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REUNITING WORD AND DEED: NEGOTIATION FOR REAL PEACEMAKING

AND AUTHENTIC CLASSROOM WRITING

by

Marsha Holmes

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of The Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

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Approved by

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APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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HOLMES, MARSHA, Ph.D.   Reuniting Word and Deed: Negotiation for
Real Peacemaking and Authentic Classroom Writing.   (1995)
Directed by Dr. Hephzibah Roskelly.   242pp.

The issue at stake in this dissertation is the relationship
between word and deed. The problem it addresses is the way in which
categories of discourse undermine that relationship. It argues that
discourse taxonomies divide word from deed because they categorize
persuasion and deliberation as characteristics of some uses of language
but not others. This splitting of word and deed informs and is informed
by other divisions--between writer and reader, meaning and consequence,
form and content, text and context. As a result, it silences the second
part of each of these hierarchies--reader, consequence, content, and
context. These divisions, this dissertation illustrates, represent an
inaccurate and destructive theory and practice of language.

The first chapter discusses differences in a theory of rhetoric as
all language use and of rhetoric as one use of language. It argues in
favor of Kenneth Burke's dialogical philosophy of language as symbolic
action and against dichotomous theories of rhetoric as a singular
category of discourse. The second chapter analyzes the contemporary
theory of one category in particular--epideictic--as evidence of the
erroneous and debilitating effects of the dichotomy of
deliberative/epideictic created by discursive categories.

Chapters three and four investigate epideictic practice. Chapter
three studies the war eulogy by providing a reader's response to
Pericles' "Funeral Oration" in order to illustrate the persuasive and
deliberative nature of the most ceremonial of traditional epideictic.
Chapter four studies the deliberative classroom essay through an

analysis of questionnaires completed by university students in three composition classrooms in order to illustrate the traditional ceremonial tendencies in discourse categorized as persuasive and deliberative. The final chapter draws the eulogy and essay together for a comparison of the similarities in these two rhetorical situations occasioned by ceremony and school, suggesting implications of perceiving rhetorical theory and practice as negotiation of deeds enacted in words in all uses of language and pointing to the consequent ability for moving farther along toward real peacemaking and authentic classroom writing.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to peacemakers--past, present, and future--who in their rhetorical occasions encourage us to make real our dreams of peace through the deeds of our words.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

How fortunate I feel to have this public occasion to say thank you and I love you to the people who have been most influential, directly and indirectly, in the shaping of this dissertation:

To my teachers, who are not just Professors Roskelly, Roberts, Gibson, and Griffith. They are Hepsie, Trish, Mary Ellis, and Kelley. They are a committee of teachers and of genuinely good people who have helped me write and teach authentically through their lessons and by their examples, in classrooms and in conversations.

To Hepsie especially, who has been my chief collaborator. Reading, writing, thinking, talking--together we negotiated this dissertation's meaning. From the moment we met, Hepsie has been guiding me in an everlasting philosophical relationship with my teaching.

To my husband, Charles, who has generously and thoughtfully given of himself in every possible way, and some seemingly impossible ones, in order to help me fulfill my dreams of becoming a teacher and completing doctoral studies. These accomplishments would be smaller and mean less without his love. His care, respect, responsibility, and knowledge of and for me make ours a blessed partnership.

To my parents, Mom and Dad, who have always encouraged me to believe that I could do what I wanted and to do what I believed. They have watched their daughter, who has always wanted to change the world and who has always loved to talk, become a teacher of rhetoric and composition. They are not the least surprised.

To my brother, John, who has always shared with me the spirit for making dreams realities. His belief and persistence have been exemplary for me. His brotherly love and now his wife Carol's sisterly love multiply immeasurably the support that buoys me daily.

To my grandmother, Mama, whose love is pure.

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      Mary Brayboy for her enduring friendship and grace.

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      Elizabeth Chiseri-Strater for her ideas and encouragement.

PREFACE

"You shall not kill."
Exodus 20:13

Over the course of my life, many voices have whispered in my ear, nudged my conscience, inspired my convictions, and shaped my actions for peacemaking. I can identify some of the instances, circumstances, and influences that nurtured me into pacifistic beliefs, although as I move from day to day the development has seemed and seems gradual, sometimes invisible. In some ways, pacifism feels as if it has always been a part of me and as if, without a design of my own, I continue to recognize more fully its fundamental place in what I say and do.

The occasion of writing a dissertation has given me the opportunity to explore the relationship between peace and language. I have come to see that theories and practices of language can be peaceful or they can be violent, whether their explicit subjects happen to be about peace and war. When the subject _is_ about peace and war, consequences of the way language is conceptualized and engaged are the most crucial of all. The matter of words as deeds becomes literally a matter of life and death. Pacifism and rhetoric, then, have become forever woven studies for me.

In this dissertation, I have added my voice to the voices that have and will persuade me to work for peace. In turn, I hope that my readers will be persuaded to add or strengthen their own voices by joining choruses or taking leads in whatever ways their lives occasion

for them in the matter of negotiating words that make a more peaceful
world.

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CHAPTER I

CATEGORIZING IN RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION STUDIES

What Are We Doing With Categories?

When I was a little girl, my grandmother kept a glass bottle of buttons in her middle dresser drawer. My very favorite pastime was to sit at her dresser, pour out the buttons on its top, and sort them into piles. Sometimes I would put them together according to color, other times by size and, as best I remember my seemingly endless fascination with this activity, into numerous other categories for making bigger and smaller piles of buttons, mini-collections of buttons that pleased me and made sense to me at the time. I don't remember anybody ever telling me how to organize the buttons; I don't remember ever holding forth to myself or other potential button organizers about a particular way those buttons had to be arranged every time. I do remember loving the way the buttons looked rolling and bouncing out of their container, the way they gathered into smaller groups. I remember how much fun it was pushing them all together in a big pile and sorting again. I remember loving making meaning with those buttons.

Years later, I sat in a University of North Carolina at Greensboro graduate seminar on classical rhetoric. My professor, Dr. Patricia Roberts, brought in a box of buttons and asked each student to sort them and to explain why we sorted as we did. Being the high-spirited graduate students that we were, we tried to sort in unique and impressive ways according to colors, materials, sizes, functions, and

other criteria I no longer recall. When we finished, the number of sortings equaled the number of sorters. (I was the most egocentric, dividing them according to buttons I liked and buttons I didn't like, arguing that the two categories would facilitate efficient button selection. Should I need a button, I'd already gathered the ones most likely to meet my needs. Well . . . I was in heaven, back in my old playtime again.)

Dr. Roberts' point was to introduce a discussion of Aristotle's categories of rhetoric by helping us see how arbitrary categories are. Nothing was right or wrong about anybody's button piles, just like my childhood creations. We sorted according to the moment's context--what we needed and who we were as button-sorters. We all provided rationales for our systems, which would serve us in our connections with these buttons. Similarly, Aristotle's rhetorical categories--forensic, deliberative, and epideictic--made sense and were useful to him at the time. He saw and heard rhetors in legal, political, and ceremonial settings. Therefore, his categories reflect his particular perspective on those public occasions for discourse. Actually, his categories did not make complete sense to him. Epideictic was slippery, but being a great lover of categories, he nevertheless asserted his trio with their defining characteristics. And they work almost so neatly that rhetoricians have been willing to accept them or at least to build with them ever since in studies of language use. Whether classical or modern, one of the common features of traditional taxonomies is the category of deliberation and its defining characteristics of persuasion, context, and action--features that are somehow more real, powerful,

and/or important in "deliberative" as opposed to other kinds of discourse. Deliberation is sort of super-discourse in rhetorical taxonomists' eyes. It is this separatist notion of deliberation and, more importantly, the limits it places on other supposedly non-deliberative discourse that exercise my concern with epideictic theory and practice.

From childhood to graduate school, my love of button play has helped me know that categories are human constructs created to enlighten the moment. More particularly, it has sparked my curiosity about, and ultimately my complaint with, people who insist on their own categories of discourse. What are the consequences of keeping all the deliberation in one pile? What are the outcomes of deliberation circulating throughout all the piles? What happens when we assume no deliberation exists, although it does? What do we get when we assume deliberation will occur, yet it does not? How quickly does taxonomy move from toy to tool to tyrant in theory and practice? Although my grandmother's button bottle was my favorite toy, and its use gave me great pleasures and lessons, I would not want to force it on anybody else and thereby destroy their play or work, especially knowing that the most famous taxonomist of all could not master the "perfect" categories.

My admonishment of dogmatic taxonomists is not, of course, a new argument. <u>Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal</u> <u>about the Mind</u>, George Lakoff's commanding discussion of recent transformations within the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science, significantly revises the traditional concept of category itself. According to this conventional view, which Lakoff terms "objectivism"

(xii), "things are in the same category if and only if they have certain properties in common. Those properties are necessary and sufficient conditions for defining the category" (xiv). In the new view, "experientialism" (xv), categorizing things according to their similar characteristics turns out to be only one way the mind might categorize. By presenting case studies as well as empirical research from multiple disciplines, Lakoff argues that the structure of thought and its categories are characterized by not one but four "cognitive models": 1) the propositional model defines categories by degrees of membership; 2) the metaphoric (traditional) model defines by necessary and sufficient conditions; 3) the metonymic model by a prototype part representing the whole category; and 4) an image-schematic consisting of a central category with many categories radiating from it (153-54). The assumption that the second, metaphorical model is the way to categorize illustrates the strength and comfort of two-thousand-year-old-plus intellectual roots in ancient Greek philosophy:

> From the time of Aristotle to the later work of Wittgenstein, categories were thought [to] be well understood and unproblematic. They were assumed to be abstract containers, with things either inside or outside the category. (6)

Lakoff's work overturns this "truth."

Another crucial aspect of Lakoff's cognitive models theory is its valuing of both reason and experience as shapers of humans' conceptual systems. Thus categories do not exist only "out there" beyond but discernible by the knower, as the traditional view of cognition has it. Categories also live "in here" within and shaped by the knower, as new work in cognition demonstrates. This dialogic between knower and known

remains untarred by the brush of relativism because it shares, Lakoff points out, objectivism's commitment to reality, truth, and knowledge, although with an invigorated notion of what constitutes them.

By calling into question conventional wisdom about categories and the stronghold it has had and still has on inquiry and metainquiry, Lakoff's work points to the futility of constructing categories that claim to explain once and for all the discourses that human beings create. Finally, his overarching goal to replace the traditional view with "ideas that are not only more accurate, but more humane" (9) resonates in the two concerns that my analysis of the epideictic category addresses—that its theories are inaccurate and their consequences destructive. It is no coincidence, then, that my argument confronts the ancient notion of categorization itself.

Studies in the relationship between thought and language also provide important insights about categories. A. R. Luria's research in child development indicates that categories constitute cognitive processes that children develop in order to understand reality; they are not cognitive products whereby children learn to define reality. Evidence of a child's cognitive development lies in the ability to construct categories in a variety of patterns. Development also has occurred when children progress from forming small, discrete categories based on differentiations to forming larger, more inclusive categories based on generalizations (55-70). In A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric, Frank D'Angelo describes the inter-related processes of categorizing in thinking and writing. In accordance with Luria's emphasis on dynamic process rather than static product, his theory aims to develop a

generative composition pedagogy rather than to determine what the categories for all thinking and writing are or should be. These studies put rhetorical theory on the path toward understanding language, rather than placing a classification system at the end of the theoretical path. Similarly, my own argument speaks for the benefits in recognizing categorizing as a process that initiates investigations of language, and it points out liabilities in a concept of categories as products that serve as the results of those explorations. Lakoff's cognitive model, for instance, prompts more thinking about thinking rather than concludes it; therefore, it is a generative instrument for inquiry. The pragmatic spirit of this dissertation, then, is embedded in chapter one's question: "What are we doing with categories?" and its argument for seeing categories as tools to think <u>with</u> rather than objects to think <u>of</u> in the service of more humane communication.

Numerous disciplines are currently accelerating their questions about the ways in which categories serve as heuristics or hammer locks. In composition studies, Kate Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly collect a group of essays, <u>Farther Along: Transforming Dichotomies in Rhetoric and Composition</u>, that aims to transform into dialogics the numerous categories constraining pedagogy. Their argument speaks to the destructive tendencies in taxonomies, given their often quick move to rigidity. Reviewing categories that divide composition theorists into a variety of competing camps, Ronald and Roskelly conclude that

> taxonomies don't permit argument [and] aren't designed for
> dialectic, despite assurances from all the taxonomists about the
> flexibility of the categories or their interdependence. Just as
> restrictive and more destructive to dialectic is the way
> taxonomies create hierarchies as they position methods and

theories.   Any hierarchy invites, maybe even necessitates, a power
struggle.   (3-4)

James Berlin, for example, does not "recognize the danger inherent when
a profusion of slippery theoretical categories can too easily become
rigid labels," nor does Stephen North accomplish the purposes of his
taxonomizing when "the very act of labeling solidifies rather than
dissolves the separations it explores" (3). My study joins the spirit
of these such as Lakoff's and Ronald and Roskelly's in warning about the
dangerous tendencies in classification systems, and in recommending
"looking beneath the surface of apparently conflicting ideas to discover
oppositions transformed--not merely synthesized--into new conceptions"
(Ronald and Roskelly 7).

In rhetorical theory, answers to my question "What are we doing
with categories?" spring from the large categorical question at the core
of rhetoric's perpetual self-examination: What _is_ rhetoric? Is
rhetoric all language use, or is it one use of language? Theoretically,
is it the whole enchilada or one taco on the combination plate grande?
Practically, do rhetorical studies interpret any use of language, or is
its field of inquiry a closed set of discourse? How big or small a
category does rhetoric as the Aristotelian study of the available means
of persuasion bring to mind? While rhetorical theory argues about
whether rhetoric is the whole or a part of language use, rhetorical
practice implicitly or explicitly posits one answer or the other and
then develops arguments from its premises. Critical interpretations of
war eulogies, for instance, can either elucidate or obfuscate these
texts' persuasive natures. Composition pedagogy can teach deliberation

as essential to all communication or as a particular end for only some
of it. My own study of epideictic is grounded in theory that argues
"Rhetoric is all language use," and it critiques the argument "Rhetoric
is one use of language." The choice is an important one to make and to
understand because the answer to the question "What is rhetoric?"
informs the analysis, teaching, and practice of all language.
Especially considering that rhetoric and persuasion are synonymous terms
for practically all theorists and practitioners, a concept of rhetoric
has essential relevance for thinking about how people are—or assume
they are not—using language to move each other. Definitions of
rhetoric shape expectations of writers and readers, texts and contexts,
form and content, and meanings and consequences. The theoretical
differences between rhetoric as all language use and rhetoric as one use
of language are laid out in the next two sections—a sketch of Kenneth
Burke's philosophy of language followed by a critique of Walter H.
Beale's theory of rhetoric.

Rhetoric as All Language Use

Transformation of the deliberative/nondeliberative dichotomy
created by categories of discourse compartmentalized according to
difference requires a philosophy of language to facilitate such a move.
Kenneth Burke's philosophy, of ubiquitous influence in rhetorical theory
throughout the better part of this century, serves such a purpose for
this study of epideictic. Foss, Foss, and Trapp provide a helpful
assessment of the wide range of critical responses invoked by Burke's
deep and diverse project. The very reasons that Burke's detractors
offer as weaknesses in his work, they note, are also the ones that his

advocates claim as its strengths. What some see as un-systematic, eclectic, and obscure, others favor as characteristics of a philosophy that is human- rather than system-centered, inclusive rather than exclusive, and respectful of its readers' abilities to negotiate the meanings of his ideas and illustrations (183-88). In their bibliographies, neither William H. Rueckert nor Richard H. Thames attempt to compile a comprehensive guide to the influence of Burke's thinking. Thames' checklist is limited to direct critical responses to Burke that "exhibit quality, address significant issues, create or resolve controversy, exemplify interdisciplinary influence, and reflect international recognition" (305). Rueckert, who has been writing on Burke since 1951, explains the near impossibility of listing all direct and indirect applications of Burke's thinking. The task, he writes, is "beyond my knowledge, patience, and talents. For such a listing, I substitute the flat, declarative statement that Burke's influence is massive" (515). My own argument, then, is one among hundreds in rhetorical studies that make their cases from a Burkean point of view. He is the consummate thinker to represent the essentially dialogical concept of "rhetoric as all language use." Several key Burkean tenets help in envisioning a concept of language and of rhetoric that includes all discourse: dramatism and language as symbolic action (including incipient action), identification and addressedness, form and appeal, and the pragmatic ideology and moral implications of his theory.[1]

Dramatism and Language as Symbolic Action: In its broadest view, Kenneth Burke's philosophical project explores human relations and the worlds human beings create. Dramatism, his foundational metaphor for

how people shape reality, casts all aspects of life as a <u>doing</u>, not a <u>being</u>, in the world. This metaphor illustrates life—or living, I should say, to put it more dramatistically—as people doing things with and to each other. Focusing on a topic a little less broad than life, dramatism studies language as the primary way in which people shape their worlds, construct their realities, engage in their dramas, do to and with each other. Burke's philosophy "treats language and thought primarily as modes of action" (<u>Grammar</u> xxii). As "a species of action, symbolic action . . . its nature is such that it can be used as a tool" (<u>Language</u> 15). In a dramatistic world of words, the being of life transforms into the doing of living, and language becomes languaging. All language, then, is a living act.

If language is doing, Burke argues, then we must ask of it "What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?" (<u>Grammar</u> xv). Burke's philosophy advocates a method appropriate for answering the question. The pentad, his profound and now popular heuristic, illuminates the five essential elements to be analyzed in any symbolic action: Act (what), Agent (who), Agency (how), Scene (where and when), and Purpose (why). The terms operate in dialogical pairs with a pliancy that enables any pair to be foregrounded. In literary criticism, for instance, one interpretation of James Russell Lowell's Civil War eulogy "Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration" might emphasize Agent and Act—the warrior as performer of heroic deed. Another reading could analyze Agency and Purpose—the means of murder in order to achieve superiority over other human beings, or the use of praise in order to justify war killings. Still another might

investigate Scene-Agent, comparing the attitude and expectations of Lowell's 1865 audience to a 1995 one, who read with two world wars and scores of other conflicts across the globe between them. In any case, Burke's philosophy requires readers to approach Lowell's eulogy—because it is an instance of language use—as a symbolic act. "Man is the symbol-using animal"; language, therefore, inescapably symbolizes (Language 3). The pentad enables symbol-users to ask: Who is doing what, how, where, when, and why? The pentad also works provocatively for interpreting symbolic acts in the composition classroom. Who are the Agents of classroom discourse and how, where, when, and why are they doing what? Rhetorical critics and teachers must ask the pentad's questions because the answers, Burke's philosophy insists, make a difference for human relations.

Language as symbolic action means much more than a narrow notion of a call to action with an actual physical outcome, often a characteristic of rhetoric as one use of language. General Mills, for instance, produces a commercial in order to persuade me to buy Cheerios on my next trip to the grocery store. I do; therefore, their use of language is rhetorical. Or, my student writes an argument about violence in which he calls for his class colleagues to write General Mills and demand that they not sponsor violent cartoons. Therefore, I as teacher judge his essay persuasive, even though his readers do not fulfill the essay's call. In addition to seeking overt, prompt change—however serious or frivolous, however likely or unlikely—symbolic action is also attitudinal. Attitude is an "incipient act" in Burkean terms (Rhetoric 50), and "[t]he realm of the incipient, or attitudinal,

is the realm of 'symbolic action' par excellence" (<u>Grammar</u> 243). Thus Burke treats every instance of discourse as a union of a word and a deed. Words are deeds, all of them; they are not entities different from one another according to whether or what kind of action they seek from their readers. Burke often argues, for instance, that poetry has the "power to induce or communicate states of minds to readers" and therefore is discourse entirely within the scope of rhetorical analysis (<u>Rhetoric</u> 50).

This concept of attitude as action informs my study's argument against the traditional notion of deliberative rhetoric as the only discourse that moves readers to action. The "incipient act" advances rhetorical study's sense of what an act can be and therefore what language can do. It helps expose the crassness of discourse categories that characterize a business conglomerate's advocacy of their product as deliberative discourse, but a war eulogist's conflation of courage and bayoneting strangers as nondeliberative. It points out the reasons for teachers' and students' frustrations in trying to distinguish the way in which a "deliberative" essay does not ask for reflection and a "reflective essay" does not ask for deliberation. Counter to this antithesis of deliberative/non-deliberative categories, Burke's incipient acts have several functions. They can be acts, substitutes for other acts, or first steps toward future acts (<u>Grammar</u> 236). For instance, a war eulogy might persuade its reader to resist military duty, or to pray for government and military leaders, or to resolve never to kill another person for any reason. (Conversely and more in the spirit of most war eulogies, the reader might be persuaded to join

the Army, to vote for increased military spending, or to promise to kill and die for his or her convictions.) Equally in all of these reader responses—not one more than the other—the war eulogy is an act with consequences.

Likewise in the composition classroom, writers can persuade readers to change what they do and think and feel. Variations in what the actual changes are and/or when they actually occur make no one of these acts more or less persuasive or significant in their world-shaping influence. Typical "deliberative" and "reflective" essays illustrate. One student writes a "deliberative" essay in order to persuade her readers to write letters to the major television networks protesting violence in their programming. Another student writes a "reflective" essay in order to convince his readers to feel the painful consequences of his brother's death as a result of gang violence. Would the first essay <u>necessarily</u> do more than the second one to change readers' actions because its call to action is more overt and immediate? Answering "yes" and thereby pre-determining a discourse hierarchy runs counter-productive to each essay's persuasive intent and need for deliberation. Conversely, the "region of ambiguous possibilities" that incipient acts constitute underscores the need for investigating them all (<u>Grammar</u> 242). All language is a living act—overt or incipient—warranting rhetorical analysis.

