Responsibility, Reaction, and Value

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Abstract:
Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.

Keywords: Responsibility - Value - Reactive attitudes - Fitting attitudes - P. F. Strawson

Article:
I
It has been almost 50 years since P. F. Strawson called our attention to the connection between responsibility and the reactive attitudes.¹ His seminal article gave rise to a minor industry that continues to this day—a fact confirmed by this very paper, which constitutes yet another attempt to determine just what the connection in question is.

In his article, Strawson makes reference to a variety of attitudes that he calls “reactive”—gratitude, resentment, and forgiveness; moral approval and disapproval; shame and guilt—and of practices, such as punishment, that incorporate these attitudes. Each particular attitude has its own particular function, but, he claims, they share a common bond with responsibility. It is hard to know exactly what Strawson takes this bond to be. He appears to think that the reactive attitudes are in some way constitutive of responsibility,² but nowhere does he spell out just what this idea comes to. At times he appears to be arguing that to adopt a reactive attitude toward someone in respect of something is to hold that person in some way responsible for that thing. Initially, this does not seem implausible. But he also appears at times to argue that to be responsible for something just is to be the object of a reactive attitude in respect of that thing. When combined, these views yield the following thesis.

\[(1) \quad P \text{ is responsible for } x = df. P \text{ is held responsible for } x.\]
This thesis is unacceptable. One reason is that it is circular (unless “responsible” is being used in more than one sense). If we are to understand responsibility in terms of the reactive attitudes, then we cannot understand the reactive attitudes in terms of responsibility. Despite the initial attractiveness of doing so, then, I suggest that we not understand the reactive attitudes as modes of holding someone responsible for something. Perhaps they are to be analyzed in different terms, or perhaps they are unanalyzable. In any case, we should replace (1) with

\[ (2) \quad \text{P is responsible for } x = df. \text{ P is the object of some reactive attitude in respect of } x. \]

But this thesis is unacceptable also. We can easily imagine cases in which someone is responsible for something although he is not the object of any reactive attitude (perhaps because no one is aware of what he has done), and we can easily imagine cases in which someone is the object of a reactive attitude in respect of something although, since the attitude is misguided, he is not responsible for that thing.

Much more plausible than (2) is

\[ (R) \quad \text{P is responsible for } x = df. \text{ It is fitting to adopt some reactive attitude toward P in respect of } x. \]

The idea here is that, whether or not P is in fact the object of some reactive attitude, if he is responsible for x then there is good reason to adopt such an attitude toward P; he is an apt candidate for such a reaction; he deserves or is worthy of such a reaction; it would be appropriate so to respond to him. This is precisely of what his being responsible for x consists.

Thesis R bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is currently the focus of a great deal of attention. That thesis may be put as follows:

\[ (V) \quad x \text{ is good [neutral, bad] } = df. \text{ It is fitting to favor [be indifferent toward, disfavor] } x. \]

Here, “favor” serves as a place-holder for one of an indefinite variety of pro-attitudes, while “disfavor” is a place-holder for some contra-attitude. This thesis about value may be traced back at least to the writings of Franz Brentano, if not before. It was given what was perhaps its first definitive statement by A. C. Ewing, and it has since been invoked by Roderick Chisholm, Noah Lemos, and others. These others include Thomas Scanlon, who 10 years ago wrote the following:

We judge things to be good or valuable because of other properties that they have. Often these are physical or psychological properties, as, for example, when we judge something to be good because it is pleasant, or judge a discovery to be valuable because it provides new understanding of how cancer cells develop. But being good or valuable cannot be identified with any such “natural” property or, more generally, with any non-normative property. This is the lesson of [G. E. Moore’s] open-question argument...

But even if being valuable cannot be identified with any set of natural properties, it remains true that a thing’s having these properties can be grounds for concluding that it is valuable. What, then, are the relations between these natural properties, the property of being valuable, and the reasons that we have for behaving in certain ways in regard to things that are valuable? There seem to be two possibilities. The first is that when something has the right natural properties it has the further property of being valuable, and that property gives us reason to behave or react in certain ways with regard to it... The alternative, which I believe to be correct, is to hold that being good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons... Since the claim that some property constitutes a reason is a normative claim, this account also takes goodness and value to be non-
natural properties, namely the purely formal, higher-order properties of having some lower-order properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind. It differs from the first alternative simply in holding that it is not goodness or value itself that provides reasons but rather other properties that do so. For this reason I call it a buck-passing account. 9

The particular account of value that Scanlon endorses may be put as follows:

(3) \( x \) is good [neutral, bad] = \( df. \ x \) has some property that provides a reason to favor [be indifferent toward, disfavor] \( x \).

