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**Building community in schools through aesthetic curricular
language**

Lee, Katherine, Ed.D.

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1993

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BUILDING COMMUNITY IN SCHOOLS THROUGH
AESTHETIC CURRICULAR LANGUAGE


by

Katherine Lee

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the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

Greensboro
1993

Approved by



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APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the
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This is an interdisciplinary, theoretical study of the two concepts, community and the aesthetic, and their intersection in curricular language. The notion of "curricular language" contains the belief that we create the world and come to value it through our use of language. It is claimed that the value of community for its members lies in its existential nature, but its value as a social entity depends on the ideological embodiment of the meanings and practices of its culture. Since a communitarian vision is antagonistic to the individualistic aesthetics of Western culture, the aesthetic is redefined to emphasize that an aesthetic engagement with the world signifies both a personal response and shared experience. It seeks to embrace rather than control the world. If the language of curriculum were aesthetic as well as scientific and technical, we could teach global understanding, international as well as interpersonal harmony, peace, justice, and compassion. Broad implications for schooling are outlined.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

My long love affair with the aesthetic began many years ago as a young dance professor. As I struggled to educate myself, as well as the aspiring teachers of dance who were my students, I happened upon a course in philosophical aesthetics. It was a revelation to me, and I read the material voraciously. During my search for direct references to the art of dance that was my immediate concern, I became fascinated by the wider implications of the aesthetic in our daily lives. In the late 1960s, when everything seemed possible and affordable, I requested (and was encouraged) to teach a course to student elementary teachers in "Aesthetic Education" as it applied to their lives in the classroom.

Aesthetics became a significant element in degree programs for dance educators at this time, so I continued to pursue my interest for professional as well as personal reasons. I undertook a degree in philosophy so that my understanding of aesthetics would be more securely grounded. As a philosophy student in England, I was aware that I did not take naturally to the faculty's confrontational, skeptical, and always destructive approach to all texts and to each other in dialogue. Furthermore, in British analytic philosophy (which is largely concerned with the character of things in general), all personal, incidental, or contextual details are considered to be a hindrance. As I read and listened to new ideas, my natural, initial response was always to identify what was pertinent to my own concerns, what connected with other ideas, and how I could construct a new synthesis with this additional information. I was more interested in the power of an idea to move me, or reveal a new insight for me, than in the indubitability of its proof.

I now see that they were operating with masculine, left-brain paradigm in which logical competence was given the greatest emphasis, and that my propensities were for a more feminine

approach (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberg & Tarule, 1986). I learned their ways sufficiently well to pass their examinations, but I always felt inadequate and inferior in the process. I was torn between my fascination for philosophy and growing doubts about my own intellectual competence.

My central interest in philosophy was, of course, aesthetics. I learnt analytic philosophers' accounts of art and the aesthetic. I became well versed in such arguments as the primacy of objective standard in art and the relative unimportance of the artist's intention. Analytic philosophy, also called ordinary language philosophy, occupied itself almost exclusively with questions of meaning, but it was always public, "objective" meaning, isolated from cultural life and the historicity of our human condition.

As a dancer I was puzzled and troubled by this. I endeavored to force my dance experience to conform to the mold shaped by the theory I had learned. In my masters thesis I tried to use this framework to give some sense to The Concept of Intelligibility in Modern Dance (Lee, 1978). There was always something missing. It was some years later that I discovered the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (Hawkes, 1977; Belsey, 1980; Culler, 1985) and a variety of post-Saussurian literature, notably in literary criticism and semiotics, which I started to apply to dance criticism.

As time went by, I became increasingly disenchanted with aesthetics, because it no longer provided a useful framework for dance studies. As I contemplated doctoral study, I decided to pursue other interests. I wanted to extend my theoretical approach to art, education, and culture, so I investigated hermeneutic-phenomenological inquiry, sociology, and feminist studies. I pressed forward but would frequently look backwards, reinterpreting significant events of my history. I grasped that knowledge, even public knowledge, is personal, and that understanding is dependent on cultural context, personal and collective histories, as well as the present context. One day, looking back, I saw the forgotten aesthetic theory staring at me. It was still there, and seemed to be struggling for inclusion. I began to redefine my views on the aesthetic.

At what point the notion of community became the catalyst in this project, I no longer recall. It began with a robust sense of "fit" and "rightness" and a strong desire to stir together the two ideas, community and the aesthetic. I had a lived understanding of important connections and wondered if any sparks would be generated by the friction. I was familiar with community arts, folk and ethnic arts, but this was not the core of my interest. I was concerned about meaning and understanding and what sense people make of community and the aesthetic in their lives. I realized that the shift away from the classic or mechanistic paradigm, centered on matter, on which most of our public institutions (like schooling) are based, must give notions like community and the aesthetic a new importance. I felt that my abiding interest in the aesthetic had a place at last, that it had a role in the serious business of educational theory and practice. As Madeleine Grumet (1992, p. 28) says, "We reconceptualize the ways we know the world not to update our abstractions, but to confirm Sartre's conviction that to name something is to change the world."

I am still not certain why I was drawn to community on a personal level. I think it might be associated with feeling like an outsider for much of my life. I was first aware of being a working class kid in a middle class school, then I began to wonder why my Mother and I were not part of the large Irish family to which my dead father belonged. During two periods of my life I have worked in a "foreign" country, for seven years in Scotland and now this is my fifth year in America. I removed myself from the Catholic Church where I had felt the strongest sense of community as I grew up, and I am aware that it is the rituals of the Church that I miss most of all. I am delighted by the number of ritual occasions in American life and mourn their loss in Britain. We have the Royal Family, of course, who remain the source of most ritual occasions, but there are no national celebrations in which we all join. I remember street parties as a child but, for many years, rituals have been confined to the privacy of homes. As an adult, my strongest sense of community has been with communities of ideas and sensibility, sometimes embodied in human beings with whom I could engage in face-to-face encounters, but often only through texts

and art works. Perhaps this is why the connection with the aesthetic felt so "natural" to me, and the notion of community so compelling.

As I began to research community, it became increasingly obvious that the term carries the burden of many definitions and interpretations. Confusion can be created among those who use it and also, often more dangerously, the mere illusion of agreement. We have all co-opted those aspects of it that suit our purposes, and often in ways that are not self-evident, and/or of which we remain unaware. Ideas of community are deeply embedded in Western and American culture but there is no unitary view.

Through language we categorize, yet little of our lived experience can be rendered communicable through separating out elements which then destroy the whole. Clumsy metaphors and images are mere approximations. The very act of trying to articulate an experience in language can destroy it or change it into something else. So why are we so driven to engage in this fruitless activity? At least I could begin with the lived experience of community. As I proceeded to work on this, one idea generated another and the mixture of community and the aesthetic began to take on a life of its own. These ideas re-thought themselves. The hermeneutic circle of my understanding turned through many revolutions. The final impetus emerged with the structure suggested by Dwayne Huebner (1975) in his paper "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings."

Huebner (1975) identifies the aesthetic as one value framework that makes available a curriculum language through which to describe and value educational activity and recognize a fuller range of meanings in the classroom. In this formulation, several threads of my own enduring concerns are woven together into a significant pattern that become the starting place for my present project. I have an abiding fascination for language and meaning, the aesthetic, ethical concerns, and education, all of which are drawn together as facets of aesthetic curricular language.

In 1975 Huebner claimed that curricular language was too limited and constraining to comprehend all the realities of the educator's task. Although this problem has been addressed by many educators and from a variety of points of view since that time, mainstream education is still confined to a predominantly technical and bureaucratic language. The language of Tyler's (1949) popular curriculum model is a case in point. He provides technical answers to questions concerning educational objectives, the selection and organization of learning experiences, and their evaluation. This model has permeated and tyrannized educational thought to such an extent that many kinds of questions have been rendered unthinkable. It usefully addresses parts of education but not the whole. In the languages of technology and science, Huebner says, "Mysteries are reduced to problems, doubts to error, and unknowables to yet-to-be-discoverables" (1975, p. 220).

It is implicit in Huebner's writing that language is not transparent, that it does not label an existing world that is the same for everyone. "Language was formed by man, for his purposes, out of his experiences - not by God with ultimate truth value" (1975, p. 218). Like other man-made tools it must be appraised continually for its effectiveness and improvements, even replacements, made when necessary. He alleges that an emphasis on technical languages in schooling, notably psychological and sociological languages as we hear them in industry, business, and economics, often leads "to ignoring the fullness of the eternal present for the sterility of the known future (1975, p. 220).

Huebner identifies five value systems (the technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical) and claims that each of them adds a necessary dimension to educational deliberations. They are not alternatives from which to choose, but all five embody and reveal realities of educational experience that need to be taken into account. Each has its place in describing and valuing educational activity but can also be abused if used inappropriately, as in the current dominance of technical language to which all curricular thinking has been reduced. Huebner admits that his is only one attempt to solve the problem of describing and valuing educational

activity, but he feels that it holds promise, especially if these value frameworks are sharpened through discussion and criticism. It is a piece of this task that I am about to undertake. My concern is with the aesthetic dimension and the categories of meaning embodied in this value system and, more specifically, those aspects that contribute to the development, enhancement, or maintenance of the possibility of community.

Before reviewing the literature in which curriculum is valued from an aesthetic point of view, I think it is necessary to make some more specific remarks about distinctions among the terms, "the aesthetic," "art," and "aesthetics," and how I am using these terms. In addition, I will identify what I understand to be the dominant paradigm for the aesthetic in Western culture. This will set the stage for all discussions of aesthetic curricular language, and indicate the need to redesign it for community.

The Aesthetic, Art, and Aesthetics

Experiencing the World Aesthetically

To perceive a phenomenon aesthetically is a matter of intention, and concerns how we attend to it rather than what we attend to. I use the term "aesthetic" as a particular lens through which the world can be viewed. It is an active, thoughtful activity, an openness to perceiving a specific presentation of qualities, ideas, and values, in order to grasp its uniqueness and immediacy, as well as the commonalities it shares with other phenomena. It requires a focus of attention and personal involvement of imagination, and feeling, that evokes a response either to the elements of the phenomenon, their internal relationship, or their fusion into a significant whole, although, we may be drawn only to some aspects of it rather than to the whole. Our interest, satisfaction, and pleasure (or the opposite) in the phenomenon will be multi-grounded and continuous with our other interests.

There is one kind of immediate response that may be drawn from us by a potent stimulus, and it is known primarily by the strong feeling it evokes. We may or may not be able to identify the contributing elements of it afterwards. This is the moment of transcendence that I

will describe in more detail in Chapter Four. It cannot be demanded or forced; legislation cannot make it happen, although we can enhance the possibility of its happening by providing external conditions that will, at least, not preclude it. Such moments are the pinnacles of our aesthetic experience but it is not always possible to achieve the deep satisfaction of the fusion of intellectual, emotional, and spiritual coherence and the full integration into our personal lives that is a transcendent moment. We are, perhaps, always seeking a sense of wholeness, but the search itself can also be enjoyable and all degrees and modes of aesthetic enjoyment are to be cherished. For example, there is also pleasure and satisfaction to be gained from consciously adopting an aesthetic stance. This is necessarily a self-reflective activity that can reward us with fragmentary insights, feelings of connection, sensuous enjoyment, and challenges to our capacity to integrate diverse phenomena.

Art and the Aesthetic

We can attend to anything aesthetically, but we know that some phenomena are more rewarding than others, notably artworks. In a work of art, as the term "art" is most often used in Western culture, an artist constructs and "frames," in time and/or space, a specific evocation of phenomenal experience which invites this mode of perception in particular. An artist will sharpen, simplify, abstract, enrich, elaborate, present or represent his or her image in order to clarify it and heighten its appeal to perception. There are many occasions when the two terms "art" and "the aesthetic" are interchangeable but, although they share a substantial area of overlap, like a Venn diagram, both also have a wider field of application.

That we should perceive and respond to a work of art aesthetically is part of our understanding of the nature of art and its role in Western culture, but there are many aspects of art that interest us which cannot be described as aesthetic. For example, there is knowledge of the physical medium, and the technical skills for manipulating it; the norms and conventions of particular art forms and the cultural codes they embrace. There is an intimate relation between

the aesthetic perspective held by an artist or spectator and their artistic knowledge and skills. Each modifies the other, but the aesthetic is a distinguishable element in our engagement with art.

Furthermore, there are a variety of instrumental uses which artworks can fulfill independent of their aesthetic qualities. An artwork may be part of a number of "realities" or diverse worlds. An artwork can be described and valued in the language of a variety of disciplines, subjects or fields of interest (hence art is a fruitful resource for thematic curriculum). In addition to its status as an aesthetic object, a work of art can legitimately be perceived as biographical evidence relating to the artist, as an historical document, as a social statement of politics or morality, as a financial investment, as part of the decor of my home, as a technical invention, a mathematical puzzle, an optical illusion, a biological curiosity, and so on.

Aesthetics

The most common meaning attributed to "aesthetics" is the study of theories of art and the meaning and justification of concepts employed in talking about art. Art as imitation, art as the expression of emotion, art as an expression of the unconscious, art as the embodiment of values, art as performance, art as concept, are some examples of theories of Western art. A theory is usually deduced from a group of art works that demonstrate some common bond of intention. In each case the theory identifies the value most prized and to which all the elements of a work must contribute. As a philosophical project the emphasis has been on the clarification of concepts in order to use language more precisely in talk about art. The emphasis is always on art in spite of general agreement that aesthetics extends to other topics. Our understanding of concepts is, of course, intimately entwined with the current state of knowledge on psychological, sociological, as well as other types of questions. Particular theories of art, favored at particular historical times and places, also resonate with the general intellectual and emotional climate. For example, great changes in the arts occur in response to major events in history. In Europe, after the turbulent revolutionary period, industrialization, and two world wars, artists saw the world from a

different perspective. Life took on new meaning and visions and priorities sprang from a new source.

When Louis Arnaud Reid (1969) speaks of art as the embodiment of values, he is recognizing that our particular interest in certain qualities, characteristics, and ideas in art derive in part from sources in life outside art. It is important to remember that art forms have their own history and values, also. Reid offers, arguably, the most all-embracing theory of art. Aesthetic valuing, like ethical valuing, relates to a specific kind of framework and range of categories of experience for making judgments, but the values themselves are culturally determined. As an aesthetic object an artwork is required to be no more than its "self." Its worth and value in our lives is to give pleasure through its beauty and/or insight into the materials and experience of living, but what counts as "beauty" or "insight" will be context specific. As one curricular language, the aesthetic is necessarily interrelated with other value systems, notably the ethical, as the root of all our beliefs about human nature and how we should live together.

Art as Our Paradigm for the Aesthetic

As a mind set and a particular mode of response to any aspect of the world, the aesthetic clearly has a wider application than works or art. It is in the context of the arts and modern theories of art or "aesthetics," however, that our paradigm of the aesthetic in Western culture has been fashioned. More specifically, it is the "monuments" of Western art that provide the grounds for the institutionalized aesthetic norm (Chalmers, 1987). The primary characteristics of the aesthetic, therefore, are exemplified by what are now perceived as masculine traits: egocentricity, autonomous expression, and enjoyment and contemplation that is objectively disinterested and disengaged from any social context, meaning, or function. These attributes are fostered and encouraged by the Art World (Becker, 1982). These are the preferences that underlie the ethos of the elite world of the fine arts or "high art" that we have inherited. It is not appropriate to outline a detailed history of modern aesthetics here, but a few words about the source of our aesthetic attitudes today may be salutary.

By the end of the eighteenth century in Europe, art had not only become distanced from the communal life, which was now run primarily as a political and economic system, but the creations of visual artists could not compete with the mass-production of goods. The traditional role of the artist in society was lost and artists felt disenfranchised. There were several kinds of artistic response to the social upheaval at this time, but they all shared an emphasis on the personal feelings, beliefs, hopes, and fears of the individual artist. Artists turned inward. Some artists favored what seems to be a flight from painful reality in a fascination with exotic places; for example, Rameau's "Les Indes Gallantes"; and the supernatural, epitomized in the Romantic Ballet, such as, "Ballet of the Nuns," "La Sylphide," and "Giselle." Yet other artists exercised their sensibilities on social problems, but they identified with the victims rather than the victors and heroes of earlier history, as in Gericault's "The Raft of the 'Medusa'," Goya's "The Third of May, 1808," or the novels of Charles Dickens or Victor Hugo.

The Romantic Movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe elevated the artist to the status of hero, almost a god. Individual genius and originality was the hallmark of the artist. Since the Renaissance, man had been the measure of all things and the artist's inspiration no longer attributed to a power outside himself; but, never had the emotional sensitivity as well as the talent of the individual been so highly esteemed. Beauty gradually ceased to be a communal idea and an expression of an integrated society. From this time it was molded by individuals who tended to pit themselves against society and tradition, and often viewed society as hostile. In the Romantic conception of art, the artist expresses his or her own feelings so that the real subject of every work of art is the artist (Osborne, 1968).

There is also substantial precedent at this time for art as social comment, and many wrestled with the role of the arts and artists in this new arrangement of human society. It is in Leo Tolstoy's book, What is Art? (M.C. Beardsley, 1985), that the concept of the social responsibility of the artist is, perhaps, given its most uncompromising form. Tolstoy claims that art is fundamentally concerned with the communication of emotion, and that the value of the

feelings transmitted are dictated by the religious sense common to society. In his own time, Tolstoy saw that the highest religious sense was the brotherhood of man under the Fatherhood of God. Since art is a means of moving man towards human perfection, it is vital that art encourages love and trust and does not pervert society by "intensifying destructive feelings of patriotism, class pride, sensuality, and superstition, that constantly increase the cruelty of man to man" (Beardsley, 1985, p. 313).

Since Tolstoy's day (1828-1910) the increased momentum of social change has seen the loss of mainstream art's moral authority and its social purpose. In a culture of bureaucratic management and economic competition, there is no place for the spiritual, for communal concern, or for the authorities of the past, because they have no function in modern ideology. Gablik (1984) suggests that during the early decades of the twentieth century, artists were forced to turn away from a social reality that they could no longer confirm. Abstract personal expressions were seen as the "dehumanization" of art, but they were perhaps, as Kandinsky claimed, an unconscious protest against materialism. By the 1960s, the turn away from the social world included turning away from any consciously expressed meaning, and art became self-referential and formal. Its popularity rested with the elite art world who understood it. Art had found a new function in society, as a commodity in the marketplace, a source of investment. The mystique of modern art played an important role in its commodity value, and the cult of the new became as rampant as it is in all our other commodity markets. The spirit of revolt seemed to turn sour. Genuine searchers for freedom and attempts to establish a meaningful place for art in society have continued at the fringes of the art world, of course; but these artistic enterprises have not been given center stage. Perhaps their time is near.

The elite art world does not leave the rest of society without artistic expression but, for the most part, the art of the people has become trivial entertainment and spectacle. Dominated by television, the criteria for popular art are primarily that it should provide sensuous, emotional, easy entertainment. [This is not to minimize the sociological importance of Music Television

(MTV) as a repository of sub-cultural feeling and meaning.] These categories of fine art and popular art (or folk art that I have not mentioned) are not well defined categories, but are merely observable tendencies, and there is considerable overlap. Furthermore, what counts as "art" at any one time is always arbitrary.

There are several points I need to make in relation to the intimate connection between art and the aesthetic in Western culture. It has been thought to be intrinsic to the notion of art, for example, that works of art are first and foremost "aesthetic objects" and as such are ends in themselves serving no useful function beyond themselves. This view reflects the gradual separation of art from communal life that reached its extreme form in the "art for art's sake" doctrine of the "Aesthetic Movement" at the end of the nineteenth century. The specifically aesthetic element in our relationship with art became its most prized characteristics, denying validity to any other aspects of our association with art as part of its intrinsic worth "as art." Nelson Goodman describes the intrinsic worth of art appropriately when he says, "Use of symbols beyond immediate need is for the sake of understanding . . . what compels is the urge to know, what delights is discovery . . . the primary purpose is cognition in and for itself" (Goodman, 1969, p. 258). In this respect, I see the relationship of the artist and the spectator to a work of art as similar. The fact that this element is identifiable and central in art, however, does not mean that it is separable in the lived experience. For a long time, the Art World has chosen to ignore the essential interrelatedness of our aesthetic engagement with the world and our other concerns both private and public. As part of a holistic and communitarian outlook this is not an acceptable point of view.

As Suzi Gablik argues, this assumption of "pure significance" is no longer tenable. "We now know, thanks to deconstruction, that a work of art is never pure, never self-contained, never autonomous. Indirectly, a belief system is being reinforced (Gablik, 1991, p. 148). It is in the interest of community that this relational aspect of artworks is both acknowledged and honored. Artists and their work are interconnected both to each other and to the wider culture. If the

connection between communal and individual meaning is valued it would no longer be an indictment, for example, to describe an artwork as "derivative."

The belief that art is to be disconnected and removed from everyday life has permeated modern aesthetics; art is framed and isolated in the gallery, or on a stage. The work remains static, complete, and unresponsive; there is no interaction, no dialogue with the spectator, and no more with the artist once it has been given over to the public space. The exception is the performance arts, of course, when the artist may have the opportunity to make changes between performances; but only to create another "finished" version.

In the art world, critics serve the important role of providing reasons why the works that the dealers show are acceptable and worth appreciating (and buying). This cynical remark would not be fair comment on the work of all critics, of course. There are many critics who are genuinely attempting to describe and evaluate works of art for the education and benefit of an interested public. They reflect changing attitudes to art. In literary criticism, for example, most British and American critics have counseled us, the spectators, to focus all our attention on the formal properties of the art object. This has been described as intrinsic criticism because the work of art is isolated from any factors external to the text. Some critics relented and allowed us to consider some extrinsic elements, such as the artist's intention, the work's sources, and historical conventions. It is the Continental critics, however, who broke with this notion and gave a central role to the consciousness of the artist and the consciousness of the reader (Greene, 1971). It was not until their Reception theory gave us a new paradigm that the "recipients" of artworks gained an acknowledged place in "the dialectical process of production and reception" (Holub, 1985, p. 57).

According to reception theorists, for example, a painting may remain unchanged as a physical object but, as an aesthetic object, it is dependent on the perception of a person; that is, on the subjective creation of meaning by that individual. In this sense there is always interaction between the artwork and the viewer. We are not condemned to live in solipsistic isolation,

however, because the painting as "text" is always differentiated and identified as a painting. The individual must have internalized the notion of "a work of art" from the community to which he or she belongs in order to have "seen" it as a painting at all. This places us all in an "interpretive community" according to Stanley Fish. We learn and rely on communal norms, "a way of thinking . . . a universe of discourse . . . a system of intelligibility . . . a form of life" (Fish, 1980, pp. 303-304). Language and communication can only occur within such a system. Rooted in the "language" of shared discourses, the expressions of individuals are the source of important insights concerning their relationship to a range of social systems and structures, including art and its various discourses. It is in the "selectivities and silences" (Casey, 1993, p. 13) of personal expressions that the meaning of lived realities is revealed. Similarly, I will argue that a person's reading (whether or not it is a self-conscious reading) of his or her relationship to the structure and ideology of a group is the basis of the sense of community he or she feels (or does not feel) with its members.

In modern aesthetics, until the recent work by Reception theorists, subjectivity has held a different role for artists and spectators. The artist has been permitted the importance of personal response and subjective meaning-making, indeed it is expected to be the subject matter of his or her work in many instances. The subjectivity of those who receive art, who contemplate and enjoy it as spectators and members of an audience, on the other hand, has been trivialized and denied much force or value in formal aesthetics. The emphasis has been on the "objective" criteria agreed by the Art World. This illusion of objectivity strips away emotion and denies validity to personal response and our radical relatedness. The "lay" person who just "knows what he or she likes" is treated with contempt, having no membership in the elite community of the Art World. A case can be made for the authority of the Art World concerning the arbitrary "rules" for particular genres or isms of art, but it cannot demand conformity to its maxims for aesthetic enjoyment which is necessarily personal. In the context of aesthetic experience, the final authority is the individual.

The predominantly individualistic nature of art and aesthetics in Western culture would seem to have little to contribute to the renewal of community, although there are many precedents for an alternative view as I have indicated. Since both art and the aesthetic are man-made constructions, they can presumably be remade and different priorities established. Similarly, we can choose not to maintain the sterile autonomy of aesthetic objects, but allow their integration into all spheres of our lives as they once were. At the margins of the Art World it is happening and the climate in education is also changing. The cycle of separation and joining in unity is moving towards wholeness again, but of course, we must shape it according to the materials at hand.

Review of the Literature: Aesthetic Dimensions of Education

Huebner offers only a brief discussion of the aesthetic, selecting three dimensions of special interest in the context of curricular language; psychical distance, wholeness and design, and symbolic meaning. Expanding on these three notions, he speaks of the form of rationality carried by the value category of the aesthetic. Psychical distance encourages the student's "playful involvement" (1975, p. 234) with ideas, skills, and knowledge, and identifies them as ends in themselves. Knowledge and learning are attempts to achieve wholeness and coherence, by creating order out of chaos, and forming the formless. Aesthetic valuing unveils knowledge, classroom activity, or students' work, as symbols of man's meanings. They are symbolic of the personal meanings significant to the individual, and they reflect the meaning "existing in and emerging from man as a life form" (1975, p. 227). This last point is his only direct reference to a possible community of people in relation to aesthetic valuing in this article. Concern for community only emerges, for example, when he turns his attention to religious metaphors for education.

Huebner speaks of "the aesthetic object, indeed educational activity" (1975, p. 227) being valued for the symbolic meanings it reveals and its truth, but nothing about the relationship between this symbolic meaning and truth. The nature of beauty is addressed only in general

terms such as integrity, form, harmony, unity, peace, the realm of perfection. He asserts that the aesthetic value framework encourages students to participate in making and discovering beauty as well as truth, and classroom activity is seen as a search for beauty but the specific nature of beauty and truth is assumed to be self-evident for the most part.

All of these matters will be extended and discussed at length in Chapter Four, but I think two comments are relevant here. It is unfair and probably unwise to be critical of a summary comment on the aesthetic, but two omissions that frequently confuse such discussions are implicit in Huebner's brief reference to it as a system for describing and valuing educational activity. Firstly, there is the conflation of the aesthetic and art. As I have said already, these two terms can be interchangeable in certain contexts, for example, in certain references to works of art, but they are not synonymous. Their differences are central to my second point, epitomized in the implication in Huebner's paper, that the meaning of "beauty" is self-evident. He argues that different value systems give rise to distinctive languages which, in turn, affect truth "as life in unveiled through the acting and speaking of the participants" (1975, p. 232), but seems to imply that beauty is universal. It is, perhaps, a universal concept, but I shall argue that manifestations of beauty in the lives of people are very popular.

I claim that the aesthetic refers to a particular kind of intention we adopt as we perceive the world, but that aesthetic judgments are always rooted in the criteria of a specific preference. These preferences were described as matters of "taste" in the eighteenth century. We also know them as the changing "aesthetics," meaning specific philosophies of art, demonstrated by the history of the arts. As Santayana asserts, "Beauty is a species of value" (Santayana, 1979, p. 165). In the context of this dissertation, the most relevant factor is that aesthetic value is culturally created. Any particular value system of beauty will have arisen in a specific context of time and place in a particular language community, a point of particular importance to an aesthetic curricular language that can move us towards community. In addition, criteria for judging something as beautiful can be learnt. For example, in art classes we learn the rules for particular

styles and genres of art; classes on any subject in an educational institution will give us good (beautiful) models of work in that field; living in another country we become aware of the norms of beauty for all aspects of life. Particular systems of "aesthetics" are associated with groups or communities of people although, as individuals, we also develop our own set of preferences that may cut across several public, institutionalized systems of aesthetics.

The term aesthetics is most often employed in the context of the arts, hence the frequent conflation of the two terms, but we can perceive anything at all from an aesthetic point of view. In this lies its potency as a curricular language, and as a value system in education. The aesthetic as a mode of perception will be addressed, as well as particular systems of aesthetics, as I consider ways in which an aesthetic curricular language can move us towards community.

Art as Experience (Dewey, 1934) is widely acclaimed to be the best work on aesthetics written in English (M. Beardsley, 1975). In this rich and eloquent book written when he was over 70 years old, John Dewey, also America's most influential educational philosopher, gives a full and clear account of "the aesthetic." In the educational context, this book was given scant attention at that time (Elsner, 1985) and has rarely been followed up and never developed fully by educators since then. Dewey speaks of the need to understand "raw" aesthetic experience before we can comprehend it in its "ultimate and approved formed," that is in works of art. He identifies the aesthetic, "in the events and scenes that hold the attentive eye and ear of man, arousing his interest and affording him enjoyment as he looks and listens" (Dewey, 1934, p. 4). It is the achievement of inner harmony as we come to terms with our environment. It is when immediate sensuous experience "absorbs into itself meanings and values that . . . would be designated 'ideal' or 'spiritual'" (Dewey, 1934, p. 29). "It is when we create our own experience according to our own point of view and interest" (p. 54). We respond to our environment "with emotional, imaginative, and intellectual values drawn from ourselves" (p. 123). Beauty "is properly an emotional term," therefore, "a tribute to the capacity of the object to arouse admiration . . . that lays hold of us with immediate poignancy." Beauty is a judgment of wholeness, "the

consummated movement of matter integrated through its inner relations into a single qualitative whole" (Dewey, 1934, pp. 129-130).

Dewey affirms that "the aesthetic is no intruder in experience from without, but . . . it is the clarified and intensified development of traits that belong to every normally complete experience" (Dewey, 1934, p. 46). The artist goes one step further in trying to create order out of disorder in a work of art. He or she gives form to the recovery of union with "the march of surrounding things. . . . Form is arrived at whenever stable, even though moving, equilibrium is reached" (Dewey, 1934, pp. 14-15). The "artistic" refers primarily, therefore, to the act of production, and the "aesthetic" to that of perception and enjoyment. A work of art is a physical product that becomes an aesthetic object when it is perceived (Dewey, 1934, p. 219).

The conflation of art and the aesthetic has arisen, Dewey suggests, because art has been relegated to the museum and gallery and lost its connection to the objects and scenes of ordinary experience. He urges that the recovery of the continuity of the aesthetic with normal processes of living is a problem to be addressed. If this was necessary in 1934 it is even more urgent in the last decade of the twentieth century. He suggests that philosophies of art ("aesthetics") are sterile if they do not make us aware of the function of art in relation to other modes of experience. For "tribal societies" (Highwater, 1992, p. 16), the "arts" brought color, grace, and dignity to the significant collective life of an organized community. They were an intimate part of living in which the meanings of group life were consummated. Western art is the extension of the rites, ceremonies, and decoration of such communities and it, too, can unite people with one another.

Although Western art has moved away from communal art to individualized expression, Dewey unambiguously states that, "It is by activities that are shared and by language and other means of intercourse that qualities and values become common to the experience of a group of mankind" (Dewey, 1934, pp. 286-287). It is the common language that is transformed by entering into relationship with an individual person through which the "tangled scenes of life" (Dewey, 1934, p. 290) become intelligible to the individual. This point is central to the connection of the

aesthetic with community. It links personal and communal meaning and experience, and attributes to art the physical manifestation of their intersection. People are a product of culture and the arts are the final measure of the quality of that culture. Every culture and subculture is an "interpretive community" (Fish, 1980), but "au fond, the aesthetic quality is the same for Greek, Chinese, and American" (Dewey, 1934, p. 331). This is significant for my project and the reason I am stressing the aesthetic rather than the arts.

Finally, Dewey claims that art (including the aesthetic) as experience is significant for the "adventure of philosophic thought" and the same claim for education is self evident. In Dewey's words:

In art as an experience, actuality and possibility or ideality, the new and the old, objective material and personal response, the individual and the universal, surface and depth, sense and meaning, are integrated in an experience in which they are all transfigured from the significance that belongs to them when isolated in reflection (1934, p. 297).

Dewey has identified the major elements of the aesthetic to which I want to draw attention, but his writing is part of a more general philosophical project. Mine has a different purpose, to develop the connection with community.

Harold Rugg (1947) followed Dewey in "consciously choosing the philosophy of experience as the basis of our consensus of educational foundations" (Rugg, 1947, p. 437) and similarly demonstrates his belief in the cultural power of the aesthetic. Rugg refers to the "creative awakening" (1947, p. 397) of an emerging new aesthetics that is American, and emphasizes that it is a vital element in the foundations of American education. The creation of this new culture has passed through the stages of transplantation (from Europe), and revolt, and is in the process of reconstructing its own indigenous forms. Notably he claims that, "In the two primary arts of man - the organic design of the House and the designed movement of the Dance - the Americans of the Great Transition were powerful originators" (Rugg, 1947, p. 408).

In addressing "art as experience," it was central to Dewey's thesis to show that the aesthetic was both part of, and heightened quality in, "ordinary" experience; and in this respect my project comes close to his. Rugg was more concerned with the nature and roots of a specifically American Aesthetic sensibility and its cultural manifestations, from which to deduce "the systematic body of concepts . . . which we can employ in the building of the new school program" (Rugg, 1947, p. 433). In the two "primary arts" Rugg identifies features that are relevant to the relationship of the aesthetic to community.

Firstly, in the building of "the American House," Rugg observes the union of form, function, and context in the expression of the architect.

Thus the House of the American is not a mere aggregation of sticks and stones thrown up against the wind and the weather. It is a deep fusion of the land, its relation to the geography of valley and plain, its relation to the local Community and to the larger encompassing Valley and its mechanisms of transport and communication, the relation of all to the changing composition of the population, the nature of man's work and play in the neighborhood and the sensitivity of the culture. In brief, the House of the American is his total cultivated scene.

Secondly, Rugg sees in dance the epitome of "the great concept of expression" (Rugg, 1947, p. 436), since "the body is the primary expressional instrument" (Rugg, 1947, p. 419). In this emphasis on expression, Rugg was a man of his time, that is, when Expressionism, especially Abstract Expressionism, was the favored theory of art. He deplores the European Puritan inheritance which gave us an education which is primarily linguistic and regards children as "disembodied intellects" (Rugg, 1947, p. 420). Rugg values Isadora Duncan as the first modern to attempt to create expressional movement and her anti-authoritarian statements, in dance and words, protesting Puritan prohibitions against the human body. He appreciates that her dancing is more than personal indulgence. She is an artist who shares Walt Whitman's vision of Democracy and freedom for Americans. She sees America dancing. Rugg is well aware that, "It

is only the literate, sophisticated, modern peoples who, through taboo and disuse, have cut themselves off from their primary expressional instrument" (Rugg, 1947, p. 19).

Duncan is a pioneer but Martha Graham is "the mature and product of fifty years of heroic determination to create original and indigenous expressional movement," Rugg (1947, p. 425) observes. Graham demonstrated increasing mastery over concept as she taught herself the language and structure of the dance. The "great concept of expression" is the cornerstone of Rugg's aesthetics, but the expressive act is also a "designed form." He describes the three characteristics of the expressive act, as "I see – What I feel ('see,' 'think,' 'intend') - With form" (Rugg, 1947, p.447). It is the forces or relations between things that are expressed.

Rugg claims that every human being has some potential to express him or herself, although there are vast differences in this capacity. Furthermore, through designed expression "Man-as-artist" has a duty to the community to put his or her uniqueness into some objective form. This is the responsibility that accompanies the individual freedom to express thoughts and feelings. Rugg describes this as "the twofold expressive Bill-of-Rights-and-of-Duties [which corresponds to the] social aspirations of our times . . . to arrange the social scene [so] that both of these requirements can be satisfied" (Rugg, 1947, p.449). Rugg states that human response is socially constituted and he is implicitly acknowledging the role of individual creativity in producing new order. "The self is focal" (Rugg, 1947, p. 450) in the aesthetic act and, because it entails forming the felt relations between things, it "plays a central role in the art of clear seeing" (Rugg, 1947, p. 468).

