggested earlier, greater role modernity was characterized by stronger preferences for individualistic interests whereas greater role traditionalism was represented by stronger preferences for the interests of others.

Moral Orientation Used in Decision-Making

In order to measure moral orientation used in making decisions about sex-role orientation, subjects were asked to reread five of the items from the SRO scale and to write a short explanation for the objective answer that was given (Questionnaire 4, Appendix A). The items were chosen to represent the three categories of statements used by Tomeh.

These items were scored for elements of "care/responsibility" and "rights/justice." Following Lyons (1983) scoring scheme, each

part of the statement was coded as representing either the "rights" or the "care" perspective. From this analysis, each of the six answers was designated as representing either a "rights" or "care" perspective. The total number of "care" responses and the total number of "rights" responses were then obtained. From this number the subject was designated as using either predominantly a "care" or "rights" mode in decision making.

Following Lyon's procedure, intercoder reliability was established by using three independent coders. Each coder was asked to score the questionnaire as described. Intercoder reliability was measured using the phi coefficient and the percentages of agreement between the scores of the three judges. The values of the correlation and percentages of agreement between the three judges were as follows: judges 1 and 2 = .71 (86%); judges 1 and 3 = .71 (86%); and, judges 2 and 3 = .60 (79%).

Pilot Test of Questionnaires

Before the questionnaires were given to any subjects a pilot study was conducted using four students in a graduate research design class. The questionnaires were given to these students with the instructions to be used in the study. The students were first allowed to complete the questionnaires. Next, they were told the purpose of each questionnaire and lead through a discussion of whether or not the instrument was measuring the desired information. Finally, the students were asked to address any problems they found. As a result of their analysis, some of the

wording in the questions and instructions for the questionnaires were refined.

Data Collection

Data collection for the study involved the researcher or an assistant meeting with most of the subjects as a group during a regularly scheduled class period and distributing the questionnaires. The general nature of the study was described and the subjects were asked to return the questionnaires to the researcher by mail. In addition, as a result of an especially poor return rate for the male volunteers, a number of questionnaires were given out individually to graduate students following the same protocol as noted above.

After completing the demographic questions, the subjects completed altered version of Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test. Following Pratt and Royer's (1982) procedure, the test was altered by the researcher to provide a measure of moral judgement or orientation (rights vs. responsibility).

Next, Hogan and Dickstein's (1972) Maturity of Moral Judgement scale was administered. This scale involved a short narrative response to 15 statements about moral choices. The scale gave a continuous measure of moral maturity that did not identify stages of moral development.

The second pair of questionnaires dealt with the subjects beliefs about sex-roles. First, Tomeh's (1978) Sex-Role Orientation scale was completed. Next, the subjects were asked to reread five

of the objective questions answered on the Tomeh scale and to write a statement for each of the five explaining why they responded the way they did. The statements used were chosen to represent the three categories of statements defined by Tomeh (1978) when developing the questionnaire. The specific questions were selected by assigning a number to each question and using a table of random numbers. An odd number was used to avoid ties in the scoring of the scale. This procedure gave the subjects a chance not to just make a choice, but to also give a rationale for that choice. The responses were analyzed to determine the mode of decision-making employed (rights/justice or care/responsibility) in making decisions about preferred behaviors for men and women. In this way, the connection between mode of moral orientation and sex-role preferences were compared. This type of analysis seemed warranted as some have expressed concern as to the validity of accepting only objective selections as indicative of reasoning about sex-role preferences. Lyons (1983), for example, suggested that:

The language of morality must always be scrutinized for differences in underlying meaning. For example, words like 'obligation' or 'responsibility' can not be taken at face value. (The moral imperatives of what one is 'obliged' to do, or what 'responsibilities' one has are, in fact, shaped by one's perspective towards others.) (p. 137)

Data Analysis

To analyze the data collected, four different statistical tests were employed: correlation, t-test, chi-square, and regression analysis. Following the earlier presentation, the null hypotheses

to be tested were examined from two theoretical perspectives. The first group of three hypotheses was designed to test Gilligan's theory of moral orientation. To examine the first two hypotheses that involved continuous dependent variables and a categorical independent variable, t-tests were employed. In the first case, the test examined whether there was a significant difference between the level of moral maturity of males and females. In the second case, the test examined whether there was a significant difference between males' and females' uses of moral orientation. To test the significance of moral maturity as a predictor of moral orientation, a regression analysis was performed.

