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The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1987

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
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John Bright Mann

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MANN, JOHN BRIGHT, Ed. D. A Phenomenological Inquiry into the Concept of Home 1987 Directed by Dr. Fritz Mengert. 133 pp.

This inquiry considers a coalescence of epistemology and ontology as an initial stage to thinking about the condition of being-at-home-in-a-world. Martin Heidegger's work on existence and being is discussed as a consideration of the relationship between self, world and earth. In addition to a Heideggerian perspective on existence, attention is given to Edmund Husserl and Martin Buber. In particular, Husserl's work with intersubjectivity and Buber's work with relationship as an expression of distance and engagement are considered as a means of expanding Heidegger's thoughts on being in the world.

Ross Mooney's work is then taken up as a way to consider engagement with the world as an intentional act of poetic thinking. Mooney's model of an infinity sign is discussed as the flow into the world of poetic thinking. Poetic thinking as preliminary to expression through scientific thinking is discussed as a matching or fitting between "me" and "world". The works of Rainer Maria Rilke are discussed as evidence of poetic thinking. The intersection of Mooney's infinity sign is understood as the act of intentionality in which a division between self and world occur. A "twisting" of the uni-verse into the flow of Mooney's infinity sign is considered first as the initial separation

from the womb at birth. The separation is then discussed as an existential

search for home through the matching of inner and outer worlds.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO INQUIRY

Much of the contemporary discourse on alienation and the loss of community centers on issues that can generally be described as grounded within a socio-political context. As such, these arguments are acceptable in their appraisal of alienation from the dynamics of class, race, sex, and other constructs of social inquiry. However, these appraisals are unsatisfactory in their failure to consider the construction of the context qua World as a unique and peculiar phenomenological problem. By excluding a discussion of the constitution, development, and maintenance of a world-view, the discourse is unable to consider fundamental areas of concern. As a result of the taking of the world as a given, a phenomenological inquiry into the formative roles of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity is dismissed. With this dismissal, what I believe to be powerful and thematic existential issues are omitted from an appraisal of contemporary alienation.

Alienation, when considered within a socio-political metaphor and expressed in terms of oppression and repression attempts to account for the estrangement of "individual" from "group". Taking this individual/group

relationship as the reference or focal point for understanding alienation fails to account for deeper and more personal issues of a "making my-self at home" in the world. A thorough search for an explication of alienation does not begin with an exhibition of social conditions predisposed to the construction and maintenance of alienation. The search begins with an explication of the constitution of the world-view, and, with the consciousness of such a view. A "homing in the world", as an expression of this consciousness, can begin to inform an understanding of being-lost-in-the-world as an expression of the estrangement of epistemology and ontology. To be lost in the world, expressed as: "I do not know how it is that I came to be here", can begin an inquiry into a dis-placement, a sense of estrangement from the real.

Dis-placement from the real may involve not only the self-perception of a dislocation from the world but also the realization of the condition of being dis-placed. Realization of the condition includes a more complex form of estrangement in which the individual realizes he is realized as "stranger". The complexity may be the result of a prior estrangement. Estrangement, as being realized as dis-placed, may be the condition in which the individual always "finds" him-self. As a result, the estrangement is made more

profound in that "I" can only "find my-self" as lost, or, as homeless. Being

realized as homeless involves the objectification of self by the surrounding

world as the Other/s. The surrounding quality of this world assumes the

qualities of a hostile rather than a welcoming, or, benign environment.

Rather than finding my-self as the center of a world, "I" find my-self at the

center of the world which is at least inhospitable. As "object of" rather than

"subject to", "I" am dis-located from a position in which "I" can negotiate

events and from the negotiation construct a world. Later, I will look at how

this "being realized" as homeless may be explained as a fundamental

element of being-at-home in the world. By comparing the realization of

being-lost with Husserl's ideas of inter-subjective social ontology

(particularly "de-centering"), the relationship between self and world as a

dynamic process of coming-to- know can be developed.

Reality, understood as a subjective and coherent construction of

experiences, depends upon meaning to establish connections between the

person and his or her World. While the phrase "coherent construction" may

appear redundant at first glance, it is not. The degree of coherence within

this construction of experiences varies with the degree of personal

meaning-making at the moment of experience. Construction, in this sense,

involves more than the assemblage of one event to the "next". While this assemblage is important, construction also indicates the internal construction of an event. Beginning with the selection of an event through attendance-to, the event "happens" as it is internally correlated wit'. experiences. As the event is made to make sense, that is, co-related with what has made sense in the past, the event is then fashioned for assembly. A "filling of the moment with experience" is only possible to the degree that a personal connection is established with that moment. A partial to complete loss of the moment, as a function of a partial or complete loss of subjective involvement, can be understood first as an initial loss of World.

More critical, however, is the way in which this initial momentary loss leads to an increased loss of moments. With each failure of personal investment within a moment, the potential for investment within the subsequent moment is diminished. Meaning-making is important as the connection between individual and moment. In this way, the singular connection of individual and moment, as an event, becomes potentially thematic and sequential. Events, interpreted as sequential and made meaningful because of the implicit order of sequence, take on the additional significance of progressive time. The significance of the moment is the

potential for cumulative, personal meaning-making. As cumulative and personal, the moment as moment allows for "me" to become thematic or universal through "my" live. The duration of that theme is dependent upon an understanding of each moment as a consequence of "me" and "my meaning. By being at the moment, "I" am able to construct and maintain an analogy between what is personal and what is universal. As Kant writes,

> We require an underlying ground which exists at all times, that is something abiding and permanent, of which all change and coexistence are only so many ways (modes of time) in which the permanent exists.

Without the additional meaning provided though sequence, the individual becomes progressively dis-engaged from world in both how he knows and what he knows. As a falling "out of sync", this loss suggests the possibility for progressively greater loss of moments through a repeated and cumulative lack of subjective construction.

External and public contributions, for example from the realm of "common sense", may be seen as oppositional or even antagonistic to a personal construction of reality. When the "common" of common sense indicates selective distribution, the concept itself can be understood as antagonistic to personal, subjective meaning-making. To the degree that "common" indicates group, non-negotiable consensual "sense", it may also

indicate minority or less significant meaning. The power of this type of common sense comes from its ability to assign value to consensual knowledge and, at the same time, de-mean personal knowledge as dis-sensual and of less significance to the group. The assignment of less significant meaning may also have a further effect on "place" or "position" in the world. The less significant "my" meaning, the less involvement or negotiation between "me" and "world". It is paradoxical that this type of "common sense" relies upon non-common or selective distribution and appropriation to maintain its own significance.

In fact, the potential for failing to acquire common sense, even the notion of "acquisition" of common sense, indicates the need for an un-common distribution of common sense. Heraclitus' notion of "what is common to all" suggests an interpretation of what is "common" that is more universal than the above. In his understanding, what is common to us all is a need for meaning. We need meaning and often share this need through community. Suggesting that common sense may or may not be acquired, as in the first example, provides for the concept of "non-sense" and renders alienation a function of common sense. While consensual common sense is not necessarily threatening to a subjective construction of memory, the

potential for overpowering an establishment of inter-subjective reality through resistance of personal investment is a critical consideration.

On the other hand, contributions from the "outside", (whether through personal conversation or from public common sense), are integral as the "stuff" for an inter-subjective construction. The inter-subjective construction of reality, as a profound act of balance between "me" and "world", can be understood as a thematization of daily experiences. Experience, as fragments for a construction of reality, can be broadly understood here as either consonnant or dis-consonnant with prior experience.

Perception as an interpretation of consonnance will be a significant consideration for this study. When meaning, as the glue connecting daily life experiences fails, and each experience can be seen only as random and beyond personal manipulation, the condition can be defined as un-real. An apparent randomness of experiences, lacking the cohesion and consistency provided by "me" through thematic personal meaning, results in a meaning-less world. Because of its meaningless-ness, the world becomes, for "me", un-real. Unable to either extract or inject my-self into the world it becomes necessary to separate self and world with the assignment of "un-reality". In this way, the relationship of "me" and world becomes unreal.

"I" am unable to make sense out of the world, or, to make a world out of senses. Disabled by the failure to make sense "I" finally see my-self as not making sense to the world. As a result, the relation between "me" and "world" becomes a more complex triadic relation between "world", "I", and "my-self".

The "I" and the "my-self", are distinguished in their relations with "world" and, as such, in disagreement. When "I" perceive "my-self" as not making sense to the world, "I" am perceiving a difference between the relations of "I"-"world" and "my-self"-"world". As a form of estrangement, being-lost-in-the-world, can be understood as the expression: "This world is not real to me", and, "I am not real to this world." To be at home in the world can begin to inform an understanding of a consciousness conscious of the constituent elements of being-in-the-world. Being-at-home, from this perspective, can move us toward an understanding of "knowing how it is that I come to know I am here".

A search for a dis-covery of Home as a coalescence of epistemology and ontology is likely to be found in a coalescence of a representative question from these two domains of thought. As a "growing together", a coalescence of these two questions results in an expression of co-relation(s).

A representative epistemological question-"How is it that I have come to know?", and, a representative ontological question-"What is it that I take to be real?", cannot be joined as-"How is it that I come know what I take to be real?- with the hope for an expression of coalescence. "How is it that I come to know what I take to be real?", retains an epistemological base and so precludes the possibility for an explication of coalescence. Coalescence, as a growing together, does not rest on the simple accumulation of these two domains. A coalescence of epistemological and ontological inquiry can be understood as a distillation from the two domains.

An understanding of a coalescence of the ontological and epistemological positions begins with a coalescence of representative questions, through a gathering together of the two positions. This gathering together, supplies what Heidegger calls "memory" and serves as the re-membering which leads to a consciousness called "home". An exploration for "home", where "exploration" is understood as a "calling-out", becomes a transcendence of both domains through the dis-covery of "home". Transcendence, as a surpassing, expresses the release of this exploration. The distinction of two questions is surpassed and subsequently abandoned in exchange for a single type of questioning which is expressed here as "home".

In the questioning "home" is conceptualized as a transcendental objective and explicated from a perspective of transcendent-towards. As the demarcation between these two questions collapses and leads to a singular investigation, the emergence of a consciousness without an object results. The submergence of this demarcation suggests an attempt for the establishment of a reciprocal, monothematic understanding.

The questioning within this transcendence seeks a common sense between the two domains and rests on a fundamental derivation. It is that derivation which serves as an impetus for the ex-ploration, as the "imploration" of the exploration. In looking for the fundamental derivation, the search becomes an evocation of "home".

As a metaphorical coalescence of the epistemological and the ontological, "home" rests in the explication of two questions- "How is it that I come to know what it is which I take to be real?", and, "Where is it that I come to know what it is which I take to be real?". The exploration for a coalescence is a search for "sameness" of thought within these two positions. Surpassing the boundaries of the two spheres of epistemology and ontology by outlining the intra-spherical sameness, the exploration can be seen as a phenomenological inquiry into the dualisms created by epistemological and

ontological investigations. It may be that various elements of these positions can be understood through the metaphor of home as being mutually and reciprocally co-existent. This co-existence of elements within each domain will be examined for their contributions to the existential condition of being-at-home.

As an "outlining" of the epistemological and ontological positions, the inquiry is circumspective and it is this quality which suggests the underlying evidence of the phenomenological impulse. An investigation of beginnings, of a search for fundamental derivation is a response to a call for a return to place, a coming home. As such, the exploration involves an examination of home as a metaphor for the problem of being in the same position for the first time. It involves, among other elements, an inquiry into how it is we come to know something as un-familiar. How is it that we can "come to know" in the sense that "coming to" seemingly must require identification through objectification of the thing we are directed towards. We must first re-cognize the object of our attention as "object". In the re-cognition, the "knowing" of an un-familiar object must be an expression of likeness between the yet to be known object and an object already "known". In other words, the un-known object must be referenced to known object. At what

point is the "knowing" "knowing enough"? At what point is the object,

"known" as un-familiar or without reference? could this point of "knowing"

and "knowing enough" be a place of coalescence within epistemology and

ontology? It may also be that "knowing" and "knowing enough" are

determined by the personal relevance or meaning in a particular moment.

"Knowing" or "knowing enough" may be expressions of what "I" "need to

know" for where "I" am in the world. As Alfred Schutz writes,

> The world seems to him at any given moment as stratified in different
> layers of relevance, each of them requiring a different degree of
> knowledge.

An investigation of "coming to" (know) involves the distinction between the

familiar/un-familiar. A "making distinct" of the familiar and the un-familiar

requires consideration of the concept of intentionality. As a "directing

towards", intentionality can be understood as attending to the familiar and,

in so doing, setting out the un-familiar. Intentionality, as an attending to the

familiar, "makes" familiar, or, "familiarizes" a world from what is less

familiar. By making familiar, rather than taking to be familiar, intentionality

includes a sense of constructive adaptation in which "my" potential world

conforms to "my current" world up to the moment of "my" intention.

Bringing "my" world to the world surrounding me, "I" can match what has

been familiar with the world now presented to me. In so doing, "my" world continues as the absorption of the world around me.

The fundamental questions for this inquiry will be the questions which can express this conceptualization. Because the questions must produce a gathering of thought, a re-membering, they are questions leading to memory. Because they must express a surpassing of both positions they are transcendental. What questions lead to a union of place and thought, resulting in an expression of position? What questions show the way to an understanding of the meaning of "home" as a metaphorcial coalescence of place and thought?

A context for home

Martin Heidegger's formal structure for questioning informs the exploration: what is sought is, first, a context for home; what is interrogated is the coming together of epistemology and ontology; and what is to be found is a meaning for home in so far as being-at-home can be understood as an expression of consonnance. Here it is emphasized that this being-at-home, this consonnance is mis-construed if it is understood as finite and somehow lethargic. Being-at-home can be understood as a position-taking through the

re-cognition of the realization of "place". As such, the position is dynamic

and precarious, subject always to the demands of balance. To explicate the

preceding it is necessary to seek a context for home; to seek a coalescence

between the domains of epistemology and ontology; and, to apprehend a

meaning for home.

For a groundwork, this explication of a context for home begins with

an exhibition of various relationships. Context, from "contextere" (to weave

together) is understood as an inter-weaving of a variety of relationships

which can lead to an elaboration of the context. What is at question is the

synthesis of the context for home. What are the constituent relationships for

the synthesis of a context for home? Relationships of this synthesis include

the relationships of the familiar and the un-familiar, and, the Here and the

There. By way of an examination of these relationships, a constitution of

World and how this constitution relates to an exploration of home will also

be examined [as revealed in the transcendental inter- subjectivity of

Edmund Husserl (especially in the Fifth Meditation of the Cartesian

Meditations) and in Martin Heidegger's analysis of "being-in-the-world"

(especially in his analysis of the Parmenides' fragment in "Poetry, Though,

and Language")]. Through an examination of the relationships of the

familiar/un-familiar and the Here/the There, close inspection of the role of exclusion will be discussed.

Exclusion will be examined, from this perspective, as a determination action for both of these relationships (familiar and unfamiliar and Here and There). That is, exclusion can be understood as an underlying formative action for each of these relationships. Just how and with whom a structure for what is taken to be familiar is constructed, as well as how familiarity endures and persists, will be a focal point for this exploration. Likewise, the relationship between Here and There will be investigated through a discussion of the contextual concept of exclusion. The dynamics involving either the coming to be or the going from being of each of these relationships, will be examined from a temporo-spatial perspective. From this perspective, any perseverance of a context for home will be investigated as explication for a being-at-home as an existential response to the Heraclitean concept of flux. Understood in this way, contributions from the relationships of the familiar/un-familiar and the Here/the There to a context for home will be examined for their contributions towards a sense of temporo-spatial stabilization.

As such, home, as a consciousness, can be explicated as a relational

condition between the countervening elements of outer world and the interior of the epoche, and, between time and space. Understood in varying degrees of "fixity" or stabilization, "home" can be examined for the possibility of an existential hesitation as an arrest of time and the concretization of place. Hesitation should not be understood here as a "freezing" of the world, but, rather, the "freezing" of a segment of a world through the concept of appresentation. Volatile from both time and space considerations, "freezing" a world represents a transformation of the world through the development of inter-subjectivity. By "holding" a segment of the world "still", the possibility for inter-subjective meaning is enhanced. "You" and "I", through the establishment of an inter-subjective experience, are able to agree upon a world now held still before us.

