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A quest for personal meaning and wholeness through the movement experience: An alternative perspective

Marshall, Jacqueline Carol, Ed.D.

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1986

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A QUEST FOR PERSONAL MEANING AND WHOLENESS THROUGH THE MOVEMENT EXPERIENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

by

Jacqueline Carol Marshall

A Dissertation Submitted to
The Faculty of the Graduate School at
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of the Requirements for the Degree
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Approved by

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APPROVAL PAGE

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The central question of this inquiry is: Does the movement experience facilitate personal meaning and wholeness? Existential-phenomenological insights are drawn from writers such as Merleau-Ponty, Bakan, and Kleinman. A major premise underlying this study is that personal wholeness is contingent on coming to terms with two symbiotic, yet paradoxical human impulses; the need for autonomy (agency) and the need for connection with others (communion). Our holistic quest is to come to terms with these two dimensions in ourselves, and show how movement facilitates their reconciliation. The major concern of this study is the increasing alienation experienced by students who feel unembodied, unfree, and unconnected in physical education. Alienation or depersonalization occurs when the inner subjective feelings and the outer observable dimensions of movement are split from each other. Our continued reliance on Newtonian and Cartesian dualistic thought as the theoretical base for physical education supports and compounds the alienation dilemma.

Merleau-Ponty's Body-Subject is offered as an alternative holistic model. The rationale and support for its position is based on the New Physics paradigm that the universe is no longer immutable and absolute but relative. The Body-Subject depolarizes the inner and outer split in movement, and helps center our paradoxical need for autonomy

and communion. The primordial dimensions of the lived body guided by our preconscious and conscious intentions supports the holistic notion of the mind-body as one entity. The body actively situates itself for meaning. Wholeness exists at both the preconscious and conscious levels of the body. More specifically, wholeness occurs when the other is dialectically met as a subject, not an object. By meeting the other as a subject the subject-object dichotomy is dissolved, revealing universal harmony, unity, and deep personal meaning.

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to Lar...

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Now of all the acts the most complete is that of constructing. A work demands love, meditation, obedience to your finest thought, the invention of laws by your soul, and many other things that it draws miraculously from your self, which did not suspect that it possessed them. This work proceeds from the most intimate center of your existence, and yet it is distinct from yourself.

Paul Valery

The work is to master and be mastered by one's idea, a passionate process ... this work has to do with language and metaphor, with the cosmos, and the figuring self in relation. It is a living, thinking, growing, remembering work between the self and the real world.

Elizabeth Sewell

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> Throughout most of recorded history, athletes and physical educators in the roles of paidotribes, teachers, trainers, and coaches, have dealt with the body as an object. This has been true with reference to their own bodies and those of others. The focus of inquiry has been on questions and problems associated with physical training and conditioning, and not on the body as a source of identity. (Leonard, 1975, p. 23)

The fundamental human quest is the search for our personal identity and personal meaning in our lives. As individuals we are in search of our uniqueness, our humanity, and ultimately, our destiny. Self-understanding is a search for authenticity not found in anonymity, conformity, or passivity. Such understanding is not a totally rational process achieved by logical reasoning or problem solving (Macdonald, 1980). This life-long struggle of coming to terms with our humanity and uniqueness is not a journey that unfolds effortlessly, but rather as a result of incessant soul searching. Although our physical and mental reality are beyond dispute, meaning and spiritual relevance remain the seemingly unfathomable question which we endeavor to comprehend. The inherent difficulty of this task is illustrated by Heschel:

> The paradox is that man is an obscure text to himself. He knows that something is meant by what he does, but he remains perplexed when called upon to interpret his own being. (Heschel, 1965, p. 6)

All concrete beings occupy a place in physical space and can be defined in terms of objective properties. Unlike other entities, however, our authentic existence occurs within ourselves through the process of direct experience of action and reflection upon our actions. Humans are unique in this respect. We are the only species with the capacity to reflect on our behavior. Since actions are readily observable and discernable, reflection has a tendency to reduce an individual to what is explicitly manifest and observable. As humans we fail to acknowledge and comprehend fully the power of the inner space within ourselves, where this process occurs as an integral path to self-understanding and personal meaning. Heschel elucidates upon this point:

> It is a mistake however to equate man's essence with his manifestations. The power and secret of his being reside as much in the unsaid and unproclaimed, in the tacit and the ineffable, in the acts of awareness that defy expression as in the vessels man creates for his expression. (1965, p. 10)

The Inner and Outer Split

This fragmentation of the outer, observable self from our inner feelings and intuition has resulted in alienation, not only from ourselves but from the larger community in which we are integrally connected. Our humanity is being eclipsed in the face of technocracy's demands for increased productivity. For the sake of human progress, we have become machine-like in our thinking. Unfortunately, in the process, we are losing ourselves. Maybe this is what Heschel implies

when he states: "Man in his anxiety is a messenger, who forgot the message" (Heschel, 1965, p. 119).

This alienation has shown itself in different ways. As humans, we no longer feel at home with ourselves and the world. A feeling of inertia has resulted. This inertia has been compounded by the tremendous technological advances which have induced a sense of fear and alienation from our environment (May, 1967). Specialization, complexity, and the transitory nature of things have left us feeling empty and powerless. We are bewildered and feel a sense of helplessness which leads to apathy and the inability to bring about change and growth, not only in ourselves, but in the world we occupy (Ravizza, 1977).

Sartre (1956) and Heidegger (1962) specifically highlight the alienation dilemma. Although these authors wrote in the context of the thirties, forties, and fifties, I feel the problems that existed then are the same concerns of today. According to Heidegger, the self or the "I" (dasein) is lost in the mediocrity of the "THEY." It is the larger public eye that controls and determines the interpretation of the "I" and the world. To Heidegger, "everyone is the other and no one is himself." On a similar note, Sartre states that every day we deceive ourselves by playing roles expected of us. Our authentic self is martyred by public demand: we lose our unique individuality to fulfill a particular function. This role is not only self-deceptive but limits

the self. We become simply appearances, devoid of our authentic self.

One way of avoiding encounters with our authentic self, according to Fromm (1941), is to immerse ourselves with somebody or something outside ourselves in order to acquire the strength which the self is lacking. Furthermore, others, when confronted with personal problems, seek solutions that merely gloss over the deeper, underlying cause. Avoidance of the self by whatever means becomes the safer, less anxious way to exist.

Similarly, May (1967) acknowledges the emptiness of our inner selves as we quest for meaning. He illuminates the idea that it is not that we do not know what we want, but that we often do not have a clear idea of how we feel. We lack sensitivity and awareness of the rich textured matrix of our interiority. The following poem by T.S. Eliot (1934) illustrates our inner vacuousness.

> We are the hollow men
> We are the stuffed men
> Leaning together
> Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
>
> Shape without form, shade without color
> Paralyzed force, gesture without motion. (p. 101.)

May draws support for the severity of our dilemma by referring to Nietzsche's (1927) proclamation that science in the late nineteenth century was becoming a factor. Nietzsche feared that our great advances in techniques, without a parallel advance in ethics and self-understanding, would lead

to nihilism. Nihilism denies all existing and traditional values on which human existence is predicated and ultimately leads to the demise of order and civilization.

Heschel, Heidegger, Sartre, and May all echo a similar theme. They call us to rediscover our unique, inner sources of strength and the integrity of our authentic self. In doing so, we will be able to actualize our possibilities into realities through our freely chosen will, acutely aware that we are the masters of our own will and journey throughout life. Only when we are autonomous and critically conscious of ourselves as free agents can we be fully responsible for nurturing our personal, authentic growth, facilitating a more meaningful contribution to the larger community.

The authentic self facilitates our search for personal meaning. Believing in and drawing on the resources of our authentic self, we as individuals are not only critically conscious of who we are but how we are. We listen and embrace our outer world of knowing through our senses, coupled with the intuitive feeling aspect of our inner thoughts. This process offers us the possibility for a more integrated mode of living. The true self emerges as a beacon humanizing the alienated, self-perpetuated, technological pit, which according to Nietzsche (1927), is precariously close to its full eclipse and our ultimate demise.

Causes and Implications of the Split

The fragmentation of humanity through our perception of

our inner and outer selves was started in the seventeenth century by Descartes (Meier, 1975). He believed that all nature must be subjected to scrutiny and be examined rationally rather than experientially. This belief evolves from the fact that the body and mind are viewed as separate entities having mutually exclusive properties. The outer and objective world of nature, including the physical body, are radically different from the inner and subjective world of our mind and experience. Reason becomes separated from emotion and will. Reason offers the answer to any problem confronting the physical laws of nature (Meier, 1975). The process, once learned, does not stop with nature. The same rational processes are turned back on humanity itself by compartmentalizing our wholeness into separate entities. Despite rigorous, reductionistic methods of logic and sophisticated techniques of data analysis, we are still no closer to understanding our psyche, since we need to be seen as an embodied entity. Only when this is fully acknowledged do we have any hope of living more centered and integrated lives.

The scientific-reductionist method that evolved when reason became separated from emotion and will has brought about a development of our conceptual and mental capacities that neglects our bodily experiences and sensations (Kleinman, 1970). We need to recover our awareness of our bodies. We have lost touch with our bodies and are unaware

of the inner world of direct firsthand experience and the inherent awareness and understanding that follows. R. D. Laing (cited in Ravizza, 1977a) expresses this point:

> As adults we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of the existence of the inner world . . . or for our bodies, we retain just sufficient proprioceptive sensations to coordinate our movements and to ensure the minimal requirements for biosocial survival-beyond that, little or nothing. (p. 99)

Subsequently, when confronted with a physical ailment, our first reaction is to reach for an external remedy to solve the problem (May, 1967). Rarely do we search inwardly for a possible cause, or assume responsibility for working through a problem. We have forgotten how to listen to the natural body rhythms that constantly inform us about our physical and emotional selves. This reliance on externals reflects the attitude that regards the body as a mechanism or object that must be serviced. Rollo May illustrates this point:

> As a result of . . . suppressing the body into an inanimate machine, subordinated to the purpose of modern industrialization, people are proud of paying no attention to the body. They treat it as an object for manipulation, as though it were a truck to be driven until it runs out of gas. They know how germs or viruses or allergies attack the body or how some other drugs cure them. The attitude toward disease is not that of a self-aware person who experiences his body as part of himself. (1967, p. 92)

The Split in Movement

Many of the attitudes we hold about the body, and subsequently physical education, are shaped by the attitude our society has about the worth of the body in relationship to the worth of the mind. Fairs (1968) states that the role of physical education in society is determined by the mind-body relationship. If the mind and body are considered separate, then the body is viewed irreverently, since it confounds reason. When the mind-body are viewed as having a modicum of relationship, the body is viewed less favorably than the mind. Whereas, if the mind and body are regarded more holistically, the body enjoys more esteem and significance (Fairs, 1968).

Ervin's (1964) study, "Education of the Physical versus Education through the Physical," states that the mind-body problem is not entirely an in-house issue; outside forces play a significant role not only for the perpetuation of the problem, but for its resolution. She states:

> From 1952 to the present day, the profession has oscillated indecisively from one to the other. The controversy thus continues . . . Not only inconsistency of purpose within the physical education profession, but a variety of outside forces retard or even prevent (sic) solution of the controversy. (Ervin, 1964, p. 312)

The cultural ethos of the last fifty years has increasingly viewed the body as an animated machine to be vigorously scrutinized by scientific analysis. Since physical education reflects the larger, macro view, it has unwittingly reflected the same (Ravizza, 1977a). This

problem has been compounded by the larger forces shaping its belief system, upon which the profession predicates its existence as well as its direction. Ravizza (1977a) acknowledges this point:

> Physical educators have unintentionally contributed to the conception of the body as an animated machine; viewing it primarily as an object of scientific analysis. In the minds of the public, physical education is associated chiefly with physical fitness, the physical educator is the person who gets the body in good physical condition, just as the dentist gets one's teeth in order. (p. 100-101)

Physical educators have also contributed unknowingly to the mover viewing himself as a duality, a mind and a body. The body is viewed as an object of scientific analysis, perpetuating society's view of the body as separate from the mind (Ravizza, 1977a). This is limiting since we do not live our lives as separate parts, but as an embodied unity. Kleinman (1979) reiterates this point when he states:

> We have come to regard the body as a thing to be dealt with, rather than as an existent presence or mode of being . . . we have divorced the body from experience and we do not attempt to understand it as it operates in the lived world; rather we attempt to explain it as a physiological organism. We don't look at it as it is, but as we conceptualize it scientifically. (p. 177)

The Split Related to Physical Education

It is my belief that physical education should be concerned with integrating the personal "inner" meanings of the movement itself with the development of "outer" physical fitness and skills. Neither should be emphasized to the detriment or exclusion of the other. The former reflects an

intrinsic focus for the impact the movement has for other dimensions of personal knowing. This focus is one of integration and affords possibilities for transcendence to a more reflective or holistic position. The latter is more consonant with an extrinsic position about the movement itself, i.e., its principal objectives are efficiency and effectiveness for the moving body in time and space. The body is primarily treated as an object.

I contend that physical education is out of balance at present. There appears to be an exaggeration of the extrinsic position where the main emphasis is on physical skills and fitness to the partial exclusion of the intrinsic position. I posit that both positions are valid and necessary. It is not simply one in lieu of the other. Opposites are only extremes of the same thing. For example, water has two extremes of steam and ice, but they are essences of the same phenomena.

The predominant view for the last fifty years has had the body as increasingly separate from the mind and as an object to be manipulated. I feel there are two major reasons for this dichotomy. First, the larger cultural ethos determines the worth and subsequent bias of the mind-body relationship in physical education (Fairs, 1968). During the last fifty years the mind has enjoyed a more priveleged position than the body or mind-body, subsequently holistic movement took a "back seat" in physical education. Secondly,

the subjective elements of the movement experience are not as easily delineated. They appear nebulous and difficult to fully understand since they are concerned with emotions, intuitions, irrationality, and transcendence. I feel the ambivalence within the profession toward embracing a more holistic approach to movement may lie in the abstract nature of the literature. It is this lack of direction in the literature and its attendant effects on personal understanding that inhibits teachers in adopting and fostering the intrinsic position in their teaching. What is needed in the literature is a clear theoretical framework touching upon the personal possibilities for meaning and transcendence through the movement experience. Once such a framework is developed, it is hoped that it will enable us to better understand, embody, and teach the full continuum of meaning inherent in movement and sports.

In endeavoring to understand the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions of the movement experience, we must avoid the natural tendency of seeking a middle ground by overemphasizing that which has been slighted. We must not emphasize the intrinsic to arrive at our balance by a process of averaging. Our goal should be to construct a philosophical framework which at the outset recognizes the movement experience to be the integration of both the intrinsic and the extrinsic, a wholeness of movement.

In professional circles, physical educators have always

acknowledged that physical education is more than just fitness and health. It has the potential for educating the whole person, a view espoused by Hetherington (1922), Nash (1930), and Williams (1927). According to Kollen (1981), however, the profession gives "lip-service" to education of the whole person, more commoningly referred to as education "through" the physical. It leaves to chance the affect of the movement experience and assumes it will take place.

Kollen (1981), in her study on fragmentation and integration in physical education, indicates that none of the current literature on the subject matter of physical education considers integrated movement. Rather, the subject matter of physical education appears to be biomechanics, exercise physiology, and motor learning. Further, there appears to be an increasing body of literature focusing on laboratory measurements on body composition, body levers, and motor learning modes based on physiology, physics, and psychology. She notes that although there are few citations in the professional journals concerned with integrated movement, there appears to be a growing body of studies concerned with the more integrated aspects of movement, which she classifies into three categories. The first category pertains to the psychological impact of the performer in movement. The second category references the positive outcomes of integrated movement experiences. The last category attempts to identify the meaning of movement

experiences for the body-subject.

My major concern for this study is that physical education appears to be alienating many persons from the joy and meaning of their bodies in motion. According to Kollen's study, physical education appears to be turning students "off" from movement rather than "on." Kollen asked graduating high school seniors to reflect on their movement experience. One particular finding indicated that students were unable to recall any examples of integrated movement within physical education, but they were all able to report such experiences outside of physical education. She concludes her study with the following findings:

> 1. Many students shape their physical education world by negative withholding; many are shaped in their physical education world toward dependency and conformity.
>
> 2. Movement is a means to an end and the body is the enabling instrument of such movement; man is not a moving being in physical education.
>
> 3. Movement is given in physical education in a masculine, competitive, athletic, and self-conscious fashion.
>
> 4. Over time, movement unfolds from mystery, newness, and excitement toward boredom.
>
> 5. The movement experience in physical education is often one of isolation, alienation from , or unconcern for others; awareness, if any, centers around tension.

I feel Kollen's study clearly illustrates the alienation that many students experience in their physical education curriculum. This is the antithesis of what we purport to be about. Can we face the fact that students find little joy, learning, or meaning through movement experiences in our

classrooms? Subsequently, this study is about the development of an alternative position that specifically fosters the subjective and integrative elements of movement.

Method of Inquiry

The focus of this ontological inquiry is how individuals find personal meaning and integration through the movement experience. The major premise of this study is that personal integration is nurtured best when we as individuals recognize two facets of our existence. The first is our need for self-hood, autonomy, and authenticity to counteract the collectivist pot of conformity as outlined by Heidegger, Sartre, and May. Bannister captures the essence of this need for self-hood when he states, "Breathes there a man with a soul so dead that he has lost the urge to impress on the world some indelible mark of his personality." (1955, p. 67) This is in direct contrast and somewhat oppositional to our second need, our need to feel connected with others outside ourselves. Individuals do not live in isolation. There is a strong, inherent, emotional and spiritual drive to feel a sense of closeness with others; our need for communion. Neither is singularly sufficient. Individually, we need to feel a sense of our own potency and autonomy affirming our uniqueness alongside our deep-rooted need to belong to the larger community which substantiates and affirms our humanity. Two alternative models of wholeness, namely professional and personal, will explore this premise as it

relates to wholeness in a movement context.

These two models will provide the theoretical base for the alternative model. Secondly, they will provide different lenses to speculatively look at the two traditional approaches from different vantage points. We must endeavor to avoid the mistake our predecessors have made in accepting an either-or position, or biasing one model in favor of the other. We need to see them both as vital dynamics in the physical education process, for each is inherently embodied in each other, they are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the task is to develop an alternative model that embraces and extends traditional thought into the context of today.

The inquiry is guided by the central question: Does movement facilitate personal meaning and integration? If so, how? Other questions pertinent to the inquiry are:

1) Is there something unique about meaning in movement?

2) Is there a connection between personal meaning and integration?

3) Is there holism in movement? If so, what is its nature?

4) Can there be spiritual/transcendental meaning in movement? If so, where and how is it found?

Of the two major approaches to philosophy, analytic and speculative, this paper will pursue the latter. Speculative philosophy is primarily concerned with evoking new questions about new possibilities, once certain knowns have been determined. It acknowledges the validity of individual's intuitive and emotional hunches. According to Thomas,

"speculation tends to examine potentials, what could be or what should be rather than focusing on actual happenings" (1983, p. 19). The intent is to clarify and develop new platforms of belief to meet our constantly changing societal needs, so that the behavior that evolves from those beliefs is not only sound but consistent.

This paper will use existential-phemenological insights from writers such as Merleau-Ponty (Bannan, 1967; Edie, 1964; Kwant, 1963, 1966; Whitford, 1982), Kleinman (1970, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1986), Meier, (1975, 1979), Ravizza (1977, 1977a), and Slusher (1967). Existentialism focuses on the analysis of human nature and deals with the subjective and irrational side of humanity and our relationships. It views individuals as subjects, not objects, and believes that human beings are ends in themselves rather than a means to an end. Individuals are not enslaved to the larger, cultural system but may make choices of their own free will. It advocates acceptance of the irrational nature of humans, that many phenomena, particularly feelings, do not fit predetermined logical patterns. Ultimately, we need to give way to leaps of faith, since logical reductionism of feelings, ideas, and behavior does not offer adequate meanings for our existence. Phenomenology focuses on the study of human consciousness and self-awareness, and is the vehicle for the existential search. Existential-phemenological insights are appropriate for this study because they endeavor to speak to and about,

the subjective nature of the inner person, which is the major focus of this study in its relationship to wholeness.

Outline of the Study

This study continues with Chapter Two which explores an alternative theoretical platform for personal wholeness using Bakan's metaphors of Agency and Communion. This will illustrate some of the external factors in society that mitigate against personal wholeness. It will also provide a model for personal wholeness that will enable humans to reconcile their need for autonomy, against the impulse to feel connected, which embodies both the agentic and communal impulses. The physical education literature will then be explored for parallels between the agentic and communal modalities, since schools are a microcosm of the larger society. The intent is to highlight specific teaching-learning practices in physical education that mirror these two modalities.

Chapter Three will explore the major theoretical and philosophical influences upon which physical education has predicated its existence. Two predominant philosophical orientations in physical education literature, education "of" and education "through" the physical will be used for this purpose. Once such a platform has been established, the extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of movement will be explored and the relationship of both philosophical orientations to wholeness will be discussed.

The second theoretical platform will be discussed in Chapter Four. More specifically, Merleau-Ponty's work on the Body-Subject will speculatively show how movement can integrate the two modalities agency and communion. Further, this chapter will attempt to explain the nature of the relationship between these two modalities as it pertains to personal wholeness and meaning.

The final chapter will elucidate an alternative, philosophical model for physical education that will illuminate more fully the subjective aspects of the personal meanings and the transcendent possibilities inherent in the movement experience. It will include implications and ramifications for the philosophical framework evolved from Chapters Two and Four. The main intent is to understand the mysterious nature of wholeness, not only for the self, but how this takes place in a movement environment.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PLATFORM FOR PERSONAL WHOLENESS

If I am not for myself
Who will be for me?
If I am only for myself
What am I?

Hillel

The quest for personal meaning and wholeness in our everyday mundane lives is elusive. Heschel (1965) reminds us that as humans we believe our existence has meaning, but exactly what the meaning is, is unclear. The journey from our Genesis to our Exodus takes a different path for each individual. For many, it is a spiritual quest for communion with the eternal deity. Such a communal impulse is also sought on an earthly plane -- the need to feel authentically connected and loving with others.

This feeling of human connectedness, however, is not sufficient in and of itself. As humans, we also have a need to express our being as separate from the group and to discover the creative powers unique to our individual personalities. It is through separation that we are able to accomplish this. By accepting our aloneness and taking responsibility for ourselves, we develop competence and control in our lives, contrary to the conformity and dependency experienced during infancy.

The individuation process is characterized by a

dialectical quality. On one side there is the need for a feeling of personal strength -- physically, emotionally and mentally and a perception of self as competent and capable. Whereas, the other side of individuation is the growing awareness of our aloneness with its subsequent anxiety. We soon realize our powerlessness and insignificance, which in turn, precipitates the impulse to submerge ourselves and reconnect with the world again (Fromm, 1941). This process of individuation makes for a higher, more meaningful re-connection with the group, for it is based on free choice rather than conformity. The end result is a deeper level of self-understanding, which in turn, facilitates a higher level of successive contributions to the larger community. Consequently, community continues to evolve and is enriched because of this dialectical individuation process.

