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**AN ASSESSMENT OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN DUAL-CAREER
MARRIAGES**

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

PH.D. 1983

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AN ASSESSMENT OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
IN DUAL-CAREER MARRIAGES

by

Nancy Morgan Kingsbury

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
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of the Requirements for the Degree
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The purpose of this study was to assess which of a group of independent variables were most predictive of the following dependent variables: (1) process power (PP), (2) process outcome (PO), and (3) subjective outcomes (SO) of decision making in dual-career families. The purposive sample consisted of 51 (N = 102) dual-career couples.

A process-oriented model of joint decision making served as a basis for the questionnaires and interviews used in the study. Data were gathered by self-report questionnaires and a conjoint, tape-recorded interview. The context variables--sex-role preference disparity (SRD), self-esteem disparity (SED), mutuality disparity (MUD), marital-satisfaction disparity (MSD), income disparity (IND), education disparity (ED), occupational-status disparity (OD), and length of marriage (LM)--were obtained from a self-report questionnaire. Couple disparity scores were calculated by the subtraction of wives' scores from husbands' scores on each variable except sex-role preference disparity in which the husbands' scores were subtracted from the wives' scores.

Process variables, which were collected during the interview, included (1) who initiated an issue, (2) the proposition which was made, (3) supporting strategies, (4) importance of the matter, and (5) response of the reactor. A process-power score for the couple

was calculated by the response of each spouse to the other in conjunction with a score based on the saliency of the issue. Process outcome was measured by spouse responses on a continuum from consensus to conflict regulation. Subjective outcome was measured by responses on a continuum from resentment to satisfaction.

Statistical procedures used were multiple regression and analysis of variance. The findings were as follows: (1) SRD was the best predictor of PP; the relationship was negative; (2) SRD, MUD, and IND were most predictive of SO; (3) SRD and IND had a significant positive relationship with SO; (4) MUD had a significant negative relationship with SO; and (5) instances in which sex-role preference total scores (SRPT) for the couple were high (nontraditional), spouses were more likely to use individualistic verbal strategies while negotiating or discussing about a disagreement than were couples with traditional scores.

Conclusions were that the process-oriented model of decision making is an effective tool for the study of family interaction. In addition, it was suggested that sex-role preference is the single most important variable in the study of the process of decision making and that one of the most important indicators of marital power is marital decision making.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The term "dual-career family" was coined in the early 1970's by Rapoport and Rapoport (1978). About the concept, the authors stated that it

. . . has theoretical significance and empirical validity in three contexts: the relationship between family and occupation, variant patterns in the social change process, and sex role issues in contemporary society. (p. 1)

The dual-career family was originally defined as:

The type of family in which both heads of household pursue careers and at the same time maintain a family life together. The terms "career" and "family" are both somewhat imprecise, but the former was used to indicate sequences of occupational jobs which were developmental in character, and which required a continuous and high degree of commitment. The latter was arbitrarily defined as involving at least a marital pair and one child living as a domestic unit. (p. 3)

According to Rapoport and Rapoport (1976), the study of dual-career families has been criticized as being biased toward the middle class. In some sense, this bias is appropriate since women from the middle class are the most likely to involve themselves in a continuous career with high commitment. Axelson (1981) claimed that the "relatively new phenomenon" of the dual-career family was a result of the feminist movement which was stimulated by Friedan's The Feminine Mystique.

By the early 1970's, women were entering the labor force at a phenomenal rate, not only for economic reasons, but for psychological reasons as well. Many of these were middle-class women who, for the first time, were allowed the opportunity to enter professions which had previously been available to men only.

In the 1970's, only seven percent of married couples fitted the description of the "typical American family" with father-breadwinner, mother-homemaker, and two children (Bird, 1979). Previously, women had entered the labor force as replacements for men who were fighting wars or to aid in services and productions related to war. This type of employment was usually temporary, and women were forced to return home when their efforts were no longer necessary. The current influx of women into the marketplace is thought to be permanent by some authorities. Bird (1979) stated her position succinctly. "This time women are never going home again" (p. xii).

Certainly, the phenomenon of women's employment has and will continue to have economic, sociological, and political impact. The present study focused on the sociological consequences of dual careers on the family. Specifically, the process of decision making in dual-career families was studied.

Decision Making as Process

According to Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980):

. . . the most fruitful way to understand the dynamics (what is going on) of male-female relations (and hence of sex, marriage, family, childrearing, and so on) is through sharp focus on sex roles and decision-making. (p. 10)

One concludes that the emergence of dual-career families indicates changes in sex roles and that these changes alter the dynamics of family decision making.

Hill (1965) pointed out that "during the 1960's marital decision making was treated as one of the most important (if not equivalent

to) indicators of marital power" (p. 22). This interest in "family power" was stimulated largely by Blood and Wolfe's (1960) Husbands and Wives which included their resource theory (McDonald, 1980).

Blood and Wolfe's assertion that marital power was no longer based on patriarchal notions, but rather on "comparative resources" was a specific way of describing the long-term movement from fully to partially structured relationships. (Scanzoni, 1979, p. 298)

Prior to the 1960's, family power was not considered an issue by such reigning structural-functional theorists as Talcott Parsons. Power was not important, because male superiority was not only accepted but justified by some writers. For example, Pitts (1964) suggested that male superiority and dominance were functional. The system functioned because there was little need for conflict. Not only did functionalists assert that the structured family model was functional, but also that any deviance from it such as outside employment for women was detrimental to families and society. In other words:

Because she is female, she is person-oriented; because she is subordinate, there is order; because there is order, younger females learn to be person-oriented and males learn to be task-oriented, and so the cycle continues. (Scanzoni, 1979, p. 297)

Price-Bonham (1976) stated that decision making was found more often in the literature than other concepts related to family power. It was pointed out that part of the problem was that decision making was operationally defined as "family-power outcomes" instead of processes of family power. Scanzoni (1979) stated the problem another way: ". . . the most glaring and misleading of these

problems has been to confound relatively fixed outcomes with the complex dynamic processes that exist in outcomes" (p. 307).

McDonald (1980) presented a definition: "power is the ability to achieve desired goals or outcomes, whether phrased in terms of changing the behavior of others, or producing 'intended effects'" (p. 113). Zartman (1976) expanded the definition of power to include not only the ability to affect change, but also the ability to resist change. "Thus, if Actor makes fewer changes, or no changes, compared to Other, then Actor can be said to have greater power than Other, and vice versa" (Scanzoni & Szinovacz, 1980, p. 86). Another aspect of power is the importance Actor places on the matter in question.

Cromwell and Olson (1975) divided power into three categories-- "power bases," "power processes," and "power outcomes." Power bases refer to the resources participants bring to the relationship. Contrary to proponents of resource theory, who focused on economic resources, power bases include many different types of resources: (1) normative, (2) affective, (3) personal, and (4) cognitive. In this study, tangible resources (education, income, and occupational status), the intangible resource (self-esteem), household characteristics (age, number of times married), and sex-role preference (degree of traditionalism/modernity regarding the role of wife, husband, mother, or father) were labeled context variables.

Power processes involve the actual methods and techniques individuals use in the decision-making process. These techniques include the variable tactics of negotiation and persuasion which individuals

employ. In the present study, the assumption was made that disparities (differences between husband and wife on specified measures) in the variables mentioned above would affect the relative negotiating power of the dyad. For example, sex-role preferences have been demonstrated to act as "guiding philosophies" in the ways parties carry on discussions and negotiations.

"Finally, the concept of power outcomes addresses the question of who makes the final decision or ultimately possesses the control . . ." (McDonald, 1980, p. 113). This definition of outcome places a static image on a dynamic process. To counteract this problem, the study defined decision-making outcomes in dynamic terms which symbolize a continuum of outcome possibilities from consensus through conflict regulation.

Subjective outcomes indicate the parties' perceptions (feelings) toward objective-process outcomes of decision making. These affect responses deserve consideration because they become a salient issue in subsequent decision-making processes.

Problem Statement and Purpose of the Study

Concomitant with the new dual-career family lifestyle, alterations in family interaction are imminent. Decision making in dual-career families is a salient issue due to the lack of societal norms which exist for this type of family unit. In other words, these couples do not generally have "spontaneous consensus" about family issues. To the contrary, in dual-career families, nearly every aspect of family life requires the dynamics of the decision-making process.

The purpose of the study was to address the following research questions: (1) among measured disparities in context variables and mutuality scores, which are most predictive of the relative negotiating power or relative discussion power in dual-career marital dyads? (2) Among measured disparities in context variables, mutuality scores, and relative negotiating power or relative discussion power, which are most predictive of decision-making process outcomes in the dual-career marital dyad? and (3) Among measured disparities in context variables, mutuality scores, relative negotiating power or relative discussion power, and process outcomes, which are most predictive of decision-making subjective outcomes in the dual-career marital dyad?

Propositions

First, one concludes from the literature the proposition that decision making is a dynamic ongoing process, which is facilitated by negotiation and reflects the power participants possess according to the various resources they claim for themselves which are recognized and accepted by others. Second, the most appropriate way to assess marital decision making is to study dyadic interaction. Third, the personal conjoint interview in the home is an optimal setting for the naturalization of methods and procedures. These propositions served as a basis for the rationale and plan of this research.

Operational Definitions

Decision making is a dynamic ongoing process which involves the exchange of tangible and intangible resources. The process is facilitated by negotiation and reflects the power participants possess according to the various resources they claim for themselves which are recognized and accepted by others.

Process power is the relative ability of the members of a dyad to affect or resist change in relation to the individual salience of the matter.

Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) defined outcome as: "how parties . . . evaluate changes (or lack of them). Outcome is also how persons assess continuing discussion/negotiations aimed at either change or constancy" (p. 101).

Subjective outcomes are spouses' perceptions (feelings indicated) of the negotiation process and objective outcomes of decision making.

Tangible resource variables are defined as (1) education (the highest level of school attained, i.e., number of years); (2) occupation (defined and coded according to the Duncan Occupational Scale) (Steven & Featherman, 1981); and (3) income (annual gross salary).

Intangible resource variable is self-esteem (the way people evaluate themselves).

Sex-role preference is the desired goals or interests concerning specific rewards and costs related to division of labor and sex stratification.

Household characteristics are age, number of marriages, and length of marriage.

Marital satisfaction is an individual's perceptions of the contentment felt for the marital relationship.

Mutuality is an individual's evaluation of prior decision making with spouse.

Disparities are the differences in spouses' tangible resources, intangible resources, sex-role preference scores, and mutuality scores.

Strengths and Limitations of the Study

The major strength of the study was that it assessed the process of decision making, whereas the majority of previous research in this area has relied on static final-say techniques to measure a dynamic process. The use of self-report and tape-recorded interaction data contributed to the strength of the research. Verbatim transcriptions of recorded interviews reduced problems of instrumentation to a minimum. In addition, the marital dyad was viewed and treated as a decision-making unit in lieu of separate individuals' making unilateral decisions. This was claimed to be an improvement over previous research in which wife's responses alone were used to measure dyad decision-making outcomes.

The primary limitation of the study was the nonrandom nature of the sample. Caution should be exercised in the generalization of findings. The fact that all of the wives in the study were members

of a professional women's club or the Junior League may have created biases.

It should be noted that the usual limitations of the personal interview, such as social desirability, were a concern. The belief was that the presence of both spouses encouraged honesty and openness which would counteract this problem.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Methodological Issues in Decision-
Making Research

Research studies about family power have been abundant, but aside from the conceptual problems mentioned in Chapter I, some of the methodological techniques used by researchers have caused findings to be suspect. According to McDonald (1980), concerns about methodologies center around the following: (1) the comparison of unequal decision-making and power phenomena, (2) measurement techniques needed for power processes instead of reliance on decision-making outcomes, (3) whether wife's responses alone are adequate indicators of husband-wife responses, (4) the need for observational techniques of family power, and (5) problems with the Blood and Wolfe-type measures.

Comparison of Unequal Decision-
Making and Power Phenomena


Price-Bonham (1976) projected concern that studies have often given equal weight to all decisions which resulted in a final decision-making score. Thus, a study was conducted to investigate discrepancies in weighted and unweighted decision-making scores. The 280 respondents (140 couples) were interviewed separately. Participants were asked to describe their decision-making behavior,

as well as their attitudes toward the importance of decisions. Various resources which were held by subjects were treated as independent variables in the correlational analyses. Results were that although no differences were found in weighted and unweighted scores related to resources using simple correlation, stepwise regression indicated that "resources do have differential influence on the DM [decision making] and DMI [decision-making plus importance scores]" (p. 639).

Process versus Outcomes

Several writers have emphasized the problem of researchers' reliance on outcomes for the measurement of power (McDonald, 1980; Scanzoni, 1979). A primary reason for this is that processes are very difficult to measure. Specifically, the majority of studies have been patterned after the Blood and Wolfe (1960) model of "who decided what." Several social scientists have attempted to remedy the situation (cf. McDonald, 1980, for citations). The most process-oriented model has been presented by Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) and used as a research instrument by Hill (1981).

The Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) model of explicit marital negotiation encompasses the enormous complexities involved in process outcomes. The model (see Figure 1), first of all, takes into consideration four clusters of context variables: (1) compositional (race, age, number and ages of children, years married, sequence of marriage), (2) resource (education, employment status, income, work-time, negotiation and bargaining experience, and skills), (3) "orientations governing bargaining power" (self-esteem, sex-role



Source: Scanzoni, J., & Polonko, K. A conceptual approach to explicit marital negotiation. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 1980, 42, 31-44.

Figure 1. A model of explicit marital negotiation.

preferences, investment in the issue, importance of the issue), and (4) "Actor's orientations regarding Other's past bargaining behaviors" (Other's cooperative bargaining, trust in Other, fairness and equitable manner of Other, Other understands and communicates well, Actor's resentment toward Other). The lower level of the model demonstrates that "outcome a" affects "b" and that "a" and "b" then affect "c," and so on. The important concept here is that outcome and process are ongoing and that previous negotiation experiences are influential on present and future ones.

The next sequence in the model has to do with bargaining positions and strategies of Actor and Other. Variations in the four context variables just described indicated the bargaining position of the party which infers their relative power.