Holding the world still can be seen both as a pre-condition and a product of inter-subjectivity. As pre-condition, holding the world still represents an intial stage for the possibility of inter-subjective experience. Before "you" and "I" can begin to "know" what we can "know" of a world, we must first agree to hold a world still. In doing so, "we" dis-place our-selves from the world in order to co-inhabit a world. Through the dis-placement we can begin to examine "our" world by exchanging "our" positions relative

to "our" frozen world. As a product, through the exchange of relative

positions, "our" world becomes a medium for inter-subjective experience

until "you" and "I", for whatever reasons, exhaust that world in terms of

"our" coming to "know" one another through it. As an intentional

circumspectual action, based on exclusion, this perspective concentrates on

the construction and the structural integrity of a placement within time and

space. Hesitation can be compared with "piece and moment" as the relational

and non-relational "evidences" of experience, and, with "presence-at-hand"

and "readiness-at- hand". How experiences come to be categorized from the

Husserlian and the Heideggerian perspectives is likely to enhance the

exploration of home.

A coalescence of epistemology and ontology

Experience, for this discussion, will provide a forum for ontological and

epistemological contributions to "home". Looking at the ways in which

epistemological and ontological thought relate to the construction and

maintenance of experiences, initiates a discussion of the familiar/the

un-familiar as well as the Here and the There. "How is it that I come to

know what I take to be real?" suggests a questioning of the role played by

familiarity towards the make-up of reality. With this assumption, the questioning goes on to determine the role of position (as the Here and the There) towards the construction of reality. In short, how does thinking and the construction of reality bring us to the concept of "home" and how does this concept serve the thinking/construction process?

The relationship betwen the familiar and the un-familiar is critical to a determination of "home". An "everyday" understanding of home naturally links home with familiarity, with a sense of ease. Home, understood as domestic tranquility, is not the issue. What is at issue is the way in which "home" enables or dis-ables experience. In what ways does "home", as a context for determining familiarity, allow for or preclude the "filling of a moment with experience"?

A "familiarization" of the world can be seen from several perspectives including a process of deduction. As I familiarize the world I "sample out" those elements of experience which I can associate with prior experience. By regarding only what I take to be familiar, I designate anything "alien" and familiarization becomes a process of a narrowing of experiences. Paradoxically, with each "new" experience, my experiences are decreased. Each "new" experience is "less new" than the previous one within previous

contexts. With continual sampling, with continual association, the "run-off" of experience is increased. As "my" experiences increase during the passage of time, "my" experiencing of the experience also decreases.

"Familiarization" of a world can also be seen as an initial stage in the process leading to an estrangement between "me" and the world. From this perspective, familiarization is a pre-condition to un-famliarization. In other words, to "know something as un-familiar" it is necessary that "I" first come to know it as familiar. Conversely, canI know something only as un-familar? In this way, familiarity is seen as a mediative stage for a becoming un-familiar with a world.

Therefore, familiarity becomes an essential element for asking what is it that we can know? what is it that we cannot know? and, what is it that is called reality? By looking at the relationship between familiarity and un-familiarity as a transitional process, the phrase "coming to know" can be made clearer. "Coming to know", from this perspective, is understood as a transition through the distance of not-knowing to knowing. By informing the metaphor with images of transition and distance, the process of "coming to know" can be compared with becoming. Just as the confluence of non-being and being presents a condition of becoming, "coming to know" presents a

confluence of not-knowing and knowing. As I "come to know" I metaphorically travel through the relationship of familiarity to un-familiarity. By this progression, "I" act as mediator between the two, "I" connect the two, and, in so doing, "I" construct a relationship. As a result, becoming progressively less familiar with a world is understood as a "setting off" of a world which I am "coming to know".

Implications for the "here" and the "there" rest on the previous understanding of "un-familiarization". Understanding familiarization as a constituent element of a "homing of a world" grounds the here/there relationship by considering the elements of distance and transition. Distance and transition of that distance between the familiar and the un-familiar informs an understanding of a "coming to know". Distance and the transition of that distance can also assist in an understanding of the relationship between the here and the there. To what extent does the assignment of familiarity help determine the positions of the here and the there? How are varying degrees of "hereness" or "thereness" an indication of varying degrees of familiarity? And, to what extent is there an extension of here as a projection of familiarity? The statement "I am here in the world" is a statement of the position here referenced to some potential position, "There."

It is only through the potential for travel and distance provided by the "there" that "I" can be "Here". Without some-place else (There), "I" cannot be in place (Here). "My" familiar-Here can be so only in relation to "my" un-familiar There. Tension lies in the need to "know" the un-familiar as familiar which could be the threshold from the "I" know the un-familiar as familiar. That, in turn, could provoke a dis-integration of the here-there relationship. In such case "knowing enough" is not "knowing too much" of the un-familiar and in so doing, making it familiar. Familiarization may lead to the transfer of the "there" to the "here" until "I" am only at "here". By losing the possibility of movement and space provided by "there", my "here" becomes static.

An investigation of the here and the there does not conclude with a demonstration of relationship based on distance and transition. Here and there can also serve the discussion as expressions of time. Understanding "I am here" as "I am here (now)", and, "I (was), or (will be) there" provides an opportunity to consider time and experience. Positing "hereness" as a condition of a present-time experience with a high degree of familiarity; and, "thereness" as a condition of a past or future time experience with a lesser degree of familiarity, presents an additional relationship of distance and

transition. Having established a "coming to know" as dependent upon a "setting off of a world", does the there stand as the "place" of "coming to know"? Can I be-at-home when I was or will be There? If I am to be-at-home must I also be out of time (ecstatic)?

This discussion will also include a look at the relationship between poetic and scientific thought. Specifically, in what ways do poetic thought and scientific thought predict and consequently construct their respective world reality? As "constructors" of reality, each type of thought understands a particular subjective relationship with a world. Poetic thought, as a transformation of the world, overtly targets what is taken to be real as challenge for transformation. What is taken to be real, as in the transition from familiar to un-familiar, implies "taking to be" in an intentional sense. The relationship between what is taken to be real and poetic thought, is an intentional expression understood as a step within a process of transformation. The poetic "charge" is to refute what is taken to be real and provide for construction of a transformed world.

Scientific thought, however, begins with what is taken to be real, as a basis for experience. World, as a receptacle for the accumulation of experience, provides environment for a coming to know itself reflexively.

Categorization, for scientific thought represents a critical concept in which experience can be co-related with prior experience as "similar". Similarity, as a significant means for systematic accumulation of experience, is made possible by categorization. As a referential system, categorization provides not only a basis for accumulation but a vehicle by which experiences can be arranged. Scientific thought will be explored as an expression of poetic thought and the degree to which this expression is enjoyed through structure based upon categorization.

A meaning for home

A large body of literature including aphorisms, parables, folk-tales, and cliches is specifically concerned with the concept of home. Despite this attention to the concept, a meaning for "home" remains illusive and ill defined. Investigating the literature, especially the cliches related to home, may provide a basis for understanding how we understand "home". By maneuvering various cliches, whether in the spoken language, or, by a transposition of words in the written form, something more than a "word game" may emerge.

If carefully considered, expressions such as "homeward bound" or

"feeling at home" reveal the illusory and diverse nature of home coupled with a resistance to specific definition. I am suggesting that the variety of meanings and cliches related to home may express a common set of themes. These themes are not easily identified as their commonality may be the result of the meaning of the meaning of home. What these cliches may share is an attempt not to define home as a specific condition but to reveal the "why" of home. Why "home"? Why the curiosity for the concept of "home"? While the clear offerings of shelter and protection are pertinent to the human need, they represent only one side of the concept. For every image of safe-keeping and shelter there are equally poignant images associated with the need to leave home. Are there times and places in which it is necessary to not be-at-home in the world? Does a necessity for not being-at-home-in-the-world have implications for the condition of loneliness? Are there times and places in which relationships with other people exist, as a result of not-being-at-home?

As a statement of "my" place in the world, is it possible that being-away-from-home is necessary to the concept of "home" itself? Being-away-from-home is not an equivalent condition to being-lost-in-the-world. Being-away-from-home implies a tethered relationship with"home".

When "I" am away-from-home, "I" am in a place relative to the "where" of

"home". It is likely that one element of being-in-the-world contributed by

the concept of "home" is the provision for a tangential encounter with "my"

world by serving as a kind of place-marker for the "me". The amount of

"my" "at-homeness" in the world allows for "my" exploration of the world.

The safety of "my" return is assured by the stability of the place as home.

From this perspective, the "why" of "home" is at least partially explained by

the necessity for the un-familiar as a parameter for the familiar. As a place-

marker for "me", "my here" is held while "I" approach there. The approach

to there is allowed by the ability to abandon, without fear of loss, "my here".

"Home", in that case, allows "me" to mediate the here and the there, the

familiar and the un-familiar and serves as the envelope for these

mediations. The travel from here to "there" is not only an exploration of

"world" by "me". While the "there" provides a place of the un-familiar it also

is the place for the Other/s. As Husserl writes,

> As relexively related to itself, my animate bodily organism has the
> central here as its mode of givenness; every other body, and
> accordingly the "other's" body, has the mode "There".

Unconditionality is a critical consideration to "home" as place-marker

while "I" encounter the un-familiar. "My" encounter with the un-familiar is

made less threatening, and therefore more likely, by the unconditional provision for return and acceptance offered through the concept of "home". As a holding place for "me", "I" can travel out, leaving "me" at home. In a sense, home keeps the "me" that is "me" up to here and now safe while "I" attend to the un-familiar that is There. "Home", to serve as place-marker for "me" must, among other things, endure, remain constant, and provide exclusion. Permanence, or the potential for permanence, is provided by the notion that"home" is always available, unchanged, and here for "me". Exclusion is used here as a critical element of belonging. The extent to which "I" belong is based at least in part on the extent to which some Other/s is excluded. If "belonging" is to have value, it must provide membership and the potential for not belonging or exclusion. It is only through the possibilty that "I" may not belong that belonging can be. As the place-marker for "me", "home" provides a place of return which is always accepting.

It is paradoxical that the permanence of unconditionality may be most important in providing a reference point to experiences with the un-familiar. Each tangential encounter can be interpreted through and by the constancy of "home". Whether, as a result of "my" excursions into the un-familiar, "home" must also change will be discussed at a later point in the

discussion. It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that unconditionality, to be unconditional, can also be taken as change.

As an approach to the "why" of home, consideration will be given to "home" in relation to loneliness. More specifically, I will consider how "home" and "loneliness" inform one another and how each concept provides a demarcation within the world. Just as being-away-from-home is a place-taking relative to the "where" of "home", loneliness can be understood as a mode of being-in-the-world relative to belonging. Being-alone, as a relative expression to being-with, depends upon the unconditionality of "home". As "home" enables "my" mediation of the familiar and the un-familiar, it also eanbles "my" mediation of being-with and being-alone.

A "homing of a world", when considered as a consciousness in response to loneliness, becomes a significant and poignant expression. The poignancy is due, in large apart, to the tension cause by the question of loneliness. Perhaps by looking at home through loneliness, a mode of being-at-home-in-the-world can be seen through varying degrees of pathos. Pathos, an expression of suffering, recognizes the existential condition of loneliness as a form of being-in-the-world. Re-cognition of the common loneliness of man provides for the re-cognition of the suffering of others. In

fact, it may be that the re-cognition of existenial loneliness provides for the recognition of the Other/s.

The extent to which "I" experience "my own" suffering may profoundly inform "my" understanding the Other as an-other among others, like "me", alone. From an anti-pathetic to an em-pathetic to a sym-pathetic involvement, each degree expresses a different position-taking in relation with a world. Each brings with it a different mode for expression of "being present at what happens to us". Each provides a specific way of coming to terms with the coming to terms with loneliness. By encountering the world in a particular way each perspective may bring clarity to a consciousness in response to loneliness.

As a way of being-in-the-world, these degrees of pathos are not individual and specific models. They indicate reference points along a continuum of involvement with a world which also includes an a-pathetic dis-involvement with the world. The varying degrees of pathos also offer an additional perspective on the tangential excursions into the un-familiar discussed earlier. By plotting an excursion over a continuum of pathos, it may be possible to understand the exploration of the un-familiar as a reaching out into the world that is enabled or disabled by the degree of

pathetic involvement at each moment of the venture. It may be that the excursion is prompted by a sym-pathetic involvement with the world and the incursion prompted by the diminishment of sym-pathy towards anti-pathy.

By looking at expressions such as "homeward bound" and considering both a usual interpretation as well as a more unusual interpretation, a relationship may develop between what "we think we mean" and "why we thought it needed to be said". It may be that neither "what we think we meant" or "why we thought it needed to be said" is as singularly important to "home" as the difference between the two. The discrepancy between "meaning" and "what was meant" may be understood as an expression of intention, or, "what I think I meant to say". "Homeward bound" as a declaration of "I am finally homeward bound" is generally considered as an expression of the happiness associated with a departure from the un-familiar and a return to more familiar surroundings. It is difficult to consider "homeward bound" as an expression of regret or of fear.

However, as a perspective on loneliness, "homeward bound" can be thought of as a "binding to home", as a sense of restraint. It may be that

"homeward bound" "means" a binding to, as an expression of "I cannot leave". "I cannot leave" can be seen as a reluctance to leave because of a fear of loneliness, an anxiety towards being-away-from-home. As an expression of the anxiety of loneliness, "homeward bound" discloses an insulation, a timidity for encounter. A "homing of the world" is finalized by the segregation of "home" and "world". Rather than integrating "me" and "world" or "what is inside" and "what is outside", a balance-between is replaced by a distinction-between.

As a statement of condition, "homeward bound" expresses an inevitable continuation of isolation. "I" am always already "homeward bound". The debilitizing effects of the anxiety of loneliness are enhanced by each refusal, with each failure to release. By "staying at home", a relationship with the world becomes frozen on a foundation of anxiety and dread. As a "homing of world", the world, in that case, is distinguished form "home" through the boundaries set by fear and alienation. By preventing an encounter with isolation "home" becomes a consciousness establishing a condition of loneliness.

CHAPTER II

THE EXISTENTIAL CONDITION OF BEING

To understand loneliness as an existential condition necessary for a homing of the world it is important to first look at the question of existence-to ask how we are in the world. By looking at Martin Heidegger's concept of Being, especially his concepts of "thrownness" and "intentionality" and then comparing these with Martin Buber's I-Thou relationship and Edmund Husserl's thoughts on intersubjectivity, loneliness can be understood as a critical component of being-in-the-world.

Heidegger's concept of Being, by definition is illusive. As beings in the world we are always already here, in the midst of being. As Heidegger writes, "To enter into what is said in the phrase "being is" remains uncommonly difficult and troublesome for the reason that we are already within it" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 174). What we are "in", Being, is explained by Heidegger as follows:

> You can, as it were, smell the Being of this building in your nostrils. The smell communicates the Being of this thing (Seiende) far more immediately and truly than any description of inspection could ever do... But do we see Being as we see color and light and shade? Or do we hear, smell, taste, feel Being? We here the motorcycle racing

through the street. We hear the grouse gliding through the forest. But actually we hear only the whirring of the motor, the sound the grouse makes. . . wherein consists Being. . .? A heavy storm coming up in the mountains is. . .wherein consists its Being? A distant mountain range under a broad sky. . . It is. (Waterhouse, 1981, p. 8).

To understand existence, for Heidegger, is to begin with the Question of Being. The question can be understood as an expression of the relationship between "me" and Being. It is only as an interrogation of the relationship itself that the question of Being can come to light and provide for the "unconcealment" of Being. Relationship, understood as mutual and reciprocal, depends upon the participation of both members. The members of a relationship must turn toward one another as mutual contributors so that the resultant context can be explained. It is, for Heidegger, the context of Being, constituted by the participation of both "me" and Being, which calls it into question. To interrogate the question of Being from either the standpoint of "me" or from the Being implies the relationship of the constituent other. Heidegger writes, "When we say "Being", it means "Being of beings". When we say "being", it means "beings in respect of Being. We are always speaking within the Duality" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 227).

By basing any interrogation of existence upon an explication of either element and not concentrating instead on the context created by the relationship, contemporary man fails to think. Heidegger's explication of

Parmenides leads to the following description of thinking: "It is useful to let-lie-before us and so the taking-to-heart also: beings in being" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 223). This leads to Heidegger's assertion that the question of Being can only be approached by a revitalized thinking that does not bifurcate world into the Self and Being but rather considers the relationship of the two and their constituent roles within this relationship. Karsten Harries writes, "If one had to use the language of subject and object, it would be more correct to identify mean's being with the relation holding between subject and object than with either subject or object" (Murray, p. 68). Critical to the relationship between "me" and Being is the reciprocal and mutual need each has for the other. Just as "I" need Being in order to be, Being needs "me", "wants to be thought", in order that Being might continue.

To begin to think this relationship, for Heidegger, requires a "step back" from traditional metaphysics which failed to think the question of being. The failure to think the question is more than a presupposition of the answer on the part of contemporary man. For Heidegger, contemporary man fails even to remember the question. By failing to remember, man fails in the gathering together of himself in being. In the "everydayness" in which man find himself more and more, the failure to ask the question

progressively becomes a failure to remember to ask. Thinking becomes

more and more, as the poet Novalis wrote, "the dream of a feeling that has

been long ago forgotten."