This is a qualified version of V, one that specifies that what provides a reason, or renders it fitting, to adopt some attitude toward \( x \) is some property that \( x \) has (The property in question must of course be distinct from the property of goodness, for otherwise the analysis would once again be circular. It is the property upon which \( x \)'s goodness supervenes). I take it that this is something that all advocates of V would regard as implicit in V; that is, all advocates of V are buck-passers. V is thus equivalent to (3).

Since Scanlon wrote the words just quoted, the buck-passing analysis of value has been the subject of intense debate. I propose to discuss some aspects of this debate. Doing so will, I think, help shed some light on R, to which V bears such a close resemblance.

II

V is open to three objections.

The first objection challenges the claim, implicit in V, that it is necessarily the case that whatever is good [neutral, bad] is such that it is fitting to favor [be indifferent toward, disfavor] it. Consider, for example, a good garrote, or a good liar. Surely there is no need to think that the garrote or the liar warrants any kind of favorable response. 10

One reply to this objection is to insist that the garrote or liar does warrant a favorable response; as far as garrotes or liars go, it is the good ones that merit preference.

As it stands, this reply will not do. There are surely many contexts in which we should say that bad garrotes or bad liars are to be preferred to good ones. Perhaps the reply can be qualified in some way in order to get around this problem, but I confess I do not know just what qualification would do the trick.

A second reply to the objection is to concede that not everything that is good warrants a favorable response but to maintain that some important subset of good things is such that every member of the subset warrants such a response. W. D. Ross, for example, distinguishes between the adjunctive or attributive use of “good” and the predicative use of this word. 11 When we talk of good garrotes and good liars, we are using the word attributively; when we say that pleasure or courage is good, we are using it predicatively. The grammatical distinction is a mark (admittedly fallible) of a difference in senses of “good.” It seems plausible to claim that it is necessarily the case that whatever is good in the sense in which pleasure or courage is good—let us simply call this the “predicative” sense—is something that warrants a favorable response. 12 I am inclined, therefore, to endorse this reply to the objection.

The second objection to V challenges the claim that it is necessarily the case that whatever it is fitting to favor [be indifferent toward, disfavor] is good [neutral, bad]. This objection raises what has come to be called the “Wrong Kind of Reason” problem, since it was originally applied to Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value which, as noted in the last section, is couched in terms of reasons in particular, rather than in terms of what it is fitting to do or in terms of what warrants doing. 13 Consider, for example, the prima facie duty of fidelity that Ross discusses. 14 It seems reasonable to say that, if someone has made a promise to do something, then there is,
at least in many cases, a reason to favor his doing it. But should we say that his doing it is therefore good? It is not obvious that we should. Indeed, Ross indicates that he himself would not say this, insofar as he calls the duty of fidelity a “special” duty that does not fall under the general duty to promote intrinsic value. But the matter is difficult. A more dramatic case, of a sort that has been the focus of recent discussion, may be more persuasive. Suppose, then, that a powerful demon threatens to inflict severe suffering on you unless you favor another person’s suffering. Surely you have very good reason to comply with the demon’s wishes. But, equally surely, this fact does not render the other person’s suffering good.

Many attempts have been made to handle this objection. In my view, the most natural solution is to note that the Wrong Kind of Reason objection of course concerns the wrong kind of reason. It applies directly to

\[(3) \ x \text{ is good [neutral, bad]} = df. \ x \text{ has some property that provides a reason to favor [be indifferent toward, disfavor]} x,\]

but not to

\[(V) \ x \text{ is good [neutral, bad]} = df. \text{ It is fitting to favor [be indifferent toward, disfavor]} x.\]

Even if it is granted that you have a reason to favor the other person’s suffering, it is less clear that the demon’s threat makes it fitting for you to favor it. Indeed, if we move from “fitting” to some other terms that are sometimes used in this context—“worthy,” for example (a term used by Brentano himself, who pioneered this sort of analysis), or “deserving”—I think it is pretty clear that the demon’s threat is impotent, insofar as it does nothing to render the other person’s suffering worthy or deserving of favor. To escape the objection, a proponent of V need only insist that his thesis is to be understood in just such terms—for example as

\[(V') \ x \text{ is good [neutral, bad]} = df. \ x \text{ is worthy of favor [indifference, disfavor]}\]

or

\[(V'') \ x \text{ is good [neutral, bad]} = df. \ x \text{ deserves favor [indifference, disfavor]}.\]