<u>Identification and Addressedness</u>: Identification is Burke's term for persuasion, and unpacking that term explains the writer-reader relationship in symbolic acts. To state it oversimply, rhetors speak to audiences in terms that aim to create identity between themselves and

their listeners. When this identification is effective in its persuasiveness, they are united. Consubstantiality, as Burke calls it, is achieved. Addressedness is the term Burke uses to indicate the reader's essential role in identification. Rhetoric is "addressed"; "persuasion implies an audience," self or other (Rhetoric 38). Writers and readers, Burke is saying, collaborate in their persuasions. Their interchange, however, should not be confused with a collapse into one identity. Identity cannot be sameness because identification implies division. "If men were not apart," Burke notes, "there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity" (Rhetoric 22). The goal of identification is not to erase division by obliterating difference, but to negotiate division through acknowledging difference. In this way, similarity and difference work together in transforming both writer and reader, rather than working separately in widening the wedges of human division. As a result, meaning is negotiated.

Identification is not a classical concept of the writer-reader relationship, which is too incomplete to account for the infinite "ways in which members of a group promote social cohesion by acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another" (Rhetoric xiv). Traditional rhetoric emphasizes overt appeals to common ground in order to explain a rhetor's persuasion of his or her listeners. It can be as simple as my niece Kaitlin advising her babysitter that "My Mommy doesn't want me to eat spaghetti." in order to get out of eating her dinner or as sophisticated as Martin Luther King, Jr. weaving scriptural references in order to gain the political advocacy of his Birmingham Jail readers. Classical rhetoric interprets these manipulations of

Mom's word and God's word as means for the end of manipulating readers, and the slipperiness of the ethics involved is evident in Kaitlin's little lie.

Identification, however, indicates transformation, not manipulation. Kaitlin and her babysitter, King and his fellow ministers all become more similar yet retain their differences as freedom from dinner and freedom from oppression are negotiated. Likewise, the values (motherly and Godly) are transformed. They are not just a means to an end; they are themselves advocated in the communication. They are, as the metaphor of transformation suggests, re-born. Of course, it is not so simple and clear-cut as this. Writers or readers do not always recognize the ways in which they identify. A writer, "having woven a rhetorical motive so integrally into the very essence of his conception, [] can seem to have ignored rhetorical considerations" (Rhetoric 37). Readers can impose "the persuasiveness of false and inadequate terms . . . upon [themselves] in varying degrees of deliberateness and unawareness" (Rhetoric 35). Language cuts both ways, representing division where there is similarity and similarity where there is division in the advocacy of values (Rhetoric 45). Therefore, the study of language use as well as its practice bear a moral responsibility if discourse is to be understood for its seen and, more importantly, unseen identifications and therefore divisions. Burke imagines a "wavering line" between identification and division and by implication between "socialization and faction" and "peace and conflict" (Rhetoric 45). A rhetorician's mission is to transform these ever-negotiable lines through collaborations respectful of both similarity and difference.

Otherwise, rhetorical study does nothing to keep people at their most

extreme from uniting with those who are similar in order to kill those

who are different. This pacifistic commitment in which "the rhetorician

and the moralist become one" (Rhetoric 26) grounds Burke's study of

rhetorical motives:

> We do not flatter ourselves that any one book can contribute much
> to counteract the torrents of ill will into which so many of our
> contemporaries have so avidly and sanctimoniously plunged. But
> the more strident our journalists, politicians, and alas! even
> many of our churchmen become, the more convinced we are that books
> should be written for tolerance and contemplation. (Rhetoric xv)

Nearly a half-century after they were written—in this age of Rush

Limbaughs, Oliver Norths, and Jerry Falwells—Burke's words make an even

more poignant pronouncement.

Burke unites the terms that have divided discourse and its study.

Identification signals that all symbolic action—all language use—is

persuasion:

> All told, persuasion ranges from the bluntest quest of advantage,
> as in sales promotion or propaganda, through courtship, social
> etiquette, education, and the sermon, to a 'pure' form that
> delights in the process of appeal for itself alone, without
> ulterior purpose. And identification ranges from the politician
> who, addressing an audience of farmers, says, 'I was a farm boy
> myself,' through the mysteries of social status, to the mystic's
> devout identification with the source of all being. (Rhetoric
> xiv)

Kaitlin and King's discourses persuade; so do proposals, poems, and

prayers. Likewise, rhetoric is as broad a term as persuasion. It is

"the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in

beings that by nature respond to symbols" (Rhetoric 43). In a

discussion of the range of rhetoric, in which he transposes classical

into modern theory, he concludes: "[T]here is no chance of our keeping apart the meanings of persuasion, identification ('consubstantiality'), and communication (the nature of rhetoric as 'addressed')" (Rhetoric 46). Burke's point is not to mince terminology but to stress the importance of studying rhetoric as a "linguistic function," meaning a real doing of something through language (Rhetoric 44). Whatever the particulars of their discourses, writers and readers act as co-Agents negotiating relationships with each other and with language's meaning.

Form and Appeal: As the language philosopher who declares "form is the appeal" (Counter 138), Burke cares little about taxonomies of form. This de-emphasis results from the dialogical relationship between means and end--the form and the appeal (or the content)--manifest in his famous declaration. Form is the intrinsic means or Agency of persuasion because "a yielding to the form prepares for [the reader's] assent to the matter identified with it" (Rhetoric 58). He describes five ways in which discourse creates for readers "an arousing and fulfillment of desire" (Counter 124; literature is the particular discourse he discusses here). These forms, however, cannot be reduced to ends in and of themselves. The form of repetition, for example, is a way of gaining the reader's assent, but it is highly unlikely that the writer's aim is to repeat. Burke discusses formal appeals in figures of speech and in the overall structure or organization of a piece of writing as features that any discourse incorporates, and he coins it convenient to group texts according to "generalizations" as classical rhetoricians did in order to manage the cumbersome task of analyzing structure of lengthy texts (Rhetoric 70). Although he acknowledges four "linguistic

dimensions" (poetics, logic or grammar, rhetoric, and ethics), he argues
not for their division but for their union; for instance, as he
prescribes analysis of poetry's rhetoric (Language 28). In the
concluding essay of Language as Symbolic Action, Burke argues against
generic constructs. Again discussing rhetoric and poetics, the two
categories that have been erected and disassembled throughout the
history of language, he describes efforts to separate them as confusing
and lackluster, given the "large area which they share in common" (302).
Responding to Wilbur S. Howell, who had recently criticized Burke's
blurring of categorical lines, Burke concludes:

> My 'Dramatistic' theory of 'symbolic action' does not permit me to
> use categories that draw the lines at precisely the same places
> where he [Howell] would prefer me to have them drawn. Also,
> frankly, I am much more interested in bringing the full resources
> of Poetics and Rhetorica docens to bear upon the study of a text
> than in trying to draw a strict line of demarcation between
> Rhetoric and Poetics, particularly in view of the fact that the
> full history of the subject has necessarily kept such a
> distinction forever on the move. (307)

Burke's philosophy of language, then, can hardly be accused of
marginalizing form, yet it does not privilege discursive taxonomy. At
its deepest level, form unites all language. Any lines drawn serve to
shape just so many temporary button piles. As his rhetorical analyses
of numerous and multifarious "forms" attest (Oresteia, Coriolanus,
"Kubla Khan," Mein Kampf, the United States Constitution, to name a
few), a conception of all language as rhetoric enables rather than
inhibits lessons about how readers and writers succeed or fail in their
symbolic acts.

Pragmatic Ideology and Moral Implications: To insist that human beings do things with language leads to crucial follow-up questions which, Burke knows, can provoke some people to avoid admitting language's reality-constructing power. Nevertheless Burke asserts the pragmatic question of purpose: To what end do we perform our symbolic acts? Or, in short, why? Choice is central to Burke's question. Symbol-users make choices in how they shape their worlds through language. They can choose what a eulogy or an essay does. This is not to suggest, of course, an unrestrained human will over language. The relationship between symbol-users and their symbols is always dialogical, not hierarchical, as Burke sees it. But language is action, and action "'implies the ethical, the human personality'" (Language 11). Human beings are not machines in motion, and they are not without ideological influences--social, economic, political. Therefore, context (the Scene of his pentad) is also central to Burke's pragmatics. When and where symbol-users have been shaped as well as when and where their symbols are enacted always inform discourse. Context and text work inseparably toward the pragmatic outcome of constructing reality. Burke illuminates this interaction through the example of scientific discourse, language commonly misconstrued as a-ideological and therefore nonpersuasive:

> The dramatistic view of language, in terms of 'symbolic action,' is exercised about the necessarily suasive nature of even the most unemotional scientific nomenclatures. . . . Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality. (Language 45)

Reflection's selection and deflection (terministic screens, he calls them) are persuasive choices. In treating rhetoric and persuasion synonymously, then, Burke does not merely restate Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as the study of the available means of persuasion. He reinvigorates it to include the universe of discourse. In other words, language use equals symbolic action equals identification equals persuasion equals communication equals rhetoric. In common parlance, unfortunately sometimes used to denigrate a philosophy of language as comprehensive as Burke's, "It's all rhetoric."

Always the dialogical thinker unwilling to make an either/or choice, Burke requires that rhetoric hold both its symbols and its symbol-users accountable for the making of their worlds. The crucial moral question asks: How do we think and feel about the results we get from our symbolic actions? This question directs rhetorical theory and practice to investigate the outcomes--the Purposes--of symbolic actions. Rather than scrutinize the kinds or genres or end-products of discourse, Burke investigates discursive consequences: "By its fruition, we should judge it" (Rhetoric 14). The "'consummation'" accomplished through the formal appeal should occupy the rhetorician's concern, he claims (Language 305). Words are deeds. Burke's philosophy brings into full view the responsibility writers and readers must take for these material effects of their language.

As briefly sketched here, Burke's philosophy of language establishes the approach to rhetoric and its study informing my analysis of epideictic. His philosophy requires observation of what human beings do and interpretation of what they have done through language. In a

world characterized through the metaphor of dramatism, this philosophy defines language as symbolic action, which can be analyzed for its motives through a pentad of intrinsically related components. It emphasizes language's effects in the mind by defining attitude as incipient action, thereby more clearly illuminating the union of word and deed. It characterizes all language use as intentional, addressed, and consequential, thereby uniting all language use under the rubric of rhetoric. It treats form as the method of persuasion inseparable from the matter to which someone is being persuaded. Finally, it seeks to move human beings toward a clearer understanding and therefore a more humane utilization of their symbols. Always the pragmatist-idealist, he seeks a rhetorical theory and practice that treats "empirical things-here-and-now in terms of a Beyond" (Language 299). The image of a project in "beyonding" (Language 298) resonates in Ronald and Roskelly's belief that rhetoric and its study can get us "farther along." Burke's philosophy inspires rhetoricians to look at words as deeds, as acts occurring between real human beings at real occasions in time and place and always with real consequences. Rhetorical study cannot separate writer, reader, meaning, consequence, form, content, text, context, word, deed (or, in Burke's terms, Agent, Purpose, Agency, Scene, and Act) for individual analysis if it is to understand what discourse—any and all of it—means.

Rhetoric as One Use of Language

Since James L. Kinneavy and his 1971 landmark book A Theory of Discourse, nobody has presented a classification system for language use

as widely considered and applied by theorists and practitioners as has

Walter H. Beale. His work in <u>A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric</u>, following

Kinneavy's by eighteen years in 1989, has been praised by fellow

taxonomists, including long-time admirers of Kinneavy's approach to

language. Timothy W. Crusius, for instance, who has recently analyzed

and amalgamated several discourse theories in order to formulate his

own, calls Beale's argument "a major contribution to thought in our

field" (53). He accurately and favorably characterizes it as "a

semiotic theory--which is to say, a structuralist theory" (55), an

"ahistorical, essentialist mode of thought" (57), "intensely

conservative" and therefore new in its approach (59); a theory that

rightly aims "to enjoy the prestige of scientific inquiry" (58). Its

emphasis on mature, written discourse can inform the teaching of college

writing, Crusius asserts, although Beale claims his primary aim is to

facilitate rhetorical criticism (67-68). For my own argument, Beale's

theory aptly serves as a chief representative of the "rhetoric as one

use of language" view in its definition of rhetoric as one of four

categories of all discourse: Scientific, Instrumental, Poetic, and

Rhetorical. Acknowledging the social constructivist view that through

language human beings construct reality, his system categorizes all

discourse and therefore all reality. "My contention will be that this

model," Beale says of his theory, "constitutes a comprehensive and

illuminating guide to the aims and substance of human discourse and to

the 'kinds of reality' that human beings discover in experience"

(<u>Pragmatic</u> 11-12). He modifies his claim by adding that "[i]t is not my

purpose to announce an elegant formula and then, like Newton, to deduce

all possible worlds from it" (Pragmatic 12). His disclaimer expresses a modesty common among modern taxonomists, yet alerts readers to observe what a "comprehensive and illuminating guide" of four categories for the word and the world will do for uses of language.

Motivational Axes: Beale's theory begins with two "motivational axes" that divide discourse into four equal kinds (see Figure 1). At the poles of the vertical axis are "Contemplation" and "Action," illustrating the extremes of discourse as either a "reflection-on-experience" or a "participant-in-experience." The horizontal axis separates "reference" and "non-reference," by which discourse is about either "designation-of-experience" or "symbolization-of-experience." Although Beale sometimes refers to these axes as "continuums" (Pragmatic 64), his other common term "dichotomies" (Pragmatic 11, 60) is a more appropriate one for pairs of concepts that reflect the old oppositions of objectivity/subjectivity (Action/Contemplation) and absolutism/relativism (reference/non-reference). He calls the ends of the axes "paradoxes" (Pragmatic 63); they function as binary oppositions. Taken together, Action, Contemplation, Reference, and Non-Reference constitute what Beale terms the "quadrad" of his "semiotic" theory (Pragmatic 10). It is similar in scope to Burke's pentad and dramatistic theory, Beale points out, but a stronger one because his work "draws upon what [he] believe[s] to be a more precise and sophisticated approach to the problem of language as symbolic action, namely that of contemporary speech-act theory" (Pragmatic 10-11)—a theory, like Beale's own, that values taxonomy as a theoretical necessity.[2]

Contemplation
utterance as reflection-on-experience

reference

designation-of-
experience

nonreference

symbolization-of-
experience

Action
utterance as participant-in-experience

Figure 1. Motivational Axes and Discourse Aims (<u>Pragmatic</u> 11).

Discourse Categories: Beale connects the points of the motivational axes with a circle, thereby dividing discourse into the four categories of Instrumental, Scientific, Poetic, and Rhetorical (and I capitalize their names, as he sometimes does, in order to be clear when I am using Beale's terms). By choosing the image of an axis, the theory implies movement. But how do the categories move? Looking at Figure 1, can Scientific discourse, for instance, framed by referentiality and contemplation, ever be primarily non-referential and active? If such a change were possible, it would require Rhetorical discourse to change also. In effect, Scientific and Rhetorical discourses would have to switch places each by rotating 180 degrees. Otherwise, how could the model keep the categories separate and orderly and maintain the theory's symmetry? Alternatively, if a category's flexibility occurs only within the parameters established by the axes, then this system defines Scientific and Instrumental discourse as always more referential than Poetic and Rhetorical, Rhetorical and Instrumental as always more active than Scientific and Poetic, and so on because each category can at best move along one-half of each axis. One end of an axis can never describe discourse marked at the other end.

I am calling the circle's quadrants categories of discourse, although Beale's dominant term for them is "aims of discourse" (see especially chapter 4, 55-80). He describes his model in this way:

> It is a map of the motives and not necessarily the forms of discourse. In fact, the principle of asymmetry that governs the form/meaning relation in speech acts argues against attempting to map both of these dimensions at a single stroke. (65)

Rather than talk about form and content <u>as</u> the same stroke, then, Beale

forges the form/content split by painting them separately in an

"unresolvable and energizing dichotomy" (160). His explanation of form

for which he constructs a "Discourse Hierarchy" (see especially

Pragmatic chapter 1, 13-29) occurs separately from the discussion of

meaning in discourse, which the motivational axes are intended to

represent. Yet his defining criteria for the "aims" of discourse, which

I will discuss momentarily, attempt to typify formal elements.

Therefore, the form/content split divides word (as a form) and deed (as

a content) with the net effect of form drowning meaning. An aim of a

discourse, to my mind, means the end toward which a discourse strives.

Aim in Beale's sense means what discourse looks like in the end, which

explains his insistence on the need for "more empirical identifications

and descriptions of the aims of discourse" (Pragmatic 67). He directs

attention to a static text, just as the "text itself" exercises

Kinneavy's "aims" of discourse theory (Kinneavy 49). All in all,

Beale's use of the word "aim" fails to convince that the theory is

anything other than about kinds, categories, and ultimately forms of

discourse.[3]

Beale defines the Instrumental, Scientific, Poetic, and Rhetorical

categories according to six criteria: purpose, subject or field,

author-audience relation, conditions for success, occasion and context,

and language and strategy (Pragmatic 93-94). Several of the

differentiations his theory makes among discourse according to these

criteria illustrate a few of the questions his system raises.

Purpose is the "strongest of the defining features" by which these categories are constructed (Pragmatic 95). The Purpose or "primary motive" of each is outlined accordingly:

> Instrumental: "direction and control of human activities"
> Scientific: "the establishment and organization of knowledge"
> Poetic: "the construction of an object of enjoyment and reflection"
> Rhetorical: "the formation and information of opinion"
> (Pragmatic 95-96)

While Beale emphasizes that these primary motives do not preclude a mix of motives within a text, he also is clear that mixing motives can quickly put a text at risk of becoming "disharmonious" (Pragmatic 95). Yet real discourses quickly call to mind any number of poets or fiction writers who would argue that the aims of directing human activity (Instrumental), establishing knowledge (Scientific), and/or forming opinion (Rhetorical) are equally if not more important to their language use as is constructing a pleasurable object (Poetic). Toni Morrison did not write her novel Beloved primarily in order to create a beautiful thing; something more meaningful than a good read can come from its reception. Neither would it be difficult to identify scientists who are increasingly aware of the power to direct human activity as well as to form and/or inform opinion. What scientist researching, say, AIDs or breast cancer, can remain unaware of the influence that his or her reported findings will have on personal and interpersonal human behavior and thought? How mindful must they be in choosing the ways in which they report findings, especially considering the diverse and numerous audiences who will respond to them? To categorize Morrison's novel primarily for its poetry and not for its politics undermines the story's

significance. To categorize scientific revelation primarily for its

knowledge and not its persuasion hides the ways in which science is

deeply controlling and ideological.[4]

The differences assigned to discourse according to the author-

audience relations criterion are equally troubling. Instrumental and

Scientific discourse are indistinguishable here. Their author-audience

relations are

> typically static, governed by the norms and constraints of
> disciplines, by statute, or by the subject matter itself. In fact
> the dynamics of the relationship play virtually no role in the
> substance or success of the communication. (99)

The presence of so many entrenched conventions, however, illustrates

that an author-audience relationship does significantly shape the

success of the communication. If it does not, then for what purpose are

the conventions? Is Scientific discourse convention for convention's

sake? The Poetic author-audience relation, on the other hand, "does

very often come into play, but usually in a spirit of play" (Pragmatic

99). Beale patronizes playfulness as often "out-right fabrications,"

proving that "whatever relationships emerge are ultimately less the

constraining factors of a communicative enterprise than elements of the

aesthetic unity itself." Thus communication and aesthetics become an

either/or choice. Readers do not listen to Sethe's narrator in Beloved

and deliberate about their attitudes and actions having heard her;

rather, they appreciate her. Furthermore, marking Poetic discourse as

the singular category with authorial "projection" or "fictionality"

presumes that discourses in other categories bear no pertinent

distinctions between flesh-and-blood authors and authorial personas.

Rhetorical discourse is the only category with "a dynamic and open-ended" relation between its author and audience, one that is "discovered or established by a successful author and is developed or exploited as a strategy of persuasion." Although Beale places none of the power in the hands of the reader for shaping this relationship, at least in Rhetorical discourse there is some acknowledgement of a real audience, unlike the static or pretend relations in the other three categories.