Referred to by Heidegger as the "neglect" of the question of Being, the

neglect leads contemporary man further from a sense of being-in-the-world

by failing to account for what is most fundamental---"my" relationship with

Being. By failing to pose the question and, instead, proceeding "as if" an

answer had been formulated, man, in his everyday conversation fails to

consider his own Dasein---his being-there-in-the-world. The "as if" of

contemporary man becomes so pervasive that the continuation of the

presupposition of an answer further precludes the articulation of the

question of being. Contemporary man, through neglect, so ignores the

original question of being that the possibility for recovery grows profoundly

difficult---"Perhaps even the alternative is no longer a genuine one"

(Heidegger, 1985, p. 131). These "destitute times" are so by virtue of man's

failure to think Being. Neglect of the question of being can be understood as

a dis-integration of the relationship between "me" and the Being.

"Dis-integration", understood as a breakdown of fundamental connections,

becomes both a cause for and a result of the inability of contemporary man

to think Being. The destitution of the day is the apparent inability of man to re-connect with Being and to realize what Heidegger refers to as "fundamental ontology".

The thoughts of Martin Buber on relationship include two critical and co-dependent actions---the "primal setting at a distance" and "entering into relation". As co-dependent elements for the establishment of relationship these actions are helpful in considering the thoughts of Heidegger on the neglect of the question of Being. While Buber's concepts are directed toward the establishment of an intersubjective relationship as the "between" of men, they can be useful when applied to Heidegger's discussion of man and Being. Buber writes,

> ...man is, or can be, in the world as a dweller in an enormous building which is always being added to, and to whose limits he can never penetrate---for he is capable of grasping the wholeness of the building as such. Man is like this because he is the creature (Wesen) through whose being (Sein) "what is" (das Seinde) becomes detached from him, and recognized for itself (Buber, 1965, p. 61).

It is this notion of "setting at a distance", understood as a positing, which furnishes insight into Heidegger's arguments for the breakdown of the relationship. The Being needs man and man needs Being.

The context of relationship is dependent upon this correlation and co-dependency of man and Being. The need of each, informed by the

Buberian notion of relationship, provides the question of Being with the critically important element of "place". "My" positing of Being and Being's positing of "me" require one another and further, each is required to be posited, to be positioned, some-where. Through the relationship, Being and "I" provide each other with "place". Buber writes, "Certainly in order to be able to go out to the other you must have a starting place, you must have been, you must be, with yourself" (Buber, 1965, p. 21).

It is important to stress here that this "setting at a distance", as one element in the construction of relationship, does not revert to an explication or articulation of one member of the relationship over and against another. The "setting at a distance" does not suggest a separateness of one over another. For Heidegger, "I" am separate from Being in order to provide the relationship. It is the "difference" which essentially constitutes relationship. A relationship as an expression of "difference" is founded on the notion of belonging. Heidegger points out, however, that belonging-together can provide additional understanding towards the question of Being if we stress the "belonging" and thereby indicate the "together" as a predicate. In the belonging "I" and Being are also together.

It is this point, the notion of "place" in Heidegger's thinking, which

begins to illuminate how loneliness can be understood as a constitutive

element to belonging, or, being-at-home-in-the-world. It may seem

paradoxical, at first glance, to suggest that being-at-home-in-the-world

would be dependent upon loneliness. Heidegger does insist that any

being-in is always already an expression of being-with. We are always

already with others in the world. However, to begin to ask the question of

Being, to begin to think, requires, for Heidegger a separation from the world.

This separation should not be considered as the traditional separation of

Subject-Object in which "I" become a spectator of the world. Rather, the

Heideggerian separation is dependent upon a separation between "earth" and

"world" accomplished through the concept of work. In "my" work, whether

as poet or laborer, "I" can establish "my" world built upon meaning and

bringing the earth into a condition Heidegger calls "readiness-to-hand". By

engaging in meaningful, "concernful" work, "I" bring about a separation

distinguishing earth and world. In bringing world into focus "I" push earth

into recession, becoming the background to "my" world and, in doing so, "I"

position earth within the condition of "present-at-hand".

The present-at-hand of the earth is the condition of the everyday

man. By failing to engage in concernful work, man fails not only to bring the

earth to a readiness-at-hand, man also fails to constitute world. The failure

to do so is a failure of differentiation. Failing to provide "depth" of

perspective through the distinction of readiness-to-hand and present-at-

hand, man fails to construct a background of earth and the consequent

foreground of world. In doing so, man also fails to provide context for a

relationship in which it is constituted as an element within the

readiness-to-hand. Work, as a meaning-making activity, indicates an

engagement with world that is profoundly different from the surrounded-by

which typifies man's lack of place in the lived world of the everyday.

Engagement-with, as opposed to surrounded-by, indicates the "setting at a

distance" which cannot be accomplished from the surrounded-by position of

the everyday. The sense of place provided by the readiness-to-hand of "my"

world stands in marked contrast to the no-place of the surrounding

everyday earth.

Along with the neglect of being, or, contributive to the neglect, is the

failure of man to consider his "thrownness" and his impending "own death".

Correlated with the neglect of being and thrownness, for Heidegger, is man's

neglect of the being of intentionality. Turning to a discussion of these

elements as contributive to the contemporary existential condition a better

understanding of the distortion of man's relationship with Being may

emerge. Within all of this a sense of being-at-home-in-the-world may also

emerge as a unique element of the realization of authentic relationship.

Intentionality, for Heidegger, involves the notion of being-directed-

toward-itself. Heidegger cites Scheler's remark that "the essence of man is

the intention towards something" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 130). Man, as a

being-toward-itself, gains a "starting place" by being "set at a distance" from

being. To complete Buber's conditions of relationship, man should now

"come into relation" with Being. The "coming into relation", just as the

"setting at a distance", liberates man and Being through the re-cognition of

relationship. By coming into the relation, the setting at a distance is

provided the element of "nearness".

"Nearness" and "distance" represent critical concepts to the

understanding of Heideggerian thinking. "Nearness", when understood as a

relative condition of existence between "me" and Being expresses "my"

contact with Being. The "contact with" remains an expression of distance yet

now supplemented by a turning-towards Being and a being-turned-toward

by Being in which a "coming to relation" begins.

The turning-towards and being-turned-towards are described by

Heidegger as a "contiguous" relationship (Heidegger, 1968, p. 145). The

contact which is the relationship of man to Being is contiguous because of the

separation created by the readiness-to-hand. "Coming into relation", then,

can be understood as the attendance to Being that comes from the

re-cognition of intentionality. The "coming into relation" takes the "setting at

a distance" and transforms the distance-from into a distance-to. In the

coming into relation with Being man beings to dis-cover him-self at home

with the world. It is in this relationship, Buber remarks,

> ... that here and here alone a being has arisen from the whole,
> endowed and entitled to detach the whole as a world from himself and
> to make it an opposite to himself, instead of cutting out with his sense
> the part he needs from it, as all other beings do, and being content
> with that (Buber, 1965, p. 63).

Man, in finding "place" within the relationship with Being, in setting

apart earth from world, the present-at-hand to the readiness-to-hand,

dis-covers what separates man from other living beings. It is in the

loneliness of separation that man finds himself in man. Clark Moustakas

writes,

> If the individual does not exercise his loneliness, one significant
> capacity and dimension of being human remains undeveloped, denied.
> A fear of despair, an agony of aloneness replaces the real experience
> but strategies of escape and alienation can never substitute for the
> growth-inducing, deepening values of a genuine, vital, lonely
> experience (Moustakas, p. 35).

Nearness, as an expression of distance-to rather than distance-from, supports the understanding of the necessity for loneliness. By considering the contiguity of nearness to Being as a condition of loneliness, loneliness can be further diffentiated from its frequent association with alienation. When "I" am lonely, "I" am lonely-with the world. Loneliness, the result of the positing of man with Being expresses a sense of being-here, or, Heidegger's Dasein. As a lonely man, man "knows" where he is. On the contrary, the contemporary "alienated" man has failed to perform the separation into readiness-to-hand. He has become, for Heidegger, Das Man, the Anyone. As The Anyone, man is as any-other. Heidegger further elaborates his position when he writes,

> We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as one takes pleasure and we read and judge about literature as one judges, we hear music as one hears music, we speak about something as one speaks (Heidegger, 1985, p. 245).

Rather than the loneliness of man with Being, The Anyone is lost-among the others who live in the everyday. In undifferentiated, suffocating contact with the Crowd, the Anyone is unable to engage-with being in a contiguous relationship. The Anyone, for Heidegger, is not the individual but rather a symbolic representative.

In failing to differentiate man and Being and so re-cognize what it is

to be human, The Anyone is in a relationship which Heidegger typifies as an

expression of "equality" or the "leveling off". This leveling off of the

everyday removes man from the possibility for loneliness through the

immersion of persistent being-in-the-midst of all other everyday men.

Heidegger writes,

> Anything that departs from this commonness, in order to inhabit the
> formerly habitual proper speaking of language, is at once considered a
> violation of the standard. It is branded as a frivolous whim. All this
> is in fact quite in order, as soon as we regard the common as the only
> legitimate standard, and become generally incapable of fathoming the
> commonness of the common. This floundering in a commonness which
> we have placed under the protection of so-called natural common
> sense is not accidental, nor are we free to deprecate it. This
> floundering in commonness is part of the high and dangerous game
> and gamble in which, by the essence of language, we are the stakes
> (Heidegger, 1977, p. 365).

"Publicness", the Heideggerian concept of the mode in which the

everyday reveals itself, stand in opposition to the private, or, lonely sphere

of man and Being---together. This mode of the everyday, or, publicness, as

the common sense of The Anyone, obliterates the private by defining and

maintaining an oppositional, devalued mode of non-sense. In providing the

realm of common sense with an explicitly invalid realm of non-sense, the

possibility of a "face-to-face" is removed.

The anonymity of The Anyone succeeds in appropriating the personal

sphere. It is paradoxical that the common sense of the everyday actually is predicated upon a selective, apportioned dispensation. It is critical that not everyone "have" common sense---that there are those who are non-sensical. The sense of belonging to the everyday, to the realm of The Anyone, is wholly dependent upon the exclusion created by the non-sensical. "My" belonging to the everyday requires that "I" surrender the loneliness which can provide a realization of my phenomenological authenticity. The common sense of the everyday is radically opposed to the other common sense of the Heraclitean logos which suggests a thinking which is binding, inter-connected, and, dependent upon the diversity of the individual.

Contemporary common sense, as opposed to the pre-Socratic, depends upon the leveling off of The Anyone through the neglect of the question of Being. By validating a common sense which denies a personal relationship between man and Being, The Anyone assures its continuity. The perdurance of The Anyone, predicated upon the failure of separation of man from the Crowd, denies access to the opening through which man can set at a distance and come into relation with Being. By refusing this access, the individuation which is necessary for authentic relationship is precluded. Denied access to this essential loneliness, man, as The Anyone, falls into the alineated group.

The Anyone remains in the publicness that refuses "the insight that we do not reside sufficiently as yet where in reality we already are" (Heidegger, 1969, p. 33). The "place" provided by loneliness is re-placed by the "no-place" of The Anyone. Rather than belonging, and in so doing, being together, we are as The Anyone and homeless. The perdurance of The Anyone, as dependent upon the common sense of publicness now brings this discussion to the fundamental Heideggerian concept of "thrownness" and with it, a consideration of the importance of an eschatological perspective.

Man, as man, is always already in the world. As such, man finds himself in a condition of "thrownness". "I" am in my here (ness) condition, uninvited, and unaware of where "I" came from or where "I" am going. The consciousness of dislocation results in a refusal to understand "my" own identity. As thrown creatures we are unaware of our "place" in the world. Unsure of our beginnings, we tentatively grope for the unknown. The insistence of The Anyone for a common sense which eliminates the possibility for my relationship with Being can be understood, from a Heideggerian perspective, as a failure to come face-to-face with the anxiety of finality and death. In fact, the concept of The Anyone, as an anonymous entity, by definition denies the face-to-face and so refutes anxiety.

Understood by The Anyone as an inapropriate response, anxiety signals a failure of being-in-the-world. By refusing to come to grips with "my" own death and also refusing to consider the anxiety created by "my" death, "I" profoundly diminish the possibility for a relationship of man and Being.

In considering the importance of eschatology to Heidegger it is essential to consider finality as an element which contributes to the concept of "care". As a critical concept for Heidegger, care is a fundamental element in Dasein. It is care, as care, that provides the presupposition for Dasein. Without care, whether as a caring for people or things, "my" individual existence becomes somewhat problematic. It is care that presupposes existence by providing for the possibility of connections between my-self and other things/people. Care can be expressed as a mode of being-with things/people which is a response to the anxiety over death. As a response to anxiety, care presupposes not only existence but also the possibility for the continuation of existence through apprehension. "I" cannot care for you without some anticipation of the future. "My" future, through care, is realized. The degree to which "my" response is a response to the anxiety of "my" death is the measure of my own authenticity.

Authenticity, for Heidegger, is linked with a Dasein which has come

face-to-face with "my own" death. So long as an encounter with death is

generalized as a consideration of death and not "my own" death, existence is

less than authentic. Failure to "personalize" death, manifest in the mode of

The Anyone which speaks of the "someday Everyone will die",

de-emphasizes the significance of my unique death and thereby blurs the

end point of "my" life. It is then possible for me to see my life as continual.

Without this end point, and with the tranquilized in-acceptance of death as

the death of Everyone, "my" life becomes continual. The never-ending

assumption, the never-ending quality of the life of The Anyone is the

fundamental refusal to consider the "possibility of the impossibility of my

existence." In the refusal, the possibilities of my own existence are negated

by my own consciousness. Heidegger writes,

> This certainty, that "I myself am in that I will die", is the basic
> certainty of Dasein itself. It is a genuine statement of Dasein, while
> "cogito sum" is only the semblance of such a statement. If such
> pointed formulations mean anything at all, then the appropriate
> statement pertaining to Dasein in its being would have to be "sum
> moribundus" ("I am in dying"), "mouribundus" not as someone gravely
> ill or wounded, but insofar as I am, I am "moribundus". The
> "moribundus" first gives the "sum" its sense (Heidegger, 1985, p.
> 316-317).

By encountering "my own" death, Heidegger holds that man

establishes authenticity through the projection of a final point of personal

existence. The authentic Dasein, with death confronted, is understood as the

appropriation of Being in which "I" do not "have", but, rather am "in" Being.

Heidegger writes,

> "I am" thus amounts to saying, I dwell, I abide in the world as with
> something familiar. Being as in-being and "I am" means dwelling
> with, and "in" primarily does not signify anything spatial at all but
> means primarily being familiar with (Heidegger, 1985, p. 158).

In-dwelling, being-familiar-with, requires that the authentic Dasein serve as

connector between birth and death and, as such, establish a context of a

"life-span". The confrontation of "my own" death and the subsequent

authentification of Dasein contribute to the realization of life-span by

accounting for Heidegger's thrownness. It is important to consider the

significance of realizing the thrownness of existence. As thrown creatures,

we realize our-selves in existence---we are here. In doing so, there also

occurs "my" response to the call from Being.

Realizing "my" thrownness, when understood as the shock of

being-here is similar to the sense of waking suddenly at night, finding

my-self here, surrounded by the darkness, unaware of "where" "I" had been

in the im-mediate prior moment. "I" was not here only to suddenly "find"

my-self here. The gasp of surprise, the in-breath of thrownness, however,

gives way to the sigh, or outbreath, of the silent response to the call from

Being. The call from Being implores man, through the acknowledgement of thrownness, to seek life. It is that moment between the in and the out breath, Heidegger's "moment of vision", which is co-dependent upon the connection of thrownness to the drawnness to the call from Being. That moment of vision provides for the "fundamental character of being of Dasein" which is "first adequately grasped in the determination, an entity which is in the to-be-it-at-its-time" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 153).

Acknowledging my-self as thrown, and through the confrontation of the anxiety of "my own" death, responding to the call from Being, requires that "I" be the nexus between the motion of being-thrown and the motion of being-drawn by Being. When not interrupted by the authentic and ecstatic confrontation with "my own" death, the motion of thrownness becomes the momentum of "fallenness"---the drop into the existential abyss. The "falling" and the "whirlwind" of the Dasein of The Anyone indicate a sense of movement without source. The absence of source, the neglect of being of intentionality, is made manifest by these considerations of movement. Being thrown, being whirled about are profound states of being-out-of-place. Understood as a failure to be-in-place, to be-at-home, thrownness is rescued in the response to the call from Being.