A proponent of V, so understood, can agree that there is always reason to favor that which is good, but he is not committed thereby to agreeing that whatever there is reason to favor is good. On the contrary, it is only when one has a reason of the right kind to favor something—a reason that is constituted by the thing’s being worthy or deserving of favor—that it follows that the thing in question is good. Contrary to what I may initially have seemed to suggest, then, I think we should be careful to distinguish between reason,” “fitting,” “appropriate,” “apt,” “worthy,” “warrants,” “deserves,” “merits,” and so on. V is plausible when couched in some of these terms, but not so plausible when couched in others.

The third objection to V does not challenge the claim that there is a strict equivalence between what has value and what is fitting to favor (or be indifferent toward, or disfavor) but does challenge the claim that value is to be understood in terms of the fittingness of favor (or indifference, or disfavor). This challenge is based on the allegation that, if it is fitting to favor something, x, this will be because x is good, in the sense that it is x’s goodness that grounds the fittingness of favoring it; the goodness comes first, as it were. But then it cannot be that goodness is itself to be understood in terms of fittingness of favor, and so V is to be rejected.

One reply to this objection is simply to deny the allegation and to insist on the buck-passing nature of goodness. Consider, for example, some courageous act which, we may assume, is (both) good and deserving of some form of favor. What accounts for the act’s being (both) good and deserving of favor is the fact that it is courageous. It is good because it is courageous and it deserves favor because it is courageous. We should not say further that it deserves favor because it is good; that would be to multiply grounds beyond necessity.
I find this reply hard to assess. It has the advantage of simplicity, but I fear that it is too simple. Certainly, I find it quite natural to say that the reason why it is fitting to favor courageous behavior is because such behavior is good. I am inclined, therefore, to endorse the objection and thus to reject V, while nonetheless accepting the following related claim:

\[(4) \text{Necessarily, } x \text{ is good [neutral, bad] in the predicative sense if and only if } x \text{ deserves favor [indifference, disfavor].}\]

Consider, by way of comparison, the following thesis:

\[(5) \text{Necessarily, } P \text{ has a right against } Q \text{ that } Q \text{ do } A \text{ if and only if } Q \text{ has a duty to } P \text{ to do } A.\]

Many writers have subscribed to this thesis. I know of no writer, however, who has advocated elevating it to the status of a conceptual analysis by modifying it as follows:

\[(6) P \text{ has a right against } Q \text{ that } Q \text{ do } A = df. Q \text{ has a duty to } P \text{ to do } A.\]

I suspect that the lack of support for (6) is due in part to the fact that it seems natural, at least in many cases, to say that, if \(Q\) has a duty to \(P\), this is because \(P\) has the relevant right against \(Q\). This would seem to indicate that \(Q\)’s duty is grounded in \(P\)’s right.

III

Given its similarity to \(V\), \(R\) is open to three similar objections.

The first objection challenges the claim, implicit in \(R\), that it is necessarily the case that, if \(P\) is responsible for \(x\), then it is fitting to adopt some reactive attitude toward \(P\) with respect to \(x\). Suppose that Paul is causally responsible for some spilt milk. It does not follow that he deserves some kind of reaction (blame, for example) on account of this—he may be just a baby. Or suppose that Paula is legally responsible for some offense. Again, it does not follow that she deserves some kind of reaction (punishment, for example)—the legal regime may be corrupt and the offense perfectly justified.

One reply to this objection is to insist that Paul and Paula do merit some kind of reaction, but I cannot see how this reply might be successfully defended. A second reply seems to me clearly better, one that resembles the reply I suggested be made to the first objection to \(V\): we should concede that not all responsible agents warrant some kind of reaction and yet maintain that every member of some important subset of responsible agents warrants some kind of reaction. One such subset strikes me as an obviously plausible candidate: the set of morally responsible agents. I believe it is indeed correct to say that, necessarily, if \(P\) is morally responsible for \(x\), then it is fitting to adopt some reactive attitude toward \(P\) with respect to \(x\).

