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A study of the evolution of the phenomenological nature of cultural consciousness: Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger

Mascali, Barbara Froeschle, Ph.D.

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U·M·I
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL NATURE OF CULTURAL CONSCIOUSNESS: KANT, HEGEL, AND HEIDEGGER

by

Barbara F. Mascali

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Co-Chair

Co-Chair

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This study is an examination of the evolution of individual consciousness from German Idealism to Heideggerian Existentialism. It traces the individual ego back to Kant and Fichte, demonstrates how with Hegel it underwent a gathering process, and suggests that with Heidegger it returned to the realm of pre-Socratic unity.

The investigation begins with an analysis of the groundwork laid by Kant and Fichte, whose conception of the powers of the Transcendental Ego paved the way to phenomenal thought. The system of consciousness established by German Idealism is thus characterized by the presupposition of an unmediated "I". With Hegel, the conception of consciousness underwent a radical change, demonstrated in his attempt to bring together the multitude of individual minds in his concept of the Absolute Spirit.

This Hegelian concept, which culminated in Marx's notion of collective consciousness, drew strong criticisms from Kierkegaard and Heidegger, who rejected Hegelian objectivism and Cartesian dualism. While Kierkegaard attempted to unify the individual "I" via the power of faith, Heidegger tried to demonstrate that Being was grounded in a primordial unity of subject and object.

However, the development of the individual "I" was thwarted by the phenomenology of Husserl, who, in Neo-Hegelian fashion, insisted on the mind's objective stance. Again, it was brought back on course through Heidegger's proclamation that the mind does not exist apart from the body. He took the stance that epistemology needed to be examined from a phenomenological standpoint, a view which led him to the conclusion that epistemology actually constitutes ontology.

The study concludes with an examination of the later Heidegger and his insistence on the authority of language. It suggests that the Heideggerian conception of the subjective individual mind is continued by Hannah Arendt, whose work on metaphor and embodiment provide important insights into contemporary thought. Although Arendt's conception of the mind demonstrates an obvious allegiance to Hegel, she follows in the footsteps of the early Heidegger in her insistence on the phenomenological method.

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Co-Chair Liz Menges

Co-Chair H. Svi Shapiro

Committee Members William Holmes

Jane T. Mitchell

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INTRODUCTION

This study arose from a need to understand consciousness in a manner different from the positivist stance. The so-called cognitive sciences seem to have come to a tacit agreement that consciousness is to be equated with awareness of perception. However, this assumption does not take into consideration the diverse activities of the mind that make this state possible, nor does it give credit to the realm in which the individual knows that it knows, in which it is not only aware of the object perceived, but of its awareness.

This paper will suggest that in Western philosophy the evolution of the individuality of consciousness begins with a separation of the "New Mind" from German Idealism. This individual mind may be traced back to Heraclitus, as numerous philosophers have attempted to demonstrate, but it was without a doubt Immanuel Kant who initiated the idea that Cartesian dualism was not sufficient to account for the diversity of individual minds.

In the course of this study it will come to light that in the evolution of the individual consciousness a variety of issues play vital roles, issues about the Self, about meaning, context, and relationship, as well as imagination and thinking. In discussing these issues, two directions

present themselves. It would have been possible and plausible to take the route of psychology, on which we encounter such thinkers as Freud and Jung. I have chosen the stream of philosophy, trying to show the process of evolution from Kant over Hegel to Heidegger.

Especially in the work of Martin Heidegger, the notions of context and culture are given a central position. His claim that culture arises from contextualization provides the basis for his conception of consciousness. Similarly, his insistence that we examine the history of consciousness in order to find clues that help us understand our present-day beliefs, as well as the reasons for them, points to the importance of context. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, it seems that an examination of the so-called Canon is necessary if we wish to see ourselves in context. Only by re-tracing the process of evolution can we come to an understanding of the present. The attempt of this study, to put the Heideggerian conception of consciousness into context, should therefore be seen as a process paralleling his own search for relation and perspective.

Hannah Arendt once commented on the necessity of the thinker taking a position outside of the "world of human affairs" in order to be able to examine it. (Arendt, 1978, p. 302). Similarly, in the course of my work, I have come to the conclusion that, while I cannot take a stance

outside of language to talk about language, it has been extremely beneficial for me to be able to talk in English about the language of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger (which happens to be my native language as well). It seems that in using a second language to describe the first, the necessary distance is gained to achieve a "spectator's" view of language. This, of course, would explain, why in the age of Kant and Hegel students of philosophy were encouraged to learn foreign languages. A point in case is Heidegger. While he was able to use German for the deconstruction of Greek, he did not have the fluency in a second language available to him when it came to the analysis of his native language. Therefrom stems his lament that we are locked into language, unable to take a step back in order to deconstruct it.

Since this study deals with two languages simultaneously, an attempt has been made to facilitate the reading by attaching a glossary of common terms in both English and German. At times, especially in the discussion of Heidegger, it seemed impossible to find English equivalents which would convey precisely the same meaning. In those cases the German term is kept, accompanied by an explanation in English.

As regards quotations, they are rendered in the language in which they were originally written. I have chosen to do my own translations, which, at times, may vary

from the English translations that have appeared in print. The reason for this decision stems from a belief in the decidedly subjective involvement of the reader.

CHAPTER I

UPROOTING GERMAN IDEALISM

Part 1: Kant - Transition and Foundation

One notion looming large in Heideggerian methodology is the concept of deconstruction (Destruktion). Only through the deconstruction, the analysis and the interpretation of our philosophical inheritance which has shaped our commonly accepted world-view, can we come in any way close to having an understanding of this Weltanschauung which we have accepted unquestioningly. Deconstruction will lead us to a comprehension of our consciousness, to an acknowledgment of the unaware aspect of our being conscious.

Heidegger is indebted to a number of philosophers as concerns this particular methodology. It was Immanuel Kant who first expressed dissatisfaction with existing philosophical systems. He realized that any intent to construct a newly conceived philosophical system must be invalidated as long as it was not preceded by a deconstruction of the existing one. Like Heidegger after him, Kant challenges our inclination to consider our conceptions of the world "natural" and "god-given", and insists that Vernunft (reason) is contingent upon an analysis of exactly these preconceived, inherited notions.

> Nun scheint es zwar natürlich, dass, sobald man den Boden der Erfahrung verlassen hat, man doch nicht mit Erkenntnis, die man besitzt, **ohne zu wissen woher**, und auf den Kredit, der Grundsätze, **deren Ursprung man nicht kennt**, sofort ein Gebäude errichten werde, ohne der seiner Grundlegung **durch sorgfältige Untersuchung** vorher versichert zu sein, dass man also die Frage vorlängst werde aufgeworfen haben, wie denn der Verstand zu allen diesen Erkenntnissen a priori kommen könne und welchen Umfang, Gültigkeit und Wert sie haben mögen. (Kant, 1988, p. 10, author's emphasis)
>
> Now it may seem natural that, once we have left the ground of experience, we should not at once begin to construct an edifice with knowledge which we possess but **of whose origin we have no clue**. Nor should we trust those principles **the origins of which are unknown**, without having assured ourselves of the safety of the foundation **through careful examination**. We should first of all have asked the question how it is possible that the mere intellect could arrive at all these insights a priori, and what extend, what truth, and what value they may possess.

Kant's Critical Philosophy

He continues by insisting that the method by which we must proceed is that of deconstruction:

> Ein grosser Teil, und vielleicht der grösste, von dem Geschäft unserer Vernunft besteht in **Zergliederung** der Begriffe, die wir schon von Gegenstaenden haben. (Kant, 1988, p. 11, author's emphasis)
>
> A large, perhaps the largest portion of our reason's activity consists in the **analysis** of the concepts which we already have of objects.

Kant's attempt to destroy dogmatism is obvious. We must bear in mind that he did not see much more validity in the Cartesian method of doubt. Contrarily, he considered the idea of skepticism merely a cynical reaction against

dogmatism, which in itself did not achieve the understanding needed for an explanation of how we come to know what we do.

> Was nun die Beobachter einer **szientifischen** Methode betrifft, so haben sie hier die Wahl, entweder **dogmatisch** oder **skeptisch**, in allen Fällen aber doch die Verbindlichkeit, **systematisch** zu verfahren. ... Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen. (Kant, 1988, p. 485)
>
> As far as the observers of a scientific method are concerned, they have the choice of proceeding either **dogmatically** or **skeptically** - in any case they should proceed **systematically**. ... Alone the critical way is still open.

The Active Self

Since his goal is the discovery of those abilities which make possible our comprehension of things, deconstruction, or Critical Philosophy, as Kant calls it, must be the sole methodology by which we come to define not only the limitations within which we operate, but also an understanding of why we have accepted them in the first place. Hegel stipulated that these limitations have been imposed upon us by previous philosophical thought, and we have been expected to accept them uncritically. According to Kant, and to Heidegger after him, a deconstruction of traditional philosophy is called for. We must probe into the origins of the existing systems in order to discover that which has been unthought by philosophy: we must uncover and examine the human powers at work in the

production of great philosophical systems. Simultaneously, we must take a historical perspective and acknowledge the reasons that have created a need for such constructions.

With this move, Kant asserts himself as the first philosopher to redefine what it means to be a rational human being. Rather than seeing the Self as passive, he acknowledges the Self's active mode with his suggestion that it is the mind that imposes its order on nature, and not vice versa, as has traditionally been assumed (Funke, 1974, p. 55). Metaphysics since Plato has grounded itself in the unquestioned assumption of a reality independent of us. Kant, in what he terms his "Copernican Revolution", states that the world does not exist independently of our experience of it. A century later Martin Heidegger, in what he called his fundamental ontology, addressed the same issue when he insisted that Dasein exists solely in relation to entities in its environment, and that these entities take on meaning precisely because of Dasein's involvement with them. Copernicus made a distinction between our perception of things (the fact that our position on earth makes heavenly bodies seem to move) and our understanding (our realization to the contrary). Kant also distinguish between our common view of the world, which posits that we exist as an independent entity, and our concepts of understanding, which are formed by means of

the activity of our thought, concepts which cannot result solely from our experience.

> So übertrieben, so widersinning es also auch lautet, zu sagen, der Verstand ist selbst der Quell der Gesetze der Natur und mithin der formalen Einheit der Natur, so richtig und dem Gegenstand, nämlich der Erfahrung, angemessen ist gleichwohl eine solche Behauptung. ... alle empirischen Gesetze sind nur besondere Bestimmungen der reinen Gesetze des Verstandes, unter welchen und nach deren Norm jene allererst möglich sind und die Erscheinungen eine gesetzliche Form annehmen ... (Kant, 1988, p. 78)
>
> As exaggerated, as contradictory as it may sound to say that the intellect is itself the source of the laws of nature and of its formal unity, such a statement is nevertheless correct and in accordance with the object, i.e. with experience. ... all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the intellect, under which, and according to which the former become possible, and phenomena assume a regular form ...

With this realization, Kant has completed the move that Descartes initiated. Not only does he agree with Descartes as to the importance of the first person in the attempt to analyze knowledge, but he acknowledges the all-encompassing nature of the individual. This acknowledgment leads Kant to the conclusion that the world **is** the world of our experience, and that we act upon the world to give it its basic form.

The System

In the **Kritik der reinen Vernunft**, Kant stipulates that knowledge of the world is possible because the self

determines the structure of every experience and thus makes knowledge of it possible. He distinguishes between two entities which influence our acknowledgment of knowledge, our consciousness. On the one hand there is a constant and stable entity given by the individual's mind itself which he calls the **Forms** (Formen) of the faculty of knowledge.

> ... wird eine Erkenntnis schlechthin rein genannt, in die sich überhaupt keine Erfahrung oder Empfindung einmischt, welche mithin vollig a priori möglich ist. Nun ist Vernunft das Vermögen, welches die Prinzipien der Erkenntnis a priori an die Hand gibt. Daher ist reine Vernunft diejenige, welche die Prinzipien, etwas schlechthin a priori zu erkennen, enthält. (Kant, 1988, p. 14)
>
> ... any kind of knowledge is called pure, if it is not invaded by any experience or sensation, if, in other words, it is possible entirely a priori. Reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge a priori. Therefore, pure reason is that faculty which contains the principles of knowing anything entirely a priori.

On the other hand there is **Matter** (Materie), which is produced by external influences. Since Kant's preoccupation is with the faculties of the mind, he naturally focuses our attention on his system of Forms which he divides into three groups. These groups he arranges in ascending order, culminating in "transcendental knowledge".

> Ich nenne alle Erkennntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegenständen, sondern mit unseren Begriffen a priori von Gegenständen überhaupt beschäftigt. (Kant, 1988, p. 14)

> I call all knowledge transcendental which occupies itself not so much with objects, as with our a priori concepts of objects in general.

Transcendental knowledge, the highest knowledge possible, is hereby placed firmly in that realm of consciousness where concepts have already been developed and play a major role. This thought is reminiscent of Fichte's Reflexion where abstract thought reigns, and where the mind is free from external apperceptions. For Fichte as for Kant, the abstract concepts developed in intellectual intuition or in transcendental knowledge causes objects to exist as objects.

Heidegger appropriated Kant's three stages in his search for the primordial grounding of consciousness, but he arranged them in reverse order since his goal is not the quest for pure reason, but rather the return to everyday coping which must underlie reason and awareness. In this sense, Heidegger applied a mode of Kant's own methodology, that of deconstruction, in order to deconstruct Kant's system.

Since Kant has made his move away from the priority of experience, he clearly stresses the method of deduction. He now explains how we can come to have any concepts at all without relying on experience and on the faulty meaning we often attribute to experience. Deduction, for him, is the explanation of how concepts can a priori refer to objects,

and with this attempt alone he removes himself distinctly from the empiricist tradition.

Level one - Sense perception

Pure reason, as Kant defines it, is based upon a three-fold division of the faculties of the mind. The most basic forms of our faculties are those of apprehension, or of sense (Sinnlichkeit), characterized by our ability to be affected by sensations. Sense perceptions as such are, for all intents and purposes, unknown. Therefore, apprehension constitutes the bottommost level of consciousness, presupposed by all the other levels, and simultaneously the germ of the process through which a thinking, experiencing, and reasoning mind can develop.

All perceptual experiences include intuitional data. Intuitional data do not classify themselves into concepts, but they provide some basis for the development of concepts through a process of reflection upon them. Intuitional data are received and are experienced as received. Of certain interest to Heidegger was the fact that Kant considers space and time as forms of our perception, forms because every single experience pre-supposes them (Waxman, 1991, p. 20). Time and space are products of intuition and in no manner givens of the senses (Green, 1992, p. 36). Thus, the realm to which Kant assigns temporality and spatiality foreshadows Heidegger's concept of being-in-the world, a

mode of consciousness which is in part determined by time and space. Space, according to Kant,

> ... ist eine notwendige Vorstellung a priori, die allen äusseren Anschauungen zugrunde liegt. Man kann sich niemals eine Vorstellung davon machen, dass kein Raum sei, obwohl man sich ganz wohl denken kann, dass keine Gegenstande darin angetroffen werden. Er wird also als die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Erscheinungen und nicht als eine von ihnen abhangende Bestimmung angesehen, und ist eine Vorstellung a priori, die notwendigerweise äusseren Erscheinungen zugrunde liegt. (Kant, 1988, pp. 19/20)
>
> ... is a necessary representation a priori, forming the foundation of all external intuition. One cannot imagine that there should be no space, although one might very well imagine that there should be space without objects to fill it. Space is therefore regarded as a condition of the possibility of phenomena, not as a determination dependent on them.

Time is defined in analogous terms. It seems that Heidegger must have found Kant's retort to his empiricist critics especially interesting, because he will eventually pick up on the notion that in our common assumptions (which are reflected in and caused by our language) we tend to consider time as an object to be had, saved, or squandered. When faced with the challenge that the passage of time is empirically observable, Kant responds that

> Die Zeit ist allerdings etwas Wirkliches, nämlich die wirkliche Form der **inneren Anschauung**. Sie hat also subjektive Realitat in Ansehung der inneren Erfahrung, d.i. ich habe wirklich die Vorstellung von der Zeit und meiner Bestimmungen in ihr. Sie ist also wirklich **nicht als Objekt**, sondern **als die Vorstellung meiner selbst als Objekt** anzusehen. (Kant, 1988, p. 27, author's emphasis)

> Time certainly is something real, namely the real form of internal intuition. Time therefore has subjective reality regard to **internal experience**: that is, I really have the representation of time and my determinations in it. Time is to be considered real, not as an object, but as the representation of myself as an object.

Time and space together with the manifold they contain are for Kant entirely products of intuition, not sense-data. They are intuitions founded on sensibility, not concepts derived from understanding.

Heidegger agreed with Kant in that he did not conceive of time and space as entities which are present-at-hand and therefore to be conceived of as objects. Rather, he made the distinction between what he called "derivative time", our conventional conception which implies that time passes outside of us, and "primordial time" which is produced by our intuitions (Ornstein, 1991, p. 164). For Kant, only one of the twelve categories was responsible for the "construction" of the concept of time and space, but Heidegger sees primordial time as being grounded in a tri-fold structure of **understanding** (to be seen in the Kantian sense as a pre-conceptual and every-day coping), **facticity** (our moods and states of mind), and **falling** (the preoccupation with entities alongside us). These three ecstasies constituted for Heidegger the three dimensions of temporality. By adding a fourth temporal dimension, Heidegger was able to think Kant's thought to its end and

succeeded in connecting time and space by providing a way to determine the "where" of time. It is the "giving" of time, the bringing-about of the conception of time that is to be seen as a pre-spatial region which brings about the presencing of the three dimensions of time.

The Process of Ordering

For Kant, the first step on the way to knowledge is characterized by the manifold that is necessarily contained in "pure intuition." At this level we cannot yet speak of an attempt to organize the manifold in any way, since we are not conscious of the intuitional data in which the manifold is contained. Therefore, a gathering and ordering of the manifold is required, which is accomplished in the Synthese (synthesis). This act of connecting the intuitional data does indeed happen on this first level of Kant's framework of knowledge. It is what he calls the synthesis of apprehension in intuition (Synthesis der Apprehension in der Anschauung). This act collects the manifold available in intuition and unites it.

> Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des Raumes), so ist erstens das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben notwendig, welche Handlung ich die Synthesis der Apprehension nenne, weil sie geradezu auf die Anschauung gerichtet ist, die zwar ein Mannigfaltiges darbietet, dieses aber als ein solches, und zwar in

> einer Vorstellung enthalten, niemals ohne eine dabei vorkommende Synthesis bewirken kann. (Kant, 1988, p. 63)
>
> In order for this manifold to become unity of intuition (as for example in the representation of space), it is necessary that the manifold is first perused and then collected. I call this act the synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed toward apprehension which displays a manifold, but which can never effect a manifold as such, contained in a representation, without the accompanying synthesis.

Only after this act has occurred can we speak of having representations, because **a** representation, by necessity, must be characterized by unity. If the act of synthesis would not take place, then the variety of apprehensions would be too diffuse. In the case of space this would mean that we would be able to represent to ourselves one spatial dimension at a time, but without the act of gathering the different dimensions, there could be no mention of the concept of space as we hold it. Since intuition offers something manifold, this manifold must be collected in order to form **one** representation.

Level two - The Intellect

One step up on his hierarchical ladder of forms brings Kant to those of the intellect. While perception fashions the chaos of sensations into spatial and temporal sense-images, the intellect arranges these images:

> ... dass es zwei Stämme der menschlichen Erkenntnis gebe, die vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaftlichen, aber uns unbekannten Wurzel entspringen, nämlich **Sinnlichkeit** und **Verstand**, durch deren ersteren uns Gegenstände gegeben, durch den zweiten aber gedacht werden. (Kant, 1988, p. 17)
>
> ... that there are two branches of human knowledge which spring from a common root, unknown to us, namely **sensibility** and **intellect**. Through the former objects are given to us. Through the latter these objects are being thought.

It is in the realm of the intellect that Kant anchors his twelve categories which are themselves forms of the intellect. Categories, such as those of continuity and of causality, are necessary for the development of concepts that are not dependent on experiences, but are a priori (Gotshalk, 1969, p. 8). Kant asserts that we can only experience by means of the application of our forms of perception and of the categories. Simultaneously, this assertion makes manifest certain limitations within which we operate, because our mode of knowledge (in time and space and according to the categories of the intellect) is the only possible mode.

On the level of the intellect, another synthesis takes place, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination (Synthesis der Reproduktion in der Einbildung). Since phenomena are not things in themselves, but have been created by our representations in the sense that they are the manner in which we are affected by external objects or incidents (Powell, 1990, p. 53), we could never imagine

that which is not present without having a way by which to organize these representations. We have to bring them together in a meaningful way. We must endow them with meaning and comprehend that which, so far, has been a part of our pre-conceptual mode of knowing. On the intuitional level we cannot be aware of our apperceptions (Pothast, 1971, p. 14), but once we have reached the level of the intellect, we have moved a step closer to knowledge.

> Dieses Gesetz der Reproduktion setzt aber voraus, dass die Erscheinungen selbst wirklich einer solchen Regel unterworfen seien und dass in dem Mannigfaltigen ihrer Vorstellungen eine gewissen Regeln gemässe Begleitung oder Folge stattfinde; denn ohne das wurde unsere empirische Einbildungskraft niemals etwas ihrem Vermögen Gemässes zu tun bekommen, also wie ein totes und uns selbst unbekanntes Vermögen im Inneren des Gemüts verborgen bleiben. (Kant, 1988, p. 63)
>
> This law of reproduction, however, presupposes that the phenomena themselves are really subject to such a rule, and that there is in the variety of these representations a sequence and concomitancy subject to certain rules; for without this the faculty of empirical imagination would never find anything to do that it is able to do, and remain therefore buried within our mind as a dead faculty, unknown to ourselves.

Through a second act of synthesis, the elements of intuition to which we were receptive before, are now collected and united. This second synthesis makes for awareness of the a priori intuition of time and space. Time and space must already be given as the rule by which the synthesis can take place. They are now brought to light, because during the act of organizing events or

objects we necessarily achieve a basic awareness of time and space. This naturally implies that time and space, although first given as intuitions, are in fact products of a synthesis and make up a unity of their own for which preconceptual knowledge is responsible. Although we may be tempted to understand time and space as preceding imagination, the fact that Kant does not exclusively rule out all manner of understanding from an account of time and space, places their genesis temporally after imagination. What he does rule out, at the level of the intellect, is **conceptual** understanding. When Kant asserts that time and space are first given as intuitions through or because of a synthesis not belonging to sense, we can assume that no intuitions of time and space precede such a synthesis. Therefore, imagination must be the force which makes any consciousness of time and space possible.

It seems that for Kant there is a sensing of sensations, which is analogous to the acknowledgment of phenomena. We encounter precisely the same notion in Fichte's stage of Reflexion (reflexation). Whereas reflection refers to the perceiver, reflexation refers to that which is perceived. By locating this sensing of sensations on the level of the intellect, Kant paves the way for phenomenological thought.

A third synthesis must take place on the level of the intellect, one which Kant calls the synthesis of

recognition in concepts (Synthesis der Rekognition im Begriff). It is here where the notion of consciousness enters into the discussion. Without consciousness we could not recognize the representations of our imagination. Consciousness is what unites the manifold of that which has been perceived and reproduced into a representation by imagination.

> Dieses Bewusstsein kann oft nur schwach sein, so dass wir es nur in der Wirkung, nicht aber in dem Actus selbst, d.i. unmittelbar mit der Erzeugung der Vorstellung verknüpfen: aber unerachtet dieser Unterschiede muss doch immer ein Bewusstsein angetroffen werden, wenn ihm gleich die hervorstehende Klarheit mangelt, und ohne dasselbe sind Begriffe und mit ihnen Erkenntnis von Gegenständen ganz unmöglich. (Kant, 1988, p. 65)
>
> This consciousness may often be only faint, so that we may connect it with the effect only, and not with the act itself, immediately with the production of a representation. Regardless of these differences, this consciousness must be there, even if it is lacking in pointed clarity. Without this consciousness, concepts, and with them, knowledge of objects are impossible.

Kant insists that phenomena are not objects outside of us, but sensuous representations. If we examine the relationship between the object and our representation of it, we must come to realize that the different representations we may entertain must all somehow agree with each other. This agreement, this unity which constitutes the concept, has been guaranteed by the third synthesis.

> Alle Erkenntnis erfordert einen Begriff, dieser mag nun so unvollkommen oder so dunkel sein, wie er wolle; dieser aber ist seiner Form nach jederzeit etwas Allgemeines und was zur Regel dient. (Kant, 1988, p. 66)
>
> All knowledge presupposes a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may be. This concept is always, with regard to its form, something general, something that serves as a rule.

If the external object is indeed nothing more than something created by the concept by means of synthesis, then there has to be an "ultimate ground" which would explain the unity of our collective consciousness. Kant finds this ground in what he calls transcendental apperception, which is nothing else than the original consciousness at the basis of all knowledge. It is a consciousness that precedes even intuitional data. It is a unified yet preconceptual and unmediated "I".

This has serious consequences concerning the identity of the "I" for Kant. Consciousness of oneself, just as consciousness of objects or phenomena, must itself first be synthesized. Otherwise "[kann es] kein stehendes oder bleibendes Selbst in diesem Fluss innerer Erscheinungen geben ..." (Kant, 1988, p. 67) ("There can be no fixed or permanent self in that stream of internal phenomena ...").

The self, for Kant, is necessary for consciousness as a singular "I". What differentiates consciousness of the self from consciousness of phenomena is the fact that the "I" can only be the subject of experience, never the

object. As a result, the categories of the intellect cannot be applied to the self because they presuppose this "I". It follows that the self cannot be known, an idea with which Fichte would disagree, since he posits that in the act of **Reflexion** subject and object become identical. This implies that the "I" as a subject is able to contemplate the "I" as an object and therefore know it. Husserl, as well, rejected the Kantian distinction between phenomena as given in intuition and noumena as things in themselves. For Husserl, the phenomenon constituted the "thing in itself", and simultaneously he saw no distinction between the Kantian forms of sensibility and of the intellect.

The paradox which grows out of this train of thought is the fact that the "I", for Kant, is that which is presupposed by the categories. It is a self that is in time and space, since time and space constitute the original intuitions. At the same time - and Hegel will eventually point this out - due to its pure and original state, the self imposes the forms of time and space in any possible experience.

Level three - Reason

Once we consider the third group of forms, those of reason (Vernunft), another paradox unfolds. While the categories in the realm of the intellect are responsible for the appearance of objects as independent of us, as

existing by and for themselves in the world, it is through the forms of reason that we come to appreciate this independence as an illusion. Indeed, we come to realize that this appearance of independence is dependent upon us and upon the forms of the intellect which in turn are dependent on the a priori categories that inform our thinking. Thus, understanding on an intellectual level is the application of concepts to make sense of our experience, to give us knowledge. Reason is the application of concepts to themselves.

Kant's **Kritik der reinen Vernunft** can be said to be an investigation into those structures which determine our experience, the structures of sense and of the intellect. A new vision of human knowledge is introduced into the discipline of philosophy which has so far dwelled on the passive reception and interpretation of sensations. Martin Heidegger, while appropriating the Kantian concept of the mind as the determining factor of experience, introduced a new aspect into this conception of the mind. For Heidegger the mind, while actively involved in the formation of its reality, must nevertheless go one step further (Heidegger considers it a "turning back"), and acknowledge the manner in which consciousness is limited in that endeavor. Heidegger's thought can be considered an extension to the Kantian philosophy in that he insists on Dasein's obligation to be receptive and open to that which phenomena

will show us. With Kant, human knowledge becomes a mode of knowledge that is basic to and yet independent of experience. It is due to this a priori knowledge that the world must have the structure we impose on it. We know - and we know that we know the world - not because our experience corresponds to reality, but because reality must conform to the structure of the mind. Kant's conception of the self and of self-knowledge is one source of our experience. It is the condition for the existence of the world, and it supplies the forms of our experience which are given a priori.

Being versus Knowing

In the "Transzendentale Aesthetik" Kant introduces two modes of Self, modes which Heidegger will acknowledge in his philosophy of being-in-the-world. The empirical self (Dasein) is characterized as the personal self with a history, immersed in everyday life. It is an "ordinary knowing consciousness." The transcendental self or transcendental ego is a formal source of a priori conditions. It is timeless and universal. In short, it is consciousness in general (Heidegger's Seiendes). If we acknowledge the difference between these two selfs and the two modes of consciousness associated with them, we will come to an understanding of the two modes of temporality connected to and produced by them.

Since the empirical self operates in the realm of perception and of the intellect, it is necessarily limited to a view of time as existing "out there" as a reality, as independent of the observer. Therefore it is a precursor of Heidegger's Dasein which is necessarily cursed (or blessed) with the ecstasy of fallenness, propelled to follow das Man. In this manner, the empirical self makes claims about the pastness, presentness, and futurity of objects and of time itself.

Contrarily, the transcendental ego is concerned with the essential features of time that are known a priori. Although Kant analyzes primarily what we knowers must be like in order that we can know a posteriori about specific temporal facts, he lists certain things that we must know a priori about time itself.

> (Die Zeit) hat nur eine Dimension: verschiedene Zeiten sind nicht zugleich, sondern nacheinander. ... Verschiedene Zeiten sind nur Teile ebenderselben Zeit. ... Die Unendlichkeit der Zeit bedeuted nichts weiter, als dass alle bestimmte Grösse der Zeit nur durch Einschränkungen einer einzigen zugrunde liegenden Zeit möglich sei. (Kant, 1988, p. 24)
>
> (Time) has one dimension only: different times are not simultaneous, but successive. ... Different times are only parts of one and the same time. ... To say that time is infinite means no mote than every definite quantity of time is possible only through limitations of one time which forms the foundation of all times.

Based on these propositions, Kant concludes that time is

not something which can exist in itself and can be experienced as an "external object" or event or as something which can be appended to objects like a predicate and thus define and characterize them. Time can only be the form of our mental activity, of our contemplation of ourselves and of our inner states. Time defines the relationship of our concepts, such as simultaneity or sequence, and it can therefore not have a physical shape (Gestalt). It is precisely the lack of physical shape which will be taken up by philosophers after Kant, especially those concerned with language, because, as Kant himself acknowledges,

> ... eben weil diese innere Anschauung keine Gestalt gibt, suchen wir auch diesen Mangel durch Analogien zu ersetzen und stellen die Zeitfolge durch eine ins Unendliche fortgehende Linie vor ... (Kant, 1988, p. 25)
>
> ... and precisely because this internal intuition supplies no shape, we try to remedy this deficiency by means of analogies and represent the succession of time by a line progressing to infinity ...

On this imaginary time line, which our language has brought about, time is sequential and one-dimensional. What is more, we attribute the characteristics of this line (which we have constructed merely as an analogy, in order to represent time in a physical manner) to time itself. The same thing happens in our modern-day analogy of the brain and the computer. In our haste to find an adequate analogy

for the brain, we turn the tables and assign the qualities and characteristics of the computer (which we intended to use as the analogy in order to explain the workings of the brain) to the brain.

Kant's Conception of Time

Kant never denied the existence of things-in-themselves - a failure which casts a paradoxical shadow on his Critical Philosophy considering his idealist stance as concerns the power of the mind - he did deny the reality of time. Time is a framework for experience, not a feature of independently real things. His argument, in support of this thesis, is that this would be the only way in which we can know a priori the essential features of time. If we were to know an independently real time and space we would have to have some type of access to it. However, the only kind of access, that of empirical observation, would not provide for the universal validity of time and space.

Another argument for the non-reality of time occurs in the first antinomy. It states that time is essentially contradictory because time is such that the world must be thought both to have and not have a beginning in time. Since what is contradictory cannot exist on its own, time cannot be real. In view of this antinomy we must acknowledge the illusory nature of reason and we must come to the conclusion that the capacity for self-contradiction

is built into reason itself. If space and time are not products of the senses and of the intellect, if they are indeed a priori as are the categories, then how do human beings acquire them? Since we apprehend time and space on the level of pre-reflective immediacy, they cannot be concepts or concept-derived intuitions.

No special act, no directing of attention is required to apprehend them. One is **in** time and space simply by having them- merely by the virtue of their presence. Therefore, the mere subjective intuition of sensations revealing simultaneity and succession already entails that one is "in" formal intuition: we are aware of them immediately in the act of synthesizing the apprehended manifold. This synthesis cannot take place unless there is a manifold of sense impressions actually present in the mind. Since time and space are forms of this act, and can arise only with its occurrence, they presuppose the presence of sensations. Time and space are thus sensible intuitions.

Intuited time and space precede all concepts. Indeed, the "Transzendentale Aesthetik" hinges on the claim that the intuition of space and time is essentially prior and independent of the acquisition of any concept whatsoever.

> Die Zeit ist die formale Bedingung a priori aller Erscheinungen überhaupt. Der Raum als die reine Form aller äusseren Anschauung ist als Bedingung a priori bloss auf äussere Erscheinungen eingeschränkt. ... so

> ist die Zeit eine Bedingung a priori von aller Erscheinung überhaupt, und zwar die unmittelbare Bedingung der inneren (unserer Seele) und eben dadurch mittelbar auch der äusseren Erscheinungen. (Kant, 1988, p. 25)
>
> Time is the formal condition, a priori, of any phenomena at all. Space, as the pure form of all external intuition, is an a priori condition, limited to external phenomena. ... thus time is an a priori condition of any phenomena at all. It is the immediate condition of inner phenomena (of our soul), and thereby indirectly of external phenomena as well.

Time and space are not concepts of outer relations. Rather, they constitute that which underlies the possibility of an individual having outer relations. Being "in" formal intuition enables us to acknowledge the range of synthetic action open to us: Only because time and space are forms of intuition, are we able to gather and order external entities (the manifold offered to us in apprehension) and to put them in relation to each other. Only because time and space are intuited, and not acquired through experience, are we able to fixate and pinpoint perceptions near or far, after, before or concurrent, outside or alongside. "Pure intuition" is the purely formal awareness of the framework within which and according to which the composition of perception can occur. Without it no empirical temporal or spatial intuition, even the most subjective and non-reflective, would be possible.

Through the act of bringing sensations into consciousness (apprehension) and synthesizing them, they

are endowed with form:

> Ich verstehe aber unter **Synthese** in der allgemeinsten Bedeutung die Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen zueinander hinzuzutun und ihre Mannigfaltigkeit in einer Erkenntnis zu begreifen. (Kant, 1988, p. 50)
>
> In the most general sense, I understand by **synthesis** the act of arranging different representations together, and of comprehending what is manifold in them under one form of knowledge.