The criterion of occasion or context also makes Rhetorical discourse different from the other three-quarters of language use. Whereas Rhetorical discourse arises in response to its real context, the other three categories "freeze, as it were, the element of immediate context, reaching out for contexts that are ultimate and enduring" (Pragmatic 101). To illustrate, he contrasts Scientific and Rhetorical occasions:

> As a norm of scientific discourse, the only significant element of context is what may be designated as the 'state of the question': What knowledge has been established as opposed to what remains unexplained or controversial? In rhetoric the 'state of the question' exists alongside or is actually embedded in a context of social action, evaluation, or understanding. (Pragmatic 102)

The slipperiness of this difference becomes evident in any number of scientific questions (the beginning of human life, the creation of the universe, sources of healing). The ways in which "knowledge" in each of these examples might be construed as "established" or "unexplained" and/or "controversial" depends on the scientific community--the context--in which their questions are raised. In order to explain Instrumental discourse's a-contextual nature, Beale refers to technical information and its goal "to produce a document that can stand up to

novel elements of situation." Anybody who has ever written

instructions, however, can attest to the intense focus on context that

such writing requires in an effort not to transcend occasions as much as

to enter into them. Anybody who has ever failed or succeeded in

understanding the instructions they read can attest to the contextual

assumptions that technical writers make. Finally, in Poetic language,

Beale's criterion for occasion pits text against context:

> Even when works of literature respond in a direct way to
> immediate, temporal contexts, moving along the continuum toward
> rhetoric, they typically develop these contexts into a pattern of
> ultimate or traditional thematics, transcending whatever is
> immediate. To the extent that they fail to do so, they fail to
> endure as works of art. (Pragmatic 102)

What Beale attributes to non-contextuality in enduring literature (a

privileging of the universal over the particular), Wolfgang Iser would

explain as the textual construct of an implied reader through which the

text can be read with revised relevance for times and places other than

its original.[5]

Of the remaining three criteria for Beale's classification system,

the subject (or field) criterion differentiates the kinds of things that

each discourse can talk about and the way they can be talked about--

their "aspect" and "reference" (Pragmatic 96-99). Conditions for

success depend on each category's "conventions," primarily degrees of

audience accommodation (Pragmatic 101). Language and strategy are

rhetorical choices, although Beale avoids that term by calling them

"methods" (Pragmatic 102-04). He recognizes this criterion as "not the

most reliable" for determining a category (Pragmatic 102). Indeed, at

this most local level of discourse the arbitrariness of categorical

distinctions becomes most obvious. Although he assigns the strategies of logos, ethos, and pathos to Rhetorical discourse, they certainly occur in others. The strategy of narrative by which he characterizes Poetic is receiving increasing analysis in non-Poetic texts. This blurring of categorical boundaries, which Beale disclaims by relegating the language and strategy criterion to a minor status, exposes similarities across all discourse, despite his theoretical insistence on difference.[6]

Rhetorical Discourse: Because Beale's project is particularly interested in Rhetorical Discourse, he further dissects this "aim" into four more categories—Informative, Performative, Reflective/Exploratory, and Deliberative—and defines their differences according to "purpose," "form," and "type" (Pragmatic, see especially chapter 5, 107-59). His Rhetorical sub-categories mirror his quartet of Discourse categories: Informative::Scientific; Performative:: Instrumental; Reflective/Exploratory::Poetic; and Deliberative:: Deliberative. These categories are, as Beale states, a reworking of Aristotle's forensic, epideictic, and deliberative trio. Epideictic is now Performative Rhetoric, similar to the larger Instrumental division.

Persuasion falls under the purview of Deliberative Rhetorical discourse, as evidenced by the purposes of each category. Deliberative Rhetoric's "normal purpose is to support specific conclusions or opinions about questions of action, value, and understanding" (Pragmatic 117), whereas the information of Informative Rhetoric is not secondary to a purpose other than itself (Pragmatic 130); the performance of Performative Rhetoric is "neither to substantiate theses nor to

communicate information but to perform public acts" (Pragmatic 141); and
the reflection or exploration of Reflective/Exploratory Rhetoric is "to
stimulate and entertain an audience, while sharing and reflecting upon
experience" (Pragmatic 152). "Suasory" is a discursive "type" in all
the non-Deliberative categories, a name that half-reveals and half-
disguises the persuasive nature of all discourse. Nevertheless, the
more the theory dissects discourse, the more the symmetry of Beale's
wheel, as he calls it, seems impeccable; indeed, mesmerizing. Just like
Aristotle's triad, it gives the impression that there is a place for
everything, and that rhetorical theory can put everything in its place.

Pragmatics as Practical Act and Theoretical Need: In order to
understand the assumptions and intentions of Beale's theory, his two
foundational reasons for calling it pragmatic are instructive. The
first reason is that his theory is "concerned primarily with what human
beings do with discourse" (Pragmatic 1). Therefore, it focuses on "acts
of discourse." By acts, Beale means what got written--the texts
themselves--not how they got written cognitively, linguistically, or
contextually. The emphasis is decidedly on the "what" not the "human
beings" or the "do" in his theory. His theory also foregrounds text by
characterizing rhetoric (meaning Rhetorical discourse) as "first and
last, a study of human accomplishment," and its aim as one "to account
for the nature and variety of such products in the realm of 'rhetoric'"
(Pragmatic 2). If people create products from discourse, reason
suggests, then it must have some use, function, or practical
application. In a simple sense of pragmatics as practicality, then,
Beale's theory is pragmatic, but its emphasis on text-as-act turns a

study of language <u>use</u> into one of language <u>used</u>. There is something
dead or static rather than alive or dynamic in this structuralist
approach. It does not illuminate what the text did pragmatically as
much as it shows what the text was substantially, which makes the theory
far more empirical than pragmatic. This sense of deadness also
permeates his contrast of oral and written discourse. Unlike oral
language, the written word is characterized by the structural "absence
of a definite situational context, by the removal of the author from
audience in space and time, and by the absence of literal voice"
(<u>Pragmatic</u> 4). He depicts the writer's and reader's absence—their
"'not being there'"—and the text's presence—of "having it in writing'"
as advantages of written discourse (<u>Pragmatic</u> 5). Again, it is not what
people are doing with language but the artifact that remains as evidence
of something having been done that concerns this pragmatic theory. Its
assumption is that discourse has to be dead-done in order to study it.

Beale's second and more "principal" justification for naming his
theory pragmatic is its response to "the critical need to develop a
system of explanations and characterizations that are at once rigorous
and nonreductive" because rhetorical theory has neither clear-cut names
nor criteria for its categorizing:

> Discourse theory, criticism, and pedagogy have inherited a
> bewildering array of confusing and overlapping terminology, with
> inconsistent and contradictory descriptions of various entities,
> under such promiscuously used rubrics as 'genre,' 'mode,' 'style,'
> and haziest of all, 'form." Clearly one of the first tasks of the
> theorist ought to be that of finding ways to organize, stabilize
> the meanings, and test the validity of such concepts. (<u>Pragmatic</u>
> 3)

The assumption—that the first order of need is organized, stabilized, validated categorical terms—echoes the old modes of discourse's rationale (narrative, description, comparison/contrast, cause-effect, problem-solution, report, and argument). Still living dinosaurs in some writing classrooms, the modes direct writers to write narrative for narrative's sake, description for description' sake; in short, form for form's sake. Yet Beale criticizes the modes:

> The rhetorical lore, while it has no doubt served as vehicle for a great deal of productive pedagogy, has never had much theoretical cogency and has fostered from the beginning a number of debilitating confusions among form, strategy, and purpose in discourse. It has contributed virtually nothing to criticism, and it seems odd that teachers of literature should be primarily responsible for keeping alive for so long a particularly arid tradition of critical concepts. That tradition's preoccupation with form and style has tended to divorce rhetorical pedagogy from its vital intellectual and cultural moorings, even among teachers who have no interest in such a separation. (Pragmatic 4)

Beale's theory plans to circumvent the inadequate and sometimes harmful modes with

> a fully adequate rhetoric of the written word, a rhetoric that comprehends and builds upon the major kinds and situations of writing as determinants of form and style, capable of casting critical and historical light upon the various orders of nonfiction prose that thrive in the contemporary world. (Pragmatic 4)

His disparagement of the modes, accurate as it is, does not square with his own pedagogy as advocated in his composition textbook Real Writing, which trains students to write three essay forms: deliberative, informative, and reflective. This practice is evidently an example of the "great deal of productive pedagogy" sans "theoretical cogency" for which Beale credits the modes—pedagogy worthwhile for the

composition classroom, although it impoverishes the teaching and
learning of literature with its "particularly arid tradition of critical
concepts." Consequently, the composition classroom essay is deadlocked
by form without meaning. How can, say, the "Scientific aim" (or the
"informative essay") be anything other than form, given the a priori
determinations that the writer intends to direct and control human
activities; the reader will be a static audience; the context is frozen
or nonexistent? How can the war eulogy as an instance of Performative
discourse be analyzed for its argument, given its theoretical fixation
as a performance void of thesis or information? Beale faults Burke's
dramatistic theory for emphasizing "'action' itself" and credits his own
semiotic theory for emphasizing "discourse itself" (56). In fact, his
focus divorces deed from word rather than perceiving discourse and
action dialogically, as Burke's does. Consequently it makes rhetorical
theory a study of what Mikhail Bakhtin calls "the naked corpse of the
word"--language stripped of its living context and intentionality (292)
--a deadly image common to the structuralist impulse.

Beale would likely hear my questions and criticisms as a voice in
the opposition argument to genre or discourse theory that he addresses
in his book's introduction. "[T]here is a general impatience with
generic studies," he acknowledges, "born of the feeling that they are at
best inconclusive and at worst damaging to the comprehension and
appreciation of individual works" (Pragmatic 7). He counters that

> even though theories of discourse acts may 'leak' even worse than
> grammars, some constructs are nevertheless clearly more adequate
> than others; the study can be conducted in a sensible and
> nonreductionist fashion, and it may have great intellectual and
> practical value. (Pragmatic 8)

While it is believable that some taxonomies could account for more discourse than others, it is unclear what "great intellectual and practical value" would come from the more thorough-going models. Beale points generally to the significance of language and its study, but he does not identify any particular benefit of language categorization:

> The human use of language is the center of the liberal arts, the starting point for our various understandings of reality, and the practical art on which the health of civilization depends. Because it affects the ways in which we view ourselves as individuals and as communities, and because it affects the way we teach the arts of language, we need the best rhetorical theory we can get. (Pragmatic 8)

His argument speaks eloquently for excellence in rhetorical studies; however, his defense of genre or discourse theory does not demonstrate the ways in which a taxonomy is the best that rhetoricians can do.

Genre theory is capable of working heuristically in the teaching and analysis of discourse although, as John M. Swales argues, rarely in the hands of a deductive taxonomist. Unlike the work of Kinneavy, which Swales criticizes as a "top-down" approach to language (42) and which I have noted is similar to Beale's, genre theorists such as Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson work inductively with a keen sensitivity to the text-context relationship (42-43). More recently, Carolyn R. Miller also aims "to illuminate rather than to classify" discourse (43). She articulates the pragmatic view that "a rhetorically sound definition of genre must be centered not on the substance or the form of discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish" (Miller "Genre" 151). Her theory of genre "suggests that what we learn when we learn a genre is not just a pattern of forms or even a method of

achieving our own ends. We learn, more importantly, what ends we may have . . ." (Miller "Genre" 165). In other words, writers and readers learn what communication can do within its contexts. Swales' research advances the heuristic power of genre thus conceived, and it anticipates that rhetoricians such as Jamieson, Campbell, and especially Miller "finally destroy the myth—or so [he] hope[s]—that genre analysis necessarily has something to do with constructing a classification of genres" (44).

Overturning the theoretical necessity of taxonomy, Swales notes, would in turn dismantle unhelpful teaching practices associated with modes and aims of discourse that have dominated composition pedagogy:

> [G]enre remains a fuzzy concept, a somewhat loose term of art. Worse, especially in the US, genre has in recent years become associated with a disreputably formulaic way of constructing (or aiding the construction of) particular texts—a kind of writing or speaking by numbers. This association characterizes genre as mere mechanism, and hence is inimical to the enlightened and enlightening concept that language is ultimately a matter of choice. (33)

A reduction of rhetorical choice to rhetoric-by-number, then, compounds the problems of classifications systems when they are put into practice.[7]

Pragmatics as A-Ideology: Although he insists on his theory's pragmatics, Beale perceives its scope to be a-ideological. He likens his project to Burke's dramatism because they are both theories "of rhetorical substance without ideological or psychological commitments" (Pragmatic 10). His system is "not in itself a construction of reality but an objective model for talking about human constructions of reality" in the same way that Burke in A Grammar of Motives envisions his pentad

as "'a philosopher's stone for the synopsis of writings that have sought the philosopher's stone'." What Burke intends with his pentad, however, is a speculative instrument for metadiscourse suitable for the inductive work of rhetoricians, not a disavowal of ideology. Indeed, neither Burke nor Beale nor anyone would bother with rhetorical studies if they did not operate from some philosophical stance shaped by their conscious and subconscious ideologies. Beale's emphasis on the "what" rather than the "how" of discourse as well as his belief that an "objective" model is not in itself "a construction of reality" give him away. How can a theory that advocates "discourse itself" as the primary thing for rhetoricians to observe and that defends taxonomy as the primary way in which to interpret observations be anything but ideological? (Just as a theory privileging actions and similarities is undeniably ideological.) Beale is engaged in a mission for realism and empiricism with a theory that sets out to categorize "the achievements of creatures who are themselves contradictory, paradoxical" and to help said creatures maneuver through "the thicket of terminology" of a "very deep jungle, in which one can get quickly lost without proper instruments" (Pragmatic 12). Echoing a New Critical rage for order, Beale's distancing from ideology is an ideologically-drenched stance. Or, as Lev Vygotsky puts it, "Deliberate avoidance of philosophy is itself a philosophy" (41).

Theoretical Self-Destruction: Beale's theory threatens its own destruction in its efforts to at once account for all discourse and to revere Rhetorical discourse (and more particularly Deliberative Rhetorical discourse) as the superior use of language. Crusius also notes this "tension between Beale's semiotic [structuralist] commitment

and his equally strong commitment to rhetoric as the central discourse aim" (58), observing that "his thesis about rhetoric cannot be extrapolated from his semiotic base, but constitutes a special argument that his semiotics can help to justify but not to generate" (59). As a fellow taxonomist, Crusius allows the inconsistency. "I suppose this makes his theory less tight and less pure, but rigor, for a healthy mind, is not an end in itself," he comments, adding further supposition that "[m]ost of us would rather be right than rigorous" (59). Crusius' willingness to let a taxonomist erect a system and then skew its principles widens the gap between theory and practice. What is given as inherent in discourse with one hand is taken away as exception with the other. Structuralism usually equates rightness with rigor; Beale's theory intends to be right through its rigor. To suddenly choose one over the other provides an escape valve for the basic contradiction that threatens to explode Beale's theory. Over and over again, the wheel's symmetry is thrown out of round with privileging descriptions of the "rhetorical aim." Deliberative Rhetorical discourse, Beale claims, is "the basic, centripetal rhetorical genus"; it is "the one toward which the others gravitate" (Pragmatic 117, 120). Its parent Rhetorical category is the only discourse with a "dynamic and open-ended" audience; the only one that "comes into being as a direct response to context" (Pragmatic 101). In discussing the principle and value of "openness and centrality" in Rhetorical discourse, his comments praise Rhetoric for its consistent moves "toward the common interests, the common capabilities, and the common norms and values of communities" (Pragmatic 105). In the image of "Zeno's metaphor, the method of rhetoric is the

'open hand,' as opposed to the 'closed fist' of scientific

demonstration." Moreover, Rhetorical discourse evidences

> a contextualist or ethical/pragmatic dimension of activity and
> consciousness, operating as a centripetal force, with
> predilections toward diversity, pluralism, balance, civility, and
> the recognition of limits. These are norms of rhetoric. . . .
> They are also norms of culture and of the liberal arts. . . .
> (Pragmatic 106)

The merits of such a living, humane use of language imply a wish that

the other categories were more like Rhetorical discourse. In his

argument's concluding remarks, Beale admits that they are:

> Rhetoric is the least specialized art of discourse; it is in fact
> the central art of discourse, reflecting in its own subsystem of
> aims all the larger aims (rhetorical, scientific, instrumental,
> poetic). As such, rhetoric has a stake in all perspectives and
> all modes of discourse. The other aims of discourse are
> historical specializations which achieve success by restricting
> both scope and method. They are centrifugal forces, both of
> language and culture. Rhetoric is the centripetal force.
> (Pragmatic 163)

This statement splinters the perfectly ordered world of language and

reality constructed in Beale's theory and illustrated by its

circumference of multiple quartets. If Deliberation is irresistible,

then how do other categories keep in their places? What accounts for

its irresistibility? How can the non-Rhetorical aims be "historical

specializations" if they are universal in their frozen contexts and

static audiences? If Rhetoric is staked in all discourse—if it is the

"centripetal force" of all language use—then why does it occupy only

one quarter of Beale's model? Why is it not the center from which all

discourse radiates? What keeps Beale's theory from explicitly

acknowledging the rhetorical nature of all language use? Of what use is

rhetoric when it is contained as the abstracted Rhetorical discourse category? What would happen if Rhetorical values of "diversity, pluralism, balance, civility, and the recognition of limits" (Pragmatic 106) also shaped Scientific, Instrumental, and Poetic categories, thereby opening all the hands of discourse? I believe with Walter Beale in the primacy of rhetoric. I also share his deep conviction to facilitate relationships between fellow human beings through language. His rhetorical theory, however, reduces rather than expands theoretical and practical ability to act on that commitment.

Contrasting Rhetorics

Whereas Burke's philosophy of language provides a way of looking at the world as shaped by language, Beale's rhetorical theory outlines the way the world looks after language has been shaped. Burke's dramatism studies words in action; Beale's semiotics stabilizes words as static objects. Burke's explanation of identification and addressedness reveal interaction between writers and readers; Beale's motivational axes limit the ways they may interact. Burke's concept of form and appeal illustrates persuasion as the essential similarity of all language use; Beale's Rhetorical discourse category treats rhetoric and its persuasion as something different from other language used. Persuasion, author-audience relation, occasion--indeed, all the shaping ingredients in language use--become things that should and do occur in some discourse but cannot or ought not occur in others. Therefore in Beale's theory, rhetoric occupies the awkward position of being at once the supreme form of discourse and the discursive form that poisons other

language use. Of their pragmatics, Burke's emphasizes consequences of
language use; Beale's isolates language from consequence.

These two approaches also set in motion different practices.
Burke's theory provides the pentad, a heuristic for inquiry that works
in any arena of speculation, especially as writers create and critique
discourse. Beale's theory supplies the quadrad in which rhetorical
criticism can identify kinds of arguments and by which composition
pedagogy can teach kinds of essays as ends for writing. The pentad uses
the process of categorizing aspects of the motive in using language--
Agent, Purpose, Agency, Scene, and Act--in order to go into the universe
of discourse and describe relationships among these motivational
elements. The quadrad, however, uses the products of categories--
Scientific, Instrumental, Performative, and Rhetorical--in order to
bring discourse into its universe and define typification and variation
among categories. The next step in practice with the pentad is to
negotiate future relationships; for the quadrad, to prescribe future
texts. Whereas the pentad is a speculative instrument for inquiry as I.
A. Richards and Ann Berthoff envision heuristics, the quadrad is an
example of the limits of traditional objectivism as uncovered by
Lakoff's research. In my childhood analogy, Burke's theory encourages
thinking about what people are doing with their buttons, whereas Beale's
calls for decisions about which pile to put their buttons in. At best,
Beale's theory provides a close study of one aspect of language use. To
gaze on the "act" or "discourse itself" for long, however, puts
rhetorical study at risk for failing to discover and understand answers
to the question: "What is involved when we say what people are doing

and why they are doing it?" With the scope of its focus, the pentad helps rhetoric and composition studies get farther along in tooling answers to that question. The choice of heuristics is an important one.

Burke's pentad also helps point out the contrast in theorizing rhetoric as all language use or as one use of language. For Burke, Agents—writers and readers—are real human beings inseparable from their words and each other; therefore, the word is human. For Beale, writers are detached from what they have done, and readers do not do anything; therefore, the word is a-human. Burke conceives of Agency and Purpose dialogically. The word appeal at once denotes by what means language appeals (Agency) and for what end it appeals (Purpose). Beale, on the other hand, opposes these terms in dichotomy with a resultant hierarchy of form over content. The dynamic, persuasive Purpose of all language inextricably weds meaning and consequence in Burke's project. Static and nonpersuasive words in Beale's represent discursive meaning as a-consequential. Language's Act and Scene—text and context—also are dialogical for Burke, but dichotomous for Beale in an Act/Scene hierarchy. Therefore, Burke's word is in the world; Beale's word is a-worldly.

Serious consequences, then, result from classification systems of language. As words are divided from each other into so many categories, they ultimately become separated from humanity, from their own outcomes, and from the world. Once rhetoricians start dividing, it is hard to stop. The more we look for difference, the less we see similarity. The more we separate, the less we synthesize. The more we look at the little pictures, the less we see the big one. The more we categorize

discourse according to necessary and sufficient conditions, the more we separate writer from reader, meaning from consequence, form from content, text from context, word from deed. The more we taxonomize, the less we transform.

The projects of Kenneth Burke and Walter Beale are representative of two fundamentally different approaches to rhetoric: Rhetoric as all language use and rhetoric as one use of language. Contemporary epideictic theory is deeply embedded in the taxonomist's point of view as it seeks to define the ways in which epideictic is different from other rhetoric and particularly from deliberative discourse. Chapter two examines the inaccurate and destructive outcomes of this choice as it is currently made in theories of what people are doing and why with their epideictic words.

CHAPTER II

CONTEMPORARY EPIDEICTIC THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF MOTIVES

From Categorizing to the Epideictic Category

When we move from the meta-level of categorization to one category
in particular--the epideictic category--what do we discover about
epideictic writers and readers, meanings and consequences, forms and
contents, texts and contexts, words and deeds? In answering this
question, I mean to do something more than a "review of literature" as a
traditional summary preceding main counter-argument. Epideictic
theorists aim to define and differentiate this category of discourse
from other discourses. My aim is to blur those categorical boundaries.
Therefore, my argument in this chapter _is_ its analysis of what
rhetorical studies currently theorize about epideictic discourse. It is
a study of the borders they draw around epideictic.

Nobody, my research indicates, has conducted such an inquiry into
contemporary epideictic theory, although a resurgence of interest in
epideictic over the past decade has created a small but vigorous cottage
industry. Contemporary epideictic theorists cite modern predecessors
with near uniformity, emphasizing the work most supportive of their own.
They always locate their arguments according to degree of Aristotelian
proximity, yet they rarely take into account other contemporaneous
scholarship. A colleague might be cited here and there, but no
rhetorician has composed the large view of what rhetorical theory
currently construes for epideictic practice. Several arguments have

been published nearly simultaneously, which would have impeded their mutual evaluation. Occasionally, however, references erroneously represent the current state of epideictic affairs. Scott Consigny, for instance, characterizes R. C. Jebb's 1876 study of ancient funeral orators as the work of one of our "modern scholars" (283), and he cites Richard Chase's 1961 classical argument in order to support the conclusion that "[m]ost scholars accept [a] construal of the epideictic as a display of skill" (295). The inaccuracy of these statements suggests that rhetorical theory is not investigating closely enough its current hypothesizing. If epideictic is as important to human beings' lives as these theorists argue, and I agree with them that it is, then rhetorical theory needs to understand where it currently aims epideictic practice. As Ann Berthoff often reminds, how we construe is how we construct (Making 10).