The second group of six hypotheses was tested following a similar procedure. (a) A t-test was used to analyze the difference in sex-role orientation between the male and female respondents. (b) A regression analysis was used to test the significance of moral maturity as a predictor of sex-role orientation. (c) A t-test was also used to analyze the difference in level of moral maturity for the "care" and "rights" modes of moral orientation used in decision making about sex-role orientation. (d) A regression analysis was used to test the significance of mode of moral orientation as predictors of sex-role orientation. (e) A t-test was used to analyze the difference in moral orientation used in hypothetical moral dilemmas for those using the "care" and "rights" moral orientations in decisions about sex-role orientation. (f) To test the relationship between the two categorical variables, sex and mode

of moral orientation used in decision making about sex-role preferences, a chi-square test of significance was computed.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

To obtain a more complete picture of the relationships that existed among the variables under study, the results of the statistical analyses were computed, where appropriate, for each sex separately and for the group as a whole. All tests were computed at the .05 level of significance.

Central Tendencies of the Data

Means and standard deviations for the continuous variables were computed (see Table 1). From these data three points can be emphasized. First, the Moral Maturity Judgement scores (MMJ) showed high consistency. A standard deviation of 4.7 indicated that the members of the group had reached similar levels of moral maturity. Second, a mean of 58.6 indicated that the subjects were generally "modern" in sex-role orientation (SRO). This was expected, since past research has shown this to be true of highly educated individuals. Last, the mean scores and standard deviations on the moral orientation scales (CARE and RIGHTS) were virtually equal. Rather than showing a preference for the "care/responsibility" or "rights/justice" orientation, the men and women showed a nearly equal concern for the two orientations.

Table 1
 Central Tendencies for Age, Care Orientation,
 Rights Orientation, Moral Maturity,
 and Sex-Role Orientation

Subjects	AGE	CARE ^a	RIGHTS ^b	MMJ ^c	SRO ^d
<u>Women</u>					
Mean	31.4	49.1	50.2	16.8	59.6
SD	9.4	8.9	8.3	3.6	7.8
Range	21-72	32-63	29-65	12-27	39-72
<u>Men</u>					
Mean	32.1	46.7	47.0	17.1	57.0
SD	6.0	9.5	9.8	5.9	8.0
Range	23-44	31-64	28-64	7-28	40-70
<u>All</u>					
Mean	31.7	48.1	48.9	16.9	58.6
SD	8.1	9.2	9.0	4.7	8.0
Range	21-72	31-64	28-65	7-28	39-72

^aCARE = Care Moral Orientation (16-80; 16 = low concern
80 = high concern)

^bRIGHTS = Rights Moral Orientation (16-80; 16 = low concern
80 = high concern)

^cMMJ = Moral Maturity Judgement (0-30; 0 = low, 30 = high)

^dSRO = Sex-Role Orientation (0-72; 0 = very traditional
72 = very modern)

Analysis of Demographic and Major Research Variables

Demographic variables (age, college major, and region) were collected and analyzed for any effects they had on the major research variables. The average age of the sample was 31.7, ranging from 21 to 72. This was a distinct advantage, since a goal of the study was to examine a sample that was likely to have experienced the kind of moral dilemmas that bring the opportunity to move to higher levels of moral reasoning. Pearson Correlation Coefficients were computed between age and the four variables of interest: care orientation (CARE), Rights Orientation (RIGHTS), moral maturity (MMJ), and sex-role orientation (SRO) (see Table 2). The coefficients were all low, ranging from $r = .11$ for age and sex-role orientation (SRO), to $r = .20$ for age and moral maturity (MMJ). The value for age and moral maturity was significant ($p < .05$). The regression of age on MMJ, however, failed to reach significance ($F \leq .08$). The correlations for these variables were not significant for the men or for the women. A t -test using all subjects also indicated no significant difference between the ages of those in the "rights/justice" and "care/responsibility" groups on the decision-making (DEC) scale.

The effects of college major on the continuous variables were measured using the analysis of variance (ANOVA). The tests for all subjects indicated that there were no significant differences between the scores on the four continuous variables obtained by the six different majors. For the men, a significant relationship

Table 2
 Correlation Matrix for Age, Care Orientation,
 Rights Orientation, Moral Maturity,
 and Sex-Role Orientation

Variables	AGE	CARE ORIENTATION	RIGHTS ORIENTATION	MORAL MATURITY	SEX-ROLE ORIENTATION
All Subjects (n = 87)					
AGE	---	-.11	-.14	.20*	.11
CARE		---	.75***	.17	.30**
RIGHTS			---	.22*	.23**
MMJ				---	.31***
SRO					---
Women Only (n = 52)					
AGE	---	-.10	-.14	.24	.06
CARE		---	.70***	.08	.33**
RIGHTS			---	.14	.23*
MMJ				---	.22
SRO					---
Men Only (n = 35)					
AGE	---	-.16	-.16	.21	.25
CARE		---	.80***	.23	.23
RIGHTS			---	.28*	.20
MMJ				---	.43***
SRO					---

* $\underline{p} < .05$. ** $\underline{p} < .01$. *** $\underline{p} < .005$

($F(4,30) = 3.4110, p = .02$) did appear for the scores on the "care/responsibility" (CARE - Questionnaire 1A - 1D) variable. The highest means were in the education (52.2) and business majors (52.0), while the lowest means were in the music (40.1) and science groups (41.2). In essence, those men in the education and business majors were more concerned with the "care/responsibility" issues on the moral orientation scales than were their counterparts majoring in music and the sciences.