On the level of intuition no form exists. On the level of the intellect, representations come into existence when the "raw material" of apprehended sensation is present and form-giving acts of synthesis are performed. The manifold of intuition is combined, and through the ordering process of the intellect, representation is possible:

> Die Synthese eines Mannigfaltigen aber (es sei empirisch oder a priori gegeben) bringt zuerst eine Erkenntnis hervor, die zwar anfänglich noch roh und verworren sein kann und also der Analyse bedarf; allein die Synthesis ist doch dasjenige, was eigentlich die Elemente zu Erkenntnissen sammelt und zu einem gewissen Inhalt vereinigt. (Kant, 1988, p. 50)
>
> Synthesis of that which is manifold (whether given empirically or a priori) produces at first a knowledge which may initially be crude and confused and in need of analysis. Synthesis alone collects the elements necessary for knowledge and unites them to have a certain content.

The importance of the act of synthesis for understanding becomes again evident in this passage. Only after the many different impressions of intuition have been gathered, combined and endowed with form, can awareness

become possible. During this process, what has so far been mere intuition, becomes intellectual understanding. With the awareness of the existence of external objects comes the ability to also represent these objects even when they are not present.

According to Kant, time and space represent the form of our experiences rather than their content. Our concepts of time and space are not gathered from experience, and therefore must be purely formal. As Kant admitted, neither of the concepts can be formed in complete absence of experience: experience is a necessary occasion or correlate upon which we form such concepts, but they are not empirical. Time and space are not acquired from experience, but activated on the occasion of experience. Therefore, there is no relation between any particular experiences and these concepts. Time and space are **how** things appear to us, in fact, how things must necessarily appear to us. They are not things themselves that appear to us.

Whereas Kant relied solely on the powers of the ego to form the world, with his contemporary Fichte we are transcending German Idealism and are moving toward a "science" of thought and understanding. The Kantian conviction that the "I" can never be known as an object is overcome by Fichte's **Science of Knowledge** in which he considers Dasein to be an object among others. The new "science" of philosophy includes thus the "I am" in the

manipulation of the object world which in turn produces a subject world as well. For Fichte the unmediated "I" and the knowledge that I know is combined, and the old Kantian opposites are erased.

Part 2: Fichte - A Way to Phenomenal Thought

Fichte wrote his **Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre** almost a decade before **Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns.** However, it appears that the latter would serve well as an introduction into the development of the mind from its "primitive" stages of intuition to the higher realm of consciousness or intellectual intuition which are the focus of his works. The **Wissenschaftslehre** serves as an examination of what constitutes knowledge. It is left to the later work to trace the path, so to speak, of human development. Both works are attempts to probe into those realms that constitute consciousness for Fichte: the unawareness in everyday life of the possibility of philosophical reflection or abstraction to return to and merge with pure intuition, resulting in the Act or in the Thätigkeit (the activity) of thinking.

The Primordial Unity

His method, unlike that of Kant who proceeded from the manifold given in the content of consciousness to the all embracing unity, is to start at the original activity of

the ego and to deduce from it the special forms of the manifold - "ein Zusammenfassen eines Mannigfaltigen" (Fichte, 1845, p. 7). With this move, Fichte distances himself from Cartesian dualism. He posits that in our mind's pre-conceptual realm there exists a primordial unity which can be separated into its different components only by force. The force which we need to apply in order to understand the composition of this Verschmelzung is philosophical reflection. Whereas Kant had considered this unity to be a product of synthesis, the uniting activity which gathers the different modes of consciousness, Fichte assumes it to be the foundation of all possible thought. His goal, like Heidegger's more than a century later, is to find the active principle in our consciousness responsible for producing a content which we are not conscious of having produced. It is to find the Act which "lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible" (Fichte, 1970, p. 93). Similarly to Heidegger, he is thus searching for the unconscious aspect of consciousness.

> Das Wesen aller Wissenschaft besteht darin, dass von irgend einem sinnlich Wahrgenommenen **durch Denken** zum übersinnlichen Grunde desselben aufgestiegen werde. Eben also verhält es sich mit der Philosophie. Sie geht aus von der Wahrnehmung des Wissens durch den inneren Sinn, und steigt auf zu dem Grunde desselben. (Fichte, 1845, p. 541, author's emphasis).
>
> The essence of all Science rests in the fact that **through thinking** the move can be accomplished from something perceived through the senses to the supersensible reason of this perception. The same

> holds true for philosophy. Philosophy starts with the **apperception of knowledge** through the inner senses, and moves up to the reason of those inner senses.

The System

The path to consciousness is clearly laid out by Fichte: We proceed from the realm of acknowledging mere sensations (intuition) to that realm where we are able to determine the cause of these sensations. This path we can follow via the activity of thinking. Momentarily putting aside the question of what it means to think, Fichte asks instead what constitutes the different realms. Hence, his goal is to locate and determine these opposite poles, one characterized by the apperception of phenomena, the other by the awareness that we are indeed acknowledging these phenomena, and, above all, by the manner in which we acknowledge them. This manner of acknowledgment plays a vital role in the making of meaning. It is the state of the "I" at the moment of acknowledgment or, as Heidegger would put it, of disclosure. If this state were not taken into consideration, knowledge would remain an abstract entity, an entity outside of the unmediated "I", and therefore meaningless to the "I". Only after the apperception of phenomena has been "brought back" to the "I" and to the particular state in which it finds itself can any knowledge become meaningful. Knowledge has now transcended impersonal

objectivity and has become subjective, and meaning has been created by and for the "I".

In his **Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre**, Fichte begins by defining Wissen (knowledge) negatively, by stating that

> ... es ist überhaupt kein Wissen **von** - noch ist es **ein** Wissen (quantitativ und in der Relation), sondern Act, keine Begebenheit, oder dass etwas **im** Wissen ... gesetzt werden [kann]. (Fichte, 1845, p. 14)
>
> ... it is not at all a knowledge **of** - nor is it **a** knowledge (quantitative and in relation). Rather, it is an act, not an event, or that something ... [can] be posited **in** knowledge.

We will encounter precisely the same rejection of knowledge as Wissen in Heidegger with the only difference that the latter takes this rejection a step further and suggests that we need to employ the term "knowing" in the sense of **können** which suggests not an acquisition of external facts, but which implies the subject's familiarity with the object and his ability to handle it and to cope with certain situations. The knowledge upon which Fichte seems to elaborate is not a particular knowledge of an accumulation of particulars, of facts, or of information, but rather a knowledge that incorporates the knower. It is a knowledge that must acknowledge the fact that it would not be what it is without the particular state in which the knowing "I" finds itself at the moment of knowing, an "I", however, that is simultaneously produced by knowledge. The

notion of abstract knowledge being modified by the state of the unmediated "I" is a Kantian concept, one that Heidegger has adopted in his fundamental ontology.

Level one - Sense-perception

The method by which Fichte proposes to proceed is to observe the activity of Wissen, and his starting point in **Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns** is "die Wahrnehmung äusserer Gegenstände" - the apperception of external objects (Fichte, 1845, p. 542). He carries on the Kantian notion of "apperception" which Heidegger, in turn, will elaborate in his concept of **facticity** which is characterized by Dasein's pre-conceptual acknowledgment of its constitution. Fichte thereby sets out to prove that intuition is a necessary requisite of having any experience at all, of perceiving external objects in the first place. Apperception, therefore, is in itself determined and limited by our "external senses" (physical senses) which let us see certain objects in only certain ways. This limitation is reminiscent of the Kantian categories which set up the boundaries within which we are able to perceive the world in a rather predetermined manner. What is of interest here is that Fichte posits the necessity of our "external", physical senses, but simultaneously considers these a limitation precisely because of their teleological character:

> So ist es z. B. unmöglich, dass einer, der kein Gesicht hat, durch Farben afficirt werde: diese Affection selbst aber ist eine Beschränkung des Sinnes überhaupt auf diese bestimmte Weise, des Empfangens durch den Sinn. (Fichte, 1845, p. 542)
>
> It is impossible, for example, for someone who does not have a face, to be affected by colors: This affect itself, however, is a particular limitation of the senses themselves, a limitation of the reception through the senses.

This raises the question of whether we can be affected by phenomena because we have sensory organs, or whether we have sensory organs because we are destined to be affected by phenomena, a matter which Heidegger will easily bring to its fruition.

Since, according to Fichte, apperception of external objects is dependent on affect or intuition (determined, however, by our external senses) and on the Kantian notion of Ausdehnung (expansion), determined by our internal capacity to pass judgement on external objects, we are still on the first level of development. We have not yet overcome the realm of immediate intuition of objects, that realm where intuition is not yet characterized by the **awareness** of external objects. Hence, we are at the stage of pre-consciousness or what Fichte calls elsewhere the **pure ego**, still in the condition where it is unaware of anything that might be a non-ego.

This pre-conceptual realm bears a striking resemblance to Heidegger's conception of Dasein employing the Zeug

(tools) which is present-to-hand. Just as the pure ego has no awareness of objects, so Dasein is unaware of the "toolness" of things. The relationship that Dasein has with tools is a pre-conscious involvement with them. This involvement in turn brings to mind the kind of knowledge that both Fichte and Heidegger define as a können (skill) rather than a wissen (abstract knowledge). Both skills and tools are thus characterized by the pre-conscious involvement that Dasein displays, by the unaware coping that it engages in when dealing with tools in a skillful manner. Awareness, according to Heidegger, does not set in until a discrepancy occurs in the relation between user and tool, in other words, when the tool breaks down and with this failure calls into awareness its originally intended function which is now absent. It is the conflict which this break-down causes which, for the first time, lets Dasein think about the present-to-hand-ness that is now lost, and therefore makes for an awareness.

Level two - The Thinking Self

In order to reach the second level in the development of consciousness, what is required for Fichte is the activity of thinking, now defined by the fact

> **dass** herausgegangen werde aus der Anschauung; ein Herausgehen aber aus der unmittelbaren Anschauung haben wir schon früher **Denken** genannt. (Fichte, 1845, p. 545)

> that we leave the realm of intuition; Above we have already called this activity of leaving **thinking.**

Is the "activity of leaving intuition" comparable with Husserl's epoche in which he recommends that we leave behind our everyday conception of the world? For Husserl it seems enough to leave one realm behind while attaining another one. This move from one extreme to another points to the Husserl's inability to put behind him Cartesian dualism. The inability to mediate opposites constitutes part of Husserl's mathematics with which Heidegger was disenchanted. Husserl, unlike Heidegger insisted on a precise system of consciousness, and found therefore no room for amalgamation of opposites. For Fichte, as for Heidegger, it is only through the unification of intuition and thinking that the object becomes recognized as object, something outside of us, seemingly independent of us - a non-ego. It seems that this insistence on the unification of two different realms of consciousness is an example of Fichte's impulse for unity, otherwise characterized by his attempt to avoid traditional dualism. Thus, thinking means stepping out of mere intuition, while affect and expansion are simply products of Selbstbewusstseyn (self-consciousness, here not necessarily in the Hegelian sense of self-reflection). This, for Fichte, is the proof needed to proclaim that consciousness is not merely "a dead and

passive mirror of external objects", but that it is "something alive and powerful in itself" (Fichte, 1845, p. 546). Simultaneously, Fichte's consciousness is not an individualized consciousness, particular to only one Dasein. It is a generalized consciousness, common to all, and it can certainly be considered the forecurser to Karl Marx's concept of collective consciousness.

In ordinary experience we are under the illusion that there are objects existing outside of us. Fichte admits that an unconditional idealism cannot account for this phenomena, and it is here where he differs radically from Kant. According to Fichte there must be a "non-I" which is independent of the "I" that apprehends it. In the conscious experience this "non-I" is opposed to the finite consciousness that apprehends it. But Fichte aims to show that this "non-I" has its source in the "I" on a deeper level, on the level of the Act, i.e. in the process of reflexive thinking.

Whereas philosophers after Fichte, namely Heidegger, attribute to language the power to create the manner in which we see the world, for Fichte it is Denken (thinking) that gives external or physical apperception its form, that of an "objective Dasein" (Fichte, 1845, p. 547). However, Fichte is not insensitive to the use of language. In his assertion that objects consist primarily of two parts, that of the objective **Form**, created by thinking, and that of

Matter (Stoff), created by the contemplation of the inner capacity, Fichte appropriates two Kantian concepts. His development of that thought, however, must seem familiar to those who have followed Heidegger's etymology and may even be the origin of his concept of Gestell (scaffold), for on the recording **Der Satz der Identität**, he acknowledges several times that he had come to the term Gestell via an analogy of Gesetz, which, in turn, is derived from Setzen in the sense of "positing."

> Sodann ist uber die Form des Denkens hier überhaupt zu bemerken, dass das Denken ein **Setzen**, und zwar ein **Setzen** einem anderen gegenüber, ein **Gegensatz** ist. (Fichte, 1845, p. 547, author's emphasis)
>
> Therefore we can note at this point that thinking is a **positing**, or more specifically, a **positing** of something over and against something else, an **op-positing**.

Here, the activity of thinking is seen as a "positing" of something over and against something else, which results in an "op-posite". The relationship of the verb and the constructed noun is not as clear in English as it is in German. It is still obvious that this proposition can only lead to one end: That all opposites ensue directly from the act of thinking. This is a notion that had already been embraced and elaborated by Kant. Here, Fichte narrows the opposites down to ego and non-ego. He calls the acknowledgment of these opposites ursprüngliches Denken (primordial thinking), or das erste Denken (the first

thinking), an expression that must bring to mind Heidegger's concept of the "first naming." (It now becomes obvious that thinking for Fichte and language for Heidegger perform approximately the same function, that of producing an awareness of external objects). This parallel is further developed by Heidegger when he insists on the fact that "language speaks itself", an insistence that may very well have its roots in Fichte's assertion that "...das Denken selbst als ein selbstständiges Leben denkt aus und durch sich selbst... (...thinking itself thinks as an independent being, out of itself and through itself..., Fichte, 1845, p. 548), since at this point in the development it is not the "I" that thinks in thinking, but rather it is thinking which thinks in the Act of thinking. Thinking for Fichte is gaining awareness. Speaking for Heidegger is to answer the call of the first naming which also translates as becoming aware. The Heideggerian notion of "language speaking itself" is therefore an appropriation of Fichte's concept that "thinking thinks itself." For Heidegger the acknowledgment of the autonomy of language will conclude his search for consciousness, because for him speaking constitutes the conclusion or the result of thinking. For Fichte, on the other hand, the notion of the autonomy of thinking is merely the first step in the ladder that leads to consciousness.

Level three - Being Conscious of Consciousness

Let us follow Fichte on his path of thinking which takes us from intuition (acknowledgment of the "I") to the apperception of external objects (acknowledgment of a "non-I") to internal apperception or Reflexion (reflexive thinking characterized by the amalgamation of abstract thought and knowing that there is an "I"). On this third level the notion of freedom is introduced, a concept which is paramount in Fichte's thought. "...the same idea [of freedom] would become the radical fulcrum of Fichte's entire philosophy, by which he would overturn [Kant]" (Solomon, 1988, p. 50). Knowledge, or "knowing that" is defined as das Seyn der Freiheit (**the Being of freedom**), and this idea is of utmost importance in the development of the concept of Reflexion (reflexive thinking). On this third level, Dasein has reached the realm in which it knows that it knows. Here again, Fichte reminds us that this realm of consciousness can only come about through unity, a notion which Heidegger embraced.

In external apperception consciousness (as opposed to self-consciousness) is bound by a certain Bilden (picturing, imagining), and it is at the same time free of Being and thus aware of Being. Contrarily, in reflexive thinking, consciousness has achieved freedom from mere Bilden, which, of course, implies that it is now aware of

this Bilden. Here again, we are considering opposites, limitation and freedom. Both are prerequisites for consciousness. The freedom that this new consciousness has acquired, a freedom that it did not possess in the first stage, is that of choice:

> In der Wahrnehmung sagte das Bewusstseyn aus: Das Ding ist, und damit gut. Hier spricht das neuentstandene Bewusstseyn: es ist auch ein Bild, eine Vorstellung des Dinges. Da ferner dieses Bewusstseyn die realisirte Freiheit des Bildens ist, so spricht in Beziehung auf sich selbst das Wissen: ich kann jene Sache bilden und vorstellen oder auch nicht. (Fichte, 1845, p. 553)
>
> In apperception, consciousness states: The thing is, and that is that. Here, the newly developed consciousness says: in addition, it is an image, a representation of the thing. Furthermore, since this consciousness is the realized freedom of imagining, knowledge says in relation to itself: I can shape and imagine these things, or I can choose not to.

Dasein's freedom is a result of its ability to think independently. Freedom is defined by Fichte as the possibility to be independent of the outside world. This potential of independence was of vital importance to Heidegger, since in his epistemology, Dasein is not only able to think, but to distinguish between its own thinking and that of others. Simultaneously, Dasein, in its potentiality of independence, is capable to think about thinking.

Imagination

But now the question arises whether the apperception that preceded Reflexion was indeed an image at all. Fichte negates this possibility, since apperception is not something that has been created by **true** knowledge. He comes therefore to the conclusion that "pure apperception" without thinking is die Sache - the thing itself (Fichte, 1845, p. 553).

With this move, Fichte discards any remains of the Cartesian notion that what we "see" in apperception is merely an image of the object. Heidegger will repeatedly point this out, especially in his later lectures which deal with Vergegenwärtigung (imagination or better "making present"). Heidegger repeatedly insists that what is "in our minds" at the moment of apperception or at the moment of imagination is not a picture of the object nor a representation or a concept of the object, but the object itself, die Sache selbst (see the **Zollikoner Seminare** and the **Le Thor Seminare** of the sixties).

Fichte characterizes the third stage in the development of thinking as one capable of imagination. The mind has freed itself from the external, physical senses, and is capable of producing images by itself. Obviously the drawback is that a certain stock of apperceptions must have accumulated in order for the mind to draw on these and to give imagination free play. In this way imagination is

bound to the physical senses. It is precisely through imagination's ability to ignore the myriad of apperceptions that affect the mind constantly in everyday life that intensifies the question of choice:

> Die Einbildungskraft allein ist es, welche uns über diese Affection durch den Sinn hinwegsetzt, und uns fähig macht, uns den Eindrücken desselben zu verschliessen, indem wir unsere Wahrnehmungen davon **abziehen**, um allein dem Schaffen durch Einbildungskraft uns zu überlassen, und dadurch eine ganz andere Zeitreihe, die von der Zeitreihe des Fortgangs der sinnlichen Entwicklung durchaus frei ist, zu erschaffen. (Fichte, 1845, p. 555, author's emphasis)
>
> Imagination alone is that power which transposes us beyond this affect through the senses. It is that power which enables us to close ourselves to the impressions of the senses by letting us **subtract** our apperceptions from it. In this manner we can surrender to the power of the imagination, and create a intrinsically different time sequence, one that is free of the sequential time connected with the perpetuation of sensuous development.

Fichte's choice of words ("to subtract") indicates that he is indeed talking about a formula of consciousness, and thus betrays his scientific leanings. The idea that in imagination we are no longer bound to what is generally referred to as "real" time clearly foreshadows current research performed in the cognitive sciences (see Dennett, 1991, pp. 144-153, and pp. 115-126, where he explains the notions of Orwellian and Stalinesque revisions of memory). For Fichte the finding is proof that through this new freedom life can transcend the causality of the immediate

Being. Knowledge or consciousness, becomes a principle which, due to its freedom to abstract itself from its immediate environment, becomes Thätigkeit (action), an idea that we will also find central in Heidegger's work. Where the latter differs from Fichte, however, is in his insistence that even in the act of imagination we are bound to our bodily existence, to our Leib. The fact that Heidegger differentiates between Körper (the body as flesh and blood) and Leib (a quasi-extension of our body) does not take away from the idea that we could not imagine without the presence of our bodies. After all, if our bodies were not at a different place than the object imagined, then we could not speak of imagination at all, but would be back in the realm of apperception.

Consciousness, for Fichte, has now gained the ability to be conscious of itself. In addition to knowing objects, consciousness is now capable of knowing its own knowing, and has created the "I". By becoming conscious of itself, consciousness becomes its own object. As an object, consciousness can thus be manipulated by the subject-consciousness. This ability to manipulate gives consciousness the possibility of being independent of the external world. Hence, in Reflexion the "I" and the "knowing that I know" is combined, and the old opposites are effaced.

In his earlier works, Fichte lets the "I" be created through a Thätigkeit (activity which goes into itself, a Sich-Setzen [self-positing]). By positing itself, the "I" comes into existence as an entity that knows itself. Fichte follows this procedure as well in the **Wissenschaftslehre** 1798:

> Dadurch also, indem ich auf mich selbst handle, mich selbst setze, dass meine Tätigkeit in mich selbst zurückgeht, kommt das Ich hervor, denke ich mein Ich; und bin beides: **Ich** bin **Ich** und ich setze mich **als Ich**, erschöpft sich gegenseitig. (Fichte, 1937, p. 355).
>
> Due to the fact that I act upon myself, that I posit myself, that my activity goes back into myself, the I emerges - I think my I; and I am both: **I** am **I**, and I posit myself **as I**. These two possibilities exhaust one another.

The first question is how the activity (Tätigkeit) can know that it is, and thus posit (and know) itself. No "non-I" must be posited, or the activity would no longer constitute self-positing. This knowledge of the activity of its own Dasein is taught through intuition in which it can assure itself of itself. Intuition cannot be but the activity itself. Otherwise the knowledge represented in the intuition could not enter into positing, which is necessary if the positing is to be its own object. Therefore, intellectual intuition is described as the identity of subject and object, in which the ego can know of its positing of the positing, and can thus posit it:

> Wurde das Ich, welches handelte, nicht auch zugleich sich seiner selbst unmittelbar bewusst, dass es handle? Ich setze mich als setzend, dies ist Anschauung; ich stelle mich selbst vor als vorstellend - ich handelte und war meines Handelns mir bewusst - Es war eins und ebendasselbe... Es war eine **Identität** des Setzenden und des Gesetzten... Das Ich setzt sich **schlechthin**, d.h. ohne alle Vermittlung. Es ist zugleich Subjekt und Objekt. Nur durch das sich selbst Setzen wird das Ich - es ist nicht vorher schon Substanz - sondern sich selbst setzen als setzend ist sein Wesen, es ist eins und dasselbe; folglich ist es **sich seiner unmittelbar selbst bewusst.** (Fichte, 1937, p. 357)
>
> Did not the acting I not at the same time become immediately aware of itself as acting? I posit myself as positing, that is intuition. I imagine myself as imagining - I acted and I was aware of my actions - It was one and the same... It is an **identity** of the positing subject and the posited... The I posits itself absolutely, without mediation. It is subject and object at once. Only by positing itself does the I become. It has not always already been substance. Rather, its essence is to posit itself as positing; it is one and the same. Therefore, it is **immediately conscious of itself.**

Fichte calls the "intuition of the 'I' acting in itself" an intellectual one and explains that only this intellectual act makes **imagination** possible. If an activity does not know of itself, it is not a conscious activity, and it follows that that which is posited in it cannot be conscious. "This identity is absolute, an identity without which imagination is not possible" (Fichte, 1937, p. 357). The fact that for Fichte imagination is a product solely of the intellectual act points to the existence of a "pure mind" in his philosophy. Heidegger vehemently rejected this sort of orthodox German Idealism. For him, there is no such

thing as a "pure mind", only "being-in-the-world", the bodily involvement with things around us. He deals with the problem of imagination in that he insists that Vergegenwärtigung (representation) is by no means a purely mental act, as is generally assumed. Rather, representation or imagination is bound by the body. He goes as far as insisting that the presence of the body is a prerequisite for imagination, for if the body were not "here", but in the same place as the object imagined, representation could not mean what it has come to stand for.

After Fichte has created the possibility that the "I" posits itself as positing itself, he must now explain how it can be that it does so. The positing-itself must define itself as an "I", something which can only happen via a concept (Begriff) of "I". Only the abstract **Begriff** will make the object exist as an object, a notion that Fichte seems to have inherited from Kant. Fichte addresses the question with the hint that it still seems as if the "I" can only posit itself if it already has a previously posited object, towards which it can direct its activity:

> Um aber das Ich denken, auf dasselbe handeln zu können, muss man sich es ja schon als gesetzt voraus denken; muss ich ein Gesetztsein von meinem Setzen voraus setzen. Dieser Einwurf ...will so viel sagen: Wie kommt der **Begriff** des Ich zu Stande? (Fichte, 1937, p. 357)
>
> But in order to think the I, in order to act upon it, it must be envisioned as already being posited; I must

> presuppose a being posited of by positing. This interjection ...means: How does the **concept** of the I come about?

Understanding must stand over and against (opposite) that which is understood and fixate it as a whole while in a state of repose (in Ruhe). This Ruhe seems to be analogous to Heidegger's state of awaiting where Dasein must remain open to the phenomena that will present themselves:

> In dieser Ruhe nun wird uns das **Setzen** der Aktivität zu einem **Gesetzten** - zu einem **Produkt**, zu einem **Begriff**, d.h. wenn man dieselbe Tätigkeit zuerst als ein Nichthandeln, also fixiert, in Ruhe sich denkt... so entsteht daraus ein Produkt oder der Begriff des Ichs, der sich bloss denken aber nicht anschauen lässt, denn nur Tätigkeit als handelnd ist Anschauung, diese aber ist nicht möglich ohne sich zugleich das Entgegengesetzte - dieselbe zuvor als ruhend - zu denken, d.h. ohne einen Begriff. Beide sind also immer zugleich miteinander verbunden - Begriff und Anschauung, sie fallen ins Eins zusammen. (Fichte, 1937, p. 358)
>
> In this state of repose the **positing** of the activity becomes a **posited** - a **product**, a **concept**. If the same activity is first thought as a non-acting, as fixed, as in a state of repose ...then from it develops a product, or the concept of I. This concept can only be thought, not intuited, for only activity as acting is intuition. However, this acting activity is not possible without thinking simultaneously the opposite - activity in a state of repose, without a concept. Both are always connected to each other - concept and intuition collapse into One.

Apparently Fichte thinks that activity as a process is given through intuition, whereas as a whole and as an object (in the state of repose) it is given through the

abstract concept (Begriff). Both intuition and concept are necessary for the activity to posit itself. Intuition is necessary so that activity will know itself. The concept is necessary so that activity can define itself as going into itself, as an "I". Concept and intuition must be one. While activity is active, it must know itself and it must know itself as an "I" and posit itself - otherwise it does not posit anything or it doesn't posit itself as an entity going back into itself. Both moments of the activity's knowing-itself are conceptualized as a temporal sequence.

Fichte's Conception of Time

While Fichte insists on the freedom of imagination, he vehemently denies that this same freedom applies to the concept of time. Time, for him is a given, not something that we posit. Time enters our consciousness by its own force. It is not something we create. We have no choice but to acknowledge it as something that exists independently of our thinking, as an entity in which our thinking takes place in order to give us our notions of "before" and "after" which we clearly entertain. Time is seen by Fichte in Kantian terms. It is one of the **forms** (things-in-themselves) because the different acts of the ego occur in such a manner as to be **dependent** on each other in a definite order.

It becomes vital to acknowledge that in this case independence and freedom are not to be used interchangeably. Independence is seen by Fichte as a given fact, a thing-in-itself over which consciousness has no power and which it cannot manipulate. All it can do is accept the fact that something exists independently of itself. Freedom, on the other hand, involves a will. This will is synonymous with the choices that an individual makes when it comes to the different modes of consciousness. While Dasein may well be able to exist in a pre-reflective (and pre-reflexive) state, it must exert a will in order to reach the realm of Reflexion and of abstract thought. This concept of the will seems to foreshadow Husserl's notion of intentionality in which an awareness of an object can only come about if consciousness makes the choice to focus on that object.

Where Fichte's account of freedom becomes problematic is in his insistence that the newly created "I" is in a position to choose between mere intuition (defined as pre-reflexive state), apperception or awareness (which implies paying attention to an object), and to not pay attention. Whereas there is indeed a choice between the latter two possibilities, it seems that the first is necessarily lost once consciousness has reached this higher realm, once the "I" is established. The "I" may be under the illusion that it can choose the innocent pre-reflexive

state. However, as soon as it is aware of that possibility of choice, it has already chosen and therefore lost the state of innocence (unawareness). If we develop this thought further, it seems that we can never characterize the act of learning as a creation of choice, since the mode of consciousness in which we found ourselves before the learning took place, must necessarily be lost.

The Logos

Intellectual intuition, the third stage in the development for Fichte, is composed of Sein and of Freiheit. These terms can not continue to be seen in their separate existence if we insist on employing them to define consciousness. Rather, they have to have undergone a Verschmelzung, a process of melting. External and internal apperception cannot simply be added in order to constitute consciousness. They must be seen as constituting, in Heideggerian terms, a primordial unity, the pre-socratic Logos:

> Es ist nicht die Aufgabe die, dass du bedenken sollest, du **wissest** von dem **Gegenstande**, und nun dein Bewusstseyn (eben **vom** Gegenstande) als ein subjectives, und den Gegenstand, als ein objectives, begreifest, sondern dass du innigst lebendig erfassest, beides sey Eins, und sey ein sich **Durchdringen:** und erst hinterher, und zufolge dieses Durchdringens mögest du auch beides unterscheiden. (Fichte, 1845, p. 19)
>
> The task is not to think that you **know** about the **object**, and thus understand your consciousness

> (precisely **of** the object) as a subjective, and the object as an objective. Rather, you should grasp in a fervently alive manner that both is One, constituting a **permutation**. Only afterward, and by virtue of this permutation, may you differentiate the two.

Fichte's dismissal of Cartesian dualism becomes obvious in this passage. According to him, consciousness can only be discovered through the insistence that the antithesis between subject and object does not exist. This insistence must be accompanied by abstraction and reflexive thinking (Reflexion).

The Unity of reflexive thinking

Fichte defines Reflexion as being composed of self-knowledge, self-awareness of being bound by external objects, and, above all, of thinking. This thinking, in turn, is defined by our Dasein, a term Heidegger will appropriate in his writings. Heidegger's Dasein is characterized by its being alongside objects in the world. This, presented by Fichte, constitutes an object in itself. In other words: "I" is aware of itself as something that exists. Through the unity of these three components - **self-knowledge**, **awareness of external objects**, and **thinking** - consciousness liberates itself from a mere knowing that it knows, and develops instead into an independent Being which is at the same time just as much a product of thinking as are external objects. Without the thinking that thinking

does, the "I" would not exist. Or, as Heidegger will put it: "Das Denken denkt" (Thinking thinks).

Reflexion does bring with it the perils of infinite regression which gives us the illusion that the "organic" unity of knowledge was a matter of uniting different parts. Fichte reminds us that what we are able to grasp in our knowledge is necessarily a unity, but that as soon as we grasp it, it splits into separate parts, each of which we can again grasp as a unity, and which splits again. The only way we can avoid this regression is by not attending to it ("dass du dich nicht weiter darum kümmerst", Fichte, 1845, p. 21). In this way, knowledge must not be seen as a uniting, since this would imply that there were separate parts in the first place which could be united, but that it is a Verschmelzung, suggesting that a separation into its components would require some effort. As Fichte sees it, we exert this effort in philosophical reflection. In our everyday activities we are necessarily unaware of the possible separation of knowledge. It is precisely into this realm of unawareness that Fichte tries to probe.

Fichte's concept of **Verschmelzung** has its roots in the Greek Logos. While he himself does not make specific reference to his philosophical heritage, it seems that Heidegger's elaboration on the Logos clarifies Fichte's concept of the primordial unity. "[Der Logos] ist niemals **dialektisch** bestimmt, das heisst als Gegenüberstehen

ständiger Gegensätze." ([the logos] is never determined dialectically, that is to say as a op-positing of constant opposites, Heidegger, 1986b, p. 277). With this statement Heidegger clearly follows in Fichte's footsteps in the sense that he, too, rejects the Hegelian dialectic which concentrates on the dissolution of opposites, opposites which must have been posited against each other before such a dissolution can take place in the form of the synthesis (Schacht, 1975, p. 33). As regards Fichte's suggestion that we do "not attend" to the regression, it brings to mind Heidegger's insistence on the "unaware" consciousness in which we are immersed in our everyday coping with things around us.

When Fichte says that in order to avoid regression, we must not attend to the form of knowledge, or rather of reflection, he is foreshadowing the Heideggerian notion of "letting go", implying not a denial of the existence of reflection, but rather a bracketing activity. The fact that on the third stage philosophical reflection can be bracketed by "letting go" or by not attending to it, leads us back to our everyday mode of being, or, as Heidegger would put it, lets us return to Dasein's being-in-the-world, and to its concernful employment of things present-to-hand. According to Fichte, abstraction or philosophical reflection is meaningless in itself. Meaning is created only when we incorporate the everyday "I" into it, which

necessarily implies that we bracket philosophical reflection for the moment. In order to clarify the difference that Fichte sees, we can summarize that reflective thinking is characterized by philosophical abstraction. This implies the bracketing of the everydayness, (compare Husserl's epoché) whereas reflexive thinking implies bringing abstractions back to the "I", i.e. the bracketing of reflective thinking (Heidegger's Being-in-the-world).

If Reflexion creates indeed a "doppeltes Wissen" (a double or two-fold knowledge, Fichte, 1845, p. 28), one subjective, the other objective, neither in itself would constitute knowledge. If we visualize form and matter of knowledge and imagine them as lines, we could see the "ideal" line defined by freedom, whose content is Beleuchtung (illumination). The "real" line is defined by Being, and has as its content Aufklärung (clarification or clearing, Fichte, 1845, p. 29). Should these lines have different directions, should they never intersect, then knowledge would be impossible. If an intersection does occur, it would seem that we can define the point of juncture (der Punkt) as the moment in which absolute knowledge takes place. At the risk of overinterpreting the evidence, it would appear that this point of juncture constitutes the Heideggerian idea of Lichtung (clearing). Heidegger's choice of words is reminiscent of Fichte's play

with terms of light. The notion of the meeting point brings to mind not only the Lichtung, but the Augenblick (moment) as well, a term employed by Heidegger to define a temporal point in which the past and the future "presence" themselves. The semantic relationship between Fichte's "illumination" and his "clarification" is not as readily apparent in English as it is in German. Nevertheless it produces an **image of light**, since even the adjective "clear" can have connotations in definite opposition to "dark". If we chose another translation of Aufklärung, that of "clearing", we soon come to realize that it can be employed spatially, in the sense of clearing away an obstruction. Maybe Fichte had this in mind, since the line of Aufklärung is, in his own words, that which is produced by freedom. It can be seen as the act of clearing away the obstruction of being bound, of finding itself limited by the physical senses.