The second objection to \(R\) challenges the claim that it is necessarily the case that, if it is fitting to adopt some reactive attitude toward \(P\) with respect to \(x\), then \(P\) is responsible for \(x\). I do not recall having seen any previous discussion of this objection, but it is apparent that a Wrong Kind of Reason problem can be raised regarding \(R\) just as it can regarding \(V\). Suppose a powerful demon threatens to inflict severe suffering on you unless you berate a clearly innocent person. Surely you would have very good reason to comply with the demon’s wishes; but, equally surely, this fact does not somehow render the innocent person guilty.

As before, I believe that the best reply to this objection is to distinguish between “reason,” “fitting,” and so on. Even though you clearly have good reason to berate the other person, it is less clear that it is fitting or
appropriate for you to do so, or that he is an apt candidate for your doing so. And even if he is an apt candidate for your doing so, it seems very clear that he is not blameworthy. And so I would simply urge that we understand R in terms of either

\[(R')\] \(P\) is responsible for \(x = df.\) \(P\) is worthy of some reactive attitude in respect of \(x\)

or

\[(R'')\] \(P\) is responsible for \(x = df.\) \(P\) deserves some reactive attitude in respect of \(x\)

or something along these lines.

Caveat: I doubt that the desert of any and all reactions must be responsibility-based. Contrary to the view of some,\(^{23}\) it seems plausible to say that some desert is independent of moral responsibility.\(^{24}\) For example, a musical composition may deserve our admiration, even though it is of course not the sort of thing that can be morally responsible for anything. So, too, the composer may deserve our admiration, even if he is not morally responsible for either the possession or the exercise of his musical prowess. Now, admiration would appear to count as a “reactive attitude” of some sort. Thus, if understanding R in terms of either \(R'\) or \(R''\) is to succeed as a response to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, the phrase “some reactive attitude” must be construed as “some reactive attitude from among a certain limited set of reactive attitudes,” the set in question comprising those attitudes the deservingness of which does indeed signal moral responsibility rather than, as in the case of the composer or his composition, some other kind of evaluability (This observation of course raises the worry that it might be impossible to identify the set of reactive attitudes in question independently of the fact that they are correlated with moral responsibility, in which case R would fail as an analysis).

The third objection to R does not challenge the claim that there is a strict equivalence between being responsible for something and being worthy of some reaction in respect of that thing but does challenge the claim that responsibility is to be understood in terms of being worthy of some reaction. This challenge is based on the allegation that, if it is fitting to adopt a reactive attitude toward \(P\) in respect of \(x\), this will be \(\textit{because} P\) is responsible for \(x\), in the sense that it is \(P\)'s responsibility that grounds the fittingness of the reactive attitudes; the responsibility comes first, as it were.\(^{25}\) But then it cannot be that responsibility is itself to be understood in terms of the fittingness of the reactive attitudes, and so R is to be rejected.

As before, one reply to this objection is simply to deny the allegation and to insist on the buck-passing nature of responsibility. This seems to be the position of a number of philosophers, including R. Jay Wallace, John Martin Fischer, and Mark Ravizza.\(^{26}\) The underlying idea is that whatever grounds \(P\)'s responsibility for \(x\) also grounds the fittingness of some reactive attitude toward \(P\) in respect of \(x\), and so there is no need also to say that \(P\)'s responsibility grounds the fittingness of the attitude. Indeed, we should not say this, since to do so would be to multiply grounds beyond necessity.

Once again, I find this reply hard to assess. It is attractive in its simplicity, but I fear that it is too simple and am therefore inclined to reject it. It seems quite natural to me to say that \(P\) deserves some reaction in respect of \(x\) (for example, that \(P\) deserves to be punished for \(x\)) \(\textit{because} P\) is responsible (in particular, morally culpable) for \(x.\)\(^{27}\) \(P\)'s responsibility for \(x\) consists, I would say, in his being epistemically worthy of being \textit{judged} in some way. Whether he is morally deserving of some further kind of \textit{reaction} is, I believe, a further question. It is a substantive question, not one that can be settled on purely conceptual grounds. Or so it seems to me—but I confess that I do not know how best to defend this position. Nonetheless, for this reason I find R to be false, although I am inclined to accept the following related claim:

\[(7)\] \(\text{Necessarily, } P\ \text{is morally responsible for } x\ \text{if and only if } P\ \text{deserves to be the object of some reactive attitude in respect of } x,\)
where “reactive attitude” refers to some particular kind of response, such as that of censure or punishment, for which P’s responsibility calls (The caveat issued a few paragraphs ago applies equally here).