"The tranquilizing of fallenness", Heidegger writes, "is not a matter of standing still in its movement but rather involves a creeping intensification" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 281). The movement of being-drawn implies a sense of position, of being-here so that "I" might be "underway". The tranquilizing of fallenness, the whirlwind of the everyday indicate a dis-orientation that can only be recoverd and transformed as a being-towards-itself by responding to the call. The authentic relationship of being-thrown and being-drawn can be further informed by the Heraclitean concept of becoming as the coalescence of non-being and being.

The call from Being rescues man from the fall into non-being, and, responding to the call, man continues being. The call and the response then can be understood as a reciprocal and mutually dependent relationship. To the extent that man fails to respond to the call, he not only continues as a being thrown, he also diminshes his being itself. By failing to respond, Being fails in its calling. Having recognized himself from a being-thrown to a being-drawn, man is then positioned (as mediator) to realize the dynamics of thrownness/drawnness and to be circumspected by Being. It is important to understand that thrownness cannot be dismissed as a social aberration or "mis-understanding" which can be "resolved". Neither thrownness nor

in-authenticity are concepts which can be "resolved" but must be understood as constituent elements of Being.

Positing my-self between being thrown and being drawn, "I" can "see" my-self as mediator and constructor of the life-span in which "my" experiences will and have been. Enveloped by the motion of thrownness and drawnness, an authentic relationship with Being results in the re-cognition of existential loneliness. Confrontation of "my own" death, being thrown, being drawn, all contribute to the uniquely personal condition which enables "me" to be-"me"-in-"my"-time. These elements must be self-referential in order that the authenticity of each is confirmed and the life-span is the span of individual birth-to-death rather than a generalized life-style of The Anyone.

Existential loneliness, for Heidegger, is the understanding of self-reference as crucial to the fundamentally personal experiences of authentic existence. As mediator of thrownness/drawnness, "I" re-member the present in the Heideggerian sense of a "gathering together" of past and future into "my" being-with-Being. For Heidegger, the urgency of the eschatological perspective reveals the personalized life-span as the structure of the horizon in which "I" must dis-cover my-self and "place" my-self in time.

Thrownness and drawnness can then be understood as ways of being in the stream of consciousness. Heraclitus writes that a man cannot place his foot in the same stream twice. The "same stream", as stream of consciousness and in flux, must always present a new stream through man's inquiries. Intentionality, for Heidegger, rescues the self from fallenness by transforming thrownness into drawness. Through intentionality, the life-span unites thrownness and drawnness and provides a "place" in which "I" can be, where "I" was, and where "I" will be.

The life-span, like the separation of earth and world, requires the setting at a distance and coming into relation so that "my" time, or, the personal, might be sorted out from the continual, or, universal. In establishing a personal item as "my" life, life-span becomes a grid for being-it-at-its time. Life-span, the grid including thrownness, drawnness, and death, is the horizon through which "I" travel. As such, it is the permanence of "me" coming-towards-my-own-death. It is extrapolation which allows eternal time to pass through "me". Considering life-span as a grid for "me" provides for a "place" excerpted without the universal where "I" can be-at-home. It is the "place" from which "I" come as well as the "place" through which "I" pass.

The life-span also provides for a consideration of the roles of immanence and transcendence. By considering a life as a span, the concept implies a bridging or connection from one point, the beginning, to a final point, death. As a bridge, a life-span connects "my" beginning to "my" end, and, in so doing, illuminates the co-dependency upon each element as correlative elements for being-in-the-world. As Heidegger writes,

> The bridge swings over the stream with ease and power. It does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes them to lie across from each other (Heidegger, 1971, p. 152).

The life-span provides the "place" through which "I" travel in a mundane sense as well as the "place" through which "I" travel towards "my" death.

Transcendence, understood through the metaphor of life-span, involves a travel or crossing that is not so much a traveling-out or over as a traveling-through-and-towards. Transcendence connects "me" with Being as "I" re-cognize that "I" am only fully "me" upon the completion of life-span. Not until "my" death completes the structure of life-span can "I" become fully "me". "My" immanence is dis-covered by "my" death, in the completion of "my" life-span and the absorption of "me" into Being. Transcendence, as the intentional being-directed-towards-itself, is realized when the self is completed---at (its) "my" death.

If life-span can be understood as a preliminary "homing" process by which "I" construct the place for my life, it is important to turn to the encounters within this construct. "Place," wrote Heidegger, "is the where of the belonging of what is handy or on hand in concern" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 226). Looking at how "belonging" occurs in a place called life-span requires that the discussion consider "my" encounters with things and people within this region. Heidegger considers being-in as an implicit expression of being-with.

> It is only insofar as Dasein as being-in-the-world has the basic constitution of being-with that there is a being-for and -against and -without-one-another right to the indifferent walking-alongside-one-another (Heidegger, 1985, p. 241).

Despite the inherent being-with residing with being-in, Heidegger's concern with individual death as a foundation for authenticity prevents his comprehensive consideration of "my" relationships with other people. He writes,

> Only when we walk it, and in no other fashion, only, that is, by thoughtful questionning, are we on the move on the way. That the way of thought is of this precursoriness in turn depends on an enigmatic solitude, taking the word "solitude" in a high, unsentimental sense (Heidegger, 1958, p. 169).

As Roger Waterhouse writes, "Inauthenticity as the gap between feeling and

self-for-others. . .was to be dealt with by getting our own self-relationship

right" (Waterhouse, p. 191). While Heidegger's thoughts on relationships

with others, particularly as the reflection of the control of The Anyone, are

important to consider, it is also helpful to consider the works of Buber and

Edmund Husserl. By contrasting Buber's thoughts on the "between" and

Husserl's concerns with inter-subjectivity, a more comprehensive inquiry of

the encounters within a life-span can be developed.

Buber writes, "We do not find meaning lying in things nor do we put it

in things but between us and things it can happen" (Buber, 1965, p. 36).

Between "us" and things, for Buber, provides the medium through which "I"

can confirm and be confirmed as an element of the I-Thou. Through the

confirmation of I and Thou, as the setting at a distance and coming into

relation, "my" identity is developed and with this the concept of community,

of being-with-others, is established. "Collectivity", wrote Buber, "is based on

an organized atrophy of personal existence, community on its increase and

confirmation in life lived towards one another" (Buber, 1965, p. 31).

The lived life finds its source, for Buber, in the diversity of

membership and participation of its particulars, or, individuals. In this way,

the concept of "individual" is understood as fundamental to the concept of

"community". Within "my" life-span, community, or, belongings-with, is dependent upon the diversity provided through the individuals who are co-present. "Community" is defined by its membership rather than the contrary. In the Heideggerian sense of belonging and, therefore, being-together, "community" for Buber represents the intimate connections of individuals who constitute the relationships contributing to a sense of belonging. That sense of belonging, of being-at-home, results from these connections which construct meaning and consequently depict world. Both the "collectivity" of Buber and Heidegger's The Anyone represent the results of an emphasis upon the leveling off or the equalization of difference, in this case, understood as personal identity.

For Buber, however, distancing of the Other through the designation of The Anyone offers no access to making meaning out of the world or a world out of meaning. As a "de-signation", The Anyone sets out, or, outlines the Other in such a way as to prevent the additional and critical coming into relation. By casting the Other in the light of The Anyone, Heidegger fails to account for the importance of inter-human consitution of world. Including The Anyone with the earth to be set apart from world excludes the Other, as individual, to assist in "my" own confirmation. By denying the Other access

to "my" world, "I" negate his possibility of existence as well as "my" own. Heidegger's "primal quilt", as a failure to realize "my own" Dasein should not, according to Buber, exclude others from "my" being-in-the-world. Buber writes,

> He (Heidegger) is right to say that we are able to discover a primal guilt. But we are not able to do this by isolating a part of life, the part where the existence is related to itself and to its own being, but by becoming aware of the whole life without reduction, the life in which the individual, in fact, is essentially related to something other than himself (Buber, 1965, p. 166).

Heidegger writes that "in order to be equal to the question of Being, we simply have to risk asking the question" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 165). For Buber, however, the significance of the risk is the risk of encounter with others. Failing to take the risk of inter-subjective encounter fails to fully come to terms with the lived world.

What the Other provides is the opposite of the Heideggerian The Anyone. While The Anyone seeks the common sense of equalization through the loss of difference, the Other presents the contours, or, negative space against which "my" self is formed. The difference of the Other is implicit within the designation. As the Other, "you" are different from "me". The realm of The Anyone provides a realm of familiarity, of absorption, in which "I" may be lost to The Anyone. Familiarity, cast as a way of being of The

Anyone, presents a ubiquitous calm which tranquilizes, causing man to

forget the question of Being. The danger of the familiar, for Heidegger, rests

in the potential for a loss of self to The Anyone.

For Buber, however, it is the Other who provides the differentiation

which is necessary for self-realization. He writes, "If everything concrete is

equally near, equally nearest, life with the world ceases to have articulation

and structure, it ceases to have meaning" (Buber, 1965, p. 23). Meaning

involves inter-subjective turning to the Other so that "we" might agree upon

a world. Language, as the between of the I-Thou relationship, becomes in a

non-pejorative sense, a "com-promise" of reality. "You" and "I", through

language, agree to a world and in the agreement arising from the

face-to-face confrontation, "we" com-promise one another's existence. In the

turning to the Other, "I" come from "my" place towards the place from which

"you" come. In the turning the familiarity that is "my" home-place comes

face-to-face with the familiarity of "your" home-place and the encounter

produces "our" world.

Failure to come to this "com-promise", or Buber's Dialogue, risks a

profound loss. The failure to construct, participate, and so perpetuate

Dialogue is equivalent to the failure to construct, participate, and perpetuate

the lived world. Buber writes that by failing to turn to the Other "dialogue becomes a fiction, the mysterious intercourse between two human worlds only a game, and in the rejection of the real life confronting him the essence of all reality begins to disintegrate" (Buber, 1965, p. 24).

Buber's Dialogue suggests a co-constructed reality, or agreed-upon world, in which "you" and "I" can be. As co-constructors of "our" world, "you" and "I" become involved in the attempt to establish one world through which experiences can then be compared and related. Language provides the avenue of the between through which "we" can inter-subjectively com-promise one world. As Husserl writes,

> The objective world as an idea---the ideal correlate of an intersubjective (intersubjectively communalized) experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as constantly harmonious---is essentially related to an intersubjectivity (itself constituted as having the ideality of endless openness), whose component particular subjects are equipped with mutually correspondent and harmonious constitutive systems (Husserl, pp. 107-108).

The Other, as "my" Other, presents to "my" world the possibility of an-other world. By providing "my" Here with a There, the Other serves a fundamental role in the differentiation of "me" and world. As Other to "me", the relationship is not concluded for Husserl, as it is for Heidegger, with the oppositional and potentially absorbing The Anyone. Husserl writes,

...in the sense of a community of men and in that of man---who, even as solitary, has the sense: member of a community---there is implicit a mutual being for one another,which entails an Objectivating equalization of my existence with that of all others---consequently: I, or anyone else, as a man among other men (Husserl, 1960, p. 129).

For Husserl, the Other, as co-related to "me", does not preclude "my" authentic being but assists in determining "my" world by providing connections---between "me" and "you", "my" world and "yours". These relationships, as connections, are predicated upon the "necessity of only one Objective world."

Just as the Other cannot exist absolutely, that is, without "my" intervention as his Other, "I", as the Other to "you", cannot exist in-dependently. "My" "I", as an absolute subjective "I", cannot be known by me as this would require the objectification of this "I" by "me". "I" know "I" am here by the manner in which the Other "behaves" in "my" presence. The Other, behaving "as if" "I" am here, confirms me as being here, by his being there. As Theunissen writes, "according to Husserl, to grasp myself as a human being amounts to nothing other than to allow oneself to be fitted in as one worldly object among other worldly objects" (Theunissen, p. 33). The loneliness of Heidegger's authentic being is not removed by either Buber or Husserl. However, the loneliness that serves for Heidegger as the necessary breaking away, or, separation from earth, provides for Buber and Husserl the

co-relational quality necessary for Dialogue or inter-subjectivity. "My"

loneliness connects "me" with "you" to the degree in which "you" are

"analogized" by "me".

Through the concept of an "analogue" Husserl attempts to explain how

"I" can come to know some-one as any-one other than "me". If the world, as

Schopenhaur suggests, is my idea, how does "my" idea include what or who

is not me? Husserl writes,

> That my own essence can be at all contrasted for me with something
> else, or that I (who I am) can become aware of someone else (who is
> not I but someone other than I), presupposes that not all my own
> modes of consciousness are modes of my self-consciousness (Husserl,
> p. 105).

In the "analogizing" of the Other,"I" know him to be not-me. But, even

this knowing as not-me is dependent upon the familiar "me". Knowing "my"

Other as not-me is also an expression of knowing "my" Other as "me". The

centrality of the "I" within "my" world must somehow accomodate the

un-familiar not-I in order to offer the setting at a distance necessary to

establish a relationship between "me" and world.

Reason, for Husserl, provides an impulse in which the un-familiar can

be explained as a confrontation with the un-familiar as not-me, or, alien.

Husserl writes that, ". . .reason is not an accidental de facto ability, not a title

for possible accidental matters of fact, but rather a title for an all-embracing

structural form belonging to all trascendental subjectivity" (Husserl, p. 57).

Reason, as an "all-bracing structural form" is the expression of intentionality

directed towards "one objective world".

The search for "harmony" as the "one objective world" leads to a

condition which Husserl decribes as,

> ...something that exists is in intentional communion with something
> else that exists. It is an essentially unique connectedness, an actual
> community and precisely the one that makes transcendentally
> possible the being of a world, a world of men and things (Husserl, p.
> 129).

This "actual community" exists because of its constitution of self in an

intentional and mediate relationship with the Other on the basis of the

harmony of reason. Through the harmony provided by reason as "one

objective world", "I" am provided an additional element within "my" place to

be. The "actual community", predicated upon the "harmonizing of monads"

includes "me", in fact, is co-dependent upon "me" with the Other. The world

becomes impossible without "me"---place is dependent upon "me". "You"

and "I" fit together and, in so doing, construct a world.

The dependency upon reason for "my" fitting in and with "my" world

is similar to Immanuel Kant's thoughts on the a priori in which "I" attempt to

match my "form of thought" with the "form of life". In Kant's teleological

model, man's fit is related to the degree to which he participates in the

progressive evolutionary development towards Being. By presenting a

teleologically-driven concept of Being, Kant provides for the possibility of a

developmental and progressive relationship between man and Being. Fraser,

in his Of Time, Passion, and Knowledge, cites Kant's idea that, ". . . what is

chaotic in a single individual may be seen from the standpoint of the human

race as a whole to be a steady progression through slow evolution of its

original endowment" (Fraser, 1975, p. 37).

Man's fit in and with a world, for Buber, Husserl, and Kant, is a process

requiring the construction, maintenance, and continuation of relationships

with others. For Buber, "I" am at home in an I-Thou relationship founded

upon reciprocity in which "we are bound up in relation to the same center"

(Buber, 1965, p. 21). For Husserl, the "harmony of monads" is dependent

upon the form of reason which brings the "I" and the Other together as

world. For Kant, "my" place in the world is found in the search for "good"

and treating others as "ends" rather than "means".

For Heidegger, loneliness serves to separate "me" from the world in

the attempt to come face-to-face with "my own" death. The eschatological

imperative of Heidegger's concept of the question of Being all but precludes a consideration of being-with in any terms other than as part of The Anyone. In summary, the eschatological perspective of Heidegger's thought provides an opportunity to consider existence not as a "what" but as a "way to be". The necessity for the "moment of vision" based on the urgency of appropriation before "my" death, leads Heidegger to an investigation of language, especially poetry, as the "way to be" through which man comes to the "clearing". While Heidegger provides little place for the Other as "I" separate my-self from world, poetry offers insights as to how "I" might be-at-home with loneliness.

Turning to Heidegger's thoughts on poetry in the following chapter and keeping Buber's contributions on relationship in mind, offers an opportunity to examine the unique relationship developed between a poet and his world. By also considering the works of Rainer Maria Rilke and Professor Ross Mooney, along with other philosopher-poets, the discussion follows Karsten Harries suggestion that "unable to establish man's place, transcendental philosophy raised a demand that only poetry and myth can answer" (Murray, p. 79).

CHAPTER III

THE PHENOMENA OF POETIC THOUGHT

In Poetry, Language, Thought, Heidegger asks, "What Are Poets For?".