"Strategies" or "tactics" or "bargaining behaviors" are those acts, whether appropriate or inappropriate, which facilitate Actor and Other's own cost-reward ratios. Figure 1 illustrates the correlation of bargaining positions and strategies. Outcomes are demonstrated in the model to be separate from processes. However, it was stated that in actuality the "two phenomena make up an intrinsic whole" (p. 40). Nevertheless, when the dynamics within the first part of the model cease, some type of social pattern emerges (outcomes). Several different types of outcomes are possible: consensus (Actor feels he/she has a "fair exchange") or dissensus (Actor disagrees). Dissensus may be accompanied by cessation or quasi-cessation of negotiation. In the former, Other's strategies are regulating in

lieu of resolving conflict, while the latter is akin to a "stalemate" whereby Other refuses to negotiate further while Actor continues to attempt modifications. Other outcomes, of course, are possible such as the dyad may suggest that they still do not have an agreement or disagreement. In this case:

It would nonetheless be possible to measure the degree of symmetrical bargaining power exercised thus far in the course of the issue by assessing the modifications and concessions each had made up to this point in time. (p. 41)

Wife's Responses as Indicators of Power

McDonald (1980) stated that several researchers have found discrepancies in husbands' and wives' responses. Nevertheless, the majority of the power research has relied on wives' responses only. Safilios-Rothschild (1969) was critical of the use of this research method when she stated:

The majority of studies have assumed--without having tested this assumption with respect to all family variables--that the two sets of responses are quite similar and, consequently, have based their conclusions and generalizations solely on the responses of the wife. (p. 290)

Safilios-Rothschild (1969) conducted a study which examined United States and Greek husbands' and wives' decision-making scores, and found distinct differences in perceptions. Conclusions were that reliance on the wife's point of view alone was neither valid nor adequate.

To summarize, although a large number of methodological techniques have been used to study family power and decision making, the focus has been on outcomes instead of processes, and the data have

been biased by reliance on the wife's point of view, and replete of the perceptions of other family members. In addition, problems persist in the use of unweighted scores and overall decision-making scores for the husband-wife dyad. Lastly, the use of self-report data collection instead of observational methods has been criticized. Conclusions are in agreement with Berardo (1980): "Many of the pressing problems [in power research] noted in the decade review of the sixties continue to remain unresolved throughout the seventies" (p. 3).

Theoretical Considerations in Decision Making

Resource Theory

According to Scanzoni (1979), most American and European research is in accord with Blood and Wolfe's (1960) "resource theory," which stated that "the power of husband varies positively with his socio-economic resources (income, education, occupational prestige, or a composite of these variables)" (p. 298). It was also pointed out that wife's participation in the labor force has been empirically found to enhance her power, while decreasing that of her husband.

On the other hand, some researchers have found that increases in husband's economic resources either decreased or had no effect on his power (Scanzoni, 1979). Other findings cited were that wife's employment had no influence on her power.

Rodman postulated a "normative-resource theory" model which was an expansion of resource theory (McDonald, 1980). The theory was

based on the assumption that marital power is affected by not only the resources of the marital dyad, but also cultural norms concerning marital power. Burr et al. (1977) posited several propositions which combined resource theory with normative resource theory to predict a correlation between resources and decision making. After testing several of the propositions, the researchers found that in opposition to Rodman's hypothesis, resources were strongly related to power when norms concerning authority were more patriarchal than egalitarian.

Kandel and Lesser (1972) conducted a study "to test the theory of resources on American and Danish urban families" (p. 134). Although the research was limited by some of the methodological problems mentioned in the previous section, some of the findings were worthy of note and appropriate to the dual-career family which is the focus of the present paper. Marital power was found to be "neither consistently nor always positively correlated with the resources brought into the marriage by each spouse" (p. 135). Husbands with lower educational levels than wives had less power than wives, while husbands who had more education than wives or the same level, whether high or low, had more power. When the wife was employed full-time or part-time, the husband had less power. Husbands with the highest power had wives who worked full-time in the home. The researchers speculated that this finding could indicate that the important variable for wife's power was her contact with the "outside" which would afford her "opportunities to gain experience in interpersonal and decision-making skills outside the family setting" (p. 137).

Social-Exchange Theory

McDonald (1980) asserted that "social exchange theory has become the predominant orientation in family power and decision-making research" (p. 117). It was stated that Scanzoni has made the greatest contribution to the relation of exchange theory to power in families.

Decision making is problem solving and may also take the form of conflict resolution. At the very basis of exchange theory as it relates to decision making is the assumption that "human beings are actors as well as reactors. They make decisions and initiate action rather than having them predetermined by their culture/milieu" (Nye, 1979, p. 7). In addition, all individuals act and react in ways that maximize rewards and minimize costs. This assumption would be inadequate as it stands for the interpretation of decision-making behaviors in families, because often rewards to one family member are costly to another.

The concept of maximum joint profit (MJP) is based on the assumption that actors are willing to negotiate for the interest of the group in lieu of individual profits (Scanzoni, 1979). MJP also rewards the individuals within the family, and in this light, is profitable for the individual family members. Consequently, MJP serves as an incentive for the negotiation process in decision making.

The pattern of social exchange is different from an economic perspective. In terms of Gouldner's principle of reciprocity:

Complete repayment is almost never reached in social exchange The ongoing inputs stimulate increased feelings of mutual gratitude and recitude, thus contributing to maintenance and stability of social systems. (Scanzoni, 1979, p. 307)

Scanzoni (1979) stated that trust is an important ingredient in the decision-making process. Actors react very differently to each other when trust is present as contrasted with distrust. Trust indicates Actor's confidence of receiving rewards from Other, while mistrust has inherent expectations of costs from Other. Ultimately, trust may instigate the emergence of nonlegitimate power if Actor reverts to coercion to force Other to react in the desired manner.

The social exchange theory concept of comparison level (CL) and comparison level alternatives (CL ALT) is relevant to family decision making. For example, in the negotiation process, one is more likely to feel equity exists if the calculation of CL reveals that he is getting his "just deserts." A similar reaction results from the calculation of CL ALT and the eventual weighting of decisions.

Sex-Role Model of Decision Making

Time was when decision making in families was extremely structured. In the Parsonian model of instrumental and expressive roles for spouses up until the 1960's, there was little need for a dynamic mode of decision making. The Ekehian concept of spontaneous consensus was the "accepted order of the day."

Along with the activist 1960's came changes in family dynamics which had far-reaching implications for the decision-making process. Gender-role norms, as viewed by Scanzoni (1979), "may be measured on

a continuum ranging from 'traditional' to 'modern'" (p. 305). The traditional end of the spectrum in the sense of "spontaneous consensus" consists of a hierarchy in which husband's occupation is on top. This structure gives the husband's interest top priority with the children often coming next, followed lastly by those of the woman. Without question, husbands in this type of structure hold legitimate power. However, as one moves down the continuum toward the modern, the more power becomes negotiable. Scanzoni emphasized the point:

"Modernity" characterizes situations in which the interests of the woman are equal in significance to those of husband and any children. Moreover, these interests generally include serious occupational involvement. (p. 305)

Consequently, one concludes that women who have a high degree of commitment to an occupation are more likely to have a modern in lieu of a traditional sex-role orientation. By the same token, husbands who have spouses with careers would also be expected to have a modern orientation.

Scanzoni (1980) developed a sex-role preference framework which incorporated sex-role orientations (preferences for desired goals or interests) (p. 17) with "sex stratification" ("the idea that men and women are systematically funneled into social positions that provide greater amounts of valued rewards (tangible and intangible) to men than to women" (p. 16)) and the division of labor by sex (men gain status in the public sphere which gives them the power to maintain the stratification status quo while women remain in the private sphere where they gain no public status and control). Scanzoni's sex-role preference inventory is a Likert-type scale which gives a

combined score to indicate whether the person has a sex-role preference of modern or traditional.

Evidence exists which indicates sex-role preference may directly or indirectly affect women's career involvement. For example, Scanzoni (1980) pointed out that "The more years of school people have, the more likely they are to hold modern or egalitarian preferences" (p. 19). Since women with more education are more likely to be committed to careers, one would hypothesize that women who hold careers are more likely to have a modern sex-role preference.

Based on other research, Scanzoni (1980) also reported that women have a stronger egalitarian preference than men. Consequently, one would postulate that women who have careers would have a stronger egalitarian preference than their husbands, even though career women probably have more egalitarian husbands than do noncareer women.

Scanzoni (1980) conducted a study to test the validity of the conceptualization of three contemporary marriage types:

Husband as head and wife as complement [wife not employed]; husband as senior partner and wife as junior partner [wife employed, but considers husband major provider]; husband and wife each as equal partners [husband and wife coproviders]. (p. 125)

In the area of sex-role preference, equal partners favored more egalitarian marital roles for wives and husbands than did junior partners, and they in turn preferred egalitarianism more than did complement wives. From these findings, one can speculate that dual-career wives would have a more egalitarian sex-role preference than would dual-wage-earner wives, and that dual-wage-earner wives would prefer egalitarian roles more than would unemployed wives.

Dual-Career Families: An Overview

As has been illustrated thus far, concomitant with the demise of structure-functionalism, decision-making and power processes have come to the forefront of marital relationships in at least the last two decades as large numbers of women entered the labor force. As a result of the women's movement, the advent of the "pill," and reduced fertility, women have sought employment quite different from the supplemental type of years past. With increased educational and occupational opportunities, women have begun to seek long-term career commitments. Concomitant with the new dual-career families, alterations in the dynamics of family interaction are eminent. At the very core of the changes inherent in the dual-career system is a new emphasis on gender-role norms and decision-making processes. This study focused on these issues from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.

Decision Making in Dual-Career Families

Decision-making issues of dual-career couples which have received the primary focus of writers' attentions have concerned the division of household tasks, child care, and the decision for the wife to become and remain employed. The following section outlines some of the research findings related to these issues and presents pertinent theory.

Dual-Career Choice

According to Rallings and Nye (1979), levels of the employment of women are affected by the following factors at the microlevel: health, abilities, motivations, and completing household responsibilities; and those which involve situational factors in the social environment, e.g., level of family income. Certainly women who choose the type of career which involves long-term commitment are influenced by many of these factors. However, the decision making for this group is much more complex than that for the "two-paycheck" family where women often work part-time or go in and out of the job market as children enter the family or are launched. The complexity of the problem implies that the decision-making process necessary for resolution is also complicated and hence requires negotiation by the spouses.

Certainly, the woman's career decision is more than a one-sided issue. St. John-Parsons (1978) quoted Bailyn:

" . . . an educated, married woman's resolution of the career-family dilemma cannot be adequately evaluated without knowledge of her husband's resolution of the way he fits his work and his family into his life" (p. 97)

It has been suggested that the woman who has more power would be more likely to seek employment (Hoffman, 1960). In other words, the husband's point of view is more or less influential in view of the relative power of both participants. For example, a husband may prefer that his wife be unemployed, because he feels that he "should" be the "breadwinner" and that her employment depletes his

socially accepted role. Therefore, in this case if the wife chooses to work in spite of her husband's feelings, then she can be assumed to have more power than he.

Arnott (1972) pointed out that at least four types have become common in women-family work roles--full-time homemaking or dual marriage work roles such as volunteer work, study for a degree, or employment (full-time or part-time). One of the most salient ways to view this decision is in the context of exchange theory.

The Exchange Perspective

In accord with exchange theory, the underlying assumption is that those couples who choose a dual-career lifestyle do so because the rewards outweigh the costs, and hence, enhance overall profits. On the surface, the most usual rewards of which one thinks in regard to employment are financial. Although obviously career women can expect to earn higher incomes than those of the "two-paycheck variety" or the unemployed, St. Johns-Parsons (1978) pointed out that the dual-career pattern was not always financially rewarding due to the high costs of child care and other services required when both spouses are employed.

In addition, dual-career women are most often married to men who have relatively high salaries so that it is unlikely that the women choose to work for financial rewards alone. In support of this idea, Rapoport and Rapoport (1978) quoted from the work of several authors: "three in five American working wives would work even if they had enough money to live comfortably without working" (p. 3).

Arnott (1972) related a woman's choice to be employed or non-employed to the concept of comparison levels and comparison-level alternatives. The author postulated that in a voluntary sense, women enter marriage with the expectation of rewards, and:

will be a fulltime homemaker if no alternative situation offers still greater profit. In a voluntary situation, the woman will remain in a role that does not provide minimal profit of CL and/or CL ALT, or will leave one that does. (p. 124).

Arnott (1972) conducted a study which substantiated these concepts. Findings were that "when role choice is voluntary, married women choose that role which maximizes their profit. (2) When role choice is nonvoluntary, they will be found in social roles which do not maximize profit" (p. 124).

Another consideration is that what constitutes a reward differs from one person to another. Both Bebbington (1973) and St. Johns-Parsons (1978) looked at the backgrounds of dual-career couples as motivating factors in the dual-career choice. It can be assumed that one's background has some influence on what one finds rewarding. For example, one who was reared in an environment where women were expected to fulfill the traditional roles of women may find the idea of having a career aversive in lieu of rewarding.

Bebbington (1973), as well as St. Johns-Parsons (1978), found several trends in the types of childhoods experienced by dual-career participants. Bebbington's (1973) findings concerning dual-career wives were as follows:

(1) only or eldest children; (2) no other adults in childhood family setting; (3) work-oriented mother; (4) tension in one's relationship with father; (5) prolonged separation from parents during childhood, or other disturbing experiences; (6) relatively high social class, gauged by father's occupation. (p. 533)

Few differences were found in husbands' backgrounds, although there was some evidence that they had a close relationship with their mothers during childhood.

St. Johns-Parsons' (1978) results were that (1) women were only children; (2) when siblings were present, the numbers were few; (3) where siblings were same sex, there was sibling rivalry; (4) wives came from families in which there was tension; (5) husbands did not come from tense backgrounds; (6) husbands came from a lower social class than did wives; and (7) husbands had strong self-images.

One could speculate that only-children women are career-oriented as a result of their high-achievement orientation. Since these individuals are achievement-oriented, they would be more likely to find a career rewarding than would those who are not oriented toward high achievement. They would also be more willing to accept the costs which accompany dual-career roles.

The husband's reward/cost ratios are more difficult to discern. For some, certainly the relief from the total financial burden would be rewarding. Rapoport's (1978) study suggested that the husband's close relationship with mother may encourage him to be empathetic with the needs of his wife. In exchange terms, he has been rewarded for being supportive of women, and consequently, finds being supportive rewarding.