Rugg concentrates on the expressing aspects of the aesthetic, on art-making, rather than on the more encompassing notion of the aesthetic as perception and enjoyment in a wide range of experiences in ordinary living and learning. This is a preference reflected in public schools where the arts curriculum has been the only site for conscious aesthetic education. Rugg recognizes the primary role of body movement in the development of verbal language, a point to which I will

return in the next chapter, but implies that it is only through education in dance that this connection can be addressed in schooling.

James Macdonald (1988) develops Marcuse's idea of aesthetic rationality in his "transcendental developmental ideology of education." Macdonald claims that if knowledge and values are personal, the self as an experiencing agency must be their validating source. The individual is limited by biological and social conditions; but it is through the inner dialectic of the self that choices are made, and they cannot be predicated through reference to any external circumstances. The role of the aesthetic in this process is obvious because its integrating function creates personal meaning and significance for the individual. Perceptions of the outer world, and present circumstances, interact with the individual's tacit knowledge and feelings, creating a personal unity or meaningful wholeness. He says, "Understanding is the crystallization of our aesthetic knowing; explicit knowledge is its rational handmaiden (Macdonald, 1988, p. 197).

He describes this as the "completion of the person," an aim that is achieved by the process of "centering" (Macdonald, 1988, p. 187). Macdonald favors this idea expressed by Mary Caroline Richards (1962), because it is much more than a psychological concept. Centering concerns self-regulation by an individual in a cultural context. In other words, the individual can only use the resources available to him or her. This quest for personal meaning has a spiritual quality, Macdonald insists, although he is aware that the spiritual carries "heavy cultural biases in our society" (Macdonald, 1988, p. 188). He identifies a number of other processes that would facilitate centering, such as pattern making, playing, meditative thinking, imagining. It is clear to him that the aesthetic principle provides much of the guidance here. He recognizes the importance of body knowledge, but "not as an end in itself," and is even more ambivalent about "the education of perception" so central to the implications of the aesthetic for curriculum. He senses its significance but mentions only an exotic exemplar (the old Indian medicine man). He urges exploration in this field and would surely have been delighted to see, since the time of this writing in 1975, the expansion of qualitative research of lived experience which is the

interpretation of experience as it is perceived. It is, perhaps, a manifestation of the appropriateness of Macdonald's "personal myth that today's technology is yesterday's magic" and that "humanity will eventually transcend technology by turning inward" (Macdonald, 1988, p. 175).

Macdonald's comments on centering also address the notion of community. As a mutual process, centering shifts the predominant rationality "toward the aesthetic, intuitive, and spontaneous" (Macdonald, 1988, p. 193). In relationships the centering process occurs through dialogue. Problems are not always solved, but a sense of integration can emerge. We create a "shared poem of our existence" (Macdonald, 1988, p. 196). When Macdonald says that "Science 'adds up'; poetry integrates," he is reminding us that we can trap each other in categories and classes. As M.C. Richards says, "It is possible in life to be many things at once. It is hard to say everything at once" (Richards, 1964, p. 96).

In recent times the notion of aesthetic curricular language has not been widely explored by educators, although many have developed particular metaphors. Theorists who demonstrate an interest in this perspective, however, tend to share a general orientation towards education that includes an inclination to seek risk, experiment, challenge, change; an ability to respond with flexibility and imagination to particularities and uniqueness in people, situations and the physical world, a predisposition to integrate and synthesize, a fascination for and desire to create new patterns of meaning; and an awareness of the immediacy of context and lived experience. Rigid formulations and exclusively technological and scientific frameworks for educational thinking and practice, favored by mainstream educational writing, are anathema to these educators. They have tended to find themselves, therefore, on the margins of educational writing, as George Willis suggests in the prologue of a collection of writings he edited with William Schubert (Willis & Schubert, 1991). This text addresses the understanding of curriculum and teaching through the arts.

The common theme is reflective inquiry, which Willis and Schubert claim is central to both art and education. The book was intended to be in two parts, the first developing some general theoretical perspectives concerning educators' indebtedness to the arts for their educational views, and the second part illustrating the theory through specific examples. In their writing, as the scholars speak of the influence of the arts on their work in the classroom, this division becomes blurred. As the editors themselves say, "That in itself illustrates how artistic, educative inquiry connects personal and professional living" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 31). Personal significance prompts these writers to reinterpret their past and perceive the forging of vital links in their lives. Not all the reflections are of an aesthetic nature, but many are examples of the kind of thinking to which I owe recognition and gratitude, and on which I want to build. The following theories are particularly relevant to my project, and occasionally I will refer to additional examples of their writing, other than those to be found in this volume.

Elliot Eisner has done more than most in this field. He has written extensively about art education, always with an awareness of its wider implications. He claims that consciousness itself depends on sensibility and that the arts refine sensibility. "Experience" is an achievement because we have to learn to "see" what we look at, and "hear" what we listen to. The arts have an epistemic function in that they provide us with powerful schemata through which to appropriate the world, and they stimulate different intelligences. He observes that these sensibilities are not much part of the curriculum outside the arts.

Two metaphors drawn from discourse in the arts, connoisseurship and criticism, received a great deal of attention when Eisner (1985) used them in his curricular language for educational practice. He suggests that the paradigm of the art critic offers a qualitative form of inquiry appropriate to educational evaluation.

It is the critic's task to be "a midwife to perception" (Eisner, 1985, p. 217), so that the artwork can be seen more comprehensively and deeply. Criticism reveals qualities and their relationships. It is dependent on the ability to see what is "subtle, complex, and important. . . .

The act of knowledgeable perception is, in the arts, referred to as connoisseurship" (Eisner, 1985, p. 219). These terms imply a sophisticated level of perception, but Eisner affirms the vital point that no perception is value-free. It is necessarily selective and depends on the purpose of the perceiver "as well as the kinds of maps, models, and theories being used" (Eisner, 1985, pp. 222-224). There are a variety of modes of description relevant to a classroom and there is no sharp line to be drawn between description and interpretation. Eisner is aware that evaluations made as a result of such interpretive inquiry are frequently questioned on the grounds of their lack of objectivity. His answer to such criticism is to claim consensual validity because "objectivity is a function of intersubjective agreement among a community of believers" (Eisner, 1985, p. 241) basing their beliefs on sets of ideas that they consider to be useful. This is Eisner's only reference to community.

Good teaching is also described by Eisner as artistic in character. It requires attention to qualitative nuance, the ability to create coherence in the composition of life in the classroom, flexibility, and an openness to possibility. At its best, teaching provides occasions for heightened consciousness and aesthetic experience for students and for the teacher him or herself (Will & Schubert, 1991).

Madeleine Grumet suggests that the "sensuous particularities" of classroom aesthetics remind her of those usually associated with women's experience. In her contribution on curriculum and teaching to the Willis and Schubert volume, she elaborates an analogy with daily life. Both the particularities of the classroom and daily life are always the ground but rarely the figure she observes. The dailiness may be hard to recover but in their known and accepted order we find the "choosing and naming of what matters and the presentation of those values for the perception and engaged participation of others." She identifies similar aesthetic processes in the constitution of daily life and curriculum:

... the symbolization, reinterpretation, the incorporation of alien cultures, objects, meanings, the blending and crossing of boundaries, the choosing of sacred objects, sacred spaces, secret names, and jokes and curses and song. (1991, p. 76)

These daily orderings are witnesses to the shared life. "They signify the process of making a shared life" (Grumet, 1991, p. 85). She has determined here important elements in the making of community which I shall attempt to elaborate.

In Bitter Milk, Grumet (1988) describes teaching as an art form. Particularly worthy of note in this context is her political awareness, that "the meaning of aesthetic forms is constituted in the dialogue that takes place between the artist's work and its audience" (Grumet, 1988, p. 80); that is, between the "teaching" and its student recipients. A further example of her sensitivity to the political nature of art and schooling is her belief that "to adopt the stance of the artist is to challenge the taken-for-granted values and culture that one shares with others," and that, "It is the function of art to reorganize experience so it is perceived freshly" (Grumet, 1988, p. 81).

Michael Apple's contribution to the Willis and Schubert collection underlines the political efficacy of an arts project that affords a group of girls a sense of ownership of their own knowledge. The girls found their voice and described their view of the world. Richard Butt records the development of his own voice through poetry and drama, and how he came to see "personal dramatic expression as emancipatory pedagogy" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 275). Bill Ayers describes his personal rediscovery of the importance of interpretation when he realized that mutually exclusive accounts of films like Bonnie and Clyde and Patton are both "true" from difference political points of view. Landon Beyer rediscovered the importance of "historical consciousness and continuity, of social struggle and political solidarity, and of individuals who manage to create and live within genuine communities" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 1948) in a film, The Women of Summer.

We can only see the world from where we stand, and who we are, and use the imagery and metaphors to describe it that we have learnt from our personal lives. Sue Stinson affirms

James Macdonald's belief that "metaphor is at the root of curriculum theory" since "sensory awareness is the raw material from which metaphors are made" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 191) and artists immerse themselves in the sensory, they more readily perceive metaphorical relationships. As a dancer, Stinson is convinced that "we can think only with what we know in our bones" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 193). She recognizes, for example, that the sense of verticality in her own body was accompanied by feelings of strength and power, and horizontality with passivity and vulnerability. These felt realities give significance to a number of dualities. For example, verticality speaks of the impulse toward achievement, mastery, agency, self-assertion, and freedom; horizontality allows us a sense of relationship, community, integration, security. Ted Aoki also speaks of bodily knowing, but in relation to music. Urging us to open up to "sonare" so that it can dwell alongside "videre" he offers metaphors such as "tensionality," "seeking attunement," "finding resonances," and "the tonal quality of voices" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 187).

Elsewhere, Sue Stinson has used art as a metaphor for herself engaging in a significant artistic process (research, teaching, as well as dancing) in which she says, "I am transformed - I am not only the artist but the work itself - former and formed" (Stinson, 1984, p. 134). She also sees "our lives as a dance, a dance we have the possibility to create" (Stinson, 1984, p. 150). These are fruitful metaphors for her because being a dancer is part of who she is, just as opera is the preferred metaphor for curriculum for Gail McCutcheon (Willis & Schubert, 1991).

Of particular concern to my project is Sue Stinson's warning that the aesthetic in itself is amoral, and as a model for curriculum we must be aware of the moral implications it holds for practice (Stinson, 1985). For example, while the aesthetic attitude encourages us to attend to things in themselves, it must not blind us to their place in, and connection with, the wider world. Exquisite transcendent moments of aesthetic experience are no longer beneficial to us if they numb our critical consciousness. She says, "I find an aesthetic model for curriculum to be valid only if it sensitizes - rather than anesthetizes - us to moral concerns" (Stinson, 1985, p. 81). I heed

these words of caution. In relation to community, the moral implications of an aesthetic model for curriculum are also complex and far reaching.

Maxine Greene (1978) has written eloquently about the potential of the aesthetic to sensitize us to wider concerns. She describes it as the creation of a state of "wide-awakeness" in the individual. Through dialogue and perceptive encounters with works of art human beings are brought in touch with themselves and a multitude of other perspectives.

Meaning, making meaning, reinterpreting the past and the familiar, is central to many of Greene's projects. She claims that, "Curriculum has to do with the life of meaning, with ambiguities, and with relationships" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 107). Reality is the meaning of our experiences. Merely learning categories, and prescriptions, therefore, is inadequate to the task of creating and recreating ourselves and our common future. It requires reflectiveness to enable us to continually relearn how to see ourselves and our world. Literature can help us to "subvert dualism and reductionism" because it demonstrates that there is no final resolution of the tensions created by living, and learning. It forces us to remain open to new possibilities and to avoid false simplicity and clarity. The claim that poetry teaches us the ability to tolerate ambiguity is made and demonstrated by Delese Wear (Willis & Schubert, 1991). Nelson Haggerson points out that it is in holistic systems, for example, the "ecological, organic, or spiritual" that "the irreconcilables have a place; I could now view them as 'both/and' rather than 'either/or'" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 253).

Wanda May speaks of the need to accept and encourage "lingering" in the school curriculum because it "means making room for myself and reflecting upon my relation to the world and what it means to be in it" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 140). As Louis Rubin observes about art education, "I suddenly realized that it was not the primary exposure to a work of art, but rather the secondary contemplation, which evokes genuine understanding" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 49). The role of reflection is also underscored in "understanding from the inside out" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 222) which is Francine Shuchat Shaw's main theme.

Reflection allows us to remain in touch with our "biographical themes" which she describes as our "windows for the way in which we see the world and define our purpose in it" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 223). From her observations of young children in a progressive school environment building their "Block City" together, she describes how their individual resourcefulness, knowledge, and interests become "a community of perspectives that differ and converge and expand" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 226). Their community purpose intensifies individual idea testing and sense making. It creates a spirit of critical exchange as they see their own constructions become part of a larger scheme, recognize the contribution of others, discuss mutual problems, and negotiate solutions.

Ann Lynn Lopez-Schubert testifies to a sensing of community (Willis & Schubert, 1991). She was led to believe in the strength of community action through her experience with music. Making music with others gave the sense of having joined a community. There was co-operation towards a joint project, but also it was a matter of "sharing their souls as well as talent to create a vision" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 156). She discovered that "the arts can give expression to what is similar about our being in the world and opens possibilities for sharing that are not perceptible elsewhere" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 157). Music allows us to "revel in the depth and fundamental essence of experience" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 154).

Another aspect of community, the concept of caring, became less academic to Robert Donmoyer when he recognized its flesh-and-blood embodiment in Louise Fletcher's performance as Nurse Ratchet in One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest (Willis & Schubert, 1991). Images are the raw material of thought, he claims, and theater and film are a rich source of imagery. Harry Broudy also gives imagery a central role in learning and "virtually every phase of our lives" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 63). In addition, he reminds us that images are always embedded in a culture. If our images are Western, then everything we interpret through them will be comprehended in terms of Western values. Max van Manen's essay is a striking example of the anecdotes that "explain indirectly by evoking images of understanding of the significance of an

experience." The experience for him was his own early schooldays and their relationship to his life now (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 295).

A feeling of belonging to a community as part of their engagement with artworks is reported by many people. In addition to those occasions when making or enjoying art requires the physical presence of others, they sense the sharing of an idea, emotion, or feeling tone through its expression in the particular medium of the artwork. Others find connection with a supernatural force. When Arthur Foshay, for example, speaks of "transcendence," he is referring to "an enlarged sense of myself - as part of a vastly large sphere of being" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 128). He sees an analogy with what theologians call spiritual or mystic experience. For James Henderson it is to aesthetic experience with nature that he turns for transcendence. He recognizes that the aesthetics of being "'grandly related," and conversing with an infinitely encouraging, though invisible companion'" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 133) are also integral to Native American cultural traditions. He frequently turns, therefore, to Native experience for inspiration in curricular matters, especially in relation to his social aspirations for greater connectedness, caring and "ethically based reciprocal dialogue" (Willis & Schubert, 1991, p. 137).

In Ways of Understanding and Education, Louis Arnaud Reid (1986) makes the claim that the arts are a unique form of knowledge. Although he is concerned to make a case for art education in schools, the distinction between art and the aesthetic is made clearly. He states that it is the arts' aesthetic character that has wider implications for education and that the aesthetic provides a very good model for education practice. He stresses the "essential interplay between reflective thinking (which is discursive) and direct intuitive experiences" (Reid, 1986, p. xi). The concrete personal experience of works of art as meaning-embodied can provide an occasion of learning that not only will enhance discriminating enjoyment of the arts but "quicken and develop the aesthetic enjoyment of everything else" (Reid, 1986, p. 140). He makes two points that are particularly relevant to my enterprise.

Firstly, as knowledge and understanding are not restricted to abstract awareness and rational processing, neither is our sense of valuing. Reid goes so far as to say that it is feeling, not reason, that creates our sense of value, and that neither moral nor aesthetic values are possible without feeling. He speaks of "holistic insight" (Reid, 1986, p. 72) in relation to understanding of all kinds and, in this book, demonstrates how our understanding of art, persons, and moral action, is undertaken by the whole person. The interconnection of the aesthetic, personal, and moral spheres of value is particularly relevant to my concern with community.

Secondly, Reid's recommendation for the teaching of art history in schools is pertinent to the possibility of moving towards community in an aesthetic curriculum language. He supports and quotes Anthony Dyson's view that art history can be taught so that "a sense of human shaping, of chronology, of location, and of cultural inflection be gained" (Reid, 1986, p. 135). Art is humanly, intentionally, meaning-embodied, not merely a display of style and iconography.

When writing about curriculum from an aesthetic point of view, most educators speak from the perspective of an individualist aesthetics. They mention connections to, or implications for, community only incidentally. This is not surprising since the various "aesthetics" of the Western world, rooted in theories of art, have taken this stance from the beginning, as I indicated earlier. Emphasis on the individual in aesthetic thinking is concomitant with this cultural ethos.

I have mined writings on aesthetic curriculum language for overt references to community and for arguments from which I can draw implications for an aesthetic curricular language that will move us towards community. It is, however, in books such as The Reenchantment of Art by Suzi Gablik (1991) that I see most hope. She speaks of a new cultural paradigm that is beginning to emerge in the work of many artists. She sees a move away from art that is isolationist and concerned with disengagement, neutrality, and autonomy, to a more social and purposeful art. Remaining individually aloof is now dangerous because our needs have become collective. She writes to encourage "the emergence of a more participatory, socially interactive framework for art" (Gablik, 1991, p. 7). Many educators share her interest in this new

paradigm, seeing an urgent need for such a change in consciousness in schooling. I want to join my voice with theirs and address the problem through my particular interest in the aesthetic; but first, I must move toward a deeper understanding of the meaning of community.

Community and Education

The relationship of the individual to "society" is not always a key issue in educational thought; however, the current interpretation of its nature will necessarily inform the structure, content and methodology of schooling. When major changes are perceived to have occurred in the evolution of historical circumstances, the focus of attention is toward revisioning and reconceptualizing the role that schools play. The schools will guide, foster, or engineer the specific kind of relationship between the individual and "society" deemed desirable at any one time. Implicit or explicit in such considerations, "society" may be the family, the immediate neighborhood or local community, the nation state, or the global community. In addition, the changing relationships among the smaller and larger communities of society necessitate new demands and challenges for education. During recent decades the need to reassess and improve the relationship of the individual to family and the wider society has become more urgent and also more complex. Schooling must play its part in this enterprise.

We have been overwhelmed by the increasing speed and volume of innovation in all aspects of life during the twentieth century, to the extent that we can find moments and fragments of lucidity, hope, connection, and material gain in our lives, but little consolidation, certainty, or security. Wholes rupture into parts and the parts in turn fall into smaller parts, and often at the expense of unity, harmony, or coherence, either in our individual lives or any of the communities to which we are affiliated. It is indicative of this sense of disintegration, and the ambiguity, contradiction, and anguish it engenders that, in common parlance, the need "to get your act together" is perceived as such a frequent and ubiquitous task. To strive for some sense of wholeness and center in our selves, our lives, and our society, has become, therefore, one of our central projects. Further, we have grown in our awareness that the development of parts without

adequate attention being given to the whole, whether that refers to the learning process or our use of the earth's resources, can have distorting and destructive consequences. "Community" is one of the concepts favored by those who encourage our efforts toward harmony and wholeness in our selves and in the world. It is a flag under which we all gather. It is a battle cry for the hawks who advance into combat and for the doves for whom community is a process in which everyone wins. It is a foundation stone of Utopia.

Advocates of community speak in the languages of a range of contemporary discourses, many of which are reflected in educational thinking. In the context of schooling a multi- and inter-disciplinary approach to community is both desirable and probably inevitable if it is addressed as a way of life and not merely a subject to be studied. Educators are currently focusing on and developing such ideas as democracy and civic learning in the classroom, co-operative learning, and strategies for pursuing equality for minority children, the disadvantaged, and the non-conformists. These are all responses to the same concerns expressed by those who exhort us to community.

Community is a multi-dimensional concept. Piece-meal practices and projects can contribute to a vision of community, and indeed must, but, community is fundamentally concerned with the meaning of human life and how we should live together in the world (Macdonald, 1977). It is foundational to education because it has moral, political, and ideological implications for practice. A commitment to community implies a pledge to a range of values and obligations that must permeate everything we do. Community as a theme in the foundations of education is my primary concern. If, however, it is to be more than a slogan to call educators' attention to an apparently common and worthy cause, or to indicate more than superficial concordance, we do need to address the confusion often experienced by those who attempt to put ideas of community into practice. The next two chapters present those theoretical findings that resonate with my experience of community and my assessment of what community might mean to educators in America at the end of the twentieth century, including the notion of community as

a foundational perspective that animates and colors every aspect of schooling, and the school as a community.

The Concept of Community as Descriptive and Evaluative

In schools, as in other contexts, attempts to encourage or create community bring, at best, mixed outcomes. The distance between our visions of the ideal, the realities of schooling, and the lives of individuals, seem greater than ever. In these last decades of the twentieth century human beings seem to be increasingly more alienated from each other as well as from themselves. Are we chasing a chimera or can anything useful be said about the notion of community?

Jacqueline Scherer (1972) suggests that "community" has an affective and psychological aura for most of us, representing a kind of personal and human togetherness that is missing in such antiseptic terms as institution and organization. We both yearn for it and feel guilty that, in our own lives, many of us share in or contribute little to the groups with whom we live. Furthermore, Scherer maintains that we have confused the concept by oversimplifying it, and creating a sentimental ideal that is far from any known reality. The problem is exacerbated by romanticized "memories" of the communities of the past when life was simpler. They are irrelevant because:

Such factors as geographical isolation, ethnic differences, common dedication to a total life-scheme, tradition, continuous association, and distinctive life-styles are no longer the sole dominating characteristics of modern association. (1972, p. 2)

The traditional social-scientific approach to studying community has been to concentrate primarily on the social structures observed and how they function in a given community.

Although Scherer took a looser "search and see" (Scherer, 1972, p. 116) approach, she was still looking for "communal forms," and she found four. The one that has proved most useful subsequently is her idea of a "social network" (1972, p.119) of communities. It refers to the unique and personal network of communities to which an individual belongs. I will return to this idea

later. Meanwhile, I shall begin my search for the meaning of community by examining, not the structure of any community, but the nature of the experience of community for the individual. I begin with a theoretical examination of this possibility, drawing heavily on the thinking of Victor Turner and Martin Buber in particular. It is more usual to examine examples of communities that are successful, but my aim is to try to determine if all examples of "good" community have any elements in common.

There is no doubt that the term "community" is frequently used as a commendation and as a legitimating device in contexts where social achievement is to be praised (a school described as a "real" community), or where it is sought (community action), or hoped for (community care). Almost as often there is no accompanying description of the specific features entailed in the use of "community." It is assumed to be self-evident. In particular contexts this may well be the case, as when an invitation is circulated to all homes in a neighborhood to take part in a "Community Clean-up" in which specific tasks are listed (although the main purpose for some people, i.e. getting to know each other, may not be listed). In other settings that entail a more complex interweaving of parts, such as a school or "education," an assumed account of community can confound many well-intentioned efforts. One of the greatest dangers, I think, is the conflation of the descriptive and evaluative elements of "community."

Philosophers have long been aware of the distinction between the descriptive and evaluative meaning that certain terms carry. One of the most influential theories was developed in the context of moral philosophy by Hare (1952), who claims that a term is evaluative if it rests upon a decision of principle rather than on empirical verification. Such decision making is the essence of morals, he says, but matters of principle are at stake in all kinds of value decisions, including political, aesthetic, and educational valuing.

In Community: Concept, Conception and Ideology, Plant (1978) concentrates on community as an evaluative concept as one way to account for the vagueness of the concept. The central tenet of his thesis is that we can have a determinate and specific concept of community

only from within the framework of an ideological position. Certainly I agree that the value decision concerning the nature of a community will dictate the substantive structure, conditions, and modes of functioning of that particular community. Furthermore, the values lived by a variety of communities can be examined from a sociological, ethical, religious, or any other chosen point of view; but any decision concerning which kind of community is most valuable will inevitably depend on the ideological stance of the person or group making the value judgment. The normative force of the ideological engagement of a group is a vital issue to which I will return later.

More immediately, I want to question his deduction from this statement that, what is commended in a positive evaluation of community, as the sense of Community enjoyed by individual members, is also dependent on those same ideological groupings. This distinction between "a community" and "Community" is central to my thesis. Therefore, from this point on, "a community" meaning the specific ideology, structure, and purposes of a community will be written with a small "c," and "Community" meaning the notion of a sense of Community felt by individual members in a community of any kind, will be written with a capital "C."

I agree with Plant that, although deeply opposed political groupings (he cites conservatives and socialists) value community very highly, what they understand by the social relationships described as "community" differ widely. His mistake, I think, is to seek the source of value of a community for individual members in "empirically detectable features of social life" (Plant, 1978, p. 82). The "cash value" (note the ideological metaphor he uses) he seeks in the concept of community, in terms of concrete experience, is sought in external institutional rules and structures concerned, for example, with justice and contracts. On page 88 he does not "deny that subjective experience is of vital importance to a sense of community," but he does not attribute any value to this factor in his overall valuing of community. Since the intensity and quality of feelings engendered by lived experience, and identifiable emotional responses are recalcitrant to rational study, they are dismissed, and feature only at the margins of his concept.

He only returns to it on page 105, when he refers to the fact that people "have certain perceptions of each other" regarding their intentions and the ways in which they value one another; and that these intentions yield "certain perceived relations between persons." He admits that these intentions are crucial but does not pursue these matters any further.

I will argue that it is our perceptions of particular kinds of relationships and their felt and perceived efficacy for us that constitute the source of our sense of Community. It is the feeling of a "strong sense of Community" engendered in people that is the source of the value that individuals find in a community of any kind. This says nothing, however, about the social, moral, or political efficacy of "a community." I agree with Plant that an examination of the evaluative aspect of "community" may cast some light on the vagueness of the concept, but I shall argue that the value of "Community" is to be found in the physical, psychological, and social benefits to individual members, and that it is the value attributed to "a community" by society (other communities) that depends on the ideological basis of its form. A specific ideological position will determine the institutional structure of a particular group of people and the relationships between people that are required, or deemed to be appropriate, or acceptable. The value to individual members is only identified through the quality of their experience of the form and its system of functioning.

"Community" as a descriptive term, then, relates to the discourses through which the common reality of a group of people is defined, expressed, and continually reinterpreted; the structure of the group; the patterns of interaction demanded, encouraged, and permitted, by the cultural norms and the ethic the members share; the structural roles they act out; the quantity and quality of the time and space given to community; its goals and purposes; the tradition in which it is rooted; and the nature of the needs and interests the possible interactions could fulfill for members, and how individuals respond to these parameters. As a list of abstractions this can be more or less detailed, but little can be said concerning the interrelationship of these features unless particular substantive values are assigned to each of them. The variables that may be

relevant even in one example of a community become almost unlimited if, in addition to the list above, their interpretation by each interacting member of the group is also taken into account. This, perhaps, explains not only the complexity of the notion of community, but also for the fragility of "good" Community.

In general terms, according to my account so far, a "good" community for its members is one that provides most physical, psychological, and social satisfaction for each member. Clearly, in political, ethical, or educational terms, such a hedonistic account is inadequate; I address these vital issues at length. My claim that a sense of Community is dependent on the psychological affect for individual members of the group is to say that, without such an affect, there is no successful community at all, only a group of people together. It says nothing about the quality of the affect, or the "community" in terms of any other value system, but I consider the nature of this affect first.

By way of explanation for the interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation: I am presenting scholarship herein from several disciplines, namely, aesthetics, art, dance, education, sociology, philosophy, and anthropology. In fact, many of my sources can be located within two or three disciplines themselves. I hope the result is mosaic but well integrated.

Chapter One has provided the reader with an overview of the dissertation and an introduction. In Chapter Two I discuss the value of community for its members, and in Chapter Three I turn to the value of community as a social entity. The ground is thus laid for a redefinition of an aesthetic curricular language sympathetic to community that appears in Chapter Four. Finally, in Chapter Five, the implications for schooling are discussed in terms of a shift of consciousness demanded by this approach, along with some practical strategies that may provide conditions for true community in schools.

CHAPTER II

THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY FOR ITS MEMBERS

Introduction

My most powerful and sustained experience of community with the same group of people was during the five years when my college dance company, Dancescapers, performed at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe and at a variety of local venues. It was possible to perform only for the equivalent of four weeks annually; and the rest of the year was spent in preparation. Most members of the company stayed year after year, even when they were no longer students, and I maintain that it was not just the allure of performing which drew them to this entirely voluntary enterprise. There were many instances of Community felt by us all, which created a potent bond.

Everyone had her part to play in the complex network of activities which constituted a performance. Not only were the obvious roles of choreographer, dancer, musician, lighting technician, stage manager, press officer, and so on, co-ordinated; but also the more subtle functions of maintaining group morale, individual self-esteem, critical standards, adequate physical provision, and other interpersonal necessities, were accommodated and shared by the members of the group. We were a small group, operating on a minimal budget; therefore, our human resources were stretched to their limit. We were not overwhelmed or dehumanized by technology, and everyone had opportunities to exercise her creativity and to take part as a whole person. It was a genuine living together of unique individuals; community derived from the overcoming of otherness in lived unity. Our common purpose became the center in which we took our stand "in living mutual relation" (Buber, 1958, p. 45). The times when I felt a strong sense of Community with this group stand out in memory as the high points of my Dancescapers experience.

I have not had the good fortune to encounter any of the primal rituals of a "tribal society" (Highwater, 1992) except on film and a brief time spent as a spectator of the Buffalo Dance at the Taos Pueblo in New Mexico. I have, however, been immersed in the strong feelings of Community engendered by dancing with other people in a variety of contexts, or singing, praying, or marching with different groups of people. I have experienced the same feeling as a spectator, too.

Attendance at a Latin Mass in a Greek Orthodox Church in Athens gave me a sense of belonging to the community of the Church. The familiarity of it in an otherwise strange place embraced me warmly. The grandeur of the church, the simplicity of the plainsong, and the artistry of the choir, all colored by experience, but it was the shared heritage and tradition that struck me most forcefully.

As I try to understand the value of community for its individual members it is the writings of an anthropologist and a theologian that resonate with my own experience. My theoretical account of a strong sense of Community is derived, primarily, from anthropologist Victor Turner's description of "communities," together with theologian Martin Buber's account of the "I-Thou" and "essential We" relations to which Turner also refers. The fact that I call upon the work of an anthropologist and a theologian for the most productive accounts of the feeling quality of Community is significant.

Turner's Communitas: The "Quick" of Human Interrelatedness

In The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Turner, 1969), the author distinguishes between existential or spontaneous "communitas" and the structure of a society or group of people. A strong feeling of Community, which he calls "communitas," just happens. It is structureless and, although it creates strong bonds among people momentarily, they can rarely be maintained for very long. Structure becomes necessary in order to mobilize and organize resources for achieving particular goals (material survival, running a business or a school, mounting a theatrical event, conducting a classroom lesson with 6th grade students, or just living

together), and providing rules for living and working together, so that the aims of the group can be fulfilled. It is my contention that we will find the highest value attributable to Community for its members in *communitas*. The value of community as a social entity depends on structure, and both dimensions are intrinsic to community (in a descriptive sense) as Turner claims.

In the foreword of The Ritual Process, Turner says that this book is his attempt to "free my own thought . . . from grooved dependence on 'structure' as the sole sociological dimension" (Turner, 1969, p. viii). Therefore it is on "*communitas*" that he concentrates, in the context of Ndembu ritual, a highly structured form of human practice. Turner derives his theory from observations of "tribal societies." He then tests its applicability to other models of community around the world with fruitful results and, by the final page, he concludes that, "The very flexibility and mobility of social relations in modern industrial societies may provide better conditions for the emergence of existential *communitas*, even if only in countless and transient encounters" (Turner, 1969, p. 203). It is this idea that is central to my project.

For Turner, the paradigmatic state of "*communitas*" is a modality of relationship that occurs, usually fleetingly, in the present. It is a spontaneous relationship between concrete, idiosyncratic individuals, an immediate experience of mutuality, creating an intersubjective reality that demands the full attention of the individual. Turner states that there is no specific structural form that expresses spontaneous *communitas*. It tends to flourish best either when there is no structure, when people voluntarily draw towards each other, or in those phases of a structured group when social role-playing is held in abeyance or is reversed.

Turner describes the experience of spontaneous *communitas* as "richly charged with affects, mainly pleasurable ones . . . (it) has something 'magical' about it. Subjectively there is in it the feeling of endless power" (Turner, 1969, p. 139). It gives rise to powerful feelings for which we do not have an adequate language. He finds himself forced to resort to metaphor and analogy, for example, *communitas* as "the 'quick' of human interrelatedness" (Turner, 1969, p.

127). Turner cites theologian Martin Buber's description of *communitas* (which Buber calls "community") as "the best way of putting this difficult concept" (Turner, 1969, p. 126-7).

Buber's Description of Community (Communitas)

Community is the being no longer side by side (and, one might add, above and below) but with one another of a multitude of persons. And this multitude, though it moves towards a goal, yet experiences everywhere a turning to, a dynamic facing of, the others, a flowing from I to Thou. Community is where community happens (Buber, 1965, p.51).

Buber's "I-Thou" relation is when "I" meets directly an unconditioned "Other" in the immediacy of the present, and the moment is filled by the sense of relationship. These moments are usually brief in time because "It is not possible to live in the bare present" (Buber, 19487, p. 34). That is, we cannot sustain the immediacy of a moment of "being" that is not mediated by thought. We have no word that can describe the experience that holds a simultaneity of sense, idea, and feeling, and which has a unique, pervasive, emergent quality. It is too complex, too whole, to identify the elements in words which must disconnect that which is inseparable, but I think Buber's "I-Thou" is an attempt to account for it.

This is the kind of feeling I have when I concentrate on the dancing of the Other and move with that person. I am her movement. My awareness is identical with her dancing. I have no body and yet my body is dancing, too. I am our body, and yet I am disembodied. I am neither living my own bodily movement nor am I attending to it; but I am living the moment and the movement with another's body. Her dancing and mine have fused into one in my consciousness. Everything other than that dancer dancing stands outside or beyond my awareness. This situation occurs whether I am copying the movement of the teacher as in a technique class; dancing in unison with another dance in a composition; improvising with one or more people; performing complementary movements with another dancer in a choreographed piece on stage; or dancing, with another person, a preset form of social dance. My body responds, but I am not conscious of the nature of the response. There is a sense in which I do not "know" whether I am

even moving at all. The vital unity of the "I-Thou" relation "is felt so forcibly that its parts seem to fade before it, and in the force of its life, the "I" and the "Thou" between which it is established, are forgotten" (Buber, 1987, p. 87).