The ultimate ground of these limitations cannot be discovered by theorizing. It is here where Fichte disagrees with Kant. Whereas Kant stays true to the tradition of Idealism by insisting on the capabilities and powers of the ego to form the world, Fichte assumes the existence of a principle that works within us without our being aware of it. This principle he calls the pure or infinite ego, a unifying force that connects our different modes of being. This principle cannot be found in the finite or empirical

ego, which is merely our personal "I", and which is characterized by our everyday "common" consciousness, concerned with individual products and acts. While this ordinary consciousness may well perceive certain limits imposed on our thinking and on our knowledge. It is only through abstraction and philosophical reflection that we can reach the point where we are capable of an awareness of that which is limited. In other words, in order to pry open the realm of the pure ego, which Fichte defines as the primitive activity of consciousness, we have to exert a spiritual energy that differs from our everyday being, or as Heidegger would call it, from our being-in-the-world. Although being-in-the-world constitutes the most original mode of consciousness, we can only come to know it by a different mode, one that presupposes it.

Fichte and Language

Fichte claims that our view of the world is formed in its totality by ordinary consciousness. He simultaneously posits that this world-view is the product of an involuntary activity of the mind of which we are not aware. This activity works in conformity to rules, but Fichte's rules differ from the Kantian categories in that he denies the exclusivity of the categories. Fichte suggests that we can supply different sets of concepts, or to use more modern terminology, are able to operate in alternative

conceptual frameworks. He rejects the determinism of the Kantian categories, but he does not deny the existence of limitations, which operate according to certain laws.

> Die Regel dieser Beschränkung ist der Begriff - des Objects der äusseren Wahrnehmung nemlich, welches reproducirt wird. [Gieb mir einen **Begriff** von der mir unbekannten) Sache, heisst, gieb mir die Regel, nach der ich mir die Sache im freien Denken construiren kann.] (Fichte, 1845, p. 568, author's emphasis).
>
> The rule of this limitation is the concept- the concept of the object of external apperception which is being reproduced. [Giving me a **concept** of the thing (unknown to me) means giving me the rule according to which I can construct the thing for myself in free thought].

Without explicitly stating so, Fichte addresses the limitations, or in this case, the powers of language. In English this is not immediately evident, since the only possible renderings of Begriff with "idea" or "notion" do not necessarily convey the sense of anything verbal. "Idea" or "notion" may just as well define a spiritual entity. In German, the word Begriff necessarily implies a verbal expression. A Begriff can be an audible or written form of an idea, not just the abstract "idea" itself.

Although the notion of the "idea itself" seems Kantian in its formulation, unfortunately it has never been considered by Kant. It seems that if there is a thing-in-itself, then there should as well be a subject-in-itself or an abstraction-in-itself. If this were

the case, could we not assume that then the abstraction would stand on its own, and could never be brought into objectification?

When Fichte suggests that giving the Begriff implies giving the rule, not only does he suggest that a definition of an object is necessary for activating the imagination, but that it is language which makes imagination, and therefore knowledge, possible. After all, if we follow in Heidegger's footsteps and attempt a personal etymology, we come to realize that by taking apart the word Begriff we come upon greifen (to grasp, which, even in English can mean to understand). Greifen is the German term for literally grasping, taking hold of something. This taking hold again shows up in begreifen (to understand), which brings us full circle, since it is itself the verbal form of the noun Begriff. After this digression, Fichte's exposition of the necessity of thinking for the production of imagination becomes clearer.

It has already been established that Fichte considers intuition-the preconceptual state preceding apperception - to be immediate consciousness. His description of intuition enlightens the notion of the givenness of consciousness: Conceptual self-definition has to join with mere intuition in order to create an "I". In his **Wissenschaftslehre** of 1798, Fichte develops the metaphor of the eye. Here it seems that the metaphor is directly applied to the

intuitive character of the "I". This is plausible, because in intellectual intuition, a positing is positing itself. Such a positing is a knowing that knows itself. If it is interpreted as intuition, it can be described adequately as an eye, whose view is directed towards itself.

> Denn nach paragr. 1 ist Bewusstsein **ein sich selbst idealiter setzen:** ein Sehen, und zwar Sich sehen... In dieser Bemerkung liegt der Grund aller Irrtümer anderer philosophischer Systeme, selbst des Kantischen. Sie betrachten das Ich als einen Spiegel, in welchem ein Bild sich abspiegelt; nun aber sieht bei ihnen der Spiegel nicht selbst, es wird daher ein zweiter Spiegel für jenen Spiegel erforderlich usf. Dadurch aber wird das Anschauen nicht erklärt, sondern nur ein Abspiegeln... Das Ich in der Wissenschaftslehre hingegen ist kein Spiegel, sondern **ein Auge;** es ist ein sich abspiegelnder Spiegel, ist Bild von sich; durch **sein eigenes sehen wird das Auge** (die Intelligenz) **sich selbst zum Bilde.** (Fichte, 1834, p. 377)
>
> For, according to paragraph 1, consciousness is a **positing of oneself in a more ideal fashion:** a seeing, a seeing oneself... In this observation lies the reason for all errors of other philosophical systems, even the Kantian. They consider the I as a mirror, in which an image is mirrored. In those systems the mirror does not see, therefore a second mirror is needed for this mirror, etc. Thereby, what is explained, is not intuition, but a mirroring... The I of the Science of Knowledge, on the contrary, is not a mirror, but an **eye.** It is an image of itself. **The eye** (intelligence), through **its own seeing, becomes its own image.**

Fichte suggests the eye as a metaphor for the "I" because the Kantian mirror, which can only be reflection of an "Other", cannot explain the intuition, the "looking at". It is possible that Fichte choses the eye as the sign of intellectual intuition because it is the reason that Dasein

can come into a relationship with itself by seeing, even if not yet in a conceptual mode. Perception, for Fichte is a process which culminates in conception, the product of the process. Analogous to this conception is the Heideggerian notion that knowing is the process the outcome of which is knowledge. For Heidegger, as for Fichte, the mode of the knowing (process) modifies the knowledge (product). The state in which the unmediated "I" finds itself during the process of knowing or learning will necessarily determine the quality and the form of the knowledge that the "I" produces. As far as Fichte is concerned, the same holds true for the creation of concepts, since the precept (process) affects the form of the concept (product).

In the **Wissenschaftslehre** of 1801 this application of the metaphor of the eye becomes even clearer. Fichte now constructs consciousness from a dichotomy of Being and Freedom, which transcends and illuminates Being. This Being is not outside of Dasein, it belongs to it. Knowledge is a for-itself, in which Dasein becomes transparent for itself. Reflexion is now called Absolute Reflexion, probably because Dasein is reflected in it as a whole, and with this activity steps into Dasein. Fichte now describes intellectual intuition as the act of reflexive thinking:

> Eben in dem Mittelpunkte, d.i. in dem Akte des Reflektierens steht die intellektuelle Anschauung und vereinigt beides, und in beiden die Nebenglieder beider. (Fichte, 1845, p. 35)

> Precisely in the center, in the act of reflecting, intellectual intuition is located and unites both. In both, it unites the secondary members of both.

Reflexive thinking is the absolute form of knowledge which is called "an in itself bright, posited, and clear eye" (Fichte, 1845, p. 37). Now intellectual intuition has taken a central position in Fichte' system, and it is considered the highest point to which one must climb. Fichte stresses the self-relation of the gaze when he says that the eye is not closed in itself. The eye "sees nothing outside of itself, but it sees itself" (Fichte, 1845, p. 38).

The Return to the Unmediated "I"

Re-tracing Fichte's path to consciousness, we come to see that the first level is that of intuition, on which Dasein acknowledges itself as an "I". This "I" is here not yet characterized as an "I" that distinguishes itself from a "non-I". The ability to make this differentiation enters in the second stage. It is defined by the apperception of phenomena, and by the illusion that there are entities which exist independently of us (things-in-themselves). Evidently this is an idea that Fichte inherited from Kant. Here the "I" must necessarily have a different form than it had in the preconceptual level, since it is in part shaped by these outside influences. Once the leap is made from

mere apperceptions of external objects to the abstraction of these objects via concepts (Begriffe) and ideas, the third level in the development of consciousness is reached. The "I" is now capable of philosophical thought, of reflection. However, the path that culminates in intellectual intuition is not completed until this capability of abstracting is brought back and united with the mode of Dasein on the first level, that of intuition.

Having reached the third level and being able to entertain abstract concepts, does not guarantee that knowledge becomes meaningful for the "I". The achievement of philosophical reflection is indeed a prerequisite of consciousness. Consciousness as Fichte attempted to define it is only reached once the capability of abstracting has turned back into itself, turned back into the most basic form of the "I", defined by intuition. The activity of reflexive thinking is the missing link through which the circle can be completed. While on Fichte's third stage, abstraction is possible, it becomes meaningful only after it has been brought back to the stage of intuition, where it has to be "melted" with the most basic awareness of the "I". Without linking it to the personal, intuitive "I", abstraction must remain outside of me, must remain meaningless.

This turning back into itself is a concept that has been appropriated and elaborated by Heidegger in his notion

of Zurückgehen (returning) to that which is always already, the unconscious knowledge that "I" am "I". Fichte's concept of the passive mode of the "I" which awaits abstractions in a state of repose (Ruhe), is born out of this turning back. The turning back is not to be considered a fourth stage, rather it is the process, the activity (Thätigkeit) by which knowledge is appropriated in the act of personalizing it and therefore rendering it meaningful. Reflexive thinking is therefore characterized by the activity of applying knowledge to "myself" and to who the "I" is in everyday life (Fichte's intuition).

It seems, therefore, that the quality of Fichte's "state of repose", the "waiting for the apparition of abstractions", determines the quality of the abstraction. While in philosophical reflection the form of the abstraction may be considered objectively, it becomes subjective through the activity of turning back. The quality of the "I" at any given point of "repose" or of "awaiting" is itself a determining factor as to the quality of the abstraction entertained on the stage of philosophical reflection.

It is not surprising that Fichte was enchanted with the writings of Rousseau who concluded that the first six years in the life of a child are the determining ones, and that anything happening after these initial years no longer matters. We may characterize the activity of learning as

the activity of bringing abstraction back to the level of intuition. Beforehand, we must realize that the determining factor is the quality of the "I" which must already be developed to a certain degree in order to sort out and personalize the abstractions that are being brought back to it. The limitations of knowledge are inspired by the limitations of the **ways** of knowing. All later knowing is but reorganization and rearrangement. If the "I" has only a limited stock of organizational possibilities available, then the knowledge it will produce will necessarily be limited as well. If, on the other hand, the "I" has a large capacity to arrange the abstractions that besiege it, the knowledge that ensues will be broader. Naturally, this poses serious problems as far as learning is concerned. Rousseau had already acknowledged the fact that after a certain age any sort of instruction could not result in an increase of knowledge. In Fichtean terms, this means that the "I" in its developing stages is dependent on input, is formed by abstract thought. At the moment of learning or knowing, however, the mind must do with the form and capacity it has developed so far. At this point, its capacity will determine the form that the knowledge will take on.

Knowledge, for Fichte, takes on an aesthetic form once it returns and incorporates intuition. In this process, the abstraction can only take on a certain predetermined form

because of the form that the "I" has at this point. The query of how the "I" has assumed this form must be answered similarly to the query of how knowledge of external objects is at all possible. According to Fichte, it seems that the knowledge that the "I" has of itself must develop parallel to the knowledge that it has of external objects. This implies that the "I" itself must pass through the three stages described above in order to reach the state where it can simultaneously influence and be influenced by the abstractions that it awaits.

To summarize, we must acknowledge that for both Fichte and his predecessor Kant the limitations of thinking are biologically determined. The major difference between these two thinkers must be the fact that for Kant the "I" is unequivocally autonomous, whereas for Fichte this autonomy is not total. Fichte insists that it is not the "I" that does the thinking. It is the thinking, the Act or process, that does the thinking. Heidegger appropriated this particular aspect of Fichte's philosophy more than a century later.

CHAPTER II

THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE INDIVIDUAL MIND

Part 1: Hegel - The Beginning of a Collective Consciousness

Having come to an understanding of the development of the individual "I" in Chapter I, we are now in a position to consider the possibility of gathering and organizing these diverse egos into an all-encompassing concept - that of Hegel's collective consciousness. To use a Kantian metaphor, the manifold of individual egos must be synthesized in order for Hegel to be able to arrive at the stipulation of a general consciousness whithin which the individual mind can be situated.

The transition from Kant and Fichte to Hegel is best characterized as a move from a purely personal to a universal subject. For Kant and Fichte, there is one subject per person, (Solomon, 1987, p. 13) and that conscious self is, simultaneously, a formal necessity. It is the unifying principle which precedes any form of consciousness. While Kant considered this unifying principle as being in space and time, Hegel's main criticism of Kant is the fact that the thinking self imposes these forms on any possible experience and must therefore precede even the conception of time and space.

For Kant the vehicle of all knowledge is the Transcendental Ego. For Fichte it is the Absolute Ego. Both are clearly reminiscent of Descartes' cogito and both are limited by their individual scope. Hegel, however, posits the concept of Geist as general consciousness that is common to everyone. While his philosophy stresses the unimportance of the individual, this is not to say that he denies the existence of individual differences, but, for the sake of determining how it is possible that we come to knowledge, he suspends the differences between individual minds. He brackets the mind, so to speak, in order to theorize about knowledge in a philosophical sense. This gives his philosophy the impersonal and general overtones that Kierkegaard and Heidegger will eventually reject on the basis that the Hegelian Geist is too objective and too abstract. In short, it is not concerned with the concepts that inform the lives of everyday people.

The discussion of Hegel's concept of Geist gains importance once we acknowledge that it is this Geist which constitutes the foundation of all knowledge. Hegel, like Heidegger after him, tries to probe the realm behind consciousness. The Geist, although located in that realm as the unifying force, is not a thing or a substance. It is a **unifying, thoroughgoing activity,** (Tätigkeit), reminiscent of Kant's synthesis and Fichte's Act, capable of gathering the manifold representations or impressions of intuition

and thereby creating the universal concepts of reason and of understanding. While Hegel's Geist is necessarily presupposed by any kind of experience, it cannot be experienced as such in any of these experiences. In this respect, his Geist parallels Kant's transcendental ego. Hegel removes himself from the Kantian theory, however, in his insistence that Geist is truly universal. It is a general consciousness, and therefore different from Kant's transcendental ego, since it does not take as its basis the claim that through its unifying activity it generates one ego in each individual.

The System

In the **Phänomenologie des Geistes**, Hegel suggests a redefinition of Kant's critical philosophy. In the introduction, Hegel challenges the presuppositions of Kant's critique. He expresses an uneasiness with Kant's claim that various kinds of knowledge are not equally reliable, and that we might choose the wrong kind. The Kantian critique is founded on the assumption that knowledge can lead either to error or to truth. Kant's goal is to show us the right direction. Simultaneously, his Critique must assume that its own definitions of knowledge and truth must be true in order to appeal to them. It seems that Hegel's criticism of the Kantian Critique is valid, since the Critique defines its own criteria of truth-

measurement without examining their validity. His main concern is the fact that the Kantian Critique makes no assumptions about what should or should not constitute knowledge.

In the **Phänomenologie**, Hegel's main project is to demonstrate that philosophy expresses the highest truth about reality (ontology). His philosophy is a reconciliation with reality. It is in stark contrast with Kant's subjective searching and the sharp distinction that he and Fichte had proposed between the ideal and the real. Contrary to philosophers before him, Hegel sees no value in refuting previous or contradictory philosophical systems.

> ... so ist es nicht abzusehen, ... dass diese Furcht zu irren schon der Irrtum selbst ist. In der Tat setzt sie etwas, und zwar manches, als Wahrheit voraus. ... Sie setzt nämlich **Vorstellungen** von dem **Erkennen** als einem **Werkzeuge** und **Medium**, auch **einen Unterschied unserer selbst von diesem Erkennen** voraus.
> (Hegel, 1987, p. 66)

> ... it is unavoidable ... that this fear of erring is the initial error itself. As a matter of fact, this fear presupposes something, indeed a great deal, as truth. ... It presupposes **ideas** of **knowledge** as an **instrument** and a **medium**, and it presupposes a **distinction of ourselves from this knowledge.**

Hegel, in contrast to Kant, does not see traditional skepticism as a problem. He accuses Kant of an error in his distinction between objects of knowledge and things-in-themselves. He argues that by thinking any thought to its conclusion, the thinker will reach the Absolute. This

applies to philosophical systems as well as to the "naive" attitude prescribed to by the "common individual."

> Denn ist das Erkennen ein Werkzeug, sich des absoluten Wesens zu bemächtigen, so fällt sogleich auf, dass die Anwendung eines Werkzeugs auf eine Sache sie vielmehr nicht lässt, wie sie für sich ist, sondern eine Formierung und Veränderung mit ihr vornimmt. ... Wir gebrauchen ... ein Mittel, welches unmittelbar das Gegenteil seines Zwecks hervorbringt; oder das Widersinnige ist vielmehr, dass wir uns überhaupt eines Mittels bedienen. ... Sollte das Absolute durch das Werkzeug uns nur überhaupt näher gebracht werden, ohne etwas an ihm zu verändern, ... so würde es wohl, wenn es nicht an und für sich schon bei uns wäre und sein wollte, dieser List spotten; denn eine List wäre in diesem Falle das Erkennen, da es durch sein vielfaches Bemühen ganz etwas anderes zu treiben sich die Miene gibt, als nur die unmittelbare und somit mühelose Beziehung hervorzubringen. (Hegel, 1987, pp. 65/66)
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> If knowledge is a tool used to take possession of absolute reality, it becomes obvious at once that the application of a tool to an object does not leave it as it is for itself, but gets formed and changed. ... We use ... a means which immediately produces the opposite of its purpose; or rather, the absurdity lies in the fact that we employ a means at all. ... Should, through the tool, the absolute be brought closer to us without being changed, ... it would defy such a trick if it were not and did not want to be with us in and for itself in the first place. In such a case knowledge would be a trick, since through its manifold effort it would pretend to do something very different than just to produce an immediate and therefore effortless relation.

In this passage from the Introduction, Hegel claims that the Absolute is with us from the very beginning, and that the process of thinking can only make us aware of that which has always already been in the background of consciousness, the Absolute. Whereas Kant and Fichte had

presented Absolute Knowledge as the ideal to be pursued by man, Hegel finds it in the innermost nucleus of everything. It seems that recollection plays an important role for Hegel, although he does not explicitly speak of Er-innerung until the last pages of the **Phänomenologie** (Verene, 1985, p. 3). When he does mention recollection, it clearly has platonic overtones.

The unity of Being and Thinking

According to Hegel, the Kantian system of thought neglected to establish a standard (Masstab) against which any judgement could be measured. Hegel asserts that such a standard is always already present in a thinking individual. Discerning truth from falsity, the individual must already believe that any thought can be true only under certain conditions. Accepting these conditions, he has already had such a standard of judgement. Thus, even ordinary knowledge, rooted in the natural attitude (as opposed to philosophical reflection), already contains the Absolute, and can illuminate it by following the ladder to philosophical reflection which Hegel will furnish in the course of the **Phänomenologie**. The image of the ladder clarifies Hegel's intention not to dismiss the natural attitude or other philosophical positions, but to offer a series of transformations through which these other attitudes can be related to philosophy:

> Die Wissenschaft von ihrer Seite verlange vom Selbstbewusstsein, dass es in diesen Äther sich erhoben habe, um mit ihr und in ihr leben zu konnen und zu leben. Umgekehrt hat das Individuum das Recht zu fordern, dass die Wissenschaft ihm die Leiter wenigstens zu diesem Standpunkt reiche. Sein Recht gründet sich auf seine Absolute Selbständigkeit, die es in jeder Gestalt seines Wissens zu besitzen weiss, denn in jeder, sei sie von der Wissenschaft anerkannt oder nicht, und der Inhalt sei welcher er wolle, ist die absolute Form zugleich oder hat die **unmittelbare Gewissheit** seiner selbst; und, wenn dieser Ausdruck vorgezogen wurde, damit unbedingtes **Sein**. (Hegel, 1987, pp. 26/27)
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> Science on its part would demand from self-consciousness that it has risen to this high ether in order to live with and in it [science]. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science hand him the ladder to help him to reach at least this position. His right is based on his Absolute Independence which he knows he possesses in every phase of his knowledge, because in each phase - be it accepted by science or not, be the content what it may - the absolute knowledge is contained or has the his right as an individual is the absolute and final form, i.e. he is the **immediate certainty** of self, and, Should the expression be preferred, he is unconditional Being.

In this passage, the demand has been made that the **Phänomenologie** must demonstrate to natural consciousness that the absolute standpoint is already within its structures, even if it is unrecognized and preconceptual. Hegel sets as his task the demonstration that a unity exists between the two opposed standpoints of natural consciousness and philosophy. It is an idea that will figure prominently a century later in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

Hegel demonstrates this unity via the dialectic. The dialectic of Geist is a process of discovery, not of ultimate proof. He rejected the philosophy of reflection because it could not rise to the idea of the absolute unity of subject and object. Contrarily, the Hegelian dialectic, recognizes the opposites. Therefore, the Absolute is not a dead concept, a thing to be reached or not. It is a process, it is life, it is spirit. Here again we must look toward Heidegger to find the continuation of this thought. Heidegger thought Hegel's thought to its conclusion, and came to the understanding that any kind of knowing is a discovery, or, to put it in his own words, a presencing of that which has always already been there but has been unthought. For Heidegger, ultimate knowledge consists of returning to the unthought realm, returning to our everyday existence in the world through the act of Er-innerung. His emphasis is on the process, on the continuity of the different forms of thinking. Contrarily, various forms of knowledge that Hegel discusses oppose one another. For objective knowledge, subjectivity is untrue. For subjective knowledge, objectivity is untrue. However, if the objective knowledge proves untrue, this does not prove that it is a wrong way to define truth. It only proves its failure to bring into consciousness an object independent of subjective conditions.

The Hegelian Dialectic

In order to get a grasp of the Hegelian dialectic, we must first come to an understanding of its chief element, the notion of negation. If the object which consciousness apprehends (der Gegenstand für-es, the object **for** consciousness) reveals the object-**in-itself** (der Gegenstand an-sich) - or, similarly, if the object-in-itself is known - then, according to Hegel, knowledge is true. If the object-in-itself is not known, then knowledge is untrue. The negation implied in this statement seems to affect not the object, but rather the consciousness that contemplates it. For Hegel, this is not the case. The object which we apprehend is not endowed with some truth that we may call the object-in-itself and which we may or may not know. Consciousness takes the truth to be the object-in-itself:

> Der Gegenstand scheint zwar für [das Bewusstsein] nur so zu sein, wie es ihn weiss; es scheint gleichsam nicht dahinterkommen zu können wie er, **nicht für dasselbe**, sondern wie er **an sich** ist, und also auch sein Wissen nicht an ihm prüfen zu können. Allein gerade darin, dass es überhaupt schon von einem Gegenstand weiss, ist schon der Unterschied vorhanden, dass **ihm** etwas das **An-sich**, ein anderes Moment aber das Wissen, oder das Sein des Gegenstandes **für das** Bewusstsein ist. (Hegel, 1987, p. 74)
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> The object seems to be [for consciousness] only the way it knows it; consciousness does not seem to be able to find out how the object is - **not for consciousness** - but **in itself**, and it can therefore not test its knowledge in relation to the object. Alone in the fact that it knows about an object at all, the difference becomes clear that **for**

> **consciousness** the **in-itself** is one thing, but another element is the knowledge or the Being of an object **for consciousness.**

Negation is defined and limited by what it negates. It does not prove the untruth of other kinds of knowledge which may define truth in another manner. It seems that the Heideggerian concept of Privation has its origin in the Hegelian negation, for, as Heidegger points out repeatedly, privation does not imply the total absence of content, but that it limits, and to a degree, re-defines the content. The fact that Hegel posits a difference in the two modes of consciousness, and supposes that consciousness is aware of that difference, paves the way for Heidegger. The latter, in his insistence that Dasein is always already familiar with the things present-at-hand, suggests that consciousness knows of its different modes, and that, therefore, we need to ask the question of Being with Dasein as our starting point.

Every concept is limited, and, once it is logically thought through, it passes over into its opposite, its negation. Through this negation a new positive is created. Negation (or Privation for Heidegger) negates only the definite content, not all content of a concept. In the process, a new concept comes into force which is related to the previous one. It is related to the old concept by

memory, by recollection, and it is thus richer than the old one.

In the **Phänomenologie**, Hegel provides an explanation of what he understands by the dialectic movement. If the process of thinking a thought to its conclusion brings the thinker to an awareness that the object-in-itself (der Gegenstand an-sich) is in actuality only the object-for consciousness (der Gegenstand für-es), then consciousness has touched both itself and the object. The object must now be seen in a different light. Hegel links the dialectic with experience, since it was through the experience of thinking that the object apprehended changed for the thinker:

> Diese **dialektische** Bewegung, welche das Bewusstsein an ihm selbst, sowohl an seinem Wissen als an seinem Gegenstande ausübt, **insofern ihm der neue wahre Gegenstand** daraus **entspringt**, ist eigentlich dasjenige, was **Erfahrung** genannt wird. ... Dieser neue Gegenstand enthält die Nichtigkeit des ersten, er ist die über ihn gemachte Erfahrung. (Hegel, 1987, p. 75)
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> This **dialectical** movement, which consciousness performs upon itself as well as upon its knowledge and its objects - **as far as the new, true object originates from it** - is really that which is called **experience**. ... This new object contains the negation of the first object; it is the experience that has been made about it.

Here, again, negation (or the Heideggerian Privation) is not to be seen as the untruth of the object as it was first apprehended. On the contrary, without the negation the object as it now appears, could not be apprehended in this

new manner. The new object has been produced by a Umkehrung des Bewusstseins (a reversal of consciousness). Similarly, it was our doing that has appropriated the negation and transformed the apprehended object.

Level one - Sense-Certainty

In the first three chapters of the **Phänomenologie**, Hegel discusses three forms of consciousness. While each form of consciousness contains within itself a certain philosophical analysis of knowledge, a certain philosophical view, together they represent the ladder that leads from the natural attitude to philosophical reflection or Absolute Knowledge. Different from Kant and Fichte, Hegel stresses the importance of the object. Kant insisted on inner knowledge as the arbitor of any kind of knowledge. Hegel suggests that the object is taken as more essential than our knowledge. With this move, he positions himself in the realm of Phenomenology in the Husserlian sense, since he is concerned mainly with the impact that objects and phenomena have on the thinking Self. For Hegel, to go beyond the subjective standpoint of the subject is the only possible way to arrive at an objective understanding. This implies, that in Hegel's epistemology, the ego is no longer limited to a particular viewpoint which in turn will impose on our categories. The different rungs of the Hegelian ladder which will eventually lead to absolute knowledge are

those of Sinnliche Gewissheit (sense-certainty), Wahrnehmung (perception), and Verstand (intellect). This "path to natural consciousness" is clearly one that progresses from the inner to the outer realm, from subjectivity to objectivity, from the individual to society at large.

On the level of sense-certainty,

> Das Wissen, welches zuerst oder unmittelbar unser Gegenstand ist, kann kein anderes sein als dasjenige, welches selbst unmittelbares Wissen, **Wissen des Unmittelbaren** oder **Seinenden** ist. Wir haben uns also **unmittelbar** oder **aufnehmend** zu verhalten, also nichts an ihm, wie es sich darbietet, zu verändern, und von dem Auffassen des Begreifens abzuhalten. (Hegel, 1987, p. 79)
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> That knowledge, which is first or immediately our object of concern, can be no other than that which is itself immediate knowledge, **knowledge of the immediate** or **of the being** (of what is). We must act in an **immediate** or **receptive** fashion, we must change nothing about the object as it offers itself, and prevent the grasp of the understanding.

It seems that this most basic and original level of knowledge will later be appropriated by Heidegger who will also inherit the Hegelian concept of being aufnehmend (receptive). The stress that Heidegger puts on Dasein's receptivity is explained by the fact that the ultimate mode of consciousness for him takes place in precisely the realm which Hegel characterized by sense-certainty, where we do not yet "understand", where our "knowledge" of things is still preconceptual. This preconceptual stage represents

for Heidegger the primordial grounding where all we can do is to "stand open" (be receptive) to phenomena. This realm of unmediated knowledge, of the unmediated "I", is also the realm of the **logos** which is characterized by an absence of the difference between subject and object.

Auffassen (mere apprehension) is still free from Begreifen (conceptual comprehension). Knowledge at this level means being acquainted with the objects of our immediate concern. (Compare Heidegger's zuhandene Dinge - objects which are present-to-hand, and Kant's "blind intuition" without concepts.) According to the traditional view, objects can be identified only if we presuppose that they have properties. Even in this view, the object must first of all be a mere "this". Contrarily, Hegel argues that even a "this" must simultaneously constitute a "what?", implying that in order to identify an object we must not only find it worthy of attention, but must be able to describe it in more or less universal terms (Solomon, 1987, p. 20). His insistence that, in order to understand knowing, we must understand how we describe objects of our knowledge gives us an idea of his view of the importance of language: Without language, without descriptions, there can be no knowing. Hegel dismisses Sense-Certainty as a valid form of consciousness, and he drops it from the dialectic almost from the beginning. As knowing subjects, or as agents, we must have some sense, however inarticulate, of

what we are doing. According to Heidegger, it is a matter of bringing this dim sense to formulation that will enable us to reach a higher form of consciousness. Thus, that activity of articulating something, that is, the activity of language will bring something to full consciousness that we have previously only had an inarticulate sense of.

The knowledge that we as agents have of our action is very different than that we may have of external objects, but it is never an immediate one. It is always mediated by our efforts to formulate it. With this assertion, Hegel distances himself clearly from the Cartesian "privileged" access that we as agents have to the activity of our minds.

It seems that Kant was one of the first philosophers to attack the notion of immediate access to the workings of the mind. He, as well, made a distinction between the different kinds of knowledge we can have - the knowledge of an external object, and the synthetic a priori truths we can hold, and which are an important sense of our own actions. Fichte, who had attempted to define subject-object identity, is Kant's successor in this line of thought. He took over the latter's concept of "intellectual intuition" as a kind of knowledge in which the activity of the self makes possible the unity of the manifold, in this case subject and object.

The task of the first moment of the dialectic is established; it is that of description, bringing to mind

the Socratic practice of articulation. "Sense-Certainty", the original naive position, although not a valid form of consciousness, establishes certain presuppositions for experience. It contains certain beliefs about knowledge, experience, and reality without which a reflective attitude could not be achieved. The validity of this "natural" frame of mind is assured by the fact that it constitutes the "absolute beginning" of knowledge. Hegel considers this naive frame of mind a lower kind of knowledge without which the rise to a higher kind cannot be accomplished.

Level two - Perception

In the second chapter of the **Phänomenologie**, we begin by assuming that the presuppositions of the "natural" stance are inadequate. For an alternate form of consciousness, that of **Perception** (Wahrnehmung), the external object is both unique and distinct from other perceivable things. Perception is an attempt to replace the bare particulars of Sense-Certainty with a different conception of knowledge, one in which we must assume that an object is a unit of properties.

> Die Wahrnehmung nimmt hingegen das, was ihr das Seinde ist, als Allgemeines. Wie die Allgemeinheit ihr Prinzip überhaupt, so sind auch ihre in ihr unmittelbar sich unterscheidenden Momente, Ich ein allgemeines, und der Gegenstand ein allgemeiner. Jenes Prinzip ist uns **entstanden**, und unser Aufnehmen der

> Wahrnehmung daher nicht mehr ein erscheinendes Aufnehmen, wie der sinnlichen Gewissheit, sondern ein notwendiges. (Hegel, 1987, p. 90)
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> Perception takes what is given to it as universal. As universality is its overall principle, so too are its moments distinguished in their immediacy. "I" is a universal, and the object is a universal. Every principle has developed for us, and our reception of perception is therefore no longer a reception of phenomena, as it was in sense-certainty, but it is a necessary reception.

Here, consciousness can no longer apprehend its object to appear as perceived. The object must now be taken to be both a distinct unity as well as a multiplicity of properties. Now the object must become an intelligible object, and consciousness must make the transition to understanding. The stage of Perception is an attempt to replace Sense-Certainty with a conception of knowledge suggesting that all that we are acquainted with are properties and that an object is nothing but a unit of properties.

Level three - The Intellect

In the chapter on **the intellect** (der Verstand) as a form of consciousness, Hegel makes the point that consciousness, although in the form of perception, has "arrived at thoughts" ("ist es zu Gedanken gekommen," Hegel, 1987, p. 104), can only in the form of intellectual understanding bring these thoughts together "in the unconditional universal" ("im unbedingt Allgemeinen",

Hegel, 1987, p. 104). The intellect's first conception of an object is a rule by which it construes the perceived appearance of the object and then goes on to a form an "unconditional" conception of it. The intellect is still under the impression that the object it perceives is distinct from itself and that it is simultaneously a multiplicity of properties. This Kraft (Force) explains our ability to individuate objects, and so, the intellect has realized that the identity of an external object is to be construed in terms of the notion of "difference." The idea of this suprasensible force is reminiscent of Kant's thing-in-itself as a substance that lies behind properties and particulars. This force (or this substance) can only be known by the intellect.

To summarize, Hegel discusses and simultaneously dismisses three versions of consciousness on the basis that we can never know particulars, only universals. In Sense-Perception this thought is conveyed by his argument that objects are not simply there. Similarly, in Perception, it is argued that we are acquainted with properties. Therefore he suggests that we predicate properties of particulars by referring to a suprasensible substance (Kraft) which has those properties. In his rejection of the Kantian thing-in-itself, Hegel, simultaneously, follows Kant's move and speculates that objects are not given, but that we are

responsible of producing the objects which we are under the illusion of being given.

Subject versus Object

In the section on Self-Consciousness, Hegel follows Kant in his insistence that the contribution of the knower is vital to any theory of knowledge. Self-consciousness becomes a new form of knowledge. By reflecting on our knowledge of objects we must ultimately come to self-knowledge. In this chapter, Hegel's aim is the description of the individuals quest for selfhood. He begins with the natural subject as a living, conscious being with desires. Conscious, it must distinguish itself from a world of objects which are other than it. These objects are not merely objects of knowledge, but also objects of desire. They seem to exist independently from the individual. In the process of achieving the truth, of realizing that these objects are not independent, the object is destroyed as object and preserved as subject. The process of desire is destructive of an object and productive of a subject. The subject has now achieved a level of "self-feeling", which is falling short of self-consciousness.