The costs involved in the dual-career system are numerous, and have received the attention of several researchers (Bebbington, 1973; Rapoport & Rapoport, 1978; St. Johns-Parsons, 1978). One of the most studied costs has been stress. Almost every aspect of the dual-career lifestyle has the potential for stress, far greater stress than the "spontaneous consensus" traditional-style relationship. A large portion of the stress is brought on because of the necessity to negotiate often, about almost every aspect of running a home.

Other costs include loss of time, work-overload, less contact with kin-network, and environmental sanctions (St. Johns-Parsons, 1978). In spite of the large numbers of costs experienced by dual-career couples, the rewards outweigh them as is evidenced by the ever-increasing numbers who have chosen to join this new family style. Conclusions are that exchange theory is very applicable to the decision-making process and outcome of whether both spouses will share work/family roles.

Decision Making About the Division of Household Tasks

The division of household labor has received more attention from researchers than perhaps any other aspect of dual-career families. One would assume that women who have the power to work on the one hand would have the power to share with husbands household tasks and child care on the other. Numerous researchers have looked at the issue of the division of household labor (Erickson et al., 1979;

Faikas, 1976; Lein, 1979; Perrucci et al., 1978; Pleck, 1979; Yogeve, 1981). Most agree that career women spend a great deal more time in housework and child care than do their spouses. The consequence of this inequality in shared tasks is a work overload for the career wife. Decision making about the division of household labor can best be viewed from the perspectives of sex-role theory and resource theory.

Sex-Role Theory

According to the Rapoport (1978), "the current situation is that most families are dual-worker families at some point in the family cycle, and that the pattern is becoming 'normalized'" (p. 3). Along with this normalization is the changing view of sex roles from traditional to the more modern type mentioned earlier in this paper. One simply cannot discuss dual-career families without including sex-role changes for the two are inseparable. Dual-career families never could have evolved without at least some sex-role changes.

Hoffman (1960) pointed out:

The increased participation of fathers in routine household tasks, a change in power relations from male dominance toward husband-wife equality, and corresponding changes in ideology about sex roles in the family . . . can be seen as mutually reinforcing. (p. 27)

Certainly, all three of these changes influence decision making in dual-career families.

Hoffman (1960) conducted a study to investigate the effects of wife's employment on household tasks sharing, decision making, and family power. The study was limited, because the data were collected

from mothers and children only, excluding fathers, and decision making was measured in terms of outcomes. Findings were that (1) when women work, fathers participate more in housework and wives less; (2) working mothers have less control of decision making in household tasks; and (3) employed mothers have more power than do nonworking mothers. Conclusions were that employment affects power structure indirectly by interaction "with the pre-existing ideologies and personalities of the actors" (Hoffman, 1960, p. 35). These results support the influence of sex-role theory in relation to resources and power in families.

On the other hand, Weingarten (1978) found no differences in family work by women who were employed professionally versus those unemployed. Concerning the division of labor between dual-career couples, the author suggested:

That couples "negotiate" a division of labor that allows women to compensate for the time they spend away from the children and men to choose the family work that is less threatening to their masculine selves. (p. 43)

Lein (1979) concluded from intensive interview data from 25 families that several factors related to role theory influence the husband's participation in family roles: (1) husbands perceive the breadwinner role as their primary function; (2) husbands and wives have difficulty sharing their primary roles; (3) pressures from outside the family inhibit change in family-role responsibilities; and (4) men's support systems reinforce traditional roles.

Perrucci et al. (1978) tested three hypotheses concerning the division of household/child-care labor: (1) resources which

indicated power, (2) sex-role ideology, and (3) time availability. Results were that the sex-role ideology variable had more influence on husbands' task performance than did the other two, regardless of wife's employment. Limited support was found for the relative-resource hypothesis.

Yogev (1981) suggested that, similar to Young and Willmott's idea that families are becoming more symmetrical (husbands are more involved in family roles; wives are more involved in work outside the home; consequently, both husbands and wives have two roles), several researchers have concluded that as wives become employed, husbands' household labor increased.

Others have found that division of household labor is quite conventional in the dual-career family (Perrucci et al., 1978; Weingarten, 1978). A traditional division of household tasks implies a traditional power distribution in favor of husbands.

Not only are there differences in the contributions to household tasks, but also in the numbers of hours devoted to careers weekly. Yogev's (1981) research showed that husbands spent an average of 9.4 more hours than did wives on their careers where children were present, while for childless couples, the difference was only 1.5 hours. However, the tradeoff in career/housework hours was not equal. Wives who had children reported their husbands spent 16.0 hours less than they did in housework and 23.1 fewer hours in child care, while childless wives claimed their husbands spent 12.1 fewer hours in housework.

These findings seem to indicate that husbands hold more power than do wives, especially where children are involved. One explanation for the acceptance of this pattern by dual-career wives is that many of the wives stated that they did not believe that their husbands were not doing their share and that they did not expect an egalitarian pattern. In other words, the wives thought the unequal roles enabled them to continue in their traditional roles as the "mothers of the families."

When these same women were asked whether they thought themselves equal to their husbands in intelligence and ability to handle things, the majority believed they were equal. Therefore, the wives saw themselves as having an egalitarian relationship with their husbands in attitude, but not in behavior (Yogev, 1981). It was suggested that perhaps the reason for these discrepancies is that these women were reared under the traditional sex-role ideologies, and have no societal models for their new dual-career roles.

Pleck (1979) reported that Blood and Wolfe (1960):

Concluded that husbands' relatively low contribution to household work did not derive from traditional ideology about family roles. Rather, they argued, husbands' low contribution is a rational response to the fact that husbands have fewer resources, particularly time, with which to perform these tasks. (p. 483).

Pleck (1979) stated that Walker and Woods, in their 1976 pioneering study concerning male family work, found that men spent 1.6 hours per day in household work and childcare, while wives spent 8.1 hours, and working wives spent 4.8 hours. Contrary to the conclusions of Blood and Wolfe (1960), that as women went to work and

gained more resources, men contributed more to family work, the Walker and Woods' studies showed that men with employed wives did not contribute more time to household tasks than did those with nonemployed wives.

Pleck (1979) analyzed data from a 1977 national sample to investigate time spent by men and women on household chores and child care. Findings were supportive of the data that family roles are changing. Men who had working wives spent 1.8 hours per week more in household tasks, and 2.7 more hours per week in child care than did husbands with nonemployed wives. Conclusions were that this changing-role perspective for men's family work, although not as prevalent as the traditional-role view that no change is needed or the exploitation perspective that little hope exists for changing roles, that it is likely to increase in importance in family studies.

To summarize, in regard to sex-role and resource theory relative to decision making in dual-career families, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Most researchers agree that dual-career wives spend much more time and have the primary responsibility for household tasks and child care. This inequality may indicate that husbands control the power in these areas.

Some researchers found that, although inequality existed, employed wives participate less in family work and husbands contribute more (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Hoffman, 1960; Pleck, 1979), thus indicating an increase in power for employed wives versus nonemployed wives. Conflicting results were postulated by Weingarten (1978) and

Perrucci et al. (1978) who found no differences in the division of labor between employed and nonemployed wives.

Evidence exists that sex-role ideologies affect the division of labor in dual-career families. Some researchers (Hoffman, 1960; Lein, 1979; Perrucci et al., 1978; Pleck, 1979; Yogev, 1981) have demonstrated that couples who have a modern sex-role ideology are more likely to share family work, although not equally. Most authors agree that the inequality is due to outside societal pressures for the participants to function in their traditional roles, lack of models for dual-career role sharing, and internalized role expectations for self and spouse.

Conclusion

The dual-career family is a family style which has evolved in the last two decades and will continue to grow in the future. Decision making in dual-career families is an ongoing process which requires constant negotiation. Those wives who have adequate resources and modern sex-role ideology are more likely to have the power to negotiate for the dual-career lifestyle. Couples who both have a modern sex-role ideology are more likely to get MJP from the dual-career lifestyle.

Decision-making research on dual-career families has concentrated on the division of household labor and child care. The evidence is nonconclusive. Most researchers agree that wives still

carry the primary responsibility for family work, but some researchers have found that employed wives have husbands who make contributions. Consensus of opinion is that employed wives have more power than do nonemployed wives.

Social-exchange theory provides the most salient perspective for decision making in dual-career families. Those couples who choose a dual-career lifestyle do so because the rewards outweigh the costs, and hence, enhance overall profits. Sex-role ideologies and resources affect what individuals find rewarding or cost-provoking.

The issue of decision making in dual-career families is a timely one, which is far from clear, based on current empirical evidence. Researchers can make a contribution to this salient issue by focusing on this aspect of dual careers in the future.

CHAPTER III
METHODS OF PROCEDURE

Subjects

A purposive sample of 51 (N = 102) married, dual-career couples was used for this study. Wives were contacted through membership in a professional business women's group. Only those women who were married and currently living with spouses were asked to participate. Other criteria for participation were that both spouses had a high level of continuous commitment to a professional career. The 100 group members unanimously agreed to involvement in the study; 50 of these were eligible, based on the above criteria.

Letters of orientation (Appendix A) were sent to the 50 couples who were eligible. In order to set up a date for the couple interview, interviewers initiated contact by telephone approximately one week after the letters were mailed. Eleven of the 50 potential subjects could not be contacted due to absence for business travels or changed addresses.

Consequently, to add to the size of the sample, the Junior League of Greensboro was contacted and 14 couples from that group who met the dual-career criteria volunteered to join the study. The total sample included 51 (N = 102) dual-career couples who resided in the area of Greensboro, North Carolina.

Data Collection

Interviewers were trained by the primary researcher in a group-training session prior to data collection. Before the interview began, interviewers reassured participants of the confidentiality of questionnaires and tape-recorded materials. Interviews, which lasted approximately one and one-half hours, were carried out in the participants' homes. The introductory letter (Appendix A) had forewarned subjects not to discuss the interview with other subjects until all data had been collected.

The first step in the procedure was the completion of the confidential questionnaire (Appendix B) by both spouses separately. To contribute to internal validity, the first page of the questionnaire, which served as an introduction, was read to the couple by the interviewer. In the interest of privacy, spouses were instructed to go to separate rooms to complete the instrument and were further instructed to refrain from communication about questions or answers.

After the confidential questionnaires were completed, the couple rejoined the interviewer for the conjoint tape-recorded interview (Appendix C). The interview form served as an absolute guide for the interview as it was designed to address all possible answers. (For an example, see Questions 1.A and 1.B.) The final stage of the procedure was for spouses to complete the closing questionnaire (Appendix D) separately and privately. This concluded the session.

Research Instruments and Measures

Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) and Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) presented a process-oriented model of joint decision making which is eclectic in its use of ideas from symbolic interaction, social exchange, and social conflict theories. The model has two purposes: (1) to analyze decision making, and (2) "to describe why changes in sex roles continue to alter the character of family decision making" (p. 13). The focus of the joint decision-making model is on the dyad as a unit. The model is especially useful in studying power relationships in lieu of previous ones which have viewed power as outcomes.

The operational definition of decision making used in the model is as follows:

Family members have items (tangible and intangible) they wish to give to and also receive from each other. Simultaneously, family members want to give and receive (exchange) items with parts of the larger society. The capability of engaging in one of those kinds of exchanges usually depends on the capability of doing the other as well. Organizing those exchanges in an orderly and satisfactory fashion is what decision-making is all about. (Scanzoni & Szinovacz, 1980, p. 13)

The model is dynamic in that it is based on Gulliver's (1979) notions of the repetitive cyclical and developmental sequences of negotiations. Gulliver (1979) defined negotiation as a process of information exchange, learning, and assessment. It was suggested that within negotiation, repetitive cycles of information exchange and assessment aid negotiation to move forward toward consensus and implementation.


Hill and Scanzoni (1982) proposed that a six-point process-oriented general framework was "applicable to a wide range of family-related decision-making issues" (p. 8). The framework, which is of recent design, was used by Hill (1981) in a study of decision making by couples who had received training in communication skills. Hill (1981) stated that the model claims conceptual and theoretical validity based on its derivation from several well known and accepted theories.

The six points of the framework are the following. First, the cyclical and developmental sequences of the process of decision making are dissected and identified into units. Second, the units are scrutinized to determine connected events. The third step is to view the units in developmental terms. A fourth step involves the unity of the developmental and cyclical processes. The "identification of outcome flowing from process represents a fifth" step. The sixth and final step integrates "past decision-making history with present processes and outcomes" (Hill & Scanzoni, 1982, p. 7).

In summary, the joint decision-making model illustrates the effects of context factors and evaluation of prior decision making on processes, outcomes, and future decision making (see Figure 2).

Process Variables

The process of decision making has been conceptualized as a series of cyclical and developmental units (Gulliver, 1979; Scanzoni & Szinovacz, 1980). Figure 3 illustrates the steps and sequences of the possible units in the decision-making process. Process variables



Source: Scanzoni, J., & Szinovacz, M. Family decision making. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980.

Figure 2. A model of explicit family decision making.

Unit I

1. Initiator (who raises the issue) (Appendix C, Item 2)
2. Substantive point (what is being said; proposition made, etc.) (Appendix C, Items 4, 4A)
3. Supporting actions (strategies used to support the position) (Appendix C, Items 5 through 13; 15 through 18)
4. Importance of position to party speaking (Appendix C, Item 14)
5. Response of Other
 - A. "Yes" (Discovery of consensus; Unit I ends.)
 - B. "Yes, but" (Development of consensus) Go to Unit II
 - C. "No" (Conflict)

Unit II

2. What is being said by Other (Appendix C, Items 21.A, 21.B)
3. Supporting actions by Other (Appendix C, Items 22 through 30; 32 through 35)
4. Importance of position to Other (Appendix C, Item 31)
5. Response of initiating spouse (Appendix C, Items 38 and 39)
 - A. If "yes," unit ends.
 - B. If "yes, but," units continue.
 - C. If "no," units continue.

Source: Adapted from Scanzoni and Szinovacz, 1980, pp. 54, 56; Hill, 1981, p. 40.

Figure 3. Process-variable units.

were assessed by the conjoint interview (Appendix C). The interview included the possibility for four units to be developed.

The first step in the unit included the initiator who raised an issue. The second step entailed what proposition or demand was made. Third and fourth steps were strategies used to support the position (supporting actions) and the importance of the matter to Actor, respectively. Response of Other was the fifth step. See Figure 3 for explanation of interview (Appendix C) items which measure unit steps.