Whether my body performs "well," according to the criteria of the dance world, on the other hand, depends not on the "I-Thou" relation but on how thoroughly and competently I have learned the technique exercise, my part in the composition, or the degree of mastery of the craft of spontaneously creating movement I can sustain in improvisation. This knowledge which Buber calls "the multitude of contents" which surrounds the "I" of "I-It," constitutes the world in which "It" becomes an object that can be classified, analyzed, and ordered; its parts separated out, for example, the structural patterning of relationships in a community. "It" is the detached world of things, and events, and ideas that has its existence in time and place and is available to everyone. It is a solid, reliable world to which we can return at will. If "I" dance well according to the standards of the dance world in the meeting with "Thou" it must be because I have knowledge about dancing, internalized and assimilated and made my own; it is, therefore, no longer separated from my being. This "dancing me" is the theme of my consciousness as I begin to move, and the specific kind of dancing demanded by the situation becomes what the psychologists call my mental set, which I establish before the event.

"Thou" hardens into an "It" when the lived relation with "I" ceases. When the dancing stops, the other dancer who was my "Thou" becomes, instead, a role-playing functionary for my "I," or an object that can be categorized, and bear specific characteristics. When "I" speaks "Thou" the speaker takes his or her stand in relation, but "Thou" continually re-enters the conditioned world of things with names qualities. The reified "It" is part of the world that we "use."

"Wholeness of the Person and "Wholeness" of the Feeling in Communitas

Thus far, I follow Buber's description of this relation, but I find his use of the term "wholeness" ambiguous. He refers to "I" being spoken with the "whole being" (Buber, 1987, p. 3) and the "Thou" addressed is similarly met in his or her "wholeness." Turner accepts this account

(Turner, 1969), but I cannot imagine what sum of descriptions or facts would add up to the "wholeness" of anyone, not even of myself. It is, however, a striking metaphor. Furthermore, it carries, for Buber, the inference that a "whole person" must be a person of integrity and that those who engage in this relation do not bring to it a judgmental attitude. I find this sense of wholeness pertinent for community, but I claim that it is the "wholeness" of the feeling of the "I-Thou" relation, that is a key notion for the "I-Thou" relation, for Turner's *communitas*, and my "strong sense of Community."

Turner (1977) calls the feeling of total communion with one another in pure relation a sentiment of "humankindness." He describes it as having the nature of a generic social bond. In addition, I accept the view of the psychologists that this sensing of completeness may also be derived from the capability of "Thou" to satisfy more specific personal needs or interests, whether or not the "Thou" is aware of so doing. For example, a sense of Community may momentarily alleviate the deficiency of growth and self-actualizing needs outlined by Maslow (1970) in his theory of motivation.

It is intrinsic to the "I-Thou" relation that it is spontaneously felt, like an emotion (Perhaps it is an emotion, but one for which we have no name?). It does not come about, at the time, as a result of conscious observation and judgment. It is not an intellectual affair at the moment of being felt. The analysis of emotion given by psychologist George Mandler (1983) is helpful here. He identifies two strands in an experience of emotion, "arousal," and "evaluation" although, in our phenomenological experience of that emotion, they are singular; they are not separable. Briefly, an emotion is "aroused" when a deviation (good or bad) from our expectations is perceived in the environment. This discrepancy creates a disturbance or interruption which triggers the autonomic nervous system in its function of reacting and warning the body to adapt to the external world. The perception of a deviation is "evaluated" relative to the cultural and personal norms and attitudes internalized by the individual. In this context the ideological framework of his or her community is a potent force. There is a sense in which we are always in

some degree of arousal, so that what we become aware of, are increases or decreases relative to the current level of activation. In addition, strong emotions seem to infuse the whole physical body and affect the whole being, not only physically. I suggest that it is this sense of "wholeness" that the intensity of a strong sense of *communitas* produces, because it affects the whole person.

"Wholeness" carrying the connotation of integrity is central for Buber. He sees the essential problematic of the "between" in dialogue as the duality of "being" and "seeming." A person dominated by "being" can give him or herself unconditionally and spontaneously without any pretense or calculated effort. The "seeming" person, on the other hand, is consciously intending to present an image of him or herself as friendly, or sincere, or whatever, to the other person. This is, we are told in Western culture, sometimes necessary for the smooth running of public affairs as we perform certain "roles," but "seeming" will never directly give an "I-Thou" relation or a sense of *communitas*. When an "I" in his or her "being" interprets another person as "Thou," however, it may or may not be the case that the other person is also "being." It could be that the "I" is not very astute when interpreting other people; or "I" is seeing what he or she wants to see; or that the other person is capable of presenting a "seeming" self very convincingly.

Goffman (1967) undertook an analysis of the "seeming" self. He calls it "face," which is the "image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes" (Goffman, 1967, p. 5). There are some public and social occasions when "being" is preferred or desirable, but there are others when it can only be tolerated or not countenanced at all. As Goffman says, "A person's performance of face-work (to maintain his own face and the faces of others) represents his willingness to abide by the ground rules of social interaction" (Goffman, 1967, p. 31). It sounds as though we spend much of our lives wearing some mask or another, but this is not necessarily an indictment, nor does it always entail loss of integrity. In Western culture it is part of both the socializing process and the maintenance of social relations. Teachers frequently present a relaxed and loving "face" to their students, although they are feeling neither relaxed nor loving. They do this for the benefit of their students.

The performance of "face-work" is a subtle matter, and the amount of "seeming" it entails always depends on the extent to which we are in tune with other people and the demands of the occasion of our meeting. But, "face-work" is more than a one way process. Common sense and a variety of research have demonstrated that behavior is not only an expression of the individual but, when it is repeated, "seeming" behavior can also affect the way the individual feels and thinks. In the context of human interaction, if the response to a "seeming" self is positive or favorable, it is likely to produce warm feelings for that seeming self. Such a response may also function as the catalyst that enables "seeming" to turn into "being." We may "express" who we are but we can also "impress" on ourselves the kind of person we would like, or others would like us, to become.

An inner city second grade teacher described such an experience to me that she had encountered in relation to one of her students who could not read. She made a conscious decision to try to improve the self esteem of this underprivileged child to see if it would help him to learn. Having employed several strategies unsuccessfully, she could think of only one other. She had put off having the child close to her for any length of time because he was always so dirty he smelled bad. She took a deep breath and invited the boy to sit close beside her and they looked at a book together. The effect was immediate and dramatic. They did this every day for a week and his progress was remarkable. He was learning to read, he was smiling, he began to initiate conversations with her. She was so thrilled she hugged him. She told the story amidst many tears.

The "Essential We" of Community, and the Distinction Between a Collective and a Community

Buber's "essential We" of community is both an extension of the "I-Thou" relation and also dependent on it because, "only men who are capable of truly saying 'Thou' to one another can truly say 'We' with one another" (Friedman, 1965, p. 371). For Buber this is the source of the vital difference between a community and a collective. He states that,

Collectivity is not a binding but a bundling together' individuals packed together, armed and equipped in common, with only as much life from man to man as will inflame the marching step. . . . Collectivity is based on an organized atrophy of personal existence, community on its increase and confirmation in life lived towards one another. The modern zeal for collectivity is a flight from community's testing and consecration of the person, a flight from the vital dialogue, demanding the staking of the self, which is the heart of the world. (1965, p. 31)

It is in the in-between of a dialogue that humanity exists, for Buber. Most teachers have experienced that moment when something he or she says catches the attention and imagination of students and they all look up. Everyone's concentration seems to hover in the space between, holding the idea. It is suspended among them and, at the same time, it links everyone together by invisible threads. It is dialogue, therefore, that holds intrinsic value. The self-realization of the individual is only a means to and by-product of this end. Buber attacks the psychologism of our age with its emphasis on the self. For Buber it denies the eternal Thou. Psychology has given us many insights but, increasingly, for a large number of Americans, it has become the only or controlling discourse through which they understand themselves and their world (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985).

I, too, see contemporary psychologism as a limiting factor for Community. I shall argue that certain aspects of the dominant forms of practice in psychology in the second half of the twentieth century exert an inhibiting influence on the creation and maintenance of Community. This will be considered in more detail later.

Perception is Culturally Determined

In the context of Community, "evaluation," the second of the two strands ("arousal" and "evaluation"), that Mandler identifies in an experience of emotion, is dependent on personal interpretation of the situation, and on the cultural determinants of that interpretation. The "evaluation" that "I" makes of a relation with another person, rendering it an encounter with "Thou," must be contingent on the knowledge and experience that "I" brings to the situation. A meeting with "Thou" rather than "It" is also dependent on the personal significance with which it

is endowed. Furthermore, "I" can only see anything according to the perspectives that inform the understanding, attitudes, and values of that individual. These perspectives are culturally learned. They are couched in the language, forms, and symbols of the culture to which the individual belongs, and which both create and define reality in that culture and, therefore, both meaning and significance for the individual.

For example, my British sensibility was developed in relation to delicate and misty watercolors of the British countryside, although I have also been educated to associate specific kinds of color schemes with certain artists and art movements, I had not been exposed to the aesthetics of a New Mexican landscape. The first paintings I saw of New Mexico seemed rather garish to me with their sweeps of luminous oranges and salmon pinks standing out defiantly against larger areas of drab. They did not prepare me for the dramatic beauty of the real thing. This was not a failure of the painter but a blindness in me. I continue to return to one painting in particular and "see" a whole world in a configuration of colors which was alien to my eye when I first "looked" at it. I had to learn to see it. I was delighted to rediscover the power of color.

Culture and a Sense of Community

Buber attributes substantial significance to language in the "I-Thou" relation between human beings (he also speaks of two other spheres of relation, our life with nature and with spiritual beings) because "'I' and 'Thou' take their stand not merely in relation, but also in the solid give-and-take of talk" (Buber, 1987, p. 102). Buber does not develop the implications of language as a social construction of reality, however, nor the inevitable inferences that must be made concerning the interpretation of the relation that must be made concerning the interpretation of the relation with "Thou." When he speaks of education and the "essential We," however, Buber does insist on the importance of a common world built up by the "common speech-with-meaning . . . that is the stuff of reality" (Friedman, 1965, p. 366). This creates a contradiction (unless the cultural construction of reality is denied) in relation to his insistence on the possibility of the "real" otherness of the other person that is addressed in the "I-Thou" relation.

He seems to imply that every person has some fixed and knowable "essence" but Buber does not articulate the relationship of this "essence" to the world the individual shares with other people. Friedman (1965) states forcibly, however, that Buber's concern is not primarily psychological, or social, but theological. The question for Buber is: How may I understand my experience of a relation with God, the eternal "Thou"? He is convinced of "the close connection of the relation to God with the relation to one's fellow-man" (Buber, 1987, p. 124), and suggests that it is through the "I-Thou" relation that we can come to some small understanding of the eternal "Thou." "The 'Thou' meets me through grace - it is not found by seeking" (Buber, 1987, p. 11). It seems as though it is a gift from God, in which case, perhaps, the "I-Thou" relation must retain its ineffability, and cannot be understood as merely another dimension of the self. In spite of my reservations, however, Buber offers such a provocative account of the "I-Thou" relationship that I, like Turner, wish to co-opt it for my purpose, although my concern is not theological.

It is as "We," however, that we construct and develop our shared world. It is in the context of the structuring of groups of people for the maintenance of the group that I can now set my earlier point concerning the social construction of language and the reality it both creates and defines. It is this factor that supports Plant's (1978) claim that communities can only be described within particular ideological frameworks. Men and women have constructed and continue to extend, modify, and create, a variety of systems that organize and give meaning to the world, and through which they make sense out of their lives together and their environment. If we learn that constitutes "reality" through the language and ways of knowing the world that we learn from the culture in which we grow up, then it must be the case that the "reality" of "I" and "Thou" and "We" will also be couched in those terms, together with the kinds of significance dictated by the values of that culture. In a crude sense, the "I" finds that the "Thou" fulfills a need or function that the culture (or bus- or counter-culture) tells him or her that he or she has or may have. The greatest sense of mutuality is likely to occur, therefore, not only when each can provide a sense of fulfillment for the other; when each "I" speaks "Thou" to the other; but also when they share the

same cultural expectations and norms, or have some understanding of and accept the ideological position of the other person. A common culture provides fertile soil for Community.

Furthermore, within a community, equality of social status offers the richest loam for the growth of the "I-Thou" relation.

Communitas is Most Likely to Occur Among Equals

When Buber speaks of "I" and "Thou" as equals, it is of people sharing in "being" at the moment of "communitas." As I have described already, Turner (1977) calls this "a strong sentiment of 'humankindness,' a sense of the generic social bond between all members of a society." As there can be no description or categorizing each of the other, Turner states that communitas is communion of equals in terms of common humanity, although individuals may differ in physical and mental endowment. Gatherings of friends, co-workers, and any kind of peer group or status equals offer the greatest range of possible occasions of communitas, because they already participate in a common identity and conform to the same expectations and demands of one another based on a shared view of the world or their circumstances. But, as Turner (1969) demonstrates through ritual practices, opportunity for the occurrence of communitas is often built into the structure of highly differentiated cultural groups. From the observation of a variety of rituals, especially of "tribal societies," Turner identifies two major types of "equalizing" procedures adopted as part of often hierarchically structured communities. People are "leveled" (either voluntarily or through coercion) by stripping them of all signs of hierarchy as a prelude to (1) withdrawing or being withdrawn from the wider society, or (2) temporarily suspending role-play. He also observes that these same principles are applicable to some contexts in Western society.

Withdrawal: Equalizing people through "leveling" procedures. Part of the initiation into most Western religious communities entails relinquishing all the external material goods and symbols of status that accompanied the initiate in his or her worldly life. Equality before God is emphasized by equality of visible signs attached to the person. Humility is embraced by denying

external confirmation of an individual self and the attribution of any status in a hierarchy. This process of "equalizing" is voluntarily undergone by initiates as they enter the "total institution" (Goffman, 1961) of the religious house in which they will live and work. In other kinds of "total institutions" analyzed in more detail by Goffman, the "leveling and stripping" of "inmates" is performed by those in authority, if not with physical force, then with the power of an authority which cannot be disobeyed except with dire consequences. For example, inmates of jails, penitentiaries, P.O.W. camps, concentration camps, are forcibly "equalized." Initial "equalizing" procedures are then followed by a variety of humiliations and restrictions on the person, self-administered (usually) in the case of the members of voluntary religious communities, but inflicted by staff (officially, often by other inmates unofficially) in penal institutions. A continuing sense of equality is thus assured, structurally, although this does not prevent hierarchies forming in the sub-cultures of such institutions.

It is important to note that the status of these "equals" is always low. Similar degrading occurs in institutions whose aims are not primarily punitive, but in which inmates are either not strictly speaking "voluntary," for example, mental institutions and some schools; or they are required to relinquish their autonomy as part of the "deal" in order to achieve some desired "good," such as in army barracks, and hospitals. These institutions also engage in a variety of "leveling and stripping" procedures, and enforce many restrictions on their individual members. Such practices are frequently carried out in the interest of efficiency, and order, or intentions to "treat everyone the same" (equalizing). But the same sense of inferiority, humiliation, lack of individuality and personal control over one's situation, is often elicited by these practices unless great effort is made by the staff to mitigate the lowering of status effect which tends to accompany this kind of "equalizing," or again, sub-cultural hierarchies mitigate the sense of being powerless for some members.

The groups mentioned above either withdraw or are compulsorily withdrawn from the wider society. It is relevant to note that it is only when people voluntarily subject themselves to

such extreme forms of "equalizing," as in a religious community, that the resulting institution is readily described as a "community." In instances such as schools, "community" is used to describe schools that manage successfully to relive the most painful effects of the "equalizing" process or when there is a conscious effort being made to do so, as when "community action" of some sort is proposed.

Students are tracked in many schools, which is one mode of equalizing them, according to their ability to learn in an academic setting. Teaching in homogeneous groups makes the job easier for authoritarian teachers with a preference for lecturing, also who must cover X material with everyone in the class. It may serve the purposes of society regarding future job openings to which those tracks lead, and for maintaining current power relations between rich and poor. Many students in the lower tracks, often from poor and ethnically marginalized groups, feel a sense of failure and inadequacy as a human being, and come to believe that it is a result of their own stupidity and lack of purpose. Conversely, the students in the higher tracks feel superior and believe it is all due to their intelligence and hard work, and so are more likely to feel self-righteous. The social reproduction of an economic structure is perpetuated by this practice (Rothstein, 1974), and such divisive attitudes are not conducive to community feelings between these groups of students.

It is tempting to assume that the "equalized" will always find Community with each other for mutual support, against the "leveling" of the authority figures, if for no other reason. When social and/or academic comparison is personally threatening, students who see themselves as similar in these contexts seem to band together and become marginalized groups of peers, especially adolescent groups and gangs. Out of such joining together close bonds can develop among these students, but they usually create their own hierarchies of power. They offer each other a degree of protection and support, but they must also be acceptable to each other on other grounds, such as physical attractiveness, religious affiliation or ethnicity, if these are issues for them. In very restrictive, punitive institutions, however, Goffman (1961) observes that the

"equalized" inmates often find difficulty in fraternizing with each other. The extensive controls and paucity of material things allowed to them sets each against the other in a constant struggle to improve their meager quality of life. People will steal from, assault, and inform on each other in order to procure even the smallest "extra" or forbidden item. In this milieu (also recognizable in many contexts in the wider society today), desire for material things reduces every person to his or her possible function as an inhibitor or source of supply for every other individual. There is, therefore, small probability that an "I-Thou" relation could develop when there is such a lack of trust.

Temporary suspension of status-dependent role playing. People may consider themselves to be equals in community in either a structural sense of belonging to the same status level or in a voluntary or modified sense of being "equalized" through conscious manipulation of circumstances as indicated above. Of course, the very notions of "equalizing" and status imply a hierarchically structured society, and it is the conscious acting out of hierarchy that is a threat to community. Most of us do not need Turner to remind us that "Men use the authority vested in their office to misuse and abuse the incumbents of lower positions and confuse position with its incumbent" (Turner, 1969, p. 178). It is his last point, confusing a position with its incumbent, that I want to extend in relation to a sense of Community.

Two related statuses, for example, teacher and student, involve a set of role expectations associated with each status. In matters to do with teaching and learning, the teacher in the classroom is the acknowledged authority, although the core of what is to be taught and learnt usually rests on an institutional decision or some higher authority. In addition, there is an important distinction between the recommended or written curriculum and the "hidden curriculum" (Gress & Purpel, 1988). The hidden curriculum may refer to those aspects of the formal curriculum that are inconsistent with or detrimental to the prescribed curriculum, and/or the "attitudes and values embedded in school experiences and relationships" (Gress & Purpel, 1988, p. 323). It is in the "attitudes and values" area of the hidden curriculum in particular, that a

teacher can either abuse or use his or her authority to inhibit or encourage a sense of Community. In order to create the possibility of a sense of Community, there is obviously a need for an "equalizing" process between the unequal statuses of teacher and student. A suspension of role-playing during which time teacher and student confront each other as equals in their "humankindness" provides such an opportunity. Indeed, if a superior shows his or her humanity to an inferior in any context, it is usually appreciated. It serves to remind both parties that the social role enacted is not the whole person, and that status is conferred by society for functional purposes, but does not have to detract from any person's worth as a human being.

The term "equal" often carries political connotations, and thus far it is equality of social status to which I have been referring. Equal meaning "the same" also has implications for a sense of Community. For example, when people commit themselves to "the same" purpose or project, out of necessity or from choice, the common enterprise frequently provides grounds for a sense of Community. The more dire or demanding the cause, in times of crisis or catastrophe such as war or natural disasters, the more likely it is that a sense of Community will occur. A powerful ideological or religious cause may have the same effect.

A Community of Ideas

In a religious community, it is not only Community in the literal sense of being physically with others that is demonstrated; indeed, in some (often contemplative) Orders, communion with other members of the order is expressly forbidden. In religious life it is the individual's relationship with God that is of central importance, and serving God in the particular mode of the Order is their common purpose. A religious Order of people living and working together share a common ideology that very consciously pervades every aspect of their being and their life together and this reduces structural contradictions within the community. Fish (1980) would say that they are practicing meaning that is community property. The practice of this all-embracing culture creates an extremely powerful bond. It is so potent that it produces a strong sense of Community that is emotional as well as intellectual. The effect of the shared ideas and ideal is so

pervasive that it engenders a puissant emotional involvement for the individual. This example illustrates that there is another sense in which a strong sense of Community for "me" is more dependent on "what is in my head" than what is "out there." It is not a matter of my interpretation of the behavior of another person, but it leaves open the possibility of a sense of community based on the sharing of ideas, for which the physical body of the "Other" to whom "I" speak "Thou" is not necessary.

Buber speaks of "the structures of the spirit" (Buber, 1987, p. 127) that are accessible to us through their material forms, for example, the writings of masters and art works. Although their authors are long dead, they can become "present" to us in a manner similar to our experience with a "Thou." We receive "only the indivisible wholeness of something spoken." This is not an uncommon experience for those who read, or are deeply involved in the arts, or any subject at all. Like a sense of mutuality with people, it takes time to come to know the "Other," to learn the structures of his or her spirit. Patience and application may then be rewarded by moments of transcendence, when an "I" speaks "Thou." I think this can happen in the classroom when some new material becomes an illumination, a lens, through which a student sees the world he or she has been looking at as though for the first time. From this excitement a love of a subject, an idea, an author, or a love of learning itself, may become a life-long passion. This topic will be developed further in Chapter Four.

The Body and Community

The Lived Body and Community

As a dance educator I am aware of the psychological power and social significance of human movement in our daily lives as well as in the many culturally patterned forms of movement we call ritual, dance, or sport. I argue that a sense of Community is primarily an emotional response to relationship, and is therefore known as a bodily experience. Yet the lived body as a source of our understanding and the locus of social praxis is greatly underrated in our overly rational culture.

Our sense of movement is holistic, but analysis can help us to understand more fully this experience. For example, in his analysis of human movement, Rudolf Laban (1960) suggests that the flow of energy in space and time determines the quality of every movement. Furthermore:

There was never a point in his whole life when Laban did not associate dance with the community. Whether it was dance to be performed professionally to an audience, or dance involving lay people carried out largely for the delight and experience of the participants, it was, in Laban's view, a community act (Hodgson & Preston-Dunlop, 1990, p. 43).

Given my earlier claim that community is always embodied, I am encouraged to see hints of a renewal of this attitude in the dance world today (see the title for the 1993 Congress on Research on Dance Conference, "Of, By, and For the People") and hope that in the wider community the love of dancing will not be lost.

I agree with Laban that it is the dynamic flow of energy that carries the greatest emotional significance and the living power of movement in community. Starhawk (1988) continually refers to the dynamic element of human movement in the context of ritual:

Feel the energy of the earth. . . . The cone of power is raised at the point in the ritual when the energy we have drawn up through our bodies spirals upward into a cohesive whole, reaches a peak, and then dies down. . . . The flow of energy will follow our movements. . . . Directed energy causes change. . . . Shaping energy is surprisingly easy, almost instinctive. We move energy with our breath, our voices, with the movements of our bodies, and by making pictures in our minds . . . energy always circles and returns; it moves in cycles, in waves, it rises and falls. It cannot move indefinitely in only one direction. (p. 29).

The association between dancing and music is described by Sessions (1979). The ebb and flow of energy is heard and felt in the pulse beat and the rhythm of music, in the increasing excitement of an *accelerando*, *crescendo*, or rising melodic pitch, and the lessening of tension with a *ritardando*, *diminuendo*, or falling melodic pitch. The intensification or diminution of effort, energy, and emotional force is analogous psychologically to the bodily experience. We respond

to music affectively because we live intimately through the same muscular responses of the nervous system that are "reproduced in miniature . . . in response to musical impressions" (Sessions, 1979, p. 255).

Young children show us the connection between vocal sound and whole body movement when they accompany their movement with spontaneous vocal sounds, and Starhawk says, "Moving together, singing together, the people are one" (Starhawk, 1988, p. 154). Regular repetitions of movements such as walking and marching when performed simultaneously by a large number of people develop an accumulative force. It is the intimacy of the physical action and the dynamic synchrony that creates a bond between participants. This is why ritual can deepen consciousness, generate energy and enthusiasm, and strengthen common purpose. Sessions also says of music, that:

Sound . . . is inextricably associated with our sensation of time. . . . The feeling of tempo, so often derived from the dance, has a much more primitive basis in the involuntary movements of the nervous system and the body in the beating of the heart, and more consciously in breathing, later in walking. (1979, p. 225)

Laban makes a clear distinction between the quantitative aspects of time in relation to movement, in terms of amount, speed, and duration, and its qualitative aspects which refer to our personal and human sense of time (Preston-Dunlop, 1980). Quantities of time can be described digitally (on clocks, metronomes, speedometers and other machines) and are associated with our instrumental uses of time, and notions of mechanical and standardized public time. Measured time also allows us to move more easily in harmony with one another and to create a sense of unity. Yet it cannot be established beforehand exactly how long it will take to reach that sense of unity in a particular group of people, or even if they will. Quantity does not guarantee the quality of the result. It becomes obvious, for example, that we must spend (is there a price attached?) "enough" time with people if we are to have an opportunity to create a sense of Community with them. How much is enough, however, will vary according to a number of

factors, but it is unlikely to conform to specific amounts of time. A "sense of Community" cannot be scheduled to occur between 9 and 9:30 a.m. on Monday morning. Not least it depends on the quality of the amount of time spent, which in turn, is contingent on the feelings and attitudes of the participants.

Qualitative time is not a sum of discrete units. It is experienced as flux, it flows, like our stream of consciousness. It is our sense of continuity and its orchestration that gives it texture and direction. According to our feelings and circumstances, time flies, stands still, is fleeting, out of control, or seems eternal. Personal interpretations abound in our daily conversation, and there are countless examples of artists' expressions of time. Stephen Kern compares three writers' experience of time. "The public time that Proust found superficial and Kafka terrifying, Joyce found to be arbitrary and ill-suited to order the diverse temporal experiences of life" (Kern, 1983, p. 17). His description of the three melting watches in Salvador Dali's famous painting, The Persistence of Memory, is appropriate here too.

One is hanging from a tree in a reminder that the duration of an event may be stretched in memory. Another with a fly on it suggests that the object of memory is some kind of carrion that decays as well as melts. The third deformed watch curls over a hybrid embryonic form - symbol of the way life distorts the geometric shape and mathematical exactness of mechanical time. The one unmelted watch is covered with ants that seem to be devouring it as it devours the time of our lives. (1983, p. 23).

Durkheim (1964) believed in the social relativity of time and that the origin of the calendar of any community is qualitative. The rhythm of social life is composed of special days and seasons, and the periodic recurrence of rites, feasts, and public ceremonies. We get to know each other through shared memories of a common past, the rough and smooth passages of time, its rhythms, cycles of events and seasons, and celebrations that mark their regular recurrence. As Kubler says, "We know time only by what happens in it: by observing change and permanence" (Kubler, 1976, p. 13). Furthermore, "The antipodes of the human experience of time are exact repetition, which is onerous, and unfettered variation, which is chaotic" (Kubler, 1976, p. 63). In

community life, as in our private lives, we are constantly trying to balance the two, the desire for security in the known pattern and the desire to escape from it to the excitement and challenge of a new variation. Kubler speaks of the many groups of a civilization, from family to city, state and nation, sheltering the individual from "disruptive originality" (Kubler, 1976, p. 73) with the many-layered structure of routine. As I get older I am aware that my need for security becomes stronger, and my youthful penchant for variation is waning.

Technology has had an enormous impact on our experience of time in the modern world. It has opened up the possibilities of previously unimaginable speed, fast changes of place and climate, fragmentation, and simultaneity; but also film gave us the capacity to capture speed in slow motion, to freeze a single image of movement, and to return to earlier times. This accelerated pace of life often limits our sensibilities to mere recognition of stereotypes, or a sense that everything is ephemeral. There is no time to linger, to enjoy, to get to know. As Harvey says, "The revival of interest in basic institutions (such as the family and community), and the search for historical roots are all signs of a search for longer-lasting values in a shifting world" (Harvey, 1990, p. 292).

Every culture has a distinctive experience of time, and also of space, which makes time visible and shapes its possibilities. Use of space also has its own symbolic force. Directional use of the body in particular contexts has specific connotations in Western culture. For example, we interpret similarly an upward gesture towards a "higher" power or spirit, gestures outwards and around another person as welcoming, loving, or caring, a sinking posture as depression or despair, a drawing inwards in self-protection. Particular gestures and their direction in space usually carry import according to the symbolic system of the institution or community.

Space is also a form of understanding. Euclid gave us two-dimensional space, but in recent times mathematicians have developed geometries for all kinds of spaces, and even for chaos. Science has extended our notions of size, demonstrating that our world is a mere speck

among many universes, and at the same time, a speck of dust contains a whole universe. The symbolic force of space is interpreted in profoundly different ways in diverse cultures.

The Egyptians conceived of space as a narrow path down which the individual soul moves to arrive at the end before ancestral judges. Their most distinctive constructions are not buildings but paths enclosed by masonry. . . . In Chinese culture space is also a path that wanders throughout the world; but the individual is led to his ancestral tomb by nature, by devious ways through doors, over bridges, round hills and walls. . . . Greek space was dominated by nearness and limit. The universe was a cosmos, a well ordered aggregate of near and completely viewable things covered by the corporeal vault of heaven . . . and it produced a geometry of regular closed figures that were the ideal forms of the earth and heaven (Kern, 1983, p. 139).

As individuals we are aware of qualitatively different spaces, and that our feelings about the same space vary with our shifting moods and perspectives. We prefer places with specific physical qualities, but they are also colored by our sense of immediate psychological comfort, anxiety, or whatever, as well as our past experiences associated with them. As we have become aware of a plurality of times, so we have a plurality of spaces, and of perspectives on the world.

Community refers to time spent with other members of the group; it also identifies our place. Like individuals, a community needs a home, a space that is familiar, and feels safe, because "the images and rituals that are known as home encode assent, continuity, and cohesion" (Grumet, 1991, p. 76). In the modern world, most of us spend less time with more communities than our parents or grandparents, and find them in a variety of places, but a sense of place still contributes to the making of community. Spaces can also enhance or inhibit our sense of community according to the appropriateness of their geometric, visual, or tactile qualities, the kind of movement they allow, and the sense of physicality we experience there.

The bodily experience of Community is central to our understanding of and attitude towards it. Yet the body's expressive and responsive function is taken for granted in most of our everyday encounters with each other. Most of our "reading" of the bodies of others and the experience of, and response to, our own movement life is unconscious and dependent on tacit

understanding. The specificity and clarity of the body images that we acquire and assimilate in this unconscious fashion come to have strong and pervasive connotations for us. We are most likely to become consciously aware of them only when we are removed from our comfortable norms. For example, when we leave our family to go to school, or move from one classroom and teacher to a new one, there is a new community with its own culture to learn, even if I help to create it, as in a classroom. The discomfort is not named because in our logocentric culture we do not educate our children to "speak the body." As Adrienne Rich says, "Culture: pure spirit, mind . . . has . . . split itself off from life, becoming the death-culture of quantification, abstraction, and the will to power which has reached its most refined destructiveness in this century." (1976, p. 284)

Communication through words is treated as primary and all other modes of interaction are entertained only as inferior versions of verbal language that are not given serious attention. In the twentieth century Western world, there is a sense in which we have lost contact with our bodies. We no longer value physicality as an essential aspect of our being, in spite of the variety of "body cults," such as aerobics, that have been developed in order to keep the body as machine in good working order, or in the fashionable "shape" appropriate to a piece of prized property that we present and adorn as a symbol of status or wealth. Body-consciousness and the lived-body are modes of being in the world that are left to private, and largely undifferentiated experience, to artists, and what mainstream ideology tends to think of as the lunatic fringe; for example, those who engage in body therapies, such as bioenergetics, Rolfing, and Alexander, or Feldenkrais systems or body technique. In addition to these body therapies there is also a growing interest in the body-mind practices based on the ancient Eastern wisdom of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Taoism. Eastern sensibility considers physical training that is unaccompanied by training of the mind to be an aberration (Yasuo, 1987). The oneness of body-mind is addressed in Yoga as well as in martial arts such as Aikido or T'ai Chi Chuan. In the West we need a change in

paradigm if we are to cultivate practices in which our bodies function in harmony with our ideas and feelings.

The Neglect of Bodily Experience in Western Culture

A "community of ideas," for which the religious order was my initial example, is, perhaps, the epitome of the Cartesian mind-body split of Western culture in communal form. In the 17th century, Descartes' influence on the Judeo-Christian denigration of the bodily life gave us a dualistic theory of the self in which the body is denied altogether. That is, for Descartes, the true self is the thinking self, to which the body is not really essential. The physical body is an outer object, a container for the inner subject, the self. This radical separation of body from self reduces the body to the status of a necessary tool that must be kept in order. There is no identity of body and self. The body becomes something of a trial, an impediment to be overcome. The domination and/or denial of the body, therefore, is central to the philosophy of all Western religious orders. Yet, ritual enactments that are embodiments of faith, hope, denial, humility, celebration or whatever, punctuate most days, as well as the sacred year, for the monk or nun living in an enclosure. These rituals are closely circumscribed by convention; they are frequent and, usually a large part of every day is devoted to them. They do, therefore, represent a form of domination over the body, through endless and obligatory repetition. The rational self dare not enjoy its "container." Bodily and sensuous pleasure must become a penance. The soul must be saved through the action of the mind but the denial and castigation of the body.

I am using the language of dualism in speaking of the body but, as most accounts of Community exclude bodily experience as a relevant element in a "sense of Community," I feel compelled to make a special case for it. As I will show later, an aesthetic approach to the world emphasizes the inseparability of mind and body, and this is one reason why an aesthetic curricular language will move us towards community in schooling.

In the logocentric, rationalist paradigms of Western culture the discourse of the body is not named. It does not enjoy, therefore, a legitimate place in serious affairs. Science continues to

extend its mastery of the substantive body; the skillful body is acclaimed in the competition of sports and athletics, and the expressive and skillful body is celebrated in art; but the knowing, understanding, and lived body of daily living is given far less attention. Concentration on technical efficiency has resulted in loss and avoidance of our awareness of the physical self other than as an object to be trained, manipulated, and adorned. We are no longer taught to listen to feedback from our own bodies.

Cartesian Dualism separated the mind from the body but, in the twentieth century, we could also be accused of having severed the outward appearance of the body from its full human being. Capitalism has turned us all into consumers of a range of commodities that are "necessary" for creating the body image and illusion of the kind of "self" that commercials convince us that we want and need. Public relations experts are mindful of Buber's "seeming" body, and Goffman's "face-work." It is required, in most fields of endeavor, that the "expert," the "professional self" is detached from the subjectivity of the feeling, personal self in the interest of objectivity. For example, those teachers who desire to be a "whole human being in the classroom" (Rogers, 1983, pp. 23-41) and a friend to their students, as well as their instructor, find themselves in an ambivalent position in relation to the prevailing ethos.

The divorce of the mind from the body and the body image from the lived body is a distinguishing characteristics of the "serious" public world. It has also crept into our personal lives, creating considerable confusion, as we have given more of ourselves over to the "experts." Not only are we dependent on a bewildering array of "specialists" for our physical wellbeing, but also we defer to the professional to tell us how to raise our children and conduct our relationships with each other.

At the margins of society there have been many experiments to try to redress the balance and restore physicality, feelings, and sensuality, to human existence; from the attempts that began in the 1960s, such as the Esalen Institute, to the men's groups inspired by poet Robert Bly's Iron John of the 1990s. There have been private schools designed to promote wholeness in the

developing child, such as the schools based in the teachings of Maria Montessori and Rudolf Steiner, but public schools are still obliged to stress the conceptual, factual, and symbolic domains of knowing and understanding, especially in the High School.