Integrating these two impulses, the need to belong and the need to express our self-hood, forms the main premise of this study. Our quest is to reconcile these two dimensions in ourselves, and understand the symbiotic yet paradoxical relationship between these two modalities. Personal wholeness, and indeed societal wholeness of the larger culture, is contingent on integrating these two needs.

Jaspers (1951) suggests that a certain tension exists within the individual because of these two modalities. On one side is the desire to safeguard our existence which manifests itself outward to the community. On the other, our need to

express our individuality and being, leading us inwards, towards our inner private world. This inner-outer or subject-object tension permeates our human existence.

Agency and Communion

David Bakan (1966) adopts the terms agency and communion to characterize these two basic modalities of human forms: agency for existence as an individual and communion for coming together with others as part of a larger organism. More specifically, agency manifests itself in self-protection, self-assertion, and self-expansion. Other characteristics include mastery and competition through separateness, isolation, alienation, aloneness, and the repression of feeling, impulse, and intuitive or creative thought. Communion, on the other hand, is manifested by a sense of oneness with other organisms; nurtured through contact, openness and union, and the removal of separations and repression.

It is interesting to note that Bakan indicates a strong connection between the musculature of the body and the agency feature since this is where we first experience a sense of control and mastery within ourselves. Both modalities, however, are necessary for human survival. Agency affirms our individual potency and power to act on the world, thereby declaring our autonomy and self-hood. Communion, in contrast, affirms our human capacity to care and feel connected with others. Neither are singularly sufficient. Whereas control,

mastery, and separation are the major features of agency; intimate understanding of our connections is the major goal of communion.

Bakan contends that the agency impulse dominates the communal impulse. Agency is preferred, considered superior, and enjoys the more dominant place in our society. The communal modality is considered adjunctive and of secondary worth, although necessary within society. One of Bakan's fundamental points, however, is that the agency impulse has split itself from the communal impulse, and that this split arises from the agency feature itself. In so doing it represses the communal dimension from which it has separated itself. It is the domination by the agency feature and its split from the communal feature that leads to human alienation, aggression, and ultimately death; either turned outward to others or inwards on ourselves.

American society has emerged from Protestant individualism, and scientific and technological breakthroughs. Supported by its capitalistic environment, our society is perhaps the most obvious and extreme representation of a nation committed to an agentic orientation. Within American society, agency is manifested in terms of our extremes of competition, mastery, and achievement, and exploitation of others and our environment (Macdonald, 1981). It has been furthur compounded by our continual renewal and commitment to military and economic supremacy over less agentic nations.

Our superpower status has caused us to view our relations

with other nations predominately in terms of self-interest and personal power -- a vestige from the colonial era. What we have failed to do is realize that we are a global people and economy. The agency modality is no longer singularly sufficient or appropriate for humanity today.

Nietzsche (1927) prophesized and warned us of the dangers of an exaggeration of the agency feature. He feared that our great advances in technology and science (agency) would lead to nihilism and even the demise of civilization without a parallel advance in ethics and self-understanding, more consonant with Bakan's sense of communion.

American society, emerging from the rugged individualism of its frontier days, and undergirded by a Protestant ethic that valued work as an expression of service to God, placed a high value on the agentic modality. Agency within this society was both the means of securing a livelihood and a higher morality. Physical courage and dogged perseverance ensured survival of the pioneer while more emotional qualities were often more of a hindrance. Reflecting on the early frontier days of this country, Ervin states the following:

> What these people failed to understand was that a new kind of life had taken over, a life that centered upon the powers and capabilities of each <u>individual</u> rather than upon the <u>community</u> and a group of leaders . . . For it was through physical strength, and physical skills that a man was able to achieve his independence and also, in time, secure a more influential place within the society. (1964, p. 21) [emphasis added]

This social attitude is no longer necessary or appropriate in contemporary society. Our cultural and social patterns are so

deeply ingrained, however, that undertaking social change in which the agentic and communal modalities are more tolerably integrated within individuals, institutions, and the larger culture is exceedingly difficult. An exploration of this significant issue, its causes and perpetuation will be discussed shortly, using the work of Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan (1982).

Koestler (1979) labels the two modalities of Bakan as the self-assertive tendency (agency) and the integrative tendency (communion). His main concern is not an exaggeration of the self-assertive or agency feature, but rather an excess of the integrative or communal impulse. Koestler feels the agency feature is kept in check by the integrative feature of the larger collective. For instance, if an individual is excessively aggressive to the extent he/she threatens community the larger collective will restrain him/her. Whereas, Koestler contends that there is little societal recall of the excessive integrative or communal inpulses characterized by fanatical devotion. History testifies to the many religious cults that have capitalized on the deep human need to belong. The Jim Jones tragedy in Guyana stands as an awesome reminder of this human tendency. Koestler reminds us that some of the most evil events in history have been committed under the guise of unselfish love. When the need to belong is stunted, individuals feel a sense of frustration and have a tendency to lose their critical faculties, surrendering their autonomy and

identity in blind worship or fanatical following of some cause. The critical point is that once ensconced into the group, the integrative tendency or the communal energy takes over, leaving little recall or societal check on this runaway impulse (Koestler, 1979).

Koestler maintains that the origin of this need is related to the long gestation and dependency period during infancy. He maintains this long period of dependency upon authority conditions and sensitizes us to obedience to a higher authority. Being thrust out of the nest to face our aloneness is very threatening for many of us. This aloneness causes many individuals to sacrifice and subsume their own identity into the collective in order to feel the sense of connection, security, and bonding they felt during infancy. Koestler believes control is the only remedy to offset this malaise in our society.

The significance of Koestler's position is that it illuminates three key points. First, it acknowledges the dangers inherent in an exaggeration of the integrative or communal tendency. Secondly, it sensitizes us to the lack of societal influence for controlling this type of fanatical devotion, and lastly, it reinforces the positive elements of the agency or the self-assertive modality, such as control and the development of autonomy as a means to counteract excessive integrative or communal impulses.

Tillich's (1952) statement that one should neither be

solely for or against society supports Bakan's and Koestler's position of the dangers inherent in an excess polar position of either modality. Bakan and Koestler illuminate the tenuous balance that exists between the agency-communion modality. Bakan (1966) enlightens us to the dangers of the agency feature when it is split from communion manifesting itself in human alienation and destruction. Similarly, Koestler (1979) reminds us of the dangers of excessive communal impulses, for which he feels there is little societal recall unlike the agency feature which is kept in check by the larger collective. There is also confusion when these two modalities are in conflict with each other pulling us in different directions. This creates ambivalence which frustrates, and, if continued, paralyzes us (Stinson, 1984). Therefore, the task is to discover the source of the problem, and develop new understandings of both dimensions which support and complement one another.

Agency and Communion as Gender

Characteristics inherent in Bakan's agency-communion impulse or Koestler's self-assertive-integrative impulse suggest a strong gender connection (Bakan, 1966, Macdonald & Macdonald, 1981). Agency and self-assertion represent the masculine impulse towards mastery and separation. Communion and the integrative feature represent the feminine impulse towards union for understanding of human connections. Since the agency or self-assertive characteristics are more valued in

society, the communal or integrative, characteristics fostered in females tend to be considered inferior.

Bakan (1966) and Macdonald (1981) note that the current gender system of our society has been restrictive on the full development of humanity in both males and females. Both the agentic and communal modalities are deemed essential to each human being regardless of gender.

> There is a need for the development of the masculine and feminine qualities within each individual regardless of sex. The splitting of one from the other -- the hierarchial order of the masculine domination and feminine subordination have denied each sex its full development and created alienation, subtle though it may be between the sexes. These roles have been functional, but for a sex gender system founded on sexual inequality and not for social survival or free human activity. (Bem, 1976, p. 47)

According to Chodorow (1978) and Kanter (1977), the present child-rearing and institutional social patterns towards gender perpetuate the split of the agency factor from the communal factor resulting in alienation and underdeveloped human potential. Our continued pattern of allowing male children to be socialized through separation and control so they fit comfortably into the work force leaves our female children less competent in this area. Similarly, male children are denied the capacity for developing the full potential for love, which is more evolved in females. Ostensibly, the female is designated the role of nurturer trained in the expressive function of social survival; males are considered the providers trained in the instrumental functions to ensure social productivity. The gender trade-off is dehumanising. Macdonald

(1981) points out that by confining women to certain helping or nurturing roles, it denies males such roles and vice-versa for females. He states:

> For when women become by role and myth the only truly protecting, nurturant, tender and compassionate ones, men are denied the opportunity of growth through loving. And when women within this role myth are also the inferior ones the whole society is denied growth and love . . . whereas for males, the designated superiority of non-loving capacities makes full loving almost impossible as part of their repertoire. (1981, p. 301)

According to Fromm (1941), human potential is maximized when an individual has the capacity to love not only himself, but also love outwardly. He suggests that the affirmation of human life, happiness, growth, and freedom is rooted in our capacity to love. Indeed, if love is a pivotal factor for human existence, denying it denies individuals their humanity. Since this characteristic is considered feminine, it is likely that half the population will not have adequately developed this dimension in themselves. The continued hierarchial, masculine value of mastery and control, the agency characteristic, is perhaps one of the more significant underlying causes for much of the alienation and aggression experienced in our world today.

Roots of the Malady

The origin of gender differences is a speculative isssue. Simmons' (1984) study on gender issues and the work-family role, suggests, upon reviewing the biological, sociological, and anthropological gender literature, that the socialization factor is a more influential factor than the genetic factor. She states:

> Although biological determinists force us to look seriously at biological differences in the sexes and the influence of hormones on behavior, the wide range of behavior exhibited in our society by males and females in role conflict situations does not suggest genetically sex-linked behavior patterns. Researchers' experience with pseudo-hermaphrodites and other atypical gender identity versus gender role situations indicate the power of socialization over genetically specified gender. (Simmons, 1984, p. 36)

Two theoretical-sociological positions that explore the roots and development of this significant issue are those of Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan (1982). Both sociologists point out that theories of human development have failed to take into account the feminine perspective.

Chodorow (1978) points out that sexual inequality and personality differences between the sexes are due largely to the fact that females are the universal primary caretakers during the formative years of infancy. As a consequence, the bonding and interaction during the early years is experienced differently in males and females resulting in basic relational differences. More specifically, males and females develop personalities which differ in respect to their perception of social relationships, independency, and interdependency, and

life of the self in relation to others. During the early parts of infancy, however, the mother-child relationship is one of unity, caring, and attachment. The infant is totally dependent on the mother for physical and psychological survival to such an extent that the identity of the mother is also the identity of the child. As the infant matures this unity and closeness changes for the male infant. This shift away from intimacy for the male infant takes place through the mother's nuances in tone, touch, and conversation. Gradually the male infant becomes increasingly aware of his "differentness" from his mother. Conversely, female infants become increasingly aware of their "sameness" with their mother. Thus, gender-role in female infants is not a major concern when compared to male infants.

More specifically, Gilligan and Chodorow note that for male infants gender identity is integrally connected to separation from the mother replacing connection with individuation.

> For boys, separation and individuation are criticallly tied to gender identity since separation from the mother is essential to the development of masculinity. For girls and women, issues of femininity or feminine identity do not depend on the achievement of separation from the mother or on the process of individuation. Since masculinity is defined through separation, while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender is threatened by separation. Thus males tend to have difficulty with relationship, while females tend to have problems with individuation. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 8)

Thus, a young boy must come to devalue those feminine qualities of caring and nurturing in his mother. In so doing he denies

these feelings within himself.

> Masculine personality, then comes to be defined more in terms of denial of relation and connection (and denial of femininity), whereas feminine personality comes to include a fundamental definition of self in relationship. Thus relational abilities and preoccupations (with mother-child issues and female-male issues) have been extended in women's development and curtailed in men's . . . This points to boys' preparation for participation in non-relational spheres and to girls' greater potential in participation in relational spheres. It points also to different relational needs and fears in men and women. (Chodorow, 1978, pp. 169-170)

Female identity and intimacy appear closely connected. In one of the many studies by Gilligan (1982), she asked women and men to describe themselves. None of the highly successful females referred to their professional or scholastic achievements in their personal descriptions, yet all included a relationship, implying their identity was integrally connected to their future connection as a wife, mother, or with a past lover -- relationship appeared the significant goal. As might be expected, men's description of self was rooted in self detachment and separation from others. Males used agentic adjectives of separation such as logical, intelligent, and "achievement oriented" to describe themselves.

Gilligan also points out that moral ideology is different between males and females. Male ethics revolves around the ethic of rights; the female, around the ethic of care. She states:

> The moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in interviews with women is an injunction to care, a responsibility to discern and alleviate the "real and recognizable trouble" of this world. For men, the moral imperative appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others and

> thus to protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 100)

The domination of male values in society appears to impact the moral reasoning and decision-making processes of men and women. Men are more detached. The male ethic of rights, or justice, tends to respect the autonomy of the individual and intervene less. Females, on the other hand, tend to live in response to the perceived needs of others and intervene more frequently. Females have more difficulty seeing the world objectively and as detached. They express greater self-doubt regarding their own opinions. As a result, decision making is more problematic in women. Virginia Woolf pointed this out when she stated: "As a result women come to question the normality of their feelings and to alter their judgments in deference to the opinion of others." (Woolf, p. 76 as cited by Gilligan, p. 16) Gilligan points out that the two factors of male values domination, and women's concern for others compound the decision-making process for women.

Gilligan, extending the work of Chodorow, illuminates the misinterpretations possible when the masculine models of human development are imposed on the life cycle of the female. Problems in human development have been allocated as problems in women's development. Both Freud and Erickson recorded notes about the differences in male's and female's perceptions, yet they failed to account for them in their theories (Gilligan, 1982). Similarly, Kohlberg claims universality in his theory of moral development despite the fact that no women were

included in his studies. Likewise, Piaget equates male development with child development. He notes, however, that the legal sense in girls is less developed than in boys. Yet Piaget's stages of moral development does not reflect this difference.

Ideally, we need to develop the masculine and feminine qualities in each individual regardless of sex (Bem, 1976). This would help ensure the capacity for more intimacy or communion in our males, and the capacity for more individuation or agency in our females. Primary parenting by both parents would increase this possibility (Chodorow, 1978), and would more likely embody both the ethic of justice and the ethic of care, nurturing a compassionate but fair society in which to live.

> The ideals of human relationship . . . the vision that self and others will be treated as of equal worth, that despite differences in power, things will be fair; the vision that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or hurt. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 63)

Chodorow's and Gilligan's empirical work and personal experiences indicate that male and female perspectives on the nature of relationship and the work place differ. In a society quick to judge and place value on certain differences the social question of gender equality is difficult and tenuous. At present, "culturally and politically, the public sphere dominates domestic, hence men dominate women" (Chodorow, 1978, p. 10). Simmons (1984) reminds us, however, that one perspective is not better than the other, just <u>different</u>. If

viewed in this light, it offers hope that we may see sexual differences not as hierarchical, but rather as different, heuristic lenses for understanding and being in the world. Ultimately, it would lead us to a better lived space in which humans could coexist more lovingly. This awareness within ourselves seems critical and of utmost importance in a world seemingly bent on self-destruction through the continued agentic behavioral patterns of manipulation, alienation, and the abuse of power.

The schools do not differ from the family. They continue gender differentiation where the family left off. Macdonald & Macdonald (1981) point out that the curriculum reflects the dominant agency pattern as evidenced in our values, type of language, and the high priority awarded science and mathematics which takes precedence over artistic expression and activity. Macdonald & Macdonald contend the curriculum has been the training ground for our technical-industrial-urban society with a value nexus focused upon the agency modality. They call for the schools to reemphasize and embody the communal aspects of human potential:

> . . . to assert a sense of commonality and connection among all organisms, of openness and vision, of non-contractual cooperation, and removal of constraints on freedom. The critical concept is communal, the school as community whereby the central curriculum questions becomes "How shall we live together?" . . . "How shall we survive?" . . . "How can we foster freedom, justice, equality, and love?" (Macdonald & Macdonald, 1981, p. 303)

Macdonald & Macdonald assert that change will necessitate a new consciousness in both our personal as well as our public

acts. It will necessitate a change in institutional structures and their operating practices. The antidote is not prescriptive through the engineering of a different technique, rather change must come through personal value, reflection, and action. It must focus on practical, alive activities in the curriculum, not biasing the technical any more than the political, ethical, and aesthetic qualities of everyday life. This enlargment and balancing of human potential will serve to offset the overemphasis on control and agency in the current curriculum.

Agency and Communion in Movement

Bakan points out that the initial experiences of control and mastery we experience are through the musculature of our bodies during infancy. Stinson (1984), reflecting on the work of Bakan as it relates to the body, maintained that this growing sense of bodily control and mastery enables us to feel more safe to engage in relationship outside of ourselves. Hence the significance of the role of the body in the early formulation of self and our capacity for meaningful relationship. Perception of the self and the capacity for relationship, however, continues throughout the life span. The growing body of literature on body concept and body image strongly suggest that a person's bodily feelings and thoughts influence other psychological and sociological dimensions of the self (Kollen, 1981). Consequently, the positive role of the body and its development in physical education are of

extreme importance in the development of capable, responsible, and caring individuals.

Agency, Alienation and Sport

Leaping from the micro-personal level to the macro-societal level, sub-cultures such as sports tend to reflect the larger culture's values (Fairs, 1968). Subsequently, the agency charactersistics we see in the larger society, such as self-aggrandizement, extremes of competition, mastery, and achievement are often mirrored in the sports arena. This is evidenced by the focus on winning, mastery, and our reliance on technique, with little attention to personal feelings or sensations. Several theorists have expressed concern at the increased alienation through the agency feature in the sports experience, whether at the competitive (Rigauer, 1981; Morgan, 1982), recreational, or educational level (Kollen, 1981; Sadler, 1977; Suits, 1979; Nugent, 1982). Unfortunately, the agency ethos of highly competitive sports seems to permeate all other less competitive sporting levels.

Rigauer (1981) discusses the exaggeration of the agency feature through his analogy that sport is an epiphenomenon of modern industrial production. He contends that sport and work are structurally analogous forms of behaviour. His intent is to liberate sports from its present "locked" ethos with work. He maintains that sport has all the features of capitalistic production, of which the two key elements are the achievement principle and rationalization. It is the achievement principle

that essentially governs the practice of modern sport; achievement engenders competition as the means by which disparate performances may be compared. Hence our fanatacism with records and statistics. Whereas rationalization occurs when phenomena are quantified with little regard for human emotions. Rigauer refers to a quote written in 1838 by Tegg noting that rationalization occurs "when a process ceases to take place according to feelings, talent, tradition, and experience but rather when every part of the process is thought-through and goal-directed" (1838, p. xvii).

Rationalization and achievement together have serious consequences. The atomization of training, where decisions regarding training and competition are made by hierarchical social and business affiliates are alienating. The athlete has little input in decision making which is often accompanied by a general loss of freedom, spontaneity, and playfulness (Rigauer, 1981). Excessive rationalization encourages antagonistic forms of competition and interpersonal relations in sports. Rationalization and achievment promote the quantifiable elements of sport at the expense of its qualitative elements. Furthermore, the athletes' freedom and creativity are limited by focusing on performance according to socially predetermined goals, not accommodating for contextual or individual irregularities; these are not tolerated. Cumulatively, these effects are very constrictive.

Rigauer points out that if we continue to link sport with

work rather than the ethos of play we serve and perpetuate the values and ideals of capitalism and not humanism. Sport, to Rigauer, should be concerned with providing more democracy and unity within the realms of sport and work. He advocates the need for critical theory to demystify and raise the consciousness of the integral connection between sport and society.

Morgan (1982) feels that Rigauer's thesis, that sport is essentially an instrument of capitalism, is untenable and too simplistic. He feels the situation is more complex, of which capitalism is but a contributory part. For Morgan, the critical issue revolves around the loss of freedom to create new cultural forms through sports. He favors the Neo-Marxist position of Horkheimer:

> It has often been said that sport should not become an aim, but should remain an instrument. To me the first idea seems right and the second wrong. As long as it is only an instrument, and consciously recognized as such, it may be used in the service of profit, politics, egotism or just as a pastime . . . All these ends, whether good or problematic, will destroy sport if they are allowed to dominate it totally, will prevent its being an expression of freedom. In this respect sport is like art, literature and philosophy, and all the springs of the productive imagination. To preserve its freedom, to allow it to make its own decisions and dictate its own regulations, in spite of all the powerful influences from outside, seems to me to be the historic task of all those who are seriously concerned with sport. (Horkheimer, cited by Morgan, 1982, p. 83)

Nugent (1982) shares some of the same fears of Morgan and Rigauer, but in the context of the game. She points to the tenous position of games lying between the elements of Callois's continuum of paidia (play) and ludus (sport). Being

the midfielder between the two games plays a critical role in maintaining the integrity of both elements. She feels game is being subsumed by the sport milieu, and is losing some of the creative spontaneous elements of play. She contends, as do Morgan and Horkheimer, that the essential nature of human movement, be it sport or game, revolves around the notion of human freedom to create new spontaneous forms impartial to the ethos of society. She draws support for this position from Berger's notion of play as a form of human transcendence and Pieper's claim that leisure is the basis of human culture.

Rigauer, Morgan, and Nugent all echo a similar theme, a return to the ethos and sanctuary of play. The failure of game for Nugent, and sport for Rigauer, Morgan, and Hockheimer, to maintain the roots of play in their original genesis and matrix of play will lead to a human space devoid of freedom and its capacity to create and transcend itself to more evolved levels of community.

Agency in Physical Education

Many of the alienating characteristics of agency identified in professional sports are also evidenced in other arenas of sport (Rigauer, 1981), the school being no exception (Kollen, 1983). Kollen points out that the fragmentation of physical education stems from our deeply embedded ideology which in practice reflects a masculine athletic-competitive image. This image limits integration in movement because it revolves around psychological rewards and status and not the

enjoyment of the movement experience itself. She points out that the problem is not specifically the masculine-athletic-competitive image per se, but the real problem is that there is an image at all. The masculine-athletic-competitive image is fragmentary. It pushes us to work harder, go further and more effortlessly; its emphasis is on the extrinsic elements of movement, not the feelings and sensations of movement. We become consumed trying to be the image, which inhibits us from being present in the moment with our bodies. Kollen (1983) calls for the profession to uncondition ourselves from the masculine-athletic competitive image and explore other avenues that allow our students to move freely, joyfully, and without fear.

Sadler (1977) makes an interesting observation concerning the new emergent culture towards self-realization and sports. Many interscholastic athletes, particularly those from the upper middle class who have been brought up with the values of self-realization, are becoming disenchanted with the prevailing environment of sports. More specifically, athletes are becoming increasingly disenchanted by the inconsistencies and discrepancies between sport's ideology, that emphasizes positive human values and sport's personnel, who frequently purport to other less ethical modes of behaviour in order to maintain control and success. Therefore, it is logical that young persons, who value personal growth and freedom, will experience alienation if locked into school programs that have

institutionalized competition under the rubric and ethos of work and not play.

Sadler identifies three alienating characteristics most typically experienced by youths today. Youths feel unfree; they feel powerless in their ability to be committed to the goals of their own personal development. Secondly, they feel unembodied, fragmented by being tugged in different directions. Lastly, they felt withdrawn, fearful of caring too much for anyone, and generally suspicious of the intentions of others.