His answer, based upon his notions of the "destitution" of our times, indicates

a need for man to become more human. Man, as the result of his

development of the world through scientific thinking, has come to believe

himself to be the master of his environment. In seeking to explain the

world, scientific man has set himself apart from the world and, in failing to

come into relation, has failed to consummate a relationship with world. "The

higher its consciousness, the more conscious being is excluded from the

world" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 108). By standing apart from the world, man, as

scientific observer, sees the world and, through the appropriation of

language, adjusts the world to scientific predisposition. The scientific

observer, sees the world and, through the appropriation of language, adjusts

the world to a scientific predisposition. Scientific thought, as a form of

ex-planation, from the Latin ex (out) planare (plane, level), tends to "level

off" or flatten out" the world so that prior and subsequent explanations can

be made to "fit" together.

Explanation, to be considered viable, must conform to or, at least, refer to a prior explanation and, in turn, be re-formed into subsequent explanation. This process of con-formation has the effect of con-forming language itself so that experiences of the world are adjusted to the explanatory language. By being selective with the language of explanation, the world, too, is simplified.

"Where Nature is not satisfactory to man's representation, he reframes or redisposes it", Heidegger writes (Heidegger, 1971, p. 110). This "reframing" through a re-naming of the things of the world, as scientific explanation, represents a dramatically different approach to language, and, to the subsequent construction of world, than does poetic thinking. "Reframing" the world, with scientific language, fails to consider the frame of relationship between man and being. Using language, rather than being used by language, man "names" the world and its constituent things and fails to grow silent, to listen to the call of being. Unable to "take the world to heart" and "let things be", scientific man confronts the world with continual description-of as explanation-for.

Failing to consider this fundamental relationship and supplanting this

relationship with the re-framed relationship in which man stands in opposition to world may negate the possibility for dialogue between man and man, and, therefore, between man and being. Heidegger writes, "The man of the age of technology, by his parting, opposes himself to the Open. This parting is not a parting from, it is a parting against" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 116).

Establishing the relationship between himself and being as oppositional, man seeks meaning and constructs a world lacking his own presence. Scientific man, as the "dis-interested" observer, is homeless in that he perpetuates a world that is only "for", never "within" him. A function of this explanation-for quality of scientific thought is the pre-supposition within the language of science of world order and the discovery of this order. Scientific thought, through explanation, seeks to present a world of constancy and permanance. As Marc Belth suggests, there is a dramatic difference between the use of language to describe and to explain, and, language that is itself a forming or creative process. "The one (explanation)", he writes, "is concerned to make coherent the world about us. The other is concerned to illuminate the "world" within ourselves, and the "world" within the world" (Belth, p. 97). Understood in this way, it is possible to conceive of the

scientific as an expression of poetic conjecture. It is possible that the poetic mataphor, as a process of forming or creating precedes and informs the "world" of scientific thought by providing a model of scientific consideration. The absurdity of poetic thought, the demand for what Belth calls the "playfullness" of poetic thinking can be understood as necessarily antecedent to scientific explanation.

Critical to the process of poetic thinking, and subsequently to scientific thought, is the quality of suggestion or allusion. Allusion, (from the Latin alludere to play with), provides power to poetic thinking. By "playing" with the world, poetic thinking assumes the license to suggest other "worlds", other variations of the "one objective world." Considering poetic and scientific thought in this manner provides an understanding of thinking that is not the dualistic poetic or scientific but rather is the dialectical poetic-scientific. "Explaining" and "playing with" become expressions of the setting at a distance and coming into relation with the world. Explaining, allows the world to be distinguished from "me". Allusion, on the other hand, offers the conduit through which "I" can engage a world and in so doing re-form that world by suggesting variations through poetic discourse. Belth writes,

... art, then, is some manifestation of man's shaping those feelings and perceptions that arise from his immediate involvements with the observables and unobservables of his world. It is the expression of his passion before he explains it. . . (Belth, p. 98).

It is this "expression of passion", as poetic thinking, which provides insight into the necessity for poetic loneliness. As the initial setting at a distance not only of poet and world but of poet and mankind, both world and man can be appropriated through the construction of relationship. The poet, separated from the "one objective world", begins the Heideggerian "venture". "As ventured", Heidegger writes, "those who are not protected are nevertheless not abandoned" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 103). The venture suggests that poets precede other men with their willingness to be unprotected in their relationship with the suffering of the world. As unprotected men, poets become open to being through their openness to the suffering within existence. It is his willingness to be ventured, to become open to his unique loneliness, which enables the poet to create a new world, to play with and suggest, through allusion, an alternative. In doing so, the poet not only transforms the world but is himself, transformed. Belth writes, "Every new poem is a rebellion against seeing myself and the world in the habituated ways. In every poem the poet creates himself anew, and holds in his imagery the same promise for those who read" (Belth, p. 123).

The "rebellion" against habituation is the engagement-with of the poet and a world versus the observation-of the scientist and the world. In his rebellion, the poet constitutes both himself and his world in the construction and maintenance of the relationship between poet and world. Contrary to this, the scientist, with his presupposed world, is barred from all allusion leading to transformation and is provided a world only for modification in the sense of reference-to rather than transformation-of. As ventured, as being lonely and open to suffering, the poet provides the potential for his own renewal as well as the renewal of world. For the poet, the world, too, is ventured, and in the creation arising from that venture, both poet and world are united.

The "things" of the world, as elements of world, are subject to transformation through poetic intervention. For both Martin Heidegger and for Rainer Maria Rilke, the "thing" is of central importance to a poetic making sense out of the world. When Rilke asks in his Ninth Elegy, "Why then the necessity to be human-", his answer follows- ". . . because earthly existence means much, and because apparently everything here needs us, this fleeting reality which strangely concerns us." The earth "needs" man, and of greater importance, it "apparently" needs man. Things, for their appearance, to

become present, need man. Rilke suggests that the things not only need

man, but need man to understand them "as even the things themselves

never dared to imagine." Man's reason-to-be is not only to perceive and

thereby provide presence through the appearance of things, but to penetrate

appearance through transformation. To "think the things", for Rilke, is first

to constitute a world from earth and then to transcend this world by

knowing the things through the infusion of meaning. When Rilke writes of

the "inexpressible things", he adds, they can only be expressed as "an

acquired world". It is the "naming" of a thing which provides potential

connections--both the connection between an individual and the thing

named as well as the connection between individuals through the

communication of the former "inexpressible" now "named". "Perhaps we are

here", Rilke writes, to "say".

Rilke's "saying" is similar to Heidegger's "worlding of a world" in which

a distinction is established between world and earth. Heidegger writes in

"The Origin of the Work of Art",

> . . . the world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the
> simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people.
> The earth is the spontaneous furthering of that which is continually
> self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing (Heidegger,
> 1977, p. 172).

Earth serves both Heidegger and Rilke as a background from which a "world" can be constructed. The construction of this world, manifested in things, involves for Heidegger and Rilke, the penetration to the "thingness" of the thing. The recession through the suppression of earth, with the highlighting of a world and Heidegger's indication of a "historical people" suggests a distinction between the universal and the personal which redeems both. As Michael Oakeshott writes,

> As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an enquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation begun in the primeval forests and made more articulate in the course of centures" (Oakeshott, p. 11).

Earth, from this perspective, is analogous to the universal and the foundational, while world can be compared with the individual and the personal. Heidegger's "worlding of the world" is understood as a process of personalizing the universal by meaning-making through thematic connections. Personalizing, as worlding, involves for both Heidegger and Rilke, an effort for stability, for homeostasis, in a world of things representative of personal meaning from experience. "The soul", Dilthey wrote, "while perturbed by the persistent change of impressions, of fates, and of the power of the outside world, must strive for inner stability in order better to withstand it all" (Dilthey, p. 28).

For both Heidegger and Rilke, the things are the stuff on which this inner stability must rest. By recession of earth and accentuation of world, depth is provided against which the things are given presence. The things, as the stuff for a stable world, are also, for both men, threatened by the advent of technology.

Technology, as a way of knowing, is described by Rilke--"Between the hammers our heart endures, like the tongue between the teeth, which yet continues to praise." The hammers of technology, as the hardness of the object (versus the thing), are poised to crush the softness of the tongue. By posing the potential for silencing the tongue which speaks from the heart, technology, for Rilke, is preparing a time without "saying", a time in which silence is not the absence of sound but the absence of the potential for sound. Technology's danger lies in its objectification of the thing, preventing an authentic dialectical relationship between the humanness of man and the thingness of the thing. It is the "taking to heart" and "letting be" of poetic thinking which technology rejects. Implicit within this rejection, and analagous to the diminishment of "world", is the loss of the realization of self-potential. By relieving the thing of its thingness, the potential for self-realization is also diminished resulting in the realization of Heidegger's

The Anyone, or Nietzsch's The Crowd. Unable to dis-cover the thingness slumbering within the thing, man too, remains concealed.

Rilke, in the sixth stanza writes, "more than ever before the things which can be experienced are vanishing, for what is crowding out and replacing them is an act without image." Comparing this with Nietzsche's "the image is a kind of consciousness" leads to the conclusion that as the things vanish so vanishes the potential for action with images. At stake is the dynamism of construction and transformation of world which is enlivened by the diversity of the things. The diminishment of the things qua earth must also for Rilke, result in the diminishment or shrinkage of world. In effect, as the things vanish, the structure of the horizon of consciousness is progressively restricted. Consciousness, dependent upon earth-things, has less and less to retrieve leaving man more and more an un-conscious being. Along with Rilke's vanishing of the things, Heidegger suggests the separation of art and technology as an "error" of technological thinking. (Heidegger uses "error" in the sense of erring, to be on the wrong way) Heidegger writes,

> ... the object-character of technological dominion spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly, and completely. Not only does it establish all things producible in the process of production; it also delivers the products of production by means of the market. In self-assertive production, the humanness of man and the thingness of things dissolves. .. (Heidegger, 1971, p. 115).

Technology, as a type of knowing which casts things as terminal

objects, prohibits the "saying" of things that is their thingness. Even more,

technology prohibits an understanding resulting from saying "in such a way

as even the things themselves never dared to imagine to be."

With the advent of technology, language became unable to "say" the

things, and, in so doing, unable to constitute that relationship between man

and things from which "world" emerges. For Heideggar, who uses "memory"

as a gathering, the diminishment of earth-things provides the potential for a

loss of memory, a forgetfulness which impacts the future. Future,

understood in terms of protention is stripped by the restriction of past, or,

memory. Future is truncated with the narrowing of the things to be

gathered. The thing, in this context, is significantly jeopardized and, as such,

so is time.

Poetic thinking, however, can "say" the things and so provide a future.

As Ross Mooney writes,

> They (artists) will be able to change the past. As the future is sensed,
> emerging into the now, it brings with it the power and requirement to
> alter the past so that the past is free to enter into the flow of the now.
> . . So the past is not past-for-ever, but the past-for-now, and in the
> now it takes on new form" (Mooney, "The Artist and Our Human Need,
> 1979, p. 14).

Poetic thinking, by saying the things, can also provide the sense of the

past-perfect or the ought-to-have-been as a means of subjectively transforming the past. By casting the past in the ought-to-have-been, the poet can alter the "was" and re-member the past as a re-flection of his present.

The things, threatened by technology, and generally, "modernization", are in Rilke's words, in need of "rescue". Because of the pervasiveness of technology, the "rescue" of the things requires that modern man re-members, gathers his thought together, and in doing so, re-collects a world. As such, the rescue of the things is also a rescue of man from a pervasive alienation within the modern world. Alienation, as a static subject-object dualism, is expressed as the "unconscious One." The remembrance of the dialectical nature of the person-thing relationship is a Heideggerian form of "rescue". It is a thinking that, for Heidegger, "is the step back from the thinking that merely represents--that is, explains--to the thinking that responds and recalls" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 181). Heidegger writes in Building. Dwelling. Thinking.

> ... man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of this relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 146).

The thing, in need of rescue, is the mediator between world and earth, and

as such, between the univeral and the personal. It is also a mediation

between the familiar and the un-familiar which grounds meaning.

The familiar, as earth, and the un-familiar, as world, are distinguished

by their relationships with the "I". As "I" experience and explain the

un-familiar they, too, recede to earth as familar. In this way, the tension

between earth and world results from the synthesis of experience. Where

this mediation occurs, for Heidegger and Rilke, is "in" language. Heidegger

writes, "Language goes on as the taking place or occurring of dif-ference for

world and things" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 207). For Rilke, this "taking place" is

an expression of "here". Rilke's "here" and Heidegger's "clearing" are

analagous concepts essential to the rescue of things, the rescue of world, and

ultimately the rescue of man.

Heidegger claims the clearing "grants the movement of speculative

thinking the passage though what it thinks." It is the place taken by

language as the place for this mediation, is also the place for rescue of these

"destitute times." Through the clearing,

> ... we may suggest that the day will come when we will not shun the
> question whether the opening, the free open, may not be that within
> which alone pure space and ecstatic time and everything present and
> absent in them have the place which gathers and protects everything
> (Heidegger, 1977, p. 305).

The clearing, as the "now" of pure space and ecstatic time can be compared with Rilke's "just once, everything, just one time." Rilke continues, "But to have existed this once, even if only one time, to have existed here on earth, appears irrevocable."

There are two elements essential for understanding the existential correlation between Heidegger's "clearing" and Rilke's "here"--the moment and suffering. As part of the constituent elements of the existential experience, these concepts supply the connections between the epoche and poesis.

Both the "clearing" and "here" consider the moment as both revelatory and horrible. The revelation of the moment as moment is the sense of stillness and stability amidst a frenetic and dynamic earth. Stillness, as a result of "saying" the thingness of a thing, provides important images for Heidegger and Rilke including "sound", "silence", and "invisibility." By saying the thing, we can in effect, seize the moment. As an ecstatic action, the moment is realized as a relationship constitued by "me" and the things. Heidegger says that the "dif-ference" between earth and world, as the moment of the clearing takes place, in language. Only by thinking of language as the "house of being" can we once more begin to think.

"Science", writes Heidegger, "does not think". In fact, "most thought

provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking"

(Heidegger, 1968, p. 6). Language, by labelling the things, provides the relief

between earth and world and the suspension called the moment.

It is important to understand how "saying" and "silence" are co-related

for Heidegger and Rilke. The saying, as a response to the thingness of a

thing, begins from silence. To hear the call of the things of being, for

Heidegger, requires that we first come to being in silence.

> The call is a directive which, in calling to and calling upon, in reaching
> out and inviting, directs us toward an action or nonaction, or toward
> something even more essential. In every calling, a call has already
> gathered (Heidegger, 1968, p. 124).

Heidegger and Rilke frequently associate the moment with references of

stillness and silence. Heidegger writes that ". . . the clearing, the open region,

is not only free for brightness and darkness but also for resonance and echo,

for around and the diminshing of sound" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 384). In the

clearing, between world and earth saying the things is to find yourself in

silence.

The silence of listening for the call and the response to the call do not

require a vocal response. For both Heidegger and Rilke, the realization of the

moment as the essential place for being-with-being is a place reached

through language that transcends "daily chatter". It is chatter, the daily discourse of The Anyone, that precludes a saying of silence. Heidegger writes, "everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 208).

In the reduction of the lived world to a moment, both Heidegger and Rilke allude to the necessity for a silence that accompanies a loss of self. "Namelessly I have belonged to you from the beginning" writes Rilke. For both, the loss of self in order to be "found" in being, suggests religious overtones. Rilke writes, "Between the hammers our heart endures, like the tongue between the teeth, which yet continues to praise", while Heidegger discusses how in the beginning the Word was with God. These references, when combined with Rilke's pervasive theme of transformation to invisibility and Heidegger's persistence of the presence of being, provide for an interpretation of the saying as a search for the divine.

Nietzsche writes, "without god all things are possible". In Thus Spake Zarathustra, he writes,

> I love those who do not seek beyond the stars for a reason to perish and be sacrificed, but who sacrifice themselves to earth in order that earth may some day become superman's. . .

> It is time for man to mark his goal.   It is time for man to plant the germ of his highest hope. . . (Nietzsche, p. 80).

For both Heidegger and Rilke it is the realization of the moment that provides the confirmation of Nietzsche's thought and the accompaning horror and liberation. Realization of moment reveals the dis-continuity of time formerly understood as linear and progressive. The seizure of the moment illustrates the potential for a radically subjective world. Silence, at the moment, can then be understood as the shock of realization as well as the "expression" of the ineffable. Transcending the appearance of the thing, coming into the clearing, man is called by the sounding of being. As man-thing (to being) he provides through his presence the reflective surface for the sounding and, as such, becomes the echo of the call from being. The ineffable does not reveal so much a loss of self as an infusion and diffusion of self into world. The infusion of self can then be seen as a "worlding of a world" by being in which "we" are re-membered as objects of being. The response of silence understood as an echo of being is similar to Heidegger's "drawing into the draft of being". The silence of response becomes closely aligned with prayer or praise as silent expression of echo in response to the ineffable.