**IV**

I have stressed the similarity between V and R and between certain objections and replies that may be given regarding them. It may seem that, in so doing, I have neglected a possible problem: that V and R may be inconsistent with one another. Here is the objection. Moral responsibility comes in one of three main forms: it may be “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral.” The positive form is commonly called “laudability,” and the negative form “culpability;” there is no common name for the neutral form. Now, R implies that, if a reactive attitude (of a certain sort—see the caveat above) toward P in respect of x is fitting, then P is morally responsible for x. Presumably, we may thus take R to imply, more particularly, that, if a positive reactive attitude toward P in respect of x is fitting, then P is laudable for x, and, if a negative reactive attitude toward P in respect of x is fitting, then P is culpable for x. But a positive reactive attitude (of any sort) is a kind of favor, and a negative reactive attitude is a kind of disfavor. Thus V implies that, if P is laudable for x, then P is good, and that, if P is culpable for x, then P is bad. But being laudable for something does not entail being good, and being culpable for something does not entail being bad. So something has to give.

I think this objection should be resisted. What should “give” is the premise that being laudable does not entail being good and being culpable does not entail being bad. On the contrary, to be deserving of a type of positive evaluation is to be good in some way, and to be deserving of a type of negative evaluation is to be bad in some way. So V and R are perfectly compatible with one another (as are the two related theses, (4) and (7), that I am inclined to accept in their place).

The question remains: in what kind of goodness does laudability consist, and in what kind of badness does culpability consist? I think the answer must depend at least in part on what kind of favor or disfavor, what kind of reactive attitude, is warranted. Here I have no specific suggestions to make. I would, however, warn, once again, against oversimplification. It may be—indeed, I believe it is—the case that people are morally evaluable along a number of different dimensions, with what I have called “laudability” and “culpability” constituting only one such dimension.

Consider, for example, what Scanlon claims about the relation between responsibility and the reactive attitudes. One might expect that, since he is a buck-passers about value, he would also be a buck-passers about responsibility. Interestingly, this seems not to be the case. Elsewhere, I have called the sort of responsibility that grounds the fittingness of reactive attitudes “appraisability,” of which I take laudability and culpability to be the positive and negative modes, respectively. Scanlon calls the sort of responsibility that grounds the fittingness of reactive attitudes “attributability.” Now, I take freedom of will to be a necessary condition of appraisability, whereas Scanlon denies that freedom of will is a necessary condition of attributability. It may therefore appear that Scanlon and I are at odds with one another, but I am not sure that that is in fact the case. It may simply be that we are discussing two different kinds of moral evaluability in persons rather than differing about the conditions of one particular kind. I am inclined to think that we are indeed discussing two different kinds. Let me explain.

Although the view that moral responsibility requires free will is very common, Scanlon is not the first to dispute it. Robert M. Adams, for example, contends that the graduate of the Hitler Jugend is to be blamed for his vile beliefs, no matter how he came by them. Eugene Schlossberger likewise holds that we may be praiseworthy or blameworthy for our commitment to certain moral values, regardless of whether they were freely chosen; and others have made similar claims. So when Scanlon suggests, for example, that a liar is not to be excused for lying just because she is incorrigible, he is not advancing a wholly new thesis. And, I want to say, it is a thesis we should accept, once its limitations have been recognized.

In order to bring out these limitations, let me consider the case of a (purportedly) “incorrigible” non-liar. Mark Twain is reputed to have said: “I am morally superior to George Washington. He couldn’t tell a lie. I can and I
don’t." I believe that this witty remark contains a very important insight. Let us suppose, no doubt falsely, that Washington was speaking the literal truth, and that he was constitutionally incapable of telling a lie. We may certainly agree with Scanlon et al. that someone who cannot commit a certain form of wrongdoing warrants some form of moral recognition, but, as Twain points out, the kind of recognition that is warranted differs from that warranted by someone who can commit the wrongdoing but deliberately chooses not to do so. So, too, we may indeed say that the youthful Nazi is in some way reprehensible for the beliefs that he holds, but, I believe, he is not to be blamed for them in the same way as he would be if he had formed them as a result of free reflection. In brief, the kind of moral evaluation warranted by an unfree agent differs from that warranted by a free agent, and this has implications regarding the kind of reaction warranted. In particular, the reaction of punishment is, I believe, deserved only when the agent has exercised freedom of will. If Scanlon agrees, then we are not, or may not be, at odds after all. The kind of agent-evaluability that he has in mind when he discusses “attributability” will not be exactly the same as that which I have in mind when I discuss “appraisability.”