Sadler's (1977) thesis contends that the very act of creating diffuses alienation. Further, the qualities of freedom, embodiment, and friendship inherent in sport, are in direct contrast to the predominant agency ethos of work. He feels the three positive qualities of freedom, embodiment, and friendship within the context of sport, as playful human movement, are a viable antidote to the alienation dilemma. In essence, he calls for the more communal characteristics of creativity, intuition, spontaneity, and feeling, as opposed to the repression of them through the agency modality, presently manifested as alienation.

Sadler's thesis is based on the empirical works of the psychologist Salvatore Maddi (1975) and psychiatrist Silvano Arieti (1976). Arieti contends that in the very act of creating a feeling of integration occurs that somehow transcends and unifies a previous state of fragmentation. Sadler elaborates further:

> In the creative experience there is a synthesis of primary and secondary processes, a fusion of bodily and mental activities in a new tertiary process from which issues creative products. Creative endeavor is characterized by an individual's experience of integration that resolves a previous state of personal disjunction. (1977, p. 88)

Many theorists have proposed different antidotes to the alienation factor of the agency modality. Rigauer (1981) calls for more political and social consciousness of the larger cultures impact on other sub-cultures such as sport, whereas Bell (1976), a liberal sociologist, calls for a modification of both cultural and social trends, and concurs with Rigauer in the development of a more responsible political structure and philosophy. Ostensibly these are macro-theoretical positions. Sadler, however, advocates a simpler solution: the use of personal creativity for sports and physical education as an antidote to youth alienation. This is similar to Morgan (1982) and Nugent's (1982) position that sport needs to maintain its connection with the ethic of play. The ethic of play is characterized by the elements of creativity, spontaneity, and intuition which is suppressed in the agency modality, yet fostered through communion.

Play as Communion

> A man's exercise must be play, or it will do him little good. It may even, as we see regularly in the press, kill him . . . Exercise that is not play accentuates rather than heals the split between body and spirit. (Sheehan, 1978, p. 71-100)

Up to the seventeenth century, there was little separation between play, ritual, and the sacred (Nugent, 1982). There was

a link between play, game, sport, and dance on one hand, and festivity, celebration, ritual, the sacred, and community on the other. This was how community was held together. Nugent noted that the movement into the industrial and technological age caused a secularization of play, characteristic of the splitting of the agency feature from the communal feature.

> A splitting of play from the significant events in the life of a community, and a tendency to characterize play as frivolous and unnecessary to life. As the shift toward progress and production was made, play became an adjunct to the so-called real and serious matters of life within many cultures of Western civilisation. (Nugent, 1982, p. 46)

Subsequently, play has not been openly advocated since it is essentially deemed frivolous and unproductive.

Play is its own reward and is an end in itself. Play is intrinsically motivated and its enjoyment and expression seem to be the major motivation for why we play (Harris, 1978).

> All of our human strivings (work, science, art) can be reduced to the general category of desire known as "having": that category which establishes the self's (pour soi) basic relation to objects or things (en soi) as one in which the former seeks to possess, appropriate, dominate, own, or use the latter. Yet, according to Sartre, there remains one human enterprise which apparently cannot be subsumed under this possessive relationship. And that enterprise is play whose goal is not to possess the object(s) of its concern but to provide expressive outlet for the realization of the player's unique subjectivity. (Gerber, 1979, p. 70)

> Play is bracketed from the serious, necessary experiences of life. Play is breaking away from routine . . . Play is distinguished from fields of Religon, Art, and Inquiry because it does not include as part of its meaning, "an intent to achieve a desirable result with respect to some ultimate reality". Play is also distinguished from these acts by virtue of its spontaneous nature. (Kretchmar, 1971, p. 29)[emphasis added]

Play and sport appear to be comprised of the elements of spontaneous celebration, imagination, pretense, and creativity (Schmitz, 1979). The essence of play, however, is pivotal around the decision to play. This voluntary decision to play is the pivotal factor that allows sport its personal freedom, and distinguishes it from work. It is intrinsically sustained by finding the midpoint between the psychological states of boredom and anxiety (Harris, 1978). Ultimately the process of doing play is the essential element. Play has no other end but itself -- pleasure and the experiential activity of creating.

The significant aspect of play is that it is also an attitude that can be applied to the whole of life. By adopting a psychological state of play in life, it liberates us to express and create our own lives according to our personal voices. Further, it leads us to be more open and responsive toward our surroundings. It listens to the intrinsic dimensions of our souls. Subsequently, our actions are more alive, pleasurable, and have more meaning.

The ethic of play is characterized by the elements of creativity, spontaneity, and intuition. These characteristics involve the "whole" of our being since they necessitate our having to respond to the complete figure-ground constellation. They involve using our primary and secondary processes; fusing our bodily and mental activities to create a new third entity. In this way play is integrative.

The major concern of this study is that students are being

"turned off" from the joy and personal meaning in physical education. As Sadler (1977) states, youths feel unfree, powerless, and unembodied. Sadler contends that the notions of freedom, embodiment, and kinship, inherent in sport as play are three characteristics that can diffuse the present alienation being experienced in sport. More specifically, personal freedom is the platform for play, since play is entered into voluntarily. The very nature of creativity and spontaneity in play, allow movement to be personal and therefore embodied. Movement in play does not necessarily conform to an external standard; movement is unique and peculiarly our own. A significant difference between the ethic of play versus the ethic of work, is that play focuses on the process, not the product.

Succinctly, sport as play allows for movement to be more alive and personal. It is also more integrated because the act of creating calls on us to respond to the "whole" situation, the complete figure-ground constellation. In this manner, sport as play is communal and offers possibilities to transcend the alienation frequently experienced in physical education.

Before developing an alternative framework for integration and personal meaning to counteract alienation in physical education, it is appropriate to review the current status of physical education. This will provide a springboard for the alternative perspective. The purposes are to discern the present platform upon which physical education has predicated

its position and see to what extent it meets our needs for personal meaning and integration.

CHAPTER III

MAJOR PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION

> Movement has always been a means for development of understanding of oneself and one's world. This form of education is ancient, primitive, and native. It predates spoken language or art as a means by which humans transmitted their cultural and development language to coming generations. Physical education is the oldest means of learning known to humanity. (Oberteuffer, 1977, p. 148)

New ideas emerge from "refashioned" old ideas, but in a different context, a process of evolutionary thought attained by acknowledging those who have gone before us. As Newton stated, "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants" (Bartlett, 1980, p.84). It seems appropriate to acknowledge, in a study about new movement possibilities in physical education, the "giants" of our profession. It is from their thoughts that my vision has grown. For this reason, the initial section of this chapter will present an overview of the major philosophical and theoretical influences postulated by the "giants" in our profession, as seen from the eyes of Sherman (1965), Gerber (1966), and philosophers Metheny (1961, 1969) and Osterhoudt (1978, 1984). This will establish the platform from which physical education has predicated its existence and development and provide a springboard for the study.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first

section discusses the two philosophical models of man in physical education, "education of" and "education through" the physical (Williams, 1930). These models will be examined for their relative positions on five major concepts in physical education: (a) mind-body relationship, (b) body of knowledge, (c) subject matter, (d) objectives, and (e) methodology. The second section will provide a critique of the two philosophical models. This will provide a rationale for an alternative vision for physical education.

Education "Of" and "Through" the Physical

In the development of new movement theory, the most essential dilemma revolves around the interpretation of the mind-body relationship. Is mindful activity separate and distinct from physical activity? Is it the responsibility of the physical educator to develop minds as well as bodies? Are bodies subservient to the mind? Consequently, in the development of new movement theory, physical educators need to be familiar with the problems of metaphysics to enable them to understand, and therefore establish, more sound platforms for beliefs about their discipline.

Before a discussion of the various positions postulated by the two models is undertaken, it is necessary to offer some background on Cartesian thought. This will primarily be done through the works of Descartes (1967), Osterhoudt (1978, 1984), Kleinman (1970), and Meier (1975, 1979). The influence of Descartes' philosophy has been enormous and

perhaps incalculable. It has affected our approach to science, education, and other fields for more than three hundred years. According to Kleinman, "it has dictated the directions by which entire disciplines steer their courses of action" (1970, p. 61). Its significance to physical education is irrefutable. It is for this reason that this concept will be discussed in more depth.

It was Descartes' intention to develop a foundation of science that "would avoid the presupposition and inadequacy of scholasticism and possess the rigorous certainty of mathematics" (Meier, 1975, p. 52). Human reason was deemed the cornerstone of knowledge, nature, and the universe. Using the process of "radical doubt," Descartes proceeded to cast doubt on everything. He discarded all opinions and presuppositions that he was a being, and concluded that he was foremost a mentally conceived entity. From this anchor or starting point, using radical doubt and reason, he established that the essence of his nature was to be a being that thinks. Hence, essence precedes existence, and the adage "I think, therefore I am" evolved. Descartes states:

> I saw from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it is very evidently and certainly followed that I was; on the other hand if I had only ceased from thinking, even if all the rest of what I had ever imagined had really existed, I should have no reason for thinking that I existed. From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me", that is to say, the soul by which I and what I am is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter, and even if body were not,

> the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 1967, p. 1Ø1)

Consequently, the two substances, mind and body (matter), exist independently of one another, but both depend on God. Matter does not possess attributes of thought, consciousness, or feeling. This distinction was applied to the whole of nature including animals and the human body (Meier, 1979). According to Descartes, behavior, i.e., the physiological account of our bodily aspects of sensations and motor movements, was explainable through the laws of physics and chemistry. In his sixth meditation, Descartes posited that movement was purely a mechanical act.

> I am aware in me of certain faculties, such as the power of changing location, of assuming diverse posture and the like which cannot be thought and therefore exist apart from such substance in which they reside. But evidently since the clear and distinct apprehension of these faculties involves the feature of extension, but not any intellection, they must belong to some substance which is corporeal, ie. extended and unthinking. (Descartes, 1958, p. 237)

Thus, Descartes defined movement as physical, nonthinking, and corporeal, having no relationship with the world of cognition, sensing, or knowing. He concluded that the mind and body are two distinct substances. The body was viewed as an unthinking, extended, material substance, whereas the mind was a thinking, unextended, immaterial substance. Further, the body was an unconscious machine subject to the rigid laws of nature; the mind was a conscious and free substance, not accountable to the mechanical laws of nature (Meier, 1979).

A criticism of Descartes' philosophy is that many facets

of our existence, particularly our intentional interactions with the world are denied or conveniently ignored. Secondly, there remains the frustrating question of how there can be interaction between a substance that is purely spiritual and a substance that is purely material. Descartes' solution of the pineal gland as where the two meet appears somewhat facile, archaic, and limiting. Thirdly, Descartes' philosophy does not account for the obvious intimate union suggested by the mind-body's mutual understandings of pain, hunger, and thirst (Meier, 1979).

Mind-Body Relationship

"Education of" the physical, with its emphasis on the 3R's and the role of physical fitness to better serve the mind, clearly views the body as subservient to the mind, but acknowledges their mutual interdependence. This dualistic relationship of mind and body as separate entities is clearly captured in W.G. Anderson's statement of 1889:

> There is an intimate relationship between mind and body. Exercise develops the muscular system and affects the growth of nerves -- by this means we can develop the brain substance itself, and thus put it in better condition for its mental education. (p. 229)

Consequently, physical trainers took responsibility for the physical and left the care of the mental to the classroom teacher (Sherman, 1965).

More specifically, dualism argues that the whole of life is exhausted by the sum of the parts that make it up. The whole is no more than the sum of its parts (Osterhoudt,

1984). Therefore, life's interpersonal and interdisciplinary relationships of knowledge and human encounters remain sterile and disparate, because it does not allow for the interconnectedness of thought and action. The body is construed as a concrete thing and movement is functional displacement of space in chronological time to fulfill an observable outcome. The body is essentially valued for its extrinsic merits (Osterhoudt, 1984).

Conversely, education "through" the physical views the body from a monistic standpoint, dualism's conceptual opposite. Monism regards the mind and body as distinct participants in the organic union of life. They are not qualitatively opposed to one another, rather, they are analogous to two sides of a single coin. Osterhoudt stated, "Each is genuinely understood, appreciated, and experienced in-and-for-itself. . .insofar as it relates to the other, and insofar as it relates to the whole which is the unity of the two (Osterhoudt, 1984, p. 63).

Monism, dualism's counterpart, bases itself on the organic thesis of life. It argues that the whole of life is not exhausted by the sum of the parts that make it up; that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. According to Osterhoudt, "one cannot be authentically engaged in the world if any of the integral parts is excluded" (1984, p. 63). Monism attempts to preserve the integrity of the mind-body relationship by acknowledging the necessary contribution of

each and the latent potency when the whole is realized in its entirety. The body is viewed more subjectively as a distinct mode of human expression. It promotes an experiential lived sense of movement and its inherent meaning (Kleinman, 1970).

In retrospect, 1930 was an historical landmark for the full endorsement of the "new" holistic physical education. It was heralded by the new Journal of Health and Physical Education and the Research Quarterly, which promoted "oneness of mind and body", as the theme for their symposium launching these two new professional journals (Sherman, 1965). Williams wrote, "Modern physical education with its emphasis upon education through the physical is based upon the biologic unity of mind and body. This view sees life as a totality (1930, p. 74). Similarly, Nash wrote, "There is no such thing as physical activity without a mental counterpart or, on the other hand, a mental activity without a physical counterpart (1931, p. 20).

Body of Knowledge

"Education of" the physical was most evident from 1850 to 1900. Educational philosophy in the late nineteenth century advocated democracy and equal access in education. Social conscience was awoken. Public schools were established so that all children would have an opportunity for education (Sherman, 1965). Educational belief at this time emphasized the value of facts and mental training. The child's mind was a blank tablet to be filled with the

"friendly" help of mental discipline. The educational process was something that was done to a child's mind to make the body healthy, strong, and supple (Metheny, 1961).

> Physical activity found its way into this fact-centered program of mental training as something that was done to a child's body to make it stop wriggling, squirming, and interfering with the discipline of the mind. (Metheny, 1961, p. 3)

The rationale for this educational position was based on the facts supplied by the sciences of anatomy and physiology (Metheny, 1961). These biological facts about movement based on the human sciences are reflective of what Arnold (1979) labels "rational forms of enquiry", concerned with questions such as: What effect does movement have on the living organism? How is growth related to motor control? What factors influence mans potential for achievement in sport?

In contrast, "education through" the physical based its advocacy on the wholistic nature of a child's learning as opposed to mental training. Psychologists recognized that the mind was only one dimension of the child, that the whole child went to school and learned by doing, gradually replacing the mental training of the 3R's. Education was the outcome of something done by the learner and programs became child-centered rather than fact-centered (Metheny, 1961).

In response to the psychological ethos of child-centered education, our professional ancestors developed "theories of play", exploring the unique concomitant values that play could contribute to education of the whole child, in the

common activities of running, throwing and kicking. Play was considered a unique form of doing through which the whole child could develop (Metheny, 1961).

Subject Matter: Physical Training and Physical Education

"Education of" the physical with its emphasis on physical fitness and strength was initially established through adoption of the German and Swedish systems of physical training. Hetherington stated that the aims were:

> Hygienic and educational; that the exercise must get organic reaction to meet the first aim; and that to meet the second, they must develop subjective motor control, alertness, will, and self-discipline. (1922, p. 338)

The formal content of the program included four groups of exercises: (a) marching, (b) free standing exercises with or without hand apparatus, (c) apparatus work, and (d) class running and running games (Hetherington, 1922).

Few schools, however, were equipped with the apparatus needed for the full development of German and Swedish gymnastics. As a result, physical training or physical culture essentially consisted of floor exercises conducted by the classroom teacher (Sherman, 1965). These exercises or calisthenics were intended to counteract the malaise of sedentary mental work of the classroom (Metheny, 1961).

Military drills and gymnastic marching were the hallmarks of the German system, whereas the Swedish system followed a more specific gymnastic progression of movement sequences. Both systems, however, were always done to the

word of command and learned by imitation. One significant merit of both these European systems was their applicability and versatility to large numbers of pupils in relatively small places (Sherman, 1965).

The values of drills and marching started to be questioned by Anderson (1889), Sargent (1914), Wood (191Ø), and others. It was maintained that children needed more freedom in their physical activity. Anderson in 1889, stated:

> Children love to romp and play -- It is ludicrous to suppose that a boy or girl can arrive at eighteen years, with a good development and of sound and robust health, having had only military drill and Swedish gymnastics as a constant diet. (p. 17)

Similarly, Wood and Cassidy in 1927 opened their classic text, The New Physical Education, with the following quote by Cabot:

> The worst of the systems of physical culture is that they are apt to become chronic and therefore useless and morbid like ascetic self-chastisement. A man was never meant to contract his muscles for the sake of exercise. Muscular contraction should be the physical experience, the outer end of a plan. We should move to get something, or kill something, in work as in sport, and with consciousness focused always on the end, never on means. (Wood and Cassidy, 1927, p. 1)

The exponents of these two European systems seldom agreed with one another as to the merits of each to exercise. This dissension and the dissatisfaction of the European systems to meet the emerging needs of American society precipitated the emergence of the "new" physical education. The "new" physical education supported and complemented the

educational ethos of the time, i.e., a shift from fact-centered, educational programs to child-centered programs (Metheny, 1961). This shift was predicated on the new psychological theories of James and Thorndyke and the new concept of experience postulated by Dewey. Experience was learning by actually doing the things which have meaning for the learner (Wood, 1927). It capitalized on the inherent interest of the child. The learner was no longer a passive recipient, an empty vessel to be filled with information. By actively embodying and living the experience it was more likely that knowledge would be retained and acted upon. Dewey stated (cited in Wood, 1927):

> The genuine principle of interest is the principle of the reorganized identity of the fact to be learned or the action proposed with the growing self; that if it is in the direction of the agent's own growth, and is, therefore, imperiously demanded, if the agent is to be himself. (p. 58)

Physical training in the form of common drills and exercise indoors gave way to a pluralistic American approach which emphasized free expressive activities inherent to children's natural movement. This was in stark contrast to the rigid, formal European systems. Sargent, in 1906, expressed the spirit of this shift as follows:

> What America most needs is the happy combination which the European nations are trying to effect, -- the strength giving qualities of the German gymnasium, the active and energetic qualities of the English sports, the grace and suppleness acquired from the French calisthenics, and the beautiful poise and mechanical precision of the Swedish free movements, all regulated, systematized, and adapted to our peculiar needs and institutions. (1906, p. 18)

Wood and Cassidy (1927) used the following quote by Edward O. Sisson to support their position that physical education should reflect American values.

> So we must lay it down as basic, that the American school must foster the child's natural tendency to be free. Nothing must be done to choke or suppress that noble instinct; nothing must be allowed to weaken his self respect or diminish his sense of personal worth. These elements are the very essence of Americanism, and American education must nourish and invigorate them. (Wood and Cassidy, 1927, p. 21)

In 1927 the philosophical foundation of the "new" physical education or "education through" the physical was elaborated by Thomas Dennison Wood and Rosalind Cassidy. Their work evolved from a need in the profession for printed facts on the history, scientific basis, content, and methods of this program. Many subsequent texts were based on the principles set forth in this book. The child was viewed holistically, and physical education was as much method as it was subject (Wood and Cassidy, 1927). Furthermore, children were introduced to an array of activities and new skills based on their identified needs and interests that emphasized both social and moral values deemed essential for good citizenry. Wood and Cassidy stated:

> In curriculum making, the child's needs are first considered, next the objectives and aims growing out of these needs, and finally a translation of these ideas into terms of activity.
>
> It is necessary to have an out-of-door program of natural big brain-muscle activities, which shall be founded on the scientific knowledge of child characteristics and practical needs; it is important to correlate these exercises; when possible, with other school subjects.

> This work is to be taught with the definite aim of developing social and moral qualities. (1927, p. 124, p. 9)

These new trends in physical education, bearing little resemblance to the German and Swedish systems, were summarized by Nixon and Cozens in 1934 when they wrote:

> In the past twenty five years there has developed an American system of physical education. This new system has its bases in the new knowledge of sociology, biology, and psychology. It abandoned the theory of formal discipline -- it regards an interested attitude on the part of the learner as essential to progress, and it regards the teacher as a leader rather than a drill master. Our new physical education has no place for exercises done to commands. Instead, it undertakes to furnish activities which have meaning and significance, -- which promote wholesome self-expression and offer desirable social training in a democracy. (p. 47)

During the last fifty years, despite the holistic premise undergirding physical education, integrated movement has not taken place in practice (Osterhoudt, 1984; Kleinman, 1970; Kollen, 1981). Since the 1960's, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in physical fitness due to several political and social factors: (a) the President's Council of Physical Fitness advocated by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, (b) educational thrust for accountability for educational outcomes to be more effective and objective, and (c), a public consciousness about the physical, emotional, and social benefits of physical fitness to counteract today's stress in the workplace.

Objectives

The dualistic model, or education "of" the physical,

promoted the development of hygiene and a vigorous and strong physique, better able to serve the mental powers of the mind. In 1899 the American Association for the Advancement of Physical Education held in Boston resolved that the principal ends of muscular exercise in school work were not therapeutic, but educational and hygienic, and that exercise educated the body toward health and competence. Similarly Sargent in 1906 wrote:

> One of the most important objectives that the instructor in physical training had to accomplish, especially in elementary schools, is to give his pupils proper poise. This implies the training and strengthening of muscle from the sole of the foot to the crown on the head. (1906, p. 234)

Gradually, the physical and moral objectives of the European systems gave way to the the "new" American physical education, which was more representative of "education through" the physical. The European objectives, however, were not totally obscured; they merely took a "back seat" in contrast to the larger goals of education of the whole child.

A significant thrust for this shift in educational practice was partly a result of the U. S. Bureau of Education publication in 1918 of the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education. These objectives were stated in terms of health, command of fundamental processes, worthy home membership, vocation, citizenship, worthy use of leisure, and ethical character. Gradually, these objectives became interwoven into the fabric of the school curriculum, and subsequently, physical education.

In 1922, Hetherington noted that physical education is a phase of education, and its objectives should be interpreted in terms of education as a whole. On a similar note, Wood and Cassidy stated:

> The main aims of physical education and general education, then, are the same: to give the child full, complete life each day. The aim of health, by physiological response to muscular exercise, is not enough for physical education. Health will come as a by-product, if the child is furnished situations in which to form acceptable mental, moral, and social responses under conditions and in ways which are wholesome and hygienic. (Wood and Cassidy, 1927, p. 69)

Sherman (1965) noted similarity in purposes when reviewing the two traditional models in physical education, but that the "new" physical education differed in terms of its emphasis on education. This was epitomized in the phrase "education through" the physical. She noted that:

> It implied that the exercise and play experience in which vigor and skill were developed, offered many opportunities for the concomitant acquisition of knowledge that would be reflected in habits, attitudes, and personal conduct. (Sherman, 1965, p. 45)

Thus, "education through" the physical had dualistic objectives, that of physical fitness and its concomitant values in other dimensions of the child's emotional, social, and ethical development although theoretically based on the monistic view of man. Sherman (1965) stated that physical education in practice gave "lip-service" to a fully embodied notion of mind-body unity. The mind and body, however, were brought in closer proximity to each other by the 1930's.