The Body in Academe

In academia, anthropologists were the first to pay serious attention to the difficult subject of the body. Early anthropological studies were usually of "primitive" peoples who emphasized the expressive capacities of the human body and "nakedness," and Ted Polhemus (1975) suggests that the savage mind and naked body of "primitive" culture posed a threat to Western reason. "If we were to render the savage world safe for Western, verbalizing man, we would have to bring the mysteries of the human body within the bounds of Western rationality" (Polhemus, 1975, p. 15). In recounting anthropology's history of studies of the body, Polhemus reminds us that in 1873, Darwin made a claim for the universality of "the chief expressions exhibited by man." On the other hand, following the Durkeimian model, Marcel Mauss (Benthall & Polhemus, 1973) assumed that members of a particular society share attitudes to and understandings of the human body. He claimed that every kind of action is a social and cultural phenomenon and bears the imprint of learning; that the techniques of the body are learnt either consciously or unconsciously and are not merely "natural."

In another kind of exploration of the symbolic body, a Saussurian framework has been used. A conceptual signified (a body imaged), and a material signifier (an expressive body movement) are contrasted and related (Benthall and Polhemus, 1975, p. 24). This approach emphasizes the arbitrariness of sign systems and offers one way of describing cultural differences, but it is primarily concerned with the "seen" body.

In psychological studies, the terms "body image" and "body concept" were used by Seymour Fisher in 1968 (Benthall and Polhemus, 1975, p. 24), and have since been used extensively in educational contexts. This refers to my own concept of my body, and again favors the "seen" body, the image I present to the world, rather than how my body lives in and responds

to the world. Those anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists who follow the mind-body dualism of both the rationalist and empiricist perspectives fail to address the lived bodily experience of community with which I am concerned.

It is from the writers of existential phenomenology that we begin to see descriptions of our embodied consciousness and the existence of the world around us as the same enterprise. We cannot abstract ourselves from our involvement in the world. All "objective givens" have their roots in embodied human consciousness, since that consciousness intentionally creates the world in which it lives.

The theme of The Phenomenology of Perception by Merleau-Ponty (1962), who gives particular significance to the "lived body," is that our understanding of the world is dependent upon perception and that there is no absolute distinction between the perceiving subject and the object perceived. Because consciousness of Community is embodied, Merleau-Ponty would say, it can only be fully understood in the context of lived experience. The body expresses that consciousness and also realizes the consciousness of Community in self-conscious reflection. In addition, it is important for my case to stress the distinction he makes between "preconsciousness" and "consciousness."

Sartre (1956) makes the same distinction, but uses the terms "pre-reflective" and "reflective" consciousness which I prefer. Sartre warns us that it is a fatal trap to assume that all consciousness is self-consciousness. The pre-reflective consciousness makes no judgments of meaning but neither is it a passive receiver and container of impressions. There is a consciousness of felt significance, a feeling of import or meaning. The problem lies in the relationship between our pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. Earlier, Nietzsche had made this point poetically:

The awakened one, the knowing one, saith 'Body am I entirely, and nothing more; and soul is only the name of something about the body'. . . . The body is a big sagacity, a plurality with one sense. . . . The creating body created for itself, spirit as a hand to its

will. . . . But one thing is the thought, another thing is the deed, and another thing is the idea of the deed. The wheel of causality does not roll between them. (1937, p. 50)

This gap between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness is often experienced as contradictions in our lives that we cannot interpret satisfactorily. The Existentialists accept this ambiguity of human existence, because they claim that we can never be sure which features of a situation are given, independently of us, and how much of what we see is created by our own perspective, by our own language, prejudices, and assumptions (Solomon, 1987). Our body can belie the words we utter, and our feelings cannot always be persuaded to match our thoughts. We are all familiar with such contradictions.

Michael Polanyi (1962) discussed this matter in terms of tacit and explicit dimensions of consciousness, or subsidiary and focal awareness. Our tacit understanding is "indwelling" and our beliefs and interpretive frameworks become part of this subsidiary awareness as a result of experience and "practicing" understanding, judging, and deciding. Knowing how to perform certain operations, both physical skills and mental functions are also incorporated into this tacit dimension. Our "personal knowledge" is the accumulation of knowledge that has been integrated into our personal scheme of things and includes both those elements that we can bring into focus and those that remain tacit. Every new situation or project on which we focus is approached through the lens of our personal knowledge. There is always a dynamic relation between subjective and external conditions. Our experience and "practice" of Community, therefore, is likely to affect any new occasion of community.

Some of the most recent and penetrating discussions of the potency of the inscribed body as an "unconscious" authority in our lives has been undertaken by feminist writers. They have made the most concerted attack on the dominant, rational discourses of Western culture because the forces of the body in knowing, being, and living together in the world are not addressed. The French feminists in particular, such as Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, and Helene Cixous, speak of

"writing the body" in an attempt to answer the theoretical question, "Can the body be a source of self-knowledge?" (Jones, 1985, p. 91); and by extension, can the body be a way of knowing and being in the world?

The primary project of feminist writers is to demonstrate that women's experience is systematically repressed by the patriarchal culture, along with other features of our lives that are characterized as "female," including the body. The body is seen, therefore, as one site from which to challenge female oppression. The problem is how to write the body and think through the body without resorting to "translation" into a masculine and dualistic mode. As Jane Gallop (1988, p. 18) says, "The body is enigmatic because it is not a creation of the mind."

For my purpose, a consideration of the body's part in our "sense" of Community, it is not the oppression of women that is my central concern, but the denial or trivialization of all bodily experience in our dealings with one another, male and female, notably in Community. Since "Community" is also considered to be a "female" project, however, the two concerns overlap.

When men speak about and attribute some importance to the body, their authority is co-opted for the women's project. Two notable examples are Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. Gallop (1988) cites literary critic Roland Barthes, writing about himself. He "embraces himself not in transparent self-possession but doubled, thus split, opaque, and beyond reach" (Gallop, 1988, p. 12). He becomes fascinated by his own tastes and dislikes that he cannot reduce to any meaning, but that simply emerge as a bodily enigma. He is strongly aware of what Polanyi calls his tacit dimension of consciousness.

French philosopher Michel Foucault also understands how the body is "trained, shaped, obeys, responds" (Foucault, 1979, p. 136), becoming a socially adapted and "useful body," and his work is frequently appropriated by feminists, such as Susan Bordo (1989). He claims that the cultural conceptions of the body, norms of beauty, models of health and human interaction, and so forth, can be seen as a set of rules and practices that inform the lived body. Thus, the human

body is inevitably stamped as a cultural product. Like Mauss (Benthall & Polhemus, 1975), he is primarily concerned with the social body.

Foucault claims the primacy of practice over ideology. Habits and even trivial routines of the body in daily living render most of us willing and unthinking social beings and because these practices are largely automatic they frequently belie our conscious and professed politics. The habituated aspect of the body is important on two major counts for my account of Community. Firstly, the bodily sensations implicit in a "sense of Community" tend to remain unacknowledged or unidentified; and secondly, it is difficult to re-educate the body to a set of patterns and behaviors that may be more conducive to a sense of Community. I will return to this latter point later when I consider practical recommendations for moving towards community in Chapter Five.

I am claiming that a "sense of Community" is known, tacitly, through the body whether or not it can be brought into focal awareness. Jane Gallop speaks of the perceivable givens of the body that we know as ours, but without knowing their significance for us. She claims that theorizing about the body is always endless because the "body" is an "authorless text, full of tempting, persuasive significance, but lacking a final guarantee of intended meaning" (Gallop, 1988, p. 13). Furthermore, she suggests that one way in which we "make sense of, rationalize, aestheticize our bodily givens, our embarrassing shapes and insistent tastes is to transform them into a consistent style" (Gallop, 1988, p. 13). In our multi-cultural society it is easy to identify styles of behavior and bodily comportment in particular communities that are culturally conditioned from birth. In addition, more self-conscious styles are visible in, for example, the fashion trade and a variety of groups (often of young people), from the cheerleaders and beauty pageant contestants to the White Supremists and the Hari Krishnas. It is not part of my purpose here to interpret these phenomena, but merely to note that choices are made concerning the behavior and adornment of the body that are the stamp of group membership and identification. Furthermore, these patterns become imprinted on the body and then feel "natural" and "normal."

They are taken for granted and become part of our subsidiary awareness. They are learnt through bodily (not verbal) discourse, and exert great power over our choices, likes and dislikes, including our interpretation of a "sense of Community."

The Bodily Element in Our Understanding of a "Sense of Community"

It is on account of this powerful physical element and the need to give credence to the function of those feelings, bodily patterns, and structures that remain recalcitrant to our self-consciousness, that I have been referring to a "sense" of Community. Mark Johnson (1987) provides an excellent description of this meaning of "sense."

I use the term 'sense' here to indicate that meaning includes patterns of embodied experience and preconceptual structures of our sensibility (i.e., our mode of perception, of orienting ourselves, and of interacting with other objects, events, or persons). These embodied patterns do not remain private or peculiar to the person who experiences them. Our community helps us interpret and codify many of our felt patterns. They become shared cultural modes of experience and help to determine the nature of our meaningful, coherent understanding of our "world." (p. 14).

Johnson's project is to explore ways in which "the body is in the mind." That is, he is primarily concerned to demonstrate how meaning and rationality are tied to bodily experience. He identifies "image-schematic experiential structures" (1987, p. xxxvii) that inform our understanding and are the basis of metaphor in our language. For instance, his examples of the bodily experience of linking, boundaries, containment, and center-periphery, are obviously relevant to a sense of Community, and I will return to them shortly. He claims that the realm of the mind in which analytic philosophers exclusively find meaning and reason takes no account of the ways in which rationality is embodied. Analytic philosophy gives us a conceptual, denotational account of meaning but a richer account of meaning and reason requires more than learning a vocabulary and tracing inference patterns. It is meaning rooted in bodily patterns that goes deeper than propositional understanding. Propositions cannot capture the full reality of lived experience. Johnson, therefore, turns to what he calls a form of "descriptive phenomenology,"

although he does not wish to align himself with any particular branch of the phenomenological tradition.

Johnson says that, from the moment we are born, our bodies interact with forces outside the body, such as weather, objects and people, and forces inside the body such as bodily processes. From these experiences, the patterns recognized and taught by our community emerge as they recur. Out of this perceived regularity we begin to develop meaning structures through which our world takes on some coherence and intelligibility. The world of our community becomes our world and it is comprehended through our whole being. "Our understanding IS our mode of 'being in the world.' It is the way we are meaningfully situated in our world through our bodily interactions, our cultural institutions, our linguistic tradition, and our historical context" (Johnson, 1987, p. 102). Furthermore, Johnson claims that abstract reflection is simply an extension of this basic sense of "having a world."

I have already stressed the importance of the preconceptual (or pre-reflective) structures, of which Johnson speaks. They are always part of the bodily participation in our sense of Community and can be sufficient to create a sense of Community for us. When we feel the "I-Thou" or "essential We" relation, or a sense of community, Johnson would agree with Foucault that it is based on an accumulation of bodily patterns, sanctioned by our community, that we have experienced in the past. He would probably have to agree with Barthes, also, that we cannot give any precise account of them or what they meant then or mean now. "Preconceptual" implies before or leading to a concept, or constellation of concepts, and he claims that it is the preconceptual bodily forms that give substance to our conscious understanding of them. Now, I want to turn to some of Johnson's descriptions of concepts that shed light on the bodily "sense" of Community. He mentions several that are pertinent to my project.

Links, bonds, and connections. One of the most pervasive image-schemas in our understanding, Johnson claims, is that of making "links." The link to our biological mother through the umbilical cord is our first physical bond with another human being. It is literally

nourishing and sustaining and immediately establishes the idea of dependence that becomes interdependence, as the mother's well being becomes interwoven with her concern for her child. This first and literal linking then becomes part of the ongoing process of "linking, bonding, and connecting that gives us our identity" (Johnson, 1987, p. 117). These links or connections can be concrete, spatial, temporal, abstract, symbolic, causal, or functional. They are the basis of our ability to make sense of the world and our own relationship to it. We speak of the "close-knit" family, and "keeping in touch" with each other, with our roots, with reality, with the latest ideas, technology, methods, or fashions. The physical link is the metaphor for all others.

Many of our experiences of Community are accompanied by, enhanced by, or initiated by, physical experiences of linking, bonding, or connecting in some manner. This fact is recognized in the ritual and ceremonial occasions that celebrate particular aspects of our communal life together. The bond is felt, renewed, and strengthened, through spatial proximity, moving in the same direction and with the same step or gesture, sharing a common beat or rhythm and dynamic pattern. These linkings in time, space, energy, or touch, may be formally arranged and traditionally handed (a body metaphor again) down, or they may arise spontaneously in any group or people (Turner's "communitas").

Groups of workers in many cultures, on land or sea, who needed to pull, push, lift, or whatever, in unison in order to accomplish a physically demanding task, have used singing. Their songs served the functional purpose of connecting their joint muscular effort into a single strong and focused pattern of movement. Marching for the military creates the habit of physical obedience and compliance and the capacity to labor together as one, physically and in tune with each other; but it is also a physical analogy for common intentions and a single cause. These are two examples of bodily sensation being used specifically to initiate a sense of Community among a group of people for functional purposes.

Psychologist Aaron Wolfgang's interest is in the nonverbal behaviors that disrupt interpersonal harmony and create intercultural misunderstanding. He is seeking to understand

more clearly how links and connections are broken or never made. "Good" intentions and the "right" words are not always adequate. In a seminar on Nonverbal behavior: A cultural and universal perspective in Canada in 1988, he reported that his research indicated that "people prefer those who move, act, and express themselves similarly to themselves." Learnt cultural patterns of behavior (some of the norms and practices mentioned earlier) create harmony within a culture because people know what to expect and how to respond appropriately. Conversely, these internalized and "naturalized" patterns can become barriers between people who do not share the same rules and norms of behavior and remain unaware of their differences. A variety of related research has shown that many people show a cloning tendency, of which they are unaware, in that they mimic the people they are with. Furthermore, those subordinates who mimic people who are in powerful positions, such as the host culture, the employer, men in general, or the teacher, are more successful in their dealings with the powerful than those who do not. Wolfgang also noted that those in power demonstrate significantly more errors in decoding the bodily expressions of their subordinates than vice versa; the implication being that it is those in the inferior position who need to be fluent not only in the verbal language of the powerful, but also in their bodily discourse. It seems to be the responsibility of the inferior or weak, in terms of social power, to create the links and connections for a greater understanding between people. This fact has enormous implications for the development of community, both locally and in the interests of world peace.

It is notable that most intimate connections that we can make with another person, touching and sexual intercourse, are rarely mentioned in academic contexts. Feminist writer Andrea Dworkin (1987), on the other hand, knows that touching is a central form of cognition. "Touch is not peripheral to human experience; it is essential to it . . . touch is the basis of human knowledge, also of human community" (Dworkin, 1987, p. 31). It is the physical connection that creates a unity, a whole, out of separate people. Her description is not abstract but evocative, intense, poetic, and worth quoting at length.

Sometimes the skin comes off in sex. The people merge, skinless. The body loses its boundaries. We are each in these separate bodies; and then, with someone and not with someone else, the skin dissolves altogether; and what touches is unspeakably, grotesquely visceral, not inside language or conceptualization, not inside time; raw, blood and fat and muscle and bone, unmediated by form or formal limits. There is no physical distance, no self-consciousness, nothing withdrawn or private or alienated, no existence outside physical touch. The skin collapses as a boundary - it has no meaning; time is gone - it too has no meaning; there is no outside. . . . There is only touch, no boundaries; there is only the nameless experience of physical contact, which is life; there is no solace, except in this contact; without it, there is unbearable physical pain, absolute, not lessened by distraction, unreached by normalcy - nearly an amputation, the skin hacked off, slashed open; violent hurt. (1987, p. 21)

Boundaries, boundedness, containment, and inside-outside. In the quotation above,

Dworkin has already spoken of the skin as a boundary. She goes on to say:

It is a thin veil of matter separating the outside from the inside. It is what one sees and what one covers up; it shows and it conceals. . . . The skin is separation, individuality, the basis for corporeal separation, individuality, the basis for corporeal privacy and also the point of contact for everything outside the self. It is a conductor of all feeling. Every time the skin is touched, one feels. All feeling passes through it, outside to inside. The skin is electric, hot, cold, opaque, translucent, youth, age, sensitive to every whisper of wind, chill, heat. . . . It is the formal limits of a body, a person, and the only bridge to human contact that is physical and direct. (1987, p. 22).

Johnson's approach is analytic. Cultural norms of behavior are referred to as harmonizers for those inside a culture, but as barriers for those who are outside. That which contains also separates. Johnson states that "Our encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most pervasive features of our bodily experience" (Johnson, 1987, p. 21). He identifies five important entailments of the recurring experience of this inside-outside structure that have considerable relevance for a "sense of Community." Firstly, the experience of containment typically involves a sense of being protected from everything outside. That which is inside is safe, secure, and is resistant to external forces. By extension it could be said that those outside the community group may feel vulnerable and excluded. We feel safe or comforted in the

bosom of our family. (Note the metonymic use of "bosom." A part of the body that is female, nurturing, and soft.) Feeling that we belong to a community gives us a sense of psychological security. Secondly, the nature of the container also restricts and limits what is possible and permitted on its inside. The social norms of a community operate in this way too. Thirdly, because of both the restrictions and the requirements of the container on the contained, the person who is "inside" a community also becomes associated with specific locations. A sense of place is part of our sense of Community. Fourthly, our literal and metaphorical "place" in the community dictates our accessibility to others, whether they come from inside or outside the community. Finally, there is a transitivity of containment. When a new student comes to a classroom the stereotypical characteristics of his or her ethnic group will be attributed to that child whether or not he or she actually possesses them.

Sue Stinson (1984) is aware that we long for union and desire the safety of community, as we fear aloneness and isolation. She also reminds us that we fear losing our separation. As an infant we experience helpless dependency so fear separation, yet we also begin to know this connection as a restricting, and constraining force. "Until we can resolve these fears, we will not truly be able to . . . fully live our lives" (Stinson, 1984, p. 75). Community is a sanctuary, but it can also provide a hiding place away from the challenges and problems of the world.

The center-periphery schema. I experience myself as being at the center of my experiential world because I perceive it through the organs of my body. People and objects in my world are perceived to be spatially near or far away, and either in the foreground or background of my consciousness. They can feature as both concrete and abstract entities in my experiential field according to their significance in my personal, social, political, economic, religious, or philosophical world at any particular time. As abstract entities they can be moved to figure or ground in my consciousness at will (Johnson, 1987). Again, my view of the world is necessarily mine, since I am at the center of both my perceptual and experiential worlds.

The center-periphery schema also has psycho-social implications for our experience of a sense of Community. If I do not experience or perceive that I am the center of the community group, or some part of it, I am unlikely to feel a "sense of Community." This is another way of saying that if there is no "I-Thou" or "essential We" relation I feel relegated to the periphery of the group. Metaphorically, if I reach out and do not "make contact" with another person, or if nobody reaches out towards me, the relational center of Community, for me, is empty. I will only experience a "sense of Community" as a subject, from a central, relational position. The "I" needs the subjective experience of being in touch with a "Thou" or the meeting, the relation, the dialogue, becomes an objective "It."

This is not to say, however, that I must be the center of attention for everybody in the group. The need to experience myself as central helps to account for the fact that individuals at the same communal gathering, a party, a family celebration, or a classroom for example, can experience "Community" very differently. We do not all "make contact" in qualitatively the same way, at the same time, or on the same occasion. Even if I have this experience with only one other person in a group, however, it may be sufficient to generate a sense of Community for me.

Embodied understanding. Johnson's key notion is "embodied understanding" (Johnson, 1987, p. 205). He demonstrates that meaning and rationality are grounded in recurring structures of embodied knowledge. Knowledge is, therefore, not only human, but a dynamic ongoing process as each individual interacts with his or her environment. I would add that the personal and cultural significance attributed to knowledge and meaning also arise through bodily experience. A child begins to learn and feel a notion of Community, either positive or negative, from the moment he or she is born. It may then be modified by other experiences and paradigms for making sense of the world as they are encountered in the environment of the child, for example at school. The only aspect of this that is certain, however, is that the notion of Community, or what a community might be, for any one person, is as continually open to the possibility and dynamics of change as other elements of their understanding.

The centrality of bodily experience in our "sense of Community" is rarely acknowledged overtly, although it is implicit in many recommendations for community-building. It is a component in the need for small groups so that people can get to "know" each other, for doing things together, for spending time together, for having a place to be together. It underlies the "getting to know you" activities of newly formed groups of people, and the rituals and ceremonies of established communities. All of these elements may be helpful in building a sense of Community, but we are rarely helped to read our own responses or consult our sensing bodies. Further, we are loath to admit that our consciousness of Community is always dependent on the nature of its physicality and only sometimes on our rational understanding. Bodily practice must harmonize with rational intention and group structures if the aim is living Community.

A "Sense of Community" can Arise in a Morally Reprehensible Community.

Finally, I must reiterate that a community can successfully provide a "sense of Community" for individual members, although the norms, ideals, and actions of the group are considered by others, outside the community to be deplorable. History abounds with such examples. Adolph Hitler understood well the joys of a sense of Community and knew how to create many of the conditions that would promote it, from the Hitler Youth groups to the mass rallies at Nuremberg with their rituals of song and gesture. Jim Jones and other charismatic leaders share this ability to unite people into bands of followers who respond to any demands made upon them, however extreme or maniacal. Rigid, doctrinaire communities are experienced as narrow, oppressive, and even cruel by "outsiders." A strong sense of Community is a powerful force and, like nuclear power, can be used or abused. It can be based in aggression, greed, or any outright wickedness, as well as love, caring, and compassion. As Stephen Holmes warns, "It is only through intense social interaction that human beings acquire their worst follies and fanaticisms: the capacity for intolerance or racism would never flourish in pre-social isolation" (Holmes, 1988, p. 26).

Extreme versions of morally reprehensible communities must turn our attention to the meaning of human life as well as how we should live together. Macdonald (1977) claimed that these are the two most fundamental questions for curriculum theorists. A community necessarily demonstrates a moral vision in action. A community is premised on moral understandings; on values of what is considered to be right or wrong, good or bad. A community embodies and specifies the normative patterns through which the individual's relationship with other people and the world are mediated, validated and limited. In the modern world, the information explosion and relative ease of travel has allowed the values espoused by one community to be more readily compared to and judged by the values lived by other communities. Furthermore, the juxtaposition and intermingling of different communities in the multicultural society of American has rendered the need to address conflicting differences in community patterns most urgent. The variety and grounds for choice are overwhelming.

Problems for Theorizing a Sense of Community

Theorizing any experiential gestalt is problematic. A sense of Community is a coherent, meaningful and unified whole, but it cannot be reduced to a necessary or sufficient set of conditions. Some of the internal structures of the gestalt (Johnson, 1987) can be identified, such as those pertaining to both the physical and symbolic sense of connection, boundedness, and equality. The possible metaphorical, psychological, and cultural extensions of them, however, are unlimited. The nature and quality of the interaction of forces is specific to a context. I will make some general comments in relation to schooling in America in the 1990s in Chapter Five, but an account of community is a task that can never be completed. Community is not an achievement but an ongoing process constantly in need of renegotiation and reappraisal among individuals in specific contexts.

Summary

I have argued that the value of community for the individual members of the group is the sense of Community felt by each person. A community is judged to have value as Community

only in terms of the positive experience of each member. The value for the individual may arise out of the sense of humankindness (Turner, 1969) generated, and in addition, or alternatively, it may be dependent on the fulfillment of particular personal needs or interests.

There are a range of conditions that are characteristic of the fundamental, existential sense of Community: for example, the feeling of being "with" others in a direct and unconditioned relationship, or of "being" not "seeming" with them (Buber, 1987); the boundedness or containment of the group, and the connections experienced within it (whether they are physical or symbolic) that contribute to feelings of security, pride and empowerment. It cannot be predicted which of these features may become integrated into an experiential gestalt (Johnson, 1987), nor can an exhaustive account of them always be given afterwards. The immediacy and spontaneity of the occurrence is also a dominant characteristic.

It follows, therefore, that it is possible that members of the same group of people will not necessarily experience the greatest value at the same time. Furthermore, the source of the value may not be the same for every member of a group. A sense of humankindness may be experienced by the whole group, but presumably, the feeling will be stronger for those who also need to feel a bond with humanity, or with just one other person, at that time. A sense of Community occurs as a result of both the experiential gestalts that are part of each individual's pre-reflective experience, and the conscious patterns and models of community he or she has learnt, interacting with the present external conditions.

"Being," for most people, requires a sense of mutuality. A set of conditions that allows all parties to "be" usually needs to include some aspect(s) of equality or sameness, such as belonging to the same cultural group, or a group whose conventions and norms are familiar; having the same social status; or sharing a common purpose or project. Even when these conditions are temporary, they may be sufficient to allow a sense of Community to be felt.

A sense of Community is always felt as a bodily sensation, and we may or may not consciously understand the grounds for the feeling. Bodily practice tends to be more powerful

than ideology (Foucault, 1979) and always takes precedence over rationality in our sense of Community. The body responds to the intuited sense of Community as a gestalt (Johnson, 1987), even when it is grounded primarily in an intellectual community of ideas. It is always embodied understanding, the result of the "massive complex of our culture, language, history and bodily mechanisms that blend to make our world what it is" (Johnson, 1987, p. 104).

It now becomes evident that the nature of the ideals and purposes that give shape to a community is of great public concern, both in terms of human relations within the community and as a social and political unit that interacts with other communities. I am calling this the value of community as a social entity. It includes the nature of the relationship between the individual and the community, and the ideological engagement of the community in the world. These values govern the particular form(s) of a community and the structure of relations among people that are required, acceptable, or possible. At this point I am in agreement with Plant (1978), that as soon as we turn to the ideological underpinning of community it can be investigated satisfactorily only in terms of specific examples and their history. In the next chapter, I will, therefore, consider American ideological context for community that informs and limits the possibility for community in schooling in the 1990s.

CHAPTER III

THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY AS A SOCIAL ENTITY

The criteria that identify the value of a community for its individual members are not the same as the standards applied to the value of that community as a social entity, with internal power arrangements and political functions among others. The structure and practices of a particular community and the ideals and purposes that inform them provide its substance in a descriptive sense as well as the grounds for its evaluation. This chapter examines the expectations and contradictions inherent in the ethical and political commitments that Americans bring to community building in schools, and how ideology in practice creates conditions in living and schooling that both foster and inhibit that project. As described earlier in this paper, although some schools evidence a strong sense of Community, the daily circumstances of school life militate increasingly against a community feeling. How can we educate children so that they develop a consciousness that seeks community? How can a school become a community?

I have already argued that a strong sense of Community does not necessarily produce a morally good society. History is full of examples that we now find deplorable. But judgment of a community as morally laudable or repugnant is always made from an ideological position, as Plant (1978) reminds us. I am writing, necessarily, from a point of view that is a combination of my personal context in the world, and my value commitments developed as a result of their interconnection.

I now turn to strands of American culture and their manifestation in the institution of American schooling that are significant for community. I cannot undertake an exhaustive description and analysis in this study. Rather, I shall attempt to identify issues and modalities that are thought either to foster or inhibit community in American culture.

Following Bellah et al. (1985) and Purpel (1989), I shall concentrate on the attitudes and values that are considered to be the norms of American middle-class life, because they generate categories and expectations that dominate our culture. They represent the core of "common sense" and are, therefore, the yardstick against which all other value systems are judged.

Culture, consisting of traditional ideas and values and their transmission through institutional patterns and artifacts, can be examined from a number of theoretical positions. Like the notion of community it cuts across disciplinary boundaries. One of the most useful concepts for examining culture is the notion of ideology, used in its broadest sense.

Ideology, as the particular construction of reality embodied in the commonsense meanings and practices of a group of people, is both inevitable and inescapable and the core of a shared culture. Each individual grows up sharing the world view of his or her immediate community. He or she will initially know no other and assume it to be right, natural, and the way things are. We tend to become more aware of our own ideology and find others different, strange, or just wrong, at those times when we find ourselves away from home. After four years, I am still constantly surprised by subtle differences between English and American culture. Ideology, embedded in public language(s) procedures, and customs, becomes hegemonic as it constructs each self beginning in the cradle, and every community as it maintains itself through time. This is both the strength and danger of ideology.

Marxist critiques are most well known for their stress on the hazards of hegemonic ideology. I see many people vote their oppressors into power because their oppression is accepted as a "natural" hierarchy, and they believe that "They must be doing the best for us." In the Marxist tradition this has been called false consciousness, or ideology as illusion.

The positive, life-giving, life-enhancing characteristics of ideology, however, are a cornerstone on which community is built. It gives substance to group identity. A common consciousness creates a bond of assumptions and predispositions that enables a feeling of being "with" others through already established and secure connections but, necessarily, it takes time to

develop. As with all great forces, the problem is how we can ensure that the power of ideology is used to the advantage of everyone.

A more neutral sense of ideology allows me to embrace the paradoxes implicit in any potent force. The term ideology also points to the material manifestation of the abstract ideas of moral and political philosophy and religion in the lived experience of politics, law, and personal interaction. American consciousness and the structure and practices of schooling that affect community in schools are the two major threads running through my examination of the paradoxes of the dominant themes of American culture.

The Common Heritage

The Classic Vision of Community

In their study of Habits of the Heart (1986), Robert Bellah and his associates found that the small town of the mid-nineteenth century expresses a classic vision of community to which many people referred nostalgically. This atavistic memory dominates the current longing for community and is the model against which all efforts to create community are judged. Rooted in history and tradition, the classic community is "a self-reliant congregation created and maintained by the voluntary cooperation of self-reliant individuals living in self-reliant families" (Bellah et al., 1986, p. 169). In this face-to-face community, the demands made on the individual could be integrated in a balance of personal autonomy and communal responsibility. The one room schoolhouse is part of this myth.

As an ideal to emulate at the end of the twentieth century, this image is, at best, misleading. So many of the conditions in which the small town developed and maintained its character no longer exist, nor were they havens of security for everyone. It does not matter, however, whether or not this vision of community is "true" or accurate because it carries the power of strong belief. It is also the stuff of dreams, and one that I share. I, too, yearn for a simpler life in a small community that has a slower pace; to live and do satisfying work in an atmosphere of mutuality; to create and live amidst beauty; to wander in the wilderness as well as

move purposefully among human constructions; to live for the joys of the moment in confidence that there is a future for which the present does not have to be sacrificed; and for my life to be conditioned by human scales but augmented by infinities. I know I cannot give substance to these dreams, but neither can I banish them. I cannot even find an acceptable substitute for them.

As Maxine Greene (1988) argues so cogently, if "reality" refers to interpreted experience, then concepts such as community or freedom and how they can be achieved will depend on the various interpretations of those trying to live these notions. Meaning and how it is shared and controlled, therefore, becomes a central problem; and, since meaning-making is one of the major projects of schooling, the manner in which this is undertaken is a matter of pedagogic concern. We create ourselves and our society with the materials and attitudes available to us, but we can claim to do this freely, as subjects, only through the on-going process of interpreting the circumstances of our lives reflectively and critically. Greene contends that students should name themselves and tell their stories (p. xii) so that they become visible to themselves. Similarly, if barriers to community are not named, but accommodated or endured, they will persist and even be strengthened.

I see the myth of the classic community is one barrier to community-making today, although it also fosters community as a way of life to be renewed. Firstly, I will note two key elements of the classic homogeneous community that are now lost; its members' roots in a common culture, and their common purpose. Secondly, I want to identify an interrelated set of conditions that stem from economic changes.

The Homogeneous Community

A common culture. The earliest settlers lived in groups that shared a common past, usually religious and ethnic. Although this "old country" culture was a cornerstone of their new life, they were initially tolerant of other groups holding a different perspective, because they were mindful of their own recent oppression. Furthermore, there was endless space to inhabit. The more settled they became, the more fiercely they defended their territory.

This is inevitably an oversimplification of the facts but it holds a kernel of truth. Early American culture did not develop out of nothing but is firmly rooted in the ideologies of diverse cultures. Human relations in these communities grew out of established forms shared by members. They tended to be permanent, and an important product of the small size of these communities was a preponderance of face-to-face relationships, a condition that both encouraged and demanded responsibility to each other.

A common purpose. The other great unifying factor was the common purpose of creating a social order in which each individual could live freely and fulfill his or her potential: That is, to produce an individualism that would work socially (the perennial problem that I will address shortly). Mere survival was often the central concern of a community. A common purpose bonds a group together, and the most compelling purpose must be physical survival.

Members of the early Kibbutz in Israel similarly pursued a common purpose that included harnessing the resources of undeveloped land and building a life together in conditions that were new to them all. They worked hard and their mastery of the land was not always immediately successful; but survival, in a literal sense, was rarely an issue. Their achievements and disappointments were followed closely by Jews the world over, and help was never far away. It was the survival of a people with a land of their own, of an ideology, that was most profoundly at stake.

This combination of a demanding project and deeply felt commitment to an ideological stance in the face of enormous odds was a powerful springboard for community for both the early homesteaders and the Kibbutzniks. The kind of excitement created by the inception of such a daunting project generates other strong feelings, including a sense of Community. Yet, the initial vigor cannot be sustained when fatigue is finally acknowledged and it is recognized that the work has become repetitive and commonplace. The next generation, who continue the project, have not experienced that initial intoxicating thrill of truly pioneering work. As Turner

observes, "The existential or spontaneous *communitas* . . . can seldom be maintained for very long" (Turner, 1969, p. 132).

In 1984 I stayed at a Kibbutz on the northern banks of the Sea of Galilee. The small Kibbutz farm, now less productive of profits than the guest house, depended on technology rather than human labor. The whole enterprise was big business with all its attendant corollaries. Little remained of the pioneering spirit except a film of the early days of this site that showed animated young people fighting the former swamp on which it was built, singing as they worked. The elderly man who showed the film had been one of the earnest youths photographed in the swamp. We shared his nostalgia. I was reminded, yet again, that we are both condemned and favored to suffer and enjoy change.

The communes of the '60s were an attempt to redesign living in community in the twentieth century. They, too, were idealistic, and could not maintain themselves through time. Perhaps their ideology was not sufficiently compelling, or the challenge not binding enough to ensure an adhesive group. Or, perhaps there were too many equally attractive alternatives to distract members from their mission.

These days "we" point to inner city ghettos, where people of a common culture live together in tight-knit neighborhoods, often against their will. A sense of Community, which we envy, may be strong in such neighborhoods, yet we often disparage them. Like the homesteaders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they, too, need each other for survival, but the forces they must combat are different. They must fight bureaucracy, prejudice, their history of oppression, and the self-perpetuating cycle of poverty. The forces they must accommodate and resist are humanly, hegemonically constructed.

In the late nineteenth century, the schools were called upon to unite in the Americanization of immigrant children. There was an urgent need to build a national community out of numerous small tightly knit communities; a demand for a civic education that would develop some basic commonalities and encourage affiliation to the broader national group

of which they were now a part. The common purpose was to build a national community, but as Mary Anne Raywid observes, at least "those to be educated were seen to have attachments. Today's challenge may be to create them when there have been none - or when they have been at best weak and transitory" (Raywid, 1988, p. 200).

Modern Conditions Stemming from Economic Changes

Material Interdependence

The classic community was relatively self-sufficient in providing for its own material needs. Today no community is self-sufficient. The small family business has been almost completely replaced by large-scale interdependence in the industrial production and distribution of goods that has come about through the growth of multi-national corporations. This preferred method of production in the interests of efficiency and economic advantage (especially for the owners) is echoed in the lives of the employees of the giant corporations. Their abilities as well as the public and private aspects of their lives are compartmentalized into separate functional sectors, each comprising a different group who may never meet people from another.