A chi-square test of independence was used to examine the relationship between college major and moral orientation in decision-making (DEC). The results showed no significant relationships between the different college majors and the moral orientation used in making decisions about sex-role preferences (care/responsibility vs. rights/justice).

Since the subjects in the sample were drawn from two different regions of the Eastern United States, t -tests were computed to measure the effects of region on the continuous variables. The results indicated no significant differences between the groups from the two states on any of the variables for men, women, or both groups combined.

Testing of Hypotheses

Two perspectives were taken to explore the relationships among mode of moral orientation, moral maturity, sex-role orientation, and moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role orientation. First, three null hypotheses were used to test

Gilligan's (1982) theorizing about moral orientation. Next, six null hypotheses were used to extend the current knowledge about the relationships between moral orientation and decision-making in the moral domain (Lyons, 1983), into decision-making in the societal domain (Turiel, 1978).

Gilligan's Theory

To get a broad view of the relationships among the variables, data were analyzed not only for differences between the women and men, but also for the women and men alone. Three null hypotheses were considered.

Hypothesis 1: There will be no relationship between sex and moral orientation (CARE and RIGHTS).

Two t-tests were employed to examine this relationship. The first one examined the difference between men and women on the "care/responsibility" (CARE) score (see Table 3). The second one examined the difference between men and women on the "rights/justice" (RIGHTS) score.

Gilligan has posited that, regardless of level of moral maturity, women will adopt a "care/responsibility" mode of moral orientation; whereas men will use a "rights/justice" orientation. Her notions were partially supported by the data. Although the women's mean scores were higher on both scales, the t-tests revealed no significant difference between the two groups on either the CARE or the RIGHTS variables (see Table 3). In addition, the high correlation ($r = .75$, $p < .005$) (refer to Table 2) between

Table 3
Difference in Care Orientation, Rights Orientation, Moral
Maturity (MMJ), and Sex-Role Orientation (SRO)
Between Men and Women

Variables	Difference	SE	DF	t	p[t]
CARE	2.41	2.08	79	1.1568	.125
RIGHTS	3.24	2.03	80	1.6002	.057
MMJ	- .36	1.16	75	-0.3079	.621
SRO	2.27	1.75	84	1.3028	.098

these variables indicates that the respondents made little distinction between the two approaches when choosing what concepts were important in the moral decision. These findings were in contrast to Gilligan's suggestion that women are more likely to reason from a position of "care/responsibility," whereas men are more likely to reason from a position of "rights/justice".

In summary, the data did not support the rejection of the null hypothesis for the "rights/justice" orientation or for the "care/responsibility" orientation. Men and women in this study were equally likely to use the "care" and "rights" orientations.

Hypothesis 2: There will be no relationship between sex and level of moral maturity (MMJ).

This hypothesis was also examined through a t-test (refer to Table 3). The data supported Gilligan's theory that women and men, given similar types of experiences and levels of education, will reach similar levels of moral maturity. There was no significant difference between the men and women on the MMJ, and thus, no support for rejection of the null hypothesis. Men and women in this study had similar levels of moral maturity.

Hypothesis 3: There will be no relationship between level of moral maturity (MMJ) and moral orientation (CARE and RIGHTS).

Gilligan has suggested that the use of the "care" moral orientation by women and the "rights" moral orientation by men will

cut across the levels of moral maturity. In essence, one does not change orientation as the level of moral maturity rises.

Correlation and regression procedures were employed to test Hypothesis 3 for women alone, men alone, and both men and women together. The tests, using all subjects, revealed positive correlations between scores on the MMJ and the RIGHTS and CARE scales (refer to Table 2). The correlation for the MMJ and the RIGHTS variable was significant ($r = .22, p < .05$). Regression analysis of the MMJ on the RIGHTS variable did not produce a significant F value (see Table 4). Therefore, moral maturity did not predict either a "rights" or a "care" moral orientation.

Looking at the same variables for men and women separately different results were produced (refer to Table 1). For the women there was no significant correlation between MMJ and either of the two moral orientations. Regression analysis did not reach the .05 level of significance (see Table 4). The correlation between MMJ and the RIGHTS variable ($r = .28$) (refer to Table 2) was significant for the men, but the regression analysis failed to produce a significant F value (see Table 4).