In 1930, Williams, in the first issue of the new Journal

of Health and Physical Education, developed the theme of life education in terms of physical education. These new objectives emphasized the development of skill in moving, as well as the development of habits and attitudes desirable for education of the "whole" man in a democratic environment. There were, however, different biases as to the singular, most important objective.

Gerber (1966) noted that the three prominant leaders of this era, Charles Harold McCloy, Jay B. Nash, and Jesse Feiring Williams all differed as to the primary objective in physical education. For example, Charles McCloy advocated the development of physical character of man as the most important objective. Jay B. Nash stressed the development of recreative skills and attitudes as his most important, whereas Jesse F. Williams advocated social values and skills useful for democratic living.

This may have provided the roots of dissension amongst professionals as to the primary purpose and the future direction of physical education. It may inadvertently also have contributed to the professional body fragmentizing itself into six professional organizations in 1960. These separate organizations were able to maintain and develop their particular objectives and values, so preserving their individual integrity and autonomy.

Methodology

The introduction of new subject matter and the

formulation of new objectives initiated alternative methods of teaching. The European systems of physical training were led by classroom teachers sometimes under the supervision of a physical training specialist who serviced several schools. A series of daily lessons were prepared by the specialists which in turn were used by the classroom teachers (Sherman, 1965). Learning by command and demonstration was the approved method of teaching new exercises. Consequently, classroom teachers had to personally master the exercise syllabus before presenting it to their students. Stecher's "Notes for Leaders" in 1896 offers insight into the specific delineated nature of teaching methods employed by the European systems:

> 1. Try to master every exercise that you intend to teach. Practice as much as you can.
>
> 2. Repeat all exercises; then alternate and combine them with new movements, gradually going from easy to difficult, from simple to complex movements.
>
> 3. Arrange your order of exercises so that your scholars leave the gymnasium with the feeling of having been benefited. Do not waste your time on movements having little gymnastic value.
>
> 4. Gradually bring your scholars to do all exercises with the utmost precision and correctness.
>
> 5. Show the exercise you want done in its best form. A practical illustration is better than a long explanation.
>
> 6. Whenever possible, all exercises should be executed left as well as right. (1896, p. 18)

The part method was adopted in perfecting these European exercises by repetition of each movement within a subroutine. Each subroutine was subsequently combined into the continous

performance of the whole exercise routine. This methodology is consistent with the dualistic thesis that the relationship among the parts are discontinuous, and therefore, activities can be treated separately (Osterhoudt, 1984).

Education "through" the physical, however, had its major roots and impetus in the new philosophical and psychological theories of learning postulated by Hall, Thorndike, and Dewey. Gradually these ideas found their way into the physical education literature. For example, Gulick in 1920 stressed Thorndike's Law of Readiness in his suggestions for teaching. He stated, "It is quite futile to try to teach children at one age what they will learn of themselves with great delight and rapidity a few years later (p. 177). Similarly, Williams reiterated some of Thorndike's principles in his discussion on "Some Practical Aspects of Method." He stated:

> To provide activity that has meaning and purpose behind it commends itself to thoughtful students of the subject. (a) Proceed from the known to the desired unknown. (b) Correlate with the child's studies in the classroom and proceed in harmony with the child's school and life experience. (c) Proceed in relation to the child's motor sense and kinesthesia. Thus involves presenting situations that are within the range of the child's motor experience. (d) The relation between motor control and mental control is close, and the development of each apparently should be carried on at the same time. (1927, p. 397)

Methodology was not totally prescriptive with directions for daily use, rather it evolved according to the individual child and the learning environment. Wood and Cassidy stated:

> Procedure grows out of problems and the situation, which

> arise with each class and group of children, and it is different in each class, depending on the interests, initiative, and originality of the children in each particular class, as well as on the intellegent and wise leadership of the teacher. (1927, p. vii)

The "whole" method of movement using shorter more frequent periods was deemed the more effective way to teach. It reflected and was consistent with the monistic position that undergirded the "new" physical education at this time (Osterhoudt, 1984). Nixon and Cozens summarized some of the important findings that dealt with new research in teaching methodology at this time.

> The psychologists have discovered that by and large the "whole" method is preferable to the part method, and that frequent, fairly short periods of practice are better in the main than less frequent periods of long duration, and that general physical well-being is conducive to learning. (1934, p. 198)

Summary Statement

"Education of" the physical found its impetus in the late 1800's and early 1900's. This early model of physical training was essentially concerned with the development of organic health and fitness. The development of strength and maintenance of normal physiological functioning was primarily carried out through the employment of the European systems of physical training. The remedial correction of physical defects was also emphasized by the early leaders, many of whom were medical doctors. This position rested on the dualistic belief in a distinction between the mind and body, wherein the training of the mind was left to the academicians, and the body, the responsibility of the

physical educator.

"Education through" the physical, or the "new" physical education, began in the early twentieth century. The aims of this period were shaped by the new psychological and philosophical theories of learning primarily espoused by Thorndyke and Dewey. Experience was deemed critical; the child was active and intrinsically involved in the lived moment. It sought more freedom and expression, which was the main criticism posited about the European systems of training. Physical education was a method as much as a subject. Activities were chosen more consonant with children's inherent movement patterns. It emphasized joy in learning, and took the form of natural activities. They included natural activities such as walking and running, free play, athletics, dramatic expression, and individual corrective exercises. The premise for this was that the whole child was to be educated, and that physical education had its own responsibility and unique contribution, no different from the rest of the school curriculum.

Critique of the Two Traditional Models

The critique of the two models will provide a rationale and subsequent springboard for the alternative perspective in physical education. A significant point to be made, however, is that the two predominant models of physical education are not mutually exclusive. Each model has a different point of emphasis predicated on different philosophical positions of

the mind-body relationship. Both have tenets and dimensions of one another. Proponents of "education through" the physical would not decry the objective aims of physical fitness and physical skills. Likewise, proponents of "education of" the physical would not claim that other concomitant values were not taking place.

Education "Of" the Physical

The dualistic, philosophical position that the mind and body are discrete entities as advanced in the model "education of" the physical, has its roots in Platonic and Cartesian thought. Both treat the body and mind as separate and the body as subservient to the mind. Physical activity's express purpose is simply the development of a healthy, strong, invigorated body better able to serve its master, the mind.

One of the positive contributions of this model is the efficient promotion of organic health and well-being. The efficiency of this model is exemplified by the command approach in that it can accommodate large numbers of pupils in relatively small spaces, and that each exercise has a deliberate function as it relates to organic fitness (Sherman, 1965). Furthermore, this position has promoted the rational objective side of movement where questions of skill development and efficiency are foci of empiricistic inquiry. Overall, this model is essentially concerned with extrinsic, objective purposes that promote organic health and fitness

expediently and efficiently as possible. In this respect, it is successful.

Serious limitations with this model appear, however, when viewed through a holistic lens. It views man dualistically, and in so doing, perceives the body as an object totally drained of its humanity. "It's a dead body, devoid of its vivifying, expressive, and intentional abilities and qualities" (Meier, 1975, p. 69). It fragmentizes man's existence; man's actions are perceived as depersonalized, largely comprehended through external quantification. Moreover, it does not accommodate the inner, subjective dimension of the personal meanings inherent to the movement experience. Each individual must interpret the movement experience in the lived moment of the present, through his own body, in his own terms.

Education "Through" the Physical

Education "through" the physical evolved as a means to remedy the narrow interpretation of the fitness model in the early twentieth century. A major consequence of this shift was the birth of the "new" physical education which was more representative of the American culture. This model has made a significant contribution to the body of knowledge about movement. It has fostered and attempted to nurture a more integrated, movement position. Philosophically, man is viewed as an integrated entity. Physical education was deemed more than simply physical. It also had contributions

to make to the development of the social, emotional, and ethical dimensions of the whole child. This monistic view affords the body the means for human expression, "a mode that promotes a lived sense of movement and an intrinsic respect for physical education" (Osterhoudt, 1984, p. 63). It endeavors to overcome the one-sided alienation of dualism, and in so doing, preserves the integrity of the whole organism.

Since its acceptance into the larger educational fraternity, the profession appears to have "rested on its laurels." Metheny (1961) contended that the very use of the word "through" has attributed to our continual inability to establish for ourselves the credibility and respect our professional soul deserves. It has also emphasized the professional uncertainty and insecurity about the unique educational value inherent to our subject matter. Our continued reliance on concomitant values of physical activity perpetuates the notion of fragmentation, despite its philosophical guise of holism. The profession needs to acknowledge and explore the unique value of movement for its own sake, and desist in validating its position in referential and instrumental values. Metheny raised a significant question our profession needs to address if we are to have the credibility and significance we deserve.

> Does physical activity really have a legitimate form of education in its own right? Or is it merely a medium through which something identified as real education may be channeled. (1961, p. 4)

We need to move beyond our need to justify physical education for its spinoff values by examining the inherent value of movement, and what value these meanings may have for human beings. How do they contribute to our sense of our own uniqueness and significance? Why do we insist on batting a tennis ball back and forth across a net in the hot sun for hours? Why do we continually subject our bodies to pain, fatigue, and exhaustion in pursuit of a ball over a certain line? At face value, they seem ludicrous occupations for intelligent adults. The irony is that we pursue them voluntarily. We, as physical educators have found some of the most significant and meaningful, episodic moments of our lives on the playing fields, where we meet ourselves, and are challenged.

Until we attempt to understand the uniqueness and meaning inherent in movement, physical education will fail in its rightful claim as an essential expression of human existence. Since this is an ontological quest, Metheny (1961) suggested philosophical inquiry as a more appropriate means to understanding these phenomena, than our more familiar modes of empiricistic inquiry concerned with physics and physical fitness.

Despite the significant contribution that education "through" the physical has made to the body of knowledge about the potential of movement to the self, it appears there has been inconsistency between thought and actual

implementation (Kleinman, 1976; Kollen, 1981; Meier, 1975; Osterhoudt, 1984). Kleinman stated:

> All education was "through the physical" and it was argued that all education was in fact physical education. While it is this point of view which has prevailed in professional physical education literature for some time now, it has not taken hold in practice. (1976, p. 37)

Similarly Kollen stated:

> The lip-service given to the ideals of the profession does not filter down in practice. While speeches are made about the importance of physical movement to the individual, the day to day action does not carry this out. (Kollen, 1981, p. 5)

Paradoxically, Kleinman (1976) suggests that the leaders of our field who intellectually endeavored to overcome the mind-body dualism inadvertently assented to, and supported conditions which resulted in an overintellectualization, overconceptualization of physical education. During the last twenty years, we have witnessed the establishment of a series of academic subdisciplines which incorporate the humanities and social, behavioral, and biological sciences. Kleinman states:

> Despite the fact that physical education predicates itself on the whole person of physical education, the subject matter of physical education appears focused on the social and behavioral sciences. We continue to perceive the whole person concept of physical education as a conglomeration of a range of human endeavors which may be divided into objective categories. (Kleinman, 1976, p. 42)

Kleinman cites a second reason for the lack of commitment towards the holistic model. He states that we have failed to deal with the individual nature of consciousness, more specifically, the primacy of the act

itself. Instead, our educational focus since the thirties has been on social concerns, or "associated learnings", dealing with the personality, not the experience of physical activity. We seem to have forgotten what the essence of our subject matter is about; the experiental act of moving in an external and personal dimension.

> Thus it becomes understandable when we see the bulk of the theoretical literature of that period devoted to claims of intrinsic ability of sport and physical education, to develop what was termed "associated learnings". The result was a redirection of the field away from activity and toward personality development. (Kleinman, 1976, p. 35)

The Perpetuation of Dualism

Modern physical education's reliance on empiristic dualism, according to Osterhoudt (1984), has been a more significant factor for why physical education has not been able to foster a more consistent, integrated, movement position. This has severely impeded its development. Essentially, this duality originates in the predominant cultural ethos, which determines society's regard for the mind-body relationship (Fairs, 1965), and the means for understanding knowledge, truth, and reality. Osterhoudt (1984) states that empiricism and dualism has pervaded the whole of our intellectual development. It has shaped the philosophical platform of modern intellectual history and undergirded the development of modern physical education as a consequence. Osterhoudt comments:

The philosophical groundwork of modern (naturalistic)

> physical education is based on the doctrines of dualism and empiricism, together empiristic dualism. Dualism has taught that the intellectual and physical aspects of our experience are qualitatively distinct substances. On first inspection, both dualism and empiricism give the impression of promoting a respectful regard for the body and its main expressions, including physical education, and they thus prove ultimately unfavorable to its practice. Dualism stands in the way of a balanced interpretation of humanity's intellectual and physical parts; empiricism fails to account for the balanced contributions of reason and sense to human consciousness. The one-sided philosophical basis of modern physical education is therefore opposed to an authentically human practice of physical education, and is in the greatest need of reformulation. (Osterhoudt, 1984, p. 62)

Osterhoudt's excellent summary of our dilemma clearly illuminates one of the more significant factors for why holistic physical education has not gained more momentum in practice. He also states that no one since Rousseau has succeeded in adding humanistic fulfillment to the monistic premise. As a result, the development of modern physical education remains incomplete. "It remains incomplete precisely because it has adopted a basis that forestalls its completion, empiristic dualism" (Osterhoudt, 1984, p. 64).

One of the implications of Cartesian thought is that phenomena are frequently viewed out of context. When an experience is viewed out of context, meaning is lost. Allen & Thomas (1977) suggest that there has been a split between experience and behavior; the inner is split from the outer. This split eludes meaning, for both dimensions of the phenomenon are vital. "Without inner experience, outer behavior loses its meaning, and without outer behavior, inner experience loses its substance" (Allen & Thomas, 1977, p.

135). Consequently, meaning of phenomena need to be discerned in the total context of both the experience and and the behavior.

The pervasiveness of dualism in Western society, education, and physical education still continues. It remains for the most part abstract and philosophical. Meier (1975) suggested that our empiricistic and dualistic approaches may be in fundamental error. He posited that a monistic approach which accounts for both consciousness and corporeality may be more productive, rather than perpetuating the intrinsic paradox of mind and body the behavior.

Historically, physical education has focused on the outer observable outcomes of physical activity. Both models, "education of" and "education through" the physical, have made little attempt to understand the nature of the inner experience of movement. Further, even "the research on self-concept in physical activity has split the the experience from the behavior and has not explored the human being in movement in a total sense; meaning, feeling, and experiencing have not been sources of data" (Allen & Thomas, 1977, p. 135). We have not made adequate attempts to understand movement in its fullest sense. Meaning in movement can only be found when both the experiential and behavioral dimensions of physical activity are mutually acknowledged. Our continual reluctance to attend to this dilemma will result in movement and our profession being

robbed of the integrity it rightfully deserves.

Aliveness and Immediacy in Movement

In the usual holistic terms, the modern physical education theorist describes man as a unity of body and mind, more commonly referred to as a psychosomatic unity. The body represents the physical aspect of our existence and the mind, the affective, or psychological dimension. According to Kirkegaard, this is a negative unity, a passive sort of existence as opposed to the more dynamic classical concept of body-mind unity (Kleinman, 1975). Kleinman contends that the classic concept of the body-soul (mind) unity is an immediate relationship of self. It is the self of the immediate man. This immediate sense of the body-mind unity implies a more dynamic dialectic. It acknowledges the intrinsic, emotional dimension of the movement as a source of meaning valid for its own merit. In an existential sense, Studer prefers to interpret the "immediacy" of the moment as process, not as a fixed entity. "I experience the now of moving as a unity of succession, continuously unfolding and revealing deeper levels of self-knowledge" (Stüder, 1977, p. 160).

Conclusion

Both models, education "of" and education "through" the physical, do not go far enough in developing the unique, inherent, educational value of movement. This is fostered by the acknowledgement of the subjective dimensions of the

movement experience. Education "through" the physical has, however, made significant inroads toward setting the stage for a deeper awareness and development of the possibilities of the intrinsic aspect of movement. The main criticism is that neither model has validated the theoretical notion that movement is valid for its own sake. It does not need to be justified in otherness, such as external instrumental benefits "of" fitness, or in concomitant psychological values as a result of moving "through" physical activities. For too long we have had to validate our existence in the curriculum based on our contributions to external referants. What we have not attended to, is the development of a theoretical model that substantiates the unique inherent value of movement in its own right. A child moves for the same reason that a child paints or sings. We move because it satisfies our human need to use our abilities, to experience ourselves as significant, creative, and therefore personalized beings in an impersonal world.

If we earnestly believe in holistic movement, our continual acceptance of empiricistic dualism as the philosophical basis for modern physical education can only result in our continued stagnation and frustration. We must be on our guard, however; we must not make the mistake our predecessors have made, and value the intrinsic more highly than the extrinsic. Both are valid and complementary. It is not a case of either-or, both are deemed essential for

discerning personal meanings. As Allen & Thomas (1977) point out, the inner loses its substance without the outer, and similarly, the outer loses its meaning without the inner experience.

Rationale for an Alternative Model

An analysis of our corporeality and meaning in movement cannot be achieved by recourse solely for objective, empiricistic thought. Our continual reduction of the subject to object only perpetuates our fragmentation. Examined experience must no longer be treated as unrelated or independent. The intrinsic dimension of humanity is acknowledged as as valid and contextually relevant to the "whole" of the movement experience. It recognizes that we are both rational and irrational. Slusher reminds us of the irrational, mystical dimension of sports:

> Most men recognize that this world is not all reasonable, that methods using completely rational thought have not worked in education, nor in solving the daily problems of living. Men in sport often recognize that there is something beyond "having the horses." And only the foolish would assume the something is restricted to achieving. Man is not all rational. He plays and lives with emotion. (Slusher, 1967, p. 86)

According to Allen and Thomas (1977), the subjective nature of humanity cannot satisfactorily be discerned using empiricisitic thinking, since we are extricably meshed and connected with both the outer and inner dimensions of reality. Consequently, humans need to be seen in the full context of their situation. Empiricistic thinking still

dominates our thought and is causing us to seek "abstract and absolute answers to highly complex experiences, with the result that meaning laden encounters are distilled to a condition of artificial purity" (Allen & Thomas, 1977, p. 136). They contend that the humanist's concern with sport and movement does not lend itself to analysis, for the ground is as important as the figure, because figure arises out of ground. This reaffirms Kleinman's point made earlier that phenomena cannot be studied outside the total context and still maintain the integrity of the original phenomena. The complete experiential-behavioral relationship needs to be studied to afford a deeper understanding of the human experience.

The controversy between whether or not data <u>about</u> a person offer real understanding of that person still continues. Data about a person assume a study of man as an objective being with quantitative characteristics, and that these data will explain behavior. If humanity is only studied objectively we negate our humanity. In the behavioral sciences, humans play a dual role: as an explorer and as an object to be explored. In modern science, the individual as an observer has been re-introduced onto the scene as participant-observer. Nature and humanity are seen as interactive agencies, and the <u>environment</u> surrounding both the subject and the researcher is of crucial significance (Kleinman, 1976). Humanity cannot be totally separated from

the environment; humanity is inextricably immersed in it.

Since empirical science with its bias towards measurement, time, and other conditions is grounded in human nature, it appears improbable that this would be a satisfactory mode of understanding human nature. "Man as a scientist cannot, with his peculiar methods and techniques, draw a self-portrait of the scientist as a man" (Allen & Thomas, 1977, p. 136). Empiricism does not allow for the qualitative idiosyncracies of the individual. These idiosyncracies can only be known when qualitative questions are asked of individuals that are sympathetic to the contextual integrity of a given situation, where the qualitative and quantitative aspects of a phenomenon are reciprocally revered.

In their discussion of the qualities and limitations of the scientific method, Allen and Thomas (1977) state it is a fallacy to assume all sciences and scientific methods are similar. They reference Oppenheimer's idea that the language and tools of one science are not applicable to another (Allen and Thomas, 1977). For example, biology and chemistry with their differing purposes use different techniques. Consequently, it is a folly to study man with inappropriate methods. Allen and Thomas, after Polanyi, state that if we are to study man as he is, a new kind of knowledge needs to be formulated, <u>one that is primarily personal rather then technical</u>. Kleinman (1976), influenced by the physicist

Heisenberg, warns us that maybe new laws and even new language are necessary in the search for understanding of a new phenomena in which man is the subject:

> In an attempt to examine movement, our researchers have adopted the "tried and true" methods of physiology. But understanding movement skill ability and its acquisition, is incomplete to say the least, and incorrect to say the most, without regard for the living subject and recognition of his purpose and posture toward the environment. This, of necessity, calls for a psychology of movement; one which is not based on the principles of physiology and physics but, in dealings with the lived moment, must accept the challenge of developing principles of its own. (Kleinman, 1970, p. 61)

In the development of new movement theory, Nixon and Ulrich (1972) state that theory should be continuallly concerned with reexamining itself to maintain its validity and appropriateness to meet a culture's changing needs. As a consequence, theory is mutuable and not static, and should be concerned with asking new and additional questions to various phenomena. They state:

> Theory and knowledge are sensitive to the times and must be reexamined continually to assure their vitality -- there is no right way. Just as the weaver can take the same threads and create a multitude of products, each different from the other in terms of color, design, texture, and function, so the physical educator can take his knowledge and concoct theory which is empathetic (sic) with specific points of view and which is a reflection of the era and to a direction for posterity. (1972, p. 25)

Ulrich (1977) also reminds us that in the development of new theory, the old approaches adopted by physical education may no longer be appropriate. New approaches and visions are needed offering new possibilities for the body and physical activity. Ulrich draws an analogy between physical education

and wine. The traditional tenets of the body and physical activity, like the grape, will continue to be what physical education and wine are about, but the manner we "package" movement appears in need of attention if it is to stay vital and worthy.

> The old wine bottles will not suffice for today's world. They crack with the heat of dissent, they chip with the tempo of the times, they have eroded under the pressure of too much dirt. How can we revise our bottling process so that it is real and relevant. (Ulrich, 1977, p. 43)

Rumblings of a Change

It appears that the initial rumblings of the holistic movement of the 1930's are once again receiving attention. History repeatedly affirms the lapse that occurs when innovative ideas are not embodied and implemented by the larger cultural ethos. For the last fifty years, the profession has predicated itself on the holistic dimension of humanity, but as Kleinman, (1976), Kollen, (1981) Meier, (1975), and Osterhoudt (1984) indicate, this has not occurred in practice. The holistic notion of humanity appears to be gaining momentum once again, as a consequence of the impact of several fairly recent phenomena: (a) new views of science, (b) convergence of the human sciences, and (c) the influence of Eastern thought. This movement draws its support from a diverse range of disciplines and professions which on the surface would appear to have little in common but their vision, and new consciousness appears to be their unifying thread. The holistic notion seeks to offer scientific

recourse through alternative lenses of being and thinking, that acknowledges the unity of man, not only with himself, but man's larger unity with nature. The rationale for this position is based on the assumption that individuals are experiential-behavioral entities. Humanity and nature can no longer be studied as discrete entities, but rather as interactive agencies, each impacting one another. The old empiricistic methods have proven unsatisfactory in offering understanding of the human condition. Consciousness about this possibility affords us hope in our society, seemingly targeted toward self-destruction.