Realization of the moment as dis-continous and ecstatic provides a highly precarious view of cosmology. "We are", writes Rilke, "the most

fleeting of all." To realize the moment is to acknowledge the absence of the presence of the gods and to face these "destitute times" which have grown, according to Heidegger, "so destitute it can no longer discern the default of God as a default" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 91). Consumed by technological production and forgetting the moment, we have abandoned a thinking that questions being. We have come to a time in which thinking is, as Novalis wrote, "the dream of a feeling long ago forgotten."

Regaining the thinking of being requires first the realization and seizure of the moment in full force. Existential solitude must not only be re-cognized, it must be suffered. Refusal of suffering, of Heidegger's "venture", constitutes a refusal to ask the question of being and to enter the clearing. This suffering is not the virtuous suffering of pragmatism, to be endured as activity, rather it is existentially necessary to become one with being. Solitude can be seen as the unique and terrifying dimension of belonging.

By following the Word, we follow the way as Heidegger's "traces of the gods." The Word, with God, suggests for both Heidegger and Rilke that in the here-ness of the clearing, in the ecstatic silence of the suspension of time and space, a transcendence of the Word results in the loss of self to One-ness, to

becoming one with being. Any naming, as a reference-to, refutes the totality of being suggesting the presence of an-other. Until the saying is understood as the transformation of earth to invisibility (i.e., nameless), there must always be a consideration of a reference-to and an expression of distinction.

The silent response to the call requires even an additional element of existential danger. Heidegger writes that those who are "ventured are not abandoned." Those who listen for the call and who respond are ventured into the draft but in their venture they are not stranded. They are required, by the listening, to "live dangerously", however, man must make himself present, and, in so doing, risk Heidegger's "cry". "The mere cry dies away and collapses" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 124). By keeping silent, by listening, we run the risk that being is not--that "I" am not. In short, we risk, by crying out into the darkness of earth, the possibility of no response. The risk of confirming solitude is to affirm isolation from being. Both Heidegger and Rilke are insistent that this crying out must be done. Listening for and thinking the question of being are confirmations that the inner-personal can be somehow matched with the outer-universal.

The word "response" comes from re-spondere (to promise in return). The "saying of things" and the "question of being" are expressions of such

response--offered within the shelter of a promise. Even more, both argue that between being and self there can be a com-promise in the sense of reciprocal understanding and being-with. Just as earth needs man to be, being must also need man. "But from what other source could the calling into thought come than from something that in itself needs thought, because the source of the calling wants to be thought about by its very nature?"

Throughout this discussion, emphasis has been placed on poetic thinking rather than poetic thought. The difference rests between the process and the product of a specific mental activity. The culmination of poetic thinking is, of course, the poem. Culmination of thought, in the form of a poem, suggests also the culmination of a relationship between poet and his world. The conclusion of a poetic thought through the expression of the poem indicates that completion of a process by which the poet and his world have, as that moment, reached a sort of agreement. It is the negotiation stage prior to this agreement to which the discussion now turns. During this transitional period, the poet and his world become a vibrant and dynamic conversation in the sense used by George Quasha.

> The Latin discursus meant "conversation", a "running back and forth", rooted in the spoken dynamic of human exchange, and not what became as the lengthy argument of reasonable men, language devoid of listening to the other (Rothenberg and Rothenberg, p. 461).

The "running back and forth" between poet and world indicates the necessity

for movement--"I", as poet, go "out" and travel "though" the world and

return to "my" inner world.

Through conversational movement, the poet en-gages, dis-engages,

creates, and re-stores his world. This movement, for Mooney, the action of

integrating, is essential for an understanding of the poetic inquiry and also

for the redemption of man from these "destitute times". Mooney writes,

> It may be that in some cultural periods, end products can be the
> artists' chief mode of communication, but today, it is not true. The
> chief mode of communication now comes through taking art as a
> means of exploration to basic truths about processes (Mooney, "The
> Artist and Our Human Need", 1979, p.9).

As a sweep of the world, Mooney's infinity sign suggests the flow of poetic

engagement. The infinity sign, in the work of Mooney and for this

discussion, expresses the relationship between man and his world as an

integrative system through which man and world are engaged. It is

important to stress the notion of engagement versus encounter. It is

en-gagement, as a promise, through which the poet and world come into

relation. The promise, as Heidegger's "care", and Rilke's "rescue", is the

confirmation of life for both poet and world through creation.

The point at the intersection of the infinity sign represents, first, the

point at which man enters into the world or the outer realm, the beginning

of the exploration of outer world. At that moment, the intersection of the

sign becomes the point of departure in which "I" travel out into the world, at

which "my" body stays behind and my "me" is issued out as a kind of

re-connaissance within the world that was without "me". It is at this

juncture, this point of departure that man, as poet, realizes the intersection

as a thresh-hold to world. Realization of the intersection as thresh-hold

rather than as precipice, enables the poet to move from the "place" prior to

the intersection, through the intersection, and into the "place" then "known"

as world. Loco-motion, moving from one place to another place, receives its

energy from emotions. Mooney emphasizes, however, that emotion is not

the equivalent of our more mundane understanding.

> Being aware of self or of those operations by which relations are being
> formed in experience is something that comes via "feeling"--feeling
> taken in the sense of "feelers", "gropers", "sensers", not in the sense of
> emotions such as fear, hate, and anger. The understanding of this kind
> of feeling is something artists must have because, in their creating, it
> is feeling that guides and flows the forming (Mooney, "The Artist and
> Our Human Need", 1979, p. 11).

E-motion is the moving-out, the act of apprehension in which the poet

reaches for, grasps, and transforms the outer world. Similar to Mooney's

"feeling" is Jacques Maritain's "connaturality" in which emotion is "an

emotion as form, which, being one with the creative intuition, gives form to

the poem, and which is intentional. . . " (Maritain, 1953, p. 119).

E-motion provides the impetus for the journey outward, away from

the self, up to the intersection, and into a world. This "up to the intersection"

does not imply the presence or location of the intersection as somehow "out

there already", separating self from world and fixed in place. The

intersection, the separation between self and world, represents the "twisting"

of the world, by the poet, in which the place known as world is first posited

so that the journey, or, flow, may continue. As a critical first step to a

"homing of the world", the twist formulating the distinction "self and world",

must be initiated by the poet. Twisting, through the perceptual e-moting of

poetic thinking, provides meaning, or, Mooney suggests, "value" to life. He

writes,

> . . . artists can help people render their daily experiences into value
> forms and value situations. What people want is help to help
> themselves in the process of creating significant values (Mooney, "The
> Artist and Our Human Need", 1979, p. 10).

The twisting into a world, as the separation between self and world leads to

a consideration of the process of the twisting itself as the action of poetic

intentionality. The poet, in the attempt to "home" a world "out there", must

manipulate or grasp the world through feeling and mold the things before

him. The molding of the things of the world into a home-place, into a place

where man belongs is a driving force behind Martin Buber's notion of

"figuration". "Man belongs in nature not merely with his vital acts, not

merely as one who moves, but also as one who perceives" (Buber, 1965, p.

158). Twisting the infinity sign into self and world, poetic intentionality is

the impulse to transcend the appearances of the material world, to come to

terms with where and who "I" am. "The artist", Professor Buber writes, "is

the man who instead of objectifying what is over against him forms it into an

image" (Buber, 1965, p. 160). The formation of an image, Buber's figuration,

begins with the consideration of the sense world as a "stage". Observation

and explanation, as scientific thinking, is supplanted by the vision and

allusion of poetic thinking.

As intentionality, the twisting produces an infinity sign from the

single circle of the uni-verse, the one-voice. The initial twisting of the circle

into self and world is not, however, the poet's act. That initial twist in which

"I" separate from "world" is "my" own birth--the release from the womb.

Womb, as the place of and for all, as the uni-verse in which all is, does not

provide differentiation. Within the womb, "I" am with every-thing, and

therefore, "I" am as everything, anonymous. The womb, as the place for all,

is Rilke's "first home" (in his Eighth Elegy). Human consciousness, the metaphor for the separation between man and other creatures of the earth, separates man as well from his "first home."

With birth, with the "distancing" from the womb, man is "thrown" into his "second home" constructed by his own consciousness and dependent upon the split between "my", "I", and "world". Rilke's "tiny creatures", unlike man, "remain for ever in the womb that brought them forth! Joy of the gnat, that can still leap within, even on its wedding day: for womb is all!" Unlike the gnat who is able to leap "within", man, from birth must always "bridge" the self and world.

Unable to look "out of" the world, Rilke's man is condemned to be "spectators always, everywhere." If man, as spectator, is always looking at rather than out of, it becomes the necessity of poetic thinking to re-turn, to travel through the world as "second home" in search of the call from "first home". It becomes necessary for the poet to become creator, to continue an exploration that, as T. S. Eliot wrote, "shall not cease until we know the place of our beginning for the first time." Knowing the place for the first time, the figurations of the world, is the integrative activity of Mooney, reached in the outer, "real" world.

> This is the bridge to reality, and the drive to establish that reality is great. The struggle is stong, and at times it may be desperate, but with patience and faith, the reality will come. The emergence will be in concreteness" (Mooney, "The Aratist and Our Human Need", 1979, p. 15).

As with Heidegger's "building", the poet in the sweep of the world constructs his "second home" in the image of that "first home" that cannot be regained. With the twist of birth into the "I" and the world, man is forever separated. Rilke, in the Eighth Elegy writes,

> Who's turned us round like this, so that we always,
> Do what we may, retain the attitude of someone who's departing?
> Just as he, on the last hill, that shows him all his valley for the last time,
> Will turn and stop and linger, we live our lives, for ever taking leave.

Departing with the twist of birth, man "finds" himself "here" from "somewhere". The poet, with the twist of intentionality sets out to "home" the outer world through engagement with other things and with other people. Traveling out, going away from his first home of the womb, man leaves behind the permanent and, with the twist, forever finds himself in motion. Forever away from the all of the womb, man is "ventured" but not "abandoned". It is at this junction, the departing of the poet into the world that poetic loneliness may be most profound. Realizing at one time both the necessity to leave home (as the imperative for movement to initiate perception), and, the impossibility of returning home (to the first home), the

poet realizes loneliness as the fundamental human quality.

J. Glenn Gray writes, "The advance of any civilization tends to cover up and obscure man's fundamental relations to his environment and to his fellows" (Gray, p. 96). What is obscured, what is challenged by the advance is the primordial loneliness of man between the womb and the world. Man is, in these times, Heidegger writes, "too late for the gods and too soon for being." The realization of this loneliness is, however, a necessity if the poet is to engage the world as "his" world. The realization of "my" loneliness, as a poet, is accompanied by "my" realization of man's loneliness. In determining his loneliness as fundamental, the poet does not turn inward to the exclusion of others. The poet turns inward to the commonality of all men within each man. In sensing his loneliness the poet confirms what is fundamental to man. Loneliness and the realization of this loneliness do not prescribe a return to an earlier historic time in which man was somehow "one" with world. Man, as man forced from the womb into the world is uniquely separate and distinct from Rilke's gnat within the womb of earth.

Hellmuth Plessner writes,

Even under the most primitive conditions man never had an
absolutely self-contained environment like that of the animals; never

did he possess the natural shelter of an environment attuned to his organs and drives (Cambell, p. 246).

Rather than a sentimental return to a "romanticized" past, poetic thinking provides a mode through which "I" can discover "my" second home in the world--where "I" can "fit". Fitting with the world necessarily involves a fitting between the I and Thou. Realizing "my" loneliness as fundamental begins the process of poetic engagement with the world and with "my" others. We belong together through our individual and inevitable loneliness.

E-moting into the world, the poet, at some point, turns, drawn inward to the direction of his first home. Although now an obsolete word, "en-moving" describes the process well. Moving out, e-moting into the world, the poet, at a point, exhausts himself. The movement out, understood as a familiarization of the world, requires the poet to select what provides him com-fort. Com-fort, in the sense of com (with) fortis (strength), is the poet's ability to match the surroundings--the people and things of his outer world--with the memories from his inner world. The exhaustion of e-motion, the exhalation of self into world, requires return, the inhalation of the inner world that is "my" past, what has come before "my" "now" of the outer world.

With the return, the coming home toward the inner world, the poet

brings with him those "fittings" that have provided him a sense of comfort, of being-at-home, with their match with the poet's "past". The commonness of the outer world with "my" inner world provides the poet with the connection in which as Mooney writes, ". . . the commoness lies in neither pole (externality, internality) but in the process by which we relate internality and externality in experience" (Mooney, "The Artist and Our Human Need", p. 11). Relation, the connection between the "out there" and the "in here", is the meaning-making of poetic thinking. It is, in fact, the source of poetic thinking to create a world, to seek out God in the world, and, in so doing, to emulate God.

Understanding the infinity sign as a symbol of the poetic engagement between self and world, two "home regions" arise. On each far side, the point at which the poet returns to the inner home or the outer home, lies a zone through which the poet passes and "fits" himself. Mooney uses the symbols (+), (-), and (=), as denotations of the manner in which man fits with the world. These fittings, as adoption, rejection, or indifference, suggest a mood or tone which provides the poet a context in which transformation occurs. Understood as sym-pathy, anti-pathy, and em-pathy, the poet fits, or homes, his world to the degree in which he is able to match or engage one world

with the other. Within the flow, whether e-moting or en-moving, the poet, as em-pathetically, anti-pathetically, or sym-pathetically engaged with the world, seeks to match what he brings with him with what he "now" confronts.

In the face-to-face with outer or inner world, the poet, in sym-pathetic relationship with world, is profoundly aware of his own sense of homing the first and second homes. Forming fittings that offer a poignant sense of being-at-home, the poet, in sym-pathetic engagement between outer and inner worlds, achieves a sense of consonnonance between what "was" and what is "now". The inner world, when understood as "my" past, offers memories of who "I" was prior to the "now" of "my" outer world. When "past", or prior to "my" inner world, the outer world provides the stuff for transformation, the material which "I" bring back to my semblance of a first home. As sou-venirs, [sou (up)-venir (coming)], "I" bring up those things and those others who assist in the construction of home. By bringing up, whether to "my" inner world the things and others of the outer world, or to "my" outer world the memories of the "past", the poet re-members his world, cements the past with present, and so consummates the future as potential.

In a sympathetic union of inner and outer world the poet gathers together, as belonging, what is common to both--his own subjectivity. Twisting the world, the poet creates his context for the realization of his own subjectivity. Through the coalescence, the weaving together of what is "out there" with what is "in here", the poet homes his world.

In the twist, designating permanent and temporary (first and second homes), the poet engenders a multitude of differentiations predicated upon public and private worlds. In a sympathetic mode, the poet does not engage every event or item sympathetically. Rather, the sympathetic relationship indicates the poet's ease of exclusion and inclusion with who he is at that place. Sympathetically related between his first and second homes, the poet is at-home-in-the-world, comfortable with his own abilities of exclusion and inclusion as he further homes his world through deeper and more fundamental engagements with both worlds, Rilke writes, "I recognize everything here, and that is why it goes right into me, it is at home in me" (Schwarz, 1984, p. 29).

Relative to the sympathetic mode, the antipathetic mode indicates a dis-engagement, a sense of "poor" fittings in the way in which they contribute to being-at-home. Failing to match the outer and inner world

with any degree of comfort, the poet is able to set the two at a distance but

unable to come into satisfactory relation-with. Maritain writes,

> In a way similar to that in which divine creation presupposes the
> knowledge God has of His own essence, poetic creation presupposes, as
> a primary requirement, a grasping, by the poet, of his own
> subjectivity, in order to create (Maritain, 1953, p. 113).

The anti-pathetic mode of being-in-the-world suggests a

"mal-twisting" of the world in which the distinction between self and world

is only partly the poet's making. The counter-twist of The Anyone

diminshes the Poet's own discretion in the motion of the twist. From this

perspective, it is possible to understand how the twisting of self and other,

predicated on the common sense of the world and carried out by The

Anyone, produces the contemporary estranged man. Disabled from his own

discrimination between self and world, any subsequent discriminations

founded on the public and private spheres are no longer his---neither the

man nor the world bear any personal imprint. Disabled by his inability to

differentiate himself and his world, man finds himself in a state of

dis-ease---unable to be-at-home, unable to transform a world that has been

prescribed as not his own.

Carried one step further, where man's involvement with the twist is

completely eliminated by the overwhelming Anyone, man finds himself

a-pathetically removed from the relationship of self and world. In fact, the relationship itself is eliminiated as the connection between self and world is severed, preventing the articulation of either element as an element of the conversation. With the articulation between self and world curtailed, man finds himself immobilized in a world, whether inner or outer, unable to con-verse with the world. E-motings and en-movings are no longer possible---he is frozen in the strangeness of a place he does not and cannot know.