I employ Burke's pentad to conduct this analysis of contemporary epideictic theory, and the eight scholars whose theories I investigate are Bernard K. Duffy, Celeste Michelle Condit, Takis Poulakos, Jeffrey Walker, Michael P. Sipiora, Michael F. Carter, Scott Consigny, and Dale L. Sullivan. All of these rhetoricians have published work on epideictic since 1983. Before further explanation of this analytical method and scholarly grouping, however, a cryptic historical summary of epideictic followed by a fuller explication of modern theories is necessary in order to provide the theoretical context from which contemporary epideictic evolves.

From Classical to Modern Epideictic: Aristotle's triad of discourse--deliberative, forensic, and epideictic--as chapter one

indicates, is the most widely known and influential of discourse taxonomies. Its definitions are attractively parallel: Deliberative discourse argues about what should happen in the future, as politicians make policy; forensic discourse argues about what happened in the past, as lawyers prove crimes were or were not committed; epideictic discourse argues about what is happening in the present, as eulogists praise persons being buried. The verb "to argue" does not fit quite as well with epideictic as it does with deliberative or forensic, as these simple, 1-2-3 definitions indicate. It is harder, evidently, to imagine how rhetors "argue" about what is happening right now, as opposed to what has or will happen--especially when it is about something as seemingly inarguable as eulogizing the dead. "What's to argue?" one might ask. "Where's the need for a writer's persuasion or a reader's deliberation?" Aristotle's rhetorical treatise does not provide a clear answer. His descriptions of epideictic contradict themselves. It is discourse for the present; it is discourse for the future. It does not aim to persuade its audience; it aims to persuade its audience to future action. The audience observes the discourse; the audience judges the discourse.[8] Despite its slipperiness (or maybe because of it) epideictic has fallen in and out of the rhetorical limelight across the centuries from classical to modern rhetorical theory. It pervaded the pedagogy of the Romans, embodied the didacticism of the Renaissance, suffered intentional neglect during the scientism of the Enlightenment, recouped partial favor amid America's nineteenth century romanticism, and sustained the disdain of twentieth-century empirical objectivism.

Epideictic's current renaissance is influenced by postmodern

constructivism and interdisciplinary studies.[9]

During the first half of the twentieth century, epideictic did not

greatly exercise rhetorical study.[10] The standard contemporary content

endnote pays primary attention to four theories advanced in the 1960s

and 1970s by Chaim Perelman, Walter H. Beale, Christine Oravec, and

Lawrence Rosenfield. Each of these theories aims to recover epideictic

from its inferior status among other categories of discourse.

Of these four dominant theories, Perelman's is most often cited.

His argument centers on epideictic function. This discourse should

sustain a culture's "universal" values that have been pre-determined in

other, deliberative discourse through "rational argumentation"

("Rhetoric" 134). Epideictic texts are radically nonpersuasive because

they "deal with topics which are not an object of controversy to [their]

audiences" (New 52). Likewise, they are nondeliberative because "it is

improper [for readers] to pose questions, to raise doubts, to ask for

explications, or to rebel" about the values laden in them ("Rhetoric"

132). Equating an epideictic orator with an educator, Perelman

constructs the writer-reader::teacher-student relationship in this way:

> Since what he [the writer or teacher] is going to say does not
> arouse controversy, since no immediate practical interest is ever
> involved, and there is no question of attacking or defending, but
> simply of promoting values that are shared in the community, the
> speaker, though he is assured in advance of the goodwill of his
> audience, must nevertheless have a high reputation. (New 52)

Through a writer's ethos and a reader's silence, then, epideictic

maintains shared values. Contemporary theories often emphasize values

as universally shared in epideictic in a way that excludes differences

among writers and readers and also transcends their particular contexts. Employing Perelman's paired notions of an absence of controversy and a presence of pre-deliberated values, these theories share his vision of epideictic as a curative discourse for its society's moral and ethical ills.[11]

Beale defines epideictic through the lens of J. L. Austin's speech act theory, although he builds on the constative/performative speech act categories (language that describes/language that does) that Austin himself abandoned as he moved toward a philosophy of all language as doing. Epideictic, according to Beale, is the "performance of or participation in an action" rather than discourse designed to "maintain or argue something about the world of action" ("Rhetorical" 225-26). It is the Rhetorical Performative discourse of his large theoretical project. There are four sub-categories of epideictic performance ("celebrative," "suasory," "instructive", and "experiential") each of which presents cultural dogma. For instance, in experiential epideictic, its "points of interpretation and reflection are suggested and controlled by the established concepts and traditions of a particular community" (Pragmatic 146). The three defining features for sorting an epideictic text into one of these sub-categories are its type of illocutionary act, choosing from among five kinds of performative speech acts ("Rhetorical" 235); its "setting," of which there are three ("Rhetorical" 239); and its "origin," choosing from a "tentative typology" of four orators ("Rhetorical" 241). The significance of the multiple combinations that these features and categories elicit is not explained. Like Perelman, Beale treats epideictic as a genre of

reaffirmation rather than persuasion because it "has the effect of intensifying or reaffirming propositions rather than of establishing them" (Pragmatic 142). Theorizing epideictic as discourse that "participates in the reality to which it refers" ("Rhetorical" 226) cements these "propositions" in the present and renders their reality unchangeable. Several contemporary theorists cite Beale in order to justify similarly a de-emphasis on future action and an elevation of ceremony in epideictic.

Christine Oravec studies the function of the epideictic audience, arguing that rhetorical studies have not completely understood what Aristotle means by "observation." Emphasizing his comments about a listener's judgment, she argues that epideictic is "a genre which includes the functions of judgment and education" that require "comprehension as well as the perception of theatrical display" (163). In studying readers at all, Oravec's theory was innovative at the time of its writing. The "comprehension" and "perception" it assigns readers, however, turn out to be a small job with a meager lesson. Summarizing the process of observation, notably from the writer's rather than reader's point of view, Oravec concludes:

> Thus the rhetor receives common values and experiences from his audience and, by reshaping them in artistic language, returns these experiences heightened and renewed. The process of 'observation' which begins with perception and functions through judgment finally ends in heightened appreciation and intellectual insight. (171)

As appreciators, then, readers becomes judges of a writer's display skills, or the performance of Beale's epideictic. Their "intellectual insight" is a recognition of that-which-they-already-have-seen, now

viewed through the rhetor's linguistic magnifying glass. This epideictic reader pales alongside a constructivist concept of meaning-making. Nevertheless, contemporary theorists who argue for a deliberative quality in epideictic or who counter criticism of epideictic as writer-centered discourse often cite Oravec's work.

Finally, of the four theories that dominate modern epideictic, Lawrence Rosenfield's argument treats epideictic as the occasion for "beholding reality impartially as witness of Being" (133). In order to participate in "beholding," a reader acknowledges, then appreciates, and finally understands the "radiance" of the occasion's reality or Being as represented by the writer (133). This theory contrasts understanding and cognition. Understanding engages celebration, emphasizes what is, and develops from internal experience. Cognition, on the other hand, engages thought, emphasizes what was and/or might be, and develops from external data (148-50). Unlike cognitive acts of mind which "act on the world" (148), epideictic beholding is an act of understanding that "annihilates the dimensions of time and space themselves, and thereby demolishes the commonsense foundations needed for judgment" (149). Thus Rosenfield's theory divorces epideictic from deliberation, emotion from reason, and the present from the past and future. These awesome moments of transcendental commemoration make epideictic a rarefied genre, a construct invoked by contemporary theories working toward an epideictic of the ideal.

From Modern to Contemporary Epideictic: The modern epideictic theories of Perelman, Beale, Oravec, and Rosenfield differentiate epideictic from other discourse in several ways. Epideictic is

nonpersuasive, nondeliberative discourse because writers and readers unquestionably share the values presented through epideictic language. A writer does not need to persuade because a reader will not deliberate. Rather, epideictic writers display or perform values, while epideictic readers appreciate them with emotion sans reason. Epideictic contexts are universal, although what happens in their present occasions does not affect future ones, unlike the categories of forensic or deliberative discourse. The resultant rhetorical situation is replete with hierarchies: writer/reader, meaning/consequence, form/content, and text/context. These power struggles persist in contemporary epideictic theory.

In current rhetorical criticism, arguments commonly posit a definition of epideictic and then apply it for analysis of a particular text.[12] In his discussion of Renaissance epic and epideictic, Brian Vickers makes a convincing case for interpreting epideictic practice according to epideictic theory in the air at the time of the discourse's writing. Conversely, other critics mix-and-match, employing a modern epideictic theory in order to interpret an ancient epideictic text, or vice-versa.

Whatever the case, while rhetorical critics posit theories through which they interpret texts, rhetorical theorists revise the epideictic theories that can be posited. Since the early 1980s, eight scholars have asserted an epideictic theory. Listed in publication chronology, they are: Bernard K. Duffy (1983), Celeste Michelle Condit (1985), Takis Poulakos (1987, 1988), Jeffrey Walker (1989), Michael P. Sipiora (1991), Michael F. Carter (1991), Scott Consigny (1992), and Dale L.

Sullivan (1988, 1991-93).[13] It is possible that one or more of these rhetoricians might not perceive their work as an evolution of epideictic theory. Jeffrey Walker's study, for instance, clearly is one about lyric poetry. In the process of making his case for the lyric as argument, however, he asserts an epideictic different from earlier theories that separate epideictic and argumentation. Therefore, he presents an epideictic theory that other critics can posit in their rhetorical analyses. In one way or another, all eight discussions revise Aristotle's hand-me-down category and explain the things people do with language—things that just will not squeeze into the forensic and deliberative categories, yet often slip out of the epideictic niche. Testing their epideictic theories with analyses of texts ranging from Plato's dialogues to C. S. Lewis' children's literature, these scholars aim to persuade rhetorical studies of epideictic's usefulness for a much-needed shoring up of late twentieth-century values.

An Analysis of Motives

What does contemporary epideictic theory say is involved when writers and readers are "doing" epideictic and why they are doing it? The question springs, of course, from Burke's master query about all language use: "What is involved when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?" (Grammar xv). The logical heuristic for answering the question is the Burkean pentad, described earlier in chapter one. This speculative instrument illuminates relationships among epideictic's Act (what), Agent (who), Purpose (why), Agency (how), and Scene (when and where) as they are constructed in contemporary epideictic theory. Unlike the taxonomist's fixation on the Act or text

itself, the pentad requires rhetorical theory to see the text in relationship with the other elements involved in its motivation or creation or "doing." The text is not the whole epideictic occasion; it is part of it. Chapter two's analysis of motives, as Burke would call it, of contemporary epideictic theory begins with the Agent-Act relationship. This first pair requires the greatest detail in part because it begins the analysis, but more importantly because it investigates the human relations of writers and readers, which is a primary concern of this project.

Agent-Act: Who is doing what in epideictic? According to eight contemporary theories and the weight of rhetorical theory's history that they bear, the epideictic Agent is the writer or the orator of the discourse. The Agent is not the reader or listener of the discourse. Not just any writer-Agent can do epideictic; neither can an Agent do just any epideictic Act. Epideictic writers must be authoritative, powerful, intelligent, wise, and eloquent because their Acts are to instruct, define, shape, display, lead with beliefs and/or memories, reflect, generate knowledge, build community, and model celebration. Epideictic readers, on the other hand, must be subservient, impotent, uneducated, naive, and silent because they receive Acts. They are to be instructed, accept the ways in which writers define and shape meaning, be captivated by their rhetoric, follow writers' beliefs and/or memories, gaze at the writer's reflections, be imbued with knowledge, be encapsuled in the writer's community, and learn what invokes permissible celebration. Whereas the writer is the subject, the reader is the object of the Act. Meaning is not negotiated between writer and reader

as co-Agents. It is handed down from writer to reader; reader in turn
is thankful for what he or she has received. Epideictic writers do to
epideictic readers; they do not do with each other through a text. The
more complete question in analyzing the relationship between epideictic
Agent and Act, then, is "Who is doing what to whom?"

Condit's theory illustrates well the subject/object relationship
between epideictic writers and readers. Her argument is probably the
most often cited contemporary concept because of its organization of
several Acts under the rubric of epideictic as the "speech of communal
definition" (284). Three pairs of "functions" or Acts, she argues,
occur in epideictic; the paradigmatic text would incorporate all three.
Although each pair assigns the writer and reader their respective Acts,
the writer is always the superior Agent doing something for or to the
inferior reader. In the Acts of "definition/understanding," which occur
when a community is troubled by an event, the writer has the "right" and
"power" to define what has happened, and the reader receives "a sense of
comfort" (288). Quite similar to "definition/understanding," the Acts
can be "shaping/sharing," in which the writer gives meaning to a
particular change and its effects on the community, and the reader then
accepts that rendition (289). Emphasizing rhetorical form, the third
pair of functions is "display/entertainment," in which the writer
demonstrates eloquence and the reader is pleased (240). In defining
"shaping/sharing," Condit warns about the potential inequity for the
reader in these pairs of Agent-Acts:

> Definitions of community are often advanced by contrast with
> 'others' outside of the community. Hence, a sharing of community
> may not include all individuals who, territorially, might live
> within the boundaries of the community. In giving a speaker the

> right to shape the definition of the community, the audience gives
> the speaker the right to select certain values, stories, and
> persons from the shared heritage and to promote them over others.
> Such a selection implies exclusion and there will never be
> complete unity about the values selected, or about how those
> values might be applied. (289)

In the face of this disagreement about communal values, Condit

nevertheless enfolds her definition of epideictic in the absence of

controversy, arguing:

> [T]he promotion of individual values in the abstract is generally
> seen to be noncontroversial because we are trained to accept a
> wide range of values, and to see conflicts only in their
> relationship to each other and to specific decisions (only the
> ideologically aware might object to praise of 'order' or 'family'
> or 'tolerance'). Consequently, there is usually no overt conflict
> of ideas and values internal to an epideictic speech. (289-90)

If a reader should actually disagree, the consequence would be "a sense

of [the reader's] alienation from the community," making the

shaping/sharing function "not-entirely-benign" (290). Condit

understates the problems created by privileging abstract agreement over

particular disagreement. To carry her "benign" medical metaphor

further, she describes the epideictic Act as one of excising the

reader's deliberation and then of discarding it as disease somewhere on

the margins of the community. The theory does not treat the

consequences of this extraction of a reader's willing ability to raise

questions about the ideologies of his or her community's values.

Instead, it blames readers for putting the scalpel in the writer's hand.

In a refutation of epideictic as a writer's "propaganda," Condit

concludes:

> The constraints of the audience's needs, its willingness to call
> for a speaker and to listen, its demands that the orator speak for

all the people and use the people's values and heritage place powerful limits on how far the speaker can take the audience, and how events can be explained. (297)

Given its acknowledgement that epideictic writer-Agents do not speak for all their community's members, this theory fabricates a reader co-Agent who does not really exist.

Sullivan, who has published the largest number of arguments on epideictic, characterizes the writer who is capable of being an epideictic Agent. This rhetor's ethos arises from four major qualities. "Authority," meaning the reputation that the rhetor brings to the epideictic occasion, enables him to speak from experience and with a spaciousness allowing more assumption than proof (Rhetoric 129-32). "Vision," an ability to see more than his audience, arises from his genius and inspiration (Rhetoric 132-35). "Presentation of good reasons" is a key marker of this rhetor's discourse. Although epideictic writer-Agents, like teachers, "may have the authority simply to tell students [or readers] the way things are," these authorities "choose instead to support generalizations with good reasons out of respect for the students' rationality" ("Ethos" 125). They also recognize logos as a dominant value in Western culture, which makes them smart enough to treat assent as if it were reasoned assent (Rhetoric 135-37). "Creation of consubstantiality" is the power through which the epideictic writer "enfolds participants" into his or her ethos ("Ethos" 114).

If this authoritative, visionary, reasoned, creator of unity sounds like quite a match for an epideictic reader, he is. Although Sullivan, like Condit, purports to construct a "collaboration between

the author and the reader" (Rhetoric 165), real negotiation of meaning is inhibited by the theoretical expectation of reader's agreement. For instance, in countering concerns that epideictic is authoritarian, Sullivan argues: "[T]hough epideictic may appear authoritarian when viewed by someone who does not share the values being lauded, the participants view it rather as a form of communion" (Rhetoric 77). This response seems strange for a theorist who aims to cure the problems of the Western world by strengthening universal values. How can an attitude of "It's only authoritarian if you don't agree" create unity? This question does not surface in Sullivan's project because the corollary to expectation of agreement is, of course, no expectation of disagreement. "The audience," Sullivan argues, "brings to the discourse a willingness to accept the speaker's assertions because of the speaker's generally perceived ethos" and because they celebrate "the same vision of reality" ("Ethos" 123, 128).

An anti-theory, anti-reader-response stance further denies the reader the status of Agent who interprets meaning. Arguing that readers should read from the "author's framework, rather than some critical perspective from the outside" (Rhetoric 159), Sullivan quotes C. S. Lewis, whose The Chronicles of Narnia he analyzes as epideictic: "'When we 'receive' it [the text] we exert our senses and imagination and various other powers according to a pattern invented by the artist. When we 'use' it we treat it as assistance for our own activities'" (Rhetoric 162). To be caught "using" rather than "receiving" a text's meaning is to commit the crime of "misreading" (Rhetoric 161). The reader is demeaned for having any pragmatic aim. A footnoted disclaimer

that epideictic can be both a rhetoric of "unveilment" (which uncovers the meaning in reality) and a rhetoric of "adornment" (which adorns reality by creating meaning) is overridden by a privileging of unveilment through the words of Rosenfield: "'The epideictic rhetor lets reality reveal (aletheia) itself, so that the audience may behold the 'radiance of Being' and be overcome with joy (thaumadzein)'" ("Epideictic" 342). Epideictic is the "rhetoric of orthodoxies" through which values and beliefs are transferred from writer to reader (Rhetoric 232, "Ethos" 117).

This power of writer over reader is illustrated in a variety of epideictic occasions. In children's literature, epideictic "attempts to inculcate time-proven values" (Rhetoric 78, my emphasis). In public ceremony unlike pragmatic discourse, it "create[s] consensus at a deeper level by reinforicing [sic]--through celebration--the common assumptions and values of the culture (Rhetoric 79, my emphasis). The verbs that I have underlined ("to inculcate" and "to reinforce") connote the clearly hierarchical and potentially violent relationship that his theory creates between writers and readers. Children must agree to be instilled; adults to be forced again. Whereas in children's literature and public ceremony Sullivan's theory admits a persuasive writer, in arguments about rhetorical criticism and scientific experimentation it reverts to nonpersuasive, nondeliberative epideictic. Rhetorical criticism is a praise-or-blame genre in which a critic "is able to engage in criticism only when he thinks his view of reality is closer to the Totality than is the view of his opponents" ("Epideictic" 344). Sullivan calls his own argument an "act of celebration" of the

ritualistic display whereby critics engage in "battle" for "power" to shape academia ("Epideictic" 345, 346). In contrast to this agonistic relationship, the reader of scientific experimentation is impotent. Science reports its results demonstratively, in a way that "transforms the audience from critics into witnesses" who are "spectators rather than judges" ("Science" 238). If these witnesses are students of their teachers' experiments, they are not allowed to think until they have been duly inculcated into dominant scientific discourse. "[C]ritical thought is considered legitimate only after the student has been initiated into the tradition," accomplished once "the teacher establishes the authority of the present orthodoxy, makes use of praise and blame in various forms of criticism, creates an apprenticeship, and teaches uniformity of methods" ("Science" 237). In Sullivan's theory, then, rhetorical critics are encouraged to "Enjoy the battle," and scientists are told "Think when and as I say think." Readers of children's literature and public ceremony are similarly advised, "Don't change a thing."

The theories of Duffy, Sipiora, Walker, and Carter also construct writers as Agents and readers as non-Agents at the receiving end of others' Acts. Duffy and Sipiora's theories assume that readers will agree with everything they hear. Duffy's funeral orator, for instance, "reviews and celebrates the history of actions and commitments with which the current generation is to be imbued [by] the instilling of philosophically correct values" in a discourse that is "uncontroversial" (79, 85). This speaker has unchecked power to inscribe his listeners because the definitional absence of controversy erases the possibility

of disagreement. The epideictic Act for Duffy, then, is a one-way move: "It cannot take the place of dialectic as a means of arriving at truth" (89). Sipiora's discussion of epideictic as a powerful mode of "meditative reflection" (251) vacillates among three definitions of the reader: observer (240), observer and judge (246), or judge, but only toward the end of "an increased adherence to commonly held values" (248). If the reader is persuaded by the writer's representation of the moment occasioning the discourse, then the reader may share in that moment. Sipiora's theory, like Duffy's, does not account for a reader who judges unfavorably.

Walker's theory more overtly relegates the epideictic reader to the status of passive object. Making his case for lyric poetry as "discursive argument in verse" through his concept of epideictic, he claims to construe writer and reader as co-Agents (17). He argues forcefully for poets as writer-Agents who are "singers of arguments" (11). His reader-Agent, however, is less convincing. For instance, Walker criticizes Charles Bernstein's recent discussion of poetics as rhetoric (Walker's own argument generally) because it describes poetry as "call[ing] upon the reader to be actively involved in the process of constituting its meaning'" (21). He disparages Bernstein's idea of a reader as an "Emerson with a veneer of Marxist and modern/postmodern literary theory" (21).