In opposition to this natural subject is the proto-self, which has achieved self-consciousness. He can make the distinction between I-as-a subject and

I-as-an-object. His quest is the destruction of the I-as-an-object, and the preservation of the I-as-a-subject. If two self-conscious beings engage in battle, the true goal is not to obliterate the other being, but rather to destroy the object-side of the "I." Therefore, when one consciousness looses the battle, it will submit as a "slave" to a "master" simply for the reason of being recognized as a second I-as-a-subject.

> Die Wahrheit des selbstständigen Bewusstseins ist demnach das **knechtische Bewusstsein.** Dieses erscheint zwar zunächst **ausser** sich und nicht als die Wahrheit des Selbstbewusstseins. Aber wie die Herrschaft zeigte, dass ihr Wesen das Verkehrte dessen ist, was sie sein will, so wird auch wohl die Knechtschaft vielmehr in ihrer Vollbringung zum Gegenteile dessen werden, was sie unmittelbar ist; sie wird als in sich **zurückgedrängtes** Bewusstsein in sich gehen, und zur wahren Selbstständigkeit sich umkehren. (Hegel, 1987, p. 147)
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> The truth of the independent consciousness is therefore the **serving consciousness.** At first this appears **outside** of itself, and not as the truth of consciousness. But as the mastery has shown that its essence is the opposite of that which it wants to be, so in its accomplishment the servitude will as well become the opposite of that which it is immediately. The servitude will go into itself as a consciousness forced back into itself, and will turn into true independence.

The master-slave relationship is reminiscent of Fichte's point of juncture of the "real" line and the "ideal" line (Fichte, 1945, p. 29). Here, the Kantian "Form" and "Matter" meet, and produce consciousness. The mode of consciousness which will ensue, however, is

determined by the weight that each line bears at the moment of consciousness. For Fichte, as for Hegel, the fluctuations which consciousness undergoes, are thus explained by their respective philosophical systems.

It is now established that for Hegel, human existence is primarily a matter of mutual recognition. Only by being recognized by others do we achieve self-awareness and are able to strive towards social meaning in our lives.

To take things a step further, Hegel's dialectic moves from mere consciousness of objects to self-consciousness, to the notion of **Reason**. Once we have achieved Reason, we must acknowledge the fact that our activities are as essential to the objects of knowledge as the objects are to our knowledge. This, again, brings to mind the "activity" and the "process" of knowing of which Fichte and Heidegger speak.

Whereas for Descartes, self-conscious understanding was self-evident, Hegel saw it as a goal that could only be achieved by an interiorization of what was once external, the overcoming of an instinctive external life. Self-perception, for Hegel, is an activity, not a given, as it was for Descartes. This notion of activity is clearly appropriated from Kant, who insisted that all perception is constituted by our conceptual activity.

The achievement of any higher intellectual understanding comes about through our activity of

formulating - in our language, our concepts, and in our social practices - as the institution of the master-slave relationship which has shown to be a search for recognition.

However, it can be argued that embodiment plays a central part in Hegel's epistemology. Since for him, mental life is pimarily to be understood as the inner reflection of an embodied life-process, this mental life must have a depth which goes far beyond the Cartesian self-transparency of the self. The path to consciousness is for Hegel a journey from outwardness, manifested in our practices, toward inwardness. Therefore, all the presuppositions for Reason which we find in the different forms of consciousness have a bodily origin, since they originate in Sense-Certainty.

Against Cartesian dualism, Kant argued that it is false that we know the mental better than the physical. Contrarily, he saw the very possibility of a unified self-consciousness grounded in the existence of physical objects. He believed in the existence of raw sensory materials which could be examined as existing within themselves. Hegel argued against this notion. He argues that any sensation we have of sense data (such as properties) can only follow and must be parasitic of our prior knowledge of physical objects.

Speculation and the Absolute

For Hegel, the intellect does not merely understand, but determines our world. In agreement with Fichte, Hegel stipulates that our experience changes with our concepts of experience. Different forms of consciousness must produce different experiences. Different philosophical outlooks must also provide different bases for experience, and for him there is no intelligible way to acknowledge a world beyond our possible knowledge.

While self-reflection is a subject-object relationship which is primarily subjective, Hegel posits that once this "reflection upon reflection" destroys itself, the path is opened to an establishment of a totality, the Absolute. Thus the destruction of self-reflection, which is caused by reflection making itself its own reflective subject, coincides "with the overcoming of the last possible opposition, that of the self to itself" (Gasché, 1986, p. 41). It is the Ego, the subject, the Self, which stands in the way of achieving speculation or absolute reflection. According to Hegel, it is Reason which makes possible the overcoming of the last possible opposition, that of the self to itself. Once this gulf is bridged, subject and object will be identical - not through a subjective or objective synthesis of the subject-object relation - but because of the fact that all opposition is overcome, and the realm of the Absolute is reached.

The means by which this Absolute can be reached, according to Hegel, is speculation and its mirroring function. As Gasche has pointed out, speculation, since German Idealism, meant a kind of purely theoretical knowledge which constituted itself in self-reflection:

> One calls a relation speculative when an object first remains fixed in a purely phenomenal state, but is then also recognized as being for a subject - an in-itself, or indeed a for-itself. (Gasché, 1986, p. 43)

The difference to the traditional notion of reflection is the fact that the relationship is not one of assigning a property to a given thing, but rather "...must be thought of as a mirroring, in which the reflection is the pure appearance of what is reflected..." (Gadamer, 1975, in Gasché, 1986, p. 43). Speculative thought lifts "the identity of which sound sense is not conscious into consciousness" (Hegel, 1977, p. 100). However, since conscious and non-conscious are by nature posited in polarity, it seems that consciousness must also be nullified in speculation. Contained within this is the assumption that speculation comes close to what Heidegger calls our originary being-in-the-world, our being-with things present-at-hand, a state which exists preconceptually, and which is the presupposition of all consciousness (in the sense of awareness, or as Hegel would call it "mere cognition"). Certainly it would seem that

this condition results if we define speculation as the overcoming of the major antinomy of reflection, that of the subject and the object of its thought.

In the first section of Hegel's **Phänomenologie**, entitled "Consciousness", the focus is not on knowledge but on the object of knowledge. The object is the "other" of the activity of knowing, whereas that activity has lost itself to the object. Only in the section dealing with "Self-consciousness" is the transition to knowledge made. Here, self-consciousness is defined as the truth of consciousness.

> Wahrheit **des Wissens**, d.h. das Wissen als das Wahre, ist erst erreicht, wo das Wissen selbst für **es** Gegenstand wird, wo das Wissen solches für es ist, wo die Gewissheit nicht mehr sinnliche ist, sondern **"Gewissheit seiner selbst."** (Heidegger, 1988, p. 185)
>
> Truth **of knowledge**, i.e. knowledge as the truth, is only then achieved when knowledge becomes an object for itself, when knowledge is in such a manner for itself that certainty no longer is sense-certainty, but where it becomes **"certainty of itself."**

For Heidegger, "certainty" in this sense is not characterized as the Cartesian "I-certainty", but as the "How" and "What" of the thing known. He is in agreement with Hegel that only when consciousness knows itself, is there a possibility of it knowing truth. For Heidegger, once consciousness has made itself its own object, knowledge is no longer relative, but becomes absolute and infinite. In mere consciousness, the boundaries of the

Hegelian sense-certainty cannot be transcended. Consciousness is necessarily limited in its scope. But once it has made itself its object, it is no longer limited by these boundaries. In self-consciousness, consciousness can transcend the limitations, and it is open to an endless array of possibilities.

> Mit dem Selbstbewusstsein ist die Wahrheit überhaupt erst zu Hause, auf ihrem Grund und Boden. In der Sphäre des Bewusstseins dagegen ist sie in der Fremde, d.h. sich selbst entfremdet und bodenlos. Wie die Interpretation der Wahrnehmung zeigte, ist die absolute Wahrheit, in der der Widerspruch wirklich gedacht werden soll, für das Bewusstsein das Befremdliche, wogegen es sich wehrt und dem es zu entgehen sucht. (Heidegger, 1988, p. 187)
>
> Truth is at home, on its own ground and soil, only with self-consciousness. Contrarily, in the sphere of consciousness, it is in foreign parts, i.e. it is estranged from itself, and it is without ground. As the interpretation of apprehension has shown, for consciousness, the absolute truth, in which the contradiction is to be thought, is something strange against which it struggles and from which it attempts to flee.

If Hegel conceives of reason as the absolute mode of consciousness, developed by the Geist, then Heidegger defines self-consciousness as the "middle", the relation, between consciousness and reason. For him, it is this "middle" which constitutes absolute truth. It is a relation which will produce the Geist capable of transcending its earthly boundaries. The potentialities of self-consciousness constitute for Heidegger once again the link to temporality. Not only is self-consciousness aware of its

origins (its beginnings as consciousness in the realm of apprehension), it recognizes simultaneously its capability to transcend these origins in the form of the Geist. While the acknowledgment of the beginnings of self-consciousness constitute the past, the possibilities of the transcending Geist point to the future, "... die Richtung der **Zukunft**, die ihm als Geist **zukommt.**" ("... the direction of the future which belongs to it (comes toward it) as Geist," Heidegger, 1988, p. 187). Heidegger himself points out that zukommen in this case has a double meaning. It indicates a "belonging to" in the sense that the Geist belongs to self-consciousness as its truth, and "coming toward" in the sense that the possibilities of transcendence are still in the future.

In his study of Hegel's **Phänomenologie**, Heidegger leaves no doubt that in the development of self-consciousness the "I" as the knower plays a vital role. Since mere consciousness turns away from the infinite character of self-consciousness, it is up to the "I" to propel it forward. But the closer knowledge comes to being absolute knowledge, the smaller out role becomes. Knowledge is on its way to knowing, and the part that we play as the knower is relegated to the sidelines. The further abstract knowledge and consciousness "go back into" absolute knowledge, the more it takes our place as the knower. "Wir selbst, die 'Wir', sind zu unserer wahren

Selbstheit gebracht." ("We ourselves, the 'We", have been brought to our true self-hood." Heidegger, 1988, p. 188). After the return from abstract thought or consciousness to self-consciousness, the "We" have become identical with the Geist. Through the thinking of thinking, which is now internalized, the identity of the knower and of the known is achieved. Abstract thought has thus returned to the realm of being-in-the-world in which the "I" exists in an unreflective manner, aware, however, of its possibilities of transcending this mode of existence.

Hegel and Language

After positing that knowledge has returned to the inner realms and has become knowledge of the self, Heidegger stipulates that language undergoes the same process, beginning in sense-certainty. He reminds us that when we say "this", we mean "this particular thing", but our language expresses a general "this", defined by its properties.

> Die Sprache sagt das Gegenteil von dem, was wir meinen. Wir meinen das Einzelne, sie sagt das Allgemeine. ... Die Sprache ist in sich das Vermittelnde, was uns nicht versinken lasst im Diesigen, ganz und gar Einseitigen, Relativen, Abstrakten. (Heidegger, 1988, p. 90)

> Language says the opposite of what we mean. We mean the particular, language says the general. ... Language is in itself the mediating force which prevents that we sink into the "this", the totally one-sided, the relative, the abstract.

For Heidegger, as well as for Hegel, language is absolute. In the realm of sense-certainty, we say: This **is**. But by formulating it in such a manner, what we are actually expressing is the notion that Being in general is. "Wir stellen uns dabei freilich nicht das allgemeine Dieses, oder das Sein überhaupt vor, aber wir sprechen das Allgemeine aus." ("Of course we do not represent to ourselves the general "this", or even Being in general, but we speak the general," Hegel quoted in Heidegger, 1988, p. 91). According to Heidegger, Being can only be spoken because it has always already be understood by us. But, while Dasein finds itself still in the realm of sense-certainty, it cannot acknowledge the fact that it means more than the particular "this", the particular object which it apprehends. Only in self-consciousness, or in absolute knowledge, can the truth of that which is said return to the "I", the subject, the Geist. Only in self-consciousness can the constant movement of the Absolute produce the unity of subject and object. Heidegger makes reference to the constant "is" of the ordinary sentence which, in Hegel's speculative proposition is turned into a transient "is", one that changes meaning according to the state of the speaker. (Heidegger, 1988, p. 93).

Since speculation, an important concept for Hegel, is rooted in language itself, it may be appropriate, at this point, to consider Hegel's conception of language and his

"speculative proposition." As Gasché has emphasized, if language is to be considered as more than mere communication, then it could certainly be considered and constructed as the medium by which a relationship to the whole, the Absolute, can be expressed. (Gasché, 1986, p. 45). Regarding the speculative proposition, Hegel exclaims:

> Formell kann das Gesagte so ausgedrückt werden, dass die Natur des Urteils oder Satzes überhaupt, die den Unterschied des Subjekts und Prädikats in sich schliesst, durch den spekulativen Satz zerstört wird, und der identische Satz, zu dem der erste wird, den Gegenstoss zu jenem Verhältnisse enthält. (Hegel, 1987, p. 54)
>
> The general nature of the judgement or proposition, which involves the distinction of Subject and Predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition, and the proposition of identity, which the former becomes, contains the counter-thrust against that subject-predicate relationship.

Implicit in this is that the common proposition, with its clear separation of subject and predicate, is adequate for common thought. Nevertheless, it is highly inadequate for expressing any speculative content, which would constitute the identity of the subject and of thought itself. Kant had already acknowledged that the relationship between two concepts in a proposition or judgement was inadequate, and had promulgated a third aspect, that of self-consciousness, which was to serve as the mediator of the two concepts. Hegel realized that self-consciousness, for Kant, was not a concept. Therefore, he replaces

consciousness with a third concept, that of the **copula**, which takes on the synthesizing function, leaving self-consciousness as a fourth construct. While in a common proposition, the predicate is an attribute of the subject, in a speculative proposition, the **copula** expresses an identity of subject and preposition. Hegel's own example demonstrates the inner destruction (the overt form of the proposition is not destroyed) of the common proposition: If we look at the sentence "God is being" from the traditional standpoint, "being" functions, so to speak, as an attribute. If we consider the speculative content of that statement, "being", the predicate, becomes the subject, while the subject "God" is dissolved. Or, as Hegel explains:

> Das Denken, statt im Übergange vom Subjekte zum Prädikate weiterzukommen, fühlt sich, da das Subjekt verlorengeht, vielmehr gehemmt und zu dem Gedanken des Subjekts, weil es dasselbe vermisst, zurückgeworfen; oder es findet, da das Prädikat selbst als ein Subjekt, als **das** Sein, als das **Wesen** ausgesprochen ist, welches die Natur des Subjekts erschöpft, das Subjekt unmittelbar auch im Prädikate; und nun, statt dass es im Prädikate in sich gegangen die freie Stellung des Räsonierens erhielte, ist es in den Inhalt noch vertieft, oder wenigstens ist die Forderung vorhanden, in ihn vertieft zu sein. Hegel, 1987, pp. 54/5)
>
> Here, thinking, instead of making progress in the transition from Subject to Predicate, in reality feels itself checked by the loss of the Subject, and, missing it, is thrown back on to the thought of the Subject. Or, since the Predicate itself has been expressed as the Subject, as **the** being or **essence** which exhausts the nature of the Subject, thinking finds the Subject immediately in the Predicate; and

> now, having returned into itself in the Predicate, instead of being in a position where it has freedom for argument, it is still absorbed in the content, or at least is faced with the demand that it should be.

We can now envision that the inner reversal does in no way constitute a simple revocation of subject and predicate. The copula, the "is", has changed meaning as it now expresses an identity rather than solely securing an attribution to a subject, or, succinctly stated, an attribution of universals to a particular. Thus, in a speculative proposition, the predicate becomes a **category**, a "universal determination" which "is the very substance, the essence of the subject." (Gasché, 1986, p. 48).

What is significant in this, is that the single proposition becomes a link in a chain of propositions, implying that in the language used in speculative thought, the categories supersede the proper meaning of the word. Hegel's insistence on speculative discourse cannot be construed as being about the functions of language. Therefore his theory of speculative knowledge seeks to combine both the empirical mode of thinking (that an object is present before reflection upon it), and Kantian transcendental philosophy, which stipulates that thought must know itself in order to be a content for itself. Or, as Hegel put it, "enters consciousness through free abstraction from the whole manifold of empirical consciousness, and in this respect it is something

subjective." (Hegel, 1977, p. 173). Speculation, therefore, is absolute intuition, since it synthesizes the opposite polarities ordained by empiricism and transcendentalism:

> In empirical intuition, subject and object are opposites; the philosopher apprehends the activity of intuiting, he intuits intuiting and thus conceives it as an identity. This intuiting of intuiting is, on the one hand, philosophical reflection and, as such, opposed both to ordinary reflection and to the empirical consciousness in general which does not raise itself above itself and its oppositions. On the other hand, this transcendental intuition is at the same time the object of philosophical reflection; it is the Absolute, the original identity. (Hegel, 1977, p. 120)

Hegel's concept of speculation, stipulated insofar as it results from the self-destruction of reflection, annuls the opposition of the a priori of the transcendental and the a posteriori of the empirical (of subjectivity and objectivity). Above all, it annuls the last opposition, that of the self to itself. It is "the full exposition of all the logically possible moments of the **logos**, a process that is completed as soon as the **logos** is folded back into itself." (Gasché, 1986, p. 54), and it is the insistence on the original meaning of **logos** that will now make possible a transition to Heidegger's conception of consciousness as being-in-the-world.

Part 2: Heidegger - Setting the Stage for Existentialism

Martin Heidegger sets out to separate himself from

traditional conceptions of space and time. In the case of time, Heidegger suggests that it neglects the retention of the past and the impending nature of the future by simply regarding them as "no-longer" and "not-yet." As for the traditional concept of space, he radically distances himself from the notion of space as an external container or from a general category under which things could be subsumed.

The following pages are an attempt to demonstrate how the reconstrual of the concept of time, which is the "ground for Being", sets Heidegger's work apart from most post-Newtonian philosophy. They will pay heed to the claim that Heidegger's "new" conceptions indeed constitute a redefinition of philosophy. They will focus on his understanding of "being-in-the-world", a conception of consciousness unique to Heidegger.

In order to gain access to Heidegger's conception of time, we have to understand at first how his notion of Self, or of consciousness, differs from that held by philosophers before him. Since for him the question of Being, which constitutes the central problem of his life work, is ultimately not answerable without considering its in-time-ness, it is only through the re-thinking of Being and its groundings that we may gain insight into time. Simultaneously, only through the re-thinking of time can we, in any way, come close to the question of Being, since

the temporal aspect is one of the constituents of Being. As for Heidegger's conception of space, it can only be understood once the question of time has been asked, since space in Heidegger's sense no longer refers to location, but is dependent on temporalization.

In an attempt to arrive at Heidegger's conception of time, it becomes necessary to investigate his rejection of reason, of self-reflection, and of the distinction between subject and object. Similarly, his rejection of the centrality of the Self, which, in his view, has not only led us astray in finding the meaning of Being, but which has also provided us with the groundwork for our distorted conception of time.

The Method

Heidegger accuses philosophers since Plato of having ignored the question of Being, or, at best, of having put it inadequately. He claims that thinkers through the ages have substituted the question for the meaning of Being with one that asks about beings. (Deely, 1971, p. 37). Since, for him, an inquiry into the nature of time is dependent on the role that time plays in our understanding of Being, he proposes two methods with which we can gain access to the question of temporality. The first method is the Destruktion of the history of philosophy which has laid the grounds for our common notions of time. The second is a re-

opening of the question of Being, by focussing on the unthought that lies at the bottom of all thought, on the question which the metaphysicians have failed to ask.

Level one - Being in Context

In **Sein und Zeit**, Heidegger makes the second possibility his central theme. He re-opens the central question through

> ... **eine[r] ursprünglichen Explikation der Zeit als Horizont des Seinsverständnisses aus der Zeitlichkeit als Sein des seinverstehenden Daseins.** (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 17)
>
> ... an original explanation of time as the horizon of the understanding of Being out of temporality as the Being of the Dasein which understands Being.

Heidegger argues that, in order to come close to the question of Being, we have to begin with "Diese[m] Seiende[n], das wir selbst je sind und das unter anderem die Seinsmöglichkeit des Fragens hat" ("This entity which each of us is himself, and which includes inquiry as one of the possibilities of its Being..." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 7), in other words Dasein. Dasein, the German term for simply "being there", is the identity of the questioner, the "I" of phenomenological inquiry, which is defined ontically and ontologically at the same time. It is assessed ontically in the sense that it is merely "being there", defined by its "being-in-the-world", ontologically, in that it is the only

being which is capable of asking the question of its own Being. However, when Heidegger clarifies Dasein by proposing that **"Seinsverstandnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins."** ("Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 10), by "understanding" he does not mean the reflexive kind of understanding that permeates the thought of Hegel, in which the subject is aware of itself as a subject.

In **I and Thou**, Martin Buber took a similar stance when he asserts that, before the "I" can become aware of itself as a subject, it is in an original relation to a Thou.

> The life of human beings is not passed in the sphere of transitive verbs alone. It does not exist in virtue of activities alone which have some **thing** for their object. ... [Man] asks the primary word I-Thou in a natural way that precedes what may be termed visualization of forms." (Buber, 1987, p. 4 & 22)

In that preconceptual realm, man exists without knowing that objects exist (wissen). His basic mode of being is one in which his relation with nature, other men, and spiritual beings play a vital part. These relations are not things that can be experienced, but can only be known in a primordial manner which is reminiscent of Heidgger's being-in-the-world.

Rather than referring to the "Knowing that", Heidegger focuses on the "Knowing how," since in German the term

wissen (knowing that) refers to a self-understanding that is conceptual. It is evident that Heidegger had in mind an understanding that is defined existentially (knowing how). Heidegger wants to go deeper than the ontological level, which Husserl saw as the foundation of all categories and concepts. To do so - and here are found echos of Kierkegaard - he insists that the ontological foundations themselves rest on a priori conditions, that Husserl's ontological foundations themselves must have foundations (Hunsinger, 1968, p. 29). For him, these a priori conditions are the manner in which Dasein, before any reflection, any "knowing that" takes place, understands its Being, by having it disclosed through its relationship with Being. Not only does this introduction to **Sein und Zeit** stress the role that Dasein is to play in asking the central question, but it also foreshadows some of the major themes of **Sein und Zeit**, those of being-in-the-world, of disclosure, and of authenticity.

But how does Heidegger proceed to "deconstruct" the history of metaphysics and ask the question that touches on the unthought? In laying out his concept of temporality, he begins by elaborating on the faulty thinking of which Western philosophy is guilty. One example of such inadequate thinking is the fact that Descartes inherited, from thinkers going back to Aristotle, the notion that the Self is an independent being, capable of "knowing" itself

independently from other beings. Also, Descartes was guilty of not examining this failure, but accepting it blindly. Heidegger objects strongly to the notion of the Self as independent. In his analysis of Dasein, he stresses the fact that, before Dasein is even capable of considering itself as an entity, we have to acknowledge that at the ontic level, Dasein can understand itself only in relation to other entities (being-in-the-world). This brings to mind Buber's patient step-by-step analysis, in **I and Thou**, of how the "I" made the transition from the "I-Thou" towards the possibility of seeing itself as a separate entity, or, for that matter, any text dealing with child development that points out the infant's existence as being one-with-the-world before developing an ego separate from the world.

> ... it becomes crystal clear to us that the spiritual reality of the primary words arises out of a natural reality, that of the primary word **I-Thou** out of natural combination, and that of the primary word **I-It** out of natural separation. (Buber, 1987, p. 24)

The separation of the "I" from the I-Thou relation is one that is achieved gradually. Only after the "I" can recognize itself as a subject, is it possible for it to acknowledge objects or phenomena. Not only does Buber deny the Cartesian primacy of the ego, he also fixates his starting point in the development of the Self at a level which Descartes had never considered.

Being-in-the-world, the primordial manner of Dasein's being has been, according to Heidegger, ignored by the great Western thinkers, who have always insisted on separating mind and body, subject and object. Being-in-the-world, that essence of Dasein which one finds "first", before any sort of self-reflection, is not a two-fold experience of the Self and of the world, but is to be regarded as one phenomenon. Only by accepting the metaphysical tradition have we learned, and taken for granted, to separate it into two entities, thus making it more problematic than necessary.

The Structures of Existence

Being-in-the-world means that Dasein is first and foremost engaged in the world, Dasein is a part of the world. Only when Dasein becomes ontological, i.e. concerned with its own Being, does it become detached from the world (the view that we commonly hold, because philosophy has urged us to do so). The self is not primarily a matter of knowledge, as the great thinkers like Descartes, Kant, or Hegel insisted, but it is first and foremost a practical function of living in the world. It is here (again) that we find Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger, in that he insists on Dasein's "authenticity" as opposed to going along with the Man, the crowd, which means not making one's

own decisions, not facing up to the question for the very meaning of Being.

"Authenticity" is linked closely with another of Heidegger's recurrent themes, that of Sorge (care or concern for the world of which we are a part). This Sorge and this besorgen is what differentiates man from things. Whereas things have a spatial inclusion in the world, in the sense of being amidst other things, (the things "present-at-hand"), man alone is capable of Sorge simply by his being-in-the-world and by the in-volvement (the involved relatedness) which this notion presupposes. Obviously, this concern, this Sorge, which refers to the necessity of our engagement with the world, constitutes for Heidegger "authenticity." Being in this world with Sorge means not being dependent on das Man, which implies defining ourselves according to the way others, the impersonal "they", define us.

> Das Dasein versteht sich selbst immer aus seiner Existenz, einer Möglichkeit seiner selbst, es selbst oder nicht es selbst zu sein. Diese Möglichkeit hat das Dasein entweder selbst gewählt, oder es ist in sie hineingeraten oder je schon darin aufgewachsen. Die Existenz wird in der Weise des Ergreifens oder Versäumens nur vom jeweiligen Dasein selbst entschieden. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 12)
>
> Dasein understands itself always out of its existence, out of a possibility of itself to be itself or not to be itself. Dasein has either chosen this possibility on its own account, or it has somehow ended up in it or has always grown up in it. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting.

"Taking hold" here can only mean being authentic, not falling back into everyday routines and ignoring our alternatives. It is this "Fallenness", which Heidegger considers the neglect of the question of Being. "Fallenness" becomes an important structure in Heidegger's notion of Dasein and he contrasts it with the notion of Existenz, that of having the "resolution" to get a grasp on our true Being.

Another of Dasein's structures is that of "facticity", the fact that we find ourselves part of a world, a feeling which is forever present to both "Fallenness" and Existenz (or resolution). Here the notion of equipment and of "being-at-hand" comes into the picture because, according to Heidegger, our most primordial manner of being-in-the-world is defined precisely through the equipmentality of the world, of the "being-to-hand", of being usable. His account on Zeug (equipment, tools) in both **Sein und Zeit** and **Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks** are exemplary underpinnings of the existential character of our Dasein (as opposed to the reflective kind of knowing).

As far as Heidegger's Destruktion of philosophy is concerned, another mistake of which Western metaphysics is guilty or, as Heidegger would term it, another inheritance that has not been questioned properly, is that the essence of Being has traditionally been rendered with "presence". The question throughout history has not been "What is

Being?" but "Who am I?" Thus the essence of Being "is". But this "is" is what Heidegger sees as problematic, because, ever since Plato, Being has been equated with something that is anwesend (present).

> Seiendes ist in seinem Sein als "Anwesenheit" gefasst, d.h. es ist mit Rücksicht auf einen bestimmten Zeitmodus, die **"Gegenwart"**, verstanden. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 25)
>
> A being is grasped in its being "present" (Anwesenheit) - this means that it is understood by reference to a determinate mode of time, the **"present."**

And in **Was heisst Denken?** he continues:

> Weil Sein für alle Metaphysik seit dem Anfang des abendländischen Denkens besagt: Anwesenheit, muss das Sein, wenn es in höchster Instanz gedacht werden soll, als das reine Anwesen gedacht werden, d.h. als die anwesende Anwesenheit, als die bleibende Gegenwart, als das ständige stehende "jetzt". (Heidegger, 1992, p. 63)
>
> Since in all metaphysics from the beginning of Western thought, Being means being present, Being, if it is to be thought in the highest instance, must be thought as pure presence, that is, as the presence that persists, the abiding present, the steadily standing "now."

Here Heidegger makes his move to show us the "faulty" concept of time that we have taken over unquestioningly. There is no doubt that the German language aids him tremendously in this endeavor.

> Das Jetzt-sagen aber ist die redende Artikulation eines **Gegenwärtigens**, das in der Einheit mit einem behaltenden Gegenwärtigen sich zeitigt. Die im Uhr-gebrauch sich vollziehende Datierung erweist sich

> als ausgezeichnetes Gegenwärtigen eines Vorhandenen. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 416)
>
> This "now-saying" however, is the discursive articulation of a **"making-present"** which temporalizes itself in the unity with a "retentive awaiting". The dating aspect which happens through the use of clocks distinguishes itself as a "presencing" of something that is "present-at-hand".

In this passage, which I consider the most problematic one as far as translation into English is concerned (and considering the abundance of footnotes that each translator finds necessary at this point, I am not the only one), the word Gegenwart or gegenwärtig) occurs three times, each time, however, in need of a different translation into English. While taking apart this German term, Heidegger discovers an entrance into the notion of time, for translated literally, the word means: "waiting for that which comes towards us." Notwithstanding the fact that this may well be one of his personalized etymological findings, we have to agree with him that "waiting for something that comes towards us" does indeed suggest the future. Heidegger rejects the "now-saying", our common practice of viewing time as a sequence of "nows" and of stressing the importance of the "now" as we tend to do in our "naive" assumptions of time, and instead puts emphasis on the future.

The Finitude of Being

At this point a term of importance in Heidegger's philosophy needs to be introduced, that of Angst, or anxiety, the acknowledgment of which is another means of establishing an authentic Dasein. By Angst, Heidegger does not mean a specific "fear" of one thing or another, but rather a general existential anxiety that faces each and every one of us in our awareness of our temporal limitations. It is the finitude of our Dasein which causes this Angst, our awareness, that our Dasein can, indeed, only be fulfilled, become authentic, at the moment of our death. Heidegger again mentions the notion of inauthenticity, which, he claims, befalls us when we do not face up to death, when we follow das Man and treat death as an abstraction, when we let inauthenticity absorb the knowledge of our death. In the language of Existentialism, we experience fear of death before love of life. Since we do not know what death is, we choose the will to live in order to comfort ourselves with the certainty of life. In doing so, we deny the possibility of death and treat it as an abstraction. What separates Heidegger from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, however, for whom death took a central place as well, is the fact that he does not suggest, as do they, that man goes against das Man, the anonymous crowd. Rather, he agrees with Hegel in that he emphasizes the historicity of Dasein and at the same time praises individual

resolution. Dasein is considered authentic by giving das Man its own personal affirmation in the acknowledgment of its facticity.

> Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit entstammt auch nicht einer die Existenz und ihre Möglichkeiten überfliegenden "idealistischen" Zumutung, sondern entspringt dem nüchternen Verstehen faktischer Grundmöglichkeiten des Daseins. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 310)
>
> Anticipatory Resoluteness does not originate in an unwarranted "idealistic" expectation that passes over existence and its possibilities. Rather, it originates in the level-headed understanding of the basic factical possibilities of Dasein.

With the term "anticipatory", Heidegger points toward the future as the temporal structure in which authenticity can be found. The basic possibilities of Dasein are none other than the Angst which frees Dasein from such coincidences as Neugier (curiosity) and Gerede (idle talk).

In the second part of **Sein und Zeit**, it is evident that Dasein, although the means by which we can arrive at the meaning of Being, does not represent the main focus of the work. Rather, Heidegger's focus is on time as that aspect which permeates Being, and through which we may be able to re-open the Question. In Part II of **Sein und Zeit**, Heidegger makes the connection between the three structures of Dasein, which are "resolution" or Existenz, "facticity", and "fallenness" with the three dimensions of time, which themselves now become a fourth structure of Dasein. The

three dimensions of time he identifies are the **future**, characterized by the structure of **understanding**, or the resoluteness to fulfill the possibility of Dasein, the **past**, linked to our **facticity**, or the acknowledgment of our constitution which gets its meaning from the past, and the **present**, connected to our **fallenness** and our tendency to let go of all authenticity and identify with das Man, and let the anonymous "they" dictate our notion of our Selfs, which, in turn will be characterized as "getting caught up in the 'now'."

> Die zeitliche Interpretation des alltäglichen Daseins soll bei den Strukturen ansetzen, in denen sich die Erschlossenheit konstituiert. Das sind: Vertehen, Befindlichkeit, Verfallen ... (Heidegger, 1986a, pp. 334/5)
>
> The temporal interpretation of the everyday Dasein shall begin with those structures in which disclosedness is constituted: understanding, facticity, falling ...

In this quote Heidegger sums up the structure of Dasein, through which he intends to arrive at the structure of temporality.

Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology

Dasein is different from other beings in that it is ontological, it is concerned with the nature of its own being. It is engaged in a world of which it is a part, but that does not mean that it is just another being in the

world. In its concern with its own being, Dasein is often tempted to detach itself from its being-in-the-world, to distance itself from itself and to treat itself like a mere object. According to Heidegger, the history of philosophy and science has continually urged us to take such an "objective" detached view of ourselves. Descartes had suggested that we approach perceptions and experiences with skepticism, that we exercise a measure of doubt in considering things from a subjective viewpoint. In this mistrust toward our perceptions is embedded a mistrust of ourselves, which resulted in a need to "step outside" of ourselves, and to assume a god's-eye view of ourselves and the world we live in. In order to overcome this detachment, Heidegger suggests a "Fundamental Ontology" in which we are at all times aware that the primary reason that Dasein is different from other objects in the world is because it cannot ultimately detach itself from itself. The answer to the question of Being can therefore never be found out via an objective stance. Rather, what Heidegger seems to suggest, is that there really is no answer, but that **Dasein** has to work out the meaning of its existence by living, not by knowing.