Lost within a world not of his making, he is no longer even "stranger" as this, too, requires relation-with. He is without relation, without family, he is utterly alone and without connection. Julian Jaynes writes, "How we excerpt other people largely determines the kind of world we live in. Writers and artists are doing in a controlled way what happens "in" consciousness more haphazardly" (Jaynes, p. 62). Being-in-the-world depends upon the cohesion of incidents, assembled as sequences, and then projected as future. With the loss of all relationships, man is crippled, unable for any movement to the "next" event or incident. Without familarity, without a home to leave or to return to, man finds himself in a stroboscopic world where all movements and therefore all perceptions become mechanized. "This is the

terrible tragedy of modern life", writes Clark Moustakas,

> ... the alienation of man from his own feelings, the desensitization of man to his own suffering and grief, the fear of man to experience his own loneliness and pain and the loneliness and misery of others (Moustakas, p. 34).

The a-pathetic twisting becomes so severe, so oppressive, that the bond between is constricted to the point of strangulation, of dis-integration. With this a-pathetic dis-integration, both world and man dissolve, suffocating from the dissolution of their relationship. As Plessner writes, "...without any objectification whatever man is not merely primitive---he is no man at all" (Campbell, 234). Belonging together, both world and man perish in isolation. Rilke writes, "I would imagine to myself a lonely face that raised itself from pillows and sought, sought for some familiar thing, sought for something once seen, but there was nothing there" (Schwarz, p. 32). It is the description of a death scene, in which the loss of familiarity signals the loss of relation. Unable to connect past with present through the re-cognition of things as familiar, the future is removed and man can only whimper and die within a stagnant present.

Poetic thinking, as a formation and re-formation of world establishes man as the organic link to life itself. As the connector between moment and

moment, between "me" and "you", between self and world, the poet creates

his own humanness and develops the humanness of life itself. In exploring

the outer and inner worlds, in e-moting and en-moving, the poet, through

poetic thinking, seeks creation as the integration of his first and second

homes. In doing so, he is not a-bandoned but is banded together with other

men who are also ventured. With the separation from the womb, man

begins to seek ways to re-integrate and to re-member what has been

initially dis-membered. Mooney writes,

> Religion, what is its basic function? The word, itself is cue, deriving
> from re (back) ligare (to bind together)... to form a union---a union of
> emergent knowing... a union with nature, a union with the universe
> (Mooney, "Creation, Continuity and Culture, 1979, p. 280).

Union, the integration of poetic thinking involves man's re-searching for his

first home, his attempt to return to the all in which no-thing lay outside the

boundaries. In the attempt to come home, to re-turn to the One, man seeks

to become un-born once more.

By adding another infinity sign to represent the search of God for man,

the re-searching deepens. The poet's continual re-search for the first home,

the attempt to duplicate that home as the second home in the world, reveals

man's re-turn to God. In exploring the world, as a response to the call from

Being, man presupposes, among and between the things, God. Likewise, in

God's presence within the world, in His search and need for man, God presupposes the presence of man. The things stand between God and man. Earth stands over and against God and man such that earth becomes the medium for the dialogue between the divine and the mortal. The reciprocal need of one for the other creates the relation through which earth serves as the conduit for divine as well as mortal intervention. Shelley writes, "Poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man."

In poetic thinking, man engages the world to provide for an engagement with God. Poetic thinking summons the "promise"---as the com-promise of reality, as the en-gagement with world, as the re-sponse to the call. The most profound of these pledges, however, is the promise of faith, the promise of the presence of God and man as the belonging together, as the integration of life. This relationship, divine and mortal, promises the universal, which pledges the life span of mankind through the recognition and realization of the God within man and the man within God. As the poet explores his world and so dis-covers God, God's presence is realized. Rabbi Heschel writes,

> Man is more than what he is to himself. In his reason he may be limited, in his will he may be wicked, yet he stands in a relation to God which he may betray but not sever and which constitutes the essential meaning of his life. He is the knot in which heaven and earth

are interlaced (Heschel, 1959, p. 134).

Rilke, in his Ninth Elegy, writes, "Earth, is it not your dream to be one day invisible? Earth! Invisible! What is your urgent command, if not transformation?" The invisibility of earth occurs, in poetic thinking, as the mirroring of the outer world, the second home, with the inner first home. The poet "homes" his second home in alignment with his first home. As he comes closer to where "every word is at home", the alignment is more nearly perfected until, "if only once", he dis-covers the Logos the early Greeks intended---the provision of form to matter.

It is the moment when, as George Quasha suggests, "language is true to itself", and man no longer feels himself to be master of language. It is the moment in which "my" inner self and "my" outer world align with one another. "I" come to know what is "real" through the alignment of the earth, now invisible, as it is en-woven with "my" subjectivity. Poetic thinking constructs a tapestry of self and world.

The invisibility of earth comes about as earth is re-cognized by the poet as one element of the Four Fold of earth, sky, God, and man. No longer "knowable" as merely a particular, earth is now realized as co-dependent with sky and belonging within the Four Fold. In saying the things "in ways they never dreamed", poetic thinking gathers together those elements which

belong, and, in their belonging, are together. Rilke writes, "...those things that are so closely akin to us, have by daily parrying been so crowded out of life that the senses with which we could have grasped them are atrophied. To say nothing of God" (Mood, p. 98).

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF POETIC THOUGHT IN PRAGMATIC CULTURE

"Vision is figurating faithfulness to the unknown and does its work in co-operation with it. It is faithfulness not to the appearance, but to being---to the inaccessible with which we associate."   Martin Buber

For contemporary pragmatic America, vision, as a metaphor for being-at-home-in-the-world, offers a way to understand the current sense of dis-integration. When the world is cast by the vision of pragmatism, in the light of scientific thought, the shadow worlds are dissolved. The worlds of mystery, the worlds of the knowable are either physically removed through the conquest of the frontier, or dismissed, through the creation and re-formulation of non-sense. By casting the world "out there" as wilderness, the home becomes shelter not for physical man, but rather for the fears and the accumulation of these fears of man. Venturing out into the world becomes an adventure of necessity and the basis for survival. Survival, based on the encounter and conquest of the environment, becomes a tragic expression of the loss of balance between man and his world. Nishitani

writes,

> .. when the relationship between man and an insensitive world on the one hand, and between this same world and God on the other, are made the ground of religion, what becomes of the relationship between God and man which is religion? (Nishitani, p.49)

In a society where man and world represent a competitive system, loneliness is not only a signal of individual failure but a threat to the society itself. The individual, alone against the world, bands together with other individuals in an effort of resistance to the world "out there" and loneliness is then associated with weakness, with "dis-empowerment." With the banding together of individuals in opposition to the environment, power itself becomes a mode of encounter with the world, the cohesion between men in their mutual opposition to earth. The initial need to "home the world" by clearing the land has become the impetus for man's destruction of his own foundation.

The initial balance between man and frontier, predicated on his own inabilities for conquest, has been offset with the development of technology to the place that man has depleted the earth, removing the very stuff through which he evolves into man. The endless quest for change, for development, has resulted in a view of transformation that is only completed through material appropriation. Rilke's transformation of earth, the poetic

impulse to see transformation as a dialectical process, is alien to the

pragmatic notion of transformation through material quantitative reduction.

In order to "civilize" the frontier, American pragmatism insists on reduction

of the elements, of a kind of physical distillation. Alchemy, for more

"primitive" societies, is a process, a contemplative union with world.

Product, for such a culture is merely by-product to process. But, in the

pragmatic position, alchemy, is a means to an end which is product. Without

great effort we are unable to consider gold, as did Rilke, longing to "go

home", to return to earth.

By looking at balance as an expression of scientific thinking and as an

expression of poetic thinking, "homing the world" can be understood from

dramatically different perspectives. Scientific thought, with its emphasis on

explanation, seeks meaning through fixed connections between the things of

the world. As such, meaning, as constellations within the world, is

cumulative and the language of science finite. Through explanation, balance,

for the scientific world, is achieved and, perhaps more important,

maintained. Contemporary man, when operating primarily with the

language of science, sets the world on a fulcrum in which the dynamics of

balance as process are continually removed. Balance, in the contemporary

scientific world, requires a relationship between man and earth which is fixed upon man's dominion over rather than conservation of the resources at hand.

The contemporary interpretation of resource indicates the pervasiveness of a balance based on the expendability of the stuff of the earth. Rather than offering a concept of new beginnings, of re-newal, resource, for scientific thinking is the source upon which depletion has been at least an implicit goal. The depletion and reduction of resources represents a successful "homing" of a frontier world. The venture out, the exploration of the world as wilderness, resources as fuel, becomes a venture for appropriation and acquisition. Resources, for scientific thinking, fuel contemporary man's destruction of his own potential for a "home-land".

A poetic interpretation of resource, however, envisions resource as dynamic process, a verb. "I", the poet, re-source my-self through "my" flow into the world. "I" come home and again and again re-source my-self into the world with each e-motion and en-motion. In re-sourcing, the poet re-cognizes the world as his place of origin and, with this re-cognition, the poet re-cognizes depletion of the earth as organically connected with his own exhaustion. In the poetic balance of re-sourcing, both men and earth seek

renewal.

In the balance of poetic thinking, world becomes the fulcrum, the hinge of the between of man and God. In the e-motions and en-movings, the poet reconciles self and world through the realization of difference between the two. In doing so, poetic man, in his fundamental loneliness between the inner and outer worlds realizes himself as the difference. The difference of who he is when "out there" as public self and who he is when in the inner world as private self is the expression of a necessity for poetic thinking---doubt. It is doubt, for the poet, that enables his thinking and provides the impetus for movement within the world. It is through doubt that the poet affirms his own sense of the ineffable. A "sense" of the ineffable, of the Kantian noumenal world, is fundamental to a poetic transformation of the things of the world. Through the phenomenal world, the poet finds the material for transformation. However, it is the suggestion of something more, of something profound as the noumenal world, which serves as the source for the allusion of language and the transformation of the things.

Doubt, while fundamental to poetic thinking, is antithetical to the contemporary epistemology founded on explanation. In scientific thinking,

doubt is an obstacle preventing explanation. So long as doubt remains, scientific thought remains inconclusive, and, as such, non-cumulative. Lack of closure, in scientific thought, is a result of flawed or inadequate thought, while, for poetic thinking, lack of closure serves for further allusion, dis-covery, and ultimately, creation.

Contemporary pragmatism, through the assertion that "matter matters", has found it necessary to suppress doubt, and, with its suppression, it has become necessary to relocate the noumenal world. If scientific exploration is to explain, is to "level off", by "clearing the land", the presence of God provides an unnecessary and potentially incapacitating obstacle. It is necessary to divest the wilderness of God, to consider the wilderness not only as God-less, but, in fact, as pagan and in need of the implementation of God. The wilderness is not a place for God, and further, it must be cultivated or civilized to make a place. "Cultivation", in contemporary pragmatism, becomes a means both for de-spoiling the earth as well as the legitimation of these actions by casting the "cultivator" as missionary. By providing the role of cultivator, the wilderness and the cultivator are both rendered inadequate without the forceful intrusion of man into the environment. Ultimately, the further the intrusion into the

phenomenal world, so the concept develops, the closer to "making a place" to which God can then come home to the world.

The assumption of making a home in the world for God's return serves as the fuel for an increased diminishment of wilderness. The "development" of the earth, as a response to "taming" the frontier, provides clear license to the resources, as raw material. Any concept of pantheism or naturalism must be eliminated. In its place, one God, somewhere further "out there", in fact, super-natural, is essential to man's domination of the earth.

By casting the phenomenal world as "all there is", as dis-associated from the noumenal world, contemporary pragmatic American society has "secularized" the everyday. Denying any inter-connections between the physical and spiritual worlds, setting Heaven "out there", has provided access to the earth without fear of consequence. However, in isolating doubt, scientific thought has constructed a paradox. Unable to accept the Kantian position of the unknowable, scientific thinking instead postulates "unknowing".

What is not known, in scientific thinking, can be known through diligence and pursuit. It is pursuit and its application which has lead philosophically to the exhaustion of the earth and the consequent exhaustion

of modern man. Working harder and harder, stripping away more and more

of the phenomenal world, modern man has become unable to accept Gregory

Bateson's suggestion:

> Our imperfect understanding should not be allowed to feed our
> anxiety and so increase the need to control. Our studies could be
> inspired by a more ancient, but today less honored, motive: a
> curiosity about the world of which we are part. The rewards of such
> work are not power but beauty (Bateson, p. 269).

Having dismissed the spiritual from the material world, modern man reaches

the final layers of the phenomenal world and finds his pursuit has resulted

in what Buber refers to as an ordered world rather than the world order.

In ordering the world through explanation, rather than dis-covering

the world order through allusion, contemporary man fails to re-cognize his

relationship with the world as a being among beings. Unable to "let things

lay before him and take them to heart", unable to follow the Buberian

notions of distance and relation, scientific thought finds in the phenomenal

world only layers to be stripped away. For scientific thinking the world can

be re-finished by melting away each layer until only the original surface

remains.

For poetic thinking, rather than a melting away, the approach is

closely associated with the artistic concept of pentimento. In the process of

pentimento a "new" painting emerges when a previous painting begins to reveal itself from underneath the "current" surface. As the various paints chemically react to one another, some layers begin to emerge, while others gradually recede. Pentimento provides a metaphor for understanding poetic thinking as the "letting things be", in their phenomenal state, so that their noumenal state can emerge in the "taking them to heart". The constant and dynamic e-mergings and re-cessings provide a picture of reality that is constantly in flux, constantly in-constant.

It is important to emphasize the character of pentimento not only for its qualities of emergence and recession but to note also the constructive layering involved in this process. Pentimento offers a perspective for poetic thinking both in its meaning-making through dis-covery as well as its meaning-making through the initial layering of one reality strata upon another. Empirical reality, when considered poetically, is subjected to radical doubt, and in this subjectification is made malleable and personally rendered. Reality, when subjected to poetic inquiry, becomes dynamic and realized as potential rather than as object. Rilke writes, "Is it possible that despite discoveries and progress, despite culture, religion and world-wisdom, one has remained on the surface of life?" (Schwarz, p. 14) For the poet, a

refusal to doubt, a refusal to question "my" understanding and "fit" with the "one objective world", constitutes a refusal to integrate "me" with world. In the failure of integration, both "my" existence and the world, for me, are jeopardized.

For the poet, the particular is of extreme importance. In the isolation of the particular, the poet sets an object at a distance so that, through poetic transformation, poet and object can become as one. Rilke writes, "He was a poet and hated the approximate" (Schwarz, p. 100). In isolating the particular the poet celebrates more than the isolation of the object and his own subjectively constructed sample of reality. In the isolation he also sets in motion a process by which constellations of meaning are constructed and adapted. By considering meaning-making as the connections of isolated and personalized objects within the world, the poet is dependent upon diversity.

Diversity, for the poet, is both the manner in which he dis-covers the world as well as the manner in which he constructs the world through linguistic allusion. "Playing with the world", the poet doubts his own reality, his past, and his potential as future. In doing so, he is dependent upon Bateson's stochastic system of world in which randomization becomes an essential element of world. Rather than the cumulative, ordered world of

scientific thinking, the world which emerges from poetic thinking is constantly yet inconsistently changing. By viewing the world in this manner, the poet engages a world in the Heraclitean sense of being present at what happens to him. As a result, Dilthey writes,

> ... the continuity between what we remember and the present, the continued existence of a qualitatively determined reality, and the continued effectiveness of the past as a power in the present, give to what is remembered a peculiar characteristic of 'being present' (Dilthey, p. 71).

By being present at what happens to him, by first engaging a world through the epoché and then through poesis, the poet synthesizes his time and makes himself at home with world. In the synthesis of past, present, and future, the poet "samples out" an event which, for Dilthey, "... becomes a symbol, not for a particular idea but for a complex seen in life" (Dilthey, p. 38). Through dynamic engagement as balance with the world, the poet's ability for re-memberence is enabled. In re-cognizing the importance of the past as the meaning-giving category of life, Dilthey indicates the significance of the past as foundation, as reference point for subsequent experiences. In contrast to scientific thinking based upon a constant push towards future, towards a development based upon goal and completion, poetic thinking, in seeking out the particular, dwells in the world and assumes a contemplative

attitude towards the things of the world.

Dilthey writes, "We call an attitude contemplative, esthetic, and artistic, when the subject finds rest, as it were, from the labor of scientifically investigating nature." (Dilthey, p. 69) It is important to note Dilthey's mention of "rest", for it is the contemplative attitude of poetic thinking, as the synthesis of past, present, and future, that enables the poet to be present. Being present, the poet realizes himself as "here" relative to the flux of time. In his here-ness, he realizes a degree of rest through an ecstatic pause.