Carter's work, through the lens of anthropology, defines epideictic as "ritual" (211). It foregrounds appeals to pathos at the expense of critical thinking in order to re-state other contemporary definitions of its Acts: It generates knowledge, constitutes community,

and educates its participants (213). When, for example, in a war eulogy
such as Plato's Menexenus, words come from the mouths of dead warriors
to the ears of living children exhorting them "to live up to and even
surpass those [warriors'] reputations and pass them on to their
children," these words exemplify epideictic's "powerful pedagogy" (229,
230). The lesson of this emotional exhortation, which Carter describes
as "extraordinary knowledge that extends beyond logic—and beyond the
deliberate falsifications of history" (223) is the perpetuation of these
same non-reasoned Acts in the future. Carter shuts down critical
thinking as Walker shuts out writer-reader collaboration, then, with
their Agent-Acts.

Unlike the Agent-Acts in these six theories, Poulakos and Consigny
construct reader-Agents who actually deliberate about that which writer-
Agents attempt to persuade them of. These readers and their
deliberative Acts, however, have serious restrictions.

Poulakos' theory is, as I read it, the most exciting and
innovative of contemporary epideictic theories because it recognizes
epideictic as an occasion for deliberation—a concept, as he notes,
largely ignored by rhetorical theory:

> Typically, generic analyses of a work made up of various forms
> credit epideictic formal elements with the general persuasive
> function of unifying auditors. But the rhetorical mission to move
> audiences to a place they are not, or to propel them toward a
> specific course of action, is still attributed to the deliberative
> elements of the work under consideration. What rhetorical mission
> epideictic can accomplish by means of its own formal texture,
> rather than its combination with other forms, is not considered.
> As a result, the potential of epideictic discourse to constitute
> the social is limited to a realm devoid of practical action, a
> realm where general standards of knowledge and belief-systems are
> communicated. ("Towards" 148)

In his analysis of <u>Evagoras</u>, Poulakos discerns two Acts in the two formal elements of Isocrates' eulogy ("Towards" 153). In the text's <u>epainos</u> (praise of character), Isocrates praises the deceased Evagoras, an Act that represents an elitist society's creation of hierarchy among its more and less praiseworthy members. In the <u>encomium</u> (praise of accomplishments), Isocrates persuades Nicocles, Evagoras' son, to study philosophy in order to govern wisely. This Act, contrary to the elitist praise, represents an egalitarian society's advocacy of education for political purposes. This pair of Acts, then, provides both a criticism of and a utopian alternative to the "socioeconomic relations that prevailed in the Athenian society during the early part of the fourth century B.C." ("Towards" 153). Isocrates the writer-Agent does not transform this critical/utopian opposition, Poulakos insists. Such transformation is the reader's Act, which at first glance looks very good for re-dressing discourse that historically has marginalized the reader as Agent. It is not, however, the deliberation and interpretation of the real, present epideictic reader that Poulakos theorizes. Co-Agent status belongs instead to the potential, future epideictic critic with the following advice:

> When cultural artifacts are interpreted as sites of social conflict over affirmation or challenge of existing structures of social relations, interpretation becomes a political gesture. It designates, that is, a realm hospitable to debates and disputes among the participants of our own society over valuations and beliefs. Making social relations an object of human consciousness, and therefore an object of potential transformation, interpretive experience [the critic's] enhances our understanding of values as things about which we [critics] must deliberate. In this manner, interpretaion [sic] is put in the service of creating a democratically secure space for conflict and a debate among participants regarding the values, aims, and aspirations each proposes for our own society. ("Towards" 161)

This statement asserts the sociopolitical aim of much postmodern criticism. It fails, however, to extend this aim to readers living in the Scenes of their culture's epideictic discourse. By theorizing an epideictic _critic_ but not an epideictic _reader_, Poulakos as academic intellectual enacts the very elitism he critiques. His argument that epideictic critics should deliberate in order to re-think and literally re-vise the values to which they are being persuaded—in short, to be political—is just as important an Act, and certainly a more timely one, for the intended epideictic reader-Agent.

If Poulakos' prescriptive for Nicocles is any indication, this theory implies a weak intended epideictic reader. According to Poulakos, Nicocles should be persuaded of the writer Isocrates' egalitarian argument. Therefore, he must "suspend his own prejudices and bracket his own desires. To enter into dialogue with the past world of his father, he must first suspend his world" ("Isocrates" 325). How a reader imprisons his own world view, and how a son divorces himself from his father's world, and what happens if and when he removes the brackets are issues that remain unexplained for Poulakos' epideictic reader. This bracketed reader sounds very much like the reader in Condit's theory who represses ideological awareness and acquiesces to the will of the writer-Agent under the pretense of noncontroversy.

Whereas Poulakos limits the epideictic reader-Agent to future generations' academic intelligentsia, Consigny narrows the reader's Acts to either the vapid work of judging "rhetorical skill" (281) or to nondeliberated compliance with the writer's "deception" (287). The theory and practice of Consigny's epideictic do not inform one another.

Theoretically, and according to Gorgias, he defines epideictic as

"'display' rhetoric . . . a genre devised expressly to display

rhetorical skill" (281-82). The writer and reader are reciprocal Agents

as the rhetor who "displays his rhetorical skill" and the audience

members who "observe and judge that skill" (281). In other words,

epideictic is rhetoric for rhetoric's sake. It is different from

"pragmatic rhetoric," a term synonymous with persuasion:

> Whereas the pragmatic rhetor is constrained by a practical
> exigence, the epideictic rhetor is [] at liberty to advocate any
> position whatsoever, regardless of how frivolous, as long as it
> affords him an opportunity to exhibit his rhetorical prowess.
> (281)

Consigny analyzes Gorgias' four major extant orations in order to

re-dress critical judgments of the Sophist's failure to live up to his

own definition of epideictic. Gorgias, he argues, turns his epideictic

occasions into pragmatic opportunities for instructing his audiences

about the deceptive, relativistic nature of rhetoric. "By showing his

audiences how they are being deceived by his own arguments," Consigny

concludes, "Gorgias's epideictic orations are in this sense parodic

'imitations' of pragmatic rhetoric, wherein he playfully depicts the

strategies of adaptation and deception" (292). Although Consigny proves

here that epideictic is pragmatic in the Gorgian corpus, not its

antithesis---indeed it is argument about argument itself--he never loops

back to his and Gorgias' definition of epideictic as "display" in order

to investigate what theoretical revisions his analysis calls for. In

practice, Gorgian epideictic is clearly more than display, and it

illustrates the inaccuracy of the "epideictic rhetoric" and "pragmatic

rhetoric" (or "persuasive" rhetoric) categories on which Consigny's theory depends.

Even if Consigny were to re-define epideictic in light of his textual analyses, the Agent-Act he points to in Gorgian pragmatic rhetoric would not permit a negotiation of meaning between writer and reader co-Agents. By definition their relationship is agonistic: "The essence of Gorgian rhetoric [is] a struggle for domination or victory over one's adversary" (286). The writer's Act is to deceive the reader into believing that her version of "truth" is the version of truth. Furthermore, the reader is encouraged to be "deceived" by the writer's version in order to show his own open-mindedness to points of view other than his own (292-93). Thus Gorgias "exposes" rhetorical manipulation, but then advises readers to be manipulated.

In the end, Consigny's theory routs epideictic with determinism as Poulakos' marks it with elitism. Their theories promise more but deliver as little for epideictic writers and readers as do Condit's communal definition, Sullivan's rhetoric of orthodoxies, Duffy's philosophical correctness, Sipiora's mental reflection, Walker's lyrical force, and Carter's transcendental emotion. In all eight formulations, the Agent-Act is a power struggle of writer's persuasion over reader's deliberation in which meaning is not negotiated and the writer always wins. Given the pre-determined outcome for the reader's response—full assent to the writer's argument—persuasion seems a misnomer or a false image for the writer's Act. Coercion would be a more accurate term for such a propagandized discourse. Furthermore, the reader's absence of a deliberative Act also is an inaccurate construct. Studies in cognition

prove the impossibility of keeping a reader from making meaning. Frank Smith's research explains reading as an Act characterized as purposeful, selective, anticipatory behavior that is based on comprehension arrived at through prediction-making and grounded in the reader's prior knowledge of the world. In this way, reading is congruous to any other Act of thinking (the introduction and first chapter of Understanding Reading develop this explanation). The harm in enacting a hierarchical writer/reader relationship manifests itself in two primary ways--as a violation of the reader as meaning-maker and in the potential violence with which oppressed readers might retaliate. Smith also critiques the damaging results to literacy programs that inaccurate theories of reading produce.

Purpose-Act: According to these contemporary theories, what is the relationship between the Act as meaning and Purpose as consequence? Why do Agents enact or "do" epideictic? They do it, in a nutshell, either to avoid change or to invite it. The clue to discovering which of these Purposes an epideictic theory embraces lies in its concept of the reader. If the reader is a nondeliberative, passive object (a recipient, an agreer, a receptacle of values and beliefs) while the writer is a persuasive, active subject (a giver, an arguer, a depositor of values and beliefs), then the Purpose of epideictic discourse is to avoid change. As the analysis of Agent-Act implies, epideictic Purpose for the majority of contemporary theories is the avoidance of change. This static aim is encapsuled in the goal of maintaining tradition--the beliefs, morals, ethics, philosophies, and ideals valued by culture, society, world.

Condit's epideictic maintains tradition as its participants seek occasions "for expressing and reformulating [their] shared heritage" (289). In a discourse in which nobody disagrees (or is allowed to express disagreement), this reformulation concocts the same old formula. With no innovating perspectives informing these noncontroversial occasions, with what would writers and readers develop anything new? In fact, this theory does not aim for discovery because epideictic works "to maintain community values (a conservative function perhaps)" (297). The second Purpose assigned to epideictic appears at first glance dynamic--"to accomplish the progressive function of adapting our community to new times, technologies, geographies, and events" (297). Scene rather than Purpose, however, commands the change here as people react to their changing world rather than create its change. Agents "explain a social world" (288), working as spin doctors who gloss the changes for anyone who wants or needs to participate in reactions to them. Given the obligation to maintain tradition, epideictic readers can expect the same old stories.

Whereas Condit's epideictic aims to help people keep up with the times as they change, Sullivan's theory intends to change the times by reverting them to an earlier Western tradition. "In the West," Sullivan believes, "objective moral standards were generally agreed upon during the Christian era of the Middle Ages" (Rhetoric 7). In order to recapture this stability, this theory assigns to epideictic discourse the Purpose of "preserving traditional values" (Rhetoric 270). Such preservation can occur, for instance, when children's literature transmits traditional values to young people. Because "the master is

already human, the pupil a mere candidate for humanity," an epideictic orator-teacher trains children to be human (Rhetoric 208). Sullivan would humanize them with the ancient virtues of "justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom" (Rhetoric 44), a quartet posited as if they are unquestionable values in the West's current "ongoing moral tradition" (Rhetoric 275). Yet these virtues are open to deliberation. What might be the difference in humanity, for instance, if children were educated to the virtues of mercy, forgiveness, love, and intuition rather than justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom? Sullivan furthermore advocates the educational Purpose of epideictic in the way that C. S. Lewis perceived education: "'men transmitting manhood to men'" (Rhetoric 215). This patriarchal thread running throughout Sullivan's argument gives little assurance to women and persons of color who have lived on the margins of Western tradition that their values will be included in those his theory intends to reinforce through epideictic Acts.

His project orchestrates the epideictic Purpose of maintaining traditional values by assigning categorical tasks to epideictic and deliberative rhetoric. Because, Sullivan asserts, Westerners do not share the same knowledge and morality anymore, they have seriously diminished their ability to deliberate. They have no standards by which to measure their judgments. In order to recover effective deliberation, they must first solidify the common ground that will be put in service of deliberation. This job belongs to epideictic:

> The alternative I suggest is that the old consensus [of the Western world] be rebuilt, modified to take into account new views of social roles. To do this, we must start with the remnants of the old tradition, making the values of that tradition widely

known and acceptable to the public through epideictic rhetoric.
(Rhetoric 20-21)

An illogical circularity undercuts Sullivan's argument. If Westerners
cannot deliberate, then how will they decide which values and beliefs
epideictic discourse should make "widely known and acceptable?" Asking
cultures or societies with weak deliberation to sew with "the remnants"
they already see invites a blindness to the un-seen pieces perpetuating
weak deliberation and weakened values. Furthermore, "Western
tradition," as I have indicated, is far from the whole piece Sullivan
purports it to be. To "take into account new views of social roles"
hardly speaks to the re-structuring of values relevant to the radical
developments in social, political, and epistemological philosophies that
the postmodern world navigates. This reactionary Purpose-Act reaches
for the blanket of "Truth" as it pushes aside any new deliberative
weaving in epideictic.

As in Sullivan's project, the Purpose-Act of Sipiora's theory
divides epideictic from deliberation. The epideictic consensus-building
Act "provides the foundation for the other two rhetorical genres,"
deliberative and forensic, and "functions to inform value oriented
dispositions to action" (249). Although confident that nondeliberative
epideictic can "'leap ahead' of political discourse and liberate it to a
re-petition of human dignity which might open genuinely new paths of
action" (249), the likelihood of any real change seems slim, considering
that the re-petitioning occurs through the conservative appeal to, as he
quotes Perelman, 'traditional and accepted values'" (248). Re-

petitioning with and for conventional values is analogous to the reformulation of Condit's Purpose-Act.

Duffy advocates philosophy as the ultimate Purpose of epideictic. The encomium, for instance, expresses "the philosophical wisdom involved in securing the maintenance of the ideal state [and] in securing the public reaffirmation of values" (86). Because the ideal state needs only "maintenance" and values only "reaffirmation," epideictic insures only the status quo. Neither is change possible for future Scenes because the encomiast reiterates current "philosophical ideas which [will] form the basis of future judgment and action." This projection of current thinking onto future thought limits words and deeds to that-which-has-already-been-philosophized.

The Purpose of epideictic, as Walker particularizes it to late twentieth-century poetry, is to offer "engaging and even important thought" to its readers (20). His discussion never places this thought in terms of modifying the social, political, or other material realities of their beliefs and/or actions. Although he effectively embraces persuasion as the essential nature of rhetoric and poetry, he does not extend his thesis to envision what the outcomes—the Purposes—of lyrical argumentation might be. Consequently, epideictic lyric, drained of potential impact on the traditions about which it argues, exists for its own sake.

Carter's theory creates two contradictory Purposes for epideictic. On the one hand, these Acts have no essential outcome:

> Like ritual, epideictic discourse possesses the potential for achieving an even greater value than more obviously pragmatic discourse precisely because it does not have the clear and practical consequences of the latter. (217)

On the other hand, he points to serious material realities in the
Purpose of a war eulogy:

> In eulogizing the war dead of Athens, their deeds [the warriors']
> become words and live only as there are words to give them life.
> And the words themselves influence the deeds, or at least the
> values, of those who listen now and in the future. (231)

This conclusion credits epideictic with the power to change both the
present and the future, thereby implying that changing words and
changing deeds are reciprocal Acts--a generative insight. In the war
eulogy, Agents can choose between words that advocate war and words that
advocate peace--two very different practical outcomes of eulogizing
warriors. In the end, however, Carter's theory resolves itself to
maintain tradition. His peroration about the power of epideictic to
persuade children to grow up to be warriors indicates that he is less
interested in cultural innovation than he is in "maintaining the
collective memory of the culture" (231) in which war always has been and
therefore always will be idealized.

These theories, with their nondeliberative readers, advocate a
static Purpose-Act in their maintenance of tradition. Conversely, when
a reader deliberates as the writer persuades and together they negotiate
meaning in a nonhierarchical relationship, the Purpose of epideictic
discourse is to create and mediate change. Two contemporary notions
point epideictic in this direction.

Poulakos' theory, as I have noted, comes closest to constructing
an active reader. In encouraging a theoretical shift from treating
epideictic as a category for texts that "transmit values from one
generation to the next" to one in which texts have a "propensity to

shape and be shaped by the social realm" ("Towards" 149), Poulakos clears a space in which change may occur. Readers deliberate about transformations in their culture, about the "'variety (or lack of variety) in the economic, social, and political arrangements that are being encouraged at [their] own moment'" as these options are represented in epideictic discourse (he quotes Berlin, 162). Thus the Purpose of epideictic seeks to invoke innovation rather than insure sameness. In that this theory privileges the reader-critic who interprets sometimes centuries after an epideictic text has been written, however, it values the word's shaping influence on the future at the expense of the Purpose-Act's import for its present Scene.

Because of the disparity between Consigny's theory and practice, the Purpose of epideictic is unclear. Despite its definition of epideictic as the rhetoric of display, Gorgias persuades in his epideictic speeches. Whether any other epideictic rhetor would be capable of rendering deliberation rather than display is not an argument Consigny makes. Likewise, the persuasive lessons themselves are limited to Gorgias' one totalizing argument that all language use is deceptive. If Gorgias can transform epideictic into deliberation by displaying all rhetoric as deception, then the ultimate deception (to use this theory's primary metaphor for language) would be to argue that epideictic's Purpose is display for display's sake. Nevertheless, this aim is the only Purpose this theory constructs for epideictic discourse. Gorgias can persuade, but he directs other rhetors to perform exercises in order to deceive their auditors who, in turn, fall for the trick. Purposefulness perpetually turns purposeless in these epideictic Acts.

Thus Poulakos' project limits the readers who may participate in change while Consigny's constrains the writers who may participate and the changes they may affect. Consequently, these two theories are not strong enough to counter the even more limited Purpose-Acts constructed in the other six theories. On the whole, contemporary epideictic theory keeps change at bay with perpetual, repetitive motion. The present occasions for epideictic discourse serve as conduit for transporting values and beliefs from the past into the future. The aim is to accomplish the transferral with as little effect as possible on the intangible materiel intended to supply future deliberative actions. The meaning of epideictic, then, is to have no consequence.

The inaccuracy of this epideictic Purpose lies in its assumption that values can be simply maintained without being affected by or affecting in the persuasive process. If, for instance, a rhetor advocates war through the advocacy of patriotism, listeners are not persuaded unless they are convinced of war as well as of patriotism as the rhetor renders it. The value of patriotism is not just maintained; it is part of what the reader is persuaded to. This Purpose also is destructive because attempting to maintain values actually hurts the values epideictic attempts to preserve. When epideictic writers and readers theoretically begin and end with the same values, they do not actively engage these values with their minds and hearts. This lack of invigoration weakens the values by exposing them to the atrophy that naturally proceeds from disuse. Thinking and feeling, on the other hand, would strengthen the values by reconstituting them through the growth that proceeds from genuine engagement. Maintenance of tradition

annihilates opportunities for future growth because it freeze-dries current values with the assumption that they will thaw out in ways appropriate for generations of humanity yet to come. In short, the Purpose of maintaining tradition destructs its own aim.

Agency-Act: Epideictic writers seek to persuade nondeliberative readers in order to maintain tradition. The motivational element of Agency asks the question: How do they do it? This is the question long familiar to rhetoric regarding the relationship between form (Agency) and content (Act). Praise, since Aristotle first categorized rhetoric, has been a primary Act associated with epideictic. Conventional wisdom accepts epideictic as the praise-or-blame genre (although blame receives minimal discussion), and it seems simple enough. A war eulogy praises dead warriors; an Independence Day speech praises freedom; a commencement address praises knowledge and learners. This notion, however, inaccurately situates praise as the end—as Act or Purpose—of epideictic. On the contrary, praise is the means—the Agency—of epideictic. Praise is how epideictic rhetors do their Acts toward accomplishing their Purposes. Aristotle himself identifies praise as Agency:

> To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. . . . Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done. (Rhetoric 1368a)

Isocrates' rhetoric, Poulakos notes, provides the first example of prose "employ[ing] praise with the purpose of shaping the audience's moral character" ("Isocrates" 318). Praise works as epideictic's Agency

through a two-fold strategy—amplification of the ideal and marginalization of the real—whereby an ideal/real binary opposition is created and sustained.

The dominant ideal amplified in epideictic is the shared nature of the values held by the rhetor and the entire audience of an epideictic Act. These common values are universal at least among everyone within the context of a particular discourse. At most, shared values bind present to future generations of as yet unknown rhetors and audiences, as this analysis of motives already suggests. Contemporary theorists posit these values as if they exist in reality, yet their theories work overtly to marginalize any real disagreement by defining appropriate and inappropriate Agency. Condit advises that rhetors explain problems precipitating epideictic occasions "in terms of the audience's key values and beliefs" (288); conversely, "a focus on partial interests [would be] anathema" (289). Sipiora brings forward this prescription for the rhetor's praise from Cicero, arguing that epideictic "'consists in narrating and exhibiting . . . without employing any argument . . . for it does not establish any propositions . . . but amplifies statements'" (251). Carter recommends that rhetors configure a sameness among themselves and their audience members through "flattery" (225). It's cheap and easy for Athenians to flatter Athenians, Plato notes, but it breaks down social barriers and building up community, Carter counters (225). In turn, marginalizing sociopolitical realities complements the flattery. Like all good Athenian funeral orators, Socrates in Menexenus makes "no mention of disagreements over any of the policies that sent Athenians to war so often, always leading to the

death of its citizens and sometimes to more disastrous consequences"

(226-27). Amplification is the appropriate Agency, then; argumentation

is not.