Taken as a whole, the data partially supported Gilligan's statement. Although they were not significant predictors, higher scores on the MMJ were significantly correlated with higher scores on the RIGHTS scale especially for the men.

Table 4
 Regression of Moral Maturity on Rights and
 Care Moral Orientations

	Beta	SE	t	p[t]
<u>I. RIGHTS ORIENTATION</u>				
<u>All Subjects</u>				
MMJ	.394	.204	1.9282	.05*
Multiple R ² = .049 (ns)				
<u>Women Only</u>				
MMJ	.313	.342	0.9135	.14
Multiple R ² = .020 (ns)				
<u>Men Only</u>				
MMJ	.434	.268	1.6212	.05*
Multiple R ² = .078 (ns)				
<u>II. CARE ORIENTATION</u>				
<u>All Subjects</u>				
MMJ	.315	.222	1.4143	.08
Multiple R ² = .027 (ns)				
<u>Women Only</u>				
MMJ	.201	.391	0.5145	.30
Multiple R ² = .007 (ns)				
<u>Men Only</u>				
MMJ	.369	.279	1.3224	.10
Multiple R ² = .053 (ns)				

*Significant

Moral Orientation and the Societal Domain

The second part of the study was designed to extend current knowledge about decision-making in the moral domain into decision-making in the societal domain. The societal domain in this study was the sex-role orientation. Six null hypotheses were posed to examine the relationships in this area.

Hypothesis 4: There will be no relationship between the sex of the respondent and the sex-role orientation (SRO).

A t -test indicated no significant difference between the men and women on the SRO scores (refer to Table 3). Thus, rejection of the null hypothesis was not supported by the data.

Hypothesis 5: There will be no relationship between level of moral maturity (MMJ) and sex-role orientation (SRO).

Correlation and regression procedures were used to test the relationship between level of moral maturity (MMJ) and sex-role orientation (SRO). For all subjects, there was a positive and significant correlation ($r = .31$) between the two variables (refer to Table 2). Regression analysis also revealed the relationship to be significant ($F(1,74) = 8.0463$, $p = .006$) (see Table 5). An increase in moral maturity was associated with a movement toward a more "modern" sex-role orientation. Moral maturity was a significant predictor of sex-role orientation (SRO). Taken together, these data supported rejection of the null hypothesis.

Table 5
 Regression of Sex-Role Orientation (SRO)
 on Moral Maturity (MMJ)

	Beta	SE	t	p[t]
<u>All Subjects</u>				
MMJ	.313	.184	2.8366	.005*
Multiple R Squared = .098 (F = 8.0463, p = .006)*				
<u>Women Only</u>				
MMJ	.520	.349	1.4884	.07
Multiple R Squared = .050 (ns)				
<u>Men Only</u>				
MMJ	.524	.203	2.5778	.005*
Multiple R Squared = .181 (F = 6.6450, p = .015)*				

*Significant

To understand more clearly the relationship between the two variables, the MMJ and SRO scores were also examined for men and women separately. The analyses revealed an interesting difference between the two groups. For the women, the correlation between the two variables was positive ($r = .22$) but not significant (refer to Table 2). This and the nonsignificant results of the regression equation did not provide evidence to support rejection of the null hypothesis (refer to Table 5).

Very different results came from the analysis of the data from the men (refer to Table 2). The correlation was much higher than for the women ($r = .43$, $p < .005$). The regression of MMJ on SRO was statistically significant ($F(1,30) = 6.6450$, $p = .015$) (refer to Table 5). These data for the men supported the sex-role researchers' notion that a movement to higher levels of moral maturity will be accompanied by a movement toward more "modern" sex-role beliefs.

Hypothesis 6: There will be no difference in level of moral maturity (MMJ) between the "care" and "rights" moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role orientation.

The results of the t-test indicated no significant difference in moral maturity between those who presented a "care/responsibility" mode of decision-making about sex-role behaviors and those using the "rights/justice" orientation (DEC) (see Table 6).

Table 6
 Difference in Level of Moral Maturity (MMJ) Between
 the Care and Rights Moral Orientation
 in the Sex-Role Decisions

	Difference	SE	DF	t	p[t]
<u>All Subjects</u>					
Moral Maturity	1.34	1.11	75	1.2028	.12
<u>Women Only</u>					
Moral Maturity	-1.12	1.24	42	-0.9006	.81
<u>Men Only</u>					
Moral Maturity	4.04	2.01	32	2.0071	.03*

*Significant

Thus, the data for the total sample did not support rejection of the null hypothesis.

Once again, separate analyses for the men and women revealed an interesting difference. Although the women showed no significant differences between the two sets of scores, the same was not true of the men. For this group, the moral maturity scores were significantly higher for the "care" group than for the "rights" group. In summary, those men who used a "care" mode in making decisions about sex-role preferences were significantly higher in moral maturity than those men who made decisions using the "rights" orientation.