Individual Mobility

Goods are manufactured in a series of stages by specialists in each phase, and jobs in service industries are similarly fragmented into narrow bands of activities. Individuals tend, therefore, to work in a particular field of operations. Since similar occupations can usually be found in the same or different corporations and in other States, this allows flexibility for an individual to choose where he or she works. These people who can find work in the immediate neighborhood in which they grew up are relatively few, and these jobs tend to be unskilled and poorly paid.

Individual mobility has become, therefore, not only a personal choice but often a necessity. To live in one community over a period of time and call it "home" is no longer the norm. Place is not only where we can trace our roots to the past; it also embodies the security of tradition and the ideology of an internalized culture as a constant guide to behavior. We can try

to put down new roots and "learn" the local traditions and mores of a new place, but it is more difficult. Back in 1970, Alvin Toffler (1971) spoke of the "new nomads." In advanced technological societies "commuting, traveling, and regularly relocating one's family have become second nature" (Toffler, 1971, p. 75). Consequently, in most areas of their lives, including the neighborhood in which they live, people experience only transient relationships.

Few of us these days, certainly during our working lives, belong to only one community. In the modern world it is more usual for an individual to belong to many groups that may or may not overlap. Like the classic vision of community, the result has its blessings and its hardships, but they are different.

In her attempt to locate modern communities, Jacquelin Scherer (1972) agrees with John Dewey that communication is at the heart of any community. Most individuals in the modern world have access to, and must engage with, multiple channels of communication, which overlap only at some points in terms of the group of people involved. She uses the concept of social networks to describe the relationship of an individual to the cluster of communities of which he or she is a member. A network may present conflicting roles for the individual but also an opportunity to balance and choose how his or her needs and interests will be fulfilled.

Andrew Oldenquist (1986) describes our situation as belonging to many "tribes" at the same time. Furthermore, these communities are often nested within one another. The political advantage of these nesting communities is that, on the one hand, they allow individualistic choice, while on the other hand, no one community has absolute claim on our loyalties. He claims that both of these factors militate against the development of a totalitarian system, an important point to which I will return.

"Little platoons" is the metaphor preferred by Charles Murray (1988). He says that, "The great joys and sorrows, satisfactions and preoccupations, of our daily life are defined in terms of them" (Murray, 1988, p. 260). He claims that it is in the nexus of our little platoons that the conditions for our happiness are found. Vital platoons must be imbued with effort and

responsibility and have something important to do. The classic vision of community, described above, includes these characteristics.

Murray's description of platoons comes closest to community in which there is a strong sense of Community, but it is unfortunate that he chose a military term. That it is a small subdivision of a larger unit is appropriate, but other military connotations that the term carries, such as rigid discipline and a strongly enforced hierarchical order, are not at all appropriate for my developing concept.

The Pluralistic Society

America has always been a multicultural society of many cultures, but the growth of huge industrial cities, together with the nomadic existence just described, has fragmented these homogeneous groups. There is, consequently, more opportunity and necessity for interaction among people of different cultures. Subcultural groups, based on age, gender, class, or interests, that cut across religious and ethnic groupings, have also been generated in response to changing conditions.

Increased communication and exchanges, arising from close proximity, have intensified the awareness of cultural differences, but not necessarily the understanding of these difference. Difference tends to be threatening. Forced to live in a pluralistic society, groups have formed negative misconceptions and stereotypes of each other which harm all concerned, and render community building in mixed cultural groups extremely problematic.

Too many conditions have changed for the classic vision of community to apply today, but it identifies important elements that could be sought in today's context. Individuals still need support from each other in order to survive but, in the modern world, comfort and assistance take on different forms. We no longer learn how to grow our own food, but we must be able to earn enough money to buy it. In other instances the support we provide for each other has been given over to the expert. Caring for the very young or very old, and those disabled in a variety of ways, has already been mentioned. Learning from daily contact and talking with friends and

family, being and working with people more experienced than ourselves, learning through observation, have all become rare events. Instead, we go to therapists and attend courses. Our interdependence ranges over a vastly expanded field, even world wide, which renders it much more difficult to perceive.

One great value of the classic vision, however, is that it speaks to community as an important part of American history and myth. It is a prized and happy national memory. I see the classic vision of community as a paradox in terms of its efficacy for creating community today.

Ideological Themes Affecting Contemporary Community

The Price of an Individualism that has Gone Too Far

Murray (1986) claims that individualism has gone too far in America and is damaging the quality of life in a number of concrete ways, among which is the loss of community. The pioneer myth that glorifies rugged individualism chooses to forget, or omit, the frequent brutality, sadism, and rape (Lasch, 1979) of the Marlboro man. Bellah and his colleagues (1985) found that many meaningful American myths have been built around these independent but responsible individuals.

They were not remembered as the radical individualists Murray despises, who always put self-interest before any other. Absolute self-interest requires that a collective enterprise, whether it is at local community, state, or national level, must serve the liberties of the individual. The radical individualist's main requirement from society is the freedom to pursue his or her own formula for happiness.

At first glance, this sounds acceptable. The Bill of Rights is an individualistic creed. It has been the chief protection of our freedom. Liberty is a socially controlled domain which makes possible a freedom in which choices can be made. We can choose, for example, a significant number of the communities to which we belong, but not all. I cannot choose my ethnic heritage, or parents, or their religious group, or even the members of my class in school. Bellah

and his colleagues state that for most Americans, freedom "turns out to mean being left alone by others, not having other people's values, ideas or styles of life forced upon one, being free of arbitrary authority in work, family, and political life' (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 99). It is a negative freedom.

For the wealthy and for the strong, this provision of negative freedom is probably sufficient; but, how can the rights of the weak be accommodated? The most common answer today is that they can be preserved by public services. We are comforted by the fact that we are turning our helpless or demanding family members over to the "experts," but the "helping professions" or "professional caregivers" are doing a job. They expect to leave their "job" at the end of the working day to attend to their own domestic commitments.

The term "caregiver" carries the human connotations of compassion and commitment, but it also creates confusion. Caring for another human being entails much more than feeding and toileting. As Nel Noddings says, "Caring is a way of being in relation, not a set of specific behaviors" (Noddings, 1992, p. 17). Furthermore, it cannot be timetabled, nor can a price be attached to each element of "caring." The term "professional caregiver," meaning someone who is paid to do the job of taking care of another person, is often problematic, therefore, for both employer and employee. The parameters implied by the notion of paid employment conflict with the expectations accompanying the notion of "caring" for both parties. It can become a source of guilt for everyone, especially for women for whom the moral imperative tends to be a matter of responsibility and care (Gilligan, 1982) rather than the preservation of rights and justice.

Before public provision was available, the helpless members of society were usually cared for in their own community. Now, the possibility of the public service offered by experts creates a tension between old-fashioned caring provided by family and the apparent selfishness of taking advantage of a modern service. There is a choice, and the choice tends to be resolved in favor of the able-bodied whose "rights" must not be jeopardized, or the individuals or families who already feel too stressed.

This brand of individualism sounds like the universal selfishness that Thomas Hobbes believes is our natural state, or the selfishness that Ayn Rand thinks is the basis of all virtue, because rationality requires her to pursue her own happiness as the ultimate good (both cited in Oldenquist, 1986). It is also the egoism to which Alexis de Tocqueville feared that American individualism would revert. Egoism demonstrates an indifference to the common good and society's institutions. Tocqueville saw egoism as a vice because it springs from a passionate and exaggerated love of self, originating in blind instinct and lack of understanding. He says that, "Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every virtue; individualism at first only dams the spring of public virtues, but in the long run it attacks and destroys all the others too and finally merges in egoism" (Bellah et al., 1987, p. 11). Individualism, on the other hand, Tocqueville claims, is rooted in democracy that "breaks the chain" of aristocratic hierarchy, but it also "frees each link." Each individual is thrown back on himself or herself alone. It allows each individual choice and control over his or her life to an unprecedented degree, but Tocqueville sees the danger of this developing into an isolation that makes "men [sic] forget their ancestors . . . clouds their view of their descendants and isolates them from their contemporaries" (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 12). Many Americans observe that Tocqueville's fear has come to pass.

Robert Griffin (Griffin & Nash, 1990) prefers the term "privatism" for this version of individualism. Griffin's privatism emphasizes the greater concern for the private life of each individual. Including the nuclear family it also underlines the lack of regard for the wider society or for any group of people who are not part of the individual's immediate circle of significant persons.

A narcissistic and hedonistic egoism is a regression to childish ways. Privatism is probably more common, but it comes in many shades: from the kind that is little more than an egoism expanded to include intimates, to those individuals whose feelings of powerlessness in the face of overwhelming problems induce them to turn to the smaller, closer, group where they feel that they can make a difference.

It also results in the "lifestyle enclaves" so despised by Bellah and his colleagues (1985). The lifestyle enclave concerns only private life and is most closely linked with leisure activities and consumption. It celebrates the "narcissism of similarity," seen in patterns of dress, decor, and recreation, and in matters of taste regarding music and food. In spite of their description of the lifestyle enclave as often "fragile and shallow," Bellah and his colleagues also see that it is probably an inevitable outcome of contemporary life, especially in the cities.

Griffin distinguishes privatism from what he calls "authentic individualism." He claims that to live authentically is to make one's beliefs, values, and projects one's own, and to do so with integrity. He charges the community with the function of supporting and promoting the possibility of individual authenticity.

I, too, value individual authenticity, but the term "authentic individualism" is morally ambiguous like "community." The possible criteria for "the best I can be" are limitless and do not necessarily address personal virtue. I can own my beliefs, values, and projects, reflect on them, and reach an understanding of my powers as an individual. Nevertheless, my authenticity in no way guarantees that the morality of my actions is acceptable; that my actions will not be harmful to others or their beliefs and values, or be perceived by others as depraved or corrupt.

Furthermore, if authentic individuality is always the final referent, there remains a practical problem for those members of society who cannot take care of themselves at the most basic level of existence. How will they be in a position to mold their own authentic individuality unless there are some individuals for whom taking care of others is included in "the best that they can be"? This is no longer a problem, of course, if we accept that all personal limitations are entirely the responsibility of the person in question.

Griffin advocates that, "Instead of dichotomizing individual and community I think that we need to integrate these two concepts" (Griffin & Nash, 1990, p. 9). He does not, however, offer any guidelines for living in community, or what that would mean from an authentic individualistic point of view. His silence indicates an assumption that it is self-evident.

Individuals who live in a homogeneous society have unambiguous models on which to base their authentic individuality, together with communal values out of which their institutional structures and practices grow. America is not a homogeneous society.

All our actions, as individuals and in community, are practices of a moral orientation. The composition and ethos of a community of individuals is directed by moral imperatives, whether they are known in the form of overt tenets, rules and conventions, or only tacitly understood through such anonymous authorities (Fromm, 1965, p. 125) as "common sense," language, habit, or custom.

The communitarian view. Griffin's colleague, Robert Nash (Griffin & Nash, 1990), responds from a communitarian point of view. He accepts the value of individual autonomy and the pursuit of individual excellence but in the context of "such communitarian principles as core values, context-embeddedness, and traditions" (Griffin & Nash, 1990, p. 10). He asserts that these principles logically follow if we accept that, "The 'authentic self' does not exist apart from its participation in a complex and lengthy cultural shaping process" (Griffin & Nash, 1990, p. 12).

I do not want to imply, however, that individuals are totally and predictably determined by social forces. I want to preserve the paradox that each individual is structured uniquely within the parameters of his or her social context. The individual and the community cannot exist without each other yet the requirements and demands of each are often in conflict. It is part of the same paradox that Nash refers to as "the permanent condition of all individuals" when we speak of individualism and community. For both individual and community, resolution of the tensions engendered are always provisional. It is a dialectic that never ends either in our daily lives or in our long term personal or community decisions. There must be "a continuing conversation about the highest goods that individuals can achieve under the realistic circumstances of living" (Griffin & Nash, 1990, p. 15).

I see a continuum with extreme individualism at one end and overstated communitarianism at the other. The radical individualist who is driven by personal appetites

("goods") will find him or herself at one extreme end of it. At the other end of the scale, the reification of community for which all individual goods must be sacrificed is also damaging to both the individual and to the community itself. R.A. Nisbet (1962) fears that, when allegiance to a community is absolute, we relinquish our sense of purpose and responsibility to a centralized power. We have seen the oppressive outcome of such abrogation of responsibility on a nationwide scale in this century in Germany and Russia, among others. There may be subtle psychological manipulation of the masses through "cajolary, flattery, bribery, mass identification with new images, and all the modern techniques of indoctrination" (p. 194), but totalitarianism always feels like the "mobilization of popular will" (p. 196).

A central feature of Nisbet's argument gives considerable support to my project; that is, that totalitarian power must relate directly to the individual, obliterating all intermediate layers of association, as in the alienation of Hitler Youth from their families. The more isolated, rootless, and insecure the individual, the more appealing the picture of a greater community becomes; for example, the growing affiliations, not only of youth, to a variety of international cults rooted in mysticism.

Centralized, national, political power can mount a Desert Storm in a relatively short time, but it has a deadly effect on all other institutions of society. Centralized power in public education can similarly mount nation-wide schemes, but the result disenfranchises individual schools and teachers. Lacking the autonomy to respond to their own particular context, teachers are reduced to the role of functionaries, carrying out the orders and policies of a distant administration. Small institutions, such as family or school, lose their life force when they have no significant functions or authority in society. Furthermore, Nisbet (1988) says, as power tightens at the center, threads are loosened and the social fabric begins to fray. In the Communitarian manifesto, therefore, the role of government, and by implication any power structure, is to be reduced as much as possible. "No social task should be assigned to an institution that is larger than necessary to do the job" (Creedon, 1992, p. 38). Nisbet claims that it

is through the diversification of power in the intermediate authorities of society that totalitarianism can be avoided. It is also these smaller associations that offer us the promise of individual freedom and security.

Returning to the continuum, the extremes at both ends are untenable as conceptions of the good life, not only in terms of their intrinsic worth but also because each denies the other. In Western society, this is perverse since human beings embody both personal and social natures. The center of the continuum embraces the integration and balancing of the common good with that of the individual. It dissolves a troubling dualism. Nash endorses Stout's common good as "what we would strive for in secular morality and politics if we were perfectly just, perfectly tolerant, and perfectly beneficent toward others" (Griffin & Nash, 1990, p. 14). They both accept that this is impossibly idealistic, and realistically acknowledge that the common good must be pluralistic, and must be subject to changing circumstances. The best we can do is to continually appraise the traditions and practices embedded in our social context in order to preserve those that sustain the liberty of individuals.

The best that an individual can become will include a commitment to others in his or her communities and the wider world, and a heightened respect for the uniqueness of other individuals. Communitarians like Nash advocate a "moral core" that is the minimum requirement for living together peaceably: "honesty, fairness, incest aversion, and respect for people's bodies, ideas, and property" (Griffin & Nash, 1990, p. 16). Likewise, authentic individualism must espouse some elements that contribute to the common good, on purely logical grounds, because the common good is also a good for the individual.

Ideally, the communitarian aspects of the continuum entail more than enlightened self-interest. It requires sympathetic concern, commitment, and compassion, not just the provision of "welfare." It is reciprocal. It occurs between people rather than institutions and people. It is not merely a rational matter; it involves the emotions. We do not simply act for or on people as "objects" of our care, but with them as "subjects" with whom we share a common human

experience. This is not to say that institutionalized caring and justice are not also necessary. They mediate ways in which alternatives can be offered where caring in the more fully human sense is not possible. In this view, justice does not merely serve social efficiency, but helps us to care for individuals, especially in extended (both in time and place) social interaction.

Many communitarians claim ultimate justifications for their principles. Many look to religious traditions, as Nash does. He points out that the moral core mentioned above, as well as self-determination and individual liberty that are central American principles, have their origins in Judeo-Christian teachings. Bellah et al. (1985) also argue that it is the Biblical as well as republican forms of individualism that place the individual in relation to a moral community, although they are always mindful of the diversity of religious persuasions in America. The Communitarian Platform is trying to offer a secularized value system that upholds the ethics if not the deities of the Judeo-Christian tradition (Creedon, 1992). In a brief but trenchant article in Time, however, Barbara Ehrenreich (1992) reminds us that even the Founding Fathers did not all believe in the same God, and that this was one of the reasons they insisted on the separation of Church and State. They were determined to defend unlimited power. In a multicultural society like America this is arguably the more appropriate line to pursue. Educational conservatives like Hirsch (1987), Bloom (1987), Bennett (1988), and Ravitch and Finn (1987) insist that if only the schools taught a shared body of knowledge through a common public language, a common moral discipline would follow. The knowledge and language belongs, of course, to the dominant culture of the privileged, and implicitly so does the moral code.

Another helpful aspect of the continuum metaphor is that it acknowledges fine shadings and a wide spectrum of balance between individual and community concerns. It admits the dangers of the most radical positions at each terminus. It indicates the possibility of passing along the continuum in either direction, as circumstances demand, and that there are no fixed positions on the way. In recent times the individualistic principles of self-fulfillment, rights, liberty, and self-reliance, have been given primacy over community, responsibility, and tolerance,

and there is now considerable concern to redress the balance. Mary Ann Glendon (Creedon, 1992), a law professor at Harvard University, goes to far as to suggest the need for a "Bill of Duties" to complement the "Bill of Rights."

The schools have reflected the cultural demand that individuals compete for rewards. There is increasing emphasis on normative grading and standardized tests. In every field of endeavor we have created the need to demonstrate who is "best" or "better than"; who has achieved excellence, or merits mention on the honor role. In sports, in spite of the ethics of sportsmanship, many schools nurture a "star" system every bit as pervasive as the promotion of celebrities by the media. The litany of examples is familiar, and so are their results.

Winners create losers; "better than" also signifies "worse than." Competition is often aggressive and used as a means of sorting students into a hierarchy that remains with them throughout their lives. The particular forms that structured competition has taken in schools are often personally demeaning to students and destructive of a sense of community. School, and life itself, become perpetual battlegrounds, and survival a matter of individual achievement. Alfie Kohn (1986) makes a strong case against any kind of competition, claiming that even "intentional competition" (Kohn, 1986, p. 5) which is the proclivity of an individual for besting others harms human relationships. The result of the effectiveness of our socialization is that "We have been trained not only to compete but to believe in competition" (Kohn, 1986, p. 7).

The core of the problem is the equation of achievement with human worth (Purpel, 1989). Success becomes the condition of acceptance as a person in the public world, including the school. In the language of democracy, privilege is justifiably earned by effort and discipline. As Purpel points out, however, the underlying notion of "deserving" is attached to a very narrow range of abilities and qualities, based primarily on intellectual achievement and a few other sanctioned activities, such as sport. The dignity and rights of individuals as persons become eroded in such a climate because these norms tyrannize our perception of people as human beings. Inherent inferiority or superiority is established as "common sense" and hierarchy as

natural or inevitable. This leads to the question, are some human beings intrinsically more worthy than others? The meaning we attribute to human worth, and therefore to human rights, becomes intertwined with another cornerstone of American ideology, the matter of equality. Since a feeling of equality was recognized as an integral element of a sense of Community, the manner in which equality is construed in the wider culture is of considerable import.

Equality

The American idea that "all men are created equal" was radical even though this equality only included White males who owned property. The principle of the human right of equality has since been extended to many other marginalized groups, such as Blacks, Native Americans, women, and other cultural and ethnic minorities; but, there is still a significant difference between the social ideals of the nation and its practices.

It is relevant to my purpose to question the myth that the state and the education system are "neutral" institutions that act in the general interest, and include a concern for equality. The question arises because every child in school does not experience equality and many daily practices in schools do not seem to support their claim to treat students equally. Frequently, we teachers are not doing what we think we are doing.

The contradictions produced can create confusion in the minds and hearts of students and their teachers. In the political and moral language of democracy children are told that they are equal, but in the technical language of the school as a means-ends business operation, they are told they are of greater or lesser worth. Teachers are given the formal structures of standardized testing and tracking, and the psychological objectives of improving their students' self-esteem. Teachers are urged to create community in their classrooms and cooperative learning situations, but also to identify superior students for special programs and awards. There are a variety of good reasons why individuals might be singled out from the crowd, but how this is perceived by the individual or the group will depend on the overall ethos of the classroom and the school. For

example, whether it is understood that individual-community goals are mutually exclusive or possible to integrate, and in this context, the meaning ascribed to "equal."

If learning through the body, through habitual behavior and procedures, takes precedence over intellectual learning, as I have claimed, the lived experience of students in the classroom has a powerful influence on how they develop their understanding of equality, or any other concept. It is a matter of deep concern, therefore, how children learn the meaning of equality through their interaction with others in school. Where the formal curriculum and organizational demands of the school inhibit the practice of equality there is good reason to work towards changing them at the level of community structuring. The attitudes and values embedded in school experiences and relationships that also contribute to a child's understanding of equality can be managed at the interpersonal level. To meet equality of "humankindness," mentioned already, is always possible.

Most people, including teachers, are well-intentioned towards the notion of equality. On the other hand, the economic pressures of capitalism distort our perception of equality, and on the other hand, "commonsense" classifications of individuals and groups according to gender, race, and class reinforce relations of domination. These two factors are not unrelated, but their force warrants separate consideration.

The capitalist system permeates the culture to such an extent that economic value is prized above all others. Persons of greater economic "worth" are accredited higher public esteem than others, and this is measured in terms of property and other material symbols. It is the view of Bowles and Gintis (1976) that schools support the capitalist enterprise by encouraging a stratified and hierarchical view of one's relationship with others. Schools reward personal characteristics useful in the marketplace. Credence is given to this view by such studies as the examination of the hidden curriculum by Jean Anyon (1980). The work tasks and interaction illustrates differences both in classroom experience and curriculum knowledge. They are

interpreted as contributing to "the development in the children of certain potential relationships to physical and symbolic capital, to authority, and to the process of work" (Anyon, 1980, p. 98).

In his study of working class ideology, Paul Willis (1980) demonstrates how a particular class ideology itself helps to reproduce class distinctions for a group of working class boys in England. He demonstrates that the hierarchy that denies and inhibits equality among people in Western society is not just a Machiavelian plot by the capitalist elite, nor is it only rooted in economics. Inequalities are also perpetuated by the cultural hegemony that exists and has developed in all subcultural groups by gender, race, and class.

Although I was born into a working class family in England, my profession as teacher and professor would be described as middle class. I experienced the discrepancy in a myriad subtle ways. I had to learn how to be one of "them" in terms of norms and conventions of behavior and speech patterns. Much more difficult is the appropriation of cultural assumptions and thought patterns. Intellectual structures and methodologies were superimposed, but I still suffer a deficit in cultural capital and certain attitudes and expectations.

Social class is related to the school one attends, its size, its prestige, its wealth, and curricula, both overt and hidden. Researchers often measure social class according to a person's (and their family's) level of education, occupation, income, and rank in an organization. These labels are used to construct major groups of people in society and are inevitably simplistic when applied to an individual. These criteria are broad guidelines, but they are closely intertwined with family history and inheritance, and with gender and ethnicity.

It is only as I reinterpret my schooldays at the Convent school for girls that, in addition to identifying class tensions, I note a number of gendering features. Physics and chemistry were totally absent in our formal curriculum, also mathematics in the higher grades. Furthermore, we were encouraged to be obedient, compliant students in awe of authority. We were not groomed for leadership roles in the world, only for the supportive, behind the scenes functions appropriate

to our gender. The male norm was not visible to me at that time in the all female setting, but his presence in absentia was just as forceful.

In mixed classes, the formal curriculum must be the same for boys and girls, but gender differentiation is visible in the modes of interaction demonstrated by teachers. Even teachers who claim to hold no prejudice against girls exhibit greater expectations for boys in a variety of subtle ways, and pay them more attention (Sadker & Sadker, March 1985). It could also be said that it is the White boy who is so favored.

Ethnic minority students such as Afro-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans also experience educational inequality, reflecting the more general societal patterning. Providing access for these minority students to majority schools is not enough if school structures and classroom practices continue to underscore their lower status and worth. In procedures such as tracking, students are frequently segregated according to ethnicity and class, which often coincide (Oakes, 1985). Mastery of social codes and skills also tends to contribute to school failure for minority students. This was an issue in my own school experience, although it was not a matter of different ethnicity but class. I was a White girl in a White school for girls, so neither ethnicity nor gender were problematic for me at the time. It is only when differences are found in close juxtaposition that they become visible.

Every school has a cultural ethos exhibited through its overt rules and conventions and its covert cultural norms of behavior, values, and attitudes. The teachers have their own individual and collective cultures, and the children bring their home culture with them to school. Furthermore, groups of students begin to develop their own peer cultures, especially as they move into high school; and there is an implicit pecking order among these to which the ethos of the school gives credence. The problem for equality is not the differences themselves but our attitude to them. There is a distinction between tyrannous, discriminatory inequality, and mere differentiation of role and function (R. Nisbet, 1988), as of student and teacher or administrator.

Since greater value is attributed to wealth and material goods than human values in our culture, those whose roles and functions have an economic advantage also have greater prestige and power. Everyone is equal yet we are obliged to get ahead, compete, achieve, and demonstrate our superiority by the accumulation of goods. This is equality as Fair Play, in which everyone has equal scope to get ahead. This version of equality has been dominant in America; but, as William Ryan (1981) points out, there is no equality at the beginning of life nor at the beginning of schooling. Not only do we inherit monetary wealth in vastly different proportions, but we all possess the cultural capital concomitant with our gender, race, or class. In addition, we are advantaged or disadvantaged by our own personal abilities and disabilities. Ryan argues that equality as Fair Play is a semantic fraud and that we must move towards a rule of Fair Shares, at least to equal rights of access to the material and spiritual necessities of life, if any significant sense of equality is to be achieved. Equality in humankindness will remain elusive without a significant change of heart in these matters. The competition to earn more so that we can purchase more goods and services has turned us into a society of consumers, the ideological thread that I will address now.

Consumerism

A morality based on commodity values rather than human worth leads to the perversion of all other values. It has perverted the individualism of autonomy, independence, and responsibility because the individual, too, is owned and used. We become alienated from the full nature of our selves. Similarly, relations of possession and self-interest taint the individual's association with other people and with the environment; everything functions only in the cash nexus (Nisbet, 1988). Relations among men and women become competitive and depersonalized, with dire consequences for the project of making and living in community.

The products of capitalism seem to have become everyone's master. The rich are as subject to the media, and the nuclear bomb, as the poor. Everybody has become a pawn in the game of making money to buy and then make yet more material goods. The system controls

individuals through the needs it has created, and it has fashioned new hierarchies and inequalities among people.

In this climate, the needs and desires of creative and feeling human beings are subordinated to the requirements of production. The individual self is no longer experienced as an integrated, thinking, feeling, agent. The individual's ability to work becomes another commodity to be sold in exchange for goods. The price is high, so the goods must be valued, thus making them more desirable. The desire becomes need and a vicious circle is in motion. The individual has become subject to his or her own alienated needs.

Marcuse (1968) speaks eloquently of the need for liberation from the affluent society. He speaks of "mutilated consciousness" and "mutilated instincts" (Marcuse, 1968, p. 186-187) as the results of the self-perpetuating pattern of consumption. He also recognizes that the most powerful obstacle to liberation from the affluent society lies in the fact that capitalism has found ways of containing the contradictions that the system has thrown up and shows signs of a continued capacity to encompass or co-opt new indications of resistance. The contemporary need for a variety of therapies and survival techniques is one kind of example of the way in which the system has turned human problems into another source of production and consumption.

Of particular concern is the symbiotic relationship between the media as it is employed by advertising and the media as it is used for entertainment. The messages conveyed merge and blend into one continuous stream. If we come to know and experience reality through the language and symbols with which we identify and describe it, the ubiquitous media must play a central role in shaping the consciousness of contemporary society that is antipathetic to notions of equality and community.

As a woman, I am constantly bombarded with the ideal of young, slender, and beautiful femininity that is the socially desirable ideal to which I must aspire. I am assured that this model is the standard, not only for the women who win beauty competitions, but also for those who snare the most desirable men and who secure the most prestigious jobs. I read the texts that tell

me that my top priority is to look good if I am to compete successfully with other women in ascending the hierarchies of the public world. Only after that will my other qualities become visible. We teach this to young girls at a tender age when the boys are praised for what they do or make and the girls are praised for how they look.

The demand for new beauty potions and fashions is generated by constant cries of "out with the old and in with the new." We are assured that last season's fashions, make-up, and accessories are outdated and must be replaced if we are to maintain our "image." We women gather in small groups to encourage each other in this enterprise, to exchange tips, and feel moral support; but, fierce rivalries and jealousies are often barely veiled. We have become commodities ourselves to sell for love or achievement in a competitive marketplace. Most devastating of all, we understand that fatness elicits moral reproof.

Gendering in school in terms of female images is supported in many subtle ways, but also overtly in such institutions as cheerleading and pom-pom squads, the Homecoming or Beauty Queen, and the twirlers. These activities honor the same beautiful females as those celebrated by the media. The argument is not with our enjoyment and blessing of such qualities, but that we have allowed them to rise to the top of our hierarchy of values and become synonymous with an individual's worth as a person. Feminist educator Priscilla Wallace sharply articulates one of the consequences of this message that children receive. As children look for direction from adults so they find us looking back at them. As we strive to maintain our youthful image, we identify for our children those aspects of youth that we value, supporting and legitimating the acceptability of only certain characteristics. "They see their own reflections in a distorting mirror" (Wallace & Lee, 1991, p. 22). Attitudes learnt when we are young tend to stay with us throughout our lives. This is a strong argument for trying to bring our awareness, as teachers, to bear on our behavior with and teaching of young children. Can we help them to live in a way that we find difficult yet desirable?

Most of us have learnt that when we consciously set about changing our behavior we often feel discomfort or guilt for a considerable length of time. The new mind-set must "in-habit" the body for a length of time before it will feel as though it belongs there. Bellah and his colleagues investigated the "habits" of American "hearts." The heart is both a bodily organ and a metaphor for a person's emotional and moral nature as opposed to one's intellect. It speaks of a person's innermost or core character, concerns, and inclinations. The metaphor reminds us of the interconnectedness of thought and feeling, thought and action, inner and outer, who we are and what we do.

In her study of sex-role stereotyping, Jean Anyon (1983) shows how both the accommodation of and resistance to patriarchal exploitation are modes of daily activity for most females. The main thrust of her argument is that we must nurture in both females and males the understanding that it is legitimate, and not contrary to femininity, for women to engage in public, political protest; and that isolated, individual, daily negotiation must be turned into group effort, if the structures of institutional power are to be changed. Social transformation of our capitalist society is our long term aim, but I want to give more support to finding better ways to live within it, to transform daily lives, as a necessary project that must run concurrently.

Andrew Oldenquist (1986) points out that capitalism is neither a religion nor a philosophy of life. In itself it is not an ideology and can and should be controlled by the moral community. Again, I articulate the need for a firm moral stance. It seems to me that it is relatively easy to identify core values, but that the implementation in daily living is deeply problematic. It depends, not least, on the "habits of the heart" of individual people, a central feature in my spiral of understanding to which I return constantly as I try to unravel the threads of community.

One aspect of consumerism that I have not mentioned so far is the exploitation of the psychology and structure of human needs in order to valorize commodities. I would like to examine this issue under the more general heading of psychology of the culture. The hedonistic

ethic encouraged by consumerism has become vital to the survival of capitalism, and any means of increasing its acceptance is sought. The social sciences, especially psychology, have been pressed into this service in order to engineer a consciousness that allows the individual, as a social being, to feel at home in his or her role as consumer. The authority of psychology has provided a stamp of legitimacy for consumerism that further undermines its effects on the individual in terms of those qualities that might enable men and women to live together in harmony and mutual respect.

The Double-Edged Sword of Psychology

The psychology of selling manipulates the individual's basic drives, notably the sexual drive. The commodity is created in the image of the consumer's desires but, as Wolfgang Haug (1986) asserts, advertising must speak to real needs if its effects are to be successful. For example, an increasing range of commodities borrow their aesthetic language from human courtship. Human sensuality and erotic attraction are co-opted for the capitalist enterprise; but then the relationship is reversed. We try to copy their illusion of our appearance and behavior, believing it to be real. The illusion thus creates a dependency on certain products; the long stemmed roses, magnums of champagne, expensive chocolates, and candlelight dinners that support the image of romantic love.

In addition, commercials do not only appeal directly to our basic impulses but also through subtle, symbolic insinuation, suggest that purchase of the article also buys a whole way of life. Philip Cushman (1990) points out that even psychotherapy that is supposed to heal what he calls "the empty self" finds itself in a double bind, because it cannot address the real historical problem, that of changing the entire social system; it can only offer what is available. It employs a strategy that attempts to heal the empty self by filling it with the values, sign, and mannerisms modeled by the media and advertising personalities.

Young people are ideal customers, ideal victims. Novelty and difference, as well as identification with peer groups, appeal to youth fetishism and the compulsive character of the

young. Always ready to try out another possibility in the process of becoming, they are natural targets for the consumer industry. The media show them a set of standardized images with a high commodity value. The psychologists also assure us all that our "free" time is our own if our work is just a necessary evil for the buying power it affords us, we have an excuse to pamper ourselves in our leisure time. As Svi Shapiro observes, "The consumptive society which has done so much to destroy the bonds of human community has also taught us that the right to live well and joyfully is not to be reserved for the privileged few" (Shapiro, p. 30). The split between work and play is in the capitalist interest because "fun," self-fulfillment, and self-improvement, can be turned into vast consumer industries.

The psychological tactics employed by advertising agencies to court the consumer have a similar utilitarian purpose to those used by the professional business manager. The manager's task is to organize resources, including "manpower" in order to maximize the efficiency of the company for whom employers work. Bellah and his colleagues (1985) claim that in contemporary culture, the manager and the therapist are representative of the two dominant languages of American individualism, utilitarian and expressive individualism. In the workplace, this alliance is played out most clearly by those employed in marketing, advertising, and all varieties of public relations occupations. Employees and the public are persuaded, or intimidated, to behave in certain ways for the utilitarian purposes of the marketplace. In private life we find that the managerial approach has been extended to every aspect of home and family life, including the most intimate, because bureaucratic consumer capitalism is the social basis of the general culture. Bellah's complaint is that both manager and therapist take the ends as given. Society as organized and lived is accepted as the unproblematic context of life. The focus of their work, therefore, is upon finding effective means to those ends. The therapist helps the individual to balance the public demands of work with his or her preferred "life-style" according to the individual's notion of the good life. Although the plethora of individual possibilities may ease

the integration for the individual, it also diminishes the ground of common understanding, thus reducing the conditions for community.

Teachers in school could also be accused of taking the context of their work as unproblematic. Overtly we must, as employees, serve our masters. Teachers' autonomy and responsibility have been gradually eroded over the years in what Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) call the increasing "proletarianization of teacher work." In individual classrooms, we must and many of us do work hard to "squeeze as much humanity and sanity as can be found in existing arrangements," as David Purpel (1989, p. 140) urges us; but most teachers do not feel empowered. On this issue Purpel says that teachers must accept the responsibilities of their profession, and that central to the basis of our authority must be a set of principles and ideas that inform our professional ethic. While accepting this overarching need, I do not underestimate the issues of trust and risk for teachers in the school as a political institution.