The importance of past for poetic thinking also includes the co-related notions of respect and reverence for the world. By first re-specting (looking back) on his world and then re-vering (holding in awe) his world, the poet lets the things be and takes them to heart. In re-specting his world, the poet considers the past as his past. In re-vering, the poet re-cognizes similarities between his-story and the story of the world, between the personal and the universal. It is the attitude which Dilthey describes as "universal sympathy" in which the "dissonances of life dissolve in a universal harmony of all things" (Dilthey, p. 69). Through the epoché "I" and the object "meet", in isolation, and through the union of poesis, "I" and the object become

relationally meaningful. As such, "I", as poet, re-cognize my-self as a being among beings.

Respect and reverence suggest, for the poet, a co-relative expression of the public and the private. "My" respect is displayed to the world, is exhibited to those others within my surrounding world. Reverence, on the other hand, is "my" understanding of how "I" feel. The union of thinking and feeling allows the poet to engage his world, to accept a universe comprised both of phenomenal and noumenal characteristics. It is the relationship of thinking and feeling which provides for "universal sympathy."

In contrast to the poetic unity of thinking and feeling, scientific thought suggests feeling as somehow less significant, obviously non-empirically verifiable. The failure to understand thinking and feeling as co-related modes of being results in the scientific concept of knowledge as distinguished from a poetic sense of wisdom. The scientific world-view, by positing a world which ultimately can be known, suggests an order to be revealed. With cause and effect, scientific thought understands the world as "knowable". The world order, conceptually constructed through cause and effect, can be manipulated and re-ordered. By re-ordering the order of the world, scientific thinking realizes control. Failure to know the order is a

failure to have thought adequately, never a failure to have felt sufficiently. In eliminating the significance of feeling as an element of thinking, a scientific world-view negates the existence of any noumenal characteristics within a world by virture of the failure of appearance.

Perhaps as important to the negation is the failure of scientific thinking to posit any boundaries for knowledge. Poetic thinking, by acknowledging the noumenal world through allusion, establishes a boundary between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds in which language is the bridge. As a connector between these worlds, poetic language recognizes the boundary between the two not as obstacle but as parameter. As Heidegger writes,

> A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing (Heidegger, 1971, p. 154).

Language, as poetic allusion, provides the presencing of the noumenal world by recognizing the boundary of knowledge as the barrier of the ineffable. In seeking the noumenal world, through allusion, the poet transforms the things of the world through a re-naming of the things. In this way, fantasy, as the presentation of the noumenal world becomes significant for poetic thinking. By creating or re-presenting the things of the

world through linguistic allusion, the poet connects the things "out there" with the inner world of self. In so doing, the poet harmonizes his inner world with an outer world and brings a quality of alignment to both worlds now seen as universe.

In contrast to this, scientific-technological thinking, with its rejection of allusion and fantasy, provides a world "out there" and "me" as necessarily distinct. Rather than a poetic wisdom with the world, scientific-technological knowledge "has" the world and "uses" the world for the generation of "new" knowledge. As the self and world are distinguished, scientific knowledge deposes the need for belief, concentrating instead upon the repression of belief through the accumulation of knowledge.

Scientific-technological thinking further precludes the acceptance of feelings as the result of its perspective on the need for control of the external environment. Accepting the natural world as in need of control and an implementation of order, the scientific perspective suggests a similar approach to the inner world as well. Belief, then, as empirically unverifiable, becomes inadequate. In controlling the inner world, like the outer world, e-motions are necessarily truncated. Removing the emotions as a viable way of knowing precludes not only the reaction to an isolated event but also the

e-moting in which further exploration is enabled. By de-meaning the

emotions, the world, as material for future meaning-making is consequently

de-meaned. The alienation of self from personal emotions is one and the

same with the alienation of self from world. Deprived of emotions and

e-moting, man lives within an inner world dramatically insulated from the

world "out there". The an-aesthetic world turns in upon itself leaving "me"

out side the out there.

Peter Berger, in The Sacred Canopy writes, ". . . it is important to recall

that the relationship between human activity and the world produced by it

is and remains dialectical, even when this fact is denied, consciousness"

(Berger, p. 96).

The recognition of a mis-alignment between "my" inner world, or, who

"I" am, with the outer world, or, who "I" am out there, remains just that, a

recognition. "I" perceive myself as alienated, a stranger to the world of my

own construction. Alienation, for Berger,

> . . . is the process whereby the dialectical relationship between the
> individual and his world is lost to consciousness. The individual
> 'forgets' that this world was and continues to be co-produced by him.
> Alienated consciousness is undialectical consciousness (Berger, p. 85)

Berger suggests, in keeping with the notion of poetic thinking, that

man without his own recognition of the world as his meaning is estranged

not only from that world "out there" but estranged from himself as well.

Where Berger differs from the concepts of poetic thinking is in his notion

that religion somehow is a significant cause of alienation, and, in fact, the

cause is largely predicated upon poetic thinking. Berger writes,

> Religion posits the presence in reality of beings and forces that are
> alien to the human world. Be that as it may, the assertion, in all its
> forms, is not amenable to empirical inquiry. What is so amenable,
> though, is the very strong tendency of religion to alienate the human
> world in the process (Berger, p. 89).

The human world, for Berger, as the world of socially constructed

reality, is removed from the influence of human intervention by calling upon

"alien beings" with greater power and abilities. Berger takes the position

that religion, in positing the existence of an empirically unverifiable

noumenal world, removes man from his necessary role as world-constructor.

By handing over the keys of the kingdom to God, man fails to assume the

responsibility for his own primary role in meaning-making. Man therefore

becomes impotent.

Poetic thought does not suggest a separate reality to which man has no

access. The noumenal characteristics of the world are not inherently covert.

God, for the poet, is concealed by the abuse or mis-use of language in which

everyday experiences are lost in the banality of the everyday. Poetic

thinking emphasizes belief and seeks, through the everyday, to join man and God through the common experience of nature. The Heideggerian concept of the everyday, the insistence upon letting things be, his call for the unification of the Four Fold, all point to poetic thought as contemplation in which God and all of nature conjoin.

Belief in a noumenal world, however, does not result in a sort of human automaton. On the contrary, belief requires that "I" act in a way which significantly differs from what "I" understand. For me to believe, "I" must first become aware of my own lack of understanding. In the Kantian phenomenal-noumenal world-view, to believe, "I" must first come to the boundary of the phenomenal in which "I" can know no more. "Knowing no more" can only suggest that "I" know, in some way, that there is more to be known, and that "I" currently do not know it. Belief depends on "my" understanding of "my" lack of understanding and acting or thinking in a manner consonnant with the ineffable qualities of which "I" do not know. Berger's argument that the initial stage in which "I" understand my lack of understanding represents "false consciousness" is quite accurate. Berger writes,

> Whatever may be the ultimate merits of religious explanations of the universe at large, their empirical tendency has been to falsify man's

consciousness of that part of the universe shaped by his own activity, namely, the socio-cultural world (Berger, p. 90).

False consciousness for poetic thinking equates with the notion that the everyday is irrevocably separate from the noumenal, that the phenomenal has no "real" connection with the noumenal. By providing a perspective in which man's consciousness not only produces the everyday world but also participates in the connection between phenomenal and noumenal, poetic thinking rescues thinking from the secular and re-invites the sacred. Poetic thinking is not oppositional to reason. Poetic thinking opposes the failure to see within reason the non-reasonable, what John Cage calls the willingness to see that chaos and order are not opposed, and, to effect the balance between phenomenal and noumenal as the dynamic exploration of world. Alienation is not so much the result of a failure to account for human construction of social reality as it is a failure to account for human activity as meaningful and sacred.

Poetic thought, through belief, considers identity as a match between the "me", "I" know as "me", or, the private "I", and, the "me" as "I" know "I" am known by others, or, the public "I". The multiple "I" necessary for the apprehension of belief, the necessity that "I" act in a manner "I" also understand to be dissonant with "my" understanding, establishes the

possibility for the articulation of a public and private "I". Novalis writes,

> The inner world is as it were more than the outer. It is so intimate,so home-like---one would like to live completely in it---it is so familiar and native. It is a pity that it is so dreamlike, so uncertain. Must then of all things the best, the truest appear so apparent---and the apparent so true? What is outside me is precisely in me and vice versa (Baron, p. 195).

Novalis' consideration of poetic transformation of reality, like Rilke's,

reflects the radical doubt of poetry in relation to empirical reality coupled

with radical belief in the potential for realization of the noumenal world.

Whether with Novalis---"the stars would rise in him", or, with Rilke---"the

birds pass through me", the poetic identity emphasizes not only the belief

but the necessity for a synthesis of beings by which nature and man are

harmonized.

In addition to connecting the inner and outer worlds through the

poetic consideration of a spiritual world, poetic thought constructs a sense of

being-at-home by providing place for both my absence and my presence. As

the un-conditional "place" for "my" belonging, "I" am enabled to leave home

and come to home throughout the poetic search of the world. By

being-at-home, whether as the public "I" or as the private "I", the search

confirms the alignment of inner and outer worlds with the positioning of

"my" poetic identity.

Dilthey writes, "Poetry does not attempt to know reality as science does, but it aims to reveal what general significance an event has, or men and objects assume, in the vast network of life relationships" (Dilthey, p. 37). It is this "vast network of life relationships" that poetic thinking anticipates and nourishes through its affirmations of respect and reverence. Looking back, "always taking leave" as Rilke writes, the poet re-searches his past against the background of mankind's past, re-sources himself as a being among other beings in the world, and re-veres what is most poignant and most profound, the ineffable quality of being-at-home in the world.

As homeward bound beings, poets harmonize the universal and personal with the common needs of man---to belong, to love and to hate, to overcome, and, ultimately, to survive. As homeward bound, poets re-cognize the earth as their source and re-source, as their empirical reality and their inner reality, as the commodity for their enterprise of life. Bound by home, the poet is irrevocably promised to the earth and the earth to him in poetic encounter. As the things "become more than they had ever dreamed" and man begins a dialogue with God, the earth is re-sourced as sacred place for meeting. The eschatological impulse is expressed by "homeward bound" as a journey to the super-natural world following death. Homeward bound, for

the poet, commands his attention, through linguistic allusion, to the earth as source for the promise of engagement through belief. In doubting the world, in suspending the empirical reality of history and material sciences, the poet transforms the world. In aligning the inner and outer worlds with public and private domains and providing a sense of co-respondence, the poet brings home to the world as he brings himself into the world and the world into himself. In the co-respondence, both the inner and the outer worlds provide echoes to one another, and, in doing so realize an alignment similar to Heidegger's notion of "dwelling."

Dwelling, as "the basic character of human being", is the primal mode in which man is man on earth. As a dweller, man, through cultivation and construction, carries out the poetic notions of respect and reverence. Heidegger remarks that the Greek work "techne" meant "to bring forth or to produce". Technology, in contemporary society, fails to account for dwelling as man's fundamental character of human being. Contemporary technology, even so called "appropriate technology", fails to adequately re-member dwelling as a pre-requisite for being human. "Only if we are capable of dwelling", writes Heidegger, "only then can we build." (Heidegger, 1971, p. 160) Building as constructing on the earth rather than with the earth fails

to re-call the promise of engagement. By the failure to re-call, man separates from earth and is left without home.

The Greek sense of "techne", indicating a "bringing forth", is parallel to our sense of fantasy. The fantastic process of poetic thinking---through which earth and earth things are transformed, through which "my" public and "my" private self are identified and aligned, through which inner and outer worlds are harmonized, requires that man dwell poetically. Heidegger writes, "Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 218).

In America today the separateness of inner and outer worlds, of "my" life to the lives around me, of even me to me, leads to a desolation of the earth. All around are the maneuverings and manipulations of man who, in the fear of loneliness and the antagonism towards earth and earth things, finds himself the desolator. In the dismissal of spiritual reality an American consciousness has so ravaged the surroundings that to "fit" with the world is in itself an aberration. It is not false consciousness to balance the material and the spiritual, to find within and among the things of the world another

world of noumenal dimensions. It is not religion but a dismissal of religion that has resulted in an American consciousness willing to steal the sacred from the earth. In settling the country, Americans, too, settled in. Home, as a shelter from wilderness was "fixed". No longer a wanderer, no longer nomadic, contemporary man no longer takes home with him, no longer sees and hears gods all around him.

In American poetry and thinking, however, are the traces of thinking and feeling that equate Heidegger's "dwelling" with a "homing of the world". Mooney's poetry and prose especially appeal to a sense of home in which man and earth can be at home with one another, in which man and earth are co-respondents. Poetic thought, with its respect and reverence, as in Buber's distance and relations, redirects the American sense of cultivation. Walt Whitman writes,

> The main shapes arise!
> Shapes of Democracy total, results of centuries,
> Shapes ever projecting shapes,
> Shapes of turbulent manly cities,
> Shapes of the friends and home-givers of the whole earth,
> Shapes bracing the earth and braced with the whole earth.

Whitman's vision of a robust American cultivating spirit re-sounds in Mooney's "Relocating God and Man and Nature".

Man can recognize
universe and God,
nature and man,
his genesis,
his now-abiding place
for going on,
his means and end,
affording him such meaning,
harmony of joining in,
and happiness,
as he, in consciousness,
can, himself, attain.

Through poetic thinking the current estrangement of man and world,

the current homeless-ness of contemporary man can be rescued.

Re-specting, American thinking can witness the development of its own

erring as it chose a course counter to its own source in nature. Re-vering,

American thinking can come into relation with the earth and its inhabitants,

honoring the call of being as the promise of life.

Breath

There is a remote echo of a whisper
Still
On the lips of the earth. . .
No longer heard
But faintly felt
In a resistance that seeks
Rather than contains.

But, in our dis-memberment so complete
(we attack without fear of reprisal)
We dissect the atom
And so turn the world upon itself.

Once I think we knew . . .
But now, unable to be-held . . .
And listen . . .

The whisper could re-member us.
We could be drawn through the inhalation
To the lingering nearness
But in the looking
We plot points to stretch them apart.
We form lines
We extend space
Until in-side-out,
We turn
Towards any light from someplace else . . .

Unable to recognize a note from home . . .
Still believing the stars are following us.

John Mann

CHAPTER V

EPILOGUE

We live in times marked by desperate searchings-for. Poetic thinking

offers the search as hope for comfort, through engagement with the world.

It is necessary to remember, though, when speaking of poetic thinking, that

history harbors memories where poetic thinkers consorted with evil. Too

often, "poets" invoke Culture as a way to prevent progress towards a more

just and a more humane world. Too often, poems and poets have

contributed to campaigns and campaign-constructors seeking to bring others

to their knees. It is necessary to remember that Martin Heidegger supported

Hitler's Nazi regime as a member of the Nationalist Socialist Party. Behind

the poetic words of Heidegger are always these words . . .

> Doctrine and "ideas" shall no longer govern your existence. The
> "Führer" himself, and only he, is the current and future reality of
> Germany, and his word is your law. Learn to know ever more deeply
> within you: "From now on every matter demands determination and
> every action demands responsibility.

> Heil Hitler!
> Martin Heidegger (Runes, p. 28)

In those moments when poetic thinking assumes the absolute, when

God is found, and, through a poet-oracle, commands; man loses sight of the

necessity for diversity. Diversity, for poetic thinking as well as for the world

at large, acts as a release valve against the Answer. In naming the Absolute

and offering the Answer, man attends to desperation and foregoes the

search. In the foregoing, man allows desperation to overshadow the vision

of the search.

Despair offsets the balance found in man's loneliness with the world.

In despair poetic thinking forsakes diversity and submits to technology.

Nowhere is the successful pervasion of technology more apparent than in the

de-meaning of the search and the searchers. Collected and categorizing,

seeking only the uniform, man announces God and maligns the ineffable.

The claim of ineffability in contemporary society too often disguises man's

attempts for gain and control.

It is also necessary to re-member, though, that ineffability may

suggest man's faith in life itself. An abuse of faith indicts only the abusor.

Losing sight of faith, man betrays the ineffable. In the betrayal man and

God suffer.

Today, in man's efforts to distance himself from suffering, the betrayal

flourishes. Without the risk of suffering man fails to amplify the pain

around him and an an-aesthetic world persists amidst starvation, war, poverty, and disease. Technology reveals its disdain for life as it desperately prolongs death. The cables and hoses of life-support systems are fed by fear, not by joy.

The Homeless . . . the Poor . . . the Abused . . . are only categories for discussion. Matching grants and long-distance call-ins only distance the particulars within the categories. The elderly woman alone, wandering a late night city street . . . the middle-aged man, alone at home, without a job, without hope . . . the bruised and swollen face of a child alone in the emergency room . . . the particulars must be suffered for the victims they are.

In sensing the suffering of the world, poetic thinking gives voice to man's own inhumanity. It is courage that rebukes the idolatry of the Answer. In man's inhumanity lies the power for his own rescue.

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