The response of Other determined whether additional units were necessary. If Other responded "yes," the result was the discovery of consensus and the termination of units. Either a "yes, but" or "no" response led to negotiation and the progression to another unit and repetition of steps two through five. The development of Unit III and Unit IV are dependent on the responses in step five of the previous unit similar to the ones mentioned for unit one above.

According to Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980), strategies fall into one of three categories--(1) verbal persuasion (Appendix C, Items 5 through 10), (2) coercion (Appendix C, Items 11, 12, 15, and 16), and (3) violence (Appendix C, Items 17 and 18).

Dependent Variables

Process power was defined as the relative ability of the members of the dyad to affect or resist change in relationship to the individual salience of the matter. Figure 4 illustrates the measurement, coding, and calculation of process power.

Figure 4
Process Power

Unit I (Appendix C)

(Items 2 through 4.A)

Steps 1 and 2 - Initiator (Actor)
makes request

(Items 21.A, 21.B)

Step 5 - Response of Other

If "yes," Code +1, +2, or +3
for Actor. Code 0 if no request
for change was made, or no solution
offered.

If "yes, but" (Actor made at least
a partial gain) Code +1, +2, or +3.

If "yes, but" (Actor made no gain)
Code -1, -2, or -3.

If "no," (No gain for Actor)

Code -1, -2, -3.

Unit II (Appendix C)

(Items 21.A, 21.B)

Step 2 - Other offered proposition.

(Item 31)

Step 4 - Importance of matter
(Code 1 - only somewhat important;
Code 2 - important; Code 3 - very
important)

(Items 38, 39)

Step 5 - Response of Actor

If "yes," Code +1, +2, +3 for Other
Code 0 if no request for change was
made, or no solution offered.

If "yes, but," (Other made at least
a partial gain) Code +1, +2, or +3.

(Item 14)

Step 4 - Importance of matter*

Code 1 - Only somewhat important

Code 2 - Important

Code 3 - Very important

If "yes, but," (Other made no gain)
Code -1, -2, or -3.

If "no," (No gain for Other)

Code -1, -2, or -3.

Units III, IV, and so on, coded in an identical fashion.

Total Process-Power Score

1. Actor and Other's scores across units were summed.
2. Wife's total score was subtracted from husband's total score.
3. Higher positive scores indicated process power in favor of the husband.
4. Negative scores indicated process power in favor of the wife.

*All gain or loss scores are coded 1, 2, or 3 in relationship to the importance of the matter as indicated in Step 4.

The final process-power score indicated the relative power of the couple unit. Higher positive scores indicated process power in favor of the husband and lower negative scores represented process power in favor of the wife. Asymmetrical power (unequal power) existed when the process-power score deviated from zero. The farther from zero, the greater the degree of asymmetry. Zero scores were indicative of symmetrical power (equal power).

Each member of the dyad received a gain (+) or loss (-) score based on the acceptance (+), rejection (-), projected alteration (+, if gain), or no request made or offered (0) of spouse's response (see Figure 4). Gain and loss scores were coded numerically in accordance with "importance of the matter;" one (only somewhat important), two (important), and three (very important).

Process Outcomes

Measurement of process outcome was obtained by responses to Item 4 in the closing questionnaire (Appendix D) (see Figure 5). Possible outcome scores were placed on the following continuum: (1) Consensus (a) complete agreement (Appendix D; respondent indicated total agreement in Item 4); (2) units in flux; (b) discussion or negotiation continues (Appendix D, Item 4.A), (2.C.) agree to disagree (Appendix D, Item 4.B), (3) conflict-regulation; (d) one person keeps trying to talk; the other does not want to talk (Appendix D, Items 4.C, 4.D); and (3.E) one person effectively keeps the other person from continuing to talk (Appendix D, Items 4.C, 4.F).

1. Consensus

2. Units in Flux

3. Conflict Regulation

- | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|---|
| a. Complete agreement following decision-making process (Appendix D; respondent indicated total agreement in Item 4). | b. Discussion or negotiations are continuing (Appendix D, Item 4.A). | c. Agree to Disagree (Appendix D, Item 4.B). | d. One party keeps trying to negotiate; the other does not (Appendix D, Items 4.C or 4.D). | e. One party effectively keeps the other party from continuing negotiations (Appendix D, Items 4.E or 4.F). |
|---|--|--|--|---|

Code 4 for 1.A.

Code 3 for 2.B.

Code 2 for 2.C.

Code 1 for 3.D.

Code 0 for 3.E

Source: Adapted from Scanzoni and Szinovacz, 1980, p. 97.

Figure 5. A continuum of decision-making outcomes.

Decision making was considered on a continuum from consensus to regulation (see Figure 5). "Resolution [consensus] represents effective decision making while regulation represents ineffective decision making" (Hill, 1981, p. 43). Outcome 1.A (consensus) was coded 4 and others were coded in descending order to zero for 3.E (conflict-regulation). The response of the spouse whose score indicated an outcome closest to the end of the continuum (conflict-regulation) served as the outcome response for the dyad. The rationale was that if either spouse indicated that negotiations had been inhibited, then there was little evidence that an outcome toward agreement had occurred. In other words, as long as one spouse perceived a lack of consensus, dyadic consensus outcome was impossible.

Subjective Outcomes

Subjective outcomes were measured by responses to Item 1, Appendix D. Responses were summed for total individual scores. Higher scores indicated satisfaction with the decision-making process outcomes, while lower scores indicated resentment. Scale scores on resentment items a, b, c, f, j, l, and o were reversed so that the above-mentioned scoring could be accomplished. In order to develop a continuum from satisfaction to resentment, items g, h, i, and k were deleted. The decision was made that those items represented resignation and would be inappropriate for the continuum established. Husbands' and wives' scores were added, with higher total scores indicative of high dyadic satisfaction and lower scores representative of dyadic resentment (see Figure 6).

*Satisfaction - d, e, m, n, p, q, r.

Resentment - f, l, o, a, b, c, j

*Letters represent responses to Item 1, Appendix D.



Figure 6. Subject-outcome continuum.

Independent Variables

Context variables. The five context variables were measured by the confidential questionnaire (Appendix B).

- (1) Tangible resource variables included each spouse's education, occupation, and income.
 - a. Education was defined and coded as highest number of years of school. Disparities were computed by subtracting wife's score from husband's score. (See Appendix B, Item 6 for measure of education.)
 - b. Occupation was defined and coded according to the Duncan Occupational Scale. Disparities were computed by subtracting wife's score from husband's score. (See Appendix B, Item 8 for measure of occupation.)
 - c. Income disparities were calculated by the subtraction of wife's income from husband's income. (See Appendix B, Item 10 for income measure.)
- (2) The self-esteem variable was defined as the way people evaluate themselves and was measured by the Rosenberg Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Hill (1981) used the instrument in a similar study because of its brevity and efficiency as a self-report measure of self-esteem, as well as its construct validity. A test-retest reliability of .85 was reported. Disparities were computed by subtracting wife's score from husband's score. Scores on each item were summed to obtain a self-esteem score. Higher scores indicated high

self-esteem and low scores indicated low self-esteem.

Disparities were calculated by subtracting wife's score from husband's score. (See Appendix B, Item 15 for self-esteem measure.)

- (3) The sex-role preference variable was defined as desired goals or interests concerning specific rewards and costs related to division of labor and sex stratification. Sex-role preference was measured by the sex-role preference inventory (Scanzoni, 1980). According to Scanzoni, the scale has face validity in addition to conceptual and theoretical validity. Disparity scores were computed by subtracting husband's score from wife's score. Spouse individual scores were summed. Higher scores indicated nontraditional attitudes, while lower scores illustrated traditional attitudes. (See Appendix B, Items 13 and 16.)
- (4) Household characteristics included age, number of marriages, and length of marriage (Appendix B, Items 2, 3, 4, and 5). Length of marriage was the variable used in the study as an independent variable.
- (5) The marital-satisfaction variable was measured by a single response on a continuum from completely satisfied to completely dissatisfied. According to Spanier (1976), respondents' ratings of personal marital satisfaction is a valid and reliable technique. Higher scores indicated high marital satisfaction. In order to calculate disparities,

wives' scores were subtracted from husbands' scores (see Appendix B, Item 22 for marital-satisfaction measure).

The mutuality variable. This variable was defined as an individual's evaluation of prior decision making with spouse. Conceptually, mutuality scores indicated spouse's estimation of Other's (1) cooperativeness, (2) trustworthiness, (3) fairness, and (4) empathy. Responses on Items 17, 18, and 19 (Appendix B) were summed to obtain an overall mutuality score. Disparities in husband/wife scores were calculated by subtracting wife's score from husband's score. Higher scores indicated high mutuality, and lower scores represented lower mutuality.

Hypotheses

Process Power

- H₁ Among the predictors investigated, disparity in sex-role preference scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance in process power in dual-career couples' decision making.
- H₂ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the second largest proportion of the variance in process power in dual-career couples' decision making.

Process Outcomes

- H₃ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

- H₄ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in sex-role preference scores will predict the second largest proportion of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

Subjective Outcomes

- H₅ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in income will predict the largest proportion of the variance in subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.
- H₆ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the variance in the subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

Process Variables

- H₇ The higher the sex-role preference total score of the dual-career couple, the more individualistic types of verbal strategies will be used by the dyad in negotiation or discussion about a disagreement.

- H₄ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in sex-role preference scores will predict the second largest proportion of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

Subjective Outcomes

- H₅ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in income will predict the largest proportion of the variance in subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.
- H₆ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the variance in the subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

Process Variables

- H₇ The higher the sex-role preference total score of the dual-career couple, the more individualistic types of verbal strategies will be used by the dyad in negotiation or discussion about a disagreement.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The following chapter presents a description of the sample, major findings of the study, and a discussion of the results. Hypotheses are stated and findings which confirm or disconfirm them are given.

Demographic Results

As was evidenced by high incomes and upper educational and occupational statuses, subjects were representative of the upper-middle-class socioeconomic group. The majority of couples were in the young-to-middle adult age level. Range of ages was from 27 years to 65 years (mean = 40 years). The average age for wives was 38.6 years, while that for husbands was 42.8 years.

Of the subjects, 18 (36%) husbands and 19 (37%) wives reported one previous marriage. No subject had been married more than two times (see Table 1). Years married ranged from one to 38 years (mean = 12.7 years).

Twenty-five couples had from one to five children under 18 years of age currently living with them (mean = 1.32 children). Of the couples who had children in the home, the following frequencies occurred: (1) 13 (52%) had one child; (2) eight (32%) had two children; (3) three had three children (12%); and one (4%) had five children. (see Table 1.)

Table 1

Demographic Characteristics of Husbands and Wives

Characteristics	Wives		Husbands		Total	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
<u>Second Marriages</u>						
Yes	19	37	18	35	37	36
No	32	63	33	65	65	64
Total	51	100	51	100	102	100
<u>Children Under 18 Years</u>						
One					13	52
Two					8	32
Three					3	12
Five					1	4
Total					25	100
<u>Educational Levels</u>						
High School Diploma	2	4	2	4	4	4
Some College	4	8	7	14	11	11
College Degree	20	39	17	33	37	36
Graduate Work or Master's Degree	16	31	15	29	31	30

Table 1 (Continued)

Characteristics	Wives		Husbands		Total	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
<u>Educational Levels (Continued)</u>						
Law, Medical, Ph.D. Degrees	9	18	10	20	19	19
Total	51	100	51	100	102	100
<u>Occupational Ranks*</u>						
24 - 39	1	2	2	6	3	3
40 - 55	11	21	11	21	22	23
56 - 71	23	47	19	40	42	43
72 - 87	14	29	16	33	30	31
Total	49	100	48	100	97	100
<u>Hours Worked Per Week</u>						
25 - 29	3	6	0	0	3	3
30 - 40	8	16	13	27	21	22
41 - 50	25	51	22	46	47	48
51 - 60	12	25	12	25	24	25
61 - 70	1	2	1	2	2	2
Total	49	100	48	100	97	100

Table 1 (Continued)

Characteristics	Wives		Husbands		Totals	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
<u>Incomes for Husbands and Wives</u>						
Less Than \$14,999	5	11	3	7	8	9
\$15,000 - \$24,999	16	35	9	20	25	27
\$25,000 - \$34,999	16	35	8	17	24	26
\$35,000 - \$44,999	4	9	13	28	17	19
\$45,000 - \$54,999	3	6	6	13	9	10
\$55,000 - \$64,999	0	0	3	7	3	3
\$65,000 - \$74,999	1	2	2	4	3	3
\$75,000 - \$84,999	1	2	1	2	2	2
\$85,000 - \$94,999	0	0	0	0	0	0
Over \$100,000	0	0	1	2	1	1
Totals	46	100	46	100	92	100

*Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI) used for coding occupational ranks. Stevens and Featherman (1981).

Highest educational levels of husbands were (1) high school diploma, two (2%); (2) some college, seven (14%); (3) college degree, 17 (33%); (4) some graduate work or master's degrees, 15 (30%); and (5) law, medical, or Ph.D. degrees, ten (20%). Wives' educational levels were (1) high school diploma, two (4%); (2) some college, four (8%); (3) college degree, 20 (39%); (4) some graduate work or master's degree, 16 (31%); and (5) law, medical, or Ph.D. degree, nine (14%). (See Table 1.)

All of the couples met the criteria for dual-career status in terms of high and continuous commitment to a career. Five individuals indicated no current employment (three husbands and two wives), but in all cases, the interruption of career was considered temporary. Two husbands had experienced business failures and were in the process of establishing new careers, while one was searching for employment. One of the unemployed wives was completing requirements for the Ph.D., and the other was seeking employment.

According to the Duncan Index (SEI), occupational rank covered a range from 24 to 87 (mean = 66.07) for husbands and 65.91 for wives (see Table 1). Among the wives, 76 percent held occupational levels above the 56 level, which indicated professional-type careers. Among the husbands, 73 percent held professional occupations above the 56 (professional) level.

The number of hours worked (see Table 1) ranged from 25 hours to 70 hours. The majority of both spouses (mean for husbands =

47.9 hours; mean for wives = 47 hours) worked 40 to 50 hours per week. Eight (16%) women and 13 (37%) men reported between 30 and 40 hours on the job weekly. Among spouses, 48 percent specified a 41 to 50-hour workweek. However, 25 percent of husbands and wives worked 51 to 60 hours weekly. Only one husband and one wife indicated a 61 to 70-hour work schedule (Table 1).