Whereas the above-mentioned theories instruct the rhetor to assert

common values and to desert contrary ideas according to the readers'

values, Sullivan's theory requires all values be measured according to

the writer's. His description of the reading process illustrates this

yardstick:

> Having filled in the blank, she [the reader] arrives at the
> author's next installment, and it is here that the author's power
> to affect opinion is exerted, either by affirming the reader's
> expectations--and thus reinforcing the presuppositions of the
> reader--or by rejecting the reader's forecast. (This is at a
> cognitive level, not interpretive.) In the second case, the
> reader's image building is impeded, and she must adopt an alien
> perspective. In either case, the author is instructing the
> reader, building the reader's wisdom and ability to judge.
> (Rhetoric 180)

Despite his parenthetical denial that this cognitive description does

not also convey interpretive process, the bulk of Sullivan's discussion

equates comprehending the writer's meaning with accepting it. Although

epideictic interpretation provides space for "alternative responses"

(Rhetoric 181), his project never mentions ways in which a differing

opinion survives or thrives within an epideictic Act. On the contrary,

if the Purpose of preserving orthodoxies is to be met, "the reader and

the author begin to share attitudes. . . . [T]he reader is being

initiated into the society's heritage of value judgments" (Rhetoric

181). The rhetor initiates; the reader is initiated. Amplifying shared

values in turn silences potentially articulated differences.

Epideictic praise also opposes the ideal and real by amplifying the abstract and marginalizing the concrete. Sullivan draws the either/or choice by privileging the general over the particular. For instance, rhetorical criticism employs praise as Agency because it is concerned "with celebrating the cultural ideal rather than with determining the disposition of a particular case" ("Epideictic" 339, my emphasis). Similarly, Agency can pitch truth against fact. In the war eulogy, for instance, "the factuality of the deeds recounted matters little compared with the truth of the values they illuminate" (Duffy 85, my emphasis). Thus political causes and material effects of war are concrete issues erased eulogistically. Reversing this truth/fact dichotomy, Carter equates truth and facts as a knowledge inferior to the "extraordinary" or "primordial" knowledge to be learned in epideictic (213-14). This knowledge amounts to lies, although Carter resists the synonym. Socrates' war eulogy, "whitewashing [Athens'] military history" (226), narrates a blatantly false history of the city-state that

> fixes before the auditors a transcendent principle that brings order and meaning to an otherwise chaotic and meaningless series of events. And in doing so, it achieves a ritual sense of extraordinary knowledge that extends beyond logic--and beyond the deliberate falsification of history. (223)

Lying is justified even when it perpetuates the violent outcomes about which it lies:

> It is suitable in a setting in which the dead of war are being honored and buried to look for reasons, some justification for war; otherwise, they have died for nothing, victims of a world gone crazy. (222)

Such insanity is precisely the reality that ritualized lying idealizes. Consigny takes falsehood to another kind of extreme. His theory characterizes amplifications of any abstraction as deceptive because they attempt, as does all linguistic Agency, to articulate "accurate replications of 'things as they are'" (287). This view of epideictic's praise as a failed attempt to be concrete renders all praise as false.

Praise of shared values and of the abstract are two formal elements of Agency in the epideictic Act. A third is eloquence, and contemporary emphasis on eloquence most overtly exposes a form/content split. A high style is the rhetorical strategy whereby the rhetor evades content and enamors readers. In order to convince an audience that they share common experience, for instance, a speaker must

> create a vivid picture of the shared definition, not merely a
> clear and rational case, and so the epideictic speech may have a
> more pronounced stylistic display than deliberative or forensic
> addresses. (Condit 292)

The rhetor should "exemplify and model the praiseworthy (or blameworthy) by creating vivid (even if exaggerated) images with words" (Carter 228). The rhetorical outcome mesmerizes the rhetor as well as the reader. "It is not surprising," Carter notes, "that Socrates would be bewitched by the power of his words, because epideictic oratory is about the power of words" (231). Likewise, the ancient orator is more concerned with "his use of language" than with "recounting the facts" (Duffy 91). And the form of versification giving lyric poetry "the power of heightened prosody" makes it the superlative epideictic discourse (Walker 218).

Amplifying shared values, the abstract, and form while marginalizing unshared values, the concrete, and content leads to a

conflation of the Agency of praise and the Act of persuasion. Praise
becomes so important a means as to become an end--praise for praise's
sake. Carter's theory, for instance, claims that "[l]ike ritual, in
which what is said is less important than that it is said, the value of
epideictic is intrinsic--the seemingly impractical value of being 'a
significant action in itself'" (217-18). Epideictic for epideictic's
sake. In the same sense, Sullivan theorizes celebration for
celebration's sake, such as scientific discourse in which the
"standardized pattern of an experimental article is a form of
celebration, a ritualistic enactment of the beliefs of science"
("Science" 239). Consigny makes the meta-conflation of Agency and Act
in his argument that Gorgias uses language--the whole of linguistic
Agency--in order to expose the deception of language--the totalizing
linguistic Act. Condit concludes that epideictic

> is told for the sake of the ritualistic need for communal sharing,
> not as preparation for some other action, and thus it is
> performative, as Walter Beale indicated; in the hearing of such
> self identifying discourse, audience members share, live, and
> display their community. (292, my emphasis)

Display for display's sake. These conflations of Agency and Act, as
Condit's reference indicates, reflect the notion of performative
discourse--performance for performance's sake--categorically instituted
in Beale's rhetorical theory. Epideictic is discourse doing the same
thing in order to keep doing the same thing, an Agency stabilizing its
Act and stagnating its Purpose.

Poulakos' project begins to shift this ideal/real opposition of Agency dialogically. He hears in Isocrates' Evagoras a tension between two contrasting realities, elitist and egalitarian, shaping the life of its ancient Athenian reader Nicocles. Isocrates does not resolve, transform, order, or otherwise alter this tension. Its change must come from a reader (a critic, to Poulakos' exactness). Therefore, Agency must be shared by the reader. Through deliberating about ways in which this real tension between two opposing world views might be transformed into a third, possible world, readers discover the ideal ("Towards" 160-61). In his commitment to Marxist theory, however, Poulakos loses a portion of his dialogical voice. His argument begins and ends with a harsh criticism of hermeneutics as interpretive Agency. His own Marxist thinking

> stands in sharp contrast to interpretive notions of understanding held by hermeneutics, whose insistence on maintaining a total separation between the symbolic and the social prevents interpretive experience from raising the interpreter's consciousness to the potentiality of social transformation. ("Towards" 162)

He argues that critics should politicize their readings into actions geared toward more fully attaining democracy:

> What governs a Marxist interpretation of cultural activity is the critic's assessment of a cultural artifact vis-a-vis its opposition to actual structures of domination and its capacity to disclose alternative structures of a more egalitarian character. ("Towards" 151)

Clearly preferring the egalitarian world, his argument becomes one of choosing between opposing realities rather than one for creating an alternative ideal as he imagines the shape of the future. My point here

is not to argue that egalitarianism is not a preferable choice to elitism, but to suggest that choosing between the two world views is not as generative a choice for a peaceful future as is negotiating the two of them and thereby transforming them into the third, possible world Poulakos speaks of. Poulakos' socialist conviction leads him away from a dialogical relationship between real and ideal and into dichotomous thinking about "opposition between actual and possible valuations" ("Towards" 161). Thus his theoretical stance only inverts the elitist/egalitarian hierarchy.[14]

Despite this slippage in his argument, Poulakos points the way for a theory of epideictic that does not necessitate praise's binary opposition for its Agency. Not coincidentally, Poulakos' is also the one epideictic theory that opens the door for a deliberative reader-Agent. As well, it argues for a de-emphasis on discourse categories. It warns against "our eagerness to classify Isocrates' works all too easily into political, artistic, didactic, demonstrative, or other types of oratory" and recommends that the challenge and consequence in studying Isocrates' discourse "lies not in taxonomy but in interpretation" of texts that blur the boundaries of such categories ("Isocrates" 326). Thus his project illustrates the related theoretical tasks of transforming the dichotomies of ideal/real, writer/reader, and discourse category "A"/discourse category "B." Without resolution of these oppositions, inaccurate and harmful features lace epideictic Agency. It is false to assume that Agency only praises the ideal (shared values, the abstract, and form) because this assumption ignores Agency's marginalization of the real (silenced differences, the

concrete, and content). The destructiveness of this Agency arises in its blaming real content for opposing ideal form, rather than its shaping of more ideal creations through a conversation with reality.

Scene-Act: "Genuine thought," Sipiora notes of epideictic meditative thinking, "is always a response to that which calls to be thought about" (247). His observation points to the final question in this analysis of motives in contemporary epideictic theory: When and where do epideictic Acts occur? Or, to put it in context with the other terms as I have analyzed them, the question is: What kind of Scene supports (and is supported by) an active writer who persuades a nondeliberative reader to maintain tradition through praise grounded in ideal/real oppositions? In short, this is the text-context concern. Theory currently splits epideictic practice across two Scenes. While two theories focus attention on the present word, the majority conflate present and future into a universal Scene.

Condit and Consigny's theories situate epideictic in the present. Communities "create epideictic occasions . . . in order to have opportunities for expressing and reformulating [their] shared heritage," which is the reason that audiences resent any reference to diversity (Condit 289). Therefore, the Scene is a faked occasional moment during which writers and readers pretend that they share that which they all do not share. According to Consigny, the Scene is any instance in which an orator is savvy enough to modify Agency to suit the emerging moment. In fact, "the rhetor may compete in any discourse whatsoever, if he is able to adapt to and master its apparatus" (293). Epideictic, for both theories, is a matter in the here-and-now, and Scene ultimately

evaporates in their explanations. To say, as Condit does, that we forget our differences does not shape the Scene; it ignores it by eradicating the text from its real context. To say, as Consigny does, that Scene is only that which a rhetor reads in order to play his rhetorical cards well does not allow context to inform discourse in any deep way, nor does the discourse affect the Scene.

As theorized by Carter, Duffy, and Walker, the Scene of epideictic is universal. Epideictic transcends place by "connecting its participants to the cosmos or to a transcendent principle"; for instance, Socrates falsifies Athenian history in order to take his auditors to a "special place in the cosmos" (Carter 221). Socrates also transcends time by opening the mouths of dead warriors and thereby making listeners "aware of an historical immortality to which they belong" (Carter 223). That this Athens or these warriors do not really exist only makes them more poignant. Duffy also reiterates otherworldliness by assigning epideictic "a broad and timeless educational function" that bears no resemblance to the practical nature of deliberative or forensic rhetoric (86). This function imbues epideictic texts with "universal" meanings such as, Duffy argues, the definition of love advanced in the final speech of Phaedrus (a Platonic dialogue that has yet to garner universal critical interpretation). Walker's theory conflates the past and present into one universe by suggesting that epideictic "speaks to the recurring, or experientially 'permanent' or chronic issues in a society's pattern of existence" (8). In theories that avoid change such as this one, the Scene is the place

where history repeats itself. Indeed, as any of these theories

illustrate, a static Purpose and a universal Scene go hand-in-hand.

The Scene in Sullivan's theory is not consistent throughout his

project. Most often it is universal, possessing the transcendental

quality described in Carter's theory. The writer's ethos embodies

Scene:

> Ethos is not primarily an attribute of the speaker, nor even an
> audience perception: It is, instead, the common dwelling place of
> both, the timeless, consubstantial space that enfolds participants
> in epideictic exchange. ("Ethos" 127)

This omnipresent Agent-come-Scene also consumes the future:

> One can almost call such a place sacred, for it is the place where
> the educative and celebratory functions of epideictic take place,
> the place where the continuing ideology of an orthodoxy is given
> birth in a new generation and rebirth in those who already dwell
> within the tradition. ("Ethos" 128)

This epideictic rhetoric of orthodoxies aims to perpetuate its

ideological Scene forever. In countering Marxist criticism of such a

goal, it speaks from the hegemonic ideology it is accused of:

> I use the term orthodoxy not in reference to a dominant ideology
> but in reference to the belief systems and perspectives of
> subgroups or subcultures within a society. What others refer to
> as a pluralistic or fragmented society, I see as a society made up
> of competing orthodoxies. From the perspective of those who do
> not share the benefits of being members of an orthodoxy,
> epideictic can be seen as hegemonic rhetoric (Poulakos), for in
> the traditional Marxist terminology, it celebrates the dominant
> ideology. ("Epideictic" 339)

Contrary to this emphasis on future Scene, Sullivan's articles on

literary criticism and scientific reports situate epideictic only in the

present, positing Aristotle's triad of past, present, and future

rhetorics in its most simplistic explication ("Epideictic" 344, "Science" 230). This emphasis on the here-and-now returns Scene to a site for display rhetoric similar to Condit's and Consigny's theories.

Sipiora's work straddles epideictic across two Scenes. Reflection takes place in the present; action takes place in the future. Thus epideictic texts are "transcendent" because they "'overshoot the established universe of discourse and action toward its historical and real alternative'" (he quotes Herbert Marcuse, 249). On the one hand, this insight points to the powerful link between present word and future deed. It treats words and deeds too discretely, however, and they exist too far apart from each other to suggest any real connection. The gap between present epideictic and future deliberation obscures the political consequences born of values not deliberated in the past's epideictic occasions. Conversely, Sipiora also flattens all temporal space, describing a speech by Heidegger as epideictic because it "illuminates the present as an enduring embodiment of things past and of those yet to come" (242). Scene, then, is either a fission or a fusion of time.

Once again, Poulakos' theory stands apart from its contemporaries. His discussion of text and context suggest an Act in dialectic with its Scene. Epideictic texts are informed by their Scenes as they "come into being, and acquire their meaning, under particular social conditions" ("Towards" 148). In turn, they inform their Scenes, "capable of critiquing or transforming the existing socioeconomic relations at the time of [their] production" ("Towards" 153). Poulakos explains the way in which a material concept of Scene fundamentally changes the ways in which epideictic can be theorized:

> Conceived as the site of a critique or transformation of the
> social order, the genre of epideictic oratory can no longer be
> understood as a stable ground upon which tradition leaves its
> unalterable traces and attains an intelligibility that persists
> across time. Rather, the totality of works that make up the
> tradition of epideictic oratory must be understood as a historical
> register that supplies us with a heritage of conflicting
> valuations among participants of various societies at various
> times. ("Towards" 161)

Thus Poulakos constructs the epideictic Scene as a place in which differing values are deliberated rather than a space in which "universal" values are deposited. This Scene is a Scene that can exist, one that can live and breathe. In contrast, his colleagues' theories construct Scenes that are impossibilities. There is no instance in the present that does not have consequences in the future. Likewise, there is no instance that is identical in the present and the future, however much epideictic theory conflates the two Scenes. No one steps twice into the same place in the river. To assume otherwise drains Scene of its power and responsibility in shaping epideictic Acts with an inaccurate and destructive text/context split.

Dividing Word from Deed

The most serious implication of the inaccuracy and destructiveness of contemporary epideictic theory elucidated by this analysis of motives is the theoretical division of word from deed. In the Agent-Act relationship, the writer-Agent controls the word and the reader-non-Agent must perform the deed. Theory acts as if the writer performs a deedless word—merely if authoritatively representing shared values. This notion is inaccurate because the writer is actually engaged in the act of persuasion to values and their future enactments. Theory expects

its reader to perform wordless deeds—merely and nonauthoritatively accepting represented shared values. This notion is destructive because the reader's critical thinking about future values and actions is numbed. The absence of deliberation furthermore casts persuasion as a misnomer. Contrary to Burke's concepts of identification and addressedness through which writers and readers transform similarities and differences, epideictic theory advocates the violent practice of a writer/reader hierarchy in which writers overpower readers and persuasion silences deliberation. In his pedagogy for literacy that advances learning as an act of becoming more human, Paulo Freire speaks against such de-humanization:

> Any situation in which some individuals prevent others from
> engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence. The means
> used are not important; to alienate human beings from their own
> decision-making is to change them into objects. (66)

The epideictic Act's Purpose to maintain tradition privileges a static state over a dynamic transformation. Sameness is always perceived as better than change. The writer's aim of no change means that only words are significant in epideictic. The reader is likewise deedless with automatic reactions that are more like the thoughtless motion of machines rather than the conscious actions of human beings. No change means no deed. Nothing happens in this theoretical position, unlike Burke's philosophy of language as symbolic action in which language users always do something with their words, and their meanings always bear consequence. As Jerome Bruner pithily makes the point, "Everything is use" (87).

Agency in epideictic produces the word/deed split through praise's dual strategy of amplification of the ideal and marginalization of the real. The idealism manifests as epideictic words that in turn marginalize the realism of deliberative deeds. The resulting form/content split awards epideictic the invective of "mere rhetoric," counter to Burke's distinction of form as appeal that melds words and deeds into a mutually shaping relationship of the container and the thing contained. As Ralph Waldo Emerson understands the organicity of form in uses of language, "it is not meters, but a meter-making argument that makes a poem" (1190). By recognizing the humanistic nature of language, Bakhtin also transforms this dichotomy: "Form and content in discourse are one, once we understand that verbal discourse is a social phenomenon" (259).

Finally, the Scene of the epideictic Act either ignores the future in deference to the present or presses both present and future into universality. When epideictic Scene limits itself to the present, it divorces present word from future deed. When it conflates present and future making them anytime and anywhere, it makes the Scene no time and nowhere—contextless—because the present and future can never be the same, and in many cases should not be the same, as Richards' definition of rhetoric as "a study of misunderstandings and its remedies" underscores (3). Furthermore, their divisibility over time as a present value-word and a future action-deed prevents ideality and reality from transforming one another. Contemporary epideictic theory, with its sensitivity to the relationship between present and future, stands on the verge of incarnating Burke's concept of incipient action, in which

acts of mind shape present as well as future acts. It ignores, however, the ideologically-drenched, contextual nature of symbols and all their users that Burke's pragmatics acknowledges.

The taxonomic goal to define and characterize epideictic as something different from other discourse and then to count the fruits of that work as theoretical conclusion leads epideictic theory to create numerous dichotomies, all of which are hierarchies of power struggle. These oppositions—writer/reader, meaning/consequence, form/content, text/context, word/deed—mirror the hierarchies sustained by a theory of rhetoric as one use of language. As chapter one discusses, this large categorical concept also limits writer-reader interactions and parcels out persuasion and deliberation as consequences of some but not other discourses. Its Agency foregrounds form. Its desire to stabilize the world and the word shapes a Purpose of sameness and a Scene pretending always to be the same. The category of rhetoric as one use of language and the category of epideictic are both theories constructed contrary to the cognitive and social nature of language as symbolic action. Both articulate unauthentic relationships between an Act and its Agent, Purpose, Agency, and Scene. Therefore, as currently theorized, epideictic is a rhetoric of denial—a discourse of no deliberation, no change, no content, no context, no deed. The pentad, Burke's dynamic heuristic, reveals epideictic as it reveals rhetoric-as-one-use-of-language: a-human, a-consequential, a-worldly discourse.

In order to discover the ways that the theoretical discrepancies and problems emphasized in this discussion of contemporary epideictic theory manifest themselves in real epideictic occasions, the next two

chapters investigate epideictic practice. They explore what actually happens between epideictic readers and writers, meanings and consequences, forms and contents, and texts and contexts that ultimately shape words and deeds. Chapter three illustrates epideictic through the most ceremonial of occasions, the war eulogy. Chapter four depicts the classroom essay and its frequent ceremonial writing. The eulogy and essay are drawn together in chapter five for a comparison of these two epideictic occasions and their implications, demonstrating that they expose similarities among all uses of language. Whether a statesperson orates or a student writes, epideictic words and deeds must be interpreted as rhetorical realities. Whether intentionally ceremonial or not, the ethical implications of these epideictic occasions are equally serious and meaningful.

CHAPTER III

WAR EULOGIES: IN SEARCH OF REAL PEACEMAKING

Epideictic in the Eulogistic Occasion

The eulogy is the paradigmatic example of epideictic discourse. As the analysis of contemporary theory in chapter two suggests, when theorists study epideictic, they often discuss eulogies. More particularly, they talk about war eulogies, describing and prescribing epideictic practice for contemporary rhetors through examples in classical oration. In selecting one war eulogy through which to illustrate the practice of epideictic, this chapter investigates Pericles' "Funeral Oration," a eulogy delivered by Athens' prestigious statesman early in the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta during fifth century B.C. Rhetoricians and historians agree on this eulogy's significance as exemplar of and influence on political life and rhetorical genre. It is often cited in rhetorical theory as a model for contemporary discourse. E. J. P. Corbett analyzes the "Funeral Oration" in his text _Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student_, asserting that "Pericles' noble utterance is the prototype of all memorial addresses" (236). He considers it along with Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" to be "as eloquent and genuine now as they were the day they were delivered from the podium," and he advises the modern student to take the oration "as his guide in the preparation of any discourse designed to praise or censure his fellow man" (236, 239). Nicole Loraux introduces her study of Athenian funeral orations by discussing the need to "first exorcize

the despotic dominance of Pericles' famous speech" (7). Clifford Orwin launches his study of Thucydides with a rhetorical analysis of the "Funeral Oration," describing it as the "best known passage in Thucydides" and one in which Pericles "depicts imperial Athens as the noblest of human projects" (15). Peter R. Pouncey describes Thucydides' respect for Pericles as the "archetype of the statesman in his pristine virtue" who projects their mutually-shared "vision" of Athens in this epideictic discourse (79, 82). As the symbol of epideictic discourse for more than 2,400 years, then, the "Funeral Oration" is a logical choice for illustrating epideictic practice.[15]

When Celeste Condit puts her epideictic theory into practice, she introduces an analysis of the Boston Massacre Orations with this comment: "In rhetorical studies, the chief tests of 'utility' have always been performance and criticism. I cannot perform an epideictic speech here. . . ." (292). At any rate, she notes, a critique is the "more appropriate" test by which to evidence the usefulness of her theory. In this chapter's investigation of a war eulogy, I choose the method Condit leaves behind: performance, by which I mean enactment. I enact my reader response to Pericles' "Funeral Oration" because it is the most dramatic and therefore clearest way that I can illustrate the inaccuracies theorized about epideictic and the destruction that results from employing an inaccurate theory of language. Rhetorical theory has always listened to epideictic writers. It is time to listen also to epideictic readers in order to gather a more complete composite of epideictic words and deeds. Rather than transfer the univocal voice

from author to critic, my response illustrates the dialogical nature of language as I put myself in conversation with Pericles.