> We are in the midst of a knowledge revolution that shows signs of a breakthrough; that researchers in the human sciences are moving independently in converging lines towards common targets. They are discarding traditional models of the cosmos and ourselves . . of the nature of nature, and the nature of human nature . . and reaching for new ones; that they have been spurred on by recent work on the brain hemispheres, on molecular biology and biochemistry, on the genetic code, on primatology and ethnology, on biofeedback and altered states of consciousness, on medicine and psychotherapies, on archaeology and astronomy, on the evolutionary process, on the structure of language and the nature of meaning, on leadership and power, and on the governance of peoples and nations. (Lerner, in Ferguson, 1980, p. 12)

According to Max Lerner, a cataclysmic change is rumbling amongst Western academicians and professionals in diverse fields on how we view the world. The world is no longer fixed and immutable since Einstein's theory of relativity shook the predicates of Newtonian physics. The old mechanical rules were not universal when reduced to subatomic levels of matter. The individual could no longer

be separate and objective in observing the universe. This has led us to a new view in physics: the role of the participant-observer. Nature and humanity must be seen as interactive agencies, not separate from each other. There now appear other ways of viewing and understanding the laws of the universe. We have shifted from a clockwork paradigm to an uncertainty paradigm, from the absolute to the relative.

The Newtonian paradigm is no longer the single way of knowing, yet we are still "trapped" in this reductionist view. The rationale for this statement is based on the following:

1) Einstein's theory of relativity eroded the principle that nature was absolute rather than relative.

2) The role of the observer can no longer be excluded from the nature of the inquiry, since Einstein has shown that there is an interaction effect between humans and nature.

3) Certain unresolved phenomena cannot be explained using cause-effect lenses, e.g., psychic and peak experiences in movement.

4) The subjective dimensions of our innermost feelings and intents have rarely been satisfactorily explained using the reductionist mode (Eisner, 1978).

The increasing interest in Eastern philosophy has made a significant impact on Western thought. Eastern thought is particularly relevant to physical education, since much of its philosophy is experiential rather than analytical (Thomas, 1983). It is essentially concerned with the integration of the mind-body relationship, and promotes

consciousness about the inner and outer man as it relates to his unification. Herrigel's little book Zen and the Art of Archery in the fifties heralded this era, and was quickly followed by others such as, Inner Game of Tennis (Galwey, 1974), Golf in the Kingdom (Murphy, 1972), and Zen of Running (Sheehan, 1978). The application of Eastern thought to Western activities has promoted not only a renewed regard for the body, but the body is the means wherein we can mesh the extrinsic-intrinsic, rational-irrational aspects of ourselves into a unified whole.

As a consequence of increasing knowlege of Eastern philosophy, the practice of meditation as a centering process has been more widely endorsed to counteract the fragmentation in our lives (Canic, 1986; Linden, 1986; Schmidt, 1986). Further, attempts have been made to show the relationship between meditation and performance, especially in sporting activities. Many professional "ball" teams employ derivatives of this approach as a means to accessing a more centered, unified state that seems to increase the possibility for achieving excellence in sport.

Juxtapositions from empirical and humanistic sciences, and Eastern and Western thought, appear to be converging towards common targets that are discarding traditional models of the universe and ourselves. Since educational thought is based on this traditional model of humanity, it becomes timely to pursue the possible implications of this

cataclysmic shift from an educational and physical education perspective. One of the purposes of this study is to herald this new consciousness, and develop a theoretical framework that allows for the experiential, more subjective, lived aspects of physical activity. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body subject will provide the theoretical base for the alternative model. The model will then be examined for how lived movement satisfies our two major impulses deemed necessary for personal wholeness (Chapter Two). The first impulse is a sense of our individual agency by recognising our aloneness and autonomy. This is in contrast to the second impulse, a sense of communion, i.e., our need to feel connected with others outside ourselves in the larger community.

CHAPTER IV

A THEORETICAL PLATFORM FOR WHOLENESS IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION

> Physical education is not education "of" the physical nor is it education "through" the physical: It is education of the person . . . man as an integrated, unified entity is consonant with the notion that education is of the whole man. Enunciating and elaborating a theory of an integrated, unified person is a challenge that should rank as a very high priority with philosophers of physical education. (Ross, 1986, p. 23)

Up to now, physical education theory has rested on the empiricistic-dualistic thesis of man (Osterhoudt, 1984), i.e., the Cartesian perspective that the body is separate from the mind. Williams (1930) attempted to counteract the empiricistic-dualistic position by postulating that physical education was education "through" physical activities, based on the biologic unity of mind and body. He gave no explanation or theoretical base for his monistic position except for a passing reference to the then emerging philosophy of behaviorism (Ross, 1986). Our reliance on empiricistic-dualism is perhaps the singular, most significant fact that has impeded physical education from nurturing and embodying a more integrated position in practice (Kleinman, 1975; Meier, 1975,1979; Osterhoudt, 1984). An alternative theoretical base is needed that allows for the subjective notions of physical activity; one that facilitates both the experiential (inner) and behavioral (outer) dimensions of the movement experience.

In this chapter a theoretical base will be presented that nurtures a more integrated position of the body in physical education. This perspective will then be discussed as it pertains to the main premise of this study, i.e., coming to terms with our paradoxical needs for autonomy and connection with others in the quest for personal wholeness. Three phenomenological notions will be used for this purpose. More specifically they are, (a) body-subject as agency (b), body-subject as communion, and (c), preflective knowing and wholeness. Consequently, this chapter will highlight how movement facilitates our quest for wholeness through personal agency, autonomy, and authenticity, against the need for communion and with our fellow being. It will illustrate how the two aspects of agency and communion are connected.

Body as Subject

Concepts inherent in the body-subject are rooted in existential theory and phenomenology. The body-subject is an optimistic point of view and relatively holistic, reflecting a non-reductionist perspective endeavoring to understand the nature of elusive, intense, and personally meaningful phenomena (Progen & DeSensi, 1984). The main impetus for this view is primarily derived from the thoughts of the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty as interpreted by Kwant (1963, 1966), Bannan (1967), Smith (1962), and Edie (1964). Merleau-Ponty directed most of his work to resolving the Cartesian problem of how we as humans can experience

ourselves as incarnate. He adopted a rigorous phemenological analysis of our being-in-the-world using the phenomenology of the body. From this it could be postulated that the body-subject provides access through bodily experience to the authentic self, knowledge, personal meaning, and wholeness.

The main existential-phenomenological assumption undergirding the notion of the body-subject is that consciousness is not separate from the body; it is an "embodied consciousness" (Schrag, 1979). Consciousness flows through the body in a reciprocal dialogue with the world. The body is viewed as our vehicle for our being-in-the-world. Existence precedes thought and provides the point of departure for our body-subject's encounters with the environment.

Existence as lived bodily experience is our fundamental and essential route through the world. It is on the level of bodily existence that all thought has its root (Bannan, 1967). As a consequence, the body is not the point where we end, but rather where we begin our process of understanding. This is in contrast to Cartesian principles where thought precedes existence, and consciousness is deemed separate from the body and the responsibility of the mind.

It should be noted that one of the major inhibiting factors for the larger acceptance of the integrated position is that our philosophical language is pervasively dualistic. We are forced to speak in dualistic language for which words

are inappropriate. Kwant (1963) states that new words are needed to express the single reality.

The concept of the body-subject or the "lived body" (Schrag, 1979) accommodates the notion that the human being must have experiences in order to have thought. These experiences do not occur disembodied; they resonate from and through the body itself. We are in the world as an embodied presence: we are "embodied experiencers" (Schrag, 1979). As Meier (1979) states:

> [My body] is the locus of a dialectical relationship with the world and the fabric into which all objects are woven; and, finally, it is the center of openness, intentionality, and meaning-producing acts. (p. 195)

Experience, to Merleau-Ponty, is fundamentally a relationship with. He states:

> To be a consciousness or rather to be an experience is to hold inner communion with the world, the body and other people, to be with them instead of being beside them. (1962, p. 96)

For Merleau-Ponty, the body transcends the dichotomy of the Cartesian mind-body split. Individuals are considered to be incarnate subjects; a unity, not a union of physical, mental, and psychological parts. We cannot infer that the body belongs to either the material or the physical realm. It belongs to both, not as their union, for a union is always a meeting of opposites, but as a single reality which is both physical and mental.

The Fundamental Character of Subjectivity

The fundamental character of the body-subject is its

capacity for relationship to the world through dialogue. "Something has subjective character by virtue of the fact it has a dialectical relationship to the reality around it, changing it into its own environment, and giving it a meaning for itself" (Kwant, 1963, p. 18). Merleau-Ponty uses the dialectic to explain how meanings arise from our relationships and interactions with ideas, things, and persons. It is dialectical in that the revelation of truth is a dynamic process which is never concluded and which is in constant motion. Dialectical reasoning attempts to offer a more encompassing means of knowing, in contrast to the predominant mode of mechanistic thinking perpetuated and postulated by Descartes. It should be noted that subjectivity is not exclusively contained in consciousness, since the body-subject also exists primordially, prior to conscious thought. Subsequently, consciousness is only marginal to subjectivity.

Merleau-Ponty differentiates between causal process and dialectical relationship. In causal actions, realities influence each other in such a way that the one is not the co-cause of the influence of the other. In dialectical relationship everything refers to everything; the total process cannot be broken down into independent actions. One cause does not simply act on the other, it also affects the others causality which in turn may affect itself as well. Thus it changes it into its own environment and gives it

meaning for itself (Kwant, 1963).

The relationship of the body-subject with its environment is dialectical. Kwant makes the point, however, that this alone is not sufficient to constitute subjectivity. The gestalt or the totality of the situation needs to be grasped if integrity of the subject is to be maintained. The gestalt cannot be understood as isolated parts. The whole needs to be seen at once within the totality of a situation. For example, all the chapters of a novel reveal little meaning if taken independently. Taken as a whole, however, each chapter has meaning for the other and concommitantly they constitute a larger whole of meanings, but they exist for the subject. Thus, subjectivity is contingent not only on the dialectical relationship, but also must be viewed in its total context, its gestalt.

> It is not by causality of stimuli and reflexes that behavior can be explained . . . or understood . . . but rather that there is a certain ambiguity in the corporeal nature; we can see that there is interaction at the various levels . . . physical, psychological, etc., . . . but we can only assign meaning to the global activity as a whole. If we attempt to localize and sectionalize the various activities which manifest themselves at the bodily level, we lose the signification of the action itself . . . we lose sight of the structure of behaviour itself. (Barral, 1965, p. 94)

According to Merleau-Ponty (Kwant, 1963), where a dialectic occurs there is the whole of meanings. Every gestalt is a whole of meanings. The subject is inside the situation and thus forms part of the dialectic or <u>circular causality</u>, two terms which Merleau-Ponty uses

interchangeably. The subject holds a premium position in the circular causality for it is "the heart of the whole of meanings and centers everything around itself as meaning-for-itself . . .the subject at the same time is both a part of the whole of the dialectical relationship and its center" (Kwant, 1963, p. 20). Consequently, the self is able to rise above itself precisely because it is situated at the center and has access to being through our preconscious and conscious intentions.

Meaning for the body-subject is not absolute, because it is through the reciprocal-other that meaning arises. The subject is changed as a result of this encounter. This process always takes a forward, futuristic direction. Humans cannot reverse moments in time. Once an encounter has emerged, a new synthesis or meaning stands in its whole for that moment, unable to go back on itself. Meanings are continually evolving through the dialectic. "The perceiving subject undergoes a continued birth; at each instant it is something new. Every incarnate subject is like an open book in which we do not know what will be written" (Edie, 1964, p. 6). Thus, subjectivity is not absolute in light of the body-subject's continual rebirthing of itself through its symbiotic dialectic with its surroundings.

For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the condition for objects, for without objects there is no subject (Edie, 1964). Merleau-Ponty justifies his conception of the body as

a subject rather than an object by his appeal to our intentional theory of consciousness (Bannan, 1967). Merleau-Ponty states (cited in Bannan, 1967), "what prevents its (the body) . . . ever being an object, ever being "completely constituted" is that it is that by which there are objects (p. 64). Not only is the body held not to be an object, but the very reason for its not being an object lies in its being the source or condition for objects. This relationship is dialectic rather than causal: subject-object are connected because of their differences and their symbiotic need for each other. The object that is essentially a structure for consciousness could not exist in the absence of that consciousness. (Bannan, 1967). Similarly, consciousness which is essentially consciousness of something, would cease to exist if devoid of its object. According to Bannan, "they are joined in their opposition, opposed in their mutual dependence" (Bannan, 1967, p. 64). Marcel (1967) utilized two phrases which symbolize the difference between the objective and subjective views of the body. In the objective mode, it can be said, "I have a body". In the subjective mode, it can be said, "I am my body". This implies that my body is myself. "My body is who I am. I exist in the world as embodied" (Schrag, 1979, p. 131)

The body is in the world as an active entity. We orientate ourselves in the world through our intentional

existence. Merleau-Ponty states (cited in Thompson, 1968), "intentional threads run out from my body into the world" (p. 40). The body does not exist as one of the passive elements of a causal connection. It is only from an intentional standpoint that we can understand whether, and to what extent, things around the body have any interest or meaning for us. Thus, we actively seeks out things and situations that have personal significance. Kwant comments:

> The body does not simply undergo the influence of things in a purely passive way, but it situates itself while it undergoes the influence, so that it is active in undergoing it. (1963, p. 33-34) [emphasis added]

Subjectivity is "permeated with intentions" (Kwant, 1963), rather questioning orientations. The fact that in certain situations the body may or may not feel at ease exemplifies that we are always questioning ourselves. Kwant infers from Merleau-Ponty that these conscious intentions are not the only ones; there are also preconscious intentions whose origins are unknown to the conscious mind, e.g., sexual meaning, colors, etc. These preconscious intentions, this bodily subjectivity, remains elusive to the conscious mind precisely because it is embedded in the body primordially.

Preconscious Subjectivity of the Body

The notion of primordial or preconscious existence is a key tenet in Merleau-Ponty's study on the subjectivity of existence. Consciousness and the body are described as inexorably inseparable, i.e., consciousness is primordially

embodied in the world (Kwant, 1963). It is the deepest level of subjectivity, and we are unable to penetrate this realm through reflective thinking. As a consequence, it is impossible for us to influence this dialogue by our conscious, free will. When existence becomes conscious through reflection, however, we are able to arrive at greater clarity and meaning. Kwant notes that this primordial level underlies our conscious level. He states:

> Below me, therefore, as conscious subject, there is another subject that is preconscious and prepersonal. This subject is the body itself, for all forms of meaning arising on this level appear to be connected with the structure of the body. (1963, p. 26)

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception is not phenomenological in the usual sense. Phenomenology examines experience using conscious reflection, where experience is bracketed or suspended, and reflected upon from a distance in order to focus back on experience with more clarity. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is an inquiry into preconscious subjectivity, and how this facilitates deeper understandings, not only of ourselves but the nature of our co-existence with nature and others.

Marcel (196Ø), in his phenomenology of the body-subject, also acknowledges the existence of the difference between primordial and reflective consciousness. He refers to reflective consciousness as our primary reflective mode and primordial consciousness as our secondary reflective mode. He maintains that there are <u>problems</u> and <u>mysteries</u> in life,

and in the clarification of a problem, abstract thought or reflective consciousness (primary reflection) is more appropriate. Conversely, Marcel (1960) also argues that mysteries can only be understood by way of primordial reflection (secondary reflection). Marcel states that the phenomenological body is, as it is experienced, an example of a problem which has at its inner core a mystery. He maintains that it is precisely because the body contains a mystery that secondary reflection is needed.

The primary characteristic of secondary reflection (primordial reflection) is that it maintains the unity of the self-object. It counteracts the loss which transpires in primary reflection's splitting of the subject (self) from the object. Marcel states:

> Roughly, we can say that where primary reflection tends to dissolve the unity of experience which is first put before it, the function of secondary reflection is essentially recuperative, it reconquers that unity. (1960, p. 102-103)

According to Marcel, the objective modes of thought conceive the self as being distinct and separate from the concrete world. Secondary reflection does not seek to explain or determine causal relationships. It attempts to restore the unity of our experience at a level that is understandable. The ultimate aim of secondary reflection is to renew, enrich, and open up ourselves to new possibilities of relationships with our world.

Although preconscious intentions belong to subjectivity,

subjectivity at this level remains impersonal. Merleau-Ponty refers to this as "anonymous existence" (Kwant, 1963). On this level, subjectivity is not a conscious subject, and does not have a name. He refers to it as "natural I." The "natural I" understands the world before and better than the conscious "I." The preconscious is attuned to the world and has its own logic. Kwant gives the following physical example (here encountered while descending stairs) to express this preconscious mode of being:

> When, for example, I think that I have reached the bottom of the stairs while I am still actually descending, my body finds the answer to the unusual situation even before I, as conscious existence, am able to raise the problem. (1963, p. 28)

The primordial level of the body operates with its own integrity, able to discern knowledge and personal meaning prior to reflective analysis. The body discerns personal meaning at the primordial and reflective level not as separate entities, rather through a process of symbiotic interweavings. The significant point Merleau-Ponty wanted to explicate is that meaning is discernible at the primordial level which supports and facilitates consciousness and personal meaning in our everyday existence.

Conclusion

Our existence is our individual style with which we relate to our environment; it is how we make our unique mark on the world. To exist is to be related with or have a relationship with others in the outer world. For

Merleau-Ponty, existence is essentially a dialectical communion with ideas, and persons emanating from our corporeal interior, guided by our primordial and conscious intentions. Merleau-Ponty's goal is to get back to the nature of the lived experience itself as a way to offset the limitations inherent in mechanistic and intellectual thought. He wanted to explicate the way we are toward our world. He sought to unravel the layers of living experience through which we are primordially connected with our world and how living experience facilitates deeper understandings, not only of ourselves, but the nature of our co-existence with others.

Merleau-Ponty primarily attempted to bring the preobjective or primordial existence to reflective awareness. He postulated that primordial meanings are our primal contact with the world; they are basic to, and underlie, our human existence prior to our reflective consciousness. He felt that the primordial dimension of man's existence had been obscured and largely ignored. This, in part, is due to the enormous impact of Descartes on scientific thinking, and the nature of man's relationship with himself and the world. It attempted to offset dualistic interpretations of us in our world, offering an alternative view. Our bodies and our consciousness are integrally embodied as a unity at a prereflective level, prior to reflective consciousness.

Body Subject as Agency

> The subject body is thus an expression of the existing holistic person: a person who is an action potential of his integrated state and a person whose totality at any one moment affects all of his acts, including perception. The subject body cannot be separated into component parts which hve precise and distinct locations and functions. (Kelly, 1970, p. 96)

Meanings that arise from the moving body-subject "stand out", relate to, and are a part of our individual existence as a result of our embodied movement situations (Arnold, 1979). These movements are unique, irreplaceable, and distinctly our own. There is a reverence for the vital dynamic action of the lived moment as it is actually happening, enabling us to be more "present" in the moment. It emphasizes ecstacy and authenticity, and facilitates transcendence to deeper, more actualized levels of our possibilities and capabilities (Arnold, 1979). It should be noted that these meanings are not exclusive in any way to the body subject, rather that this model specifically promotes these ideals as the rationale for its position.

The notion of embodiment by the body-subject is important to the self for two reasons. Firstly, it is the sine qua non of our existence and therefore of our consciousness. Secondly, it is our mode of experiencing the world, and thus a prerequisite for discovering who we are (Arnold, 1979).

Embodiment infers that we experience our bodies as peculiarly and uniquely our own. The body both expresses us

and is who we are. As Marcel states, " I am my body." Our bodies are indissolubly linked to who we are (Schrag, 1979). We are embodied experiencers. "The lived body is not an object which man possesses, rather it is man and man is his body. Man's mode of insertion into the world is his body; it is his foundation in existence" (Meier, 1979, p. 194). Although the lived body is positive and dynamic and necessitates us to be consciously engaged and doing something, it is not confined to physical activity. It is, however, more completely and more poignantly felt in movement and sports, since these activities elicit a more intense awareness of our bodies.

Movement Voices: The Body-Subject as Personal Agency

As we concretely live our actions, we come to know them as our own, since action and the self are synonymous for the body subject. Hence, the more the body is experienced, the more the self is realized, and conversely, the less the body is experienced, the less the self is developed. Consequently, there seems to be a close correlation between self-identity and body awareness from a phenomenological perspective.

> The less the body is experienced, the more it becomes an appearance; the less reality it has, the more it must be undressed or dressed up; the less it is one's own known body, the further it moves from anything to do with one's own self. (Peterson, in Ravizza, 1977a, p. 102)

The lived body also signifies a mode of orientation rather than a conceptualized entity (Schrag, 1979). It is

through our sense experiences that the world is exposed to us. Since we are always present as our bodies, it is as our body that we can experience the world--smell it, hold it, touch it, and perceive it (Gerber, 1979). It is through the orientation of our lived body that personal meanings of our primordial body are disclosed and expanded upon by our reflective consciousness.

The body concretely and subjectively lived and experienced is different from the body objectively known. For instance when I throw a ball, I experience the lived moment of the action; the roundness and hardness of the ball; the feel of the movement; I experience myself. The body subject allows the experience to be more personal and therefore more meaningful.

> To the phenomenologist, to understand the body is to see the body not in terms of kinesiological analysis but in the awareness and meaning of movement. It's to be open to gestures and action; it's the grasping of being and acting and living in our world. Thus movement becomes significant not by a knowledge about the body, but through an awareness of the self. (Kleinman, 1979, p. 178) [emphasis added]

This is in contrast to the objective body. The objective body abstracts the data in an attempt to understand it in terms of its generality. In so doing, information applies to everyone, but characterizes no one in particular. Movement gradually becomes divorced of its humanity and individuality; it appears sterile. It has a tendency to alienate us from embodying the movements for and as ourselves. The movement is no longer our own and we are no longer the movement.

Thus the body concretely lived needs to be consistently contrasted with the body objectively known (Schrag, 1979). Both yield different data, each valid in its own right. If either is taken exclusively, however, movement loses its integrity. For without the inner, movement loses it substance, and without the outer, movement loses its form (Allen & Thomas, 1977).

The Mover as his own Agent

The notion of individual agency is a key notion to the body subject and existential thought. Arnold, in Meaning and Movement, Sport, and Physical Education (1979) develops the self as "agent" as one of his central ideas; subsequently, his influence is evident in this next section. Experiences of the body as ourselves in movement are crucial to our self identification and personal agency. It signifies to the mover that we are strong, powerful, and capable of accomplishing more challenging tasks. "To be able to feel good about one's physical performance is to feel good about oneself - and the converse is also true" (Gerber, 1979, p. 186). The following testimony by a gymnast testifies to sports capacity to affirm the self.