The average income for wives was \$25,000 to \$30,000, and for husbands, it was \$35,000 to \$40,000 (Table 1). Husbands earned approximately 27 percent more income than did their wives. When combined, 53 percent of husbands' and wives' combined incomes fell in the \$15,000 to \$34,999 range (Table 1).

Data Analysis

Data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Nie et al., 1975). Procedures used were multiple regression and analysis of variance. A significance level of .05 was required for acceptance of hypotheses and all statistical results.

The multiple regression technique was used to determine the best predictor among the previously listed independent variables of the dependent variables. In order to test the hypotheses, a separate regression was run for each of the dependent variables. In addition to the defined independent variables, the dependent measure, power process, was entered as an independent variable in the regression for the dependent measure, process outcome. Similarly, the dependent variables, power process and power outcome, were submitted as

independent variables along with the previously specified independent variables in the multiple regression for the dependent measure, subjective outcome.

A one-way analysis of variance was performed on the data for sex-role preference scores (see Appendix B, Items 13 and 16) (total score for spouses summed) by the use of the verbal strategy, "It is best for me." (See Appendix C, Items 7B and 24B.) Scheffé's test (alpha level .05) was used as an a posteriori contrast test to specify group mean differences.

Distribution of Responses

Independent and Dependent Measures

Table 2 contains the means, ranges, and standard deviations for all of the dependent and independent measures. The mean for process outcome (PO) was 2.3 which indicated that the average score on the continuum of decision-making outcomes (see Figure 5) was between discussion or negotiation continuing ("We are still talking") and "agree to disagree."

The positive process power (PP) score (mean = 1.18) indicated that husbands had a slight advantage in the power arena. The subjective outcome mean of 91.2 was representative of high satisfaction scores for the couple as a unit. Sex-role preference disparity scores (mean = 4.16) were indicative of wives' attitudes toward sex roles being higher than those of husbands.

Table 2
Means, Ranges, and Standard Deviations for
Independent and Dependent Measures

Variable	N	Mean	Range	SD
Process Outcome (PO)	49	2.30	0 - 3	1.0
Process Power (PP)	50	1.18	-6 - 6	2.6
Subjective Outcome (SO)	44	91.2	56 -112	13.6
Sex-Role Preference Disparity (SRD)	50	4.16	-8 - 19	7.0
Education Disparity (ED)	51	-0.20	-5 - 6	2.6
Occupation Disparity (OD)	46	0.19	-50 - 38	19.6
Income Disparity (IND)	43	2.07	-4 - 9	3.1
Self-Esteem Disparity (SED)	51	-1.90	-19 - 8	6.6
Marital-Satisfaction Disparity (MSD)	51	-0.08	-5 - 3	1.6
Mutuality Disparity (MUD)	46	-0.46	-59 - 81	26.2
Length of Marriage (LM)	51	12.18	1 - 38	10.17

The mean scores of wives' sex-role preference scores was 36.23 and husbands' mean scores were 31.01. These means support the expected result that women have higher sex-role preference scores (more nontraditional) than do husbands. However, it should be pointed out that the husband and wife means suggest that both are more nontraditional than traditional.

Wives held higher educational levels by a small margin (mean = -0.20), while husbands had an equally small margin of higher occupational status (mean = 0.19). Higher incomes were reported by husbands (IND mean = 2.07), and wives reported higher self-esteem scores (SED mean = -1.90). Wives were only slightly more satisfied with their marriages than were husbands (mean MSD = -0.08). Mean scores on marital satisfaction were almost equal for husbands (4.686) and wives (4.765), and were high for both. Mutuality disparities were small (MUD = -.46) with wives expressing more feelings of mutuality toward husbands than vice versa.

Process Variables

In response to Questions 1, 1A, and 1B of the interview (see Appendix C), "What is the one thing you disagree about most often?" 14 categories of issues were identified. Table 3 lists the frequencies for each response.

The issues disagreed about most often were (1) children (N = 13), (2) money (N = 11), (3) time (N = 6), (4) personal habits (N = 4), (5) household tasks (N = 4), (6) purchase of an item (N = 4), and (7) communication (N = 2). One couple each stated that the following

Table 3
 Issues Disagreed About Most Often by
 Dual-Career Couples

Issues	N	Percentage
Discipline of Children	13	25
Money	11	21
Time	6	12
Personal Habits	4	8
Household Tasks	4	8
Purchase of an Item	4	8
Communication	2	4
Socialization	1	2
Religion	1	2
Status of Women	1	2
Sex	1	2
Jealousy	1	2
Relations With Kin	1	2
Vacation Choice	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Totals	51	100

were areas they disagreed about most often: (1) socialization, (2) religion, (3) status of women, (4) sex, (5) jealousy, (6) relations with kin, and (7) vacation choice.

Fourteen couples claimed they had no disagreements in response to Question 1 (Appendix C). When asked Question 1A (Appendix C), "Thinking back to your recent past, what was the one thing you disagreed about most often," 12 of the 14 were able to identify an issue of disagreement from the past. Finally, in response to Question 1B, the remaining two couples found an area about which they had disagreed.

Test of Hypotheses

Correlations Among Independent and Dependent Variables


A correlation matrix of the independent and dependent variables is presented in Table 4. Figure 7 presents a path analysis for the correlation matrix among independent and dependent variables. ED was positively related to LM; LM was positively related to OD; and IND was positively related to IND. IND, SRD, and PO were positively related to SO, and MUD was negatively related to SO. SRD and MUD were negatively related to PP, and OD was positively related to PP. MSD was positively related to MUD.

Table 4

Correlation Matrix Among Independent and Dependent

Variables

	PP	PO	SO	ED	OD	IND	SED	SRD	MSD	MUD	LM
PP		.01	-.12	.10	.30	.15	.13	-.45	.06	-.21	.02
PO			.30	.05	-.08	-.02	.04	.08	.15	-.02	.04
SD				-.08	.06	.21	-.13	.40	.10	-.22	-.06
ED					.43	.17	-.05	-.11	-.08	-.05	.41
OD						.34	.05	-.16	-.16	-.15	.22
IND							.20	-.03	-.11	-.08	-.08
SED								-.22	-.14	-.11	-.16
SRD									.01	.21	.14
MSD										.29	.19
MUD											
LM											.18



*Only those variables which had a correlation of at least .21 were included.

Figure 7. Path analysis for correlations matrix among independent and dependent variables.

Process Power

- H₁ Among the predictors investigated, disparity in sex-role preference scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance in process power in dual-career couples.
- H₂ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the variance in dual-career couples' decision making.

The eight independent variables--(1) length of marriage (LM), (2) income disparity (IND), (3) sex-role preference disparity (SRD), (4) marital-satisfaction disparity (MSD), (5) self-esteem disparity (SED), (6) mutuality disparity (MUD), (7) occupational status disparity (OD), and (8) education disparity (ED)--were entered into a multiple regression analysis with process power (PP) as the dependent variable. Table 5 reports the results of this analysis. These eight variables taken together yielded a multiple R of .58, which explains 30 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Overall, T was significant at the .05 level.

SRD ($\beta = .41$) was the only variable with a significant T score ($p < .05$). Consequently, hypothesis 1 was supported and accepted. SRD scores were negatively related to process power which indicated that low SRD couples experienced higher husband power. Although the T score was not significant, the second best predictor of process power was occupational-status disparity ($\beta = .226$). The third best predictors were mutuality disparity ($\beta = .135$) and marital satisfaction disparity ($\beta = .133$). Hence, hypothesis 2 was rejected.

Table 5
 Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of
 Process Power in Dual-Career
 Decision Making

Variables	B	Beta	T
Length of Marriage (LM)	.015	.061	.392
Income Disparity (IND)	.081	.087	.613
Sex-Role Disparity (SRD)	-.151	-.405	-2.898*
Marital Satisfaction Disparity (MSD)	.221	.133	.949
Self-Esteem Disparity (SED)	.009	.023	.169
Mutuality Disparity (MUD)	-.014	-.135	-.964
Occupational-Status Disparity (OD)	.031	.226	1.454
Education Disparity (ED)	-.071	-.071	-.456
(Constant)	1.465		

Analysis of Variance for Total Equation

<u>Source</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Regression	99.936	9	12.492	-
Residual	233.444	23	5.558	2.248**

* $p < .01$ Multiple R = .5475 R Square = .2997 Standard Error = 2.3575
 ** $p < .05$

Process Outcomes

H₃ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

H₄ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in sex-role preference scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

In addition to the eight independent variables which were used to test hypotheses 1 and 2, process-power scores were entered also into a multiple regression analysis with process outcome (PO) as the dependent variable.

The nine variables in combination produced a multiple R of .24 which explained five percent of the variance in the dependent variable. The overall F was not significant; thus, hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported. Beta weights for marital satisfaction disparity, sex-role preference disparity, and education disparity were .176, .142, and .127, respectively. Although these were the highest beta weights, none had significant T scores; therefore, no application of results was possible.

Subjective Outcomes

H₅ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in income will predict the largest proportion of the variance in subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

H₆ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the second largest proportion of the variance in the subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

Process power (PP) scores and process outcome (PO) scores were added to the eight independent variables to test hypotheses 5 and 6 with subjective outcome (SO) as the dependent variable. Table 6 presents the results of the analysis. The ten variables combined yielded a multiple R of .64, which explained 41 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Overall F was significant at the .01 level.

SRD ($\beta = .42$) and MUD ($\beta = .343$) had a significant T score at the .01 level. IND ($\beta = .268$) was significant at the .05 level. Among the independent variables entered in the regression, SRD, MUD, and IND in descending order were the best predictors of SO. Consequently, hypothesis 5 was rejected, and hypothesis 6 was accepted.

The relationship of SRD with SO was positive and indicated that the higher the sex-role preference disparity of the dual-career couple, the more satisfactory were the subjective outcomes of decision making. MUD had a significant negative relationship to SO ($p < .01$). The lower the mutuality disparity in dual-career couples, the more satisfaction the dyad expressed toward the subjective outcomes of decision making.

The significance level of the positive relationship between IND and SO was .05. The interpretation was that couples with high income disparity have high satisfaction with the subjective outcomes of

Table 6
Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors
of Subjective Outcome

Variables	B	Beta	T
Length of Marriage (LM)	-.079	-.064	-.441
Process Power (PP)	-.086	-.018	-.123
Process Outcome (PO)	3.000	.240	1.930***
Income Disparity (IND)	1.197	.268	2.004**
Marital Satisfaction Disparity (MSD)	1.408	.175	1.301
Self-Esteem Disparity (SED)	-.230	-.122	-.945
Mutuality Disparity (MUD)	-.173	-.343	-2.590*
Education Disparity (ED)	-.256	-.053	-.359
Sex-Role Disparity (SRD)	.771	.423	2.941*
Occupational Status Disparity (OD)	-.027	-.040	-.266
(Constant)	79.168		

Analysis of Variance for Total Equation

<u>Source</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Regression	3300.164	10	330.016	2.8736*
Residual	4593.722	40	114.843	


*p < .01 Multiple R = .6466 R Square = .4181 Standard Error = 10.7165
 **p < .05
 ***p < .06

decision making. Although the significance level of process outcome ($p < .06$) was slightly above that which was acceptable, it was close enough to warrant consideration. The relationship of PO and SO was positive; therefore, couples who rated themselves near the consensus end of the process-outcome continuum were more likely to have high subjective outcome scores which represented high satisfaction.

A path analysis was developed (see Figure 8) to further explain the relationship of selected context variables to subjective outcome. The analysis indicates that SRD and MUD have a positive relationship, while MUD and SO are negatively related and SRD and SO are positively related. SRD is negatively related to PP, and PP is negatively related to SO. In other words, the greater the SRD, the less the PP. IND is positively related to SO so that the greater the IND, the higher the satisfaction score on SO. Likewise, PO has a positive relationship with SO; therefore, the higher the PO scores, the higher SO. PO is negatively related to SO; hence, lower PP scores correlate with high SO scores. MUD is negatively related to PP and indicates that low MUD correlates with high PP.

Process Variables

- H₇ The higher the sex-role preference total score of the dual-career couple, the more individualistic types of verbal strategies will be used by the dyad in negotiation or discussion about a disagreement.



+ or - indicates the direction of the relationship.
 B = Beta weights from multiple regression.
 C = Correlation from matrix for dependent and independent variables.

Figure 8. Path analysis for subjective outcome.

A one-way analysis of variance was applied to determine the relationship between sex-role preference scores total (SRPT) for the individual couples (see Appendix B, Items 13 and 16), and the use of the verbal strategy, "It is best for me" (see Appendix C, Items 7 and 24) by at least one spouse, neither spouse, or both spouses. Group One of the independent variable, BM, consisted of couples in which both spouses responded "yes" to the question, "Do you ever use the reason it is best for me?" while discussing their disagreement over an issue. Group two was made up of couples in which both spouses responded "no" to the above item. In group three, one spouse answered "no" and the other answered "yes."

Table 7 reports the means and standard deviations on SRPT for the three groups. Group one (N = 23) had a mean SRPT of 70.13; group two (N = 14) had a mean SRPT of 62.07; group three (N = 13) had a mean SRPT of 64.15. The total mean for all groups (N = 50) was 66.32.

Table 8 presents the one-way analysis of variance of mean SRPT for groups one, two, and three. The results indicated that there was a significant difference between the SRPT for the three groups, and the null hypothesis was rejected and hypothesis 7 was accepted.

The Scheffé test was applied to find the confidence interval for the .05 level of significance. Results are reported in Table 9. Groups one (both use BM) and two (both do not use BM) had significantly different ($p < .05$) SRPT scores. Couples in which both partners used BM while negotiating or discussing a matter of disagreement

Table 7
 SRPT Means and Standard Deviations for
 Groups One, Two, and Three*

Groups**	N	Mean	SD
Group One	23	70.13	8.05
Group Two	14	62.07	7.42
Group Three	13	64.15	8.70
Totals	50	66.32	8.69

*SRPT was computed by adding husbands' and wives' scores on sex-role preference (Appendix B, Items 13 and 16).

**Group One - Both spouses use the verbal strategy, "It is best for me" in negotiation or discussion.

Group Two - Both spouses do not use the verbal strategy, "It is best for me" in negotiations or discussions.

Group Three - One spouse uses the statement above and the other does not.