Therapy serves as a model not only for the managerial sector but also for schooling. Some therapy prepares the individuals to "play the game" and to make decisions about the "tradeoffs" available to them, other kinds of therapy take the more optimistic stance of guiding individuals towards personal authenticity and autonomy. As Bellah et al. (1985) note, it has become not only the model for many kinds of work, but much of our work is therapy. The same might be said of teaching.

We have on the one hand the human relations approach to industrial management, and on the other hand, the management approach to human relations. It is sometimes difficult to find an aspect of one's life or one's self that does not feel as though it is being, or ought to be, manipulated. Where do we find the "authentic self" in all this? How can we locate the self as the "I" who can meet a "Thou" in the "we" of community? Ideally, therapy helps us to translate social experience into personal meanings that, in turn, become the grounds for social action. It is when the self is the only reality that psychology becomes problematic for community. It may teach us sensitivity to others uniqueness and some measure of tolerance, both traits that are central to

community, but self-interest as the ultimate goal will always present a stumbling block to the experience of full community, even in fleeting moments.

Behaviorist learning theory has taught us how to shape students toward desired behaviors through providing appropriate stimuli to which students would respond in predictable ways. The work of psychologists such as Skinner (1968) entailed developing behavior objectives of small enough dimensions to produce clearly defined, "objective" results. In certain contexts, the use of reward and punishment has useful outcomes, but it also reduces human behavior to mechanical and routine responses. In addition, the implication that behavior is only the response to external forces leaves little place for the role of subjectivity, intuition, or the moral development of the individual. Claims that this method of psychology is value-neutral were particularly popular in the 1950s and early 1960s (Seane, 1990), the heyday of this approach, when attempts to avoid value expressions were deemed to be highly desirable.

A more humanistic psychology has developed since that time, in which it is proposed that an individual's perceptions influence their view of the world and their actions. This theory also includes the claim that the self-fulfillment of individuals is the center from which flows relations with others (Beane, 1990). The group process movement, spawned by this approach to psychology, holds greater potential for community in schools, but it too must avoid the pitfalls of being little more than another form of social engineering.

Most damaging to the foundations of education and society in general is the tendency to psychologism, as Buber claims. Problems of ethics and morals, for example, cannot be treated as matters of fact, amenable to psychological accounts of causation and description. Psychologism has become the handmaiden of the consumer ethic, reinforcing the utilitarian aspects of individualism that lead to a more material pursuit of self-interest.

The value system underlying all others in America, it is generally supposed, is implicit in the democratic social order. The democratic myth plays a similar role in the classic vision of community in America. Everyone "knows" it and makes claims for its centrality and power for

the American way of life. Yet conceptions of democracy are rooted in multiple realities. They have been reinterpreted over time as circumstances have changed, and also by a wide range of interest groups.

The Democratic Social Order

The relevance of this enormous topic to my concern with community is self-evident. Democracy is an institutionalized body of principles that values liberty, freedom of choice, and human diversity; it provides a way of arriving at political decisions rather than a body of beliefs. It is, therefore, a system that should encourage a sense of community. The issues of individualism, equality, consumerism, and psychology, already discussed, have all affected American practice of democracy. My particular interest lies in the structures of schooling that have come about as a result of the development of democracy in America, and the roles schools have played in the advancement of democratic causes.

The popular ideal of democracy produces the kinds of structures in which community could flourish. We honor these absolutes but the perennial problem is how these universals can be fleshed out in particular actions. America's greatest educational philosopher John Dewey's basic theme was the democratic ideal. He speaks of education as a "freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims" (Dewey, 1948, p. 147), but he is accused by Forrest Peterson (1987) of allowing "social aims" to degenerate into an empty concept because they do not pertain to anything specific. My reading of Dewey, on the other hand, suggests that he is merely stressing that democracy is primarily a process rather than a politics of specific goals. It has been claimed that in a multicultural society in which ethics and morals have become relative, the maintenance of process is the most important, or perhaps the only goal possible, and that it is, therefore, probably the main achievement of democratic theory (Reilly, 1980).

Dewey's actions follow from this philosophy. For example, he believed that the urban and industrial society of this time had destroyed the sense of community, and the school must foster it by helping students to become aware of sharing common social purposes and to

understand their own contribution to the community. Dewey aimed to develop social imagination through cooperative activities, and create a school that was both a community in itself, and a preparation for the wider community in which the student participates and must become a responsible contributor (Dewey, 1902).

Dewey responded to his immediate circumstances in practical action, but his main contribution to democracy was pedagogical. Dewey's preferred methods, however, limit a full understanding of the interconnectedness of knowledge, knowing, human values, and existential realities. He stressed rationality and commitment to experimental inquiry, and failed to take account of the tacit-implicit forms of cultural knowledge that influence behavior and understanding (Bowers, 1987). Problem solving is an integral element of the democratic process but specific problems addressed are not value-free, and assumed consensus can be misleading and sometimes dangerous. Dewey offers us many strategies for encouraging the democratic process in school, but fewer concerning the resulting society the process might create.

In the name of democracy, American education is always confronted with providing a system that is beneficial to both the individual and society, and it has been cast in a number of molds. For example, social efficiency doctrines greatly influenced the development of the high school. Vocational guidance became an important aspect of selection and training for students. Attempts to improve the efficiency of guidance procedures were then scientifically developed in the form of measurement of intelligence, ability, and interests. In this way the race for jobs and prestigious positions was thought to be no longer a function of the market place, with its relation to wealth and family background. Rather, it would be based on an objective, scientifically assessed meritocracy that also convinced individuals of their social worth (Spring, 1989). Only with hindsight have we come to see more clearly that this supposed objectivity masks class, gender, and ethnic discrimination.

These are some issues of inequality in educational provision. The first to be addressed at the organizational level was the attempt to end discrimination against ethnic minority groups

through desegregation legislation (beginning with Brown v. Topeka, 1954). The women's movement followed the civil rights movement and, by the 1970s, sex bias in schools was at issue. Some success has been achieved in producing and using gender-fair curriculum materials. Progress in the process of instruction is slower, however, suffering not only from entrenched opposition but more pervasively, from the nonconscious ideology of patriarchy. The masculine perspective and language has been internalized by men and women throughout history and its dominance is highly resistant to attack. Society's history and reality has rendered women invisible or ascribed them stereotypically passive and dependent roles (Banks & Banks, 1989). Gender discrimination and inequality still exist both in schools and in the wider society.

The brief sample above demonstrates attempts to respond to currently perceived needs in society through educational reform, but the school has not been a neutral arena in which the good of all has been carefully balanced. The intentions of most reformers have been honorable, but are inevitably biased in particular perspectives on a problem. Action in schooling has, therefore, reflected and favored the wishes and demands of the dominant political power group, which in turn, controls the government.

In capitalist societies like the United States, schools primarily serve the interests of the business community. A democratic empowerment of students and teachers, in the spirit of the democratic guiding myth, is difficult to achieve in such a climate. As Spring points out, "No government in the world has consciously supported a school system that educates students to overthrow that government," and he suggests that "A major problem in the modern world is the linking of political power to the development of the human mind." Spring accuses critics of "confusing the thinkable with the doable" (Spring, 1989, p. 185). Yet, if we do not teach students how to understand their society critically and name their problem (Greene, 1988), nor encourage them to imagine and develop alternatives, we are not giving them the tools to remake it.

At this point, I will summarize this section by identifying two broad bands of interacting forces arising from the values of community as a social entity that seem to me to encourage or

impede it. One is the patterns of relationship between people that ensue as a result of the manner of implementation of the hierarchical power structure, just mentioned. The second is the relation of the individual to the dominant ideology of his or her particular school.

The Structure of Power Relations Among Individuals in Schools

In the authoritarian, also called the traditional, mode of education there is a great difference in the status level between teacher and student. Conditions for community either in an "I-Thou" relationship with the teacher or with each other are almost non-existent in an extreme authoritarian classroom and such circumstances do not lend themselves to the "we" of community. It is possible, however, that moments of "humankindness" can be shared, or the bonds of intellectual community felt, even in a predominantly authoritarian context.

One-way communication or benefaction, in which the givers and the receivers maintain the same roles, denies the mutuality of community. A totally authoritarian school or classroom is like organized welfare and charity. They all provide material goods and services, not necessarily of the recipients choosing. They also disempower those who are the supposed beneficiaries by removing the possibility of any reciprocation or taking responsibility for themselves. A student perceived as a tabula rasa on which to write society's demands, is refused the individual autonomy without which the freedoms of democracy make little sense.

The more occasions in which students can be invited to take responsibility for classroom decisions and choices, and share and develop ideas with each other and the teacher, the more likelihood that a sense of community may be engendered. External control from above gives way to the development of self-discipline and self-evaluation. Concern for others and their learning can also be encouraged in addition to personal achievement and success. Competition for survival and privilege can become competition for challenge and fun, or preferably, eliminated altogether. In such an interactive context, all the people concerned, teacher and students, bring their personal knowledge, feelings, interests, and needs to bear on the process of learning as well as the more usual school resources. Listening to others and learning from them, as well as taking

the risk of making oneself vulnerable by speaking or showing one's own ideas, allow possibilities of coming to know the other as a "Thou."

The structuring of daily life in schools profoundly affects students' understanding of democracy and the possibility of community. Strategies such as addressing issues that are real to students, cooperative learning, contracts agreed with students in relation to classroom discipline, work tasks, and grades, project work, assessment by portfolio (Rogers, 1993), are all aimed at establishing an atmosphere of democratic freedom and responsibility in the classroom. Ideally, students will become independent learners from a genuine desire to learn. They will also learn that there are occasions when independence is in everyone's interest, and other times when it is appropriate to be dependent on other people. Cooperation and collaboration are often authoritatively imposed on students initially, but the aims of community will not be served unless students develop an understanding of the communitarian purpose of these modes of working. Contributions and roles do not have to be equal in the sense of "identical" but they must all be welcomed and valued.

The Relationship of the Individual to the Ideology of the Group

One of the elements necessary to a sense of Community is a feeling of commonality of shared ideas or values, a common purpose, or fate. In traditional notions of community where people live in homogeneous groups that share a common heritage and way of life, there are many strands of overt understanding as well as internalized values, habits, customs, and conventions that are practiced unconsciously. In modern society, the threads of commonality may be few and tenuous. There may be only a single idea, or purpose, or value, or a common fate, that draws people together. Quantity does not always result in quality in this context either but, the more a group has in common, theory suggests, the larger the number of possibilities for community there should be.

A sense of community is the result of fragile connections, impossible to predict or enforce. The best that we can do is to try to create fertile ground in which such a delicate plant

may grow. In the last section I indicated that the structure of certain kinds of arrangements among people are more conducive to a sense of community, such as a democratic rather than an authoritarian classroom structure in schools. Yet structure alone will not produce community. The ideological strands of American culture at work in the school and classroom are a major contributory factor. The ideology of a school or classroom may be completely in tune with the structures that are in place, run counter to them, or it may match them irregularly. Ideology is more pervasive and less conscious, and every individual must cope with the subtlety, complexity, and endless variety of its manifestations. This is difficult enough within a homogeneous culture but is a Herculean task in a multicultural society.

The dominant white, male, middle class, ideology of most schools is alien to many of the cultures of the students who attend those schools. All first grade teachers know that in the first days of a new school year their students need to be taught many social skills, attitudes, and customs. Yet, even first grade teachers are not always aware of the full extent of a child's social needs when that child comes from a home that is culturally very different. Texts, such as the one edited by Banks and Banks (1989) already mentioned, offer many practical suggestions for multicultural education. It identifies the diversity of needs and the extent of the problem for teachers in contemporary America.

The general point I wish to make here is that if an individual, either student or teacher, neither shares nor is in tune with the dominant ideology of the school it will be experienced as oppressive by that individual. Overtly he or she may follow the rules, obey the laws, and be subservient to the norms and conventions practiced but, if this situation continues, such members of the school become depersonalized. The ideological demands are felt as confining and limiting, unsympathetic to the integrity of that person. The social norms are not perceived as their own. As Terry Eagleton says so forcefully, "If the process of hegemony is to be successful, ethical ideology must lose its coercive force and reappear as a principle of spontaneous consensus within social life" (Eagleton, 1990, p. 41). In American education there has always been a tension

between conscious efforts to speed up the processes of hegemony and the notion of personal freedom.

Every child must be socialized into his or her own immediate community. The theme of Oldenquist's book (1986) is the terrible consequences of not socializing a social animal. In addition, we can and do learn the rules for membership in a variety of professional and social groups, associations, and clubs. It always takes a certain measure of time for any situation to acquire a sense of "normalcy" but, in order to feel that I belong, and therefore feel comfortable in new group situations, I also need a minimum of acceptance from the other members. I can be in a group but not of it. I can know and play by the rules but I need confirmation from other human beings.

This brings me back full circle to the nature of the experience of community for the individual, to the "habits of the heart" that the individual develops and lives, and to the perception of our relations with each other that constitute the source of our sense of community. The interrelationships of the discourses through which the experience of schooling is articulated, the structures of schooling, and the patterns of interaction that are demanded, fostered, and permitted, are both mediated and interpreted by the individuals who exercise them and on whom they are practiced.

CHAPTER IV

AESTHETIC CURRICULAR LANGUAGE REDEFINED FOR COMMUNITY

Introduction

My challenge to the dominant views of the aesthetic is threefold. Firstly, in the context of curriculum language sympathetic to community, I want to stress the more general use of the aesthetic as an intention to perceive anything, not just artworks, in a particular kind of way. Secondly, I see a need to strengthen the case for the centrality of the subjective nature of aesthetic perception and its value in all educational pursuits, and in particular its value in learning to live together in community. By subjectivity, I mean a person's consciousness or internal awareness that is both private and individual and yet, in a very important sense, not strictly individual. It is continuously formed in and by relationships with others. In the urgent need to create community at all levels of human interaction, I believe that the development of individual consciousness sympathetic to this concern is the basis on which changes in structure and behavior could be built. Individual consciousness shares communal patterns, but an individual's response can also help to reshape those molds, which brings me to my third point.

By integrating communal values with aesthetic values, I believe it may be possible to reawaken our capacity for compassion and empathy with our own communities, and to extend these capabilities beyond tolerance to the enjoyment of differences among people. It is time to reinforce and popularize the interrelatedness of the arts and other aspects of our lives, the social responsibility of the arts, and the importance of the aesthetic in our life experience. Aesthetic values need to be released from their subservience to radical autonomy so that a different set of imperatives may be embraced as well. Gablik describes this as "the cultural recovery of the feminine principle . . . and the consciousness of interconnectedness . . . which is also . . . the

ecological vision" (Gablik, 1991, p. 123). This amounts to the enactment of a different moral perspective.

It is already affecting the choice of artistic expression for some. Gablik describes the work of a number of artists as "models of partnership" in her chapter entitled, "Making Art as if the World Mattered" (Gablik, 1991). It heralds the changing purposes of certain artists in their response to the world. They have moved beyond the art-life polarity. Instead, their artistic activity is participatory, favoring engagement with others or with the environment, and it is primarily their social conscience that is "expressed." These signs of a more communal art are, perhaps, evidence of a desire to return art to its ancient function of celebrating and challenging our communal life and linking personal and communal meaning. Not that I am suggesting all art should be created in this manner, although more art that is collaborative and processual would certainly be a welcome extension in the art scene. I am more concerned about a change in consciousness in relation to all art. Art is a phenomenon that is embedded in the lives and culture of people, and I hope for an attitude to all art that reflects that lived experience.

In identifying aesthetic concepts for a curriculum language, I am advocating the widest possible application of the terms. In the interest of community, on the other hand, I am also recommending that we perceive other people, our relations with them, and the ways in which we function in groups, from an aesthetic perspective. Such an approach, I am claiming, could enhance our vision and enactment of community.

For the sake of clarity, I will address the pivotal concepts of an aesthetic curricular language for building community in two groups, roughly corresponding to what I have described as the value of community for its members and the value of a community as a social entity. In the first section the emphasis is on the experience of the individual in which I will discuss the notions of transcendence, personal, meaning, and significance, and the immediacy of aesthetic experience. In the second section, the embeddedness of aesthetic experience in structure and culture is the focus and will be discussed under the headings of wholeness and beauty.

The Aesthetic: Experiential Dimensions

Transcendence in Aesthetic Experience

As art provides the archetypal context for understanding the aesthetic, so the moment of transcendence, often referred to as "having an aesthetic experience," is the embodiment of all that is most highly prized in this kind of encounter. My contention is that transcendence is one of a battery of concepts needed for revisioning education and for moving towards community, although this concept is burdened by emotionally-charged, historical connotations that render it problematic. It is the moment of Turner's "communitas" (Turner, 1969); the strong sense of "humankindness" that urges us to seek out and maintain community.

The Aristotelian sense of transcendent refers to that which lies beyond the bounds of any category. It is a conceptual problem which may additionally carry the Kantian sense of something beyond the limits of all possible experience and knowledge, such as the theist's God. Transcendence, in this metaphysical sense, was a problem for the rational project of the Enlightenment. It was ultimately dismissed by the Logical Positivists who declared that the metaphysical, being outside objective experience, is either meaningless and trivial or mere superstition.

Usage of "transcendent," in the sense of surpassing categorical definition, is usually fairly clear; but this is not always the case when it is used with spiritual overtones. Furthermore, it can create considerable discomfort. Many of us, and I include myself, are ill at ease with the language of spirituality: its concepts are not fashionable in our materialistic society. In addition, there is a genuine, and often fearful, lack of understanding of the probable connotations implied by its use. This concept does not usually feature in "interpretive communities" (Fish, 198) of teachers. There is no shared system of ideas in which this concept finds a place in the public world outside particular religious contexts, and with curriculum theorists such as Phenix (1975), MacDonald (1988), Purpel (19849).

I leave open the possibility of transcendence that entails our connection with a supernatural being. My preference for a secular, aesthetic description of transcendence lies in its offering me, a finite being, a firmer place to stand, and a relationship with the infinite rooted in my own nature. The usefulness of this term is that, as a description of a particular kind of experience, it draws attention to an occurrence with which we are all familiar but cannot fully describe. It is not accessible through out public language and therefore tends not to be valued. At its core is a complex but unified experience that is not responsive to linear and categorical analysis. It is not the result of a sequential chain of causes; consequently, it cannot be predicted, nor can it be externally evaluated or controlled. It "just happens" and remains an unsolved mystery. Only in our private world is the power of this phenomenon felt, and sometimes recognized and acknowledged as a turning point in our lives.

Dewey (1934) draws attention to the distinction between our continuous experience of the environment together with our inner states of being, much of which is inchoate, and our awareness of an experience that is singled out from the general flow of experience. It is the self-conscious awareness of the relationship between inner and outer data that renders the experience transcendent. Three psychologists name this experience of transcendence in secular terms. Maslow (1970) calls it a "peak experience," Glasser (1976) names it "the state of positive addiction," and Csikszentmihalyi (1990) speaks of "flow" as optimal experience.

Maslow cites music, sex, and natural childbirth as particularly potent sources of peak experience. Glasser claims that meditate, running, and athletics prove to be useful contexts in which the positive addiction state might be achieved. Earlier research by Csikszentmihalyi (1977) was in the context of play and sport, but more recently (1990) he has extended the list to an indefinite number of physical and intellectual activities. The results of his studies make it clear that the process of total involvement that he calls "flow" is dependent not on events themselves but on our interpretation of them; I would say, on our aesthetic perception of them.

These descriptions of transcendence were first recognized in relation to physical experiences. I suggest that this is because strong emotion is an intrinsic element of such experiences, and emotion is always a bodily sensation. Similarly, I claimed in Chapter Two that a sense of Community is powerfully and literally "embodied." In addition, all three psychologists, Maslow, Csikszentmihalyi, and Glasser, agree that, in Maslow's terms, "It looks as if any experience of real excellence, of real perfection, of any moving toward perfect justice or toward perfect values, tends to produce peak experience (Maslow, 1970, p. 30). Furthermore, they all bear witness to the fact that the results of these moments of transcendence further their cause. For Maslow, it is an identifiable and memorable step towards self-actualization, "full humanness," and the discover of identify. Glasser's interest is therapeutic. He claims that strength to overcome negative addictions can be gained from positive additions to activities which give rise to "a feeling of perfection that flows in waves of satisfaction" (Glasser, 1976, p. 56). For Csikszentmihalyi it is a condition of being that is prized for its own sake. It is a state of happiness.

The fact that a transcendent moment is also transformative is significant for my project, too. It is a moment of great magnitude because of the insight it affords the individual. It may be a memorable learning experience because it is not merely intellectual but also invested with strong emotion for the individual. The experience may be non-verbal as in a significant sense of Community. Whatever the nature and context of the transcendent moment, afterwards, the person is forever changed on account of this new insight. It is the moment when Archimedes leaped from his bathtub, crying, "Eureka!" the world is suddenly arranged in a new pattern, with new possibilities. That which was dispersed and separate is gathered together and unified with its own emergent meaning for the individual. Journalist George Leonard describes his experience as a student:

You feel a little lurch as your own consciousness, the teacher's voice, the entire web of sound and silence that holds the class together, the room itself, the very flow of time all

shift to a different level . . . you find yourself trembling slightly with the terror and joy of knowledge, the immensity of existence and pattern and change. And then, it ends and you must go. You reel from the room with flushed face, knowing you will never again be quite the same. You have learned. (1968, p, 8)

He cites an instance when his photographer caught a boy-- ". . . in the very act of learning. . . . I was to describe it as one of 'those magic moments when knowledge leaps across the gap like a spark, and a child flings up his hand, exulting, 'I know. I know!' (1968, p. 135).

I distinctly remember my increasing exhilaration as I grasped more and more implications of the fundamental insight that reality is socially constructed. I, too, have witnessed students who suddenly "see" the point, and students for whom hours of practicing and struggle abruptly result in being able to swim or find their "center" in dance. Transcendence for the learner marks the moment when knowledge becomes a personally significant possession. It is a moment of going beyond the limit or boundaries of previous knowing. When the experience is transcendent, elements fall into place, into a pattern of coherence, in which the connections are not merely logical. It is a matter of insight rather than inference, and it is not reversible.

If such insight is to be gained for a vision of community, either through a deepened understanding of community or the experience of a sense of Community, there are at least two factors that might contribute to its possibility. One is the physical circumstances outlined in Chapter Two, but the other is that community itself must be a value that is coally validated. Only then will community become part of our expectations and a sense of Community a hoped for experience. We go to the theatre or gallery as part of our cultural behavior and hope for "an aesthetic experience" as a reward. Values create norms of behavior and a specific range of expectations for the people who engage in them.

Victor Turner (1977) himself states that he is not sure about the precise nature of the connection between "flow" and "communitas" but he does agree that people have a sense of being at times that Buber would call, "an essential We." As I have described these aspects of community

(in chapter Two) and the nature of the transcendent moment of aesthetic experience I think that they have much in common with the "I-Thou" and "the essential We" relations. These moments filled by the sense of relationship are brief in time because we cannot hold on to the present. The dynamic of relation" (Buber, 1987, p. 87) is so powerful that they often feel like moments out of time and these encounters become exemplars in our lives. We try to understand them in order to derive the knowledge whereby we can meet again a "Thou." But it is a "finding without a seeking" (Buber, 1987, p. 11). We are blessed when a "Thou" comes to meet us but we cannot guarantee that it will occur. Part of the power of transcendent experiences is that they cannot be forced. We feel that they happen to us gratuitously, taking us completely by surprise. Like peripheral vision, they disappear when we turn to see more clearly.

Experience of the "essential We" is rare. Turner suggests that the "flow" of "communitas" is, "...most likely to be found in association with beginnings and transitions, genesis and exodus . . . with the liminoid genres of leisure . . . and often with the capacity to 'play,' just as in sexuality and lactation, foreplay elicits physiological flow" (Turner, 1977, p. 52).

I think it was an example of our capacity to "play" together that I witnessed at a conference for dance educators during which a few teachers had been invited to show some of their work with children. There were more boys than girls in the final demonstration by a group of fifth graders who showed us their own compositions based on passing energy. The class used a full range of dynamics, but it was the delicacy of the sustained, fine touch movements, and sensitive relationships, which were performed with total absorption by one group of boys, that was particularly potent. Their gifted teacher, sensing the involvement of the spectators, suggested that the boys invite everyone to join them in the dance. Without a word, the whole group of over one hundred people, including some skeptical male administrators, were drawn into this enthralling moment, a moment out of time. There was a spontaneous bonding in a moment of utter simplicity. Words can never capture the quality of this encounter. It reminded me of Gablik's comment that, "In our man-made environments, we have comfort and luxury, but

there is little ecstasy" (Gablik, 1991, p. 84). This experience of flowing, of merging, and immersion in physicality generated by these young boys, sustained the whole group for the remainder of the conference.

Such ungovernable potency, which can be felt by groups as well as by individual people, is a threat to a society in which impregnable systems of well-regulated organization are demanded. Like many sources of great power, of course, transcendence is neither good nor evil in itself. The quality of the outcome depends on the intentions and actions of those who respond to it. There are important matters to which I will turn in the next section of this chapter.

To claim a role for transcendence in education is not new. Good teachers of all subjects and disciplines have always known its value, even if it remains unsung and lacks vindication and validation in the dominant technological language of schooling. This formulation of transcendence, in aesthetic terms, both emphasizes the intrinsic worth of joy, delight, and sense of well-being, derived from the experience, and acknowledges that it can occur in a wide range of contexts. The extrinsic gains can similarly occur in a variety of situations, including learning and insights relevant to community, and the experience of a strong sense of Community itself.

I have made the claim that a transcendent aesthetic experience is when there is a perceived wholeness that resonates with the individual's understand and feelings. The final referent for an aesthetic judgment is not reason, but there are obviously some criteria, open to rational exposition, that may provide a platform for the judgment. My task now is to attempt to account for the nature of aesthetic attention to the world in greater detail.

Personal Meaning-Making and Significance

Significance implies a terminus that is psychological, whereas meaning is primarily conceptual. Theoretically, these two terms belong to different discourses but, in practice, they are difficult to separate. Together they underscore the necessary interrelatedness of the psychological and conceptual aspects of making meaning, which is vital to learning.

When I make an aesthetic judgment such as, "It's beautiful" (elegant, graceful, pretty, ugly, grotesque), I think I am doing at least three things. I am saying that (1) I like and appreciate a particular phenomenon and find it attractive, or I am very drawn to it. I am acknowledging that both the psychological and conceptual understanding and judgment are mine, even if I cannot articulate this evaluation; (2) Either directly or indirectly something has value to me in relation to my needs, my desires, or my interests; (3) I have judged this phenomenon to be good or successful. These are rarely conscious elements in my finding something to be beautiful; but like so many of the things we do and say, it is the result of previous knowledge synthesized into the present action.

It is central to the aesthetic approach to the world that the phenomenon has meaning for me; that it is my judgment. I discovered that the archetypal theme of the cave held personal meaning for me. I had just read the account that Seonaid Robertson (1963) gives of her discovery that teenagers respond with great depth and insight to certain archetypal themes such as the cave, and found myself drawing my cave. The foreground is the inner, engulfing darkness of the cave, looking out into a bright and open space, but in which nothing is clearly visible. Many hints of things but they are always partly hidden, and distant. Half concealed, they are enticing, yet threatening. This is Plato's cave too. In my cave I feel safe, I tacitly understand it but do not consciously know it. It carries the familiarity of habit. It is textured yet not shaped. Its qualities are felt not seen. Suddenly I made the connection with my long fascination for some of de Chirico's paintings, such as The Rose Tower. I recognized it as a representation of my cave from where I play out the dialectics of my life.

This emphasis on personal perspectives and subjective realities is trivialized or dismissed as "knowledge" in an intellectual climate that favors objectivity, positivism, and empirical proof. Yet, politically, American individualism is supported by many structures and practices, as I indicated in Chapter Three. Furthermore, the language of "expressive individualism" (Bellah et al., 1985) is a powerful force in the culture. This is a contradiction in Western culture that is very

evident in schooling. We continually urge children to express themselves uniquely, but the biggest prizes go to those who conform.

The problem for an aesthetic curriculum language sympathetic to community is to reveal that the self, and its individuality, is relational; and, to acknowledge and celebrate the fact that a "self" is always in dialogue. Many artists behave and are treated as though they are engaged in a perpetual monologue, although this is logically impossible. Artists are always dependent on the good auspices of the functional community of the Art World (Becker, 1982), as well as its political fashions, and the ideology out of which his or her work grew. My view is that the self is simultaneously culturally molded and individually unique, although in ways that are still a mystery. Some accounts of this process throw points of light in this darkness.

Berger and Luckmann argue strongly that the individual self "cannot be adequately understood apart from the particular social context in which it is shaped" (Berger & Luckmann, 1987, p. 68). As our culture-bound language shapes the reality we perceive, so we, ourselves, are socially constructed in important ways. Each new generation imbues old forms of reality with new significance and meaning and extends or changes the range of knowledge and possible experience for the next generation; but even the views of the heretic, the atheist, or the avant-garde artist, are rooted in the beliefs and traditions against which they rebel.

Consciousness of self and others arises and develops through social interaction, and the self-images we develop become crystallized into a more or less stable self-concept. This implies a capacity to symbolically represent the self as an object in the light of our understanding in the general beliefs, values, and norms of our community, and the mastery of the many roles played by our social selves in public contexts. On such theoretical grounds individual autonomy can appear to be nothing more than an illusion.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the awareness that our consciousness is shaped in relation with others, this is not to say that I am always aware of either how, or when, the forming took place, or its content. Not even individuals themselves can ever give confident predictions

about themselves. In a homogeneous community it is impossible. In contemporary Western society in which most people have a whole network of different community values on which to draw, even at a very young age, we often do not even know the relevant systems with which to begin to interpret an individual's behavior or ideas. The individual becomes even more opaque, but he or she also becomes more obviously unique. As Mead (in Rock, 1979) recognized, there does seem to be an aspect of ourselves that takes in unmediated experience and results in action which could not be predicted by the individual. Mead uses the concepts of "I" and "me" to account for this phenomenon. The "I" is an imputation about the concealed essence of a person, and the "me" has the self-image of the behavior after "I" has performed the action. Common sense demands that some account is given of the hidden self, because we have all had experiences in which we seem not to be visible to ourselves; or when, with the benefit of hindsight, we realize that we made incorrect inferences about our "selves."

Our logocentrism has caused our other sensibilities to atrophy, or, at least, it has subverted the "knowledge" of ourselves we gain from them. We pay scant attention to messages from the body if they are not corroborated by the rational mind and converted into symbolic form. As Marion Milner recommends to painters, "try to observe what the eye likes" (Milner, 1967, p. 22). We also need to pay attention to how we feel, our responses to the information perceived by all our senses.

In the language of dualism there are many attempts to understand the complexities and wholeness of a "self," part of which always remains hidden to us and recalcitrant to any description. Freud tried to account for inexplicable discontinuities in our mental life by postulating the concept of the "unconscious," but its association with neuroses and repression yield only negative possibilities. The split-brain studies researched by Sperry (1968) and his associates offer a scientific basis for this dual self, claiming that the right brain makes a rapid synthesis of complex material and then the left brain identifies and describes it. Polanyi (1962) distinguishes between focal and tacit knowing, indicating a similar dual operation as I have

already described in Chapter Two. Beliefs and interpretive frameworks become embedded in subsidiary awareness. Knowing and understanding is a matter of integrating discrete facts and various discourses into the individual's own scheme of things. As Polanyi claims, there is only personal knowledge.

On this account of knowing, the role of our individual biographies, our values, and personal commitments in aesthetic judgments become obvious. My first viewing of the film, The Dancer's World, narrated by Martha Graham and danced by her company, was a momentous occasion in the history of my engagement with modern dance. It was both a culmination and a beginning. It was the turning point when I grasped the nature of modern dance and what it could be; when the fragmented knowledge and understanding that I had acquired up to that time took on some semblance of unity. I had found my home at last, a place where I could belong. It was a world where I felt in harmony with the intentions, desires, strivings, will, and the strength and tenderness of the people who inhabited it. I understood without knowing; knew without being able to identify the elements of that knowing. I heard the voice that was also mine, only mine was still silent, searching for the forms that would allow it to speak. This sense of mutuality changed my consciousness.

The lived experience of community, or lack of it, will be learnt far more thoroughly than any rational exposition, as I claimed in Chapter Two. In relation to trying to develop an understanding of and feeling for community in schools, it is clear that teaching facts about community (or any other values) will be grossly inadequate if the "hidden curriculum" and the community life of the school militate against it. Also, if actions belie the words spoken, the contradiction creates confusion for the student, which can turn to cynicism later. Many students already bring with them to school only unpleasant experiences of community that make them suspicious. As I said earlier, schools maintain a functional community, but rarely allow occasions for a sense of Community to arise. We need stability in human conduct, and individuals need to

be able to function satisfactorily in society; but individuals also need to feel that they belong and that their membership in a community is valued.

The individual inherits a social order, and his or her interpretation of significance and meaning are all rooted in institutional modes of moving, behaving, conceptualizing, thinking, feeling, structuring the world, and ordering the symbolic universe. This comes to the individual as personal lived experience; but through continual communication with others he or she learns which of these experiences are also commonly shared. That is, it is impossible not to share most of the values of our culture(s), if only at the level of tacit knowing. An aesthetic response to the world is innocent in that it holistically engages our full consciousness in an immediate response to the world, but it is not ignorant. It is, at the very least, dependent on the internalized norms of our culture(s), and the more we can bring to it (for example through schooling), the more we will find in the experience.

Much of the cultural patterning of our common fund of knowledge and experience has been internalized as tacit knowing. That is why I do not consciously "know" why I find something "beautiful," but my individual response is likely to be related to the "ready-made," explicit standards and meanings of my community(ies). In other words, my aesthetic preferences and enjoyment both form a bond with my cultural group(s), and at the same time, in my awareness that the preference is "mine," it asserts my individuality, my sense of difference from the other individuals in the group.

Aesthetic judgments are an acknowledgment that my interpretation of a particular phenomenon resonates with my needs, desires, or interests in such a way that the very perception of it is felt to be significant, and sufficient to call forth an emotional response. This is when we speak of valuing "the thing in itself." It is no part of an aesthetic response to the world that action is taken as a result of it, and it is often called, therefore, a contemplative activity, and one in which we "distance" ourselves from functional activity. In itself, therefore, it is not instrumental and has no practical outcome; but, of course, as it meshes and is integrated with our other concerns, it

may color our feelings about the world or powerfully motivate our actions. It can be a compelling force and influence.

The aesthetic elements of public ritual and its dramatic presentations move people so that they feel they are part of, and are participating in, a national life. The physical participation in community, and the shared ideas and purposes seen to be central to a sense of Community, are greatly enhanced when their aesthetic qualities are strengthened. When their symbolic representations are strong and clear, they, too, intensify the sense of belonging, so long as their vital link with the community is maintained.

When I claim that something is beautiful I am making a conceptual judgment about what I construe to be the nature of that thing. It is my judgment that it is "good" or "successful," but the criteria for that judgment will belong to some version of a public set of standards. My judgment may be idiosyncratic in that I have made a choice from among those at my disposal. Or, perhaps, I have only incomplete sets of criteria as part of my tacit understanding on which I can draw as I focus on the object. My aesthetic response, the feeling of significance for me, is not dependent on any fixed set of criteria. Only if I want to become an expert on x, say, the aesthetics of the Romantic Ballet, in the public world must I learn the established criteria for what counts as Romantic Ballet, and how to use them appropriately. "Standards" for an art form and the "standards" by which I personally judge something to be aesthetically pleasing to me, are not necessarily the same. In this I demonstrate my individuality, and the authority of the individual in aesthetic judgment. I can "know" that this version of Giselle by the Kirov Ballet Company is highly acclaimed according to the connoisseurs of the ballet Art World, but if the Romantic Ballet does not hold much appeal as a dance form for me, my aesthetic enjoyment may only be minimal.