Contrary to epideictic theory's expectations, as I read this war eulogy I hear the orator persuading readers. I also recognize a need for its listeners to deliberate about what they are being persuaded of. Rather than universal values, Pericles asserts foundational beliefs that I as his reader do not share. My response calls into question his appropriation of womanhood as a way of justifying and naturalizing war. It also questions his construction of manhood as a violently natured and abstractly idealized man of courage, nobility, and honor. A problematic public/private::masculine/feminine opposition accompanies these treatments of gender. The response also resists misrepresentations of acts of war, in which Pericles idealizes war by characterizing warriors as immortal and marginalizes the realities of war that I foreground—the actual injuring and killing of and by warriors and the political and social ideologies that lead to war. His oration intends to maintain all of these beliefs by advocating the tradition of war that empowers them. Consequently, my response highlights the links between these valued ends and their violent means and its "might makes right" mentality. The eulogy's hierarchical world view significantly undergirds this relationship between values and violence. Superiority of one country over all others necessitates violence as a means of maintaining hierarchy, which my response persistently points out. I have first-hand familiarity with this world view; I grew up as the daughter in a career military family.

The purpose of Pericles' eulogy draws great concern in my response. His introduction claims that his eulogistic words are insignificant compared to deeds. I, however, listen to what his words are doing. Although he states the purpose of his eulogy is to praise, my response uncovers the intention to persuade his audience to future acts of war through the agency of praise. In his purported praise of ancestors, he actually advocates traditional abstract values. His praise of Athens promotes a hierarchical world view. Praise of warriors persuades his audience to continue warring behavior, and comfort for the bereaved further argues for them to perpetuate the world view occasioning the war eulogy. In each of these segments of his eulogy, my response draws out the covert intention behind the overt "praise," and I deliberate the values and actions that Pericles would persuade me of.

What you read in this chapter's reader response is akin to reading my marginal comments and journal entries on Pericles' war eulogy. I share my reactions, paraphrases, immediate and revisited interpretations. I respond to the entire eulogy as I read chronologically (ellipses condense his argument but eliminate none of its points). For the sake of my response's readability, I have clustered my comments rather than present each interruption of the oration as it actually occurred. My words are earnest, emotional, thoughtful, harsh, inquisitive, relentless. I feel as if I'm talking back to more than talking with Pericles, as if I am, say, sassing my father. Rhetorically and ideologically that's a fair analogy, although I don't like the difference in our voices--Pericles' so controlled, mine so desperate. His speech commands the epideictic occasion through the

power of patriarchy, in turn excluding the feminism guiding my response. His patriarchal words incorporate war ideology, whereas my feminist language engenders pacifism. A power struggle goes on between Pericles and me in our collision of world views. We need to figure out a way to transform the latent violence brewing between his and my use of these eulogistic words.

The presence of an Antigone in the imagination of ancient Greece makes me hopeful that feminists then would have responded or at least have wanted to respond similarly as I do now. The consequences of their speaking out, much greater than my own, sadden and further determine me. My placing myself as a deliberative co-Agent in the making of this epideictic text interrupts its dominant ideology of war. War was "men's business" and war eulogies were male orations "in which no female element [could] assume a decisive function" in ancient Greece (Loraux 24, 284). The political and rhetorical situation is not significantly different today in these regards. My response is akin to the radical assertiveness of Sophocles' Antigone who illegally buries her outcast warrior-brother, Polynices. It is unlike the responses of real ancient Athenian women. As Margaret Alexiou's research of funeral laments explains, their responses were limited to wailing, often seen as a sickness, even while it was valued for its ability to incite vengeance. The oration was the public act of the man, and the right to mourn was his, given mourning's alignment with the right to inherit.[16]

I am an Agent unwilling to wail or shut up. I don't trust Pericles' authority as Agent. I question his use of praise as Agency and the values he employs to perpetuate his world view. I react to what

he says of and in his Scene and listen for its resonance within my own context. I blur distinctions between Athens and America in the course of noticing their similarities as nations of war, and I don't worry about creating anachronisms or catching allusions. My situatedness is, to say the least, overt in my response. I loathe the Purpose of this eulogy--its persuasive intent to move me and other auditors to future war acts. I am not persuaded, but I am deliberative. I am, in Judith Fetterley's rich term for a feminist who actively reads a patriarchal text, a "resisting reader." I resist as an "'act of survival'" not only for myself but for others in the hope that war eulogies, as Fetterley hopes for American literary texts, "will no longer be read as they have been and thus will lose their power to bind us unknowingly to their designs" (she quotes Adrienne Rich, viii; xii-xxiii).

Reader Response to Pericles' "Funeral Oration"

The response begins with Thucydides' introductory recounting of this epideictic occasion, its eulogy, and the orator:

Introduction of Occasion and Orator:

In the same winter the Athenians, following their annual custom, gave a public funeral for those who had been the first to die in the war. (143)

Thucydides, I notice you do this every year; it's an "annual custom." It's winter--the most deadly of seasons. The "custom" is "public." What about the private grief?

These funerals are held in the following way: two days before the ceremony the bones of the fallen are brought and put in a tent which has been erected, and people make whatever offerings they wish to their own dead. Then there is a funeral procession in

> which coffins of cypress wood are carried on wagons. There is one
> coffin for each tribe, which contains the bones of members of that
> tribe. (143)

You talk of bones and of coffins. What more will your eulogy say about

these material effects and what they show the "tribes," our families, of

the reality of war? As my country prepared for a recent war in the

Persian Gulf, some people complained when the news reported military

purchase of body bags. Often not a lot of tolerance for material

reality when we're busy being "patriotic. . . ." The mourners are

clustering to make "offerings." What would my family have offered?

> One empty bier is decorated and carried in the procession: this
> is for the missing, whose bodies could not be recovered. (143)

Yes, I know what you mean. During and after the Vietnam War, some

Americans wore bracelets engraved with names of missing warriors on

them. I prayed every night that my father, piloting Air Force gunships,

would never become one of "the missing," or one of the dead.

> Everyone who wishes to, both citizens and foreigners, can join in
> the procession, and the women who are related to the dead are
> there to make their laments at the tomb. (143)

No! Thucydides, lamentation doesn't begin to satisfy my response to

this funeral. I don't want to wail for the war-dead; I want to speak

against the wars that we create and order people to die in. I don't

want to repair the damages--heal the wounded and bury the dead; I want

to stop death in war from happening to begin with. I don't want to help

repeat the same old story: Men fight; men die; men are heroes. Women

are the reason they fight; women cry; women are alone. I want to

transform the narrative for all who die and mourn—men and women. And, in my modern times, I don't want the equality of fighting alongside men; I want the equality that enables me to stop the fighting. Lament? Don't ask for my lament, employ my tears at the tombs, use me in your justification of people killing each other, marginalize me. God, that makes me mad. I am sick that these men killed and were killed. And I don't want your eulogy to ennoble and therefore enable the dying to continue.

> The bones are laid in the public burial-place, which is in the most beautiful quarter outside the city walls. Here the Athenians always bury those who have fallen in war. The only exception is those who died at Marathon, who, because their achievement was considered absolutely outstanding, were buried on the battlefield itself. (143)

The bones and the coffins of men "fallen"—euphemism for dead men—are themselves falling away to an idealized remembrance of war. Bury them in the "most beautiful" place. The most excellent of warriors earn the most beautiful of places—the killing scene itself.

> When the bones have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by the city for his intellectual gifts and for his general reputation makes an appropriate speech in praise of the dead, and after the speech, all depart. (143-44)

Pericles is the man (of course a man) selected because of his "intellectual gifts." What are his emotional gifts? He's "chosen by the city" because of his "general reputation"; he's a patriarchal mouthpiece. Sounds like the grand ol' orator in, say, Dale Sullivan's epideictic rhetoric of orthodoxies. The speech, you promise, will be "appropriate." Appropriate—meaning it'll maintain values by

marginalizing disagreement? Praise is the aim here, you tell me:

"praise of the dead." And that's it? Praise as an end, not a means?

Praise for praise's sake; really? And afterwards I'll merely "depart?"

"Depart" to do think, feel, and be what? What will Pericles tell me?

What would a feminist tell me?

> This is the procedure at these burials, and all through the war,
> when the time came to do so, the Athenians followed this ancient
> custom. . . . (144)

Did you imagine or hope, Thucydides, that twenty-four centuries later we

would still be enacting this "ancient custom?" Across the world,

warriors and other citizens are buried in every season, on every day it

seems, as part of war's deathful outcomes. Kill-eulogize-kill-eulogize-

kill-eulogize. Same story for you, for me, for whom else tomorrow?

> When the moment arrived, [Pericles] came forward from the tomb
> and, standing on a high platform, so that he might be heard by as
> many as possible in the crowd, he spoke as follows: (144)

It's time for me to listen. I hear the crowd hushing. We look up as

you, Pericles, take your position overlooking us.

Eulogy's Introduction:

> 'Many of those who have spoken here in the past have praised the
> institution of this speech at the close of our ceremony. It
> seemed to them a mark of honour to our soldiers who have fallen in
> war that a speech should be made over them. I do not agree.'
> (144)

How interesting! You begin by questioning the genre of war eulogy.

> 'These men [the dead warriors] have shown themselves valiant in
> action, and it would be enough, I think, for their glories to be

proclaimed in action, as you have just seen it done at this
funeral organized by the state.' (144)

You suggest that the act of burial is a more fitting honor for warriors'

acts than words of praise. The word is inferior to the deed, then? Is

the word deedless? Why do you erect a deed/word hierarchy at the

beginning of your speech?

'Our belief in the courage and manliness of so many should not be
hazarded on the goodness or badness of one man's speech.' (144)

You believe not in words but in the "courage and manliness" of these

dead men's war acts. I believe in the courage required of living with

differences through peaceful means, rather than violating one another

because of them. I believe it's manly to live with people whom we are

different from, not kill people un-like us. You speak in the first

person about "our belief" in your notion of "courage and manliness" as

if there's a universal voice in this "one man's speech." But I won't

silently mouth your words and nod in agreement about "our" supposed

universal values.

'Then [in one man's speech] it is not easy to speak with a proper
sense of balance, when a man's listeners find it difficult to
believe in the truth of what one is saying. . . . Praise of other
people is tolerable only up to a certain point, the point where
one still believes that one could do oneself some of the things
one is hearing about. . . .' (144)

You sense that you risk over-stating "the truth" about the war-dead.

You evaluate your rhetoric according to how "tolerable" it will be, and

the measure of its "praise" will be if "one still believes that one

could do oneself some of the things one is hearing about." In other

words, if you can persuade us that we can do what these warriors have done, then you'll be more likely to get us to do it in the future. "Tolerable" = persuasive. Audience member "believes" = persuaded to perpetuate the cycle of war. "Praise" = a purpose I'm becoming more deeply suspicious of "tolerating."

> 'However, the fact is that this institution was set up and approved by our forefathers, and it is my duty to follow the tradition and do my best to meet the wishes and the expectations of every one of you.' (144)

"Fact." "Institution." "Set up." "Approved." "Forefathers." "Duty." "Tradition." Sounds so permanent, so impervious. And we aren't supposed to shake the permanent and impervious--especially not the institutions of our foreFATHERS--are we? But I believe that it is _my_ duty _not_ to follow the patriarchal tradition of war eulogies. If my own father had been killed while killing in war, this "tradition" or "custom" couldn't possibly have meet my "wishes" or "expectations." I wish to change the facts and the institutions; I expect to create new duties and traditions. You, on the other hand, discount eulogistic words as impotent or inferior to deeds, yet advocate their tradition and agree to take the leading performance of them. You don't doubt the power of eulogistic words; you're going to use them to get _me_ to meet _your_ intentions.

"Praise" of Athens' Ancestors:

> 'I shall begin by speaking about our ancestors, since it is only right and proper on such an occasion to pay them the honour of recalling what they did.' (144)

Congratulations are in order, beginning with our ancestors. "[R]ight

and proper," of course. I hear a maintenance of tradition coming.

Seems morbid, even perverted, to congratulate the heritage that led to

these deaths. Can we find an interpretation of the past that lies

somewhere between your congratulations and my condemnation of it so that

we can get farther along? Where's the thirdness here?

> 'In this land of ours there have always been the same people
> living from generation to generation up till now, and they, by
> their courage and their virtues, have handed it on to us, a free
> country. They certainly deserve our praise.' (144)

And up until now, all over the world we have "foreigners" and xenophobia

and other hierarchical manifestations of difference . . . and more war.

Ancestors violate other ancestors with "their courage and their

virtues."

> 'Even more so do our fathers deserve [our praise]. For to the
> inheritance they had received they added all the empire we have
> now, and it was not without blood and toil that they handed it
> down to us of the present generation.' (144-45)

Imperialistic "add[ing to] the empire," and certainly not "without blood

and toil." Your phrasing—"it was not without blood and toil"—makes

the cost sound but little. But Pericles—"blood and toil"—the

injuring—is war's primary goal and consequence.

> 'And then we ourselves, assembled here today, who are mostly in
> the prime of life, have, in most directions, added to the power of
> our empire and have organized our State in such a way that it is
> perfectly well able to look after itself both in peace and in
> war.' (145)

More congratulations: "[W]e" maintain the tradition. Oh, God--in what ways have I and do I maintain it? I fear that the Pericleses of the world will maintain it with or without me--by adherence or coercion. Twenty-five hundred years have maintained traditions via the tradition of war. In the United States, a revolutionary war, a civil war, two world wars, regional wars in the Far East and Middle East. . . . Where are the pacifists? The feminists?

> 'I have no wish to make a long speech on subjects familiar to you
> all: so I shall say nothing about the warlike deeds by which we
> acquired our power or the battles in which we or our fathers
> gallantly resisted our enemies, Greek or foreign.' (145)

Now that you think you've convinced me to maintain tradition through your ancestral "praise," what's next? Not war stories. What would happen if you talked about these "warlike deeds," Pericles? Would it invite (incite?!) a discussion that complicates your intentions? If deeds are so great and words so meager, why <u>not</u> recall the deeds that bring us to this mass burial today? Let's talk--realistically--about killing and dying. Let's look at the connections between "power" and war you flaunt. Many warmongers today downplay that relationship, hiding more persistently behind the "values" and "beliefs" in new world orders and simplistic notions of right versus wrong and good versus evil. But, no, you don't want to talk about material reality or political ideology, not in the way that I want to, anyway.

> 'What I want to do is, in the first place, to discuss the spirit
> in which we faced our trials and also our constitution and the way
> of life which has made us great.' (145)

How are these topics--a country's spirit, law, and lifestyle--separate

from its "warlike deeds," Pericles?

> 'After that I shall speak in praise of the dead, believing that
> this kind of speech is not inappropriate to the present occasion,
> and that this whole assembly, of citizens and foreigners, may
> listen to it with advantage.' (145)

I should listen . . . "with advantage." You've put me on notice: Pay

attention; my praise for the dead will benefit you. This rhetorical

situation is becoming clearer and clearer: You intend to persuade me.

Not praise for praise's sake. But I am a "foreigner"--a resisting

reader--you didn't count on. I'm supposed to be one of the silent

"citizens"--a woman lamenting at the tomb. But I'm talking back.

"Praise" of Athens' Spirit and Law:

> 'Let me say that our system of government does not copy the
> institutions of our neighbours. It is more the case of our being
> a model to others, than of our imitating anyone else.' (145)

Athens, "model" city-state. Smug, elitist superiority fueling

imperialism.

> 'Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the
> hands not of a minority but of the whole people.' (145)

I'm not going to pretend that women had an equal place in this

"democracy" you praise, Pericles. Women still work to have equal voice

in my democracy. Your public sphere excludes me.

> 'When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is
> equal before the law. . . . No one, so long as he has it in him
> to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity
> because of poverty. . . . We are free and tolerant in our private

lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect.' (145)

The law, the law, the law . . . . Translation: Don't talk back; come to the tomb and lament. That's how my "service to the state" has been defined for this ceremonial occasion. That's my "public" role, if I am to maintain the law with "deep respect." You are not, then, "free and tolerant" of my "private" life.

'We give our obedience to those whom we put in positions of authority, and we obey the laws themselves . . . and those unwritten laws which it is an acknowledged shame to break.' (145)

Although you shame me for disobedience, I will not obey "laws" drained of humanity. What about these bones and coffins between us, Pericles? I'm having trouble attending to your "praise" of Athens because I'm thinking about the deadly results of Athenian actions and attitudes that bring us to this funeral service today.

'And here is another point. When our work is over, we are in a position to enjoy all kinds of recreation for our spirits. There are various kinds of contests and sacrifices regularly throughout the year;' (146)

Reinforce war's win/lose, live/die ideology as play's entertaining value.

'. . . in our own homes we find a beauty and a good taste which delight us every day and which drive away our cares.' (146)

Home, in your public/private division, is the private sphere of a woman's place and responsibility. My service, then, is to provide "a beauty and a good taste" that will "drive away [your] cares."

'Then the greatness of our city brings it about that all the good
things from all over the world flow in to us, so that to us it
seems just as natural to enjoy foreign goods as our own local
products.' (146)

Athens: The great political and economic centripetal force. Sounds

like my supposed land-of-plenty.

"Praise" of Athens' Spirit and Courage:

'Then there is a great difference between us and our opponents, in
our attitude towards military security. . . . [W]e rely, not on
secret weapons, but on our own real courage and loyalty.' (146)

Weapons need no secrecy when they are possessions of men with superior,

"real courage and loyalty." What makes these men more "real" than

others?

'There is a difference, too, in our educational systems. The
Spartans, from their earliest boyhood, are submitted to the most
laborious training in courage; we pass our lives without all these
restrictions, and yet are just as ready to face the same dangers
as they are.' (146)

Oh, now I see how they are more "real." Athenian courage is

genetic--natured, not nurtured. Athenian warriors are natural-born

killers.

'Here is a proof of this: When the Spartans invade our land, they
do not come by themselves, but bring all their allies with them;
whereas we, when we launch an attack abroad, do the job by
ourselves, and none of our enemies has ever yet been confronted
with our total strength. . . .' (146)

I live in a superpower country, too, although we like to enlist allies

as a way of justifying wars. When countries use "total strength"

nowadays, it's nuclear war. Hiroshima is a complicated, hard war story

to tell. When we don't use "total strength," it's a war that won't end.

Vietnam is a difficult story to tell, also.

> 'Yet, if our enemies engage a detachment of our forces and defeat
> it, they give themselves credit for having thrown back our entire
> army; or, if they lose, they claim that they were beaten by us in
> full strength.' (146)

When the "enemy" tells war stories, they lie. When you tell them, it's

the truth. Isn't that just what your enemies' eulogists are telling

their citizens?

> 'There are certain advantages, I think, in our way of meeting
> danger voluntarily, with an easy mind, instead of with a laborious
> training, with natural rather than with state-induced
> courage. . . .' (146)

A voluntary military—naturally courageous, spontaneously brave,

genetically superior. Men born to die in war.

More Praiseworthy Athenian Attributes:

> 'There are also [other reasons for Athens to be admired]:
> Our love of what is beautiful does not lead to extravagance; our
> love of the things of the mind does not make us soft.' (147)

Moderate aesthetics and hard intellect control love, beauty, softness.

Masculine/feminine hierarchy in your associations here.

> 'We regard wealth as something to be properly used, rather than as
> something to boast about. As for poverty, no one need be ashamed
> to admit it: the real shame is in not taking practical measures
> to escape from it.' (147)

Blame the poor individual for weak individualism. Overcome adversity

with autonomy, not collectivity.

'Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs
but in the affairs of the state as well. . . . [W]e do not say
that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds
his own business; we say that he has no business here at all.'
(147)

If everybody is politically active as you describe Athenians, then

everybody can take credit--or blame--for politically-incited wars,

right? If, however, citizens are bound to be respectful of the law and

are bound by a warring nature, as your praise of Athens indicates, then

aren't they unlikely or unable to act any differently from ways they

always have? I'm reminded we're perpetuating an "ancient custom."

Where's the Agency for change in this system?

'We Athenians . . . do not think that there is an incompatibility
between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action
before the consequences have been properly debated. . . .' (147)

Words and deeds! But you don't mean words are deeds. You mean "think

before you act"--two separate things. Consequences are "properly

debated" in some other, deliberative forum unlike this epideictic one.

We're just praising and lamenting for the moment. Therefore, we miss

the most poignant moment to re-think our words and therefore to re-shape

their deeds.

'We are capable at the same time of taking risks and of estimating
them beforehand. . . . But the man who can most truly be
accounted brave is he who best knows the meaning of what is sweet
in life and of what is terrible, and then goes out undeterred to
meet what is to come. . . .' (147)

Deliberation precedes future action. Don't mix the two; act

"undeterred" by subsequent thought once in the actual context being

shaped by your prior deliberations. The real mark of bravery, you say,

is to _realize_ that you are going to do something terrible, and do it

anyway. Now there's an attitude twisted by an abstract value of

courage. It privileges a model of self-sacrifice; in other words, it

values violence to the self.

> 'We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good
> from them. This makes our friendship all the more reliable, since
> we want to keep alive the gratitude of those who are in our debt
> by showing continued goodwill to them. . . .' (147)

Athenians engage in war knowing how terrible it is, and they engage in

friendship knowing how much gratitude it will net. The power

relationship is the same. It's all about keeping Athens on top.