Table 8
 Analysis of Variance of Mean SRPT
 for Groups One, Two, and Three

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	647	2	323	4.99*
Within Groups	3049	47		
Totals	3696	49		

* $p < .01$

Table 9
 Scheffé's Test of Group Means and Differences
 Between Group Means at the .05 Level
 of Significance

<u>Means for Groups</u>			Difference	Scheffe Test .05	Significant
One	Two	Three			
70	62		8	5.7	p .05
70		64	6	5.7	No
	62	64	2	5.7	No

had higher (more nontraditional) sex-role preference attitudes, while those where both spouses did not use BM had lower (more traditional) sex-role preferences.

Discussion

As was expected, the dual-career couples in this study represented the upper-middle class with total incomes averaging \$64,000 annually. With both spouses working 40 to 50 hours per week, it was no surprise that time was one of the issues disagreed about most often. Several researchers (Bebbington, 1973; Rapoport & Rapoport, 1978; St. Johns-Parsons, 1978) pointed to time management and lack of time as one of the most stressful aspects and costs of the dual-career lifestyle.

The high process-outcome scores, high subjective-outcome scores, and high marital-satisfaction scores of these couples indicated that, in spite of the stressful nature of this type of lifestyle, the majority of these couples implement effective decision-making processes and have had some success at working out disagreement satisfactorily.

As was mentioned earlier, division of household tasks is one of the areas of concern for dual-career couples. The participants of this study substantiated previous findings as household tasks was one of the issues disagreed about most often. Subjects who initiated the disagreement over household tasks were in all cases wives who wished husbands to participate more. This confirms the previous

findings of researchers (Perrucci et al., 1978; Pleck, 1979; Weingarten, 1978; Yogev, 1981) who concluded that dual-career wives participate more in household chores than do dual-career husbands.

There was some overlap with household task issues and time management. For example, some of the time conflicts were related to not having enough time to complete household tasks. Since both spouses in these couples work similar hours each week, the Blood and Wolfe (1960) argument that husbands participate less at home because of fewer resources such as time was not supported. Neither were Yogev's (1981) findings supported that dual-career husbands spent more hours on their careers than did wives.

Contrary to the expectation that dual-career couples would disagree about childcare, the primary focus on the child issue was disagreements over discipline in lieu of care. Part of the explanation for this is that the average age of the couples was 38 to 40 years, and that most of the children were older and required less care but required a great deal of decision making by parents. In addition, 36 percent of the sample had been married previously and lived with stepchildren. Therefore, several of the disagreements cited concerned the discipline or relationship with stepchildren.

Money was the issue of concern for 21 percent of the couples. Even though the average income of couples was \$64,000, and scarcity of the resource was not a problem, decision making about expenditures was a problem.

Process Power and Sex-Role Preference

The results of this study supported the statements of Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) that the dynamics of male-female relationships can be best investigated through a "focus on sex roles and decision making" (p. 10). Sex-role preference was found to be an important variable throughout the study.

Hill (1965) pointed out that marital decision making was "one of the most important (if not equivalent to) indicators of marital power" (p. 22). The present study confirmed this notion by the results of the multiple regressions in which eight independent variables were successful in the prediction of process-power scores which emerged from the decision-making process.

The mean power-process score for couples was 1.18 which indicated that husbands had higher power than wives by a small margin. Yogev (1981) suggested that one reason for the acceptance of unequal power by dual-career wives was that the unequal roles enabled them (the wives) to continue in their traditional roles.

Resource Theory

Even though husbands in the present study had higher overall incomes than did wives, no evidence was found in support of the Blood and Wolfe resource theory. Neither income, education, nor occupational status was correlated with process power. This investigation substantiated Scanzoni's (1979) discussion of power in which the point was made that some researchers have found that increases

in the husband's economic resources either decreased or had no effect on his power and that the wife's employment had no influence on her power.

Rodman's "normative-resource theory" which was based on the assumption that marital power is affected by not only the resources of the marital dyad, but also on cultural norms concerning marital power was tested by Burr et al. (1977). Conclusions were that resources were strongly related to power when norms concerning authority were more patriarchal than egalitarian. These dual-career couples were generally nontraditional and had a more egalitarian lifestyle than patriarchal lifestyle. Perhaps, for this reason, tangible resources were ineffectual in the prediction or influence of power in these dual-career couples.

One of the most important findings was that sex-role preference disparity was the best and the only statistically significant predictor of power. This result substantiated the conclusions of Hoffman (1960) that employment affects power structure indirectly by interaction "with the pre-existing ideologies and personalities of the actors" (p. 35).

The negative direction of the relationship suggested that when couples were similar on sex-role preferences, higher power in the relationship went in the direction of the husband. This finding would be expected for those couples in which both spouses are more traditional (have lower SRP scores), but become more difficult to explain in those cases where both spouses are nontraditional. The

speculation is that couples in this study who had lower sex-role disparity scores were traditional; hence, the negative relationship of sex-role disparity and process power.

Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) pointed out that in those couples in which sex-role preference disparities are high, the wife usually has the more nontraditional score and that conflicts are more likely to occur. These dual-career wives had highly nontraditional sex-role preferences; thus, one would expect that where large disparities in SRP existed, the wife was more often the nontraditional of the two. Perhaps, in those couples who have large disparities in sex-role preferences, the wife is less likely to relinquish power to the husband and is more likely to respond to the husband's requests for change negatively. Therefore, in those couples, the husband would have less power.

Subjective Outcome

According to Scanzoni and Hill (1982), "Resignation/resentment are . . . predicted by disparity over income (most strongly), mutuality, and sex-role preferences, and also strongly by objective-outcome disagreements" (p. 20). The present investigation found similar results from the multiple regression in which subjective outcome was the dependent measure. Subjective outcome was predicted best by the same variables mentioned above, only the strongest predictor was sex-role preference disparity instead of income disparity. The positive nature of the relationship indicated that the greater the disparity, the higher the satisfaction toward the outcomes of decision making.

As was mentioned earlier, one would expect wives in couples with large sex-role preference disparities to be more nontraditional. Concomitant with the previous finding that large sex-role preference disparities predicted reduced husband power, perhaps the present result indicates that these couples are satisfied with this arrangement.

The significant negative relationship between mutuality disparity and subjective outcome were expected. When couples view each other as trustworthy, fair, empathetic, and cooperative in prior decision making, then they naturally express positive feelings of satisfaction over the outcomes of decision making. To put it another way, it is difficult to be resentful toward someone with whom one has had fair and equitable dealings in the past. This finding supports the exchange theory of the "principle of reciprocity."

Income disparity had a significant and positive relationship with and was the third best predictor of subjective outcome. Husbands in the study claimed higher incomes than did wives; therefore, in high-income disparity, the husband usually had the higher income. This disparity probably means that the husband not only has a higher income than the wife, but that the income for the family is high in general. Higher income families can often solve problems through the ability to afford entities which provide solutions. For example, at least one-half of the couples who disagreed about household tasks negotiated and found consensus by hiring outside help.

Consequently, subjective outcomes have a good chance to be satisfactory when couples have the means to solve some problems in this way. Were this income not available, the couple would be forced to deal with the disagreement between themselves, and could result in less satisfactory and more resentful outcomes.

Sex-Role Preference and Verbal Strategies

Several authors have pointed out the correlation of the types of verbal strategies used to influence partners during the negotiation process with sex-role preference (Scanzoni & Szinovacz, 1980; Scanzoni & Polonko, 1980; Hill & Scanzoni, 1982). Those individuals with more modern sex-role preferences are more likely to use "it is best for me" as a guiding philosophy in the decision-making process than are more traditional individuals who are likely to use the verbal strategy, "it is best for others (BO)."

The results of a one-way analysis of variance indicated that group one which consisted of couples where both used BM was significantly different from group two which was made up of individuals where neither of the partners used BM. Findings were that group one had higher sex-role preference total scores (SRPT) (more modern) than did group two. Therefore, the theories mentioned above were supported by the present analysis. Modern couples were more likely to use BM than traditional. In other words, modern individuals seek personal rewards and are willing to bargain in their own interest with partners.

Summary of Results

Three of the seven hypotheses were supported by the data. The independent variables in combination predicted a significant amount of the variance in the dependent variables, process power and subjective outcome.

As was expected, sex-role preference disparity was the best predictor of process power. Occupational-status disparity and mutuality disparity were the second and third best predictors, respectively.

The independent variables in addition to process power were unsuccessful in predicting power outcomes. Therefore, hypotheses 3 and 4, which stated that mutuality disparity and sex-role preference disparity would predict the largest portion of the variance in process outcomes, were rejected.

The variance in the dependent variable, subjective outcome, was best predicted by sex-role preference disparity and mutuality disparity. Hypothesis 6, which stated that mutuality disparity would be the second best predictor, was supported. Hypothesis 5, in which income was expected to be the best predictor of subjective outcome, was rejected.

A one-way analysis of variance supported hypothesis 7 which stated that couples with higher sex-role preference total scores would use more individualistic verbal strategies than would those with low scores.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to assess which of a group of independent variables (context variables) were most predictive of the following dependent variables: (1) process power (PP), (2) process outcome (PO), and (3) subjective outcomes (SO) of decision making in dual-career families. The eight independent variables were sex-role preference disparities (SRD), self-esteem disparities (SED), mutuality disparities (MUD), marital-satisfaction disparities (MSD), income disparities (IND), education disparities (ED), occupational status disparities (OD), and length of marriage (LM).

The purposive sample consisted of 52 (N = 101) dual-career couples. Thirty-seven of the wives were members of a professional women's group, and 14 of the wives were members of the Junior League of Greensboro, North Carolina.

A process-oriented model of joint decision making which was developed by Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) and Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1981) served as a basis for the questionnaires and interviews used in the study. Data were gathered by self-report questionnaires (see Appendices B and D) and a conjoint tape-recorded interview (see Appendix C). Context variables were obtained from the confidential questionnaire (see Appendix B), and process variables were measured by the interview (Appendix C). Context variables were (1)

measures of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), (2) sex-role preference, (3) marital satisfaction, (4) household characteristics (age, number of marriages, length of marriage), (5) income, (6) occupational status (Stevens & Featherington, 1981), and (7) educational status. In addition, mutuality scores which measured degrees of trust, equity, empathy, and cooperativeness couples had for each other based on evaluations of prior decision making, were obtained from the confidential questionnaire. Couple-disparity scores were calculated by the subtraction of wives' scores from husbands' scores on each variable except sex-role disparity in which the husbands' scores were subtracted from the wives' scores.

Process variables entailed (1) who initiated an issue, (2) the proposition which was made, (3) supporting strategies, (4) importance of the matter, and (5) response of the reactor. A process-power score for the couple was calculated by the response of each spouse to the other in conjunction with a score based on the saliency of the issue.

Process outcome was measured by spouse responses in the closing questionnaire (see Appendix D, Item 4) to where they thought they ended on a continuum from consensus to conflict regulation (see Figure 5). Subjective outcome was measured by responses to an item (Appendix D, Item 1) concerning how they felt about the disagreement they had described in the interview.

Statistical procedures used to analyze the data were multiple regression and analysis of variance. Results indicated that both

partners in the couples scored high on the following variables: (1) educational levels, (2) occupational status, (3) incomes, (4) marital satisfaction, (5) mutuality scores, (6) subjective-outcome scores, and (7) modern sex-role preferences.

Seven hypotheses were tested. Below are the hypotheses statements and results:

H₁ Among the predictors investigated, disparity in sex-role preference scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance in process power in dual-career couples.

H₂ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the variance in dual-career couples' decision making.

Of the eight independent variables mentioned above entered in a multiple regression, SRD was the best predictor of the dependent variable, process power. The eight variables taken together explained 30 percent of the variance in the dependent variable ($F = p < .05$). SRD had a significantly negative relationship with process power at the .05 level.

H₃ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

H₄ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in sex-role preference scores will predict the second largest proportion of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

In addition to the eight independent variables which were used to test hypotheses 1 and 2, process-power scores (PP) were also entered into a multiple regression analysis with process outcome (PO) as the dependent variable. The overall F was not significant; thus, hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported.

H₅ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in income will predict the largest proportion of the variance in subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

H₆ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the variance in the subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making.

PO and PP were added to the eight independent variables to test hypotheses 5 and 6 with subjective outcome (SO) as the dependent variable. The ten variables combined explained 41 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Overall F was significant at the .01 level. SRD had a significant positive ($p < .01$) relationship with SO; MUD had a significant negative ($p < .01$) relationship with SO, and IND had a significant positive ($p < .05$) relationship with SO.

H₇ The higher the sex-role preference total score of the dual-career couple, the more individualistic types of verbal strategies will be used by the dyad in negotiation or discussion about a disagreement.

A one-way analysis of variance was applied to determine the relationship between sex-role preference total (SRPT) for the individual couples and the use of the verbal strategy, "It is best for me" (BM) by both spouses (group one), neither spouse (group two), or at least one spouse. Results indicated that there was a significant difference ($p < .01$) between the SRPT for the three groups. The null hypothesis was rejected, and hypothesis 7 was accepted.

Results from Scheffé's test indicated that groups one and two had significantly ($p < .05$) different SRPT scores. Couples in which both partners used BM had higher (more nontraditional) SRPT scores than did those in which both spouses did not use BM and had lower (more traditional) SRPT scores.

Conclusions

The results of this study have demonstrated that sex-role preferences are the single most important variable in the study of the process of marital decision making. As sex roles continue to change and dual-career couples increase in number, sex-role preferences will take on an ever-increasing importance in the study of the family.

Findings point to disparities in sex-role preference attitudes as the best predictors of power. Those women with modern sex-role preferences are more likely to be involved in a career and consequently, may have power more equal to that of their spouses. This effect of employment on power is indirectly affected by the sex-role

preference. Therefore, it is recommended that sex-role preferences and decision making be included in any studies of family power.

No evidence was found in support of Blood and Wolfe's resource theory. Neither income disparities nor other tangible resource disparities were predictive of process power.

One of the most important indicators of marital power is marital decision making. The successful prediction of power by a combination of variables from a decision-making model illustrates that power can most effectively be studied through the process of decision making.

The findings of this research indicated that mutuality and subjective outcomes are a salient issue in the study of decision making, because they affect future decision making. The negative significant relationship of mutuality disparity to subjective outcome suggested that prior decision-making history was salient for subsequent decision making.