There is a general lesson to be learned here. Many philosophers have proposed accounts of moral responsibility, and these accounts often differ in their details. Gary Watson, for example, appears to hold that what he calls attributability concerns the evaluation of an agent’s character, whereas I have claimed elsewhere that appraisability is independent of character. Fischer and Ravizza argue that moral responsibility has to do with an agent’s responsiveness to reasons, whereas I have made no such claim and have, by implication, denied it. I. Haji contends that what he calls appraisability is in part a function of authenticity, whereas I have, by implication, denied this. Michael McKenna has recently argued that one cannot be morally responsible for something unless one is capable of participating in certain moral practices, whereas I have once again claimed otherwise. Such examples can be multiplied indefinitely. The question arises whether these other philosophers and I disagree about the nature of moral responsibility. The general lesson is that we might be disagreeing with one another, but also we might not be; perhaps we are instead discussing different, though related, modes of moral evaluability. I suspect that whether this is so depends at least in part on whether we would agree or disagree about precisely which reactive attitudes are deserved by those whom we deem morally responsible for their behavior. If we agree about just which reactions are deserved, then that is a sign that we also agree about the kind and degree of moral evaluability at stake; if we disagree about the former, that is a sign that we also disagree about the latter. But the matter is not straightforward, since these signs are not infallible. That is, it would seem perfectly possible for two people to agree about the kind and degree of evaluability at stake but disagree about just what reactions are deserved, and also perfectly possible for two people to disagree about the former and yet agree about the latter. This being the case, the question of how to distinguish kinds and degrees of evaluability is complex. How it might best be treated is not an issue that I will undertake here.

References


**Footnotes**

1 Strawson (*1962*).
5 Cf. Brentano (*1969*, p. 18): “[T]he good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct”.
6 Cf. Ewing (*1948*, p. 152): “We may…define ‘good’ as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’”.
7 Cf. Chisholm (*1986*, p. 52): “A is intrinsically preferable to B = df A and B are necessarily such that, for any x, the contemplation of just A and B by x requires that x prefer A to B”.
8 Cf. Lemos (*1994*, pp. 12, 15): “p is intrinsically worthy of love if and only if p is necessarily such that, for any x, the contemplation of just p by x requires that x love p and not hate p… p is intrinsically good if and only if p obtains and p is intrinsically worthy of love”.
11 Ross (*1930*, Chapter 3).
14 Ross (*1930*, p. 21 f.).
15 Ross (*1930*, p. 27).

Cf. Blanshard (1961, pp. 284–286). To say that \( x \)'s goodness grounds the fittingness of favoring it is not to say that the former is the \textit{ultimate} ground of the latter. On the contrary, its goodness is itself presumably grounded in some non-evaluative property that it has.


See Zimmerman (2007, pp. 346 f.) for further discussion.

The \textit{locus classicus} is Hohfeld (1919, p. 35 ff).

Again (see note 18 above), to say that \( Q \)'s duty is grounded in \( P \)'s right is not to say that the former is the \textit{ultimate} ground of the latter. Perhaps rights are themselves grounded in rules, which are themselves grounded in certain non-normative properties.


I say “seems,” because the evidence is not conclusive. At Wallace (1994, p. 76) we read: “…holding a person responsible does not involve the belief that the reactive emotions are \textit{required} by the person’s violation of moral obligations, …but only the weaker belief that it would be \textit{appropriate}…for one to feel such emotions…” At Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 7) it is stated: “…on the Strawsonian view, being morally responsible is being \textit{an appropriate candidate} for the reactive attitudes.”


As before (see note 30 above), this is actually an oversimplification of my view regarding the relation between desert of punishment and freedom of will. For refinement, see Zimmerman (2002, pp. 570–571), especially.

Cf. Watson (2004, Chapter 9), on the two kinds of responsibility that he calls “attributability” and “accountability.”


Fischer and Ravizza (1998, Chapters 2 and 3).

Haji (1998, Chapter 7).

McKenna (forthcoming).

For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper I am grateful to the editor, to some anonymous referees, and also to members of audiences at Florida State University, Delft University of Technology, and the University of Montreal.