> You start to feel the tremendous friction caused by the unbelievable speed at which you travel round the bar. Your hands are aching, the bar tears and rips at them. You must hold on. They burn now; your hands are trying to shed an unwanted annoyance. But you must hold on . . . The ceiling trades places with the floor, then floor with the ceiling. And then abruptly and seemingly miraculously, you find yourself standing on your feet. You feel you have transgressed into one exciting world

> and back again. You feel wonderful. You cannot name what that feeling is, but it does not matter. As long as it is there you keep returning to that world. (McDonnell, 1967, p. 6)

Similarly, expression is integral to the human condition. "Nothing is more expressive than the human body, our hands and fingers, our dancing feet, our eyes, our voice, in joy and sorrow" (O'Neill, 1974, p. 114). The body emanates its inner secrets for public display.

> Movement is itself a language in which man's highest and most fundamental inspirations are expressed. . .each phase of movement, every small transference of weight, every single gesture of any part of the body reveals some feature of our inner life. (Laban, 1966, p. 45)

It is through the body that we express our existence as peculiarly our own; our individual "logo." The body emanates its inner secrets for public display.

> Existence, as a giver of meaning, manifests itself in all human phenomena, in the gestures of our hands, the mimicry of our face, the smile of a child, the creation of the artist, speech and work . . . The body is this power of expression. It gives rise to meaning; it makes meaning arise on different levels. (Kwant, 1963, p. 57)

One particular inter-collegiate basketball player I taught, reflected on his joyous experience of creative dance, a medium in which he had struggled to feel comfortable, as follows:

> I think in our last dance everything really came out of me. I mean I put all I had into it. The dance came from the inside of me. (Higgins, 1981) [emphasis added]

It is through our expressive gestures and actions of our lived body that we unfold broader personal meanings of our primordial authentic self. This affirms our uniquness and

personal agency, as a self, who is both strong and capable.

Coming to terms with our aloneness is a key tenet to personal agency and our authentic self. To be in sports, is to be basically alone (Harper, 1979). Being alone, however, is not dependent upon physical isolation. We can be alone, and with ourself amidst a room full of people. "Being alone is, in a sense, a oneness; a singularity; a unity within one's self" (Harper, 1979, p. 126). It is within this wholeness or total state that we can truly understand and embrace that "one is."

> Whether he is hurling a javelin, soaring off a ski-jump, performing a double back flip off a diving board, or screaming towards earth in a free fall sky dive, man is alone. He is beyond the world of public determinations; of official identities; of functions; of self deceptions and of everydayness. And in the solitary state of oneness, man can meet himself. (Harper, 1979, p. 127)

Personal success or failure depends solely on the athlete, even though he/she may be in the company of others (Harper, 1979). This is not a contradiction, for within the communal sports arena the athlete stands alone. In sports we cannot shirk being alone; we cannot defer this private state in preference to a safer public state. By choosing to play we are condemned to solitude; we are condemned to facing ourselves (Harper, 1979).

> The occasions are many; the feeling is real. It is for man himself, in the end, to realize himself as man, to shake himself loose from his death grip on the averageness of the everyday, and to "be". In the aloneness of sport man is potentially able to realize that he is - that he is unique - that there is no other person like him in the world. He is, and that in itself is important. (Harper, 1979, p. 127)

Freedom in and through choices and decisions is a key tenet of personal agency. It is a freedom, not only for the manifestation of our preconscious and conscious intentions, but also the freedom to become more of a self. As Arnold (1979) illuminates, this freedom towards change may be conceived rationally or irrationally, good or bad. It is precisely because of this freedom to choose, however, that we as individuals differentiate ourselves from the Heideggerian "THEY"; that our agency, autonomy, and our authentic selves may be disclosed to ourselves.

> My personal human identity is at least partially a product of my free will to free myself. . .And it is in entering such a world (sport) that man may know himself symbolically as a powerful agent in being since, in that world, he literally uses externally controlling necessities. . .to serve his own purpose. (Fraleigh, 1973, p. 114)

Our self-hood emerges over time in the process of choosing and deciding. More specifically, Macquarrie comments:

> A self is not given ready made at the beginning. What is given is a field of possibility, and as the existent (body subject) projects himself into this possibility, rather than that one, he begins to determine who he shall be. (1973, p. 145)

Movement and sport abound with opportunities for choices and decisions. Decision making in the lived movement is a decision "against" something, as well as a decision "for" something. Deciding one route rather than another in the moment thrusts us as individuals forward by commitment to the decisions we choose. There is no time for armchair

deliberation: in sports we need to be unequivocal and instantly decide one way or another. Whether to go for the catch? Make the volley? Go for the foul? In so doing we put ourselves on the line, at that instant. Action in sports is concrete and immediate, and in deliberating and being accountable for our choices, we may discover, not only who we are, but who we could be.

> . . . To the agent the full content of the commitment is not grasped at the outset. It is only as the action unfolds and we become embroiled in it, that we discover there is no easy going back. What is more the action is real. . . the tackle involves one having to make it. There is no shirking or deferring of responsibility. It is the self, the agent, who has to decide and do. (Arnold, 1979, p. 39)

Slusher was one of the first sports philosophers to recognize the concept of freedom in sports, as it related to the authentic self. In his classic text, Man, Sport, and Existence (Slusher, 1967), he elaborated on the inseparability of freedom and sports. Sport is freely chosen and freely engaged in. It allows for creativity and spontaneity within the context of the rules. Slusher feels that an awareness of individual freedom is the cornerstone to sport, and that this awareness is the basis for our authenticity and our self-realization. He states:

> Deny freedom and sport is denied any meaningful place in the realm of existence . . . As the sport event unfolds, each situation presents itself with a number of potential choices . . . Choice is a foundation of awareness . . . the performer develops through it and, in the process, sport develops because of it. (1967, p. 118)

Lived movements from the body-subject position are

irreplaceable, unique, and distinctly are own; we have a sense of our own individual worth. They affirm our uniqueness and our individual agency in the world. There is a reverence for the embodiment of the joy and spontaneity of the moment, of sensations and feelings inherent to the moving body. Furthermore, our individual worth that evolves through experiencing and mastering the agency of our bodies provides a more centered position from which we may go forth and encounter others more openly and lovingly, not defensively.

Body Subject as Communion

> One of the truths of our time is this hunger deep in people all over the planet for coming into relationship with each other. Human consciousness is crossing a threshold as mighty as the one from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. People are hungering and thirsting after experience that feels true to them on the inside, after so much hard work mapping the outer spaces of the physical world. They are gaining courage to ask for what they need: living interconnections, a sense of individual worth, shared opportunities. (Richards, in Ferguson, p. 60, 1982)

Voices on Communion

M.C. Richards' quote symbolizes our increasing need for deeper more vital connections in our communal relationships with others and ourselves. She points out that we appear to be embarking on a new level of consciousness that seeks more consistency and resonance between our inner more intuitive and outer more rational realms of understanding and the faith and courage to search for this truth. This view acknowledges the less developed primordial dimensions of our psyche

alongside the more developed outer dimensions of our ordinary consciousness.

Contact with the world is a given and irreducible fact of human existence. We do not find ourselves through thought alone to prove our being; the other is a necessary condition for our self-realization. "A self is a becoming, it is a coming to be, it becomes itself independently, yet obligated. An other is a necessary condition for this process to take place" (Kleinman, 1975, p. 45).

> It is a significant fact that we are not sufficient to ourselves, that life is not meaningful to us unless it is serving an end beyond ourselves, unless it is of value to someone else. (Heschel, 1965, p. 57)

The true human condition unfolds and is nurtured by lived experiences and authentic interconnections with "others." To be is to be related with, to have connections with others outside the self. Heidegger (1962) states that by virtue of being in the world, humans encounter others. Thus, one's being must be described as being-with. One cannot avoid the other, for as Buber says, even a denial of the other, implies an implicit recognition of the others' existence.

For Heidegger, humans interpret themselves through the other. Authenticity is lost, however, when we submerge ourselves in the average identity of the impersonal other, relinquishing ourselves of our responsibility and self-hood, taking refuge in the collective, the "they". Paradoxically, authenticity and our uniqueness are nurtured in the context

of the other, by recognizing that one is essentially like the "they", in that we experience the same anxieties and our mortality, yet one is singularly different. Authentic existence does not pivot around the exceptional condition of the subject, rather it is an existential modification through others (Arnold, 1979).

Experience, according to Merleau-Ponty, is fundamentally a relationship with (Kwant, 1963). Merleau-Ponty attempted to elucidate being as an experience which entails a communion with. He thought that getting back to the lived experience offered a means to precede the error of mechanistic and intellectual thought. Edie (1964) states:

> .. My consciousness is turned primarily toward the world, turned toward things, it is above all a relationship to the world. (Edie, 1964, p. 116)

Merleau-Ponty described personal interaction as a "coupling" of two conscious bodies, a mutuality, rather than an external manipulation between a person's consciousness on another's body (Kretchmar, 1971). This opens the self as one is present with another; in so doing there is reciprocity, not manipulation. Kretchmar states:

> . . . perception of other persons occurs through this personal interaction. One experiences the Other affecting himself. Reciprocally, one can witness his own actions affecting the Other's behavior. Thus, the Other is perceived through reciprocal interaction rather than objectification of and by the other. (1971, p.40)

According to Whitford (1982), Merleau-Ponty's notion of relation is a positive way of being in the world as opposed to Sartre's position. Sartre felt that relation was

essentially a negative reciprocity. We meet the other as an object, for we have no access to the other's consciousness. We meet the other as a "tool", as an object (Kretchmar, 1971). Interaction therefore is essentially alienating and hostile.

According to Buber (1970), humans enter into relationship with persons or things in either an I-It or an I-Thou mode. The I-It mode is the fundamental mode, wherein the world appears dichotomous. One in which others stand separate from the "I". It is with this mode that we gather data, whereas within the I-Thou humans know no objects, no distancing from others, no separate I. It is here that true communion takes place, however fleeting: it remains a powerful, profound, and meaningful, human experience.

Marcel (1960), like Buber, indicated that humans encounter others in two basic ways. We can co-exist, where the interaction appears superficial and somewhat mechanical, more representative of the body-object. Or, we can achieve togetherness with an other by being wholly "present" with our colleague (Kelly, 1970). In this mode of existence, more of our spirit is released to ourselves.

> When somebody's presence does make itself felt, it can refresh my inner being; it reveals me to myself; it makes me more fully myself than I should be were I not exposed to this impact. (Kelly, 1970, p. 69)

Movement Voices on Communion

The very nature of sports necessitates an encounter with

an other. "Man of sport, by definition of the activity, must relate to the object" (Slusher, 1967, p. 7). The object can assume many forms, either animate or inanimate "others", or both simultaneously. It may take the form of another person on the opposing team; it may be a teammate. Inanimate objects may include inertial forces such as gravity and wind, or simply the landscape such as mountains, rapids, and waves.

> It cannot be explained satisfactorily to anyone who never has stood on a mountain top commanding a view of a hundred miles of winter, felt the wind whip through his clothes, quaked at the thought of the plunge ahead and then shackled himself to a pair of hickory boards and let fly down the hill. (Swenson, 1948, p. 19)

Slusher (1967), Kleinman (1975), and Kretchmar (1975) maintain that meaning is never activated when the individual divorces self from others. It is one's ability to connect that makes personal meaning possible. Through dialectical experiential encounters, meanings become correlated with those of others who share the experience. Consequently, we are constantly remaking ourselves and each other; we are never quite the same as we were prior to the encounter with an other.

> Exploration of the nature of the other, which constitutes a necessity and essential part of the dialectic, has been for the most part, avoided or perhaps taken for granted . . . It is the "other" which signifies people and things which are essential to the nature of human relationships. I am contending here that it is these human relationships, man's dialectic with people and things, which provide an avenue for man to become a self . . . and essential ingredient of kinesis (movement toward self) is encounter. (Kleinman, 1975, p. 46)

Besides the body being existentially and immediately

apprehended as one's own (self-referential), the lived body is also experienced in a communal context. This communal context adds another experience of the body. Some of our closest human encounters arise from the "battlefront of the contest."

Meier (1975) contends that the competitive struggle in sport fosters an authentic and unique communication which he refers to as a "loving struggle." This interpersonal intimacy wherein powerful positive and negatives highs and lows are shared reveal our true selves and foster greater authenticity. Pertaining to teamwork, Meier discusses the "kinship of the rope" as symbolic of the trust and closeness that binds mountain climbers together. Sports abounds with kinship possibilities which have a propensity for communication not easily found and which are lasting and irreplaceable. Sayre (1964), in his book Four Against Everest, testifies to the kinship in mountain climbing:

> The companionship provided by climbing together is almost universally valued by mountaineers. The friendships established are lasting and irreplaceable . . . For the deepest friendships spring from sharing failure as well as success, danger as well as safety . . . Men are made for the close warmth of friendship tested in danger and adversity. It is not impossible without this testing, but it is much more difficult. (1964, p. 214)

Similarly, Kleinman states:

> The bodily person in touch with the other is much more complete and fulfilling. The sensual experiences of having been there in sport also provides for a unique way of knowing of self and other. It achieves at times a level of communication not easily reached or often found. (1975, p. 49)

Lived body as Experiential Unity

The sensuous experience of our athletic energy as a dynamic alive form has often been characterized as a sense of intimate relation to others and to the world (Fetters, 1977). The lived body is more open and receptive to feelings, sensuality, spontaneity, and the joy of the moving body. As a consequence, the lived body is more capable of increased intimacy with others.

Sport, because of its intensity, is able to nurture this intimacy. It allows the sensuous body to immerse itself in activity and become lost in the medium (other). A surfer attests to this as follows: "I sought harmony and found it when I joined together with a curling wave" (Arnold, 1979, p. 51). This intensity enchances the intimacy of the body with the other. To such an extent, there is frequently no distinction between the participant and his medium, between subject and object. As Lee states:

> The power to give yourself wholly to an end, to lose yourself in the work at hand, not to know whether you are building the house or the house is building you, whether you are carrying the ball or are merely the one in the mud at the bottom of the heap . . . makes drudgery accepted. (1922, p. 275)

A Pentathloner beautifully expressed his experiential unity as follows: "I flow down the mountain. In time with the moment. In pace with the universe. Watching from inside and out. Unity and all" (Jones, 197Ø, p. 52).

Sport offers numerous oppurtunities for this experience

of oneness as a sensual dialogue (Fetters, 1977) which Kleinman (1975) refers to as "sensual dialectic." Athletes have described this unity as a total immersion in the sensuous qualities of their medium, characterized by feelings of effortlessness, revealing an absence of opposition, only extreme harmony. Ravizza (1977) recalls this following description of playing basketball at the age of thirteen:

> I never played basketball like that before; there was such an incredible feeling of control, strength, flow, and inner power as I drove to the basket, I knew I could do anything I wanted on the court. Nothing was resisting me as I moved effortlessly in toward the basket again and again. There was no distinction between myself, the ball, and the basket . . . we all were together. (p. 61)

The experiential unity that Ravizza speaks of is profound and deeply engrained. Moments of experiential unity allow us glimpses into eternity where everything is whole. These moments are so powerful that our lives are often not the same. The awe of the moment affirms that there is indeed another reality besides the here and now, but it is only discernable upon reflection after the event. In these moments we transcend ourselves by extending the previous limits of our experience. They are deeply satisfying, so we continue to pursue them.

The experiential fusion that takes place during these intense moments in sport transcend thought and action. There appears no distinction between the mind and bodily action. Mind and body are acting in unison, to such an extent that one does not know who is the subject and who is the object.

As a consequence dualism is dissolved. All that is, is unity.

Sport offers many varying levels of communal human intensity. The sensuous experiences of oneness are consonant with the I-Thou encounter as espoused by Martin Buber. Buber's (1970) work on I-Thou, however, is perhaps the most profound, prolific, and insightful work that has been developed regarding the communal and spiritual aspect of movement. Several movement theorists have referenced the Jewish philosopher-theologian Buber in their studies on the qualitative aspects of encounter in sports (Arnold, 1979; DeSensi, 1980; Gerber, 1979; Kretchmar, 1975; Thomas, 1983). The mere fact of two persons creating tests for one another in order to excel in a superior fashion reveals little or nothing of the human quality of the exchange (Kretchmar, 1975). Buber highlights the subjective, qualitative possibilities of human encounters through his treatise on I-Thou. Gerber states the following on Buber's work:

> In I-Thou he theorizes that man finds himself, man becomes, man is, only in relation to his Thou. Through relation, through the encounter of the I with the Thou, through the dialogue, man finds himself, his meaning and his roots. (1979, p. 129)

Buber (1970) contended that all life was encounter. Every relationship, or encounter in life, whether animate or inanimate, i.e., man and man, man and nature, or man and object is either an I-It relationship or an I-Thou relationship. Within the I-Thou encounter, the individual

lives as a subject among subjects, fusing the subject-object dichotomy into a mysterious subject "twoness" (Kretchmar, 1975). "A person must responsibly maintain his own unique perspective in venturing 'out' toward the other" (Kretchmar, 1975, p. 23). Each affirms the other as unique and individual. One cannot pre-determine how and when an I-Thou will occur. Rather, Kretchmar (1975) specifically states its occurrence is by "will" and "grace," which he also used as the title in his article (1975) on Buber. He states that an I-Thou is a direct and a spontaneous meeting, wherein each party affirms the other. He notes that pre-established biases of the other inhibit the flow and grace of an authentic I-Thou. Kretchmar states:

> One confirms the other without condition, in the abscence of pre-ordained criteria of friendship and without manipulative intent. An openness to surprise and mystery prevails . . . Yet confirmation of the other does not necessarily entail ideological agreement. I-Thou is not synonymous with sentimental concord. Even hatred is thought, by Buber, to be much closer to I-Thou than superficial friendship or other benign but apathetic relationships. The very ability to enter into intimate relationship is counted as man's greatest asset. (1975, p. 2Ø)

Most of life takes place in an I-It mode. Within this mode, the individual lives as a subject among objects, wherein individuals tend to manipulate and objectify others as a means to their own ends. The I-It mode is necessary to life, for it is a means of securing knowledge and sustaining life. Despite its objectivity, Buber recognized the importance of I-It relationships for effective, responsible

living. Progen & DeSensi state:

> Lacking the relation characteristic of the I-Thou encounter, the I-It encounter is a subject-object relationship. Buber (1970) indicates that we cannot live without the I-It world, but if individuals live with the I-It world alone, authentic human life cannot be achieved. (1984, p. 81)

Slusher (1967) notes that the subjective aspects of sports are often neglected. He states that the nurturance of relationship or "personal meeting" is essential to maintaining and developing our humanity. Sport, according to Slusher, provides a unique arena that goes beyond the usual interpretation of teamwork and competition. It is within this context that the individual athlete achieves authenticity and humanness and is able to develop his existence to its fullest. Ultimately, he acknowledges that the I-It relationship is the more frequent encounter in sports, and it is probably unrealistic to expect mutuality and "meeting" amongst athletes in today's materialistic society.

The nature of the I-Thou is elusive and ineffable. In fact, DeSensi (1980) points out that it may not be possible to express the essence of elusive and rare subjective phenomena outside the context of the relationship. A significant point to be made is that qualitative, subjective encounters are not specifically limited to the I-Thou mode entirely. Although never as intense or as powerful, the I-It mode encounter can be qualitatively enhanced, having experienced an I-Thou or having been sensitized to the

possibility. By acknowledging our fellowbeing more subjectively and lovingly, the possibilities of an I-Thou encounter are considerably increased. In so doing, we transcend the every day into a more vital, alive, and loving world wherein each individual is affirmed and feels more authentic. Affirmation is endemic, and seeks to foster affirmation in others making for a more human caring universe in which we may exist.

The significant point is that individual intentionality determines the integrity of the encounter. Consequently, the manner in which competition is presented to students is critical in shaping their belief system about contesting with their fellow being. One can choose to affirm or negate the "other." In choosing the latter, we perpetuate the larger society's sense of alienation, apathy and, powerlessness previously documented by Fromm (1941), Heidegger (1962), and May (1967). The adage "Winning is not all" alludes to more implicit, communal possibilities of sports. It offers a more positive outlook for the human condition since it is characterized by affirmation and reverence for each other, rather than that of alienation and negation.

Prereflective Knowing and Wholeness

Merleau-Ponty's aim was to bring the preobjective or preflective world to reflective awareness since he felt that our original contact with the world had been obscured or ignored by traditional philosophy. He was essentially

interested in the relationship between preflective experience and conceptualization of the experience. It is important to note, however, that the source of meaning cannot be identified with consciousness. Meaning, according to Merleau-Ponty, is situated in the body at both a primordial and reflective level.

> That the body is a subject, a meaning-giving existence, is deduced by Merleau-Ponty from the fact that there are many forms of meaning, which, on the one hand, do not have the character of a reality existing independently of us but, on the other, do not result from a free and conscious giving of meaning. It follows, therefore, that man must already be a meaning-giving existence on the preconscious and not-yet-made level, on the level of bodily existence. (Kwant, 1963, p. 21)

The body is access to the self even at this obscure level. The body has its own inner logic prior to reflection on movement. The more the body is experienced, the more the self is realized and, conversely, the less the body is experienced the less the self is developed. Consequently, there appears to be a close correlation between <u>self-identity</u> and <u>body awareness</u> from a phenomenological perspective.

<u>Movement Voices on Prereflection</u>

Several movement theorists have discussed the significance of prereflective and reflective meanings inherent in movement. More specifically, some theorists have posited that movement is dynamic and whole at the prereflective level. Furthermore, the body is access to all being and knowing; we move in order to know. This being the case, it infers that movement is of major importance in our

lives and is valid in its own right. Metheny (1961) always maintained that if the profession was to maintain its integrity and position in society, we needed to validate movement for its own sake, not in other concomitants of social, emotional, and psychological values.

Fetters (1977) discusses the prereflective notion of movement which she refers to as the nondiscursive symbol. She recognizes the prereflective and reflective realms of consciousness as essential sources of meaning. Prereflective knowing, however, offers a single intuitive grasp of the total body's awareness of force, time, space, and flow used in movement. This is in contrast to the reflective dimension of the body where meanings are built up in a logically discursive fashion. Rather, the "whole" of the experience is grasped in an instant prior to any reflection. The body feels rather than knows. Meaning is grasped in the direct experiential engagement of the action itself. This is where movement is virginal and whole, unadulterated before the reductionist analysis of reflection.

Metheny (1965) posits an alternative view concerning how we understand the body. Her work is based on Cassirer's and Langer's work on symbolic transformation. She contends that the body transforms sensory experiences into abstractions which are ideas of the senses since this is how the human mind operates. Fetters (1977) contends, however, that these abstractions or ideas about the movement are not necessarily

representative of the discursive reflective mode of knowing. Rather, the body grasps the movement intuitively and immediately since they are inextricably "bound up with the sensuous experience of the body as a dynamic rhythmic form" (p. 256). She does not feel that movements are transformed into abstractions, or an idea of the movement. She states that movement is grasped in the lived experiential moment as it is happening and that reflection after the movement allows movement to be understood in the total context of both the behavior and the experience.

Studer (1977) acknowledges that significance exists at the prereflective stage, but that it is implicit and incomplete until reflection consolidates the meanings into our thoughtful consciousness. Therefore, Studer maintains that experiences are significant only on reflection, not in action. Similarly, Metheny suggests that the sport experience is too immediate and reactive to contemplate it as it is happening. It needs reflection for the total meaning of the experience.