Hypothesis 7: There will be no relationship between the moral orientation (CARE and RIGHTS) exhibited by an individual and his/her sex-role orientation (SRO).

A correlation using both men and women together showed that the CARE and RIGHTS scores had a significant, but low positive correlation with the SRO scores ($r = .30$ and $r = .23$, $p < .01$) (refer to Table 2). In essence, as the subjects showed a greater concern for "care" and "rights" orientations, they also were more "modern" in their sex-role orientation. In the regression analysis both CARE and RIGHTS scores were significant predictors of SRO (see Table 7).

These same results were not obtained when the total sample was broken into the two smaller groups. For the men, the correlations

Table 7
 Regression of Care and Rights Moral Orientations
 on Sex-Role Orientation (SRO)

	Beta	SE	t	p[t]
<u>All Subjects</u>				
Care	.297	.093	2.7533	.005*
Multiple R Squared = .089 (F = 7.5809, p = .007)*				
Rights	.226	.119	2.0535	.01*
Multiple R Squared = .051 (F = 4.2170, p = .043)*				
<u>Women Only</u>				
Care	.357	.150	2.3754	.01*
Multiple R Squared = .111 (F = 5.6426, p = .02)*				
Rights	.217	.137	1.5866	.05*
Multiple R Squared = .053 (ns)				
<u>Men Only</u>				
Care	.303	.208	1.4576	.07
Multiple R Squared = .006 (ns)				
Rights	.312	.205	1.5225	.06
Multiple R Squared = .070 (ns)				

*Significant

were positive with the CARE and RIGHTS correlations being $\underline{r} = .23$ and $\underline{r} = .20$ respectively (refer to Table 2). These scores did not reach the .05 level of significance.

The women, in this case, showed very different results. For this group the CARE and SRO correlation was higher than that for the RIGHTS ($\underline{r} = .33$) and SRO ($\underline{r} = .23$) (refer to Table 2). Both of the scores reached significance ($\underline{p} < .01$ and $\underline{p} < .05$, respectively). Regression analysis showed SRO to be a significant predictor of CARE (refer to Table 7). The regression of SRO on RIGHTS did not reach significance. For hypothesis 4 then, the data supported rejection of the null hypothesis for the total group. This also held true for the women on the CARE variable only. Data for the men alone did not support rejection of the null hypothesis.

Hypothesis 8: There will be no difference in moral orientation measured using hypothetical dilemmas (CARE and RIGHTS) between the care and rights moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role orientation.

To test this hypothesis two \underline{t} -tests were employed. The first test indicated no significant difference between the group who used the "care" orientation and the group who used the "rights" orientation in making decisions about sex-role orientation, in the "care" moral orientation (CARE) measured using hypothetical moral dilemmas. The second \underline{t} -test showed no significant difference between the group who used the "care" orientation and the group who

used the "rights" orientation in making decisions about sex-role orientation, in the "rights" moral orientation (RIGHTS) measured using hypothetical moral dilemmas. Similar results were obtained when the men and women were examined separately on these variables. Thus, there was no support for rejecting the null hypothesis for the total sample, the men alone, or the women alone.

Hypothesis 9: There will be no relationship between the sex of the respondent and the mode of moral orientation used in decisions about sex-role orientation.

To test the relationship between these two categorical variables a chi-square test of significance was used. The test revealed no significant relationship between the men and women on the moral orientation used in decisions about sex-role beliefs (see Table 8). Thus, there was no support for rejecting the null hypotheses.

Table 8
Relationship between Sex and Moral Orientation
Used in Sex-Role Decisions (Frequencies)

	<u>Moral Orientation</u>	
	Care	Rights
Male	16	15
Female	30	18

Chi Square = .9170, $p = .33$

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND DISCUSSION

This study was an attempt to analyze the relationships that exist among three variables: level of moral maturity, moral orientation, and, sex-role orientation. The purposes of the study were (a) to examine suggestions that there are two modes of moral reasoning (Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1986), and (b) to extend current knowledge about the relationship between moral reasoning and sex-role preferences by moving away from the much studied psychological measures of intrinsic sex-role self concept and concentrating on the sociological measures of social conventions and decision-making in the societal domain (Turiel, 1978).