One of the many problems for educators is to help students find a balance between accepting the given, the knowledge and wisdom handed down to them, and viewing it critically in the light of the world today, their own lives, and their own public and private realities. My early doctoral studies revealed to me that I had spent most of my life ruled by reason, "objective"

knowledge, and a variety of public standards and demands, or the masculine part of my nature. Furthermore, I had accepted this mode of being in the world without question. The feminine, emotional, intuitive aspect of my nature has been largely left to its own devices, or been perceived (by me) as cumbersome excess baggage to be repudiated as often as possible. "Me" as subject and author of my own knowledge never became the object of my interest or concern because it had no valid existence.

I am the authority for my aesthetic judgments but this means I must also bear the responsibility for using them well. To quote M.C. Richards:

...our knowledge, if we allow it to be transformed within us, it turns into the capacity for life-serving human needs. If knowledge does not turn into life, it makes cripples and madmen and dunces. It poisons. . . . Knowledge becomes property. . . education may be sacrificed to knowledge-as-commodity. (1964, p. 16)

Aesthetic attention and evaluation offer some guidelines for achieving this balance. By entering into the world of the text, the subject, the person, or group, new "realities" can be made accessible to me, and new conceptions of humankind and our possibilities and responsibilities may be considered.

"New" may refer to new in world or global terms, or it may only be attributable to me. This point is particularly important in the education context. Even the simplest, oldest, or most common ideas (by public standards) are met for the first time by each student. The merest flicker of doubt in a teacher's face can turn a transcendent moment of revelation, achievement, and fulfillment into a lifelong memory of self-distrust, a sense of inadequacy, or shame. What could have been a magic moment becomes a snare, a deception, a mockery, as the flash of illumination for the student is exposed as the teacher's common daylight. When working in an aesthetic mode the self is heavily invested in the outcome, so that when I reveal or make public my meaning and significance, I render myself extremely vulnerable.

Many years ago, I took a group of first year college dance students to see a performance given by a local ballet company to which they responded with enormous enthusiasm and delight. As a young professor, I worried for some time that I should have informed them of the artistic poverty and generally poor quality of the technical aspects of this performance. Three years later, one of these students, now majoring in dance, asked me if I remembered the occasion of this performance. She said, "They were really awful, weren't they?" but added, "I'm glad you didn't tell us then, we would have felt embarrassed about enjoying it - and probably would have given up dance altogether."

The subjectivity of the aesthetic response is easier to accept than subjectivity in many other contexts, because it appears to have few implications for practical activity. In fact, I would suggest it colors our choices and resulting actions far more than generally acknowledged. It affects what we learn and our capacity to learn most profoundly. If it is accepted that all our learning and knowing is personally constructed, then a system of education that relies on standardized testing for much of its claim to success is not only shortchanging the individual but is also unrealistic.

The aesthetic emphasizes and celebrates the personal sense we make of our experience. An aesthetic approach to meaning is not only multi-perspectival, it is non-linear and holistic, which must serve to remind us of the interrelatedness of knowledge, and of knowledge and experience. As Louis Arnaud Reid says, "The meshed grills of conceptual screens can artificially atomize what is flux and unity" (Reid, 1986, p. 69). The aesthetic both denies the insularity of knowledge systems and revels in their characteristics, since it encourages us to delight in the specificity and illumination made possible by their perspectives. This openness yields opportunities for emergent meanings and multiple realities that are vital if we are to improve our interpersonal understanding and redesign community for our lives today.

Immediacy

Being awake to the immediacy of the present is a requirement for aesthetic participation. Each new encounter with some aspect of the world is a fresh experience, and the willingness to become engrossed in its particularities is a way of loving it. The sad fact is that, in our fast-moving modern world, we cannot afford to "waste" time lingering on the qualities of things. Time is an expensive commodity that must be filled with purposeful activity that is, for the most part, predetermined. As an eleven year old, a requirement for a Girl Scout badge demanded that I stay in one place for half an hour and record everything that I observed. Tuning my senses to the river bank on which I sat took me into another world that I was reluctant to leave. My factual knowledge was scanty and having to write was an intrusion, but the experience of opening myself to everything around me, or just "being" and merging with the landscape is still vivid.

The language of the public world of business carries the masculine, intellectual, scientific, distanced concerns of objectivity and organization. Our functional, daily language follows the lead of this dominant mode of relating to the world; it becomes more summary, more technical, more prone to the use of restricted codes and abbreviations. Its paucity reflects the lack of importance attributed to the experiential quality of living. In addition, as Andrea Dworkin says, "The paring down of the vocabulary of human affect to fuck-related expletives suggests that one destroys the complexity of human response by destroying the language that communicates existence" (Dworkin, 1987, p. 48).

In school we formally educate students to read the written word, and other specific symbol systems such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and the arts. There is no formal tuition in "reading" the human body, or in educating the senses or the emotions; it happens incidentally. There is some concern for the "seen" body; Buber's "seeming" self. There may be requirements about the body's appearance and comportment in school, and a few skills in bodily presentation are sometimes learnt under the auspices of "interview techniques." The lived body as the

manifestation of the individual, sensing, feeling self, the social self, the "house of the human spirit," is ignored.

I am not suggesting that a formal curriculum is the answer. The problem of the present status of the body in education lies in the fact that because it is never addressed, except as a machine in biology and athletics, it appears to hold no value for education. It has no serious place in the public world, in the public language. It must remain at the margins of our lives, its value restricted to "leisure" pursuits. The body is acculturated at the level of tacit knowing but "culture" then seems to leave it to "nature." The theory of multiple intelligences developed by Howard Gardner (1983), and current interests in learning styles (Kolb, 1984) indicate growing interest in more physically based diversity in education; and increasing violence in the schools has prompted the development of strategies for "conflict resolution." These are piecemeal acknowledgments of more than an intellect at work in schooling, but we are still a long way from any sense of integration, of a "whole person" in education.

Elliot Eisner (1985) emphasizes a qualitative approach to schooling. He speaks of educational criticism and connoisseurship as analogous to these functions in the arts. The art critic is "a midwife to perception" (Eisner, 1985, p. 217) because he or she talks about the qualities of works of art to enable others with less skill to perceive them more comprehensively. A critic must first become a connoisseur, which is the art of appreciation, developing the ability to perceive nuances and subtleties in art. It is the desire and competency to see, not merely look at a work. It can be acquired only through exposure to a range of experiences in the mode of expression. The critic then describes, interprets, and evaluates what is perceived. Eisner calls criticism the "art of disclosure" (Eisner, 1985, p. 219). In this sense teachers are critics enabling their students to develop the skills of connoisseurship in order to become critics themselves.

The meaning we make of what is available to us, and the significance it holds for us, will be a combination of what it offers and what we bring to the interpretation of what we "see," but it is always embedded in a particular context. It is necessarily, therefore, an ongoing process.

Aesthetic experience is existential; it is lived experience. In this respect, an aesthetic approach to the world has much in common with the phenomenological method.

Husserl's slogan, "The things themselves" sounds like a command to perceive the world aesthetically (Beardsley, 1985, p. 367). The phenomenological method entails becoming keenly aware of what is "given" to perception while setting aside all other concerns. Whether the "object" actually exists, all the culturally-determined preconceptions about the phenomenon, and the theoretical constructs available to the perceiver, must be set aside. This is the operation of "bracketing" existence. This is not to say that the knowledge, beliefs, and values of the perceiver must be ignored. They are accepted and noted as part of the experience but commitment to them is not allowed to influence conclusions about the phenomenon itself.

Phenomenology asserts the primacy of qualitative experience and the richness and irreducibility of its unity which is also central to aesthetic experience. Yet I have argued that commitment to subjective judgment is also at the heart of the aesthetic. The lesson to be learnt from phenomenology is, perhaps, not to reach closure on that judgment too soon. Greater enjoyment may be sustained if the fullness of the essential characteristics of the phenomenon are explored. A transcendent moment may occur without such penetrating attention, but many are dependent on prolonged involvement with a phenomenon. I think that this point is particularly relevant to our engagement with other people. We cannot hope to understand the complexities of even one human being; but to come to a person as the nexus of a multitude of interacting forces might restrain our inclination to categorize and stereotype people and make judgments prematurely. It could encourage the tolerance and openness necessary for community.

It is in its existential version that phenomenology teaches us that we are alone in a world without meaning and that the individual, therefore, has both the freedom and the responsibility for creating meaning. The creation of meaning is also the creation of self, but this project is never complete. We are always in the making. In order to live an authentic life, we must continually exert this freedom. If we relinquish this responsibility we become creatures of habit and routine,

or allow ourselves to become an economic resource, an obedient consumer, a role player, or functionary in society. An aesthetic approach to the world should help us realize our authenticity. Existentialism reminds us of our personal responsibility for our own authenticity but it denies our connectedness with others and the possibility of sharing the burden of living in the world. It cannot lead us to community.

A sense of Community always occurs in the present, as a result of present circumstances and the individual feelings and agenda of each member. If our attention is focused only on some future achievement or state of being, we will not be alive to the moment. I reiterate that transcendent moments cannot be predicted, but a sense of Community is more likely to occur in a school atmosphere that values personal meaning experienced by faculty and students, and encourages attention to the daily quality of life in the school. Generally, schools are not communities by choice. The teacher and students in a classroom have rarely "chosen" to be with the other specific individuals. In the first instance, schools and classrooms are functional communities. The transformation of these collections of people into communities, therefore, usually requires willingness, and considerable effort from all concerned. Exploring the individuality of the members of our immediate group, the uniqueness of their ideas and actions, their hidden qualities, and latent talents, however, is likely to prove fruitful, given that we tend to love what we come to know. Learning to create community with any group of people is a useful lesson that could be transferred to a variety of contexts in the wider society.

We could come to other people in the school as we come to a work of art for aesthetic engagement. At our first encounter with a person, as with a work of art, we intuit his or her meaningfulness to us directly. Their behavior and speech, sensuous characteristics, nuances of movement and expression, add up to an impression that may be pleasing, antagonistic or even offensive to us. First impressions are powerful, but we are not at liberty to walk out of our classrooms as we can remove ourselves from a gallery or theatre. We tend to dismiss art that is not immediately appealing to us, but sometimes we have good reason for making an effort to find

something enjoyable about an initially unattractive piece, or at least to arrive at some understanding of it. Do we owe less to our peers and colleagues? As I indicated above, our effort can be handsomely rewarded.

In relation to human beings, there are a multitude of factors with which we may find greater sympathy or affinity: their immediate activities, purposes and concerns, biographical details and history, the nature of their sensibility, life-world and values. Buber is very clear about our need for the "full sharing in being" (Buber, 1987, p. 62). By entering into relationship with other persons, I become conscious of my own subjectivity. I encounter my own joy or sadness, my hopes for the future, confirmation of my present.

Other human beings may also respond to our efforts and the relationship can be pursued in the direction of a mutual commitment. With a work of art, we do not have this luxury. The meaning of our encounter with the other person will be a combination of what information one offers and what we bring to our interpretation of our relationship, as with art. The diverse and integrated meanings that make up one's individual life-world can also hold symbolic power for us. The possibilities of extending the relationship with another person, however, are limited only by our interest or application. Furthermore, the greater understanding and connection achieved is likely to increase our concern for that person and desire to continue or improve the relationship we have with him or her.

Since the institution of schooling is highly structured, it is relevant to observe that the roles people play in the school (student, teacher, administrator, janitor, secretary, counselor, or minority student, at risk student, class clown, star, dummy, jock, scapegoat, and so on), can be compared to the various genres, styles, and isms of art. In each case we have tokens and clusters of qualities and characteristics that serve to identify each type, but, at the same time, each example of the type also presents its own idiosyncratic features. Some traditional artistic genres, like Greek tragedy, are now closed systems, but most are constantly reborn and dressed in

modern habit, like the roles played out in schools. It is never safe to make assumptions about people on the grounds that they have a particular role in a given context.

One final comment on this analogy concerns the appropriate setting of the school for people as works of art. Do the physical conditions and structural arrangements of the institution enhance the quality of its "artworks?" Or, does the school inhibit, hide, or obstruct either the creation or enjoyment of these artworks?

The Aesthetic: Structural and Cultural Dimensions

When I find aesthetic pleasure in a phenomenon, I have implicitly passed a judgment on it. The nature of it resonates with my needs, interests, or desires. In addition, I have also evaluated its worth as the kind of thing that it is and, according to the criteria I have available to me, found it to be "good" of its kind. These criteria I will have learnt from their public manifestations in my culture either formally, for example in school, or informally through their common practice; and, I will have internalized a version of them which is "mine." The basis of my aesthetic judgments is, therefore, culturally constructed, and it is to this aspect of the aesthetic I now turn.

Aesthetic values held in common are publicly exhibited in the cultural norms of thinking about and patterning experience, as well as preferred modes of presenting and representing the world. Artistic traditions and a wealth of conventions specific to each medium and period of art are the common currency of the public dimension of art. They can create an intricate web of intertextuality. Particular artists and works of art will play key roles in marking, reflecting, and predicting changes in both thinking and feeling, and we can learn to decode a work by mastering the appropriate symbols and conventions. But, as I have suggested already, our aesthetic engagement with art cannot be reduced to this understanding.

There are similar public criteria for other activities that have a strong aesthetic element, such as architecture, fashion, interior design, television, or sport. Particular choices are formed by the impact of idea on material into coherent entities so that we can grasp their expressive and

meaningful images. A successful "form" will allow us to apprehend its "beauty" in a single act of synoptic perception.

Baumgarten (Redfern, 1983), writing in 1750, believed that the aesthetic perception of beauty was a property of things when perceived as wholes. In a single undivided impression, their full richness is retained in an intuited experience. He contrasted this with the discursive, analytic process of science. He argued that rationalistic knowledge (left-brain activity), which tends to dissolve the original vital fullness of the experience, needs to be complemented by the kind of cognition which is mediated by the senses.

Wholeness

If "holistic" insight is the core of aesthetic activity, the questions of what kinds of structure give rise to this possibility of wholeness must be addressed. The aesthetic principle of wholeness has been variously described as "organic unity" or, more loosely, "unity in variety." Our aesthetic delight in wholeness is our response to the fulfillment of one of our deepest human drives: the desire to find order in the apparent chaos that surrounds us. Our fundamental motive for seeking knowledge is to find connections and relationships among discrete pieces of information and experience (Reid, 1986). Part of the wholeness of aesthetic experience is that we have made personal sense out of something, recognized a pattern, found a form that had not existed for us before that moment. Transcendent experiences can be on a grand scale, as in the moment of "discovery" of a great scientific explanation; or in small configurations, an "I" meeting a "Thou" which is no more than a fleeting moment in the transaction of daily business, or a child suddenly grasping how fractions work. All aesthetic recognition of patterns of wholeness are not transformational, of course, but we gain considerable enjoyment and satisfaction from experiencing known formations, especially when we find them in a new context.

Aesthetic attention shifts back and forth between part and whole as we multiply connections and relationships seeking a satisfying synthesis of sense, trying to understand the "wholeness" of the whole. The hermeneutic circle describes the progress of interpretation

(Heidegger, 1985). Every new factor is interpreted in the light of anticipated meaning arising from our pre-knowledge (including Polanyi's tacit knowing). As the new knowledge is shaped by the old, understanding enables us to give it some expression (Polanyi's focal knowledge). As we reflect on our new acquisition it is integrated into our knowledge system and, in turn, causes us to revise our earlier understandings. This is why a transcendent moment of understanding and integration is felt to be so powerful and why it is transformational. Gestalt psychology further corroborates that the qualities which belong to the whole are emergent and cannot be reduced to or built up from the parts.

Neither is form separate from content. As Ben Shahn argues so cogently, in the context of art, "Form is the very shape of content" (Shahn, 1979, p. 297). The structure of any content or material is never arbitrary. Form is generated by the nature of the material, an idea, an intellectual attitude, a feeling tone; but, at the same time the "content" only finds its expression through its form; it is part of the content. There is no "formed content," therefore, that can be separated from motives and intentions. These may be the motives and intentions of the author(s) of the "formed content" or those attributed to it by others, or those found in it by others. In the latter case, interpretation by others will not necessarily coincide with the author's. The classroom of a teacher who encourages children to talk and work together in the interest of developing community may be seen as noisy by an outsider, and a place where students are not spending enough "time on task."

The notion of formed content brings into focus the relationship of the objects of aesthetic perception to the wider world. Embedded in the objects of aesthetic experience we have the intersection of cultural values and practice. As an element in curricular language, it brings us to their connection with fundamental ethical and political attitudes and assumptions, and their formations in the practices of schooling. The materials and resources provided for students' use, the physical and political arrangements in school, the practices and strategies favored for teaching, are all evidence of an underlying belief system. They will be perceived by students

according to the common codes of understanding established in the school, or by other standards the students bring with them from other schools or their life-world.

In other words, aesthetic judgments made by students in school will be rooted, to a greater or lesser extent, in the norms they have come to understand in relation to schools and schooling. Their standards for "good of its kind" will be in continual formation, as a result of what they are explicitly and implicitly taught, and as they extend and deepen their own understanding. Furthermore, whether or not an aesthetic approach is encouraged or valued at all, or only in specific contexts, such as art, will also be part of what is learnt.

The concept of wholeness, more than any other, resonates with current concerns. Eagleton (1990) suggests that Postmodernism has challenged the notion of totality, or any kind of wholeness, just at the historical moment when it is clear that what we confront is indeed in some sense a "total system" of world organization. This is too large for us, as individuals, to see or grasp, and what we experience in our lives is ever increasing fragmentation of our selves and our lives in the interest of this "whole" system.

Whole, wholeness, and holistic are buzz words in popular parlance through the last decades of the twentieth century as we try to retrieve a sense of wholeness in our fragmented lives. Each "fragment" of our life seems to be part of some larger institutional whole to which it is also subservient. We turn to holistic medicine that treats the entire person, to heal the damaging mind-body dualisms of centuries. Victims of alienation try to integrate themselves into whole persons through a variety of therapies. The ecologists urge us to recognize that humankind and the rest of the physical world are part of a single system, and to respond to the needs of the environment before our greed and self-interest destroy it.

I believe that an aesthetic curricular language can support the role of the schools in changing our cultural consciousness of these matters. But the current ideology of competition for material goods among individuals, businesses, and states, our consumer mentality, and our destructive hegemonic practices create a climate in which wholeness at any level is difficult to

achieve. The aesthetic principle of wholeness encourages us to seek and pay attention to the details of specific forms; to the existential particularities of a form rather than the general concept employed. The structure of schooling, schools, or classrooms does not live until it is embodied in the lives of students and teachers. Communities with similar structures will vary in a multitude of details in their daily practice. Also, although the "formed content" of the smallest and most intimate community and the world community may embody the same vision, their structures and specific content must necessarily be different.

An aesthetic approach to wholeness inspires us to find it anywhere and everywhere. In addition, because the aesthetic emphasizes process rather than products, one instance of "wholeness" that is sensed may, in turn, become part of yet another whole. The generative nature of the relationships of wholes and parts is extremely important to our notion of redesigning community in society today, I think. It returns me to Scherer's (1972) notion of the "network" of communities in which most individuals live today. Each community provides some sense of wholeness for the individual; that is, "wholeness" that is about an integration of understanding, feeling, and action, rather than community as the totality of experience imagined in "the classic vision of community." It is the whole network that must provide that totality. Furthermore, that totality is only then part of another whole community, that is the school, or the state, the nation, the world. As the community becomes larger and can no longer be face-to-face, the understanding of the common bonds and purpose, and their symbolic manifestations become more important. Those who were concerned with "Americanization" as an important role for public schools understood this well.

Beauty

"Beautiful" is a word that has achieved a level of such generality in its use, as an expression of satisfaction with any activity, or object, that it has become trite. I think we need to reclaim it. Since the time of Plato, we have associated beauty with truth and goodness, "that holy triad of human values whose possession made for the wholeness of man" (Kaelin, 1989, p. 3).

Beauty was one of Plato's universal Forms. Although it is a transcendental form he claims that it is easier to access than many Forms because we know it through sensuous images (Beardsley, 1975). In the Renaissance, ideal beauty is associated with the harmony of elements; for Kant, beauty is the form of purposiveness without a purpose; Hegel described it as a paradigm of freedom and the essence of spirit, because in a fulfilling contemplation all desires drop away; for Emerson, it is the most perfect form to answer an end. Schiller was also aware that beauty could attract too much attention to surface and appearance rather than substance, or to pleasure rather than social commitment. He claims that it is a synthesis of the sensuous and formal impulses that lifts our perception of beauty to a higher plane (all cited in Beardsley, 1975).

With the advent of modern art, beauty lost its pivotal position as an ideal to be pursued by artists. It followed, therefore, that it no longer had any currency as a concept in aesthetics. As unquestioning adherence to tradition was challenged from all sides beauty was one of the obvious candidates for rejection.

Although beauty has been repudiated by the arts, beauty as the harmony of elements that gives us pleasure is, I think, central to a concern for the aesthetic and an aesthetic curricular language sympathetic to community. In common parlance, to describe something as beautiful is like awarding it a prize for giving me pleasure and satisfaction in the perception of its wholeness which I construe to be good of its kinds. Beauty is in the mind of the beholder; beauty refers to the emotional impact associated with my judgment; and beauty is always a positive value.

Santayana (1896) suggests that there are at least three kinds of beauty: the sensuous beauty of physical stuff; the formal beauty of design; and the expressive beauty of meaning which is significant to us, and which resonates with our personal needs, interests, and desires. These three kinds of "beauty" frequently sit together, each an element of the whole, but one aspect may be more dominant than the others. Also, if we are particularly susceptible to certain qualities, they can outweigh others that are considered to be negative. I will appreciate the beauty of color in circumstances when neither form nor sense are appealing to me at all.

There can be joy, or pleasure, derived from the aesthetic appreciation of these kinds of beauty in all aspects of schooling. The beauty of acts and intentions, of caring and compassion among students and faculty in schools, would foster a climate in which community could flourish. But a technological curriculum model does not give credence to the non-verbal, the personal, and that which is dependent on individual consciousness, except in terms of motivation towards some objective goal. Valuing the thing in itself, taking delight in the experience of the moment and its possibilities, or having time to linger and wonder, are too often denied in the interests of order, efficiency, standardization, and certainty.

There is a sense in which beauty is the goal of aesthetic experience. An aesthetic curricular language shows us where to look for it, validates the worthiness of the search, and confirms the value of what we find. When the beauty of community is sought, we do not just seek appropriate structures, and worthwhile or imaginative projects, but an intimate human interaction. Psychological analysis and managerial skills are not enough. Above all it requires the full engagement of our humanity.

To find beauty in something is to recognize both what is and what could be, within and beyond the present conditions. It is not surprising that beauty has also been described as the good and the true. Beauty becomes a happy memory and a promise that it may return (Marcuse, 1979). The positive values of beauty are, therefore, beneficial for a number of reasons. Especially relevant for today is that they can give us hope for the future. A person who seeks beauty has a subjective point of view which gives importance to the things of his or her imagination. Children cannot choose whether or not they attend school, but their "work" there can be more than servitude if it also becomes a quest for beauty. Beauty does not have to be left to "free" time and, therefore, relegated to the trash bin of everything superfluous, trivial, wasted, and ignored.

Limitations of an Aesthetic Curricular Language

As I have indicated already, but must reiterate at this point, an aesthetic approach to the world that is disconnected from our other concerns is inadequate as a curricular language and as

a way of life. Also, in a fundamental sense, the aesthetic as an autonomous mode of being in the world is impossible. An aesthetic curriculum language offers us a way of perceiving the world and relating our findings to ourselves, but what is of value to us aesthetically in education will always coincide with what is valued in our culture, at least to some considerable extent. The role of an aesthetic framework for valuing curriculum must include, therefore, how the aesthetic interacts with other value systems, for example, the other four value frameworks identified by Huebner (1975).

The intentions and aims of education are determined through all five value systems and need the languages of all five discourses to be fully rounded and balanced. The technical, scientific, political and ethical systems of value embraced by those who determine the purposes and structure of schooling will provide the possibilities and restraints for aesthetic engagement and, together with the wide culture, will define the content of aesthetic delight and satisfaction. The history of the arts shows the impact of prevailing values on what is considered to be aesthetically interesting. For example, technical innovations in photography, film, and synthesized music, have created new media for art forms; the pointe shoe transformed ballet. New scientific discoveries gave impetus to Impressionist painting. Authority was questioned and its power overturned, resulting in different political arrangements in the Age of Revolution in Europe; and together with the demotion of the artist in society, turned artistic interest to the victim rather than the hero. Ethical dilemmas are probably the most frequent sources of artistic inspiration.

In itself the aesthetic does not result in action, but it can have a powerful effect on how we feel about and understand the world. This power must, therefore, be harnessed and used to serve the highest purposes of schooling. It is but one path on the journey that is education. Isolated from the others it can lead us to a blind alley, towards self-indulgence, self-interest, hedonism, immorality, or even amorality; especially if the aesthetic is divorced from moral purpose.

Through my investigation of an aesthetic curricular language for building community, I have tried to demonstrate that, although individual experience is the core of the aesthetic, it does not have to be tied to an individualist stance to others and the world. It is in the context of the arts in Western culture, which gives us our paradigm of the aesthetic, that individualism and the aesthetic have become synonymous. The separation of art from life and community involvement result in art as individual expression. Art as personal meaning and the celebration of that uniqueness and difference dominates, and is more highly esteemed than, art as shared meaning. We need both. We need to acknowledge our commonalities and our individuality. It is through individuals that new ideas are born and new ways and new worlds envisioned. It is together with others that they can be brought into existence if they are shared. It is on the shoulders of others, the communities that went before, that the individual stands who creates something new. We are connected, and the connections themselves must be valued.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOLING

I have developed a theoretical account of community and the aesthetic that resonates with my own experience, but I have not yet attempted to create these links in systematized or sustained school practice. I am aware that, as the theoretical issues have taken shape and connections established, my consciousness has changed and inevitably informed my practice as a teacher. I find I have a basis for making many choices that had previously "felt" right yet, at the same time, seemed arbitrary. Consciousness is pervasive, permeating every thought, action, and decision.

As I consider the implications for schooling of an aesthetic curricular language sympathetic to community, it is the change in consciousness it demands that I think is fundamental. Firstly, therefore, I will describe the claims I think I can make for this change in consciousness and show how it complements work in other fields, all of which indicate a new paradigm for education, a radical shift in the way we experience the world. Secondly, there are certain strategies and practices indicated, according to my theorizing, that may provide appropriate conditions for community. These are elements, or parts, that can be addressed separately, but being mindful that the whole is always more than, and different from, the sum of the parts. Only a guiding consciousness can integrate the complexity of the whole.

A Change of Consciousness

Huston Smith identifies the modern Western mind set as "an epistemology that aims relentlessly at control" (Smith, 1984, p. 63). We see it at work in schooling in which students are taught how to control themselves, each other, their environment, and the earth's resources. Rationality, knowledge, skills, and truth, are instrumental in the enterprise of controlling our lives, physical materials, and human resources. As we gain control over people and things, they

become objectified for us and we begin to manipulate them to serve our needs, purposes, and desires. A rational and scientific mind set glorifies objectivity, certainty, and systems. In this mode it is illegitimate to speak of, or to value, the subjective; the existential realities and human qualities of our lives; or the ambiguity, paradox, and contradictions we encounter daily. There is, however, a growing bank of evidence from the margins of society, of a consciousness that is moving towards a holistic paradigm.

Signs of Changing Consciousness

Elise Boulding states that, "All the major World Religions - Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and others - contain two sets of teachings: the teachings about violence and holy war, and the teachings about living in Peace" (Boulding, 1988, p. 60). Holy war teachings are based on overcoming those who are different and are often seen as metaphors for the war in every individual soul. Peace teachings are about the oneness of humankind and the need to nurture, reconcile differences and opposites, and seek justice and equality for all. Traditionally, mystics have emphasized our oneness with the rest of creation, but other religious groups concentrate on living lives of peace, for example, Hasidic Jews, Quakers, Mennonites, Brethren. Working for reconciliation in the world as it is by such groups has already played an important role in the lives of people and in international affairs. More recently, there have been several movements within established churches to reinterpret some of the fundamental traditional tenets of belief and organization in order to respond to the concrete daily experience of the here and now.

The Base Communities, especially in South America, make two major changes in Christian practice. They include criticism of their state of poverty in the secular world along with Bible study and celebrations of their faith. They understand that their religious faith and political engagements are interrelated and do not inhabit different realms of being (Cox, 1984). Their beliefs have been called Liberation Theology and involve the whole person. In addition, members of Base Communities no longer depend on the Church hierarchy as their only leaders.

There is a significant degree of lay control and a more egalitarian ethos in these communities.

"The Basic Christian communities mark a switch from a church resting on the point of a pyramid, in the person of a bishop or priest, to a church resting upon the base, the community of believers" (Cox, *Pro Mundi Vita*, September, 1976, p. 118).

The Creation Theology movement also has a political agenda, sharing with Liberation Theology the recognition that social and economic injustice cannot be ignored in religious thought. Creation theory emphasizes collective action and responsibility that is transformative of ways of life. It urges that we live in smaller, more humane, just communities, and show our reverence for nature and ecological concern in actions. In sympathy with my aesthetic interests, Mather Fox (1983) rejects the Church's emphasis on sin and guilt and, instead, exhorts us to celebrate joy, sensuality, compassion, and our responsibility to co-create the world (Purpel, 1989). Fox emphasizes faith in the creative process when it is used constructively to fashion a world of love, justice, and joy as we would a work of art. Such creation and recreation can be undertaken by everyone in response to life's demands but it must be pursued actively. It is the artist in all of us that will change the boundaries of human consciousness; through our capacity for imaging and living out those images.

Elise Boulding (1988) tells us, also, that we must do peace. That is, peace is not a state to be achieved. It is never a condition, only a process continually being made. Vanquishing the adversary is not the only possible resolution of conflict, either at the level of personal or international relationships. She identifies noncompliance, arbitration, mediation, and negotiation as non-violent ways of managing conflict, but reconciliation, active co-operation and integration/union as positive ways of achieving peace. Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, in very different contexts, show us the power of a non-violent approach to conflict. Boulding also reminds us that only people, not technological schemes, can design community.

Women have traditionally been the peacemakers, but as Boulding points out, "Whether they are carrying out traditional or non-traditional roles, women tend to be made invisible"

(Boulding, 1988, p. 63). But when the oppressed speak for themselves, "insurrections of subjugated knowledges bring about new interpretations" (Welch, 1985, p. 44). Liberation and creation theories have reinterpreted Christian symbols and texts, and so have feminist theologians like Sally McFague (1982). Her description of God as mother, lover, and friend, instead of a loving but vengeful father, provoke us to strip off our false consciousness and seek new relations with each other and the earth.

In the secular context, feminists have identified characteristics, aptitudes, and attributions that have become core dualisms in the thought systems of Western culture, and which have become culturally gendered and oppressive to women. The "male" cluster (including mind, reason, order, control, objectivity, fixed forms, literal truth, dualistic, independence, public sphere) has been favored over the "female" cluster (body, emotion and feelings, chaos, spontaneity, subjectivity, metaphor and poetic truth, wholeness, connection, private sphere) in Western society, which has developed a one-sided and partial view of humanity and societal structure. There are a range of feminist opinions concerning how this imbalance should be dealt with; I prefer the perspective expressed by Donna Wilshire (1989), "A feminist view of knowledge must not continue the dualistic either/or pattern," but rather a "both/and pattern of utilization" must be espoused, "in which items from both columns either co-operate or alternate" (Wilshire, 1989, p. 96). The dualities attributed to male and female do not belong exclusively to biological men and women but are more usefully construed, for example, as David Bakan (1966) describes the dichotomy, as two ways of being in the world for all people, through Agency and Communion. Hierarchical dualisms are inimical to the change in consciousness I am advocating. They need to be dissolved and each hold the other in balance. We need to be able to focus on separate details and remain alert to a wide spectrum of data simultaneously, giving equal value to the public, verifiable world and the private world of subjective experience. Then, as Wilshire suggests, individuality would be "seen as properly manifested only within a sharing community"

(Wilshire, 1989, p. 97) and we might be able to heal "human alienation from self, other, and planet" (Wilshire, 1989, p. 95).

In order to reverse global ecological deterioration, the most radical ecological movement, the bioregionalists, advocate a fundamental change in the modern mind-set, away from a man-made, machine-based culture to a culture rooted in the natural world. The maximization of individual freedom, a logocentric culture, technical control and development of the earth's resources, continual economic growth, and internationalized economic activity, would no longer be the most cherished priorities. Rather, "Their view involves a more communal life style, the use of intermediate, less energy-intensive technologies, and the recovery of the symbolic richness of oral traditions" (Bowers, 1987, p. 161). Their root metaphor is the interdependence of all life forms. Individuals must know and be responsible for their place and be faithful to its needs as well as their own.

These few brief examples indicate that the seeds of the new holistic paradigm are already growing. The consciousness from which it springs is being articulated in answer to a variety of problems perceived in the world today, and renewal of community is a fundamental element in all the agendas derived from its impetus. It remains to draw some practical implications for schooling from the perspective I have developed in this study. Namely, the contribution an aesthetic curricular language can make to building community in schools.

The Practice of Community in Schooling

When we come to the world aesthetically, we seek to embrace it rather than to control it. We try to perceive people and the physical world in order to see more clearly how they are, not merely to use them. Appreciation and acceptance of the nature of people and things become more important than evaluating their usefulness. Learning is an inevitable outcome of this attitude to the world, it is part of the process of coming to know and love it. Furthermore, such a frame of mind is more conducive to sharing knowledge and understanding, joining with others, and gaining power with them not over them, and working with the earth. I want to identify the

following qualities of consciousness that are fostered and encouraged by an aesthetic curriculum language sympathetic to community and those aspects of schooling directly affected: (1) openness, (2) the relational nature of the self and of knowledge, and (3) a concern for wholeness. Finally in this section, I will discuss the aesthetic as a domain of freedom.

Openness

Perceiving the world aesthetically opens up the possibility of attending to all aspects of a phenomenon. Some elements of the experience will become focal because of the specific concerns of that moment but, in so far as the phenomenon is perceived as an aesthetic object, we will become aware of the interaction of forces and their emergent meaning for us.

We can impose the templates of particular knowledge systems, of subjects, or disciplines, for example, on our perception of them, but an aesthetic attitude does not encourage subservience to rigid or closed systems. Neither does it preclude attention to and delight in the details of specific perspectives; but the aesthetic also creates an awareness of the essential interrelatedness of knowledge and the non-linear nature of coming to know. It does not give precedence to the intellect but calls on the senses and the emotions, too. An aesthetic response is holistic as we imaginatively construct our own subjective reality.

This openness implies a state of what Maxine Greene (1978) calls "wide-awakeness." It is an openness to the immediacy of the present in which encounter and dialogue take precedence over preconceptions and artificial separations, and we eschew stereotypes and labels that lead us to closure too early. The norms and conventions learnt from our culture shape our perception and understanding, but we also grow in awareness of intricate webs of meaning and feeling, and the multitude of perspectives that is human reality.