> In the moment of commitment to the values he attached to his own human actions, no competitor has time to rationalize about his own feelings and his own motivations. In that moment of all-out action he must experience himself as he is, in all the complexity of his own feelings about himself, his gods, and other men who claim the right to share the universe of his existence. (Metheny, 1979, p. 233)

Kleinman (1970) concurs with Fetters in that meanings take place at the prereflective level of the body prior to the Cartesian cogito of reflection. Further, Kleinman states

that conscious perception does not account for sensations of pain,or sound, or appetites of hunger, or thirst. Consequently, they significantly challenge the dualistic premise of the body. Kleinman alludes to a more intimate union of the body and believes that significance does exist at this prereflective level. He writes:

> The subject is inextricably involved in the world long before reflection about it begins. The human being is thus condemned to existence and meaning on a much more fundamental level than that of reflection. And it is this level of existence which stands a chance of being revealed by direct, non-reflective description. That, I suggest is where the significance of the act lies. (1970, p. 74)

In her 1966 farsighted study the Phenomenology of Dance, Maxine Sheets attempted to intuit the primordial and original lived experience of dance. She suspended her bias and sought her original or prereflective contact as a dancer. She differentiates between reflective consciousness and prereflective consciousness based on Husserl's theory. She feels the prereflective state of consciousness is vital, for this is the core or inner spark from which dance, as a creative and performing art, sprung. Although she recognises the significance of the prereflective consciousness, she also recognises that consciousness is always consciousness of something: "Every consciousness intends an object" (Sheets, 1966, p. 12). She clarifies her views when she notes that "in lived experience, nothing is objectively constituted; neither consciousness itself nor the object of consciousness exist as given." Thus, she acknowledges the vital interplay

between the prereflective and reflective levels of consciousness encountered through the dialectic in the search for meaning, in particular the prereflective mode.

Kaelin (1979) supports Sheets position that significance and meaning exist at the prereflective level of bodily existence. According to Langer, as Kaelin points out, a dancer abstracts his/her bodily movements in terms of space, time and force into dynamic images which appear only to the reflective consciousness. Kaelin takes exception to this viewpoint when he comments:

> To suggest that a dancer first understands a feeling, and then translates it into kinesthetic imagery, is to suggest that a dancer dances before dancing. Since the counters (she says elements) of the dance medium are movements, the dancer must already have made the movements in order to have gained his or her "idea". (Kaelin, 1979, p. 175)

He states that Langer's theory lacked a working, experiential schema of the body, a body which understands before the mind is operational.

According to Schutz (cited in Yamaguchi, 1983) experiences in their prereflective mode are without meaning. In prereflective bodily movement the individual is only aware of a stream of consciousness, a series of undifferentiated, nondiscrete events. Schutz identifies this stream or flow of consciousness as duration or personal time as opposed to spatial or cosmic time to explain the prereflective and reflective modes of being. Consciousness of this stream emerges by the act of reflection. Only in the past are

experiences meaningful. Schutz states that "we apprehend not by living through them but by an act of attention" (Yamaguchi, 1983, p. 27).

Thomas (1983) contends that the body provides a source of information before the conscious mind attends to the action. From an experiential, feeling stance she states:

> Before anyone tells you or before you think about it, you as your body experience yourself as a moving being . . . There is no way you can know what static balance is or whether you are capable of static balance unless you experience a sitation that demands it. Your body tells you what it is to achieve it or not achieve it. It is not an experience requiring reflection or evalution as it occurs as part of the on-going experience. (1983, p. 136)

Essentially, the prereflective level contains the unity and "feel" of the movement before the cognitive processes begin to analyze what is going on. When bouncing a ball, we instinctively know its roundness, its softness or hardness, the angle of a rebound. This happens even before we have an opportunity to reflect (Thomas, 1983). Sensations are an integral, implicit part of why we engage in sport and movement for hours on end in the gym or hot sun. This is where the joy and meaning emerge to transport our mundane ordinary lives to heightened levels of self-awareness.

Although Fetter's, Kaelin's, and Sheet's discussions focus on the aesthetic experience in movement, they state that meaning in sport is experienced through the direct presentation of the sensuous dynamics of the moving body. Sport is aesthetic in that we express ourselves through our bodily actions, and we articulate our subjective lived

moments, transforming sensuous primordial perceptions into personal meaning. These existential meanings are lived in the body and are not abstractions. They exist in their totality in an embodied personally significant way. Fetters, Kaelin, Sheets, and Thomas contend, contrary to Metheny, Schutz, and Studer, that prereflective meanings are valuable in their own right and are personally significant.

> Pre-reflective consciousness of these meanings comes through a total body awareness of the varying qualities of force, time, space and flow. These are existential meanings, not metaphysical concepts. They are lived in the body, apprehended in a personally embodied way. They are not abstract and intangible but concretely familiar and immediately felt as somatic and sensuous realities. I submit that these meanings found in the sensuous perception of one's body as a dynamic rhythmic form are valuable in their own right. (Fetters, 1977, p. 256) [emphasis added]

It should be noted here that the prereflective and reflective meanings are essential to understanding movement. They are symbiotic. The prereflective unfolds the inner subjective sense, i.e., the feel of the movement. The reflective offers objective insights as to what the movement looks like, i.e. its form, and has a tendency to be more analytical. Together they represent the inner and outer dimensions of the movement experience. Neither are mutually exclusive on their own, they are inherently interwoven.

Fetters suggests that the sensuous experience of the moving body as a dynamic form at the prereflective stage can be characterized as the intimate union between the body and the world. This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty's position

(Kwant, 1963) that the prereflective stage enjoys a natural unity. The lived body exists at that moment in a unified stage prior to analytic reflection. Thus, the prereflective dimension endeavors to keep the integrity of the unity in movement. The significant point of this discussion is that some theorists are beginning to recognize that movement is dynamic, meaningful, and whole at this prereflective level.

The notion of meaning being prereflectively grasped at such a primordial level of our bodily existence offers physical educators a theoretical base that movement is inherently valuable in its own right since the body is access to all knowledge and meaning. We move in order to know. The body is access to all being and all knowing. Consequently, movement is how we know the world and ourselves. This infers that movement is of major significance in our lives and it is valid in its own right.

Concluding Statement

The idea of the body-subject or the lived body allows us to find a connection between our agentic and commununal impulses. The theoretical base of the lived body or body-subject is offered as an alternative perspective in physical education in lieu of the dualistic Cartesian thought more prevalent in physical education today. Cartesian doubt destroys our lived unity by removing ourselves from experiences, by placing the philosophical position on thought processes, rather than experienced processes. Marcel

(1960) contends that Descartes has overlooked the fact that humans are always a self in a situation, with their unique frame of reference. No two people perceive new information in the same way, given their unique contextual background of previous experiences. Further, human affectivity, our feelings about a situation are ignored. Hence, the "I" or the self is no longer an actual living, existing human, rather the self is detached and represents an abstract, theoretical self. This alienates us further from ourselves. A consequence is that the abstracted self no longer intermingles with the world, or with its own body; the self and the body are reduced to the status of things, not as vibrant, alive creators of ourselves.

The last chapter presents the alternative perspective outlining the premises, characteristics, and ways to enhance personal performance. It will also illustrate the integral role of communion with others in the quest for personal meaning and wholeness in physical education.

CHAPTER V

LIVED BODY AS AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR WHOLENESS IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION

> In the attempt to explain movement, our researchers have adopted the "tried and the true" methods of physiology. But understanding movement skill ability, and its acquisition, is incomplete to say the least, and incorrect to say the most without regard for the living subject and recognition of his purpose and posture toward the environment. This, of necessity, calls for a psychology of movement; one which is not based upon the principles of physiology and physics but, in dealing with lived movement, must accept the challenge of developing principles of its own. (Kleinman, 1970, p. 61)

The lived body is offered as an alternative theoretical base for physical education. It allows and accommodates for the primordial, subconscious, more mystical dimensions of the human psyche, more in keeping with new models of our universe. The purpose of this alternative perspective, however, is in the personal meaning it has in practice, not its rationale justifying its position. My major concern is that physical education appears to be alienating many students from the joy and personal meaning inherent in movement. The lived body is developed as a means to counteract the alienation dilemma, where students feel unembodied, unfree, and unconnected. Rather, the lived body specifically promotes personal wholeness, lived experiential unity, joy and spontaneity, and lastly, a new inner and outer morality. The lived body significantly challenges and counteracts the present alienation experienced by students in physical education. Movements are more lifelike and

individual. As a consequence, meaning is more personal, therefore more profound, because movements do not have to be replicated to a external standard. Lowen captures the essence of the lived body when he states:

> The alive body is characterized by a life of its own. It has a mobility independent of ego control which is manifested by the spontantaneity of its gestures and the vivacity of its expression. It hums, it vibrates, it glows. It is charged with feeling. (1967, p. 209)

It is of major significance to this study and an important point that movement is revered both as an art and a science. The artistic and technical aspects of movement are mutually symbiotic. The artistic accesses the intrinsic, sensual feel of the movement and provides the substance or essence. The technical accesses the extrinsic, more definitive, developmental aspect of movement. Together they facilitate holistic human movement and give movement its integrity. Too frequently the sensual aspect of the movement experience is passed over in pursuit of the technical dimension of skill acquisition. At present, our cultural ethos places considerable emphasis on technique. It is deemed the means not only to learning, but even the solution to many complex human relationship problems. Little societal value is placed on the sensual and emotional dimensions of the human experience. Failure to embody the inner, sensual experience alongside the outer, technical dimensions of the movement experience results in sterile, non life-like, depersonalized movement. It is these types of movement

experiences that Kollen (1981) alluded to that were alientating many students from enjoying and developing physical skill in physical education. One particular finding in Kollen' s study indicated that students were unable to recall any examples of integrated movement within physical education, but they were all able to report such experiences outside physical education.

General Characteristics of the Lived Body

The essential nature of the body-subject or lived body, is that life is in the lived moment. There is a reverence for the vital dynamic action of the lived moment as it is actually happening. During these moments, life is authentic, real, and peculiarly one's very own. It emphasizes ecstacy and authenticicty, and facilitates transcendence to deeper, more actualized levels of our possibilities and capabilities.

The lived body is most basically an expression of being-toward the world. The body accesses our world and is our instrument of communication with the world around us. The aim of the lived body is not knowledge of the body, rather, the goal is self-awareness and self-understanding. Lived movement allows one to see into one's own being. This awareness, however, is hidden in process. If the final outcome is the only concern, many pertinent insights inherent to the moving body are lost. Experiencing rather than conceptualising about the experience is deemed the key to

accessing self-awareness.

The body-subject attempts to explain the body as an experiencing subject, not a recipient of objective data. The body or self is inextricably embedded in the world and cannot be detached from experiences. The examination of the experiential base of movement is characteristic of the existential-psychological perspective. It advocates starting with experiential knowledge rather than systems or abstract concepts deduced a-priori. Hence, personal subjective knowledge is emphasised, upon which abstract data may be subsequently accommodated through the means of reflection.

Humans are not subject to systems, but free to choose based on our their free will. The body is active rather than passive. The body does not undergo the influence of experiences in a passive way, it situates itself through intentionality. We orientate ourselves through our intentional existence. It is only from an intentional standpoint that we can understand whether, and to what extent, things around the body have any interest or meaning for us. Consequently, we actively seek out things and experiences that have personal significance and meaning.

The lived body transcends the opposition of the mind and body. The body-subject is a single entity which is at the same time, both material and spiritual. The body is no longer an object in the world, it is a point of view of the world. As Descartes states (cited in Edie), "the soul is not

merely in the body like a pilot in his ship, it is wholly intermingled with the body" (1964, p. 5).

The lived body argues strongly for the irrational side of humanity, and suggests that many phenomena, in particular feelings, do not fit predetermined patterns. By accepting the interplay of the irrational alongside the rational ways of knowing, humans are more able to respond naturally and spontaneously to fundamental life situations. This array of more vital, personal, experiences ensures that learning remains more alive and more meaningful.

The following premises have evolved from the study. These form the main platform for the alternative perspective in physical education.

Premises of the Lived Body

1. Movement facilitates awareness of self and others.

2. Roots of the mind are already established in the body.

3. Prereflective unity and meaning exist in the body prior to consciousness.

4. Lived body is not an isolated phenomena, it is intentionally related to the world. It emerges in one's primordial experience of being.

5. Intentionality guides our actions and helps shape personal meaning.

6. Meaning and feeling are inherently related to behavior.

7. Meaning and behavior in experiential movement have gestalt characteristics.

8. Reality of personal experiences cannot be explained by

analysis and abstraction of sensory data. It requires meaningful integration and reflection on lived experience.

9. Lived body is access to the agentic and communal aspect of personal wholeness.

Specific Elements of the Lived Body

Personal Wholeness

The main premise of this study is that personal wholeness is contingent on coming to terms with two symbiotic yet paradoxical impulses--the need to express our self-hood (agency), and our need to feel connected (communion). The lived body specifically promotes and integrates these two dimensions of the psyche through the dialectical encounter. The self as agent is a key tenet in the lived body, since action and the self are synonymous for the body-subject. The more the body is experienced, the more the self is realized, and so the converse is true. Consequently, from a phemenological perspective, there is a close correlation between self-identity and body awareness.

Movement also satisfies our need for communion or connection with others. Being a self through sports demands a literal being in touch with the other. Sport is alive with possibilities for relating to the other, not through an intellectual dialectic, rather a sensual dialectic (Kleinman, 1975). Sarano expresses this idea beautifully: "The universal body; my true body is the world, woven of

relationships between men of flesh" (cited in Thomas, 1983, p. 128).

This sensual engagement evolves meaning and a level of communication not often found in more sedentatry modes. Alive exchanges in sport tend to be more authentic because there is little time to reflect on behavior, decisions have to be made in the moment. Further, the environment of focused attention abounds with extreme moments of elation and disappointment. Cumulatively, sports moments are revelations of the self acting in an alive and authentic manner, and are characterized by a curious permanence.

Buber (1970) points out that all life is encounter. Every relationship in life, whether animate or inanimate, is either an I-It or an I-Thou. This is in contrast to alienation by the exaggeration of the agency feature, where the other is perceived instrumentally and objectively; consonant of the I-It mode. Communion is made possible when a Thou meets another Thou: "the other is viewed as a subject with whom I experience a co-presence in such a manner that our individual freedoms are mutually acknowledged" (Gerber, 1979, p. 159).

To Buber, the I-Thou is not only a human phenomena, for inherent in the I-Thou is the relation with the eternal Thou; connection with the eternal deity, "every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of every particular Thou, the primary word addresses the Eternal Thou

(Buber, 1958, p. 75). The eternal Thou is the "presence" of something far greater than ourselves. It is not limited to ourselves, however, for we are but a part. The eternal rests in the space "in-between" two Thous; it is spirit that forms the cement to connect my Thou with your Thou. Hence, peak moments in sport are deeply satisfying and often considered "spiritual." They transcend our everyday lives by allowing us glimpses into eternity by unfolding and revealing new visions of ourselves.

These two impulses, agency and communion, foster a sense of our autonomy and individual competency, yet also enable us to feel connected with our world. Dewey (1963) points out that if we eliminate the social, communal factor, we are left with only an abstraction; similarly, if we eliminate the individual, agentic factor from society, we are left with only an inert and lifeless mass. Both the agentic and communal elements are deemed essential for personal and societal well being.

Lived Body as Experiential Unity

The lived body fosters experiential unity by its very regard for the sensuality and intimacy between the outer world and our inner world of experiencing. This unity is evident at two levels of the body -- the preflective and the reflective level. At both these levels of the body there appears no opposition between the subject and object, just

experiential fusion of oneness. The experience of oneness dissolves the dualism inherent in other models of physical education. The phenomena of oneness and unity is a chief characteristic of the lived body. Figure 1 illustrates this concept.



Figure 1

The experiential fusion that takes place during preflective and reflective movement experiences transcends thought and action. In actional movement, thought does not precede movement. Its concern is with the process of the unfolding of activity as sequential flow, "the agent thinks and chooses as he performs." Furthermore, "choices that are made arise from and are an ongoing part of the action itself as it unfolds to actualize the possibility of the project" (Arnold, 1979, p. 19). There appears no distinction between the mind and bodily action. Mind and body are acting in unison, to such an extent one does not know who is the subject and who is the object.

> . . . the hand that guides the brush has already caught and executed what floated before the mind at the same moment the mind began to form it, and in the end the



Figure 1. Discrete and Non-discrete Meaning Sources (Adapted from Thomas, 1983, p. 42)

> pupil no longer knows which of the two -- the mind or hand -- was responsible for the work. (Herrigel, 1971, p. 46)

Thus, our corporeality is an entity with two faces without clear and precise marks of demarcation, the distinction between the subjective and objective poles are blurred in the experienced lived body.

Arnold (1979) differentiates between preflective and reflective modes by stating that unity at the preflective level of the body is non-discrete, whereas reflective unity of the body is discrete (see Figure 2). Non-discrete, preflective unity provides information without reflective thinking. The body itself becomes a source of knowledge. Upon walking outside, the body tells you whether it is humid or dry. It does not require reflection for knowledge. Similarly, when movement in sports become automatic, execution takes place without reflection. Thomas (1983) points out that preflective knowledge is a relatively new phenomena in Western philosophy. It does, however, have a long tradition in Eastern philosophy. Prereflection is the root for eastern metaphysical beliefs about the monistic liason between the mind and the body.

Discrete peak moments of reflective unity in sports are more consonant with an I-Thou experience; they stand out as deep, meaningful, episodic moments forever etched on our memory. But they only take on meaning after the event, through the process of reflection. According to Martens

(1978), the sports peak experience, in contrast to Maslow's peak experience, is the highest human experience. Discrete experiences of unity are frequently regarded as the most supreme moments of our human lives. They require a total embodiment and integration of mind, body, and spirit, whereas Maslow's peak experience does not necessarily involve all dimensions of the mind-body-spirit triad. Consequently, unity experienced in intense moments in sport may be the most powerful and profound human experience available to humanity.

> [In peak moments in sport] the person both exists and finds his essence. They satisfy him so he returns. One competes in order to self actualize and find out who one is. In actional (lived) movement the self finds unity and once found "being" is attained. It may last for but a moment, but in that moment meaning is constituted and never to be forgotten. (Arnold, 1979, p. 41)

Despite experiential unity at the discrete level of the body, unity also exists at the preflective level as non-discrete. The notion of meaning and unity being prereflectively grasped at such a primordial level of the body offers physical educators a theoretical base that movement is inherently valuable, and does not have to be justified in other emotional and social educational referrants.

Lived Body as Spontaneity and Joy

> Today we find that joy, just old fashioned happiness is one of the most essential elements of life. It is one of the aims of education. It is one of the criteria by which education is judged. We are coming also to recognize the close inter-relationships of those elements which we call mind and body. (Nash, 1930, p. 22)

Nash recognized the significance of joy inherent to the moving body. Yet joy as an inclusion in the curriculum is the exception rather than the rule, given the present ethos of accountability in education. The level of personal joy is commensurate with the level to which we fulfill our potential as unique individuals (May, 1967). Joy results when we use our powers. Joy, rather than happiness, is the goal of life, for joy is the emotion which results from our fulfilling our nature as human beings.

Relating this to a movement context, the essence of preflective experiential bodily flow is joy. This is the natural condition of the human organism. Spontaneous movement is basic to this level of consciousness and existence. The body exists in it purest state. It is pure self resonating at the core of its primordial existence releasing joy and pleasure. According to Fahey (1977), this is the "passionate body" -- alive, positive, pulsating in its purest most authentic state. For it is human passion that enhances our energy which charges our activities with gusto and dynamism. This is aliveness.

> In this state of joy and passion the moving body seems to dance as the person realizes how good it feels to cooperate with instinctual nature -- ones spontaneity senses a unique emergence of self. One is alive when one moves, but totally alive when the movements are spontaneous, vital, alive, and free rather than frozen, immobile, and unresponsive. (Fahey, 1977, p. 112)

It is interesting to note that Buber (1970) also

recognized that the highest relationship of man to man or man to experience is spontaneous and direct, and a prior plan inhibits this spontaneity. Spontaneity is the capacity to respond to the total picture, i.e. the figure-ground configuration. According to Rollo May (1967), spontaneity is the active "I" becoming part of the figure-ground. "In a good portrait the background is always an integral part of the portrait; so an act of a mature human being is an integral part of the self in relation to the world around it" (May, 1967, p. 98). Hence, spontaneity is very different from egocentricity and effervescence, or simply letting one's feelings out regardless of the situation. Spontaneity is the acting and responding to a specific situation in the present moment. These moments are never the same. Consequently, spontaneity is characterized by originality and uniqueness.

Our primordial, spontaneous, movement meanings are fundamental to and underlie our very existence. Our authentic selves are realized through our spontaneous movements. They are fun and pleasurable -- the run on the beach, the sudden leap for joy. They constitute what it truly means to feel alive -- "the value it contains is immanent in the action. It is not subject to theorizing" (Arnold, 1979, p. 28). Thus, our true selves are actualized in our spontaneous movements.

> To me my spontaneous movements are meaningful. On an ordinary routine day in the stream of experience they are on reflection like shafts of sunlight that express and

> reveal my innermost self. I catch myself out in new, un-thought-out and exciting antics. Spontaneity in movement seems to me to be profoundly human. To suppress and deny it is to curb what it is there in the depth of our beings. Without their comings and goings I doubt if I should ever know myself fully as an animate organism. (Arnold, 1979, p. 28).

Fahey (1977) contends that persons who do not or will not allow themselves to experience the joy and spontaneity of the authentic self, deny their inner reality from becoming an outer reality. This split of the inner from the outer perpetuates the fragmentation in dualism. Furthermore, this split is fundamental to and indicative of some human relations problems. The repression of feelings and needs are the frequent precursors of later physical and mental disorders, since the body encodes both positive and negative emotions (Reich, 1973).

> . . . spontaneity is a function of the "elan vital", and is found in its most flourishing state amongst children, weakened in middle age and progressively blunted in those who suffer from mental disorders. (Porot, cited in Arnold, 1979, p. 27)

In humanistic psychology, which is concerned with "being" and "becoming", spontaneity and creativity are regarded as powerful liberating processes in the self-actualization process (Arnold, 1979). Consequently, spontaneity inherent to the lived body maintains our aliveness and humanity, and seems to have an indirect relationship with our physical and mental well being.

New Inner and Outer Morality

Fahey (1977) contends that the alive, passionate body leads to a new inner morality where the body is valued and revered. The body is acknowledged as having its own inner, primordial wisdom and logic placating the ego for the body. Further, it is characterized by an inner sense of passionate appreciation for the unique insights that allow us to see into our own being. The cornerstone to this new perspective is the intrinsic motivation of experiencing the joy and pleasure of experiential movement. It is grounded in an inner sense of passion which sustains itself. The initial step toward understanding and desiring integration is accepting and placing value on these bodily feelings as worthy, pleasurable, and valid in and of themselves. This is a prerequisite for understanding and releasing the experiential joy inherent in human movement.