Four questionnaires were used to gather the data. An altered form of Rest's Defining Issues Test was used to measure the mode of moral orientation taken by the individual when confronted with four moral dilemmas. Moral orientation was defined as being either an emphasis on the "care/responsibility" issues described by Gilligan (1977, 1982), or the "rights/justice" issues described by Kohlberg (1981). The level of moral maturity was measured by the Maturity of Moral Judgement scale developed by Hogan and Dickstein (1972). Tomeh's (1978) Sex-Role Orientation scale was used to measure the degree of "nontraditional" beliefs about family behaviors held by males and females. The moral orientation adopted by the respondent

when making decisions about the social conventions of sex-role behaviors was measured by an instrument developed by the researcher. In addition to these data, information on several demographic variables was collected and examined for possible influences on the variables under study.

Data were collected from 87 graduate students who volunteered to participate in the study. The subjects were from two states in the eastern United States. They were citizens of the U.S. and had lived the majority of their lives in this country. There were 52 females and 35 males in the sample. All of the females and all but two of the males were caucasian. The demographic data revealed the sample to have a mean age of 31.7. The subjects had high and consistent levels of moral maturity, generally "modern" sex-role preferences, and a high concern for both the "care" and "rights" orientations to moral reasoning. The college major of the subjects had only one significant effect on the variables under study. The men majoring in education and business had significantly higher CARE scores than men in the music or science categories.

To test Gilligan's theories of moral reasoning, three null hypotheses were stated. Hypothesis one was a test of Gilligan's notion that, when confronted with moral dilemmas, women consistently reason from a position of "care" and "responsibility," while, in contrast, men consistently solve moral dilemmas using a "rights" and "justice" approach. These assertions were not supported by the data in this study. There was no significant difference between the men

and women on either the CARE or RIGHTS scales. The high correlation between the RIGHTS and CARE scores suggests that little distinction was made between the two by either the men or the women. This supports Gilligan's (1986) contention that both sexes understand and use both modes of moral orientation.

The second null hypothesis was used to examine the idea that, as a result of the different approaches to moral dilemmas used by men and women, men tend to score higher on scales measuring level of moral maturity. Again there was no support for rejection of the null hypothesis. There was no significant difference between the men and women on level of moral maturity as measured by the Moral Maturity Judgement scale.

Null hypothesis three was employed to examine Gilligan's notion that one's moral orientation does not change as level of moral maturity increases. She suggested that moral orientation will cut across level of moral maturity and will not move toward the "rights/justice" orientation as moral maturity rises. These ideas were partly supported by the data in this study. For the total sample, the men alone, and the women alone there was no significant relationship between the "care/responsibility" orientation and level of moral maturity. This was not true of the "rights/justice" orientation. The RIGHTS score for the total sample and the men alone were significantly correlated with Moral Maturity. For neither of these groups, however, was moral maturity a significant predictor of the "rights" orientation. The second part of the

study was designed to extend our knowledge about relationship between moral reasoning and sex-role orientation. This was done by concentrating on the sociological measures of sex-role orientation and decision-making in the societal domain (Tomeh, 1978). Six null hypotheses were used in this part of the study.

A test of hypothesis four revealed no difference between the sex-role preferences of men and women. As was expected when using a highly educated sample, neither sex was significantly more "modern" in their beliefs about the preferred behaviors for men and women.

Hypothesis five was used to test the sex-role researchers' suggestion that sex-role orientation will become more "modern" as one moves toward higher levels of moral maturity. The data in this study partially supported this assertion. There was a significant positive relationship between level of moral maturity and sex-role orientation for the sample as a whole. But when broken down into the two groups, the results remained true for the men but not for the women.

Hypothesis six was designed to extend the knowledge about the relationship between moral orientation and decision-making in the moral domain (Lyons, 1983), to decision-making in the societal domain (Turiel, 1978). It was used to examine the difference in moral maturity between those who used a "care/responsibility" moral orientation when making decisions about sex-role preferences and those who used a "rights/justice" approach. The tests revealed no significant differences for all subjects or for the women alone.

For the men alone, however, the care group was significantly higher in moral maturity than the rights group.

Hypothesis seven was designed to examine the difference between the "care" and "rights" orientations and sex-role orientation. The tests revealed that a higher concern for either moral orientation was significantly associated with a concern for more "modern" sex-role preferences. These same results were not obtained when the two groups were analyzed separately. For the women, the results were similar to those of the total group. Both orientations were significantly related to more "nontraditional" sex-role preferences. Data from the men showed no significant relationship between either of the two moral orientations and sex-role orientation.

Hypothesis eight was also used to examine decision-making in the societal domain. It examined the relationship between moral orientation measured by looking at moral dilemmas (CARE and RIGHTS scales) and moral orientation used in decisions about the social convention of sex-role orientation. A test of the data revealed no difference between those using the "care" or "rights" moral orientation in making decisions about sex-role orientation, in the moral orientation used in hypothetical moral dilemmas.

The ninth hypothesis examined the relationship between the sex of the respondent and the moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role preferences (societal domain). For this sample, there was no significant relationship between the sex of the

respondent and the moral orientation they used in making decisions about sex-role preferences.