Close encounters of all kinds. A curriculum based on rationality, and a belief that knowledge is always based on concepts expressed in symbolic form, does not give credence to polysensory awareness, or value its role in learning. Hands-on activities for learning feature in

elementary schools but tend to disappear in high schools. Learning becomes less embodied and more cerebral.

Openness to the fullness and diversity of phenomena of the natural world or the constructed world of human beings is the first requirement for aesthetic engagement. It promotes curiosity and a desire to pursue connections that are both visible and merely suggested. As we observe, listen, touch, taste, smell, or feel our body respond to the small details of a familiar place or object, it reveals its uniqueness. It will show us different faces as we survey it from different perspectives, or focus on it very closely, and then from increasing distances. As our focus shifts, relationships emerge. Patterns recur, the part takes its place in the whole, one becomes one of many, and over time, continued observation will show qualitative changes in the relationships.

Students can be encouraged to orchestrate their senses in a variety of school lessons. This habit sensitizes children to their environment, gives them a feel for their world, and encourages them to delight in its qualities, as well as grasp the public, intellectual account of it. Since a sense of Community is very dependent on physical as well as intellectual harmony, responsiveness to the qualities of people, place, time, and objects must not be ignored but valued as a vital aspect of our humanity and shared life together.

My meaning, your meaning, our meaning. An aesthetic approach to curriculum entails a commitment to encouraging students to make personal sense of the world. Each student brings him or herself into being, and schooling can aid this unceasing process by affirming the necessity of the student's conscious participation in this enterprise. It is also an autonomous unfolding mystery to which he or she must learn to attend and respond.

There is, also, need for a constant dialogue between the inner voice and other people; peers, adults, and the "voices" that are available only in symbolic form. Conversation on a personal level does not have to be restricted to peers during recess. In conversation we can share our concerns and interests. Children need adults to listen to them and to talk with them as

people if they are to develop their sense of "humankindness," a basic condition for a sense of Community. The student-teacher roles do not have to prohibit this human engagement.

In addition, as children try to come to an understanding of the perspectives developed and cherished by others, either teachers' points of view, different cultural perspectives, or those expressed in text books and other curriculum materials, they are increasing their personal knowledge. In the public schools, ruled by standardized tests that are administered at given stages (and in many cases, at specific ages), knowledge is measured out and exactly what is to be learned is determined. It is so much data to be learnt and stored, later to be retrieved by the student for an examination, a matter of memory rather than understanding. In the worst case scenario, "knowledge" becomes a series of disconnected commodities stored in the warehouse of the brain. If this is the primary method of learning, it is easy to lose the sense of learning the wisdom of the ancients in order to integrate it into the living of contemporary life. On the other hand, if the material learnt is assimilated by students and integrated into their understanding, as it meshes with their other concerns it may color the motivation that impels them to action.

Dialogue between students in co-operative learning groups, and students and teachers, in words, or other symbolic forms, is the basis for the growing understanding of each student. In this way, students will learn how symbol systems are a means of communication among people that result in mutual understanding. They will come to realize that the meaning of all meanings must be continually negotiated and interpreted by individuals in terms of the tacit knowledge each one has already at his or her disposal. A teacher can help a child to understand only if he or she is prepared to listen to a child's perception of the material. Teachers must also try to be aware of the assumptions in which their own knowing is rooted. Students may find themselves drawn to particular communities of ideas and sensibility as their understanding grows.

"Teacher-proof" materials, machines, and pre-packaged do-it-yourself manuals cannot be substituted for human interaction. As students learn a variety of "stories about the world," under the headings of the subjects or disciplines taught in their school, an open approach to their

separateness could yield connections among them, new syntheses, fresh orientations, and opportunities for being creative. It is central to the nature of the aesthetic that it asserts the value of personal meaning in a public world and, therefore, encourages at least the possibility of transformation, both for the individual and for the advancement of knowledge and understanding in the public world. David Bohm describes this moving beyond the established norms and systems: "Imagination that moves freely without barriers may then give rise to particular imaginative insights" (Sloan, 1984, p. 16). It is interesting to note in this context that many great innovators did not do well in formalized schooling or according to public standards; for example, Issac Newton's elementary school work was rather poor; Albert Einstein could not read until he was seven years old; and Leo Tolstoy flunked out of college. Bohm also affirms that, "Insight is not restricted to great scientific or artistic creations, but rather that it is of crucial significance in everything we do, especially in the ordinary affairs of life" (Sloan, 1984, p. 19). My point here is that we must not only remain open to these possibilities, but let children know that we value them when they happen, and furthermore, that we value the openness itself.

Creativity is not a matter of ungrounded inspiration. Creativity is a form of rule-breaking, and can, therefore, only emerge in the context of rules that are known. ("Happy accidents" are not only possible but frequent, but the creative response is to recognize them.) It is a disposition to break out of a rule-bound situation and then reform the rules to create a new synthesis. Children deprived of materials and resources in their environment, and symbolic capital, as well as basic skills and knowledge, have only a limited field of possibilities on which to draw. Creativity is a process of seeking and discovering, monitored by ongoing judgment, which depends on present understanding. It may have a visible outcome in a painting, a dance, a journal, a science or history project, working or playing together. We are also being creative all the time as we connect the outer world with our inner knowledge and understanding, and the lives of others with our own. In this sense aesthetic perception is always active and creative. Students' creativity can be challenged in all subjects, although it has become an exclusive

prerogative of the arts in schools. Teachers must be generous and open-minded to acknowledge their students' insights, and also know children well enough to recognize when a particular student has made a great leap forward in a transcendent moment for him or her, if not in terms of their peer's norm.

The antithesis to creativity in routinization. This is not to say that all routine activity is bad, but only that which produces a habit-dominated mind. The unquestioned following of routine prevents schools and teachers from being responsive to immediate needs and opportunities.

Relating knowledge to human values is problematic in schools in which many issues remain contentious. The value of community that I am advocating here entails a commitment to shared as well as individual knowledge. The "hermeneutic problem," as Gadamer sees it, is "concerned with achieving an agreement with somebody else about our shared 'world.' This communication takes the form of a dialogue that results in the 'fusion of horizons'" (Bleicher, 1987, p. 3). The concept of "our knowledge" for students in schools is problematic in institutions where competition among individuals for high personal scores on standardized tests is the norm. In a prevailing ethos of competition for individual grades, it is incomprehensible to many students that they should be awarded a group grade for a co-operative assignment. Considering that the majority of students, as adults, is likely to work in corporations, it is interesting that students are ill-prepared for this in high school or university. Most successful businesses rely on teams, working together to create, produce, and market their goods or services.

A factor that inhibits an openness to the integration of knowledge, particularly in high schools, is the partisan nature of the implementation of subject and discipline divisions through departments in schools. Some academics affiliated with particular disciplines sometimes display intolerance towards a colleague not working within traditional parameters. The separation of knowledge into disciplines with clearly prescribed goals is so deeply embedded in curriculum

thinking that alternatives are unthinkable. As Huebner (1975) maintains, a concept of learning and the curriculum design it supports has become fossilized in our curriculum language.

In the examples above, relating to my meaning, your meaning, and our meaning, the ability not only to listen but to hear, and to see as well as look, is indispensable. My description of aesthetic perception is an account of listening and hearing, looking and seeing, and I should add, paying attention to what is not "said." Again, approaching a phenomenon with an open, polysensory awareness will reveal the particularity of its characteristics. In turn, if individuals are to take part in dialogue, they must learn to articulate their own meanings to the best of their ability. Introducing students to as many forms of expression as possible should enable each individual to find his or her own preferred mode. Yet again, standardized testing favors verbal and certain other symbolic systems, but a holistic paradigm will attribute equal value to other modes of expression and communication.

The Relational Nature of Self and Knowledge

Encounters with the world and making personal sense of it are central to aesthetic experience, and what we know and understand about ourselves and the world is always relational. It is constantly changing as meaning and significance are renegotiated in the new context of present lived experience. The world, his or her culture, and the educational context, are "givens" for each student, and shape the individual's cognitive lens, but there is a constant dialectic between person and world. Neither remains static for the individual, but each constitutes the other in continual reciprocal relation, as Madeleine Grumet describes:

Educational experience is a process that takes on the world without appropriating that world, that projects the self into the world without dismembering that self, a process of synthesis and totalization in which all the participants in the dialectic simultaneously maintain their identities and surpass themselves. (1992, p. 32)

If the individual "self" is always in dialogue with the objective world and with the subjectivity of other selves, then there is the possibility that the polarities and paradoxes that keep

things and people separate or in opposition to one another can be dissolved. Buber speaks of the "lived relation" as "the true original unity, and that it is in the in-between of dialogue" (Buber, 1958, p. 18) that our humanity exists. He claims that the "I-Thou" or "essential We" relation of Community depends on intersubjective relations. Community is never achieved in the sense of being completed, nor does it have a specific form or context. It is a continual process. It is the nexus of a multitude of mutual actions and interacting forces that are interdependent and constantly changing.

Difference and diversity among people. When an attitude of openness is extended to other human beings, and creativity brought to bear on relationships, we become awake to their particularity and diversity as well as the commonalities shared in our humankindness. It makes possible the full sharing of being of which Buber (1987) speaks, and it is from such ground that empathy and mutuality grow.

In the highly structured and fast-moving modern world, many of our relations with other people are heavily circumscribed by rules and conventions. We are required to interact primarily in terms of the roles and statuses ascribed to us by society. In school the relations among students and faculty are often restricted to this dimension. Our interactions with each other are mediated by the statuses we occupy, because each status is associated with a web of expectations which indicate the parameters of desired or required behavior. Learning the rules appropriate to specific statuses, such as teacher and student, is part of what it means to become a socialized human being. The informal rules and their range of flexibility and hiddenness are the hardest to learn; also, the more "covert" their nature, the harder it is to "teach" them. Children beginning formal schooling, moving to a new class or school, must learn a new formulation of the rules espoused by their new teachers and schools. This can be problematic and stressful for new students; it is particularly difficult for children arriving in the middle of a school year. They need special help to master the ropes.

These difficulties can also be exacerbated for students who do not share the same cultural background as the other or their classmates. Openness to their difficulties requires even closer monitoring. As Macdonald (1988) suggests, it may be helpful to consider many of the problems of culturally different populations as fundamentally a problem of tacit knowing. Culturally different students may not have interiorized the experiences which allow them to make sense of either school tasks, behavioral, or social requirements. Differences in culture may stem from ethnicity, class, or gender diversity, and the ideological differences and concomitant attitudes will reflect those of the wider society. Further roles and statuses tend to evolve for students in relation to cultural stereotypes. In a classroom or school, teachers can endeavor to reduce the impact of stereotyping students, but the social force of cultural differences in society is a powerful barrier to overcome. Because the norms that arise out of co-operative activity in the classroom are identified and agreed upon by the members of the group, it is a valuable method for cutting across culturally determined statuses. For our peace of mind, we need a sense of mutuality which entails adapting to each other's needs and interests, reconciling differences, and actively co-operating together. A sense of Community can flourish only when there is a sense of harmony.

In a school or a classroom, occasions for coming together as a cohesive group with an identity will also enhance the sense of unity that cuts across other interpersonal differences. Classroom or whole school projects carried out within the school or taken into the local community serve this purpose well. Sports events are most frequent, but they are also competitive and serve to create other hierarchical distinctions between students. The performance arts are another valuable source of communal activity. Works can be performed and created to rejoice and celebrate, or to commemorate and solemnize particular occasions. The community of feeling, the companionship and fun derived from such events mark key moments in our shared life.

I claim that the choosing of physical objects and places, and marking special occasions through ritual, identify a community for its members, and that the physical coming together is

important to community, not least because it provides the opportunity to create a bodily habit. Movement can "impress" its patterns and meanings upon us so that they begin to feel natural and normal and, therefore, comfortable. (Although, the comfort of bodily habit must not replace the meaning of the ritual. Empty rituals are a mockery.) If a ritual is also a joyful occasion, then it is likely to be sought again. As Terry Eagleton claims, "What brings us together as subjects is not knowledge but an ineffable reciprocity of feeling." In the aesthetic, which fuses rationality, sensation, and feeling, we can be united "with all the authority of a law, but at a more affective, intuitive level" (Eagleton, 1990, p. 75). As we near the end of the twentieth century, schools may be one of the last bastions of live performance, where it is possible for anybody who has the desire to play in a band or orchestra, sing in a choir, or perform in a play or dance concert to do so; or even play an active role as a spectator. The sophistication of recording devices makes possible the private enjoyment of performances of all kinds, but the communal dimension is a sad loss. It also strengthens the distinction between the "professional" artist and performer, and the amateur, turning the arts into a field for experts only.

Through the art of other cultures, students can learn to open themselves to the paradigmatic myths, stories, themes, characters, and symbols of others. If art is a metaphorical manifestation of consciousness, then it must also demonstrate the artist's relationship to the world. Students can enjoy and learn from the art works of others and through artistic practice can develop their own perspectives. Yet art education is so often separated from the comprehensive purposes of living, it becomes another technical exercise circumscribed by external rules, and a collection of facts to be learned. Art itself has suffered from the intellectualization of the art academies, following the trends of the mechanistic and then the technological world views that have become dominant since the Renaissance. The Art World has become a battleground of partisan interests and particular aesthetic theories. Artistic activity that reorganizes our daily experience so that it is perceived freshly, touches the lives of few people. The aesthetic impulse is numbed by the media into a state of passivity for the mass market, and

the professionals of the Art World maintain their elite distance to command higher prices. They, too, have succumbed to the blandishments of consumerism, and most of them have abandoned the ethical role of art (Gablik, 1984), making a fetish of its autonomy and lack of relation to the rest of our lives.

It takes time to come to know people, time spent together in which the individuality of each person has the freedom to be expressed and accepted; and there must be occasions for coming together in the equality of our humankindness. Classrooms, in which there are always objectives to meet, goals to achieve, and schedules to follow, rarely provide these conditions. A certain amount of openness in the structure of classroom life, for example in terms of physical layout and scheduling, is usually necessary to provide the right climate, as George Wood (1992) demonstrates in his descriptions of schools that work.

More specifically for this project, moments of Community in a classroom or any other context of schooling must be cherished and embraced. So often a sense of Community must be curtailed and dispelled because it is "time" to do something else, to follow the scheduled timetable. M. Scott Peck (1987) speaks of "stumbling into community" and observes that most transformative moments of Community are the result of "happenstance." We cannot plan or predict them, but children can be helped to recognize the importance and value we attach to these transformative moments, especially through our example. We need to create expectations that it will happen, confirm its occurrence, and demonstrate that it is a valued aspect of life and of schooling. In schools, where people are obliged to spend so much time together, there ought to be many occasions for joyful mutuality among individuals, whether students, teachers, administrators, secretaries, custodial staff, parents, or any other individuals working in or visiting the school.

Wholeness

Most public schooling today reflects a concern for the quantity that students learn rather than the quality of their learning; it emphasizes the ability to learn a multitude of disconnected

bits of information rather than the capacity to make connections. Much time is spent memorizing information and the "objective" knowledge of the public world, and relatively little time is allowed for students to integrate this knowledge into their own scheme of things or to do things that make sense to them, especially in high schools. Schooling tends to ignore the wholeness and interconnectedness of knowledge and understanding; and the deeper forms of knowing, personal, aesthetic, and ethical knowing; "This attitude ignores the fact that actually all things flow into each other" (Bohm, in Sloan, 1984, p. 23).

New forms of evaluation. Standardized testing, along with inevitable standardized curriculum that makes such standardized evaluations possible, is probably the primary element in public school mainstream education today that inhibits an aesthetic approach to learning. Standardized tests do not take account of the range and potential of the human mind, the capacities for non-linguistic knowing, the varieties of learning and expressive styles of human beings, or the diversity and complexity of human cultures. "Speed and low cost were the silver bullets that enabled the norm-referenced test - with its multiple-choice responses - to conquer the world of education and hold it in thrall" (Maeroff, December 1991, p. 274). Alternative assessment procedures, such as the use of performance-based tasks, portfolios, interviews, and exhibits, tend to be more time-consuming, labor-intensive, and imprecise. Cheapness, precision, and comparability are bought at the expense of meaningful learning. If evaluation of student progress is important (which it is, for the student's satisfaction as well as for potential employers) then time is not wasted in carrying it out. But methods for evaluation must be derived from the work in progress, not vice versa.

Existential dimensions of teaching. A change of consciousness demanded by an aesthetic curriculum language committed to a communitarian point of view must, of course, begin with the teacher and those who decide what will happen in the public schools. In Educating the Reflective Practitioner, Donald Schon (1987) speaks of teaching artistry through reflection-in-action. His description of professional artistry has much in common with aesthetic attention. It is learnt in

practice because it is a holistic response to a particular situation. It is demonstrated in "the kinds of competence practitioners sometimes display in unique, uncertain, and conflicted situations of practice" (Schon, 1987, p. 22). We are aware of no antecedent reasoning, and awareness, appreciation, judgment, and adjustment seem to be simultaneous. He calls this "knowing-in-action," and it is dynamic. Facts, rules, and procedures can be learnt as elements of a teaching strategy, but these technical instruments are always modified if teaching-learning is an interactive process between teacher and student. Underlying Schon's view of the practitioner's reflection-in-action is a constructionist view of knowledge and reality and an awareness of the role played by our tacit knowledge and processes. I share these beliefs, as I have demonstrated in my account of the aesthetic. Schon also refers to communities of practitioners who are continually engaged in worldmaking. They have a "professional way of seeing their world and a way of constructing and maintaining the world as they see it." As teachers learn their practice, they are initiated into the "traditions of the community of practitioners and the practice world they inhabit" (Schon, 1987, p. 36). Peter Abbs (1984) confirms that "there is no escape from the existential dimension in teaching. The teacher must be a learner and explorer in his own right if he is to be a teacher of others" (Abbs, 1984, p. 22). Furthermore, "We can only teach out of our own being" (Abbs, 1984, p. 123).

It is at the margins of educational practice, in alternative schools and in special education, that a new holistic paradigm is being embraced most successfully. In a special issue of the Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Problems (Volume 1, Issue 2, Summer 1992) called "Empowering Young Minds," topics include partnership models of schooling, one boy's transformation, navigating the paradigm change, and schools of joys. It is, of course, addressing examples of schooling that are not circumscribed by the innumerable standardized tests to which mainstream schools are subjected.

There have long been schools that share a similar vision of an interconnected world, such as the schools modeled after the philosophy of Maria Montessori and Rudolf Steiner, but it is not

yet the dominant perspective of public schools in America. There are islands of reform in individual schools and classrooms, as George Wood (1992) reports in his recent publication of Schools that Work. He describes public schools that are currently successful because they are places in which children learn to think critically and to co-operate, where they learn to participate in a democratic society; they are places where children love to learn.

The Aesthetic as a Domain of Freedom

The notion of freedom has always been the cornerstone and most powerful symbol of American ideology and democracy, and a fuller understanding of it can provide an important link between individual and community concerns. The possibility of freedom has brought oppressed people from all over the world to America, but the term is used ambiguously and battles over conflicting freedoms are ongoing. It is a freedom that is grounded in self-interest and individual rights which tends to militate against notions of community, yet I have argued that some sense of freedom to be and to choose is necessary if an individual is to feel empowered to open him or herself to the possibility of community.

As Fromm has demonstrated so forcefully, the structure of modern society has allowed people to become "more independent, self-reliant and critical," but at the same time they have also become "more isolated, alone, and afraid" (Fromm, 1969, p. 124). Of greatest significance for my project is Fromm's argument that the program is not merely a matter of external forces but the lack of internal authority. He cites Dewey's formulation of the problem as he presents it in

Freedom and Culture, published in 1939:

The serious threat to our democracy is not the existence of foreign totalitarian states. It is the existence within our own personal attitudes and within our own institutions of conditions which have given a victory to external authority, discipline, uniformity, and dependence on The Leader in foreign countries. The battlefield is also accordingly here - within ourselves and our institutions. (1969, p. 21)

The development of subjectivity that feels itself connected to others, grounded in the conditions of the world, as well as the individual's immediate time and place, can be encouraged through an aesthetic approach to the world.

Maxine Greene (1988) speaks eloquently of aesthetic engagements, not merely with art objects, taking place in domains of freedom. Believing that "reality" refers to interpreted experience, she argues that the notion of freedom and how it can be achieved must also depend on the various interpretations of those trying to live in freedom. Meaning and how it is shared and controlled, therefore, become the central problem. Since personal meaning-making is central to aesthetic activity, it can become a vehicle for reflecting on the notions of freedom and new possibilities for it. By entering in to the world of the text, subject, discipline, work or art, or another person, new "realities" can be made accessible to the student.

Imaginative play allows a student to create new worlds, to practice making judgments, to dream of alternatives. The aesthetic gives importance to the things of an individual's imagination. Students can learn to address the complexity, uncertainties, and paradoxes of issues, rather than to swallow easy and partial solutions; they may learn to live with the realization that there are no final answers, come to respect a diversity of view points, and desire to create spaces for dialogue.

Activity is only free if it is grounded in an acceptance of the conditions of the context. Selves, as well as societies, take shape in the "matrix of social, economic, cultural, and psychological conditions" (Greene, 1988, p. 80) and the meanings we attribute to them. Greene contends that people should name themselves and tell their stories so that they become visible to themselves. This is, of course, an on-going project, a perpetually emergent one, as we accumulate more materials and perspectives through which to think about and come to know ourselves. She agrees with those who claim that freedom is always situated.

Knowing the conditions of our immediate world. Openness to the conditions of our immediate world and the interrelatedness of its parts is the most comprehensive aesthetic interest

we can demonstrated. The bioregionalists urge us to know our place ecologically, which should become part of a school's concern, but to know our world in its fullest sense is a much larger and even more complex undertaking. The importance of "learning" and being open to the people in the school and classroom I have already mentioned. Now I will turn to broader matters of ideology and practical politics in schooling.

The way a community (a school district, for example) feels about individuals, other people, other cultures, the world, affects (and is affected by) the kind of meaning it sustains as accepted "knowledge," or the "right" way to live in the world. That is, the psychological, political, ethical, and religious perspectives we share interact with the conceptual accounts we give of those views. Furthermore, they control the kind and range of material taught in schools.

Like our actions, the meaning we make of the world is never value-free. Received knowledge, passed on to children as objective "truth," conceals rather than reveals this condition. Knowledge is prioritized into hierarchies by a ruling class elite which serves its own material interests by controlling the production and dissemination of ideas. White males are usually at the top of every pyramid, whether it is the system of capitalism, or individual institutions. It is their "truth," intellectual climate, and sensibilities that students learn, and little credence is given to the "truth" of women and other marginalized groups.

Ricoeur's two opposing theories of interpretation are useful here (Webb, 1988). He believes that symbols not only give rise to thought but also to idols. Given the possibility of both outcomes, he suggests that we need two opposing theories of interpretation; the hermeneutic of "faith" which trusts the apparent meaning of symbols; and the hermeneutic of "suspicion" which deconstructs their obvious meaning and unmask and reveals the illusions lurking in their shadows. Both interpretations of ideology need to be taken into consideration.

Freire's emancipatory education also begins with the immediate life world of the individual and students learning to name their situation (Freire, 1971). He sees education as a process of critically reflecting on take-for-granted beliefs and prompting their physical and social

existence. Freire claims that the transition from passive acceptance to critical awareness empowers the individual to participate in authentic democratic forms of cultural development and organization, although this has been contested.

If a student learns to respect other points of view, feels free to interpret all narratives in relation to his or her own life, and is encouraged to question, the partisan nature of so-called neutral frameworks for understanding will be revealed. Closed systems of knowledge and interaction may have a place in the world, but they only have the authority we ascribe to them. Understood in this light, the political arrangements which give rise to preferred systems then become a matter of interest and concern. Democracy in the classroom can begin in first grade, but with an increasing depth of understanding gained over the years in school, students will also learn to apply their knowledge and practice to the wider society.

In the understanding of aesthetic meaning we exercise individual freedom which is the basis of ethical conduct and is, therefore, vital for responsible action and intervention in the public as well as the private spheres. Although aesthetic appreciation may create an openness to a sense of Community, I agree with Greene (p. 86) that it is insufficient to change the world unless the sense of connection and relatedness results in action to create the public space. It is in the public space that our living in the world together must be negotiated and collective action determined. Freedom demands respect for the diversity of perspectives that people bring to this living together and an acknowledgment of their equal validity, but the creation of a community which is valued by all will result only from a commitment to shared goals for which everyone is morally and actively responsible. Even if negative freedom is achieved, that is the absence of interference controlled by the laws of socially administered liberty, people can still fail to act on their freedom or abuse it. Shared values must be developed into a framework for a moral community which guides the actions performed in "freedom." While multiple communities address themselves only to their own self-interests, this cannot happen. In America, and in the wider world, as well as in schools, this is currently a major problem.

Shared values. Seeing oneself, one's situation, or one's community in a new perspective may open up new possibilities of resistance to oppression, but there is also a need for reciprocity if changes are to be made (Greene, 1988). Greene insists that as teachers we must listen to all the voices and their multiple realities, as well as encourage our students to listen. We must seek a foundation of significantly shared values and norms. An aesthetic rooted in a more communitarian world view would emphasize the common as well as the unique, and also that shared meanings must be constantly reinterpreted by communities as well as by individuals. Desiring good for others for their sake, no matter how different their "goods" may be, requires a commitment to a wider sense of community and civic order. In other words, ethical and moral concerns become central to the aesthetic project if the freedom of the aesthetic domain is to make a positive contribution to community, shaping the exemplars we perceive as embodiments of the beautiful, the good, and the true.

Yet, there is a dilemma here. If the aesthetic response is a spontaneous result of a subjective synthesizing of values, and the process of hegemony has been successful, then as Eagleton suggests, "The aesthetic is in this sense no more than a name for the political unconscious." (Eagleton, 1990, p. 37). Does this mean that there is no free choice, that the aesthetic is not a domain of freedom after all? I return to my argument in the last chapter, corroborated by Wolff (1987), who makes a useful distinction between the universality of social determinism and the existential reality of our sense of freedom. We are not "free" in the sense of being un-determined but in our ability to make situated choices, as Greene suggests. The active nature of aesthetic engagement is one kind of response to the need for conscious and reflexive monitoring of our actions. In a reflective and critical aesthetic mode we do not take easy refuge in the commodification of meanings or in the standardization of experiencing the world. If, as Marcuse claims, art (and aesthetic attention) is, "committed to an emancipation of sensibility, and reason, in all spheres of subjectivity and objectivity . . . [and] . . . the aesthetic transformation

becomes a vehicle of recognition and indictment" (Marcuse, 1977, p. 10), then art and the aesthetic can play an active role in consciousness-raising for reshaping our society.

Dominant cultural values are presented in the powerful hegemonic practices of the media, with their ideological messages delivered in a variety of entertainment forms (Gitlin, 1982). We are aware of the "media manipulation of the young into credulous and ardent consumers - of sensation, violence, criminality, things" (Greene, 1988, p. 28), but the distraction provided and comfort promised lures young people into acceptance and a sense of inevitability. It disguises the dehumanizing forces of society and man-made barriers to freedom.

The hegemonic force of that which is presented under the flags of public authority, truth, the right, the natural, or merely the fashionable, is sufficient to render it above question. Part of the power attributable to public authority is that it can count on rational agreement based on psychological acquiescence of fear. Resistance for Greene, therefore, entails meaning "mindlessness, mechanism, routine behaviors, and the rule of 'brute' habit," as well as political activity. This kind of resistance is not encouraged sufficiently in schooling today. I think "media studies" are to be found more often in English than American schools, but contexts can be found in American schooling where critical interrogation of mass culture is undertaken. As Aronowitz and Giroux suggest, "deconstruction of mass audience culture is the first priority" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 36) if we are to "penetrate the apparently opaque 'mind-set' of students" derived from the entertainment of mass culture, especially television. In order to affirm themselves as subjects with a capacity for choosing and imagining, as well as for realizing possibilities, students need to learn to see "reality," all realities, as problematic.

The structure of schools as living communities. A school embracing an aesthetic curricular language based on communitarian concerns looks and feels very different from public schools today. Central to this enterprise is the process of orchestrating relations among all members of the school. The American democratic process serves this function well, providing we maintain an awareness of individual responsibilities as well as rights. The roles of

superintendent, principal, teacher, and administrative staff are as authorities having a specific range of expertise to contribute to the community of the school, but all individuals live interdependent lives, collectively take part in decision-making, and cherish the individuality and contribution of each person.

A school curriculum informed by a communitarian vision and using an aesthetic curricular language includes traditional forms of knowing and subject matter and interdisciplinary studies. Traditional knowledge is balanced with child-centered interests; children are encouraged to be trusting disciples and critical individuals, to attend to small details and try to comprehend the big picture. All learning is approached as a matter of thought and feeling, a search for stability and freedom to create new worlds. In other words, holding polarities and paradoxes in dialectical tension is a central concern.

Classes are small, perhaps twelve-fifteen children. A sense of Community demands face-to-face interaction which is impossible in large groups of people. Students are not grouped according to ability and much learning occurs in interest groups with children of different ages. Teachers share their expertise and interests and also collaborate and learn with their students. Students' work is evaluated through the demonstration of competencies, individual portfolios, and group projects. Central organization would be the minimum necessary for the smooth running of the school, and would be developed through the democratic process. Some flexibility in timetabling and use of space would be necessary to allow activities to extend, at least sometimes, to a natural conclusion felt to be appropriate by the group. Interaction with the local community is encouraged, and there are many communal celebrations in the school as well as in individual classrooms.

The architecture of the school building has an assortment of spaces, varying in size, shape, and texture, and includes the possibility of redesigning some spaces on a daily basis. School furniture also shows variety in design and texture, and includes multi-purpose building

blocks for the construction of items for working on particular projects. Needless to say, the aesthetic quality of everything is considered carefully.

Such an alternation in consciousness entails a radical change in the premises on which public education rests. An awareness that knowing is participatory and experiential, as well as intellectual, reveals the importance and quality of being. If we are responsible for our own being, so we are also responsible for the knowledge we create and our actions that result. Knowledge is not purely objective in the sense of being separate from life and the issues of living in the world together. Knowledge carries with it an ethical responsibility. Science and technology, for example, are instruments but not ends in themselves. Consciousness of our own being also creates respect for other human beings. The recognition, appreciation, and respect for the diversity of gifts, talents, and uniqueness of other people demands a just and caring society, and is the ground on which small immediate communities can be built, as well as a global society. Finally, when the connection between knowledge and values is acknowledged more fully, there can be public dialogue about the kind of communities and culture we want.

This dissertation reflects my desire to make a place for the aesthetic in the new developing paradigm for education, especially in the matter of changing consciousness open to its demands. It is idealistic, but I know it is not impossible because I can give the last word to the description given by George Wood of the work of teachers who are already practicing it in their schools:

The vision they set out, one of engaging kids in school so they will become participating members of their community, responsible for their own learning, and willing to work for a better world, was shared by all the educators with whom I spoke. This ideal gave rise to development of a school climate based on community, to a commitment to change the school experience from passivity to activity, to develop curricula that connect with kids, and to open the school doors to the world outside. The way in which this vision came to be a central part of all these teachers do [sic] illustrates the first step in meaningful democratic school reform. (1992, p. 235).

Conclusion

At the end of this exploration, I discover that I have been a closet communitarian. I had no name for my preferred way of being and working with people. Having tried to articulate the meaning of community, I realize that I attempted to create community whenever I had the opportunity, notably as a teacher, as director of a dance group, and as the head of a department. I have not found myself in many "natural" communities, such as family, and I had ideological problems with some that I might have joined. I understand now that I had resisted some groups because Community was demanded or commanded. Intuitively I felt that it must be allowed to grow; it cannot be forced.

I have enjoyed working on a variety of communal artistic projects but, from the theoretical standpoint of individualistic Western aesthetics, they were of peripheral interest. Only recently have I fully realized that Western aesthetics is individualistic. It was not a descriptor I had thought to apply. Renaissance Humanism had taught us that man is the measure of all things and the center of the world, and this underlying assumption has remained inviolate. As this "given" is rendered problematic, and the singularity of "man," as well his exclusive maleness, is questioned, the pieces fall into a different design.

The linear nature of the presentation of my findings does not represent the path of my investigations. I began with community (Chapter Two, then Chapter Three), all the time thinking in terms of the "old" aesthetics as I sought connections between the two concepts. Like a jig-saw puzzle, a few pieces would fit together here and there, but I continued to make new discoveries right until the end.

The most interesting aspect of Chapter One to me was not the definition of the terms, aesthetic and community, but linking the paradigm for the aesthetic (Western art) and the review of literature on aesthetic curricular language. There was scant mention of community in this literature and, initially, I began to think I had made a grave error in trying to link the aesthetic with community. Given the paradigm derived from an individualistic art, however, the

blindness to community began to make sense. Dewey's Art and Experience was more comprehensive, but the implications of his aesthetic for community had never been developed.

The interdisciplinary nature of Chapter Two reflects the complexity of a sense of Community, but also the lack of material in any one discipline. Sociologists (until recently) tend not to speak of lived experience, psychologists center interest on the individual, the anthropologist, Turner, was initially interested in *communitas* in the rituals of primal peoples, and Buber is primarily interested in our relationship with God. My background in dance made me aware of the physicality of a sense of Community.

The problems for renewing community in America are considerable but not insurmountable. In Chapter Three I identify current conditions that affect both the building of community and the dominant attitudes towards it. We want community, but some of the circumstances that might make it possible are antipathetic to other goals that are cherished. If community is a priority, on the other hand, the need for certain individual achievements and acquisitions disappears. In the modern world, much stress at the level of personal as well as international relations, would also be relieved.

The terms I use in Chapter Four in an aesthetic curricular language for building community are not new, but I extend their usual range of application - notably, to the aesthetic perception of people and relationships. Objects, especially art objects, and the natural world, are the usual sources of aesthetic delight. The aesthetic emphasizes the importance of personal meaning and significance, and the development of self-consciousness. Perception of pattern, structure, and relationship can also remind us of our interdependence. In addition, close attention to the nature of our aesthetic judgments reveals that they are not independent of our ethical values.

I have drawn implications for schooling only in the most general terms in Chapter Five. I will continue to work on specific details. An aesthetic and communitarian vision should inform every aspect of schooling, structure, power relations, curriculum, content, classroom practices,

strategies for learning, evaluation procedures, and the quality of daily life. Pieces of this picture are being promoted in schools already, such as co-operative learning, democracy in the classroom, whole language, ecological, multi-cultural, global, and peace studies, and alternative assessment but, without the overall vision, they can become just a few more tricks for the classroom. In many cases they create contradictions in relation to other aspects of schooling that are already in place. Implementation of many of these ideas is more difficult in high school classrooms because of the constraints imposed by public examination. The trickle-down effect of standardized testing has the most injurious effect on community. It is also, probably, the feature of current public schools most difficult to change, because of its far-reaching ramifications. A fuller employment of the democratic process is possible in all schools, however, and together with the change of consciousness demanded by the paradigm shift, becomes more than a functional procedure.

There is much work to be done to create a desire for community in the face of a competitive consumer culture, as well as developing strategies for building it. An aesthetic curricular language can, at least, remind us to actively attend to each day, every learning opportunity, and each other. This possibility remains with everyone of us. We need neither technology nor permission to embrace the world and others and not sit in judgment, to use all our senses and develop all our ways of knowing, and to create harmony, beauty, justice, and compassion everywhere.

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