We now get a clearer picture of how Heidegger intends to use his "Fundamental Ontology", which is really the Destruktion of the history of ontology, to come to an understanding of the nature and the structures of

primordial time, an understanding which he terms "ontological disclosure." In his view, Primordial time, or the question of Being, has never been considered by Western philosophers. Primordial time, like Being, is concealed from us by our everyday-ness, by our uncritical acceptance of the opinion of das Man, and of our culture and tradition, and by our philosophical history which has dwelled on what he calls "derivative time," or "now-centered time," with its emphasis on the present.

In order to obtain any notion at all of this primordial time, to have it unconceal itself for us, Heidegger suggests that we take basically the same steps that we have to take in order to re-open the question of Being: We must get from theoretical reflection, which has been part of the methodology of traditional philosophers, to a practical deliberation, one that heeds the being present-to-hand, the tool-ness of things. From there, we need to take one further step back to the 'mindless' everyday coping, which is Dasein's most basic, primordial mode of being. Heidegger insists that we need to look into the background of our everyday existence, and in this endeavor he is not alone. A number of philosophers make an investigation into precisely this background the center of their methodology. Heidegger's notion of primordiality separates itself in that his is a structured common-sense background whereas Searle's vocabulary-less Background,

Barthe's Myth, Polanyi's Tacit Dimension, Wittgenstein's hurly-burly Background, Gramsci's commonsense, and to a certain degree even Johnson's notion of Embodiment constitute an unstructured, unpenetrable mass of assumptions and presuppositions. The fact that Heidegger's "most primitive groundings" do indeed have a structure is what makes them identifiable and lays them open for interpretation.

To get to the foundations of "derivative time", to the deepest level where our common concepts are grounded, Heidegger again suggests that we look at the average person with his unreflective assumptions about the supposed constancy of "now-time". This was, after all, the basis for the metaphysicians' claim of an eternity which was detached from our everyday existence.

> Der Grund dafür liegt im Verfallen des Daseins und der darin motivierten Verlegung des primären Seinsverständnisses auf das Sein als Vorhandenheit. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 206)
>
> The reason for this lies in the falling of Dasein and in the diversion of the primary understanding of Being to Being as presence-at-hand, a diversion which itself is motivated by the phenomenon of falling.

Dasein understands itself as a vorhanden (present-at-hand) being "in" a vorhanden (present-at-hand) world. However, man is not a thing, and in this quote Heidegger shows us again how the traditional metaphysical conception of man's relationship to the world is faulty. Heidegger

reminds us that Dasein is not a spiritual thing which is placed "into" the space of other material things. Neither is knowledge an act that transpires "between" the subject and the object, in the sense that both subject and object are "vorhanden." (Compare "The man who experiences has not part in the world. For it is 'in him' and not **between** him and the world that the experience arises." Buber, 1987, p. 5). With this move, he renounces the Cartesian notion of the subject as a substance, as an autonomous source. In our conventional conception of time, the "nows", arranged in linear sequence, are vorhanden; time passes outside of us. The past is therefore seen as vorhanden time that has vanished and is left behind by Dasein (Vergangenheit), but it can be carried to the present as a vorhanden moment. The future, however, is a temporal aspect that Dasein does not acknowledge. Rather than giving in to the Angst, rather than facing its own finitude, it has resolved, together with das Man, that death is an abstraction, something that befalls people in general, but not Dasein personally. According to Heidegger, our conventional notion of time is calculative time, which is itself derivative and dependent on primordial time: it springs from it, yet, it conceals it. This conventional time is problematic for Heidegger, because it is so familiar to all of us, and it is taken for granted as something which is self-evident. Heidegger sees it as his mission to expose the limitations of conventional

time by "destructing" the sequential time which permeates our philosophical tradition.

The Primordial Unity of Subject and Object

If we are to understand the concept of primordial time, which is the basis for our "naive", common-sense assumptions of time, we have to take a closer look at Heidegger's Sorge. It is in this concept that the three temporalities of original time are enclosed. In the Buberian sense, this Sorge is the I-Thou relation in which "The present arises only in virtue of the fact that the **Thou** becomes present." (Buber, 1987, p. 12). Contrarily, the I-It relation can never constitute an immediate present, only a mediated past, because it is concerned only with objects (the Heideggerian notion of falling).

A look at Sorge in its three-fold totality, as it constitutes Dasein and Dasein's practical involvement in the world is necessary. Sorge, in its everydayness, is a mode of Dasein's being-in-the-world, and it involves the three temporalities of resolution (**Sein und Zeit**, paragraph 68), which can be unveiled via the experience of Angst. It is "Die fundamentalen ontologischen Charaktere dieses Seienden ... Existenzialität, Faktizität, und Verfallensein." ("The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity [Angst], ... existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen." Heidegger,

1986a, p. 191), which brings into focus the notion of Sorge. The acknowledgment of Angst constitutes Dasein's authenticity, and brings Dasein to the juncture where it can face its temporal limitations, its finitude, with an "anticipatory resoluteness" (Heine, 1985, p. 112).

The Dimensions of Temporality

Sorge, a term chosen for its etymological connection of Sorge/besorgen = helping or "involved relatedness" (Wood, 1989, p. 163), is grounded in a temporality that is not sequential, like our naive concept of time. Rather it is an integral dynamic process of Dasein. In its **understanding**, Dasein is always ahead of itself, pointing to the future, (Zukunft) as "that which comes towards us." By "understanding", Heidegger does, in this case, mean the "knowing how" (können), not the ontological "knowing-that":

> Mit dem Terminus Verstehen meinen wir ein fundamentales Existenzial; weder eine bestimmte **Art von Erkennen**, underschieden etwa von Erklären und Begreifen, noch überhaupt ein Erkennen im Sinne des thematischen Erfassens. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 336)
>
> With the term "understanding" we have in mind a fundamental existential, which is neither a definite species of cognition, distinguishable, let us say, from explaining and conceiving. Nor is it any cognition at all in the sense of grasping something thematically.

Rather, it is "knowing-how" in the sense of "knowing how to talk":

> Wir gebrauchen zuweilen in ontischer Rede den Ausdruck "etwas verstehen" in der Bedeutung von "einer Sache vorstehen können", "ihr gewachsen sein", "etwas können". (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 143)
>
> When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression "understanding something" with the signification of "being able to manage something," "being a match for it," "being competent to do something."

This understanding activity is always directed toward bringing something about. It is organized by a for-the-sake-of-which, which Heidegger calls "projection", but

> Der Entwurfscharacter des Verstehens besagt ferner, dass dieses das, woraufhin es entwirft, die Möglichkeiten, selbst nicht thematisch erfasst. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 145)
>
> The character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects - that is to say, possibilities.

"Understanding" in this sense, is directed towards a possibility of Dasein's fulfillment in the future. Since this fulfillment can theoretically only happen at Dasein's own death, the possibility becomes an impossibility, and so "understanding" becomes the authentic facing towards death, towards Dasein's imminent impossibility. This authentic understanding and facing up to Dasein's finitude can only be accomplished through an "anticipatory resoluteness," which is a rejection of das Man and its illusions of infinitude:

> Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit ist kein Ausweg, erfunden, um den Tod zu "überwinden", sondern das dem Gewissensruf folgende Verstehen, das dem Tod die Möglichkeit freigibt, der **Existenz** des Daseins **mächtig** zu werden und jede flüchtige Selbstverdeckung im Grunde zu zerstreuen. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 310)
>
> Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring **power** over Dasein's **existence** and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments.

While Zukunft, analyzed into its etymological components, conveys a sense of passivity on Dasein's part, this is certainly not the case in Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit. In order to be resolute, we must grasp our possibilities, and be authentic. The concept of "understanding" as a structure of Sorge is the fore-structure for the possibility of self-knowledge and of interpretation. By being anticipatory resolute, Dasein is ahead of itself and understands itself as being primarily in and of the future. The reason for the future's priority in Heidegger's concept of temporality is the fact that the future as the ecstasy of understanding makes possible the "... Kunft, in der das Dasein in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen auf sich zukommt." ("... coming in which Dasein, in its own potentiality for Being, comes toward itself." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 325)

The ecstasy of **facticity** is what structures the temporality of the past. Facticity, for Heidegger, are our Stimmungen, or Gemütsverfassungen, our moods or states of

mind. Heidegger points out that, in remembering an event, what makes us remember is not so much reflective knowledge, but rather the frame of mind, the mood we were in, at the time of the event. Our moods bring us back to something and remind us of our "disclosive submissiveness", our thrownness. Moods are so pervasive that they become unnoticed, and that may be the reason why traditional philosophy has overlooked them. Heidegger points out that we cannot analyze our moods, and we certainly cannot get rid of them: "... das Dasein [ist] schon immer gestimmt ..." ("... Dasein always has some mood ..." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 134). Thus, Dasein is always given, and it is this givenness that Heidegger calls thrownness:

> Diesen in seinem Woher und Wohin verhüllten, aber an ihm selbst um so unverhüllter erschlossenen Seinscharakter des Daseins, dieses "Dass es ist" nennen wir die **Geworfenheit** dieses Seienden in sein Da, so zwar, dass es als In-der-Welt das Da ist. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 135)
>
> This characteristic of Dasein's being - this "that it is" - is veiled in its "whence" and "whither," yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the "thrownness" of this entity into its "there" in such a manner that it is in-the-world as "there."

In our common assumptions about time, we see the past as something at-hand, something that we had at one point, but have no longer. Contrarily, in the primordial conception of time, the past is part of our being. It is the having-been-there (dagewesen) of Dasein which is

integrated with the present and the future, because it is behaltend (retentive). Dasein can only experience it as such, if it indeed exists projectively, toward the future, and thus becomes a behaltendes Gewärtigen (retentive awaiting). Our past gives us the means to understand ourselves, and it is in the acknowledgment of these "possibilities of Being" that we project into the future. Only by making the past our own, do we bring ourselves into the possession of the future possibilities.

The third ecstasy, that of **falling**, belongs to the temporality of the present. Falling as an existential structure is the way Dasein is by its very nature. It is always drawn away from its primordial sense of what it is: "Im Verfallen kehrt sich das Dasein von ihm selbst ab." ("In falling, Dasein turns away from itself." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 185). Dasein's falling is its absorption with that which Dasein finds alongside, with things present-at-hand, and which have been interpreted and defined by das Man. The things present-at-hand make up Dasein's necessary structure by insisting on making present and on the "now":

> Wenn aber das Dasein selbst im Gerede und der öffentlichen Ausgelegtheit ihm selbst die Möglichkeit vorgibt, sich im Man zu verlieren, der Bodenlosigkeit zu verfallen, dann sagt das: Das Dasein bereitet ihm selbst die ständige Versuchung zum Verfallen. Das In-der-Welt-sein ist an ihm selbst **versucherisch.** (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 177)

> If Dasein itself, in idle talk and in the way things have been publicly interpreted, presents to itself the possibility of losing itself in the "one" and falling into groundlessness, this tells us that Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation towards falling. Being-in-the-world is in itself **tempting**.

Falling, however, is not necessarily inauthentic. Rather, it is a necessary part of authentic Dasein, especially when it gets transformed into resoluteness, a stand that produces the authentic Self. The moment of transformation is the Augenblick, often translated in following Kierkegaard, as the "moment of vision". Translated literally, it means "the blink of an eye", but I believe that Heidegger meant to convey, once again, its everyday meaning, which is probably best rendered by the English "moment". The moment brings to light the possibilities of a situation (Heine, 1985, p. 116). The moment, like the past, is linked to the future, since Dasein, if indeed authentic, has to grasp that possibility with anticipatory resoluteness. Dasein is, therefore, once again in the temporality of the Zukunft:

> Der **Augenblick** ... meint die entschlossene, aber in der Entschlossenheit **gehaltene** Entrückung des Daseins an das, was in der Situation an besorgbaren Möglichkeiten, Umständen begegnet. (Heidegger, 1986, p. 338)
>
> The **"moment"** ... means the resolute [way] Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circum-stances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern.

Through the present's indebtedness to both the past and the future, we can now see the dynamics of Heidegger's temporal relationship, and we can better understand his quote linking Dasein with Sorge:

> Das Sein des Daseins besagt:
> Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden). Dieses Sein erfüllt die Bedeutung des Titels **Sorge**. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 192)
>
> The being of Dasein means
> ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world). This Being fills in the signification of the term **Care**.

Dasein is ahead-of-itself in its understanding of the possibilities of the future. It is already-in-the-world, in the sense that is its past, and thus influences its future projects. These projects, in turn, generate the decisions that Dasein makes in the present by being alongside (or with) entities in its "spezifisch hantierende[n] Gegenwärtigen des Zeugs." ("specifically manipulative way in which equipment is made present." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 353). Time is not something outside of Dasein, an entity through which Dasein goes and which is infinite. Time is, in its primordial sense, not the commonplace notion of time, but rather an ecstatic temporality which "zeitigt sich als gewesende-gegenwärtigende Zukunft." ("temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 350).

In summary, for the Heidegger of **Sein und Zeit**, temporality is the sense of Sorge that permeates our being-in-the-world. Time is the manner in which Dasein comes to an understanding of its own Being. For Dasein to be authentic, it must be aware of its have-been and it must grasp its possibility to move into the future. Temporality is the "thoughtful recovery of the ground of our Being," and it is this thinking which has its own temporality, which is the temporality of the circle. It is the circling back to the place where Heidegger begins: the place of the disclosure of Being. In the circle is hidden "eine positive Möglichkeit ursprünglichsten Erkennens" ("a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 153). Just as Heidegger's investigation into the meaning of Being in **Sein und Zeit** moves in a circle, so is his structure of temporality circular, moving from the future, from the anticipation of death, back to Dasein's realization of its facticity and its finitude, only to exist in an insightful moment. Opposed to this futural temporalization of time is within-time-ness, which bypasses time in its primordiality, and which has been the focus of traditional philosophy. This within-time-ness is Dasein's everydayness and inauthenticity which manifests itself in the "now-time." Here, Dasein exists as an awaiting being which is either "not yet" or "not any longer". It can no longer unite the

past, the future, and the present. The metaphysical tradition thinks of the Being of beings as existing within time. Also, it thinks of time as a series of existing points, in time, in which the Being of beings exist. What sets Heidegger apart from traditional philosophers is his opposition to this within-time-ness in which Dasein forgets the temporalization of time itself.

CHAPTER III

TRANSCENDENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Part 1: Kierkegaard's Existentialism

With Martin Heidegger's conception of time, the Hegelian Geist as the all-encompassing unity of individual egos looses its impact. For Heidegger, Sorge is a presupposition for temporality, implying that in acknowledging our concern for the world around us, we must develop a new conception of consciousness. With the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, such a consciousness, anchored in the physical world, but capable of transcending it, is born. Kierkegaardian existentialism is characterized dichotomously. On the one hand, the highest level of consciousness we must strive to reach, transcends all earthly things. On the other hand - and this is the deciding factor - Kierkegaardian consciousness is capable of transcending traditional philosophical assumptions which locate truth solely in the spiritual realm. After accomplishing this move, consciousness is once again anchored in a pre-Socratic, and certainly pre-Cartesian unity of mind/object.

Søren Kierkegaard, a one-time student of Hegel, expressed his disdain for the German philosopher with the claim that he, as well as Hegel's other contemporaries,

have "forgotten what it means to exist." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 223). With this statement he distances himself from the epistemology of the idealists, notably Hegel, who saw the essence of humanity in the fact that man is a knowing being. According to Kierkegaard's contemporaries, man's most vital capacity is to obtain knowledge. Kierkegaard, like Heidegger after him, objected strongly to this characterization of humanity. With the often quoted statement "Truth is subjectivity," Kierkegaard assures his place in modern philosophy as the first existentialist. He is not primarily concerned with knowledge. The question he proposes to ponder in his work is what it means to exist as a human being. Surely there must be more to being human than having the capacity to think and to know. With this thought, Kierkegaard sets out to encourage his readers to peel away the shell of absolute idealism in order to discover what parts of the Hegelian dialectic may be existential (Löwith, 1958, p. 128).

From Objectivity to Subjectivity

Most philosophers in the Western tradition have equated knowledge with truth. Kierkegaard's famous statement reflects his rejection of knowledge as the defining essence of being human. For Hegel, in order to come to absolute knowledge, man must take on an attitude of objectivity. As a matter of fact, Hegel does not even take

into consideration "man" as an existing human being. He stipulates that transcendental knowledge can only be obtained once we refrain from considering man as "being-in-the-world", and concentrate instead on the transcendental ego, an abstract entity that has nothing whatsoever to do with everyday existence. Kierkegaard objects very strongly to this attitude of objectivity. Not only does he see it as an impossibility, but the mere consideration seems ridiculous because "men are essentially finite, subjective, particular individuals, not unlimited, objective, impersonal knowing minds." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 100). Kierkegaard does not deny that we can be beings for whom knowing is one mode of existing, but "the knower is an existing individual and ... the task of existing is his essential task." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 185).

Objectivity and universality are of tremendous importance for Hegel's system of transcendental knowledge, but for Kierkegaard, like for Heidegger after him, it is the state of subjectivity that man must reach in order to be in accord with his essential nature. Heidegger, in rejecting the objective stance of German idealism, contemplated man not as a knowing being, but as a being involved in things around him. Rather than asking about Dasein's knowledge, Heidegger resurrected the question of what it means to be human. Linked to this query is the investigation into the possible modes of knowing. Instead

of focussing on knowledge as a result, Heidegger made it his life's work to ask the question of Being, and to interpret the different modes in which Dasein can stand in relation to its world. For Kierkegaard, to exist as a human being is to be subjective; man's nature is to be subjective. "Only in subjectivity is truth, and for man existing, the process of transformation into inwardness in and by existing, is the truth." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 184).

But what is this inwardness for Kierkegaard? Surely it cannot be the reflective stance that Kant and Fichte propose, the self-conscious act of knowing that one knows. It means, contrarily, knowing what one's essential nature is, knowing that "Truth is subjectivity" (Solomon, 1987, p. 84). With this inward appropriation, this transformation of inwardness, truth (or that which is known) can correspond analogically to an essence coupled to existence, and gains therefore a reality. That, however, is not enough for him. What is vital in this proposition is not only that one must come to know one's own essential nature, but that one must act in accordance with it by achieving the proper inner state which is not characterized by mere impersonal cognition. Rather, "the subjective reflection turns its attention inwardly to subject, desires in this intensification to realize (actualize) the truth." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 175).

Whereas Hegel tried to teach us that the transcendental ego, far removed from everyday existence, from the Dasein, must be objective and rational, Kierkegaard posits that the abstract Hegelian notion of **Geist** must for that very reason be without meaning. If Hegel defines as truth that thought which corresponds to an object (that which knowledge is knowledge of), it follows that "Truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity between objectivity and the Begriff." (Hegel, 1987, p. 354). For Hegel, an object can only be true if it adequately realizes its Begriff (notion) or its essence.

Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel as far as this definition of truth is concerned, but he takes the definition to another level. For him, a man is a 'true man' if he acts in ways that his Begriff or his vocation require. This implies that one can be in a state of truth only if one's actual inner state is in agreement with essential human nature, that of being subjective, particular, and inward, and by rejecting any pretense of objectivity. In other words, "to be a particular individual ... is the only true and highest significance of human being." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 134).

While Kierkegaard rejects the Hegelian **Begriff**, he appropriates much of the latter's terminology, such as the concept of unity. He is in agreement with Hegel concerning the suggestion that the unity of two opposites constitute

truth. But, whereas for Hegel the dichotomy consisted of the Begriff and the experienced object, of subject and object, for Kierkegaard the opposed concepts are the finite (human beings) and the infinite (the God of Christianity), necessity and possibility, as well as temporality and eternity. However, it must be said that if indeed there exists this God, then ultimately man's finiteness is subjective. Through faith, God even gives man the potential to be non-finite.

The dichotomies are not the only concept that Kierkegaard appropriated from Hegel. He obviously uses Hegelian terminology when he writes about synthesis. But, instead of according it the meaning of a solution to a problem, as had done Hegel, Kierkegaard sees in synthesis the first grasp or definition of the problem itself.

> The human being is a synthesis of infinity and finitude, of temporality and eternity, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two [factors]. Considered in this way the human being is not yet a self. ...In the relation between the two [factors] the relation [itself] is the third [factor] as a negative entity, and the [other] two relate themselves to the relation, and in the relation to the relation; this is the way in which the relation between soul and body is a relation when soul is the determining category. If, on the other hand, the relation relates itself to itself, then this relation is the positive third [factor], and this is the self. (Kierkegaard, 1941d, p. 73)

The self, for Kierkegaard, is not a dependent factor. Rather, it is a controlling factor and therefore properly

belongs to the category of spirit or the Hegelian Geist. Spirit enables man to distance himself from the finite world. Because of his spirit, man does not live an immediate life, a form of life which would include no opposition. He constantly finds himself in a position at the center of the contradictions, and strives to reconciliate them. Man himself is a compound of these oppositions concerned with the possibilities of erasing the limitations posed by them. This unification, for Kierkegaard, is located in the individual will, and is therefore purely subjective.

As regards the dichotomy of finitude/infinitude, it follows that truth can only be achieved when one is in a state of faith, when the individual is in a relation of unity with the ultimate reality, the God of Christianity. But this faith requires passion, and in order to leave behind, or, what is more, to reject Hegelian rational objectivity, a leap must be made into a realm that is opposed to rational understanding. Indeed, the concept of faith reckons that truth cannot even be known without the relation to God. This leap into radical subjectivity is Kierkegaard's "Leap of Faith" which constitutes the entrance into a relationship with God, or with the ultimate reality opposed to us finite beings. Faith, in the Kierkegaardian sense, requires an either/or decision.

Either we make the leap of we don't; mediation is not possible.

Once again, Kierkegaard borrows certain notions from the Hegelian system. He insists that paradox as the greatest stimulus for passion is an absolute necessity. This is reminiscent of the Hegelian dialectic, in which an antithesis to the thesis is necessary in order for the movement to be propelled forward. In Kierkegaard's case the paradox consists in the opposition between humanity and God. He stipulates that paradox is an absolute necessity for the intensification of subjectivity. In fact, the degree of objective uncertainty is proportional to the possibility of faith. Similarly, the less we can rationally be convinced of something, the less objective we are, the more our passion and faith will be strengthened, and the more likely we will be to achieve "eternal happiness." Thus, knowledge gives way to emotion, since it is through emotional involvement that the subjective thinker can introduce that aspect of himself which is his reality.

Kierkegaard's insistence on the importance of emotions (Solomon, 1987, p. 83) brings to mind the Heideggerian concept of moods (Stimmungen or Gemütsverfassungen) which play a vital role in our everyday involvement with life. Simultaneously, the term "emotions" for Kierkegaard includes the realm of the senses. Again we hear echos of Heidegger and his affirmation that Dasein cannot distance

itself from the physical and sensuous involvement with things alongside of it. That, indeed, any attempt to consider Dasein in abstract terms will lead away from its essence. This essence is characterized by both Heidegger and Kierkegaard as the physical, embodied relation in which Dasein stands toward other Daseins and objects present-at-hand.

Kierkegaard has without a doubt paved the way for Heidegger with his rejection of objectivity, but it seems that the latter has reached a compromise in that he at least acknowledged the possibility of objective thought. Kierkegaard insisted in the exclusive validity of the subjective stance, whereas Heidegger considered it to be only one of the various modes of consciousness. The fact that he judged being-in-the-world to be the ultimate and authentic mode of existence does not diminish the fact that other modes are not without value for him.

The System

While Kierkegaard may indeed have a rather limited idea of the meaning of human existence, he nevertheless acknowledges the fact that most individuals are not able to make the ultimate leap of faith. Heidegger had acknowledged this shortcoming in his discussion of Dasein's facticity. Facticity is defined as Dasein's awareness that it is part of the world, that any attempt to remove itself from this

given fact is senseless. Kierkegaard devotes much of his writings to the more common mode of existence, that which Heidegger saw as being cursed or blessed with facticity. The former's ontology therefore describes the different life orientations. It is concerned with the ways in which people structure their lives in order to make them meaningful. His phenomenology of spiritual development, although it is similar to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, is not as exclusive as the latter's system. The different modes of existence that Kierkegaard elaborates are just that: possible modes of making meaning of life. This does not imply that he doesn't approach the discussion in an non-judgemental frame of mind. On the contrary, he makes it quite clear that they indeed constitute a development, beginning with the least adequate mode, and culminating in the most.

It may be of interest to note here that in laying out the spiritual development of man, Kierkegaard reverses Hegel's "path of natural consciousness" (Fløistad, 1983, p. 165). Whereas Hegel's path goes from private to public, from inner to outer, Kierkegaard's journey is inward. For him, the public world is unable to provide for the individual's "eternal happiness," and therefore the individual has to turn inward in order to become radically subjective. Heidegger agreed with Kierkegaard in this respect. For him, the public world and its powers of

persuasion constituted das Man. Dasein, in its fallenness, is at constant risk of giving in to the demands and the temptations of das Man, and is therefore forever in danger of becoming "inauthentic." Authenticity, for Heidegger as for Kierkegaard, must be found within the individual. Therefore, the turn inward constitutes for both a vital act in the production of personal or subjective meaning.

Level one - Acquiescence and the Senses

In **The Present Age** Kierkegaard discusses the most common of all possible modes, that of **public existence.** This mode, reminiscent of Heidegger's "falling" and acquiescing to das Man, is the most disdainful mode of existence. At this level, people "...do not live aesthetically, but neither has the ethical manifested itself in its entirety," (Kierkegaard, 1940, p. 107). Like Heidegger's inauthenticity, this form of existence is characterized by the need to be socially accepted. The individual at this stage must "fit" himself to any environment of inauthenticity, thus becoming inauthentic himself. He does not have the capability to look and to go inward. There can be no mention of true individuality. Moreover,

> ...many lives are wasted. ...the many who are helpless, thoughtless, and sensual, who live superior

> lazy lives and never receive any deeper impression of existence than this meaningless grin. (Kierkegaard, 1940, p. 268)

While the individual's actions might outwardly seem to convey a degree of social solidarity, according to Kierkegaard, this is only an illusion. The individual at this level is not capable of any form of commitment. Acquiescence must not be confused with conscious dedication.

One step up we find ourselves in the **Aesthetic mode** of existence. Here, Kierkegaard acknowledges the positive aspect of living a life devoted to sensuality. But since it is the pursuit and not necessarily the achievement of pleasure which guides this mode, it can only result in a temporary state of satisfaction, never in "eternal happiness." While the title of the work in which Kierkegaard describes this particular mode (**Either / Or**) suggests that a choice has to be made between the positive aspect of the life of the senses and its negative aspect. It seems that he is aware of the fact that neither can be excluded. Kierkegaard's stance on the life of the senses may well be described as ambiguous. At one point he insists that it represents an aspect of human existence which should be a part of life. Contrarily, he hastens to enlighten us of the dangers that such a mode might entail, considering the fact that sensuality may well take over the

whole of existence, in which case the other modes on which he places more value, may be relegated to the sidelines. The quest for a mode of more enduring satisfaction is therefore not yet over.

Level two - The Development of the "I"

It seems that with the **Ethical mode** of existence we have finally reached the highest realm of spiritual development. A distinction is in order on the different forms that this mode can take on. In **Fear and Trembling** Kierkegaard seems to suggest that it is to be understood as an objective spirituality, invoking memories of the Hegelian universality. It is defined as a commitment to a universal system of institutions which structures the life of the individual. By choosing to exist in accordance with the accepted ethical norms of society, the individual will take on stability and orderliness, dignity and significance. In the **Postscript**, on the other hand, the ethical mode of existence comes to mean a mode of inwardness and subjectivity. "The ethical is a correlative to individuality." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 138). In the lower stages of spiritual development, the modes of publicness and of the aesthetic did not reflect a conscious commitment, the ethical mode defined in this manner constitutes a very personal commitment, opposed to the more objective commitment of **Fear and Trembling**. Although

Kierkegaard seems to agree with Hegel on the importance of the achievement of the "universal" as concerns the ethical, for him, the particular, such as family life, is placed on the same level as participation in the life of the state: "The ethical had for Abraham no higher expression than the family life." (Kierkegaard, 1941b, p. 121). therefore family relations are not subordinated to other social institutions. Rather,

> ...it is beautiful and salutary to be the individual who translates himself into the universal ... who has the universal as his home, his friendly abiding-place. (Kierkegaard, 1941b, p. 86)

suggesting that the universal is seen as an umbrella term under which the particular and the subjective find their place. The shortcoming of an ethical stance that is purely objective is the fact that it hinders the individual in the development of his subjectivity and his personality. That this is a serious drawback for Kierkegaard is obvious, since for him to be human implies having a unique personality. It implies making conscious decisions and being responsible for one's own actions rather than relying on others for guidance, a notion which Heidegger inherited from him. While the "objective-ethical" mode does bring with it a commitment, it is a commitment to something that is objective and impersonal, and therefore can not have the same value as a commitment that is more subjective.

This subjectivity implies that the individual makes a commitment to something of his own choosing. It is through this commitment that an individual personality can develop. Without it, the multiplicity of possibility could not be narrowed down. It now becomes clear that for Kierkegaard the unifying power of personality is the choice that one makes, not the Kantian abstract and unconscious act of synthesis. Before the choice is made that will eventually define the personality, there is a myriad of possibilities available. Through the act of choosing, the individual defines himself as an individual. Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, it is not as important **what** one chooses, but **how** one does so. Here again, the notion of acting according to one's Begriff or to one's vocation comes into play. One's actions must coincide with one's personality, but the problem is that only through one's actions does a true personality develop. Consequently, we must assume that the development of a personality that is truly unique parallels the choices that one makes. It must be considered a parallel process, a tension.

> I should like to say that in making a choice it is not so much a question of choosing the right as of the energy, the earnestness, the pathos with which one chooses. Thereby the personality announces its inner infinity, and thereby, in turn, the personality is consolidated. Therefore, even if a man were to choose the wrong, he will nevertheless discover, precisely by reason of the energy with which he chose, that he had chosen the wrong. For the choice being made with the whole inwardness of his personality, his nature is

> purified and he himself brought into immediate relation with the eternal Power whose omnipresence interpenetrates the whole of existence. This transfiguration, this higher consecration, is never attained by that man who chooses merely aesthetically. (Kierkegaard, 1949, p. 106)

The choice involved is an "absolute choice". It represents an enduring commitment to something.

The question that must come to mind is how the "how" of the choosing is accomplished. It seems that every choice I make is directly proportionate to my "I", to my Begriff or vocation. In making a choice, I do so with everything that I am, everything that I know, and with every experience that has accumulated and has shaped my "I". My actions are determined by the form of the "I" at the moment of decision. Simultaneously, the "I" has been produced by experience and by the previous choices that I have made. Fichte's influence on Kierkegaard becomes especially clear in that both would insist that the "how" of choosing can be educated to a degree. If consciousness is choice, then the choices that I make must come directly out of the modes of consciousness that are already established, and will, in turn, produce a further mode of consciousness. However, in order to choose, I must first become conscious of being conscious, otherwise my choices will be limited, and the act of making a choice is meaningless if there are only limited possibilities to choose from. Only by becoming self-conscious, will I be able to attain the goal of

stepping outside of my every-day being-in-the-world and will be able to even become aware of a wide array of choices available to me. In the Kierkegaardian religious mode of existence, this even implies of attaining the goal of eternity by achieving a Buberian I-eternal Thou relationship and by stepping outside of my thrownness. Thus, the highest level of Kierkegaard's spiritual development must imply being capable to attaining a god's eye view of my existence, and thus answering the question for Being.

It would seem that European existentialism has taken Kierkegaard's question of the "how" of choosing extremely serious. While the latter focuses on the issue of choice primarily in his section on the ethical mode of consciousness, the existentialists after Heidegger have made the question an all-encompassing one. Borrowing the notion of fear from both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, they ascertain that the basic choice we make is the choice to live. While we did not choose to be put into the world, we have come to accept this thrownness and subsequently we choose life over death. It seems, however, that before we have become aware of choices, we have learned the fear of death (Heidegger's Angst). While we don't know what death is, we realize that we can avoid this uncertainty through the will to live.

As soon as the development of an "I" is accomplished and self-consciousness is achieved, we are faced with the paradox of being aware of our own consciousness. This puts us in a position of questioning the "why" of our own existence. According to Kierkegaard, it is blind faith which keeps us from being vulnerable to having been thrown. Therefore, the choices that he recommends must be choices that are in direct contrast to rationality. However, the fact that our basic choice is the choice to live, implies that all subsequent choices must be based on and come out of this one choice. In this case the question is no longer whether one can learn to choose, but whether one can learn to realize the necessity of choice. By becoming conscious of the need to choose, the choice has already been made.

Looking back to the aesthetic mode laid out by Kierkegaard, it seems that what one chooses, matters after all. The individual absorbed in this mode of existence makes an absolute choice by devoting himself solely to the pursuit of pleasure. What seems to disqualify this general choice is that it is not a choice which will lead to the consolidation of personality. The unified personality can be achieved only if the commitment one makes does not lead to ultimate frustration as does the aesthetic mode.

The difference in the ethical mode described in **Fear and Trembling**, which constitutes one of objectivism, and that elaborated on in Kierkegaard's other works, is that of

choice. It seems that in the objective stance one makes a single choice, that of an independently determined "universality". In the subjective stance, on the contrary, a twofold choice is called for. First of all one must choose a life of subjective and personal commitment, and secondly one must choose something specific to which one makes such a commitment. For Kierkegaard, subjectivity is greater than objectivity, and therefore, he insists on the separation. Choosing something specific, however, does not merely imply a subjective commitment to an objective goal. What Kierkegaard has in mind is a passionate choice, one that culminates in faith which, in turn, is born out of the paradox of objective uncertainty. The reason he insists on a subjective choice, is that, like in Fichte's system of consciousness, the state of the "I" at the moment of choosing plays a vital role because it determines the quality of the choice made. If the level of self-consciousness has been achieved, the choice one makes will be "returned" to the subjective realm, and will therefore take on meaning. As long as it remains in the objective realm, it can never be appropriated by the "I", and therefore remains meaningless. By merging with the "I" at the moment of choosing, the choice one has made becomes the "I", and the unity between subject and object is achieved. Simultaneously this implies that the "I" is now in a position to overcome the aesthetic realm characterized by

its focus on the earthly, and is in a mode where it can transcend to a higher realm that is endowed with an infinite number of possibilities.