Conclusions are that the process model of joint decision making is an effective method for the study of the actual processes of decision making. One of the strengths of the model is that it considers the couple as a unit. The model is a distinct improvement over the final-say technique whereby outcomes are viewed as static entities, because it encompasses the dynamics of family relationships and interactions.

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APPENDIX A
LETTER REQUESTING PARTICIPATION

Family Research Center
Department of Child Development
and Family Relations
University of North Carolina
Greensboro, NC 27412

Dear Member of the Forum:

As you know from a recent Forum newsletter, the Forum's executive board voted unanimously to cooperate with the Family Research Center of UNC-G in carrying out some important research. And if you were at the September Forum meeting, you will recall I took a few moments of time to explain the purpose of the research. As I said on that occasion, we are all aware that relationships between women and men are changing rapidly these days. As a result, how women and men actually work out their decisions becomes very important. Right now, we know very little about the ways in which achieving business and professional women work out decisions with the men in their lives. For women who are currently married, this means their husbands; for women who are not currently married, it means the man who is at present, or who was most recently, the most important man in their lives.

In a few days, one of our courteous and professional interviewers will be calling you. If you are married, s/he will arrange a time when it is convenient for her/him to come to your home. At the appointed hour, our interviewer will ask each of you separately to fill out a brief questionnaire. Then the interviewer will ask you and your husband together to respond to a few questions. In order to help us keep track of three people talking at once, and to make sense of the information as we analyze it later on, we have found that it helps to tape record these conversations. The entire session takes around 35 minutes, and people we've interviewed in the past tell us it was an enjoyable and very interesting experience. We are sure that after your interview you will feel the same way.

We have found that some women who are not currently married, or else not living with their husbands, nonetheless have a male friend with whom they often have to work out important decisions. If you have such a friend, our interviewer would like to have the same kind of session with you and your friend as I described above for married couples.

We have also found that although some women do not currently have a male friend with whom they work out important decisions, during the past they had a husband or friend with whom they did. If that applies to you, our interviewer would like to talk to you (without involving that person) about your decision making with that person.

All Forum women (and their husbands and friends) may be completely assured of total confidentiality and anonymity. No connection is ever made between you and your individual answers. Instead, responses from all persons are grouped and analyzed together. You are familiar with newspaper reports of percentages of people who give their opinions about certain matters. It is those percentages we are interested in, because it is that information that helps us make recommendations for community programs to enrich the quality of American family life.

We very much appreciate your part in contributing to healthier family experiences. If you have questions at all either before or after the interview, please call me at 379-5315.

Thank you again for your kind cooperation.

Sincerely,

John Scanzoni
Professor

JS:ph

P.S. Please do not discuss the contents of the interview until after all Forum members have been interviewed. Thanks--early next year I will be happy to share our findings with the Forum.

APPENDIX B
CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Confidential Questionnaire

Before we ask a few questions of you and your husband and wife together, we would like to take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire.

There are no right or wrong answers. We only want to know your opinions about things.

Feel free to answer each question as truthfully as you can because your husband or wife will not see what you have put down.

The questions we are going to ask you and your husband or wife together are different from these questions so that your husband and wife will not know what you have said in these pages.

Please answer each question by putting a circle around the number that best fits what you want to say.

If the meaning of the word is not clear, please answer the question in the best way you know how.

If instructions (IN CAPITAL LETTERS) are not clear, please ask me and I will explain them.

And, of course, you know that everything you say will be held in absolute confidence. You are completely anonymous as far as the results are concerned. Your answers are placed with many others and analyzed statistically. You will never be connected with your answers.

Thank you! We know you will find this experience an interesting one!

1. Are you:

MALE 0

(or)

FEMALE 1

2. On what month, day, and year were you born?

DAY MONTH YEAR

3. Have you ever been married before?

YES 0 (CONTINUE)

NO 1 (SKIP TO Q 5)

4. How many times?

NUMBER

5. On what month, day, and year did your (present) marriage begin?

MONTH DAY YEAR

6. How far did you go in school--what was the highest grade or level of you you completed?

HIGHEST GRADE

7. Do you currently have a regular paying job?

YES 0 (CONTINUE)

NO 1 (SKIP TO Q 11)

8. What kind of work do you do? What are the main things you do on your job?

8A. When did you start the job you now hold--what month and year?

MONTH YEAR

9. How many hours per week do you usually work at your present job?

HOURS

10. Here is a list of yearly incomes different people have. Please circle the letter of your own (not your partner's) estimated 1982 income. Please give the gross figure--before taxes, etc., and including income from salaries, rents, royalties, dividends, etc.

- | | |
|---------------------|--------------------|
| a. Less than 14,999 | k. 60,000 - 64,999 |
| b. 15,000 - 19,999 | l. 65,000 - 69,999 |
| c. 20,000 - 24,999 | m. 70,000 - 74,999 |
| d. 25,000 - 29,999 | n. 75,000 - 79,999 |
| e. 30,000 - 34,999 | o. 80,000 - 84,999 |
| f. 35,000 - 39,999 | p. 85,000 - 89,999 |
| g. 40,000 - 44,999 | q. 90,000 - 94,999 |
| h. 45,000 - 49,999 | r. 95,000 - 99,999 |
| i. 50,000 - 54,999 | s. Over 100,000 |
| j. 55,000 - 59,999 | |

11. Are there any children under 18 years of age currently living at home with you?

YES 0 (CONTINUE)

NO 1 (SKIP TO Q 13)

12. IF YES TO Q 11: How many children now live with you at home?

NUMBER OF CHILDREN

13. Please circle whether you strongly agree, agree, have mixed feelings, disagree, or strongly disagree about each of the following statements as they apply to a mother.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Mixed Feelings	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. A mother should realize that her greatest rewards and satisfaction in life come through her children.	0	1	2	3	4
b. A mother of preschool children should work only if the family really needs the money a whole lot.	0	1	2	3	4
c. A working mother should give up her job whenever it makes a hardship for her children.	0	1	2	3	4
d. There should be more daycare centers and nursery schools so that more mothers of preschool children could work.	0	1	2	3	4
e. If being a mother is not satisfying enough, she should take a job.	0	1	2	3	4
f. A mother of preschool children should not work because it is not good for the child.	0	1	2	3	4
g. A mother with preschoolers should be able to work as many hours per week as their father.	0	1	2	3	4

14. Please circle how often you do each of the following religious experiences, or have these religious feelings.

	Very Often	Often	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
a. Attending religious services.	0	1	2	3	4
b. Engaging in prayer.	0	1	2	3	4
c. Encouraging others to turn to religion.	0	1	2	3	4
d. Participating in a church social activity.	0	1	2	3	4
e. Listening to or watching religious broadcasts.	0	1	2	3	4
f. Reading the Bible.	0	1	2	3	4
g. Feeling that God loves you.	0	1	2	3	4
h. Have something that you call a religious experience.	0	1	2	3	4

15. Here are some ways people describe themselves. Do you strongly agree, agree, have mixed feelings, disagree, or else strongly disagree about each statement as it applies to you personally?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Mixed Feelings	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.	0	1	2	3	4
b. At times, I think I am no good at all.	0	1	2	3	4
c. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.	0	1	2	3	4
d. I am able to do things as well as most people.	0	1	2	3	4
e. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.	0	1	2	3	4
f. I certainly feel useless at times.	0	1	2	3	4
g. I feel that I am a person of worth at least on an equal plane with others.	0	1	2	3	4
h. I wish I could have more respect for myself.	0	1	2	3	4
i. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.	0	1	2	3	4
j. I take a positive attitude toward myself.	0	1	2	3	4

16. Please circle whether you strongly agree, agree, have mixed feelings, disagree, or strongly disagree about each of the following statements as they apply to a father.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Mixed Feelings	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. The father should be the <u>main</u> financial support of his children.	0	1	2	3	4
b. The father should spend as much time as the mother in looking after the <u>daily</u> needs of his children.	0	1	2	3	4
c. The father should be the children's main disciplinarian.	0	1	2	3	4
d. The father has the <u>special</u> responsibility to discipline the children firmly.	0	1	2	3	4
e. The father has a special responsibility to set an example to his children of leadership and assertiveness.	0	1	2	3	4

17. How well does each of the following statements describe your husband/wife when you and he/she disagree about something that is important to him/her? PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF THE FIVE NUMBERS FOR EACH STATEMENT.

	Does <u>NOT</u> Describe h/h At All				<u>DOES</u> Describe h/h Very Well
a. He/she says or does something to hurt my feelings	0	1	2	3	4
b. He/she gets really mad and starts yelling	0	1	2	3	4
c. He/she gets sarcastic . .	0	1	2	3	4
d. The more we talk, the madder he/she gets	0	1	2	3	4
e. He/she gets up and walks out	0	1	2	3	4
f. He/she takes a long time to get over feeling mad. .	0	1	2	3	4
g. He/she clams up, holds in his/her feelings	0	1	2	3	4
h. He/she tries to avoid talking about it	0	1	2	3	4
i. He/she comes right out and tells me how he/she is feeling	0	1	2	3	4
j. He/she gets cool and distant, gives me the cold shoulder	0	1	2	3	4
k. He/she tries to work out a compromise	0	1	2	3	4
l. He/she tries to smooth things over	0	1	2	3	4
m. He/she tries to reason with me	0	1	2	3	4

	Does <u>NOT</u> Describe h/h At All				<u>DOES</u> Describe h/h Very Well
n. He/she listens to what I have to say and tries to understand how I feel	0	1	2	3	4
o. He/she does something to let me know she/he really loves me even if we disagree	0	1	2	3	4
p. He/she wants what is best for him/herself without really considering my preferences and needs	0	1	2	3	4
q. He/she wants what is best for me, without really considering his/her own preferences and needs . . .	0	1	2	3	4
r. He/she wants to balance what is best for him/her with what is best for me .	0	1	2	3	4

18. How well do each of the following statements describe your husband/wife in general? PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF THE FIVE NUMBERS FOR EACH STATEMENT.

	Does <u>NOT</u> Describe h/h At All				<u>DOES</u> Describe h/h Very Well
a. She/he is primarily interested in his/her own welfare	0	1	2	3	4
b. There are times when she/he cannot be trusted.	0	1	2	3	4
c. She/he is perfectly honest and truthful with me	0	1	2	3	4
d. She/he can be trusted completely	0	1	2	3	4
e. She/he is truly sincere in his/her promises . . .	0	1	2	3	4
f. She/he does not show me enough consideration . .	0	1	2	3	4
g. She/he treats me fairly and justly	0	1	2	3	4
h. She/he can be counted on to help me	0	1	2	3	4
i. She/he nearly always knows exactly what I mean . . .	0	1	2	3	4
j. She/he usually senses or realizes what I am feeling	0	1	2	3	4
k. She/he realizes what I mean when I have difficulty saying it	0	1	2	3	4
l. She/he usually understands the whole meaning of what I say to him/her	0	1	2	3	4
m. She/he appreciates exactly how the things I experience feel to me	0	1	2	3	4

19. How TRUE is each of the following statements in describing how you feel about your husband/wife? PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF THE FIVE NUMBERS FOR EACH STATEMENT.

	<u>NOT</u> True At All				VERY True
a. I find it difficult to express my true feelings to him/her	0	1	2	3	4
b. I feel entirely safe in telling him/her about my weaknesses	0	1	2	3	4
c. There is nothing important that she/he does not know about me . . .	0	1	2	3	4
d. I can ask him/her anything	0	1	2	3	4
e. I can express both good and bad feelings to him/her	0	1	2	3	4
f. I am able to share private things face-to-face with him/her	0	1	2	3	4
g. I can be honest with him/her	0	1	2	3	4
h. I am open with him/her about things I am afraid of	0	1	2	3	4
i. I feel I can confide in him/her about almost everything	0	1	2	3	4

20. Which of the following statements best describes how you feel about the FUTURE of your relationship with your husband/wife?

ON THE LINE BELOW, PLEASE MARK THE LETTER OF THE STATEMENT THAT BEST DESCRIBES HOW YOU FEEL.

- a. I want desperately for my relationship to succeed, and would go to almost any lengths to see that it does.
- b. I want very much for my relationship to succeed, and will do all I can to see that it does.
- c. I want very much for my relationship to succeed, and will do my fair share to see that it does.
- d. It would be nice if my relationship succeeded, but I cannot do much more than I am doing now to help it succeed.
- e. It would be nice if it succeeded, but I refuse to do any more than I am doing now to keep the relationship going.
- f. My relationship can never succeed, and there is no more that I can do to keep the relationship going.

LETTER

22. All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied have you been with your marriage over the last two months? Place an X in the box that best describes how satisfied you have been.

Completely
Satisfied

Neutral

Completely
Dissatisfied

APPENDIX C
CONJOINT INTERVIEW

Conjoint Interview

The guidelines for the next part of our time together are very simple. For example, I will ask you (TURN TO ONE SPOUSE) some questions about your decision making, but while I am doing that, you (TURN TO OTHER) should feel free to interrupt, or break in, at any point and help out your spouse in case she/he has forgotten some detail, or you think what she/he is saying should be said in a little different way. Next, after asking you (FIRST SPOUSE) some questions, I will ask OTHER a few, and OTHER should feel free to interrupt and help out at any point, just as FIRST did. In summary, what we would like to have is an interesting and lively discussion which comes as close as possible to the ways in which you actually work out your marriage decisions.

We have found that in every relationship, the partners now have, or have recently had, one or more disagreements. The partners tell us the disagreements cover many different areas. For example, the disagreements may be over money--people say their partner spends too much or too little, or uses money in the wrong ways. Often there are disagreements about employment--what job to take, and whether partners spend too much time working. Other disagreements partners tell us about include where to live, which partner should do which chores around the house, as well as matters of affection, sex, and companionship--such as spending too little time together. Other partners tell us they often disagree over who should take care of the children--or spend time with them; they also disagree over personal habits, or visiting friends and relatives, or religion, and so on. The list of possible disagreements is almost endless.

1. Thinking of your own relationship, what would you say is the one thing you currently disagree about most often. That one thing does not have to be on the list I just read--instead, the disagreement can include anything at all. With that in mind, what would you say is the one thing you disagree about most often?

(SKIP TO Q 2)

- 1A. IF COUPLE SAYS, "We have no current disagreement . . ." READ:

Couples who tell us they have no current disagreements, tell us about disagreements they had in the recent past. Thinking back to your recent past, what was the one thing you disagreed about most often?