Implications for Moral Reasoning Research

The results of this study have several implications for the study of moral reasoning. Gilligan has suggested, in contrast to Kohlberg, that there are two paths to moral maturity. One path follows the development of a concern centering on issues of care and responsibility, while the other centers on a concern for issues of justice and individual rights. She also suggested that, although these are differences of theme rather than by sex, each sex, as a result of the socialization process, tends to adopt one approach over the other, and that the orientation adopted is not altered by the movement toward higher levels of moral reasoning. These ideas were only partially supported by the findings of this study.

There was no relationship found between the sex of the respondent and their moral orientation. It may be that it is a difference of theme and not sex and the variables measured here were not appropriate to the study of this distinction. It may also be, as Pratt and Royer (1982) suggested, that the two orientations are not general across moral issues (or across domains) or that the orientations are only "moderately distinct patterns of reasoning" (p. 203). The high correlation between the two RIGHTS and CARE scores in this study seems to support this possibility. As there have been a number of studies that have supported the existence of the two moral orientations, further research is needed to explore

the strength of the distinction between the orientations and to discover factors other than sex that may contribute to the adoption and use of the two orientations.

The study partly supported Gilligan's contention that moral orientation is not altered by the movement toward higher levels of moral maturity. No significant relationship was found between level of moral maturity and the "care/responsibility" moral orientation, but this was not true for the "rights/justice" orientation. More study is needed to test the consistency of this finding. The data did not support Gilligan's (1982) contention that women will be likely to reason from a position of care regardless of achievement levels or occupation. The women in this sample, though of a high level of achievement, were nearly equal in their concern for the two orientations, a characteristic that both Kohlberg (1984) and Gilligan (1982) predicted when the women had more experience.

Lastly, there was no relationship between the sex of the respondents and their level of moral maturity. Although Gilligan has suggested that as a result of the use of a "care" orientation, women have been judged to be on a lower level of moral maturity when measured by Kohlberg's scale, other researchers have found little support for this contention (Walker, 1984; Thoma (cited in Rest, 1986)). The results of this study supported the findings of Walker and Thoma. There was no relationship between the two variables. It seems that a good case can be made for proceeding under the belief

that sex is not a determining factor in the moral orientation or level of moral maturity reached by an individual.

Implications for Sex-Role Research

The most striking implication for sex-role research was the finding of a significant relationship between level of moral maturity and sex-role orientation. In developing their scales sex-role researchers (Osmond & Martin, 1975; Scanzoni, 1975; Tomeh, 1978) aligned "modern" sex-role beliefs with higher moral thinking because they indicated an acceptance of greater role flexibility and a greater concern for individualistic interests. This implies that a rise in moral maturity will be accompanied by support for "nontraditional" sex-role beliefs. Such thinking was supported by this study, notably by the data from the men but not from the women.

The finding of a significant relationship between both the "care/responsibility" and the "rights/justice" orientations and sex-role orientation may also indicate support for the sex-role researchers' thinking. It may be that higher levels of concern for moral issues, regardless of the orientation used, parallels higher levels of moral maturity in general and thus would also be related to more "modern" sex-role beliefs. Further research is needed to test the connection between the strength of the concern for moral orientation and moral maturity and how these might be related to sex-role orientation.

As noted earlier, Turiel (1978) has proposed a different approach to the study of moral reasoning and sex-role orientation.

He suggested that sex-role beliefs were social conventions and a part of the societal domain and not moral imperatives. Following his reasoning, the relationship between moral maturity and sex-role orientation may be the result of the parallel development of the two domains and not the result of any causal connection between the two concepts. His thinking may be supported by the finding of no significant relationship between moral orientation and moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role preferences. If Turiel is correct, this finding may have occurred because moral orientation was being measured in two different domains. The CARE and RIGHTS scales measured reactions to moral dilemmas (moral domain) while the DEC scale examined decisions about social conventions (societal domain). More research is needed to further study whether sex-role beliefs are truly part of a separate domain and, if so, what relationships exist between the different domains.

Limitations of the Study

There were limitations to this study that should be noted. Several of these deal with the nature of the sample and its selection. First, the sample under study was very homogeneous. The subjects were all well educated, nearly all white, and all from a similar cultural background. As discussed in the research procedure, these sample characteristics were chosen to allow the testing of specific suggestions that have been made about moral reasoning. Although this was accomplished in the study, the selective nature of the sample limited the ability of the tests to

measure difference in the subjects (limited variability) and limited the generalizability of the findings to other groups. Future research should test these same concepts with groups that are less well educated, from a variety of cultural backgrounds, and from more than one race. Second, the sample size, especially for the men, must be considered. As a result of the common problem of getting subjects to return questionnaires, the sample size was smaller than planned. It was especially difficult to get men to cooperate. This situation also points to a third problem, the nonrandom and possibly self-selective nature of the sample. As volunteers were used as subjects and the return rate for those initially stating a willingness to participate was 40%, it is possible that the results from this sample were nonrepresentative of what would have been obtained from a truly random sample of individuals.