Level three - Faith before Knowledge

For Hegel the achievement of the level of objectivity culminated in absolute knowledge. Kierkegaard saw serious flaws in this type of consciousness. He stipulates that in order to achieve eternal happiness, more is required than the secular mode of the ethical. Therefore, the highest stage to be reached is the **Religious mode** of existence. It is here where the notion of the paradox re-enters into the discussion. For Kierkegaard, the very heart of Christianity is a belief in the paradox that God is both finite and infinite (generally considered a question of either/or), an idea established by the doctrine of Incarnation. This paradox constitutes the ultimate test of faith, since the event of Incarnation is not one which can be explained rationally. Since subjectivity is, for Kierkegaard, a function of passion, it follows that one who believes in this paradox has a high degree of subjectivity.

The reason that Kierkegaard characterizes the Incarnation as the decisive event in Christianity is that it enables man to eliminate the need to transcend the world. The fact that God, the infinite being, appears in the finite realm, makes the achievement of eternal

happiness in this world possible, because through the Incarnation God makes himself accessible to all finite beings. Genuine individuality and eternal happiness can come about in a relationship of human beings to God. This idea must have had a great impact on the thinking of Martin Buber, for this particular relationship reappears in his work as the I-Eternal Thou. By making the leap of faith, by abandoning rationality, the individual will be capable to enter into a God relationship. But the leap of faith must be made in "fear and trembling", it must involve passion, which itself is intensified by the paradox.

After having identified Kierkegaard's stage of spiritual development, it is appropriate to return to the central issue of his work, the question of what it means to exist as a human being. Kierkegaard's focus on the term "to exist" becomes clear once we take into consideration the importance that he places on subjectivity and individuality. We must realize that the objective stance prescribed by Hegel has nothing whatsoever to do with everyday existence.

The notion of existence has traditionally been posed in opposition with that of essence. Pre-Kierkegaardian philosophers back to Plato have generally assumed that essence determines existence, that an object is an object due to its essence, but that that object may or may not exist. This thought has been adequately expressed by Kant

when he addresses the object-hood of things. The fact that certain predicates are suitable to entire categories of objects indicates that these predicates define their essence. From this essence we may then deduce that objects can exist in reality. Kierkegaard objected strongly to this stance, and turned the essence-existence problem of the idealists on its head.

> Factual existence is wholly indifferent to any and all variations in essence, and everything that exists participates without petty jealousy in being, and participates in the same degree. Ideally, to be sure, the case is quite different. But the moment I speak of being in the ideal sense I do no longer speak of being, but of essence. ... such being does not involve it [essence] dialectically in the determination of factual existence, ... (Kierkegaard, 1936, pp. 32/3)

It is obvious that for Kierkegaard faith comes before knowing. He makes a distinction between the ideal (essence) and the factual (existence) mode of being. But what is truly innovative in his philosophy is that for him reasoning does not move from essence to existence, but rather the other way around. Hegel insisted on the unification of thought and being. But Kierkegaard strives to separate subject and object. When Hegel and his predecessors spoke of "existence", they did so by endowing "existence" with a universal ideal in mind. Kierkegaard, contrarily, considers "existence" as the personal existence of the subjective thinker, and hereby foreshadows the Heideggerian concept of Dasein, concerned with its everyday

existence in a "real" and concrete, not an "ideal" and abstract world. Kierkegaard's concern lies in the personal interpretation of being (Heidegger's Seiendem), or in the manner in which the concept of existence applies to the subjective thinker. He is not concerned, as Hegel was before him, with Being in a general sense, but with being as realized in factuality, not with essence but with existence. Kierkegaard does not substitute emotion for reflection. He points out that a mode of reflection is necessary that is rooted in the emotional situation of the subjective thinker. Pure Being, with which the pre-Kierkegaardian philosophers had occupied themselves, has, by itself, no value for him, because it represents a kind of Being that is not that of man. It is merely an abstraction.

Time and Eternity

Concerning Kierkegaard's epistemology, one notion looming large is that of **repetition**. The Platonic concept of recollection establishes knowledge as something that has always been there. It does not place emphasis on the moment of transition from ignorance to knowledge (Wyschogrod, 1954, p. 35). Since the learner has always known, the point where recollection helps him to identify the knowledge can not be of importance. Kierkegaard abandons the notion of recollection and proposes that the change from a state of

ignorance to one of knowing is like the change from non-being to being (Kierkegaard, 1936, p. 13).

> ... **repetition** is a decisive expression for what "recollection" was for the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowledge is a recollection, so will modern philosophy teach that the whole of life is a repetition. The only modern philosopher who had an inkling of this was Leibnitz. Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions; for what is recollected has been, is repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so called is recollected forwards. (Kierkegaard 1941c, pp. 3/4)

With the concept of repetition, Kierkegaard has succeeded in uniting the past and the future. While the forwards direction suggests an element of novelty, it is not entirely new and independent of the past (Wyschogrod, 1954, p. 36). It is connected to that which has been, but simultaneously it is directed toward the future, toward possibility and becoming, concepts which Heidegger will respectively appropriate years later. Becoming, for Kierkegaard, is the transition from possibility to actuality (Wyschogrod, 1954, p. 37).

Here, the Kierkegaardian view of time and temporality is manifested, for again, the dichotomy of essence and existence is played upon. He insists that possibility is essence (ideal), whereas becoming is existence (real), and the very fact that his focus is on becoming brings him to pronounce that the past is not necessary (Kierkegaard, 1936, p. 63). The very emphasis that he places on the

concept of becoming suggests that the past must itself have, at one point, been in the state of becoming, otherwise it wouldn't be what it is now. Once again he connects the past to the future by proposing that the freedom of becoming can only then be ascribed to the future if it is simultaneously ascribed to the past. Thus, the past can never be past if it is conceived of in the present. What is emphasized is the potentiality of the future, and the possibility of the mind to liberate itself from the present. Kierkegaard's concept of becoming is strongly reminiscent of Heidegger's emphasis on the temporality of the future and his insistence that, while there is no "present" as it is generally defined, the past and the future meet in the "presencing".

Like Heidegger after him, Kierkegaard realized that time is a factor closely related to the existential nature of being. Man exists in time and he must operate in and with time. The concept of eternity, however, is that temporal aspect with which Kierkegaard occupied himself more than with so-called finite time:

> ... time itself in its totality is the instant; eternally understood the temporal is the instant, and the instant eternally understood is only 'once.' In vain would the temporal assume an air of importance, count the instants, and add them all together - if eternity has any say in the matter, the temporal never gets farther than, never comes to more than, the "once." For eternity is the opposite; it is not the

> opposite to a single instant (this is meaningless). It is the opposite to the temporal as a whole, and it opposes itself with the power of eternity against the temporal amounting to more than that. (Kierkegaard, 1939, pp. 103/4)

Rather than seeing eternity as an infinite extension of time, as had Hegel, Kierkegaard views it as never-changing presence, it is the present forever (Wyschogrod, 1954, p. 42). If, as Kierkegaard had suggested, eternity is indeed the opposite of the temporal, must we not assume that eternity exists outside of time, and can therefore neither be viewed nor understood with our frame of reference which is steeped in temporality? Also, does this not suggest that, assuming that we could step out of time and take a God's view, all time and the temporal must seem like a mere instant or moment? The condition of theoretically stepping outside of time is equated with Being in the Hegelian sense, therefore "In modern philosophy the abstraction culminates in 'pure being,' but pure being is the most abstract expression for eternity." (Kierkegaard, 1944, p. 75).

If we do step outside of time, and even Kierkegaard admits that in an abstract way we are able to assume that position, then the temporal must indeed seem to us like a series of moments strung one next to the other. If this accumulation of moments make up our conception of time, then Heidegger will be correct in his declaration that the

way in which we normally conceive of time is precisely of an accumulation of moments.

Are we to assume that Kierkegaard now reneges on his position concerning the concept of "pure being?" It seems that he cannot deny the impact that it must make on man's thinking, but he relegates it to the sidelines by insisting that it is merely a part of the being of man, not all of his being. It is that part of him which is eternal.

That man succeeds in capturing his eternal aspect is made clear in **Fragments** where Kierkegaard once again takes up the concept of **moment** (I am assuming that the **instant** discussed in **The Concept of Dread** plays the same role, but has been rendered from the Danish by a different translator).

> And now the moment. Such a moment has a peculiar character. It is brief and temporal indeed, like every moment; it is transient as all moments are; it is past, like every moment in the next moment. And yet it is decisive, and filled with the eternal. Such a moment ought to have a distinctive name; let us call it the Fullness of Time. (Kierkegaard, 1936, p. 13)

Although the moment is defined here as belonging to the past, it belongs at the same time to the future. By calling the moment eternal, Kierkegaard reminds us that eternity past and future are united and result in temporal fullness. They result in a realm which incorporates all the dimensions of time in a seamless, moment to moment fashion, and condenses them into one instant.

It now becomes clear that Kierkegaard's dialectic method unfolds itself in the dichotomy of pure Being and existence as well as in that of the eternal and the temporal. The fact that man constantly finds himself at the center of these opposites is at the basis of Kierkegaard's concept of subjectivity. This subjectivity should not be seen as a doubt regarding the reality of the outside world, and a substitution of an inner, subjective world for it. His concept of doubt is not an epistemological one; it does not have to do with knowledge, but with an act of will.

> The Greek skeptic did not doubt by virtue of his knowledge, but by an act of will (refusal to give assent). From this it follows that doubt can be overcome only by a free act, an act of will, as every Greek skeptic would understand as soon as he had understood himself. (Kierkegaard, 1936, p. 67)

Obviously, Kierkegaard considered his philosophy a return to the Greek tradition (Fløistad, 1983, p. 162). By condemning the doubt of Idealism, he clarifies his stance and asserts that at the center of his ontology is the relation of the individual to the outside world. However, "relation", for him, does not simply mean how one thinks, but rather how one acts in accordance with this thinking. Therefore he is clearly in a position to criticize modern philosophy for posing at its central problem the distinction between subject and object, for apparently it has asked the wrong question. Rather than considering

knowledge, Kierkegaard has opted to make his basic distinction between that of pure Being, which has nothing to do with man, and existence, which has everything to do with man.

Part 2: Husserl's Phenomenology

To understand Edmund Husserl and the impact that his philosophy has had on Western thought, it is important to situate him properly in the context of the tradition to which he is heir. His roots are to be found in Greek philosophy, and he saw it his mission to revive the ancient Greek ideal of pure science.

> Spiritual Europe has a birthplace... It is the ancient Greek nation in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. Here there arises a **new sort of attitude** of individuals toward their surrounding world. And its consequence is the breakthrough of a completely new sort of spiritual structure, rapidly growing into a systematically self-enclosed cultural form; the Greeks called it **philosophy**. Correctly translated, in the original sense, that means nothing other than universal science, science of the universe, of the all-encompassing unity of all that is. (Husserl, 1954, p. 276)

The philosophical method which he employed and christened Phenomenology has, therefore, as its goal the establishment of a science of philosophy (Elliston, 1977, p. 72). While most philosophers of this century were relegated to responding to previous philosophical systems (as is the case with Hegel's system, which seemed

impossible to top), the development of phenomenology is truly an innovation. Certainly Husserl himself must have seen it in this light, for he considered phenomenology a revolution and a new beginning in philosophical inquiry which would put an end to the "unscientific" endeavors of his predecessors. But he was also the first to admit that his point of departure is without a doubt Cartesian in the sense that it stresses the primacy of the first-person experience. Also, there are distinctly Kantian elements in his thought, namely the search for the basic a priori principles that govern human understanding. At the center of Husserl's phenomenology is the search for the foundations (or background) of consciousness. The method he developed is first and foremost an epistemological enterprise, concerned with that which is basic to all human understanding and experience.

While phenomenology owes much to Descartes, there are points in which Husserl vehemently disagreed with him. These concern mainly Descartes' method itself, such as the mind/body split, and his insistence that we know the mind better than the body. Another point of disagreement is Descartes' skepticism - the supposition that all of our beliefs are false, although in Husserl's concept of epoché we will see a re-working of this sort of skepticism.

Husserl was dismayed by the relativism and historicism of Nietzsche and Dilthey which, in his view, invited

skepticism. At the same time he rejected the empiricists' "natural standpoint", because taking it for granted implied failure. He wanted to return to a philosophy of the Absolute. By trying to locate the Absolute in consciousness, he follows in the footsteps of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. As for them, so for Husserl, truth is to be found in consciousness. This explains his starting point which is modelled after Descartes' insistence that our own consciousness is self-evident. Simultaneously, it explains why Husserl never questioned the implications of this concept.

Phenomenology is characterized as a "return to the things themselves," a term which, in itself, is reminiscent of the Kantian thing-in-itself. Whereas Kant insisted on the existence of independent objects, Husserl's "things" are not only objects but phenomena and intuitions coupled with experience. "Phenomena" in the Husserlian sense, however, should not be equated with "experiences", since such an idea would reinforce the Cartesian dualism which he tries to abandon. It would evoke a differentiation between experiences and the objects themselves. Husserl's "phenomenon", contrarily, is the object as it is experienced, and includes something of both the experience and of the object itself. A phenomenon is that which "immediately presents itself" to us. Thus, it is not something different than the physical object, also it is

not something different than experience. While Kant distinguishes between phenomena, given in intuition, and noumena, things in themselves, Husserl rejects this distinction and asserts that phenomena **are** the things in themselves. It follows that for Husserl the Kantian distinction between the faculties of sensibililty and of the intellect must seem nonsensical, since his own concept of intuition must include parts of both of these Kantian faculties.

In order to gain a fuller understanding of Husserl's refusal to make this distinction, it is helpful to examine the notion of intentionality, which is a central aspect in Husserl's work, and which he had inherited from his teacher Franz Brentano. Husserl, unlike Brentano, claimed that in phenomenological description, it made no difference whatsoever whether the object in question was one experienced in "reality", in a dream, or in a hallucination. He insists on the intentional neglect of the existence of objects, indeed he claims that the phenomenologist is not concerned with objects except as they appear to consciousness. Husserl focuses on the ontological question raised by intentionality, which concerns the mode of being of intentional directedness itself. The distinction that Husserl insisted on is one between the act of consciousness and the object of consciousness. According to him, intentional acts are not

self-enclosed processes needing to be related to things external to them. Rather, intentionality is our very openness to reality. But despite the distinction, there must be a correlation between act and object, since every act takes an object, and every object is the object of an act (Weizsäcker, 1990, p. 198). What traditional philosophy has called "experience" is nothing more that the correlation between the intentional act (the experiencing) and the intentional object (the experienced). It makes no sense to define the phenomenon either as intuition or as an object. Contrarily, the phenomenon as the intentional object of consciousness is an object as intuited. It is what it is only because of the fact that we are conscious of it. Seen in this light, we come to understand that phenomenology actually addresses two questions: the one about the conscious act and the one about the intentional object. However, we must bear in mind that the two can never be completely separated.

Level one - Suspending all Prejudices

If we are to consider phenomenology as a special sort of philosophical investigation, we must take into consideration some of the claims that Husserl has made in regard to his procedure. One such claim concerns the demand that phenomenology is "presuppositionless", and that the results of phenomenology are absolutely true and

unconditional. Husserl insists that phenomenology rely solely on description and not advance a philosophical theory. Phenomenology must be free of any theory, because a philosophical theory would lead to bias and to dogmatism. If any philosophical investigation were not to be presuppositionless, the philosopher would be in constant danger to include in his thinking some unquestioned element which he would take for granted. In order to prevent this and to assure that phenomenology remains indeed description and does not turn into theory, Husserl devises a series of disciplines, one of which is his insistence on the suspension of the natural standpoint (epoché). He further claims that by accepting such traditional metaphors as seeing the mind as a container, we base our thinking on presuppositions and therefore take a step away from pure description. The demand that phenomenology remains presuppositionless must eventually bring us to the realization that the concepts of phenomenology can only be analyzed in terms of the concepts of phenomenology themselves. It is in danger of becoming a circular argument, a problem that has often been focussed on by critics of phenomenology. It seems that every other philosophy runs the risk of being able to defend its proposition only through its own concepts and principles and this sort of criticism is not really valid.

The empiricists before Husserl had claimed that all concepts are abstractions from experience, and that, as a result, our knowledge of the world is empirical knowledge. For them, the only necessary truths were trivial and conventional truths. For Husserl, on the other hand, the very structure of human consciousness as well as the "essences" make necessary truths true. These essences cannot be discovered through traditional method, but only through a special discipline, that of phenomenology. Phenomenology is an examination of the essential structures of consciousness with the goal of describing necessary and universal truths of experience.

Level three - The Power of Being

What is necessary for there to be any experience at all? For Husserl it is without a doubt the essences that make things what they are. Heeding the limitations of language, we might describe essences as categories in that they are not concerned with objects in particular but with that aspect of objects that makes them recognizable as objects at all. In other words, essences provide us with the possibility that we may not only see particular objects, but that we are able to see kinds of objects. We are able to see now that, in contrast to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, Husserl did not rely on deduction or dialectic, but insisted on evidence. However, this kind of evidence must

not be confused with the evidence of the empiricists who relied on the senses. Rather, Husserl speaks of a kind of evidence that can be directly intuited with a special method of philosophical investigation. And with his phenomenology he means to (re-)discover a body of indubitable necessary truths. In this sense, phenomenology thinks the Kantian transcendental viewpoint to its end in that Husserl not only claims that the truth must be found in the self, but that the self itself must find it there. The self is not only the place where the truth can be found, but it is at the same time the discoverer.

Here, it may be necessary to re-examine a claim made above about Husserl's contempt for what he calls the "natural standpoint." In fact, he never disclaimed the validity of this ordinary way of thinking in everyday life. When doing philosophy, it can only lead to absurdities. If a thinker cannot distance himself from the natural standpoint, it follows that he brings to his investigation an entire baggage of presuppositions, biases, and taken-for-granted notions which necessarily prevent him from getting at the truth.

One such accepted notion that we have learned from traditional philosophy is, of course, the idea that objects are simply "given" to us. Although, at times, Descartes' doubt might affect us, and we begin to wonder whether the object we perceive is actually present, all doubting and

rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint.

> ... Zweifelhaftigkeit besteht in dem Sinne, dass ein Zweifelhaft-werden und Nichtig-werden denkbar ist, die Möglichkeit des Nichtseins, als prinzipielle, niemals ausgeschlossen ist. ... Am absoluten Sein der Erlebnisse ist dadurch nichts geändert, ja, sie bleiben immer zu all dem vorausgesetzt. (Husserl, 1950, p. 109)
>
> ... doubt exists in the sense that a becoming-doubtful and a becoming-nothing is possible for thought. That the possibility of nothingness is never to be excluded in principle. ... This does not change anything about the absolute Being of experiences. In fact, experiences remain always a presupposition to all doubt.

This standpoint is only capable of treating cognition as a fact of nature. It assumes that all knowledge comes from experience and denies the Kantian supposition that there must also be a priori knowledge which is not dependent on experience.

Level three - Leaving Existence behind

In order to leave behind the natural standpoint, full of biases and presuppositions, and to reach the phenomenological standpoint where we can concentrate on pure description, we must apply what Husserl calls **epoché**. Whereas Descartes had insisted that we doubt the existence of everything, Husserl suggests that we simply "bracket" existence, because, as such, it is entirely unimportant to experience. This phenomenological reduction by which we

suspend judgement about the natural world is, according to Husserl, the most important means to arrive at a frame of mind in which we are able to discover the importance of things without being burdened with unnecessary judgements.

The reduction of experience to an intuition of pure consciousness enables us to recognize that there are objects of consciousness itself. It allows us to distance ourselves from the spatial/temporal existence of objects, and to recognize that whatever we know about these "external" objects we know only through the intentional objects of consciousness. Phenomenology, then, is always a description of objects for consciousness rather than for common sense. Husserl's epoché urges us to describe consciousness and its objects rather than the world and its objects. As has been pointed out above, the epoché seems almost like a reworking of Descartes' doubt, but where the latter is skeptical of all our every-day assumptions, Husserl neither doubts nor seeks a proof, but only attempts to describe what it is for us to believe these things.

Simultaneously, the phenomenological reduction attempts to guarantee that we do not see individuals but essences. It is an attempt to reduce descriptions to descriptions of essences and to focus attention on the meaning of phenomena rather than on the particulars of an experience. This form of investigation links Husserl to

Kant in that it is reminiscent of the latter's insistence on the categories.

It is precisely Husserl's categorical intuition on which Heidegger focuses, as a point of divergence, from his teacher. While he acknowledges (in the Zähringer Seminars) that both he and Husserl had come to philosophy through Brentano, it was the later Brentano who influenced Heidegger (namely **Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles)**. Husserl got his start with Brentano's early works.

> Ein seltsames und bezeichnendes Zusammentreffen bei Husserl und Heidegger, dass beide ihren ersten Schritt mit demselben Philosophen, aber nicht mit dem selben Werk gemacht haben. Mein Brentano, sagt Heidegger lächelnd, ist der des Aristoteles! (Heidegger, 1986b, pp. 385/6)
>
> It is a strange and telling coincidence that both Husserl and Heidegger have taken their first steps with the same philosopher, but not with the same work. My Brentano, says Heidegger smilingly, is the Brentano of Aristotle!

In his **Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt** of 1874, Brentano attempted to describe the essential structure of mental experiences and then to classify them according to their natural order. He came to the conclusion that the essence of mental experience is intentionality - the minding-of-the-meant - therefore Husserl's insistence on the importance of intentionality. But, as concerns Heidegger's judgement, Husserl's major achievement was the

discovery that the being of entities can itself be rendered present as a phenomenon through categorical intuition. In Husserl's **Logische Untersuchungen**, the second part of the Sixth Logical Investigation has as its title "Sensibility and Understanding." The sixth chapter which is at the beginning of this second part carries the title "Sensible Intuition and Categorical intuition", which proves for Heidegger that Husserl takes as his starting point sensible intuition in order to reach the realm of categorical intuition. For Husserl, categories are more than just form. The Categorical Intuition implies an intuition which lets one recognize a category or similarly, an intuition (a being-present for), which is directed immediately toward the category. Husserl showed that no part of an assertion can find intuitive fulfillment in sensuous perception. In the statement "the paper is white", the "is" cannot be a sensuous intuition. The "is" or the "being" is in actuality a Überschuss (surplus or excess) over the content of sensuous intuition. But once the "is" has been freed from its status as a mere copula, it can be seen as a directly given phenomenon. Since categorical intuition is in the same manner as sensuous intuition (in that it is giving), Husserl has come to the concept of the Categorical Intuition via analogy.

Part 3: Heidegger's Debt to Husserl

While Heidegger agrees with Husserl to this point, he points out that the latter had stopped short of this conclusion. Husserl had failed to think the thought to its end by asking for the nature of the absence from out of which being is disclosed as presence. Heidegger acknowledges that Husserl's great achievement was the Vergegenwärtigung (the making-present) of the Sein which is phenomenologically present in the category.

> Durch diese Leistung ... hatte ich endlich einen Boden: "Sein" ist kein blosser Begriff, ist keine Abstraktion, die sich auf dem Weg der Ableitung ergeben hat. Der Punkt jedoch, über den Husserl nicht hinauskommt, ist der folgende: nachdem er das Sein gleichsam als **Gegebenes** gewonnen hat, fragt er ihm doch nicht weiter nach. Die Frage "Was besagt Sein?" entfaltet er nicht. Für Husserl war da nicht der Schatten einer möglichen Frage, weil es sich für ihn von selbst verstand, dass "Sein" Gegenstand-Sein bedeutet. (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 378)
>
> Through this accomplishment ... I finally had ground under my feet: "Being" is not a mere notion, not an abstraction which has come about through deduction. The point which Husserl does not surpass, is the following: After he has won Being, so to speak, as a **given**, he does not continue to ask about it. He does not develop the question "What does Being mean?" For Husserl, there existed not even the possibility of a question, because for him it was self-evident that "Being" means Being-as-an-Object.

Precisely from the fact that Husserl is content with considering Sein an entity or an object, stems Heidegger's dissatisfaction with his teacher and his claim that the question for Being does not exist in Husserl's work.

Husserl's ultimate interest lay in the epistemological clarification of pure consciousness. He was concerned with finding the foundations of knowledge. Heidegger, on the other hand, (and with him other existential phenomenologists) is in search for those universal features that make a human being human. For him, to be a person is to be in a position, and be able, to raise the question of who one is. The fact that man cannot find out who he is renders this quest into one not so much concerned with knowledge, but with the acknowledgment that man is ultimately a decision-maker. Where Husserl focussed on knowing objects in the world, Heidegger and other existentialists countered his endeavor with the insistence that we do not know objects, but use them instead. For Heidegger, intentionality is primarily evident in ordinary habitual experience, and he suggests that it should be treated as such, and not, as Husserl would have it, by analogy with the theoretical standpoint. His claim that Husserl did not see everydayness as the basic field of intentionality leads him to proclaim that the latter read the natural attitude from a prejudicial scientific viewpoint.

Back to Existence

And so Husserl's epoché, the insistence that in our quest for the truth we must suspend the natural standpoint,

is widely rejected by the Existentialists. They, including Heidegger, realize that we indeed must begin with the natural attitude in order to come close to understanding the role we play in the world. Because what we are primarily concerned with is not mere perception of objects, but the pragmatic dealings (Umgehen mit) with the objects of concern. And while for Heidegger the phenomenological method is a thematization of ordinary life, the implication stands strong that we do not "look back" to pure consciousness in the act of reflection, but that we "look ahead" into the realm of possibilities that is the practical dimension of objects.

Rather than suspending the natural standpoint, as Husserl had prescribed, Heidegger suggests that what must be suspended is the prejudice of the individual experience. That which is priorly known when one knows an object is the Wozu, the what-for. As a matter of fact, the only reason we are able to concern ourselves with objects is because we have already understood it as being for the purpose of something. It is precisely this pre-reflective relation that we have to objects that constitutes for him our primordial involvement with the world, and he is certainly not going to let this viewpoint be suspended.

Insofar as man already knows the being-dimension of objects, Heidegger considers man to be beyond entities (his Immer-schon-vorweg-sein - always-already-being-ahead). And

this disclosure is what he calls "world-disclosure", which has its basis in the constant movement directed to the future.

The Tension between Presence and Absence

We can now see that Heidegger's conception of time and his concept of Ereignis (appropriation) has its roots a) in the Husserlian method for analyzing the intentional disclosure of being and b) in the Aristotelian concept of movement. For Aristotle, a moving object is one that does not fully appear, is never fully present, but that does appear, in its incompletion. Its presence is always mixed with absence. Background and foreground are in a constant tension. Therefore, to know a moving object means to keep present to mind not only the present object but also the presence of the absence that makes it a moving object. In the third Le Thor Seminar in 1969, Heidegger picks up this idea in his discussion of Aletheia and Logos.

> Dem Wechsel unterworfen sein, sich ändern, das ist sich von etwas Früherem entfernen: abwesen. Die Idee allein ist reine Anwesenheit, nie abwesende Anwesenheit, ein Sich-beständig-vergegenwärtigen. Das ist es, was im Übermass da ist: die anwesende Anwesenheit. (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 37)
>
> To be subjugated to fluctuation, to change, is to distance oneself from something earlier: absenting. The idea alone is pure presence, never absenting presence, a constant presencing. That is that which is there in excess: presencing presence.

In this discussion, Heidegger tries to make the point that ideas are just as anwesend (present) as are physical objects. We must wait until a later discussion to hear the details of the "presence of the absence." In the same seminar, Heidegger touches on the Aristotelian notion of movement as phenomenon (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 354), and comes to the conclusion that the latter's word for this "presence of the absence" is dynamis, a word for being, which Heidegger translates with Ereignung (the appropriation into presence of what is not fully present). Aristotle concentrated on the movement of physical objects. For Heidegger, this movement makes itself felt in all that comes from unknownness into knownness or from forgottenness into remembrance. Through all of these modes of disclosure, phenomena comes into presence (Murray, 1978, p. 109). It is of paramount importance that for him, the factor of absence does not constitute a negation of the presence. Rather, it is a form of privation, of Mangel (lack) which is firmly intertwined with the presence. Therefore, the absential dimension is the same entity as not being fully present.

According to Heidegger, the appropriation process, the process of movement and of appearance, was forgotten with Plato who insisted that we concentrate on only one of the phenomenon's possible modes: that of eidos. After Plato, the being of objects is interpreted as stable disclosedness. For Plato, only that which is unmoving and

stable is meaningfully present. Temporal, moving entities are relegated to the status of the non-real. For this reason, Heidegger considers man's fallenness and his absorption in objects-as-present a normal consequence of the very nature of disclosure.

The preoccupation with movement and with the concept of Ereignis in Heidegger's later works brings to mind Bergson's deliberations on the nature of movement and his musings of why it is that we see a stable entity as the paradigm, and a moving entity as a deviation from that norm rather than vice versa. Derrida's work on the nature of supplementation focuses in part on the same view, and he suggests, among other examples, that traditional philosophy has long considered motion to be a supplement to stability. Of superior interest is the discovery in the area of quantum mechanics which stipulates that the electrons within a given atom are simultaneously at different places, and can only be pinpointed at a certain point through the act of observation. Just as these electrons are in all of their possible states at the same time, so is Heidegger's disclosed object in all of its possible states at the moment when it is described as a phenomenon.

> The only way to fix a particle in a single location is to observe it. Through some process physicists don't pretend to understand fully, the act of observation not only reveals a particle's condition, but actually determines it, forcing it to select just one of the possible states. (Freedman, 1992, p. 65)

The old Eastern parable about the falling tree which Heidegger must have been familiar with, especially after his increased interest in Eastern Philosophy, gets a new twist with the Schrodinger experiment in which, while unobserved, a radio-active sample in a box would exist in all its possible states, that is emitting and not emitting radiation. Only the act of observation would cause a Geiger counter to detect radiation. And so it is with Heidegger's act of appropriation. While he has gone far beyond the Kantian question of whether an objective reality does exist or whether we make that reality what it is through our interaction, he came to the conclusion that the act of appropriation "gives" (from es gibt) the various forms of presentness to which we must awaken. If metaphysics has indeed taught us to forget being with its withholding the absent aspect of presence, then to return to appropriation means to enter into the true movement that is disclosure, and to accept that presence in the sense of Anwesenheit. This implies a bivalent structure of presence and absence.

In a 1943 essay entitled "Aletheia", a discussion of Heraclitus' fragment 16, Heidegger struggles with the same dichotomy, and he comes to the conclusion that when Heraclitus names the "never-sinking" or the "never-disappearing", he

> nennt dem Sinne nach die Verbergung, nämlich das niemals Eingehen in sie. Der Spruch meint zugleich und

> gerade das immerwährende Aufgehen, die eh und je währende Entbergung. ... Entbergung **und** Verbergung, nicht als zwei verschiedene, nur aneinandergeschobene Geschehnisse, sondern als Eines und das Selbe. (Heidegger, 1990d, pp. 261/2)
>
> names in essence concealment, namely the never-entering-into-it. The passage refers, at the same time, and especially to the always-lasting disclosure, the lasting recovery as it is. ... Recovery **and** concealment, not as two different events pushed next to one another, but as One and the Same.

While it has become standard practice to translate Entbergung with the English term "disclosure" or "unconcealment", Heidegger himself points out in the same essay (Heidegger, 1990d, p. 263) that the sense of Bergung or bergen (safe-keeping) must not elude us when we examine this concept. In Verbergung (concealment), the object or the idea is not just hidden away from observation, but simultaneously "preserved". At the moment of disclosure, a similar phenomenon must occur: The object or idea must still be preserved and safely kept in order that it may again enter into Verbergung.

But even the Pre-Socratics seem to have ignored the bivalence of concealment and unconcealment in their everyday thinking. Why else would the Heraclitan fragment 72 point out that precisely the Logos, which is encountered everyday, remains a distant notion for everyday man? Mortal men are constantly faced with the concealing/unconcealing gathering, but

> ... sie kehren sich dabei ab von der Lichtung und kehren sich nur an das Anwesende, das sie im alltäglichen Verkehr mit allem und jedem unmittelbar antreffen. Sie meinen, dieser Verkehr mit dem Anwesenden verschaffe ihnen wie von selbst die gemässe Vertrautheit. Und dennoch bleibt es ihnen fremd. Denn sie ahnen nichts von jenem, dem sie zugetraut sind: vom Anwesen, das lichtend jeweils erst Anwesendes zum Vorschein kommen lässt. Der LOGOS, in dessen Lichtung sie gehen und stehen, bleibt ihnen verborgen, ist für sie vergessen. (Heidegger, 1990d, p. 273)
>
> ... they turn away from the clearing and turn only toward that which is present, that with which they come into immediate contact in their everyday dealings. They think that this dealing with that which is present will secure them the appropriate intimacy as if by itself. And still, it remains foreign to them. For they have no inkling of that with which they are meant to be united: of presence, which illuminates that which is present and lets it come into unconcealment. LOGOS, in whose clearing they walk and stand, remains hidden for them, is forgotten for them.

While Heidegger will always stress the importance of this "unaware" realm, he nevertheless points out with regret that ordinary man, even pre-socratic ordinary man, lived his life holding certain assumptions about the being of entities, because "[die Allermeisten] leben aus [dem Logos], ohne zu wissen, wovon sie sprechen. Sie sagen **ist** ohne zu wissen, was **ist** eigentlich bedeutet." (Heidegger, 1990d, p. 227). ("[most men] live out of [the logos] without knowing what they are talking about. They say **is** without knowing what **is** actually means") In his analysis of the Heraclitan Fragment No. 72, Heidegger points out repeatedly that "everyday man" lives in a relation to day and night. But he notices only the game of change or the

moment of change from day to night. He does not realize that this game of change (Wechselspiel) is in actuality the very Being of night/day. Therefore, by focusing either on night or on day, ordinary man neglects the essence of night/day, which is its Miteinanderzusammengehörigkeit (belonging-together-one-with-the-other) to be found in the "hidden middle" of night and day. One cannot be what it is without the other, and therefore must not be contemplated separately.

At first glance it seems that, with statements like this, Heidegger is contradicting his basic premise, namely that Dasein finds its most primordial meaning in the realm of pre-conceptual consciousness, in Being-in-the-world. However, considering the stress he places on the notion of "return", we can assume that the Logos cannot and could not be grasped, not even by the average Pre-Socratic, without the effort of philosophical thought, i.e. without listening to "the thinking of thought."

Part 4: Heidegger and the Unity of Time, Space, and Body

The notions of time, space, and embodiment are irrevocably intertwined in the later works of Martin Heidegger. These pages will focus on the treatment of embodiment as it appears in Heidegger's later works under the concept of the Leibphänomen. Whereas Descartes had insisted that we know the mind better than the body,

Heidegger distances himself from this view and suggests instead that even the most abstract feats that we accomplish "mentally" have as their presupposition the "being-there" of a body.