(SKIP TO Q 2)

- 1B. IF COUPLE SAYS, "We have never had any disagreements . . ." READ:

Some couples do tell us they have never had any disagreements, and we are very interested in how they are able to do that. To help us understand, I would like to have you play act for us how you usually make a decision over some important area of your marriage. Take, for example, the matter of companionship--how much time you should spend together. Suppose one of you felt you needed to spend more time together. Which one of you would be more likely to bring up that sort of matter?

(USE RESPONSE CATEGORIES IN Q2, AND CONTINUE.)

2. Couples tell us that one person usually brings up the disagreement more often than the other in order to discuss it. In your relationship, which one of you usually first brings up the disagreement over _____?

WIFE 0

(INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ CATEGORIES.)

HUSBAND 1

BOTH EQUALLY 2

If "Wife" OR "Husband" is response to Q1, turn to that particular PERSON AND GO TO Q3.

IF "Both Equally" IS RESPONSE, TURN TO WIFE AND BEGIN AT Q3.

3. When was the last time you brought up the matter of your disagreement over _____?

 DAYS AGO WEEKS AGO MONTHS AGO (DO NOT READ.)

4. What exactly did you say to your partner in connection with your disagreement over _____? For example, what changes did you want, and so forth? What was your opinion, or point of view, and how did you present it?

- 4A. Is there anything else you said specifically while presenting your point of view regarding your disagreement over _____?

5. Partners tell us that at the same time they bring up the disagreement itself, they also say and do several things to help each other see their point of view. The first of these things is to give facts, figures, and other details about the disagreement--but they do not try to influence the other person to see their point of view, or to get them to change their minds. For example, couples who are trying to decide about buying a car try to say something about the payments, how much gas mileage they can expect, and so forth. Or if they are trying to decide about a job for one partner or the other, they give facts on salary, hours, and so forth. When you are discussing your disagreement over _____, would you say you try to provide a lot of facts and figures about it, do you provide some information, little information, or no information at all?

A LOT 0 SOME 1 LITTLE 2 NONE 3 (SKIP TO Q7)

6. Exactly what kind of information do you give to your partner?
7. Partners tell us that they often go one step beyond merely providing information to their partners. In addition, they also try to influence, or help, the other person to see their point of view. They often try to influence them by giving them reasons such as those listed on CARD A. (HAND CARD A TO PARTNERS.) As I read each one, please tell me if you ever use that reason while discussing your disagreement over _____ with your partner.

	YES	NO
a. It is best for the children.	0	1
b. It is best for me.	0	1
c. It is best for your partner.	0	1
d. It is only right and fair.	0	1
e. It is your partner's responsibility.	0	1
f. It is best for the family.	0	1

8. Are there any other reasons you use to try to influence your partner to see your point of view while discussing _____?

YES

NO (SKIP TO Q10)

9. IF YES TO Q8, What are these reasons?
10. Please tell me which of the above reasons you use most often to help influence your partner to see your point of view.

11. Another thing that persons do to try to help influence their partner to see their point of view is to make promises such as, "If you do this, then I will do that," and so on. While you are discussing your disagreement over _____, would you say you make promises like that?

VERY OFTEN	0
OFTEN	1
SOMETIMES	2
SELDOM	3
NEVER	4 (SKIP TO Q13)

12. What exactly do you say when you make those kinds of promises in connection with your disagreement over _____?

13. Another thing that persons do to try to help or influence partners see their point of view is to tell them how important the matter is to them. When you are discussing your disagreement over _____, would you say you tell your partner how important the matter is to you?

VERY OFTEN	0
OFTEN	1
SELDOM	2
SOMETIMES	3
NEVER	4

14. How important to you personally is the point of view you mentioned earlier in connection with your disagreement over _____? Is your point of view:

VERY IMPORTANT	0
IMPORTANT	1
ONLY SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	2

15. Another thing that persons do to help influence partners see their point of view is to make certain statements such as, "If you do not stop doing this, then I will not stop or start something else you might want," and so on. While you are discussing your disagreement over _____, would you say you make statements like that:

VERY OFTEN	0
OFTEN	1
SOMETIMES	2
SELDOM	3
NEVER?	4 (SKIP TO Q17.)

16. What exactly do you say when you make those kinds of statements in connection with your disagreement over _____?

17. Another thing persons do to influence partners to see their point of view is to use certain strong words, or do certain strong things, such as those that appear on CARD B. As I read each one, please tell me if you ever use it while discussing your disagreement over _____?

	YES	NO
a. Get mad or angry.	0	1
b. Raise your voice.	0	1
c. Get up and leave the room.	0	1
d. Get your partner to feel guilty.	0	1
e. Get your partner to feel selfish.	0	1
f. Get your partner to feel ashamed.	0	1
g. Swear.	0	1
h. Call your partner "dumb" or "stupid."	0	1
i. Throw things.	0	1
j. Slap or hit.	0	1

- | | YES | NO |
|------------------------|-----|----|
| k. Cry. | 0 | 1 |
| l. Pout, or feel hurt. | 0 | 1 |
18. Please tell me the letter of the thing on CARD B that you use most often in connection with your disagreement over _____.
- _____
- LETTER FROM Q17
19. TURN TO PARTNER REACTOR
- Since there are always two sides to every disagreement, I would first of all like to ask you if you would say that everything your partner (name) has said so far is accurate; or would you say that there are some things she/he has said which in your opinion need to be changed in some way?
- ACCURATE 0 (SKIP TO Q21)
- NEED TO BE CHANGED 1
20. What specific things that she/he said need to be changed?
21. Your partner says that his/her point of view over _____ is that (Q4, 4A). (ASK INITIATOR IF THAT IS CORRECT STATEMENT.)
- When she/he says that, what do you say in response? Specifically, how is your point of view or opinion on your disagreement over _____ different from his/hers?
- 21A. What exactly did you say to your partner in connection with your disagreement over _____?
- 21B. Was there anything else that you added?

22. While you are discussing your disagreement over _____ with your partner, how much information (facts, figures, details) do you provide? Do you provide:

A LOT	0
SOME	1
A LITTLE	2
NONE?	3 (SKIP TO Q24)

23. Exactly what kind of information do you give to your partner?

24. Which of the reasons on CARD A do you use to help or influence your partner to see your point of view while you are discussing your disagreement over _____ with him/her? Do you say:

	YES	NO
a. It is best for the children.	0	1
b. It is best for me.	0	1
c. It is best for him/her.	0	1
d. It is only right and fair.	0	1
e. It is his/her responsibility.	0	1
f. It is best for the family.	0	1

25. Are there any other reasons you use to try to influence your partner to see your point of view while discussing _____?

YES 0

NO 1 (SKIP TO Q27)

26. IF YES TO Q25, what are these reasons?

27. Please tell me which of the above reasons you use most often to help influence your partner to see your point of view.

28. In trying to help your partner see your point of view, how often would you say you make promises such as, "If you do this, then I will do that," and would you say you make them:

VERY OFTEN 0 OFTEN 1 SOMETIMES 2 SELDOM 3

NEVER 4 (SKIP TO Q30)

29. What exactly do you say when you make those kinds of promises?

30. How often would you say you tell your partner how important the matter you are discussing is to you? Would you say you do that:

VERY OFTEN 0

OFTEN 1

SOMETIMES 2

SELDOM 3

NEVER 4

31. How important to you personally is your point of view in connection with your disagreement over _____? Is your point of view:

VERY IMPORTANT 0

IMPORTANT 1

ONLY SOMEWHAT
IMPORTANT 2

32. While discussing your disagreement over _____, how often would you say you make statements such as, "If you do not stop doing this, then I will not start or stop something you want," and so on, in order to help your partner see your point of view? Would you say you do that:

VERY OFTEN 0 OFTEN 1 SOMETIMES 2 SELDOM 3

NEVER? 4 (SKIP TO Q34)

33. What exactly do you say at those times?

34. Which of the things on CARD B do you say or do to help or influence your partner to see your point of view while discussing _____?

	YES	NO
a. Get mad or angry.	0	1
b. Raise your voice.	0	1
c. Get up and leave the room.	0	1
d. Get your partner to feel guilty.	0	1
e. Get your partner to feel selfish.	0	1
f. Get your partner to feel ashamed.	0	1
g. Swear.	0	1
h. Call your partner "dumb" or "stupid."	0	1
i. Throw things	0	1
j. Slap or hit.	0	1
k. Cry.	0	1
l. Pout or feel hurt.	0	1

35. Please tell me the letter of the thing on CARD B that you use most often in connection with your disagreement over _____.

LETTER FROM Q34

TURN TO INITIATOR.

37. What specific things need to be changed?

38. In regard to your disagreement over _____, you say that _____, and your partner says _____. When she/he says that, do you make any suggestions for new ideas or compromises, or changes, that either of you could make that could help settle your disagreement?

YES 0

NO 1 (SKIP TO Q40)

39. What exactly do you say?

(SKIP TO Q41)

40. IF NO TO Q38, why do you not make any new suggestions?

(SKIP TO Q46)

41. TURN TO REACTOR. Would you say that what your partner has just said is accurate, or are there things that need to be changed?

ACCURATE 0 (SKIP TO Q43)

CHANGE 1

42. What specific things need to be changed?

43. When your partner says those things, do you make any additional suggestions for further changes that either of you could make?

YES 0

NO 1 (SKIP TO Q45)

44. What exactly do you say?

(SKIP TO Q46)

45. Why do you not make any additional suggestions?

46. TO BOTH PARTNERS:

The last time you finished talking about your disagreement over _____, where would you say you ended up as far as the line on CARD C is concerned? Would you say you ended at number zero--complete or total disagreement--or were you at a number further to the right--and if so, which number was it?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Complete
Disagreement

Complete
Agreement

47. To finish our time together, I am now going to give each of you a brief questionnaire to complete separately from each other. Like the questionnaire you completed earlier, your partner will not be told what you say on this questionnaire, so you can be completely open and honest. But before you do this, is there anything that either of you would care to add to any part of the discussion we have just had regarding your disagreement over _____?

APPENDIX D
CLOSING QUESTIONNAIRE

Closing Questionnaire

We would now like you to take a few minutes to think about the discussion you just had with your husband/wife. As with the questionnaire you filled out earlier, your husband/wife will not know what you say in these pages.

1. As you are thinking about the discussion we have just had, for each of the following items, please circle the number that comes closest to describing how you FEEL right now about the things you and your husband/wife said to each other.

	<u>NOT</u> How I Feel At All				<u>How I</u> <u>DO</u> Feel
a. Angry	0	1	2	3	4
b. Annoyed	0	1	2	3	4
c. Hurt	0	1	2	3	4
d. Closer to him/her and more loving than before	0	1	2	3	4
e. More understanding for him/her than before	0	1	2	3	4
f. Resentful	0	1	2	3	4
g. Resigned	0	1	2	3	4
h. That talking was a waste of time	0	1	2	3	4
i. That she/he will go ahead and do what she/he wants to any- way	0	1	2	3	4
j. That she/he will use what I've said against me	0	1	2	3	4
k. Sorry for what I said	0	1	2	3	4
l. That she/he tried to pres- sure me to do what she/he wants	0	1	2	3	4

	<u>NOT</u> How <u>I</u> Feel At All					How I <u>DO</u> Feel
m. That she/he wants to work out something that is best for both of us	0	1	2	3	4	
n. She/he understands my point of view	0	1	2	3	4	
o. She/he does not realize how important the matter of disagreement is to me	0	1	2	3	4	
p. She/he showed me how much she/he cares about me	0	1	2	3	4	
q. She/he was open about her/his needs and what she/he really wants	0	1	2	3	4	
r. Satisfied	0	1	2	3	4	
s. OTHER? PLEASE WRITE IN ANY ADDITIONAL FEELINGS YOU MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE DISCUSSION WE HAVE JUST HAD.						

2. Think for a moment about what you and your husband/wife said you wanted at the beginning of the discussion. Considering the way the discussion went, how much would you say you gained as a result of the discussion?

PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST DESCRIBES HOW MUCH YOU WOULD SAY YOU GAINED.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
NONE OF WHAT I WANTED					ALL OF WHAT I WANTED					

3. And how much would you say your husband/wife gained as a result of the discussion?

PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST DESCRIBES HOW MUCH YOU WOULD SAY SHE/HE GAINED.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

NONE OF
WHAT
SHE/HE
WANTED

ALL OF
WHAT
SHE/HE
WANTED

4. In thinking about the matter that you and your husband/wife just discussed, where would you say you are RIGHT NOW with regard to this specific matter?

PLEASE MARK ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

- a. We are still talking about it. _____
- b. We have agreed to disagree, and not talk about it for a while. _____
- c. I keep talking about it even though my husband/wife does not want to. _____
- d. My husband/wife keeps talking about it even though I do not want to. _____
- e. My husband/wife does not want to talk about it, so I just keep quiet. _____
- f. My husband/wife keeps quiet because he/she knows I do not want to talk about it. _____

5. All things considered, how fair would you say the situation is right now as far as this specific matter is concerned?

PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT COMES CLOSEST TO HOW FAIR YOU THINK THE SITUATION IS.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

COMPLETELY
UNFAIR

COMPLETELY
FAIR

6. In thinking about this situation, what do you figure is the best possible way to settle it in order to make you yourself most satisfied?

7. What is the best possible way it could be settled in order to make your husband/wife most satisfied?

8. 8. What is the best possible way it could be settled to make you both equally satisfied?

9. And finally, please add anything else that you can think of about how you and your husband/wife try to decide this particular matter.

THANK YOU!!

APPENDIX E
CONJOINT INTERVIEW RESPONSE CARDS

CARD A

	YES	NO
a. It is best for the children.	0	1
b. It is best for me.	0	1
c. It is best for your partner.	0	1
d. It is only right and fair.	0	1
e. It is your partner's responsibility.	0	1
f. It is best for the family.	0	1

CARD B

	YES	NO
a. Get mad or angry.	0	1
b. Raise your voice.	0	1
c. Get up and leave the room.	0	1
d. Get your partner to feel guilty.	0	1
e. Get your partner to feel selfish.	0	1
f. Get your partner to feel ashamed.	0	1
g. Swear.	0	1
h. Call your partner "dumb" or "stupid."	0	1
i. Throw things.	0	1
j. Slap or hit.	0	1
k. Cry.	0	1
l. Pout or feel hurt.	0	1

CARD C

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
COMPLETE DISAGREEMENT									COMPLETE AGREEMENT	