One other aspect of the study that must be considered here was the adequacy of the instruments used to gather the data. The Sex-Role Orientation and Maturity of Moral Judgement scales were well tested and recognized as valid measures of the two concepts. The other two scales were not as well established. The scale used to measure moral orientation was based on Rest's Defining Issues Test, but it was an altered form of that test. The last instrument was developed from Tomeh's scale but the scoring of the items was altered from Tomeh's original scale. Although the items on the moral orientation scale were checked for face validity and the scoring of the altered Tomeh scale was checked by measuring the

interjudge reliability of three judges, more testing and greater refinement of these instruments is needed to assure their adequacy for collecting the desired information.

Conclusion

It was hoped that this study would both test some recently developed notions about moral development and its relationship to sex-role orientation and extend the knowledge currently available into some untested areas. A specific goal was to move the focus of the research away from the much studied psychological measures of sex-role orientation and into the sociological measures of the social conventions of sex-role orientation. It was also hoped that the study would stimulate further research on this timely and important topic of study. The data from this study revealed several areas in which there were notable differences between the men and women on the variables investigated. Further attention to such differences and their correlates is needed to uncover the complexities of the relationships between the sexes and the beliefs they hold.

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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRES

RESEARCH PROJECT

Thank you very much for your participation in this important research project. These questionnaires are aimed at understanding how people think about social problems. There are no "right" answers in the way that there are right answers to math problems. We would like you to tell us what you think about several important social issues. Please answer the questions presented in the way they seem right to you. The questionnaires are anonymous and your answers to the questions will be completely confidential. Each participant will be assigned an identification number, and this information will be kept in a locked file. No real names will be attached to any data that we collect. The data collected will be analyzed to find the average for the whole group. No one will see your individual answers. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You should feel free to discontinue participation at any time or to decline to answer specific questions. Your participation will have no affect on your final class evaluation.

Please check the appropriate answer:

1. Sex male female
2. Age
3. Race
4. Citizenship United States Other
5. Country in which you have lived the majority of your life:
 United States Other
6. College Major

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70-73, Appendix A Questionnaires

U·M·I

QUESTIONNAIRE 2

DIRECTIONS: For the following 15 statements - read the statement and assume that it has been made by a person with whom you are having a conversation. Then, in the space below each statement, indicate what your reaction would most likely be.

1. The FBI has its hands tied in many cases because of the unreasonable opposition of some people to wire tapping.

2. (Black Speaker) Even after graduating from high school I can't find work. Yet I know many white dropouts who have good jobs.

3. The city is going to repeat what has been done in many other cities by building a superhighway right through the slum district. Many apartments will be torn down and many people will be forced out.

4. Some boys have it easy. They go to college and get out of the draft, and we get sent to Vietnam.

5. I told Jack my idea for the new project. He took it to the boss and got the credit.

 6. The new housing law is unfair. Why should I be forced to take in tenants that I find undesirable?

 7. In many medical laboratories experiments get performed on live animals and very little care is taken to minimize pain.

 8. I read another story today about a girl who was refused an abortion in a hospital. An incompetent doctor gave her an illegal abortion and she died.

 9. I think it is unnecessarily cruel to keep condemned prisoners on death row for so long, and to make the execution such a ritual.
-

10. The police should be encouraged in their efforts to apprehend and prosecute homosexuals. Homosexuality threatens the foundations of our society.
11. A powerful group representing hunters and gun manufacturers is holding up a gun control law that the majority of the people in this country want.
12. The government shouldn't have passed the medicare bill. Why should we pay other people's bills?
13. Several policemen were called into a slum area to break up a street fight but when they arrived the local residents threw bricks at them from the windows.

14. During last years ghetto riots a shop owner saw a boy jump out of the broken window of his store with a television set. The man shot the boy, who is now crippled as a result.

15. The police were rough when they broke up that crowd of students even though the students were parading without a permit.

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78-79, Appendix A Questionnaire 3

U·M·I

QUESTIONNAIRE 4

Directions: Please read the following statements taken from the previous questionnaire and give a statement explaining why you chose the answer that you did.

1. In marriage, the wife and husband should share making major decisions.

5. A married man's chief responsibility should be equally divided between his job and family.

7. A mother of young children may want to work if it makes her personally happy.

8. If the wife makes more money than the husband, it would not upset the balance of power.

15. A married man should realize that his wife's career may interfere with his career.