Measuring Time

In the **Zollikoner Seminare**, a series of seminars which Heidegger gave for a number of Swiss psychoanalysts between 1959 and 1969, time is one of the topics he tries to grapple with. In his introductory remarks about the method of inquiry into time, he suggests that the "how" of formulating the question is what is most important. He comes to the conclusion that, if we are to let phenomena "speak" to us, then it is necessary for us to bracket all our common assumptions, everything we already know about time. Heidegger intends to begin his inquiry with the vorhanden and zuhande" thing which we use for time measurement: the clock. But, since there is no measuring without "now"-saying, we fall back again into our traditional assumptions, where the "now" as present has priority over the other two "directions" of time. Such expressions as "today", "tomorrow", or "before" are time determinations which, however, do not determine time as time. Instead of giving (geben) time, they state (angeben) time. In this instance the German language aids Heidegger, since between geben and angeben there is an obvious

connection. The expression that Heidegger is trying to approximate is that of geben. Geben lets us arrive at the es gibt or "it gives" time, a concept that I will discuss below. This "always already being there" takes us then to another expression, that of "having time":

> Dieses Messen von Zeit ist jedoch nur möglich, wenn dergleichen wie Zeit schon gegeben ist, wenn wir die Zeit schon **haben**. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 53, author's emphasis)
>
> This measuring of time is, however, only possible, when such a thing like time is already given (gegeben), when we already **have** time.

By examining this "having" of time, we become aware of the fact that we always only have time "for" something, a point that Heidegger makes as well in the **Le Thor Seminars** of 1968 and 1969. This "what for" Heidegger calls Deutsamkeit (distinctability), and Deutsamkeit is one of the characteristics of time. The other characteristics of which he reminds us are Datiertheit (datedness), Zeitliche Weite (temporal breadth), and Öffentlichkeit (public-ness). We have already encountered Datiertheit in such temporal pronouns as "then", "tomorrow", or "after". Zeitliche Weite implies that the "now" of our common-sense linear time does not necessarily have to refer to a moment, but rather, it can mean a wider range of time, such as "tonight." In Öffentlichkeit, he means that the "now" that I am referring

to at any given time, is not merely my personal "now", but is understood by those around me.

The fifth characteristic of time, that of Privation, implies that a negative statement such as "I don't have time" does not bring about a negation of time exclusively, but rather, it modifies the "having" of time. Something is missing, just as a sickness is not the exclusive negation of a psycho-somatic condition, but a privation. It is this fifth characteristic to which Heidegger will refer repeatedly in his exploration of the phenomenon of time.

By elaborating on these characteristics of time, Heidegger is now in a position to move a step ahead. He reminds us that "now" time is one-dimensional, because the three dimensions that we attribute to space must be sequential. They are not simultaneous, as they are in space. We cannot take "dimension" in any spatial sense, as Bergson had done with his assertion that calculative time is spatial time, based on the notion that we are "in" time. It is precisely the first four characteristics of time listed above that make it possible for us to experience the three dimensions of time as simultaneously (gleichzeitig). Concurrently, Heidegger concedes that the three dimensions of time have the same origin (they are gleichursprünglich), but are not open to us to the same degree (not gleichmässig). If we focus on one dimension, the other two

necessarily move into the background, thus the focussing brings with it another instance of privation.

This "having" of time poses another problem. In what sense are we to take this "having"? It is clearly not the case that we as the "having" subject are active in any manner. Nor does anything happen to the thing that is "had" during the "having." Therefore, "having" has nothing to do with possession. To elucidate, Heidegger draws once more on the phenomenon of Angst, which already was of vital importance for him thirty years earlier. Now, "to have Angst" (the German expression for "to be afraid") is used to demonstrate that it is not the fear which I have that makes me afraid, but rather, it is the being in fear. The fear is not the object of the "having", but it is the having itself. Therefore, the "having" of "having time" is present-at-hand:

> Im Zeit-haben für etwas bin ich auf das Wofür gerichtet, auf das, was zu tun ist, was bevorsteht. Ich bin dessen **gewärtig**, bin dies jedoch so, dass ich in einem dabei noch bei dem verweile, was mir gerade **gegenwärtig** ist, was ich **gegenwärtige**, wobei überdies, ... ich zugleich behalte, was soeben und vorher mich beschäftigte. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 84, author's emphasis)
>
> In having time for something, I am directed toward the "for what", toward that which needs to be done, that which is forthcoming. I am expectant (gewärtig) of it, but only in such a manner that at the same time, I am still with that which is **present** to me, which I presence (gegenwärtige), and in addition, ... I retain (behalte) that which has just now or before occupied me.

Here is the unity of time that Heidegger attempted to achieve already in **Sein und Zeit.** It is evident now that "having time" is not like having an object. It is temporality which is itself the "abode of humankind." Therefore, if we have confirmed above that time has always already been there, we are neglecting the phenomenon of the "having", because we stipulate that time is something present-at-hand, as if it were an object. Since it is our relation to time which is paramount to our being-in-the-world, the time "for something" is created in the Gewärtigen, the Gegenwärtigen, and the Behalten.

> Dies ist in seiner dreifaltigen Einheit die Zeitigung der Zeit, die wir haben und nicht haben. Hierbei hält sich noch ganz im Dunkel, wie die Einheit dieses Dreifaltigen der Zeitigung zu bestimmen ist. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 86)
>
> This is, in its three-fold unity, the temporality of time, which we have and don't have. By establishing this, it is still in the dark, how the unity of this three-fold of temporality is to be determined.

Just as calculative "now"-time is a derivation of primordial temporality, so is physical space a derivation of existential spatiality for Heidegger. Although a detailed, yet preliminary discussion of space precedes that of time in **Sein und Zeit**, it is not until the concept of temporality and Sorge has been expanded, that Heidegger makes the move to argue that spatiality is grounded in temporality, a notion which he later discards: "Der Versuch

in "Sein und Zeit" Paragraph 70, die Räumlichkeit des Daseins auf die Zeitlichkeit zurückzuführen, lässt sich nicht halten." ("The attempt in **Being and Time**, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable." Heidegger, 1969b, p. 24).

The Spatiality of Existence

The first mention that Heidegger makes of space in **Sein und Zeit** is in section 12, where he discusses being-in-the-world as the basic mode of Dasein. He acknowledges the games that language plays with us by focussing on the being-**in**-the-world:

> Das In-Sein meint so wenig ein räumliches "Ineinander" Vorhandener, als "in" ursprünglich gar nicht eine räumliche Beziehung der genannten Art bedeutet; "in" stammt von inan-, wohnen, habitare, sich aufhalten; "an" bedeutet: ich bin gewohnt, vertraut mit, ... (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 54)
>
> The Being-in does not mean a spatial inclusion of things present-at-hand, since "in" in its original sense did not mean a spatial relation in this manner; "in" stems from inan-, to live, habitare, to dwell; "at" means: I am used to, familiar with, ...

Although the expression "being-in-the-world" would have us think of a thing (Dasein) enclosed within a space (world), Heidegger insists that this notion of "being-in" is to be regarded as a category of metaphysics, while the "being-in", to which he is referring, is an existential. However, he is quick to add that under no circumstances must we make

a separation between body and mind, thus seeing the bodily "being-in" as an addition to the spiritual (geistig) level. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 56). That this is a notion which philosophy has taught us, will also be taken up by Derrida in his treatment of the supplementary character which is embedded in all metaphysical dichotomies. As we have seen before, "being-in" is characterized by Sorge. It is not an attribute which Dasein has at times, and at other times can do without. Dasein has a spatiality of involvement in addition to that of inclusion in the sense of having an inside-ness in a spatial receptacle. In these two ways of being become evident the distinction between things present-to-hand (Zeug, tools) and things present-at-hand (things alongside of us).

> So etwas wie Gegend muss zuvor entdeckt sein, soll das Weisen und Vorfinden von Plätzen einer umsichtig verfügbaren Zeugganzheit möglich werden. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 103)
>
> Something like a region (Gegend) must first be discovered if there is to be any possibility of allotting or coming across places for an equipmental whole that is circumspectively at one's disposal.

Heidegger's example is the workshop, the region, in which a specific place for the tools is possible. As in the discussion on temporality, we can detect that it is the Sorge which makes up Dasein's being-in-the-world, and which provides the possibility of Dasein's spatiality:

> Räumlichkeit des Daseins, das wesenhaft kein Vorhandensein ist, kann weder so etwas wie Vorkommen an einer Stelle im "Weltraume" bedeuten, noch Zuhandensein an einem Platz. Beides sind Seinsarten des innerweltlich begegnenden Seienden. Das Dasein aber ist "in" der Welt im Sinne des besorgend-vertrauten Umgangs mit dem innerweltlich begegnenden Seienden. Wenn ihm sonach in irgendeiner Weise Räumlichkeit zukommt, dann ist das nur möglich auf dem Grunde dieses In-Seins. (Heidegger, 1986a, pp. 104/5)
>
> The spatiality of Dasein, which is essentially not a present-at-hand can thus mean neither something like existence at a certain place in the "Weltraum" (world space), nor can it mean a being present-to-hand at a certain place. Both of these are modes of being of the innerworldly being. Dasein, however, is "in" the world in the sense that it deals with beings encountered within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with familiarity. So if spatiality belongs to it in any way, that is possible only because of this being-in.

This spatiality exhibits the characteristics of Ent-fernung (dis-tance) and Ausrichtung (directionality or orientation). Whereas Ausrichtung is explained in the availability of tools in a certain region, and will be further elaborated on in the second part of **Sein und Zeit** and below in this paper, Ent-fernung needs further clarification. Although often translated with "distance" or "dis-tance", I would prefer "dys-tance", since the prefix Ent- in German implies "something that is against". Ent-fernung, as it is used by Heidegger, conveys the "abolition" of distance. Like Leder in **The Absent Body**, who speaks of "dys-appearance", I believe that the English prefix "dys-" comes closer to what Heidegger means by Ent-fernung.

Ent-fernung has nothing to do with measurable distances. Rather, it conveys the notion of accessibility and above all, of the interest that I take in it. Therefore, tools, when being used, have the highest degree of Ent-fernung, because in my absorption with them, I grant them a high degree of accessibility. In this manner, the term Nähe (nearness) also takes on a new meaning, different from its everyday usage: "Die Näherung ist nicht orientiert auf das körperbehaftete Ich-ding, sondern auf das besorgende In-der-Welt-sein, ..." ("Bringing-near is not oriented towards the I-thing encumbered with a body, but towards concernful being-in-the-world, ..." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 107).

Heidegger does not leave it at this explanation of Dasein's spatiality. He takes the topic up again after his treatise on temporality, and it is in section 70 that the problem of space arises anew. Here, he tries to find a connection between the structure of temporality and that of spatiality, and he proceeds in doing so with the help of the notion of Ausrichtung (directionality or orientation). Although he disclaims the connection in his later works, and, although much of the secondary literature mentions his attempt only in passing, it is quite interesting to observe how he proceeds.

Heidegger reminds us again that "...Zeitlichkeit ist der Seinssinn der Sorge." ("...Temporality is the meaning

of being of Sorge." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 367). If we wish to examine spatiality as dependent on temporality, we have to acknowledge that Dasein can be spatial only as Sorge in the sense of its factical fallen existing. Dasein is never inside space in the manner in which a body is in a receptacle. Rather, Dasein can be spatial in a manner that is impossible for a body, only because it is geistig (brought about by mind, spirit,...).

While he announces the linkage between time and space in a third part of **Sein und Zeit**, which he never completed, Heidegger is at this point rather cryptical about the connection he intends to make between these two notions. What makes the short paragraph interesting, however, is his choice of newly-coined terms which, in German, aid him tremendously, as they have done before in his etymologizing about the future.

Since Ausrichtung is one aspect of spatiality, Richtung, having the meaning of "direction", can be linked with the directionality that is embedded in both the primordial past and future. Ausrichtung is concerned with the discovering of a Gegend (region) (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 136), and we have seen before that the region is always already there to be discovered. A region implies the "where-to" for all the tools, all the things present-to-hand, and thus the concernful being-in-the-world is always "ausgerichtet - sich ausrichtend." ("directed - directing

itself." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 368). While Dasein is discovering a region (and let us be reminded that that region is already there, ready to be discovered), it is grounded in an "ecstatically retentive awaiting". This naturally indicates the past (its being always already) and future (the possibility of being discovered). While Dasein is getting settled and finds its place, (Sicheinräumen), it is a "directed awaiting" of that region, which implies again the sense of futurity. But at the same time, this settling-in is a dys-tancing of all things that are present-at-hand and present-to-hand. In other words, through its interest and its absorption with everything that is alongside it in the world, Dasein is settling into the present. Sorge, or Dasein's concernful being-in-the-world comes back from the already discovered region to that which is closest, that which is of interest, that which is present-to-hand, by abolishing the distance. This can happen, because the

> Näherung ... des entfernten innerweltlich Vorhandenen ... gründen in einem Gegenwärtigen, das zur Einheit der Zeitlichkeit gehört, ... (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 369)
>
> nearing .... of all things which are dys-tantly present-at-hand ... are grounded in a Gegenwartigen, which belongs to the unity of temporality, ...

While spatiality comes full circle precisely like temporality, this discussion itself takes on the form of a

circle in that we are again at the point where Gegenwart in everyday German means "present", but where Heidegger performs one of his etymological tricks and underlines the centrality of the future.

It is worth considering, at this juncture, whether Heidegger's Lichtung (clearing) does not, in a way, reflect his thinking about space, or rather, his thinking about time-space, since clearing does not refer to a clearing in the sense of a location, a clearing in the forest, but also to something that happens, an Augenblick, a moment, that has to be reckoned with and grasped. The clearing, for Heidegger, is a field of disclosure, an open space where being can be encountered by Dasein. But it is always a clearing which has been cleared by Dasein itself, and Heidegger calls this activity of clearing Dasein's being-in or Dasein's being-its-there:

> Was dieses Seiende wesenhaft lichtet, das heisst es für es selbst "offen" als auch "hell" macht, wurde ... als Sorge bestimmt. In ihr gründet die volle Erschlossenheit des Da. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 350)
>
> That by which this entity is essentially cleared - in other words, that which makes it both 'open' for itself and 'bright' for itself - is what we have defined as "Sorge,"... In "Sorge" is grounded the full disclosedness of the 'there.'"

We must distinguish between "clearing" as a verb and as a noun. The clearing (verb) brings about the clearing (noun), and it seems that, no matter how vehemently

Heidegger denounces this idea, the noun does indeed suggest a kind of spatiality, even if it is only through its semantics, while the verb does retains the flavor of temporality. When Heidegger suggests that Dasein as being-already-in, as being-amidst, and as being-ahead-of-itself can be considered an ecstatic temporal structure, it must be regarded as the activity of clearing in that it opens up the past, the present, and the future. It creates a clearing in which Dasein "presences" itself, and thus makes available the possibility of encountering everything else that is in the world. When Heidegger speaks of the "clearing of self-concealing" (Lichtung des Sichverbergenden) in **Beiträge**, maybe he does not mean that here the self-concealment which being imposes upon itself, is cleared away. It is possible that he means that the self-concealing which does the clearing and emptying, and allows Being to "presence" itself, in which case the "clearing" would function as the gerund of the verb. If any "presencing" or "unconcealing" is to take place, the clearing (noun) has to be already established, has to be "there". Since Heidegger insists in the **Beiträge** that the presencing of the clearing for self-concealing takes place in the moment, we are back again in the concept of temporality. The Augenblick is related to the present and does the "presencing".

While the discussion so far has centered on **Sein und Zeit**, we must not ignore what Heidegger had to say on time and space after the Kehre, notably in his lecture **Zeit und Sein**, which he gave in 1962. While at first reading, the concepts of Being and of Time seem to have undergone a reversal since **Sein und Zeit**, closer scrutiny reveals that, although they have undergone a tremendous change, temporality is still the horizon of Being. Whereas in **Sein und Zeit**, the occurrence or the event concerned the temporality of Dasein and its structure, in **Zeit und Sein**, the occurrence or the event concerns the temporal character of Being itself. Before his Kehre, Heidegger still spoke about the "present" constituting one aspect of temporality. Now he speaks about "presence", which is much further removed from the "now"-time that he has always criticized.

In **Sein und Zeit**, Heidegger attempted to investigate the nature of Being with the help of Dasein. Now he by-passes Dasein, in order to get to Being directly:

> Der Versuch, Sein ohne das Seiende zu denken, wird notwendig. ... Das Sein, es selbst eigens denken, verlangt, vom Sein abzusehen, sofern es wie in aller Metaphysik nur aus dem Seienden her und für dieses als dessen Grund ergründet und ausgelegt wird. (Heidegger, 1969b, p. 2, pp. 5/6)
>
> The attempt to think Being without beings becomes necessary. ... and to think Being itself explicitly requires disregarding Being to the extend that it is only grounded and interpreted in terms of beings and for beings as their ground, as in all metaphysics.

Heidegger is making one final attempt to approach Being in a non-metaphysical manner.

The Fourth Dimension of Time

In this later works, Heidegger's focus is on "presencing." He states that "Sein besagt Anwesen." ("Being means presencing" Heidegger, 1969b, p. 5), and that "die Prägung des Seins hat sich längst ohne unser Zutun oder gar Verdienst entschieden." ("this character [Being as presencing] has long been decided without our contribution." Heidegger, 1969b, p. 6). But this presencing is not accomplished by Being itself. We would do well to return to what language tells us, because, as he points out:

> Wir sagen nicht: Sein ist, Zeit ist, sondern: Es gibt Sein und es gibt Zeit. Zunächst haben wir durch diese Wendung nur den Sprachgebrauch geändert. Statt "es ist", sagen wir "es gibt." (Heidegger, 1969b, pp. 4/5)
>
> We do not say: Being is, time is, but rather: there is Being and there is time. For the moment we have only changed the idiom with this expression. Instead of saying: "it is," we say "there is," It gives."

The German es gibt (it gives) is equivalent to the French il y a, does not have an English counterpart. Heidegger insists that it is just this "it gives" that has been unthought by Western philosophy. He claims that it is Being that has been thought. But, as the expression clearly

demonstrates, Being is actually that which is given, the object. What then is the "It", the subject of the giving, the giver, and how do we proceed to think about it? Heidegger focuses on this issue when he links Being with Time by suggesting that the "It" which gives Being can be found in time. This thought takes him to pronounce that "Sein heisst: Anwesen, Anwesen-lassen: Anwesenheit." ("Being means: presencing, letting-be present: presence." Heidegger, 1969b, p. 10). He reminds us again, that by insisting on the word "present", we are transported right back into the old notion of representing time as a series of "nows," and thus of agreeing with Kant that time has only one dimension. His own suggestion will keep us from falling back into our old habits:

> Allein die Gegenwart im Sinne der Anwesenheit ist von der Gegenwart im Sinne des Jetzt so weitgehend verschieden, dass sich die Gegenwart as Anwesenheit auf keine Weise von der Gegenwart als dem Jetzt her bestimmen lasst. (Heidegger, 1969b, p. 12)
>
> However, the present in the sense of presence differs so vastly from the present in the sense of now that the present as presence can in no way be determined in terms of the present as now.

But how are we to determine the sense of presence? If presence means "the constant abiding that approaches man, reaches him, is extended to him," then the source of this extending reach must be time. Not just in time generally, says Heidegger, but in the future. Here, we hear echos of

Sein und Zeit, in that the future is to be considered the dominant part of time. With the future, with that which comes toward us, presencing is offered. "Mit diesem [Anwesen] lichtet sich das, was wir den Zeit-Raum nennen." ("With this presencing, there opens up what we call time-space." Heidegger, 1969b, p. 14). Now, time-space becomes the clearing, the opening up of futural approach, of past and present. We are, however, cautioned that this opening is "pre-spatial"; it is not to be considered a container kind of space, but rather as that which can provide space.

Now we can understand the change that Heidegger has undergone in the three decades since **Sein und Zeit**: Time now becomes four-dimensional. The reason for our failure of ridding ourselves of our traditional concept of time is that we have always borrowed the three dimensions of space and applied them to our concept of time. Therefore, we consider the future as "not yet", the past as "no longer," and the present as "now". We have left unthought the fourth dimension, that of the "it gives", "das alles bestimmende Reichen" ("the giving that determines all" (Heidegger, 1969b, p. 15). The fourth dimension is the "nearhood" (Nahheit) that we have already encountered in the discussion of spatiality in **Sein und Zeit**. The Nähe, the dys-tancing which brings about the presencing of all things present-at-hand and present-to-hand, also brings about the presencing of the other three dimensions of time. It is not

only the present (in the old sense) that is presenced, but simultaneously the future and the past:

> Vielmehr beruht die Einheit der drei Zeitdimensionen in dem Zuspiel jeder für jede. ... Aber sie [die Nähe] nähert Ankunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart einander, indem sie entfernt. (Heidegger, 1969b, p. 16)
>
> ... the unity of time's three dimensions consists in the interplay of each toward each ... It [Nahheit] brings future, past and present near to one another by distancing them.

With this fourth dimension Heidegger succeeds in connecting time and space, though not, as he had announced thirty years earlier, by making time a presupposition of space, but rather by providing a way to determine the "where" of time:

> Denn die eigentlich Zeit selber, der Bereich ihres durch die nähernde Nähe bestimmten dreifachen Reichens, ist die vor-räumliche Ortschaft, durch die es erst ein mögliches Wo gibt. (Heidegger, 1969b, p. 16)
>
> For true time itself, the realm of its threefold extending determined by nearing nearness, is the prespatial region, which first gives any possible "where."

In the **Zollikoner Seminare**, where Heidegger makes an attempt to clarify some of the terminology he used in **Sein und Zeit**, we are taken back to the Lichtung. He maintains that the Da in the term Dasein equals das Offene (the Open).

> Diese Offenheit hat auch den Charakter des Raumes. Räumlichkeit gehört zur **Lichtung**, gehört zum Offenen, in dem wir uns als Existierende aufhalten und zwar so, dass wir gar nicht eigens auf den Raum **als** Raum bezogen sind. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 188)
>
> This Open also has the characteristics of space. Spatiality belongs to Lichtung, in which we live as existing beings, in such a manner that we are not ourselves in relation with space as space.

He continues with the suggestion that both temporality and spatiality belong to the Lichtung: "Raum und Zeit gehören zusammen, aber man weiss nicht wie." ("Space and Time belong together, but we do not know how." Heidegger, 1987, p. 188). Are we to assume that at the time of the seminars he had given up on the previously assumed relationship between time and space? Or only that, although there is a relationship, this relationship eludes us as something that cannot be proved, an idea Heidegger did not have much patience for?

Heidegger's later writings are characterized by a focus on the aesthetic. In his numerous discussions of art, he returns to his conception of space, which has not so much undergone a change, but which has been vastly expanded since the writing of **Sein und Zeit.** The short treatise entitled **Die Kunst und der Raum** (**Art and Space**), Heidegger elaborates on the concept of Leere (emptiness), and takes this as his clue to make the connection between "emptying" and "finding an area." While these concepts have already

appeared in his earlier works, it is not until now that he succeeds in establishing a direct link.

Heidegger concedes that the Leere (emptiness, often translated into English with vacuous) is neither a negation nor a privation of space. In our common assumptions, we tend to consider emptiness as the opposite of fullness, as the lack of the "filling of spatial areas". Contrarily, he suggests that this Leere may be not a lack, but a force that brings about something. Again, he relies on etymology, and connects the verb leeren to lesen (in the sense of "collecting").

> Die aufgelesenen Früchte in einen Korb leeren heisst: ihnen diesen Ort bereiten.
> Die Leere ist nicht nichts. Sie ist auch kein Mangel. (Heidegger, 1969a, p. 12)
>
> To pour the collected fruits into a basket means: to prepare this place for them.
> Emptiness is not nothing. Nor is it a lack of something.

Related to this Leeren (to empty) is the notion of Räumen (to clear away), a connection which Heidegger fails to elaborate. Through "listening to language", we come to realize that the "clearing" (verb) brings about the open in which people can settle, ("Räumen ist Freigabe von Orten," Heidegger, 1969a, p. 9). But this clearing happens simultaneously with the Einräumen, the actual settling in. Heidegger reminds us that the German language gives Einräumen a two-fold meaning. Not only is it the act of

getting settled, it also conveys the sense of "to concede", in this case to "let" the settling-in take place.

Now that the place, the clearing for the settling in is accomplished, what happens in that place? According to Heidegger, it is "das Versammeln im Sinne des freigebenden Bergens der Dinge in ihre Gegend." ("the collecting in the sense of the releasing securing of things into their region", Heidegger, 1969a, p. 10). The region, as defined by Heidegger in earlier works, is free expanse that, at the same time as being open, ensures that the things within it are kept safe (geborgen). This term, of course, brings to mind not only the securing aspect of the region, but the concealing aspect as well, since verborgen is also a derivative of bergen. The conclusion that Heidegger draws is that the things are the places themselves, and do not, as is commonly assumed, merely belong in the places.

The Phenomenon of the Body

In the **Zollikoner Seminare**, Heidegger reconsiders the concept of space, this time coupled with the phenomenon of Leib, and not, as in **Sein und Zeit**, with time. In a seminar given in 1985, he first approaches the concept by talking about Vergegenwärtigung (re-presentation), and the need for embodiment during this process. Here, the dichotomy of mind and body, or, in this case, since he is speaking to a group of psychiatrists, he calls it the difference between psyche

and soma, comes again under attack. In this seminar, Heidegger is trying to convince the participants that what is generally referred to as mental representation, is by no means a thing belonging solely to the mind, but that it involves the body as well. Since Heidegger's goal is for his audience to grasp what he means by Leib and Leiblichkeitsphänomen, it might be appropriate to insert at this point a preliminary remark concerning the German word for body. Since the English language has only one word, it cannot distinguish between a living body, a dead body, or a non-living body. In German, however, two terms are available, that of Körper, and that of Leib. Although this statement calls for a clarification, I don't think that the terms should be explained at this point, since it would spoil the point Heidegger is trying to make at the end of this particular seminar. Let us therefore follow him in his very patient attempt to take his audience step by step to where he wants to lead them.

Contrary to common assumption, Heidegger insists that if I am "re-presenting" or imagining a thing, then I am directed toward that thing itself, not toward a picture or an image of it. The essence of re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) is a Sein-bei (being-with), and the re-presentation is but one possible mode of our being-here (in the sense of being-here with our body and next to things present-at-hand). Only by being actually here am I

capable of re-presenting anything that is not here. As Heidegger puts it, "Im Hiersein vollziehe ich die Vergegenwärtigung." ("Through my being-here, I accomplish the re-presentation." Heidegger, 1987, p. 93). The Sein-be is not a being-with in the sense of being with a thing present-at-hand. Rather, the Sein-bei of our being here has the essence of being open for that which is present-at-hand (Offenstehens für das An-wesende), an aspect which we often neglect, precisely because it seems too obvious to be contemplated. This standing open for things present-at-hand is the essence of man, and it has, among others, the two possibilities of either being bodily present, or of re-presenting. The mode of re-presentation demands that we are here with the things around us, otherwise it would no longer constitute re-presentation. In other words, we have to be physically removed from the thing we are re-presenting, but the body does not simply disappear; it stays "here."

In struggling with what he calls the Leibphänomen, Heidegger insists that "Das Dasein ist nicht räumlich, weil es leiblich ist, ..." ("Dasein is not spatial because it is embodied, ..." Heidegger, 1987, p. 105). Rather, he maintains that this embodiment is only possible because "...das Dasein räumlich ist im Sinne von einräumend." ("Dasein is spatial in the sense of einräumend [finding and having its place]." Heidegger, 1987, p. 105). When we

consider the phenomenon of Leib, we probably could do worse than to start with our Körper (physical body), that part of us which has traditionally been on one side of the mind-body-question. (This brings to mind Heidegger's procedure in **Sein und Zeit**, where, in order to ask the question of Being, he chose Dasein as that entity most familiar to us with which he entered into the question). Therefore, by paying attention to our sensory organs, we may be able to approach the phenomenon in question, that of the Leib. Heidegger posits that the difference between the hand and the eye is that of the two, only the hand is capable of a "double sensation". It can not only feel the object it touches, but can also feel itself being touched by the object (which constitutes, again, a kind of privation). The eye disappears, and it becomes obvious that this passage has served as the basis for Leder's book **The Absent Body**. If I say that I am involved in something mit Leib und Seele (in English: wholly absorbed in something, literally translated: involved with body and soul), then my body as a thing present-at-hand (Körper) disappears, simply because I no longer pay attention to it. Finally Heidegger has reached the point where he considers it appropriate to clarify his notion of Leib. He claims that the only manner in which traditional philosophy has come remotely close to the phenomenon is through Aristotle's pronunciation that the human body (Leib) in its being-here can only be a

beseelter Leib (a body endowed with a soul). And so, Heidegger carries this notion further by saying that "... ich kann das Leibphänomen nicht in der Relation zum Körper bestimmen." ("... I cannot determine the phenomenon of embodiment in relation to the body [Körper]." Heidegger, 1987, p. 112). After all, what does a statement like "This is my body" mean? Am "I" in the body or is the body in "me"?

It slowly becomes obvious that Heidegger's Leib is the "I" of traditional philosophy, but it is not an "I" that is split into mind or body. "Das **Leiben des Leibes** bestimmt sich aus der Weise meines Seins." ("The **embodiment of my** Leib is determined by the mode of my Being." Heidegger, 1987, p. 113). While my Körper has definite, measurable boundaries and a certain volume, the boundary of my Leib "ist der Seinshorizont in dem ich mich aufhalte." ("is the horizon of Being in which I dwell." Heidegger, 1987, p. 113). In other words, while I am looking at an object, not only is my Leib involved in this seeing, but its boundaries do not end where my Körper ends; rather they are extended to the object that I have "in eye." Thus,

> Der Leib ist im Hören und Sehen beteiligt. Sieht denn der Leib? Nein, **ich** sehe. Aber zu diesem Sehen gehören doch meine Augen, also mein Leib. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 114)
>
> The Leib is involved in seeing and hearing. Does the Leib see? No, "I" see. But for that I need eyes, which are part of the Leib."

Imagination and representation are not activities that go on inside of me, in my mind as separate from the body. In acknowledging this, Heidegger cannot but give his audience one last kick by implying that the reasons psychologists are wrong in their thinking is that they see everything as an expression of the "inside" rather than to see the Leibphänomen within the relatedness of humans, i.e. the "being-in-the-world." Or, as Heidegger himself put it:

> Der Leib ist das Ich, nicht mein Körper. ... Das Leiben gehört immer mit zum In-der-Welt-sein. Es bestimmt das In-der-Welt-sein, das Offensein, das Haben von Welt immer mit. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 126)
>
> The Leib is the "I", not my Körper. ... Embodiment always belongs to Being-in-the-world. It always determines the being-in-the-world, the being-open, the having of world.

In the **Zollikoner Seminare**, Heidegger himself sums up what sets him apart from traditional Western philosophy. He stresses that to approach the phenomenon of embodiment, we must overcome the dichotomy of Subject and Object, and we must experience for ourselves the being-in-the-world as the human essence. Only since Descartes does philosophy talk about Gegenständlichkeit and Anwesen, which imply things present-at-hand and objectivity. Whereas before Descartes, so Heidegger claims, the being was understood as being from itself, it constituted one of the great shifts in philosophical thinking that being exists only so far as it is represented by me as a subject. According to the

Cartesian and Newtonian conception, the I-Body-World is separated into components. Heidegger sees it as his mission to re-think "being-in-the-world" in its unity, because we are not in-the-world as bodies (Körper) alongside each other, but out being-in-the-world is characterized by a being-with (Mit-Sein) that is concernful. While the Cartesian conception of the ego was taken over by Kant in the determination of the objectivity of the object, and carried to its end by Husserl, Heidegger sees himself as the first philosopher to re-think the "original" conception of consciousness not as self-consciousness or characterized with intentionality, but as being-in-the-world which is to a large degree unconscious in the traditional sense. What is needed, is description and interpretation, i.e. phenomenology, not explanations and scientific proofs. These neglect our mode of being conscious by simply being-in-the-world. In a conversation with the Swiss psychiatrist Medard Boss, Heidegger sums up the essence of being human in the following manner:

> Wir können nicht "sehen", weil wir Augen haben, vielmehr können wir nur Augen haben, weil wir unserer Grundnatur nach sehenden Wesens sind. So könnten wir auch nicht leiblich sein, wie wir es sind, wenn unser In-der-Welt-sein nicht grundlegend aus einem immer schon vernehmenden Bezogen-sein auf solches bestünde, das sich uns aus dem Offenen unserer Welt, als welches Offene wir existieren, zuspricht. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 293)
>
> It is not that we can "see" because we have eyes; rather, we can only have eyes, because, according to

our basic nature, we are seeing creatures. Thus, we could not be embodied as we are, if our being-in-the-world did not basically consist of a relatedness which is always already perceived - a relatedness to that which grants itself to us from the Open of our world, as whose Open we exist.

CHAPTER IV

PHENOMENOLOGY - THE DISMISSAL OF THE CARTESIAN METAPHOR

Part 1: Heidegger and Language

Das Wort

Wunder von ferne oder traum
Bracht ich an meines landes saum

Und harrte bis die graue norn
Den namen fand in ihrem born -

Drauf konnt ichs greifen dicht und stark
Nun blüht und glänzt es durch die mark...

Einst langt ich an nach guter fahrt
Mit einem kleinod reich und zart

Sie suchte lang und gab mir kund:
"So schläft hier nichts auf tiefem grund"

Worauf es meiner hand entrann
Und nie mein land den schatz gewann...

So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht.

The Word

A treasure from afar or from a dream
Did I bring to my country's borders

And I waited for the grey norn
To find the name in her well -

Then I could grasp it tight and strong
Now it blooms and shines through the night

Once, I arrived after successful journey
With a treasure, small and delicate

She searched and searched and gave me word:
"There is nothing that slumbers here in the depth"

> After which it slipped from my hand
> And my country never gained the treasure...
>
> Thus, I sadly learned to do without,
> Where the word fails, there will be no thing.