During intense moments of fusion between action and thought, subject and object, profound joy is experienced. By necessity, it requires the internal focusing of attention and merging of thought and action on a severely restricted field. Csikszentmihalyi (1983) posits that within this intense contraction, a grand expansion, "an opening out to the basic concerns of the human condition" takes place (Csikzentmihalyi, 1983, p. 373). As one climber said "In this miniature, that one thing (climbing) is a complexity as

great as the whole" (p. 373).

Within these physical-emotional contractions, deep, episodic insights may emerge. They open us to the transcendent dimensions of ourselves and our world around us. They are steeped in awe, and as Heschel (1965) reminds us, it is awe that precedes faith to bring about personal change. Hence these deep flow experiences of unity frequently provide springboards for new personal visions. Oneness experiences exude from this awe and majesty. They open us up, and, according to Csikszentmihalyi, new cultural forms may emerge which lead to new forms of morality. Herzog's testimony captures the significance of these moments:

> In overstepping our limitations, in touching the extreme boundaries of man's world, we have come to know something of its true splendour. In my worst moments of anguish I seemed to discover the deep significance of existence which till then I had been unaware. (Herzog, 1953, p. 12)

These transcendent moments are deeply personal and sometimes spiritual. As a direct consequence, our personal landscapes for being and living are often changed. They frequently lead us to interpret, fuse, and embody them into our everyday lives. In so doing new outer forms of morality may reveal themselves.

Csikzentmihalyi references the work of Huizinga (1939) to support his thesis. Huizinga points out that one of the significant purposes of play is that it facilitates experimental ways of living, from which new ones may emerge. As Huizinga states, "For many years the conviction has grown

upon me that civilization arises and unfolds in and as play" (Huizinga, [1939], 1950, p. 1). The arts, science, law, religions, and government -- all have their historical genesis in playful activity. Once successfully embodied as enjoyable and suitable, these pilot schemes may become accepted and institutionalized into the larger culture. Consequently, lived experiences of oneness or deep flow experiences are like "laboratories" in which new cultural forms and values may be acted out. In their wake, new evolutionary forms of living and morality may evolve.

Intense embodied movement situations go far beyond the immediacy of the joy and pleasure of the moment. Our perceptual world opens our attitude into seeing the world with new lenses filled with awe and wonderment. We internalize the properties and characteristics of these transcendent moments and attempt to generalize them into our outer world. This inner-outer awareness is dialectical and self sustaining, since we constantly search for deeper levels of self-understanding.

Enhancing Human Performance From Within

As Slusher reminds us, most physical educators and coaches recognize that success in sports is more than just "having the horses." There is an element of mystery within the subjective, lived dimension of the body which appears to access and allow for more powerful moments of unity to

"happen." Technique does not access this level or dimension of the body. As a consequence, many professional athletes and coaches are adopting the affective aspects of inner game theory into their training programs. Inner game theory, according to Wertz (1977) is a mixture of Zen, Yoga and common sports psychology. It should be noted that the lived body specifically promotes the intrinsic dimensions of movement, yet it also acknowledges the vital role played by the more objective intervention techniques. Both are deemed essential to the learning process (Gallwey, 1974; Leonard, 1975; Murphy & White, 1978; Ravizza, 1979).

We seem to have overlooked the importance of the affective dimensions of movement. Ravizza (1979) posits that the subjective approach is not only complementary, but also a means of further improving performance. Up until now athletes have had a solitary struggle to reach the integration of mind-body-spirit necessary for zenith moments with their body. Our techniques have become so sophisticated that they push the body to its ulitimate level of performance, wherein the athlete is primarily viewed as an object. It is hardly surprising to observe the increased levels of drugs, and blood doping, that is referenced in the media today. The Len Bias tragedy (Sports Illustrated, June, 1986) symbolizes too well the present state of professional sports. The stress is enormous. Attention to the subjective dimensions of athletes feelings and flow as valid and

integral to performance, offers a means to counteract the alienation that takes place when athletes perceive themselves as objects in the giant machinery of professional sports.

The structure of sport, by the very nature of its rules, facilitates complete focusing, or centering with the task at hand. The paradoxical nature of the rules in sport restrict the participant in order to liberate him. More specifically:

> Each player must keep within prescribed confines, but in such a way that his activities continue to be appropriate. The sonnet's tight demands make the poet call on his reserves; a similar result is produced when a player carries out his role. That role both enriches and limits. It lifts him up into a context of traditions, obligations, and ideals thereby transforming him. (Weiss, 1969, p. 161)

The lived body focuses on self-knowledge; being able to peer into one's own being. It requires consciousness of the process of participation and skill acquistion, as well as developing awareness of the knowledge and insights to be gained about ourselves, others and nature of the sports experience itself (Ravizza, 1979). The significant point in the development of the affective dimensions of the body is that athletes do not have to do anything different with their movement. It simply requires bringing consciousness to movement and developing bodily feelings and sensations <u>during</u> these movements. It focuses on <u>experiencing</u> the movement as opposed to <u>doing</u> the movement.

By focusing on the process and not solely the product, we become more aware of the subjective dimensions. This

awareness opens us up and reveals new human dimensions. Lowen (1970) suggests the following about the significance of awareness.

> Self-awareness is a function of feeling. It is the summation of all body sensations at one time. Through his self-awareness a person knows who he is. He is aware of what is going on in every part of his body; in other words, he is in touch with himself. For example, he senses all other spontaneous or involuntary body movements. But he is also aware of the muscular tensions that restrict his movements, for these too create sensations . . . Not being in touch with his body from within, it feels strange and awkward to him, which makes him feel self-conscious in his expression and movement. (p. 57)

Hence, awareness is an integrated perspective. It is not thinking about movement, but rather an intuitive feeling of both figure and ground, which Ravizza (1979) likened to the non-judgemental awareness of a child. This awareness contributes to enhanced performance in two ways. The first is the development of a philosophical platform, and the second is essentially experiential, as the athlete optimally grasps the lived moment.

The philosophical position <u>grounds</u> athletes as they begin to develop a deeper personal understanding of the meaning and significance of the "whole" movement experience. This meaning helps to sustain many athletes through the arduous training schedules demanded of athletes. Ravizza (1979) cites the case of the swimming captain at the University of Southern California who related that his peak experiences made all the training and effort worthwhile and

meaningful; they sustained him. Subsequently our personal connections with a sport seems to prevent burnout, particularly in younger athletes with less emotional maturity to deal with the ardous demands of competition.

Secondly, awareness also facilitates performance by helping athletes become more totally involved in their movement as it is actually happening. Too frequently the focus is on the end result of the encounter, not the joy from moving. By focusing on the internal bodily feelings the athletes are able to "listen" to their bodies, better able to coach themselves. Skilled, highly sensitized athletes instinctually know when to move, as the following gymnast testifies: "It just feels right . . . my body knows" (Ravizza, 1979). Consequently, the athlete is more in control of both the inner and outer forces of the moving body. For instance, athletes are keenly aware when too much tension is present in certain muscle groups, and sensitive to subtle changes in flow experiences, not only of themselves, but also the changing flow within the contest; they are "tuned in." This new inner morality, where the body is valued, characterizes the existential-phemenological perspective of the lived body.

As noted, when athletes are operating at their peak, they are totally absorbed in the activity. Gerber (1979a) states that in order to achieve this oneness state we cannot be conscious of the elements of our acts, it requires an

element of thoughtlessness, more focused towards an inner goal. Conry (1977) refers to thoughtlessness as a process of disengagement of the self from the ego. The self ultimately endeavours to turn one's mind inward toward the pure embodied consciousness, divorced from the social ego. The trick is to turn inward without falling into the trap of objectifying oneself through thinking about the act.

> . . . to get yourself back into this state of being in the world by simply loosing your mind and coming to your senses (experiencing the joy and passion of the body). You can be reborn into a centered state which manifests itself in the unified actualization of the joy and passion found in being one with your body. Not with your body as an instrument or object but as a work of art continuously in process -- a continuous, on-going, life-giving creation and presentation of your self to the world; a communion of human components with spontaneous joy and passion as the cement. (Ravizza, 1977a, p. 118) [emphasis added]

In order for the process of body unity to occur, and a new inner morality, where the body is valued, a mind-body state that ordinarily places the ego before the body must be reversed. Humans need to let go of the ego, i.e., the rational before the sensual. Any conscious, volitional effort becomes subordinated to an opening up, letting go, and giving oneself to the wisdom of the body. The body as object perpetuates the stronghold position of the ego. Kollen (1983) illustrates simply and poignantly through some of her own thoughts whilst running, how egotistical intrusions inhibit us from being into movement more integrally.

> You are jogging and, for a second, things are perfect. All of a sudden something intrudes . . . The thought

> comes in, "I should be running faster if I want to improve". I wonder how far I've gone and begin to estimate and calculate. I see some people up ahead. I don't want them to think I'm slow. I speed up and quickly become exhausted, and run around a corner so I can stop. I think, "wow!" I'm running well today. Why can't I do this all the time. (p. 91)

As soon as these intrusions come in we are no longer present in the movement. The personal joy "evaporates" and whole movement becomes fragmented. Usurping the role of the ego for the natural integrity and wisdom of the body is a key tenet in inner game theory. According to Wertz (1977), some distinct inherent force, power, or what Herrigel (1971) calls "It" takes over, to create the perfect shot. The body has replaced the ego-mind.

Many articles and books have been written on means to access our inner game potential (Murphy, 1972; Galwey, 1974; Ravizza, 1979; Herrigel, 1952, 1974). It is not within the bounds of this study to offer a full treatise on techniques presently employed; however, an overview of the major ideas inherent to inner game theory will be presented which may be subsequently studied in more depth.

Quieting the mind

Essentially quieting the mind involves one's consciousness to be less consumed with thinking, wishing, or the regretting of a previous movement decision. All these actions inhibit us from being "present" in the movement. Ideally, good shots emerge when the mind is as still as

possible. Within a Zen context, Herrigel states:

> What stands in your way is that you have too much willful will . . .(let) go of yourself, leaving yourself and everything yours behind you so decisively that nothing more is left of you but purposeless tension (1971, p. 51-52).

Ravizza suggests one way to suspend our usual perspective is to modify the familar variables of time, space, flow and force. One or all may be changed. Simply slowing down the movement, or closing off some of the sense perceptors such as the eyes, allow for more kinesthetic feel within movement.

Centering on the Task

Concentration is not sufficient. Centering requires focusing ones's full attention on the movement experience as it is actually happening, like a camera zooming in at close range on its subject. The mind cannot be on the past or future but focused on the direct experience.

> The first thing you have to do is to learn the trick of undivided attention or concentration. By these terms, I mean something quite different from what is ordinarily meant. One "concentrates" on writing a chapter in a book, or on solving problem (sic) in mathematics; but this is a complicated process of dividing one's attention, giving it to one detail after another, judging, balancing, making decisions. The kind of concentration I mean is putting the attention on one object, or one uncomplicated thought, such as joy, or peace and holding it there steadily. It isn't thinking; it is inhibiting thought, except for one thought, or one object of thought (Criswell, in Ravizza, 1977a, p. 104)

Similarly, in action the athlete:

> . . . no longer thinks of his shoes to which and hour ago he gave such attention, he "forgets" the stick that

> supports him . . . He "ignores his body" which he trained. For only by forgetting, in a sense his plans and his body, will be able to devote himself to the laborious task that has to be performed. What there still is, psychologically speaking, is only the mountain: he is absorbed in its structure, his thoughts are completely given to it. (Van Den Berg, 1962, p. 1Ø7)

Thus, the present moment is where athletes optimally act, and the more centered they are with themselves, the more integrated the action. "The present moment is the door to the deeper levels of the sport experience" (Ravizza, 1979, p. 73).

A centered position is a balanced, stable position. From this place a person moves, directs his energy and flows with the movement experience. It provides an anchor from which to move to the outside from a place of strength and not a scattered position within. The natural athlete is one who unconsciously is tuned into this tenuous inner-outer equilibrium point called one's center. Finding one's center is important, for it enables us to live and experience our bodies from a constant space, which in our tumultuous world appears as a comforting haven in which to feel safe and more secure (Ravizza, 1979).

Entering into the Experience

During this phase athletes do not have to force their movement; they simply allow themselves to merge with the action. It requires limited effort. Ravizza (1979) in his research on peak experience, indicated that athletes

frequently "allowed the movement to move them" (p. 73). There was no distinction between the self or the movement. He references a female gymnast who reflected this technique prior to her routine. The gymnast would stare at the apparatus, and gather herself and the apparatus into her center, and when she felt at harmony with herself and the environment, only then, would she initiate her movement. The "It" or force takes over, allowing harmony to "happen."

Thus, inner game theory seriously challenges some of the more conventional methods of skill acquisition. Conventional methodology posits that individuals who take up an activity are to conform to a specific rigid model. For example, one hits a backhand or serve to an external standard. Physical educators need to recognize that we cannot control students' energy for movement. By attempting to control students' movements by conforming to external standard, we alienate the student from embodying the movement as his or her own. As a consequence, movement is sterile and depersonalized. Our role as facilitator is to tap into our students' intrinsic motivation inherent in natural playful movement. Ironically, this was the central tenet of the new physical education movement fifty years ago. Wood and Cassidy were advocating this position as early as the 1920's in their classic text, The New Physical Education. They stated that:

> A rational program of physical education activities must be grounded in the original nature of the human being, and it must provide satisfying expression in vigorous

> action for the wholesome, natural instincts and impulses of children and youth. (1922, p. vii)

According to inner game theory, there is an individual adjustment to skill, rather than the player to the game (Ravizza, 1979). Thus, inner game theory allows for individual differences and accepts the premise that movement belongs to the individual, and that movement is personal. Similarly, Metheny (1968) refers to human movement as the catalyst that links our inner and outer worlds towards more self understanding. Human embodiment, then, is the external manifestation of our inner intentions; it mirrors and manifests our inner and outer reality.

The underlying assumption of the lived body is that athletes are total human beings with cognitive and affective dimensions. The cognitive and affective aspects reflect the inner and outer dimensions of movement. Thus, the extent of success in sports is contingent on how well the inner and outer forces are simultaneously gathered. The moment in which the inner and outer unite, a powerful centering force results. It is during these moments we experience life at its most intense point.

Inner and Outer

Inner Game theory acknowledges the tenuous balance between the inner and outer dimensions of the movement experience. This presupposes that humans must be in touch with and accept the constant interplay of two essential yet

contradictory human energies, the active and irrational, alongside the passive and more rational; they are both mutually complementary. Fahey (1977) contends that the more we can accept the irrational dimension of our being, the more likely we will be able to respond naturally and spontaneously to the whole constellation of movement and life's situations. This is the alive body.

> You can be reborn into a new centered state which manifests itself in the unified actualization of the joy and passion found in being one with your body. Not with your body as an instrument or object but as a work of art continuously in process -- a continuous, on-going, life-giving creation and presentation of your self to the world; a communion of human components with spontaneous joy and passion as the cement. (Fahey, 1977, p. 118)

Our inner, spontaneous, experiential movements are pleasurable and oriented to growth. Other, more regulatory movements may have pleasurable elements, but they are not about growth, rather they are about maintenance. By repressing the inner, spontaneous emotions, we block the natural flow of the body energy. This leads to diminished energy and a loss of feeling in the body; we no longer feel ourselves as vital and as potent, and our self-identity is diminished accordingly.

Outer, more reflective movements reveal the form and definition of our behavior and are more consonant with the social sytems emphasis on control, rationality, and holding back. Human beings need to be able to slide along the experiential-behavioral continuum with ease, able to respond

freely and openly, yet responsibly. This signifies a positive balance outlook for living. There is flow, ease, and consistency between our experiential more spontaneous nature and our behavioral more rational nature. Concomitantly, they support and complement self-identity. They help us center ourselves. As individuals we are more able to embrace our lived moments with enthusiasm and passion, yet we also acknowledge the personal responsibility of our actions.

Inner-Outer as a Continuum

The enemy of whole vision, according to William Blake, is our outer reasoning powers divorced from our inner imagination (Ferguson, 1982). Our half minds are continually making rules and moral judgments, smothering human spontaneity, feeling, and art. As Jaspers (1951) also states the greatest mistake in philosophy is the separation of thought and action. Western thought seems to abide in dualism, a vestige of Newtonian and Cartesian thought.

The lived body in contrast views the body as having inner and outer poles, which exist as one entity. This particular view closely resembles tenets of Zen and Eastern philosophy. A recurring theme in Eastern philosopy is that within unity there is polarity, yet interlocking harmony (Thomas, 1983). The body, in its subjective, prereflective and reflective state, is viewed as embodied with

consciousness and access to the world; there is no distinction between mind and body. Similarly, Zen and the lived body feel the body is the source of experience and self-awareness, where a type of "oneness" is conceivable. Their difference, however, is that Zen views the body as access to spiritual enlightenment, whereas in the lived body the major focus is on self-awareness and consciousness. Consequently, both view polarity as a myth, since the inner and outer dimensions of the psyche are simply polar entities of the same phenomena.

Myth of Polarity

Fahey (1975) suggests that the mind-body dualism is a myth of polarity. He states that polar refers to something that has parts, ends, or extremities that are related and joined to form a single whole. Further, he asserts that polar extremes are inseparable opposites, similar to two sides of a coin. Transposing this perspective to the lived world, it appears that much ambiguity exists, which can be symbolized by the concept "oneness of opposites." Fahey states:

> . . . The supposedly explicit polar opposition of mind and body conceals an implicit unity of the integrated self-body, or person. So it is then that we have a polar and mutually sustaining relationship between two entities considered to be opposed or basically opposite. In reality, as experienced they are the ying and yang of mind-body in perpetual interplay. (1975, p. 62)

According to Merleau-Ponty, ambiguity lies at the heart

of human existence, for rational thought only leads to paradox (Wilber, 1983). He points out that the body is the condition for objects, and the reason the body is not an object lies in its being the condition for objects. This relationship is dialectical. The body and objects are bound together because of their differences and opposed in their mutual dependence. This ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty believes, lies at the heart of human existence (Whitford, 1982). Everything we live or think always has several meanings because the many parts of a phenomenon are not isolated, rather the parts permeate and interpenetrate each other. Ambiguity therefore discloses the intimacy of our relationships in our existence, and is not necessarily negative or limiting.

Harman (1961), a futurist, hypothesizes that there will be a relaxing of the subjective-objective dichotomy (Kleinman, 1976). Harman states that there is a increasing number of scientists with recognized scientific training that are paying more attention to the potential of the intrinsic, more unconscious aspects of the body as potential "keys" to self-realization. Scientists are also seeing loose parallels between the tenets of ancient mysticism and theories in new physics. In the search for the grand unification theory, physicists are turning to ancient wisdoms as possible insights for this breakthrough because they are finding that theories are frequently contained and hidden within a simple

capsule of an ancient wisdoms.

Insight into the potential of our mystical primordial state of our being, paralleled by scientific training, offers humanity exciting possibilities for unfolding more of the essential core of our inner existence. For instance, the "new" physics led by Suzuki (1959), Capra (1982), and others is perhaps the intellectual pioneer in diffusing the subject-object dichotomy. The observer can no longer be separate and objective in observing the universe. This has led to a new view in physics: the role of the participant-observer. Nature and humanity need to be seen as interactive agencies, for each affects the other. The universe is relative and interconnected, not disparate and absolute. The old Newtonian and Cartesian laws of reduction and objectivity upon which much of our knowledge of our world is based are no longer valid.

Physical education still continues to base its rationale on Newtonian and Cartesian dualistic thinking that is absolute. This is no longer appropriate, given the huge knowledge explosion of science. Physics in particular has illuminated the amazing interconnectedness of all living matter, human or other. In so doing, it acknowledges primordial knowing and the instinctive communicative elements which connect seemingly disparate living forms. We are only just beginning to see the possible implications and ramifications of this knowledge shift from absolute existence

to relative existence in everyday life and our physical education curriculum.

Concluding Statement

My major concern is that physical education appears to be turning students off, rather than on to the joy and spontaneity inherent in the lived body. The lived body has a passionate regard for life. Every moment is revered as vital and alive. This passion is probably the fundamental reason why most of us are in physical education today. Instinctually we remember the joy of our childhood days . . . running down a hill as fast, yet as safely as we could . . . being on the edge with one's body. These moments are exhilarating. The profession seems to have forgotten the personal power and significance of these lived moments. Our pedagogy appears to focus on the more objective domains of movement . . . what the movement looks like, techniques to improve performance, critical observation techniques etc. Subsequently, sensations, feelings, and harmony in movement have not been accorded much significance. The lived body is offered as a means to depolarize and heal the the split between the inner qualitative, and the outer more technical dimensions of movement. It is time that we as physical educators finally recognize the responsibility we have to our students. We need to recognize that the goal of physical education is not only technical skill but also personal

meaning. If students find personal meaning in movement, it is more likely they will reach not only more self-understanding and self-awareness, but also develop more joy and reverence for their bodies, and subsequently themselves.

The problem in sport occurs when there is a neglect of the qualitative, perceptual experience in favor of an exclusive emphasis on technical achievement and winning. An athlete's experience of the body continually shifts and flows between consciousness of the quality of the sensory experience and a concern with the technical dimensions. Both are integral to the movement experience; they are not mutually exclusive, but symbiotically entwined. Our continual reliance on the Cartesian dualistic model only serves to perpetuate the split in movement.

We need to re-examine the fundamental principles so thoroughly accepted by our psychology and motor-learning researchers. It has been contended in this paper that the physical and biological laws of Newtonian and Cartesian thought do not apply when endeavouring to understand the nature of lived experiential movement. Another theoretical base is needed. The lived or subject body based on the Merleau-Ponty's works is offered as an alternative theoretical base. This perspective mirrors and is more consonant with the new physics paradigm, from which the lived body draws much of its rationale.

The lived body views the body as one entity. It recognizes the integral connections between the self and the world. The main support for its position rests on the fact that the body is primordially embedded in the world prior to conscious thought, yet it also acknowledges the paradoxical, yet symbiotic, dialectical nature in which the subject exists with the other in the quest for meaning and wholeness. Personal meaning for the lived body arises from subject-object interaction through lived human experience; hence the "other" (object) is deemed a vital and critical element in understanding our humanity. Furthermore, wholeness exists when the "other" is met as a subject, not an object. By meeting the other as a subject the subject-object dichotomy is dissolved, revealing universal harmony and unity.

Inherent in the lived body are the celebratory elements of joy and spontaneity of being alive. By being more present in the moment, movement reveals not only the joy of the body but the joy of life. The body is the means to embrace and celebrate life. Ironically life starts with the body and ends in the body. In between our genesis and exodus we can either choose to celebrate or denigrate life. The lived body offers the key to the celebration of life and each other. Meaning in the lived body lies in the space "in-between" two subjects, when a Thou meets another's Thou. This is the "It" that Herrigel refers to in Zen, or the force that seems to

"happen" in experiential peak moments in sport. There is no distinction between inner and outer, subject and object, just unity and harmony. It is during these moments that we feel a sense of true communion with an entity beyond ourselves. It is during these moments that we experience what it truly means to feel embodied and whole. Our personal quest for wholeness is momentarily complete, as we meet with the eternal Thou; for in the whole is the sacred. This is where the true meaning and significance of physical education lies . . . anything less is dehumanizing.

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