With an examination of Stefan George's poem **The Word** (Heidegger, 1990b, p. 154), Heidegger affirms his position within the philosophical controversy about the relationship between language and thought, or the making of meaning, as the thinker par excellence to reject the traditional notion of meaning being constituted in the direct relationship between word and thing.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980, Lakoff, 1987, Johnson, 1987), take a similar position in rejecting what they define as the objectivist stance, which posits that the meaning of an utterance is to be found in the direct relationship between the speaker and a "reality" (which exists independently of the speaker). Concurrently, they argue against the notion of language being the "mirror" of nature, which reflects the implication that the Self, the ego, or the "I", is construing itself as a result of an outside refractive "reality" impacting on it:

> The objectivist answer is that symbols (that is, words and mental representations) are made meaning-full **in one and only one way:** via the correspondence to entities and categories in either the existing world or in possible worlds. (Lakoff, 1987, p. 160)

What Heidegger calls "common sense", and Lakoff terms "folk models", is basically our everyday naive conceptualizing of exactly these correspondences. Both agree that this naive understanding must be grounded in something deeper, and they identify traditional philosophical theories as the culprit for our faulty thinking. Heidegger repeatedly refers to traditional metaphysics, starting with Descartes, as the basis of our everyday thinking. He suggests that by deconstructing the grounds from which our notions came, we will be able to approach language in a more primordial way, through the method of phenomenology. Phenomenology will enable us to become aware of the myriad of tacit assumptions we generally ascribe to, assumptions which are so overwhelmingly self-evident, that in our everyday coping, we seldom pay attention to them. What sets Heidegger apart from Lakoff and Johnson, however, is his insistence on language's **mystery**. In **Unterwegs zur Sprache**, he maintains that

> Das selbe Wort LOGOS ist aber als Wort für das **Sagen** zugleich das Wort für das **Sein**, d.h. für das Anwesen des Anwesenden. Sage und Sein, Wort und Ding gehören in einer verhüllten, kaum bedachten und unausdenkbaren Weise zueinander. (Heidegger, 1990b, p. 237).
>
> The same word LOGOS is a word for **Saying** just as it is a word for **Being**, for the presencing of that which is present. Saying and Being, word and thing, belong to each other in a veiled way, a way which has hardly been thought and is not to be thought out to the end.

The Limitations of Language

Implied in this is that, while we are aware of the fact that our common sense thinking is based on particularistic biases resulting from the impact of traditional Western philosophical thinking, it is not necessary, perhaps impossible, to identify these presentiments.

Heidegger argues that naming a "thing" is a condition for its being entertained in thought, (i.e. that the name is the mark - the physical and public form which the sign must have). He delineates and describes one of these limitations in the fact that we are never able to stand outside of language, to talk about language from a standpoint outside of its parameters. He notates the limits of language's reflexivity in the remark: "Erst wo das Wort gefunden ist für das Ding, ist das Ding ein Ding. ... Das Wort verschafft dem Ding erst das Sein." ("Only when the word has been found for the thing, does the thing become a thing. ... The word provides the Being for the thing." Heidegger, 1990b, p. 164). However, in the analysis of George's poem, in addition to his "Dialogue on Language", Heidegger comes close to articulating the absolute sense of mystery caused by these limitations. It is this dimension of the limit of reflexivity, namely the impossibility of an explanation of language's originary nature, which Hegel had taken up. Heidegger undoubtedly owed much of his own

thinking to Hegel, but he rejects Hegel's absolute subjectivization of being. He demonstrates this rejection in his orientation toward the object, toward the world, and toward language. He does so through the method of phenomenological investigation.

The Unmediated "I"

Contained within post-Hegelian thought was a realization that a definition of consciousness as self-reflection had to result in an infinite regress. It is both fundamental and paramount in Heidegger that we see, what Tugendhat has called "self-less consciousness of self" (1979, p. 34), which is grounded in the immediate knowledge that one has of "having certain states." (the unmediated I). In **Sein und Zeit**, Heidegger demonstrates that the modes proper to Dasein precede any sort of reflexive cognition. For Heidegger, man's essence does not simply lie in a subject-object relationship. Rather, Dasein's relationship to the world is characterized primarily as being-in-the-world:

> Dieses "Wissen" ist nicht erst einer immanenten Selbstwahrnehmung erwachsen, sondern gehört zum Sein des Da, das wesenhaft Verstehen ist. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 144)
>
> This knowing does not first arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the Being of the "there", which is essentially understanding.

Dasein's identity is not established by self-reflection. Self-reflection can only be possible because a primordial sense of being-in-the-world is prior to it, a being-in-the-world characterized by Dasein's immediate connectedness with things ready-to-hand within-the-world (innerweltliches Zuhandenes). Therefore, being-in-the-world is the prerequisite for self-reflection. Vice versa, self-reflection is contingent on the acknowledged sensing of being-in-the-world. The structures of consciousness in daily life constitute a more original concept of reflection, one that is grounded in Dasein's pre-reflexive self-understanding, since "Es genügt nicht, den Begriff des Selbstbewusstseins im formalen Sinne der Reflexion auf das Ich zu fassen,..." ("Self-understanding should not be equated formally with a reflected ego-experience,..." Heidegger, 1989b, p. 247). To place it in a more poignant prescription,

> Das Selbst ist dem Dasein ihm selbst da, ohne Reflexion und ohne innere Wahrnehmung, **vor** aller Reflexion. Die Reflexion im Sinne der Rückwendung ist nur ein Modus der Selbst**erfassung**, aber nicht die Weise der primären Selbst-Erschliessung. (Heidegger, 1989b, p. 226)
>
> The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception **before** all reflection. Reflection, in the sense of a turning back, is only a mode of self-**apprehension**, but not the mode of primary self-disclosure.

According to Heidegger, our naive view of language assumes that speaking is an expression wherein something internal externalizes itself, and that it is a human activity. He maintains that our notion of language as an expression of inner emotions is grounded in traditional Western philosophy. It is this tradition that he sets out to deconstruct by taking the following steps: We must get from theoretical reflection which has been part of the methodology of traditional philosophers to a more practical deliberation, one that pays heed to the being present-to-hand, to the tool-ness of things. From there, we need to take one further step back to the "mindless" everyday coping, which is Dasein's most basic, primordial mode of being. Heidegger insists that we need to look into the background of our everyday existence. This endeavor is not exclusively Heideggerian. A number of philosophers posit precisely this project at the center of their methodology, among them Martin Buber and Hannah Arendt.

The Authority of Language

The destruction of philosophy brings with it the destruction of the subject over objects. As man speaks, he is listening and responding to a presencing of world. For Heidegger, utterance is only the last event in speaking, and when we cannot find the right word, it is an instance when language in its own Being fleetingly touches us, which

is exemplified in George's poem above. It is an instance that parallels the failing of tools which brings about our awareness of their "tool-ness." ("The Zeug imposes itself upon awareness when it ceases to function, at the moment of breakdown." Ronell, 1989, p. 44).

When Heidegger says that "Language speaks", he does more than turn the traditional view of language upside-down (Standish, 1992, p. 129). With this statement, he establishes the relation between language and the world as "the co-occurring of Saying and Worlding" (Singh, 1992, p. 91), the original **logos**. Simultaneously, he destroys the presumed priority of man, since man's linguistic activity is replicated as a responding to language's saying. In his later works, Heidegger clarifies that both language and world happen (come into presence), and that man is a presencing agent whom Being needs and manipulates. He goes a step further in his insistence on the autonomy of language and on the predominance of the world over man by relegating man to a mere medium, through whose articulation language and world come to be.

What Heidegger wants to achieve in his later work is an altered experience of language, freed from the categories of Western metaphysics. As Edwards has pointed out, Heidegger tried to synthesize the two dominant concepts of language in philosophy, namely that of language as expression of inner states, and that of language as

representation, in which the sign becomes a substitute for the thing itself. The latter concept insists on the "natural identity" of idea and object, an idea which Heidegger criticized mainly for its depiction of human consciousness as passive (Edwards, 1990, p. 70). However, this is an accusation that he might make of the expressionist view as well. For Heidegger, language creates, it does not represent reality, just as the symptom (to paraphrase Nietzsche) does not represent the disease, but is the disease. Language presents reality, or even, is reality. For Heidegger, whose aim is not to develop a theory of language, these traditional accounts of language conceal the primordial truth of language which he wants to have reveal itself.

Rather than establishing a theory of language, he wants to "experience language preconceptually" (Edwards, 1990, p. 86). Implicit in this notion is the uncovering of all existing theories. To accomplish this, he has to search for the "unthought" (that which traditional philosophical accounts have neglected, and which he hopes to find in the dif-ference [Unter-schied] between word and thing). If the Unter-schied is the dimension in which the primordial experience of language, the **logos**, is to be found, we first and foremost have to clarify what he means by this term.

In "Der Weg zur Sprache", Heidegger suggests that all language begins with naming. This naming must be understood

as the "primordial" kind of naming that first reveals what there is to be named. Primordial naming, says Heidegger, is calling, bidding something to come into nearness. The naming first reveals the thing to us.

> **Das Wesende der „Sprache ist die Sage als die Zeige.** Deren Zeigen gründet nicht in irgendwelchen Zeichen, sondern alle Zeichen „entstammen einem Zeigen, in dessen „Bereich und für dessen Absichten sie Zeichen sein können. (Heidegger, 1990b, p. 254)
>
> **The essential being of language is Saying as Showing.** Its showing character is not based on signs of any kind; rather, all signs arise from a showing within whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs.

Here, it becomes clear that language does not pre-exist this first naming, but that it is this first naming which brings about language. This would also imply that the relationships between word and thing are not merely arbitrary ones, as Saussure claims. What Heidegger seems to say here, is that the relationship exists a priori, but that it is only revealed to us by the word, by language. On a deeper level, Heidegger claims that language and world cannot be separated from one another. They must constitute a whole. Saussure would certainly have agreed with this claim insofar as he himself calls language a holistic system of significant differences. "The dif-ference is neither distinction nor relation. The dif-ference is, at most, dimension for world and thing." (Heidegger, 1971, p. 203)

Is Heidegger suggesting that there is some primordial articulation of things into a world, or words into a language, and that the differences of "separateness and towardness" must be opened up in order for language to be at all? Certainly it is in this dif-ference where we encounter the mystery that Heidegger alluded to, and which he characterizes as the speaking of language.

Germane to this notion is the question: How does Heidegger proceed to use language as one of the means to arrive at his conception of consciousness, which is, in his opinion, constituted by language? The answer exists dichotomously. In his blatant refusal to accept the meaning accorded to words by the tradition of metaphysics (or to put it more bluntly, the "common" meaning of words), and conversely, in his deconstruction, his etymologyzing, of exactly and explicitly these particular words.

The idea of an etymological deconstruction is mirrored in Hannah Arendt's suggestion that metaphors mark the relation of things, that they bridge the gap between our mental activities and the world of appearances.

> All philosophical terms are metaphors, frozen analogies, as it were, whose true meaning discloses itself when we **dissolve the term into the original context**, which must have been vividly in the mind of the first philosopher to use it. (Arendt, 1971, p. 104, author's emphasis)

The conclusion is realized in a) that our everyday concepts are, indeed, dictated by the language that we use, and b) that the underlying base, the background of such words or expressions, reveal, once we let these words show themselves to us, the mode in which we are primordially connected to the world. By probing into the background, Heidegger achieves what he had set out to accomplish, namely to show that the question of Being is answerable by heeding our being-in-the-world, that consciousness as he defines it, is not self-reflection. It is a sort of unconsciousness which is defined by the things present-at-hand, and, above all, by our language.

The idea that thought cannot arise without speech is similarly expressed by Merleau-Panty when he states that "...thought and speech anticipate one another. They continually take one another's place," (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 17). It was Hannah Arendt, however, who built upon Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world. In her treatise of metaphors, she demonstrates that our language does indeed originate out of our bodily concerns with the world (She calls it the world of appearances).

Part 2: Hannah Arendt and the World of the Senses

In **The Life of the Mind**, Arendt makes it clear that what we find meaningful in the world is located on the surface. With this statement, Arendt clarifies her stance

concerning the metaphysical tradition. She reminds us that traditional Western philosophy has always insisted on the distinction between the world of the senses and the world of the mind. Based on this presupposition is the assumption that the world of "mere appearances" has its groundings and its causes in something deeper, in Being. Similarly to Heidegger, who spent a lifetime struggling with the question for Being, Arendt comes to the conclusion that there is no metaphysical Being, but that the world manifests itself of its own accord, in the realm of the Heideggerian being-in-the-world.

Arendt dismisses the Cartesian dichotomy of body and mind, but she substitutes the Kantian distinction between Verstand (intellect) and Vernunft (reason). Similarly to Kant, Arendt suggests that the Verstand represents nothing more than the scientific quest for empirical knowledge. According to her, the intellect is concerned with cognition. Reason, on the other hand, occupies itself with thinking, which in turn generates meaning.

> The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same. (Arendt, 1971, p. 15)

This is remeniscent of Fichte who claimed that "mere" abstract knowledge is in itself meaningless, and can be made meaningful only when it is "brought back" to the unmediated "I".

Arendt suggests that the metaphors we use to speak about our psychic life are based on our preconceptual bodily experiences. Without a doubt, her work has served as a basis for Mark Johnson's theory of embodiment. Johnson wants to look into the Background of our common metaphors, and, like Heidegger, he aims to unconceal and reveal it and establish it as a grounding notion. Thus, Johnson can make the following statement:

> A metaphor is not merely a linguistic expression (a form of words) used for artistic or rhetorical purposes; instead, it is a process of human understanding by which we achieve meaningful experience that we can make sense of. A metaphor, in this "experiental" sense, is a process by which we understand and structure one domain of experience in terms of another domain **of a different kind.** (Johnson, 1987, p. 15)

Nevertheless, it is in his notion of moral responsibility where Johnson is clearly most indebted to Heidegger. He follows a similar path, beginning with the act of "responding". If response is not mere reaction, then it involves my awareness of myself as a center of force capable for action. But since this action presupposes a sense of myself, this sense of identity must be grounded in preconceptual structures of experience. If I am aware of myself as a source of force, if I can say, "I make this happen", then the response, which is not to be equated with a mere reflex action, becomes the notion of responsibility through which I also become aware that I have a choice as

to how I will respond. Thus, for Johnson, a development of moral responsibility is possible because we "project metaphorically from our sense of physical force and interactions onto the more abstract, psychological realm of moral interactions" (Johnson, 1987, p. 16).

Thinking in Tension with Being

When Hannah Arendt talks about the life of the soul, it is clear that she refers to what Heidegger has called the "first naming." The life of the soul are the Heideggerian Gemütsverfassungen (moods) which constitute our facticity. With her insistence on our "moods and emotions, whose continual change is in no way different from the continual change of our bodily organs" (Arendt, 1971, p. 32), she foreshadows contemporary cognitive science which reduces, or rather equates our emotions to chemical processes in the brain. Furthermore, Arendt insists that in imagining and remembering, we make present that which is physically absent.

> ... remembrance, the most frequent and also the most basic thinking experience, has to do with things that are absent, that have idappeared from my senses. Yet the absent that is summoned up and made present to my mind - a person, an event, a monument - cannot appear in the way it appeared to my senses, as though remembreance were a kind of witchcraft. In order to appear to my mind only, it must first be de-sensed, and the capacity to transform sense-objects into images is called "imagination." (Arendt, 1971, p. 85)

Only by removing myself from the world of appearances and of bodily objects, can I come to thinking. However, in remembering an object that is no longer present, what remains with me is the "basic impression" that I still have of it, an impression that was first determined by my moods. In connection with this insight, it is of interest to note that recent neurophysiological findings situate the capacity for memory in the Hypocampus, which is also the site for emotions.

Arendt's notion of "de-sensitizing" brings to mind Heidegger's attempt to show that in the act of imagining or representing, I have to be physically removed from the object I am recalling (Heidegger, 1987). Simultaneously, the concept of "de-sensitizing" makes us aware of the constant tension that exists constantly in us, best exemplified in Hegel's master/slave parable, in which two consciousnesses fight for dominance, and in Paul Valery's phrase "Tantôt je pense et tantôt je suis." ("At times I think, and at times I am." Valéry, 1957, p. 916).

It follows that in the Kantian realm of apprehension, life in its sheer thereness is meaningless. "... no experience yields any meaning or even coherence without undergoing the operations of imagining and thinking." (Arendt, 1971, p. 87). In this realm the senses dominate. The soul that Arendt speaks of is located precisely in this realm, it is linked to the senses. But the language of the

soul, the "first naming", needs to undergo a transformation before it can become what we customarily call "language." In order to constitute speech, the language of the soul has to be translated into metaphors. But Arendt is quick to point out that emotions, which constitute the life of the soul, can never be expressed. What is expressed in speech is what we think we feel. Here, again, we must acknowledge that emotions by themselves are meaningless until they contain a reflection upon them. Thus, Arendt, like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, comes to the conclusion that language is thinking.

With this move, Arendt completes the destruction of the Cartesian "res cogitans" on the basis that it is a "bodiless, senseless creature." (Arendt, 1971, p. 48). Simultaneously, she deconstructs the ensuing solipsism of the German Idealist tradition which asserted that the self is the primary object of knowledge and that nothing exists in itself. Going back to Kant, Arendt suggests that the concept of the thing-in-itself has value, because our common-sense assumption of its existence is based on our knowledge that it appears as an independent object to others as well.

Therefore, our common-sense of reality is not subject to any doubt. Rather, it is guaranteed by a "threefold commonness." (Arendt, 1971, p. 50). First, and foremost it is guaranteed by our five senses which, although they

perceive of an object in different modes, all have the same object in common. In addition, there is the observable fact that for all of us the object perceived has the same meaning. Lastly the fact that members of other species who may perceive of the object very differently from us, agree on its identity. The first reason is of importance because, from the five senses, Arendt deducts a sixth sense which is responsible for letting "reality" appear real to us. The sixth sense is thus the Kantian synthesis which unites the manifold of the other senses and gives us the impression of realness.

Again, Arendt establishes a dichotomy, this time between our thought processes and our "thoughtless" common-sense assumptions. While thought processes are physically located in the brain, they have no natural relation to reality. Common-sense, on the other hand, gives us our feeling of realness, and have the "same relation to reality as biological evolution to the environment." (Arendt, 1971, p. 52). The process of thinking cannot divorce itself from the "real" world (since our language is made up entirely of metaphors based on physical experience), and it follows for Arendt, that the Husserlian notion of epoche is nonsensical. On the one hand, due to our language, we can never claim a total separation from the world of appearances. On the other hand, as she had insisted previously, the process of thinking requires that

we remove ourselve from the objects present-at-hand, otherwise the preoccupation with them would prevent thinking. In any case, the method of bracketing the natural attitude, or in Arendt's words, the world of appearances and the objects around us, is not something that has to be learned, but is a natural part of thinking.

Regarding thinking, Arendt is in full agreement with Heidegger that the post-Newtonian era has forgotten its meaning.

> Thinking, no doubt, plays an enormous role in every scientific enterprise, but it is the role of a means to an end; the end is determined by a decision about what is worthwhile knowing, and this decision cannot be scientific. Moreover, the end is cognition or knowledge, which, having been obtained, clearly belongs to the world of appearances; once established as truth, it becomes part and parcel of the world. (Arendt, 1971, p. 54)

aas Heidegger has pointed out repeatedly, the Ancients defined thinking as the preservation of phenomena. We of the modern age aim to "discover the hidden apparatus which makes them [phenomena] appear." (Arendt, 1971, p. 53). This becomes evident in our reliance on technology which we try to employ in such a fashion as to force that to appear which does not appear of its own accord. It is obvious that the Kantian intellect has replaced thinking or reason. The intellect tries to make sense of what is given to us by the senses (through empirical observation), whereas reason tries to understand its meaning.

According to Arendt, the philosophers after Kant, including Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, had blurred the distinction that Kant had made between thought and knowledge because they believed that "the result of their speculations possessed the same kind of validity as the results of cognitive processes" (Arendt, 1971, p. 64), in other words, "truth." For those thinkers, it was the end result of thinking that mattered. For Heidegger, as well as for Arendt, the validity of thinking lies in the thought process itself, regardless of its outcome. Thinking, for Heidegger, is not propelled by a thirst for knowledge or a drive for cognition. It is an activity that is passionate, and that belongs to man, simply because he is a thinking being.

> Heidegger never thinks "about" something; he thinks something. In this entirely uncontemplative activity, he penetrates to the depths, but not to discover, let alone bring to light, some ultimate, secure foundations which one could say had been undiscovered earlier in this manner. (Arendt, 1978, p. 293)

Since thinking undoes its own results, Heidegger felt compelled to start anew again and again, as his preoccupation with the question for Being shows. Instead of aiming for a result, his life's work centers on one question, which he approached from a multitude of possible angles. Heidegger was aware of the fact that

> the thinking ego, of which I am perfectly conscious so long as the thinking activity lasts, will disappear as though it were a mere mirage when the real world asserts itself again. (Arendt, 1971, p. 75)

This may be the reason why Arendt is indulgent when it comes to his dubious involvement in public life which culminated in his membership in the National Socialist Party during his rectorship. When Arendt writes that "after ten short hectic months ... [the shock of public life] drove him back to his residence" (Arendt, 1978, p. 303), what she is referring to is the "residence" as that realm of the thinker in which the world of appearances is absent.

Thinking and Time

The suggestion that in the activity of thinking we are removed from the "real" world, brings Arendt to the question of where exactly we are when we are thinking. If we are not among the things present-at-hand, that is to say, in space, then the other realm we must consider is that of time. We remember what is no longer present, and we anticipate what is not yet.

Similarly to Heidegger, Arendt condems our common conception of time as a continuous, sequential line, going into one direction, into infinity. Just as Heidegger was unable to imagine the ego outside of time, Arendt conjectures that the reason we view time in this sequential manner is the fact that we are spatially involved in our

world, in which the continuity of our everyday business encourages the continuous conception we have of time.

The sensation of the thinking ego actually involved in life takes on a very different form. No longer is the line a continuum, but, as Arendt sees it,

> ... past and future are antagonistic to each other as the no-longer and the not-yet only because of the presence of man, who himself has an "origin," his birth, and an end, his death, and therefore stands at any given moment between them; this in-between is called the present. It is the insertion of man with his limited life span that transforms the continuously flowing stream of sheer change ... into time as we know it. (Arendt, 1971, p. 203)

The thinking ego is thus located in the in-between. From one side it is besieged by the past, from the other by the future. And the in-between it where he makes its abode, its lasting presence where it spends its life. Arendt makes it clear the the thinking ego, the Dasein which is conscious of its consciousness, must not be confused with the self "as it appears and moves in the world, remembering its own biographical past," (Arendt, 1978, p. 205). On the contrary, her ego is ageless, without a past or a future. In short, it is the epitomy of the Hegelian Geist, and it is in contradiction with the Heideggerian notion of being-in-the-world, on which he bases his conception of temporality.

Another issue on which Heidegger is in diagreement with many modern thinkers is the role of the will in

thinking. Husserl had stressed the intentionality of thought, and Nietzsche had spoken of the will to power. Contrarily, Heidegger's stress is on Gelassenheit, the state of relaxation and serenity in which the thinker "stands open" to thoughts. With the concept of receptivity, Heidegger sets himself apart from his contemporaries in that he negates the importance of the individual, the subject. For him, it is the thought that comes to us, it is the phenomenon that presents itself, if only we as human beings are able to stand open toward it. As Arendt points out (1971, p. 122), this immobile state of receptivity is characterized by the fact that Heidegger removes himself from the metaphor of the eye. Traditionally, the activity of thinking has been described with the metaphorical activity of seeing. The later Heidegger abandons this analogy, and replaces it with the act of hearing. Thus, it becomes perfectly plausible why he should define the activity of thinking in a passive (receptive) rather than in an active manner. Seeing necessitates the active involvement of the subject, it involves the Husserlian intentionality as well as the Nietzschean will. Contrarily, hearing is considered a passive activity. The individual is not at liberty to choose between hearing or not hearing, as he is in the process of seeing. This lack of choice implies the absence of will on the part of the subject, and

simultaneously it suggests the autonomy of a "thinking that thinks."

With this idea, the Heideggerian concept of thinking comes full circle. With the absence of sight, truth becomes invisible. It can no longer rely on the "powerful self-evidence that forces us to admit the identity of an object the moment it is before our eyes." (Arendt, 1971, p. 119). Truth is thus not to be found in Arendt's world of appearances or in Kant's realm of the intellect. Truth discloses itself in the process of thinking which every once in a while happens upon a Lichtung, where it discloses itself for us.

The Death of Thinking

Unfortunately, as Heidegger points out, our technical age has removed us from thinking. Due to the Ge-stell (scaffold) which determines our world-view, we are no longer even able to view objects as Seiendes (being-as-objects), but have reached the point where there are only resources to be used and consumed. Similarly, knowledge, as it is assessed in contemporary society, is no longer even an "external object", but has taken on the characteristics of a resource, to be used for the perpetuation of the Ge-stell.

> Sein ist heute Ersetzbarsein. Schon die Vorstellung einer "Reparatur" ist zu einem "antiökonomischen"

> Gedanken geworden. Zu jedem Seienden des Verbrauchs gehört wesentlich, dass es **schon** verbraucht **ist** und somit nach seinem Ersetztwerden ruft. Darin haben wir eine der Formen des Schwundes im Überlieferungsmässigen vor uns, dessen was von Generation zu Generation weitergegeben wird. ... Auf die **Zeit** bezogen, ergibt dieser Charakter die **Aktualität**. (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 369)
>
> Today, being means being replaceable. Even the idea of a "repair" has turned into an "anti-economical" thought. An aspect of every Being of consumerism is that it **is already** consumed and therefore demands to be replaced. We have before us one of the forms of loss of transmission, of that which is passed on from generation to generation. ... Taken in relation to time this characteristic produces the **current interest**.

As he had already done in **Sein und Zeit**, the Heidegger of the late sixties still laments the fact that our philosophical heritage has taught us to view time in terms of the present (which, in its excess, becomes Aktualitat), to be replaced at will. The fact that we resist what the past might offer us points to our inability to view the three temporal dimensions in interaction. Therefore, the claim that our age places an abundance of information at our fingertips meets on deaf ears because Heidegger would counter that the information available to us is just that: information, impersonal, external to us, and probably even replaceable, depending on the direction that our technological advances take us.

But if all Seiendes is replaceable, it implies that our relation to **Sein** must undergo dramatic changes. Heidegger claims that modern man has become a slave to the

forgetting of Being (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 370). We, who have created technology, are letting ourselves be manipulated by our creations, and are not even aware of it ("UND DASS ER NICHTS DAVON WEISS." Heidegger, 1986b, p. 369). We substitute Philosophy and Poetry with Cybernetics, and we are equally quick to accept information as a replacement for knowledge. What we don't know, and what we will never be taught by the new disciplines, is the fact that we are performing this replacement, since this knowledge would not be in their interest. And so the search for the foundation of knowledge has been ended by modern education which is necessarily a slave to the modern Ge-stell. The Man has taken over, and as far as Western thought is concerned, the fallenness that this take-over brings with it is no longer just one mode of Dasein, but has consumed it at the expense of all other modes.

Already in **Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität** (**The Self-Setermination of the German University**), his speech at the acceptance of the rectorate at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger speaks of the essence of knowledge, or rather, of the essence of **Wissenschaft**. Despite its often nauseating rhetoric, this speech contains an important Heideggerian question, that of what constitutes knowledge in out modern age. Although a perfectly acceptable translation into English is the commonly used term "science", the more elaborate "science

of knowledge" would be more appropriate, since Heidegger does not limit himself to the Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences), but places the Geisteswissenschaften (spiritual sciences) above the former. That he does not want to speak about science in a "contemporary manner", he makes clear in the statement that comes as close to a definition as any Heideggerian elaboration does:

> Alle Wissenschaft ist Philosophie, mag sie es wissen und wollen - oder nicht. Alle Wissenschaft bleibt jenem Anfang der Philosophie verhaftet. Aus ihm schöpft sie die Kraft ihres Wesens, gesetzt, dass sie diesem Anfang überhaupt noch gewachsen bleibt. (Heidegger, 1990a, p. 11)
>
> All science is philosophy, may science know that and want it - or not. All science remains tied to that beginning of philosophy. From that beginning it gains the power of its essence, that is, if it can still live up to the power of its essence.

The beginning that Heidegger speaks of is the Logos, through which man can, for the first time, come up against, question, and understand the Seiendes im Ganzen (the Being in its entirety, Heidegger, 1990a, p. 11). Contrary to contemporary notions of "science", this original Greek science had as its goal to come as close as possible to Being by means of "theory". What is important -and certainly contrary to any modern notion of science - is the fact that "in the beginning",

> Nicht stand ihr Sinn danach, die Praxis der Theorie anzugleichen, sondern umgekehrt, die Theorie selbst

> als die höchste Verwirklichung echter Praxis zu verstehen. (Heidegger, 1990a, p. 12)
>
> It did not aim to adapt praxis to theory, but vice versa, to consider theory itself as the highest realization (materialization) of true praxis.

For the Pre-Socratics, science did not merely serve as the means to bring into consciousness that which is unconscious. Rather, science is seen as the power which engulfs the entirety of Dasein. Science and knowledge imply a persistent questioning for that which is concealed.

> ... dieses Wissen ist uns nicht die beruhigte Kenntnisnahme von Wesenheiten und Werten an sich, sondern die schärfste Gefährdung des Daseins inmitten der Übermacht des Seienden. (Heidegger, 1990a, p. 12)
>
> ... for us this knowledge is not the calm acknowledgment of essences and values in themselves, but it is the biggest threat to Dasein in the midst of the predominance of that which is (of being).

In contrast to modern science and modern education, knowledge and, above all, thinking, is a constant questioning, not the answer to any of those questions. Therefore, the rectorate-speech must be seen as an elucidation on the essence of knowledge and of science. Simultaneously, it constitutes a warning against what Heidegger considered the ultimate decline of knowledge and of the German University system: the move from the dangerous and uncertain realm of the **Weltungewissheit** (world-uncertainty) in which a common questioning must persist, into the realm of the certainty of modern science

in which ready-made answers are valued above anything else. It is obvious that the warning was not heeded, for the German University has since undergone a turn which has brought about the forgetting of thinking that Heidegger spoke of, and has instead elected to celebrate the results of scientific investigations.

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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

Anxiety - Angst (Heidegger)
existential anxiety caused by our awareness of our temporal limitations.
(compare Kierkagaard's **fear**)

Apperception - Wahrnehmung (Fichte)
(second level of consciousness); perception of phenomena and/or objects. Limited by our physical senses. (compare Kant's **apprehension**)

Apprehension - Sinnlichkeit (Kant)
(Fist level of consciousness); most basic faculty of the mind. Our capacity to be affected by sensations. Apprehension makes possible the contemplation of objects.
(compare Fichte's **apperception**)

Being - das Sein (Fichte and Heidegger)
The force that makes being possible and brings it about.

being - das Seiende (Heidegger)
That which exists within Being.

Body - Leib (Heidegger)
the "I" of the questioner as opposed to the "body" of traditional philosophy which is juxtaposed with "mind".

Categories - Kategorien (Kant)
forms of understanding. Rules which determine the manner in which we are able to think.

Clearing - Lichtung (Heidegger)
the moment and/or the place in which we achieve consciousness.

Concept - Begriff
Kant: A priori to the experience of external objects. Prerequisite for knowledge.
Fichte: The result of the activity of thinking. Makes possible the move from apperception to abstract thought.
Kierkegaard: Vocation or calling of man that requires him to act in ways that are true to it.

Dasein (Fichte and Heidegger)
the identity of the questioner; the "I" of phenomenological inquiry. - The individual as it is involved in existence.

Epoche (Husserl)
The act of temporarily bracketing or suspending our prejudices. (Prejudices in the sense of cultural baggage).

Facticity - Faktizität (Heidegger)
the fact that we find ourselves part of the world; characterized by our moods.

Fallenness - das Fallen (Heidegger)
our absorption with things alongside of us and with routines.

Form (Kant and Fichte)
Stable entity given by an individual's mind. Makes a priori knowledge possible. Not dependent on experience.

Intellect - Verstand (Kant)
Often translated as "understanding".
(Second level of consciousness); makes possible the thinking of objects.

Intuition - Anschauung
Kant: pre-conceptual data produced by the faculties of the mind, not by experience; makes a priori knowledge possible.
Fichte: (First level of consciousness); pre-conceptual data determined and modified by physical senses.

Knowledge - das Wissen (Fichte and Heidegger)
characterized as a skill rather than an accumulation of facts.

Logos (Heidegger)
The primordial unity of world and language. ("the word is the thing")

das Man (Heidegger)
the anonymous "they" which dictates our notions of Self. (compare Kierkegaard's comparative self)

The manifold - das Mannigfaltige (Kant)
a variety of data (impressions) contained in intuition.

Matter - Materie (Kant), Stoff (Fichte)
External object or phenomenon as created by the mind.

Moment - Augenblick (Heidegger)
A point in time at which phenomena present themselves. A point in time in which the three temporal dimensions meet.

Permutation - Verschmelzung (Fichte)
the unity of self-knowledge, awareness of external objects, and thinking.
(compare Heidegger's **primordial unity** or **Logos**)

present-at-hand - vorhanden (Heidegger)
objects alongside of us.

present-to-hand - zuhanden (Heidegger)
objects that are characterized by the use we make of them.

Reason - Vernunft (Kant)
(third and highest level of consciousness); produces the acknowledgment of the limitations of the categories.

Reflexation - Reflexion (Fichte)
(highest level of consciousness); amalgamation of abstract thought and the knowledge that there is an "I".

Self-reflection - Selbstanschauung (Hegel)
subject-object relationship. Consciousness makes itself the object.

Sorge (Heidegger)
concern for the world of which we are a part.

Synthesis - Synthese (Kant)
the act of ordering the variety of data supplied to and by the mind.

The thing-in-itself - die Sache selbst (Kant)
assumed existence of objects independent of our mind.

Thinking - denken (Fichte)
process; the activity of bringing something into awareness.

Thrownness - Geworfenheit (Heidegger)
the acknowledgment that we have been placed into this world without our will.

Tools - Zeug (Heidegger)
Objects which we use in a pre-reflective manner.

Transcendental Apperception - Transzendentale Anschauung (Kant)
an unmediated, unified "I" which is prior to intuition. Unity of subject and object.

Understanding - das Verstehen (Heidegger)
characterized by "knowing how" rather than "knowing that."

Unity - Einheit (Kant)
the result of the act of synthesis.

Vergegenwärtigung (Heidegger)
Used in the sense of imagination. Bringing that into presence which is absent. Generally translated as re-presentation.