> 'Taking everything together then, I declare that our city is an
> education to Greece. . . .' (147)

And, as this funeral occasion evidences, "[t]aking everything together,"

these attributes of Athenian superiority lead to war. No way to avoid

the violence with your hierarchical world view. But then, that's not

your aim.

"Praise" of Athens' Power and Immortality:

> 'And to show that this is no empty boasting for the present
> occasion, but real tangible fact, you have only to consider the
> power which our city possesses and which has been won by those
> very qualities which I have mentioned. . . .' (148)

You see? That's what I mean! Might = right. Your praise of Athens is

advocacy of hierarchy. Now reverse the equation. Right = might. How

do we maintain the hierarchy? Materially, war. Rhetorically, eulogy.

Sooner or later. Therefore, grief for dead warriors is hypocritical and

inevitable.

'Mighty indeed are the marks and monuments of our empire which we have left. Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now.' (148)

Mighty immortality--the changeless Agent, Act, Scene, and Purpose.

'We do not need the praises of a Homer, or of anyone else whose words may delight us for the moment, but whose estimation of facts will fall short of what is really true.' (148)

The "facts" are the real "Truth" in your abstractions.

'For our adventurous spirit has forced an entry into every sea and into every land; and everywhere we have left behind us everlasting memorials of good done to our friends or suffering inflicted on our enemies.' (148)

Through forced entry with irrevocable markers you patronize the willing and violate the unwilling. The rapacious imagery repulses me.

'This, then, is the kind of city for which these men, who could not bear the thought of losing her, nobly fought and nobly died.' (148)

Oh, yes . . . draw up your "praise" of Athens with the ancient feminization of one's country. Such a familiar personification. "She" is the reason for the war. It is noble to kill and be killed for "her." I'm angered by the feminine being blamed for violence; the feminine is nonviolent. What could be "noble" about killing in the name of the mother?

'It is only natural that every one of us who survive them should be willing to undergo hardships in her service. . . .' (148)

Therefore, it would be un-"natural" for survivors not to want to kill

and be killed. You silence me from articulating a different, pacifistic

value by perverting it.

> 'I have spoken at such length about our city [] because I wanted
> to make it clear that for us there is more at stake than there is
> for others who lack our advantages;' (148)

Your enthymeme persists today: Athens has a lot at stake; therefore,

Athens has great reason to engage in war. Unstated premise: Powerful

countries deserve to remain powerful--at any cost. If I don't

deliberate your eulogistic argument, Pericles, I won't uncover your

logic. So, I deliberate.

> '. . . also I wanted my words of praise for the dead to be set in
> the bright light of evidence. And now the most important of these
> words has been spoken. I have sung the praises of our city;'
> (148)

The greatness of Athens should justify any means to maintain Athenian

tradition. You have attempted to persuade me of "her" superiority,

which now will be the "bright light of evidence" you shine on warriors

as you sing their "praises."

"Praise" of Dead Warriors:

> '. . . but it was the courage and gallantry of these men, and of
> people like them, which made her splendid. Nor would you find it
> true in the case of many of the Greeks, as it is true of them,
> that no words can do more than justice to their deeds.' (148)

"[T]heir deeds . . . I stop to imagine a war deed for a moment . . .

mutilating someone else's body . . . watching blood gush, flesh tear,

bones break . . . pushing their injured body away from my own . . .

hurting them again to be sure that they are dead. The words "courage

and gallantry" or "splendid" never come to mind when I imagine such

scenes.

> 'To me it seems that the consummation which has overtaken these
> men shows us the meaning of manliness in its first revelation and
> in its final proof.' (148)

"[C]onsummation": euphemism for death. Want to be a man? Die in war;

it's the alpha and omega of "manliness."

> 'Some of them [the dead], no doubt, had their faults; but what we
> ought to remember first is their gallant conduct against the enemy
> in defence of their native land. They have blotted out evil with
> good, and done more service to the commonwealth than they ever did
> harm in their private lives.' (148)

You split the warrior into a public/private self, making public

"conduct" honorable, private "harm" insignificant. The opposition helps

justify acts of war. Killing is murder in the private sphere; killing

is "gallant" deed in the public sphere. You also couch their "service"

in binary opposition: "good" versus "evil."

> 'No one of these men weakened because he wanted to go on enjoying
> his wealth. . . . More to be desired than such things, they chose
> to check the enemy's pride.' (148-49)

"[C]heck[ing] the enemy's pride": euphemism for killing the other

person. Paradigm for public behavior: self-sacrifice.

> 'This, to them, was a risk most glorious, and they accepted it,
> willing to strike down the enemy and relinquish everything else.
> As for success or failure, they left that in the doubtful hands of
> Hope, and when the reality of battle was before their faces, they
> put their trust in their own selves.' (149)

You imagine warriors engaged in battle as "glorious" risk-takers trusting their autonomous selves and abandoning concern to "Hope." Not the scene, as you know, in my imagination.

> 'In the fighting, they thought it more honourable to stand their ground and suffer death than to give in and save their lives.' (149)

They did not run. "[H]onourable" to take life, not "save" it.

> 'So they fled from the reproaches of men, abiding with life and limb the brunt of battle;' (149)

"Abiding": euphemism for sustaining mutilation to the body. "Brunt": injury's pain.

> '. . . and, in a small moment of time, the climax of their lives, a culmination of glory, not of fear, [they] were swept away from us.' (149)

Death is a momentary "climax"—nothing to be afraid of. It "swept them away"—the ultimate, "glorious" orgasm. How, Pericles, do you _know_ that this is what death was like for these warriors? My father's post-war nightmares don't suggest "glory." Would it have been glorious if he'd been killed—or "gone all the way," as the sexual idiom puts it?

> 'So and such they were, these men—worthy of their city. We who remain behind may hope to be spared their fate, but must resolve to keep the same daring spirit against the foe.' (149)

Emulate them. Hope not to die, but covet the "daring spirit" of those who did. Harness it when you make war. Otherwise, you won't be "worthy"; you won't make your country "splendid."

'It is not simply a question of estimating the advantages in
theory. I could tell you a long story (and you know it as well as
I do) about what is to be gained by beating the enemy back.'
(149)

Somebody has to win; somebody has to lose. Always win. Remember the

tradition. Maintain the tradition.

What I would prefer [to tell you] is that you should fix your eyes
every day on the greatness of Athens as she really is, and should
fall in love with her. (149)

Concentrate on Athens, you say. Think about Athens in terms of desire;

think about desire in terms of a woman; "fall in love with her." See

lovemaking as a metaphor for warmaking. What? We're not really killing

and dying--we're loving a woman? What could be more natural, right?

You implicate women as accomplice to war acts--women naturalize them.

If I flip the analogy, it validates violent conquest of women by

defining loving her in terms of making war. Double-edged sword. You

gloss war with love and love with war. I'm so angry, I almost can't

keep reading.

'When you realize her greatness, then [you will] reflect that what
made her great was men with a spirit of adventure. . . . [T]hey
gave to her the best contribution that they could.' (149)

Warriors are the greatest citizens because they die (or come) for

Athens. If dying in war is the best act of all acts, then bring on the

world war to end all worlds! The farther I push your logic, the more

destructive it gets.

'They gave her their lives, to her and to all of us, and for their
own selves they won praises that never grow old, the most splendid
of sepulchres--not the sepulchre in which their bodies are laid,
but where their glory remains eternal in men's minds, always there

on the right occasion to stir others to speech or to action.'
(149)

War death: Ticket to immortal life as everlasting inspiration. Quite a tempting proposition for all the future warriors and women of warriors in your audience. You hold up the ghosts of wars past to "stir [them] to speech or to action"; in other words, to persuade younger generations to fight. If getting killed in a war immortalizes a person, then should I wish that all my loved ones die war deaths? More destructive logic.

'For famous men have the whole earth as their memorial: it is not
only the inscriptions on their graves in their own country that
mark them out; no, in foreign lands also, not in any visible form
but in people's hearts, their memory abides and grows.' (149)

The memory not only lives, it "grows." Yes, and one way it grows is through an advocacy of war values in eulogistic "praise" of the dead. Rhetorical perpetuation of the process. Notice the feminine images appropriated to the process. Earth, often a maternal figure, holds the dead men eternally. The heart, often figured as the site of feminine emotion (not masculine reason) nurtures them forever. There are other ways to remember, other reasons to remember. Unlike your ideal of immortality, The Wall begs us never to forget reality as it makes its visitors read thousands of names of dead Vietnam warriors.

'It is for you to be like them.' (149)

Yes, Pericles. You do advocate war death for all. "It is for you to be like them." Your argument, your thesis in eight simple words. It is the point that I deliberate here and urge us to negotiate. You come completely from behind the veil of praising Athens and "her" warriors

and explicitly persuade your audience to perpetuate its history of war. You metaphorically have put the words in the warriors' mouths. They, not you, "stir" us to war's word and deed. How persuasive, because we don't want to think the un-thinkable--that millions of people have killed and been killed in war for uncourageous, unnoble, very mortal reasons. "It is for you to be like them." Once again, I am so angry, I almost cannot read.

> 'Make up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and freedom depends on being courageous. Let there be no relaxation in the face of the perils of the war.' (149-50)

Therefore, to continue your logic, happiness depends on being courageous. Your equation of "courageous acts = war acts" ignores a whole other realm of human interaction. Acts of love, of caring, of healing the body, of discourse. My attempt to engage you right now is an act of courage.

> 'The people who have most excuse for despising death are not the wretched and unfortunate, who have no hope of doing well for themselves, but those who run the risk of a complete reversal in their lives. . . .' (150)

Within the paradigm erecting war death as superior immortal death, you now create another hierarchy: the more prosperous a warrior, the greater his "sacrifice" of death. Your divisive oppositions never end as your "praise" of dead warriors works to persuade young men to emulate them and all other persons to enable their emulation.

<u>"Comfort" for Parents of Dead Warriors</u>:

> 'For these reasons I shall not commiserate with those parents of
> the dead, who are present here. Instead I shall try to comfort
> them.' (150)

Finally, you will speak to the grieving loved ones. But no sympathy,

you say. Instead, something to ease the pain. Oh, have you set us up.

Who wants to say that their dead warrior did not serve a great country,

or that he was not courageous, brave, manly, patriotic, immortal? How

easily you can withhold sympathy now because there is nothing to be

sorry about. I sense advice coming.

> 'They [the parents of the war-dead] are well aware that they have
> grown up in a world where there are many changes and chances. But
> this is good fortune--for men to end their lives with honour, as
> these have done, and for you honourably to lament them;' (150)

The advice goes like this: Parents, amid a changing world, consider

yourself lucky to have ended up with a war hero. At least some things

don't change. Take it as an "honour" which, like your sons' courage and

nobility, is another value abstractly defined in terms of war.

> '. . . their life [the warriors'] was set to a measure where death
> and happiness went hand in hand.' (150)

But happiness and death are not <u>necessarily</u> mutually dependent

ingredients that we <u>must</u> "measure" into violent formulas.

> 'I know that it is difficult to convince you of this.' (150)

Yes, Pericles. Yes, it is.

> 'When you see other people happy you will often be reminded of
> what used to make you happy too. One does not feel sad at not

> having some good thing which is outside one's experience: real
> grief is felt at the loss of something which one is used to.'
> (150)

You refer to their children as if they were objects! They are "what

used to make [them] happy" and "something [they got] used to." You

suggest that I cannot feel sad because their grief is outside my

experience, but I _can_ sympathize, and I won't keep this distance you

establish between individual and community.

> 'All the same, those of you who are of the right age must bear up
> and take comfort in the thought of having more children. In your
> own homes these new children will prevent you from brooding over
> those who are no more, and they will be a help to the city, too,
> both in filling the empty places, and in assuring her security.'
> (150)

Your understanding of grief: Parents will be sad when they see other

parents with their living children. Your advice: Bear more children.

Replace the ones "who are no more" in order to forget them.

Reproduction for the sake of war helps "secure" the city. Good citizens

fill the gaps that their dead sons have left in Athens' volunteer army--

at least until the "new children" are killed, too.

> 'For it is impossible for a man to put forward fair and honest
> views about our affairs if he has not, like everyone else,
> children whose lives may be at stake.' (150)

Children's lives are not "at" stake; they _are_ the stakes with which war

maneuvers! Another hierarchy--allegiance to country is more important

than care of family. Who am I to talk, you suggest. Childless adults

have no credibility in speaking about war policies. But, wait! My

stepchildren were young adults when I met them--draftable, enlistable

ages. Should I have wished a war for them? I have a nephew and niece, ages 5 and 4. Should I hope their parents raise them as recruits for future wars? When my stepchildren have children, do I encourage them to train warmongers?

> 'As for those of you who are now too old to have children, I would ask you to count as gain the greater part of your life, in which you have been happy, and remember that what remains is not long, and let your hearts be lifted up at the thought of the fair fame of the dead . . . [and] having the respect of one's fellow men.' (150)

Your advice to parents too old to have more children: Be glad for the life you've had, realize you'll be dead soon, and enjoy the "fame" and "respect" that having dead warriors for sons brings in the meantime. A bit of your own immortality. These words to all parents you call "comfort." Would they have comforted my grandparents? Maybe, although the only war stories I've ever heard from them are about family letters and packages keeping them in touch, and one about Japanese radio propaganda that made them laugh. Hardly immortal heroics. Would these words have comforted my parents? Less likely. When I told my father I was studying war eulogies and their praise of the dead, he demanded, "What's to praise?" Hardly a desire for "heroic" immortality. Would they have comforted me as a parent? No. These are not words of comfort. They are words of propaganda.

"Comfort" for Male Relatives of Dead Warriors:

> 'As for those of you here who are sons or brothers of the dead, I can see a hard struggle in front of you. Everyone always speaks well of the dead, even if you rise to the greatest heights of heroism, it will be a hard thing for you to get the reputation of having come near, let alone equalled, their standard.' (150-51)

Your more sympathetic tone here is not because fathers and siblings have

died. Rather, you advise these sons and brothers of the difficult time

they can expect in trying to live up to their dead relatives'

reputations. How do you compete with a dead war hero? Guess they'll

have to die in war, too. Just your point.

> 'When one is alive, one is always liable to the jealousy of one's
> competitors, but when one is out of the way, the honour one
> receives is sincere and unchallenged.' (151)

The real, young men in your audience should aspire to be ideal, ageless

warriors. Their competitive edge will cut a death wish, if your

persuasion is effective. Would your "comfort" have persuaded my

brother? Hardly. His music seeks to unite, not divide.

"Comfort" for Widows of Dead Warriors:

> 'Perhaps I should say a word or two on the duties of women to
> those among you who are now widowed. I can say all I have to say
> in a short word of advice.' (151)

Oh, yes--the women. "Perhaps" you should speak to the widows briefly

about their "duties." Evidently, it's a pretty sure bet that they

wouldn't disobey. I doubt the likelihood of my mother's servitude

should she have become a warrior's widow. I notice you won't speak to

these dead men's daughters or sisters. No doubt we'll follow our

mothers' duty? The "comfort" amounts to an authoritarian afterthought.

> 'Your great glory is not to be inferior to what God has made you,
> and the greatest glory of a woman is to be least talked about by
> men, whether they are praising you or criticizing you.' (151)

A woman's "greatest glory" is to be un-noticed, un-mentioned, silent, absent. No! My invisible status as object is part of your design, Pericles, not God's. Why is my silence necessary? Does it facilitate the advocacy of all you value in war? Conversely, how does a feminist voice complicate matters? My response makes your persuasive task more difficult, yet you thought I'd have to work just to avoid being "inferior." No fear that I would actually be superior to what you perceive God has made me.

Conclusion of the Eulogy:

'I have now, as the law demanded, said what I had to say.' (151)

That's the extent of your "comfort" to the widows? You've done all the patriarchal LAW demanded. What about the demands of our hearts and minds? You measure out words of comfort only as they help persuade people to continue grievous acts. The "law" forbids questioning the "law"; re-thinking not allowed.

> 'For the time being our offerings to the dead have been made, and for the future their children will be supported at the public expense by the city . . . for the ordeals which they have faced.' (151)

Veteran benefits reward the "ordeal" of becoming a fatherless child.

> 'Where the rewards of valour are the greatest, there you will find also the best and bravest spirits among the people.' (151)

A touch of flattery to buy future silence: Your loved ones have been killed; therefore, you have one of the "best and bravest spirits among the people."

'And now, when you have mourned for your dear ones, you must depart.' (151)

Your closing statement. Its finality bothers me. As if mourning can be completed at the grave side. As if departure will make it no more of my business. Walk away from the war-dead . . . not so easy for me to do. You've given me three places to go: 1) If I am a mother of child-bearing ability, I bear more sons so that more warriors can die; 2) If I'm too old to bear children, I appreciate the respect that comes from having a dead warrior for a son until I die, which I can hope will be soon; or 3) If I am a widow of a dead warrior, I keep my invisible place. Pericles, I want to depart, but not to any of these places.

Summary

This reader response to Pericles' war eulogy exposes the inaccuracy and destructiveness of epideictic theory. As the Agent of this epideictic Act, Pericles authoritatively presents universal values. As the eulogy's reader, however, I assert myself as a co-Agent. Rather than share or succumb to its values, I deliberate and reject them. Pericles' authoritarian manner of persuasion attempts to silence my deliberation, even in the words of "comfort" he offers the bereaved. My deliberation manifests in a hostility that suggests the violation I feel from his authoritarian position in this discourse and the latent violence brewing in its struggle between writer and reader. The Purpose of praise is falsified as the response draws out Pericles' multiple strategies to persuade his audience members to perform future acts of war. The harm in this persuasive intent is in its denial, which represents Pericles' words as "mere rhetoric" or ceremonial display yet

expects readers' actions to result from them. By conflating praise as both meaning and consequence of the discourse, Pericles hides its real outcome. Epideictic Agency amplifies the ideal of war and marginalizes the realities of wars, thus negating truths and degrading the discourse to lies. Consequently, adherence to eulogistic form contaminates its content. The erroneous conflation of present and future Scenes becomes clear in the differences between Pericles' patriarchal and my feminist ideologies. The danger of reading this text a-contextually comes in repeating its history unthinkingly.

The values advocated and traditions maintained in Pericles' "Funeral Oration" do far more than praise the dead, commemorate their memory, or comfort loved ones. They persuade readers to perpetuate the world view that occasions them. Therefore, as a pacifist I must become a resisting reader. I must recognize that "[c]onsciousness is power" (Fetterley, xix). If I want to work for peace, then I must change epideictic theory and practice such that my pacifism is allowed a voice. I must transform epideictic occasions as traditionally conceived into rhetorical ones. Accordingly, the potential for constructive outcomes from discourse occasioned by ceremony is demonstrated in my active reading of Pericles' oration. His eulogy promotes a world view, and my response makes it an opportunity for re-thinking that world view. His oration persuades its readers to act on behalf of that world view, and my response deliberates those actions and suggests alternate ones. His oration seeks to accomplish its aims by asserting authority and employing implicit strategies, and my response seeks to accomplish its aims by sharing authority and making strategies explicit. Thus

rhetorical choice rather than rhetoric-by-number designs the epideictic occasion. My response is an instance of acting with the moral responsibility integral, as Burke and many others acknowledge it, to the uses of language. Contrary to the erroneous determinations of epideictic theory, rhetors and readers can choose whether its Agents will include readers, its Purpose will be clear, its Agency will be fair, its Scene will be ethical, and whether it will treat its Acts as words and/or deeds. My response opens up the epideictic occasion to an analysis of its motives in order that symbol-users may know more about what they do and can do with their epideictic words.

This transformation of epideictic is important for advocating any world view. Even if I shared Pericles' values, I would still need to deliberate in my response to his eulogy in order to make a conscious decision about whether and why I would advocate war for my own and future generations. In other words, deliberation is necessary in order to respond humanistically rather than mechanistically to an epideictic occasion. Whatever the ceremonial oration may be about, rhetors and readers choose what they will promote within it. In the eulogies of war, the choice between advocating peace or war is the most crucial-- life or death--choice of all.

Although Pericles' "Funeral Oration" stands as the premiere illustration for describing and prescribing epideictic discourse from ancient to contemporary rhetorical theory, current eulogistic occasions replicate its persuasive nature and further suggest the importance of its active deliberation. The national memorial service for victims of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on

19 April 1995 provides one example. Four days after the destruction that killed 168 people, political and religious leaders came together to eulogize the dead and to comfort the living. Whereas my pacifistic response to Pericles' war eulogy requires my dissent as I speak from the margins of a warring society's dominant ideology, I am an assenting member of the majority in this eulogistic occasion. I understand this moment as do millions of other auditors. I join Americans as well as citizens of other countries in mourning the deaths and in questioning the morality and motives of the bomber(s). I have seen the dead and injured children and adults, the frightened families gripping photographs of loved ones yet unearthed from the rubble, and the tearful rescuers exhausted from the physical, psychological, and spiritual strain of their work. I abhor the violence; I am shocked by its cruel, unsuspected perpetration; I am hurt and angry. I struggle with the information that an American or a group of Americans are the primary suspects in the planning and carrying out of this act of terrorism. I am open, not hostile, to the authoritative orators of this service, including its most prestigious—President Bill Clinton, the Reverend Dr. Billy Graham, and Governor Frank Keating—and to them leading me through this tragic event and toward healing. To this extent, then, I am in traditional epideictic terms a member of a universal audience with shared values. Less traditionally, however, I also am prepared to deliberate what these orators say and the way they say it—to listen for the deeds of their words.

Furthermore, in part because I know what it feels like to be a marginalized, silenced, and resisting reader in other ceremonial

occasions, I am aware that all members of this memorial service's audience are not assenting listeners. If, in fact, white males who are extremely fearful and distrusting of their federal government bombed this building, these men are not alone in their escalating concerns about governmental control of citizens' lives. Although investigative reports range in estimates of the numbers of activist anti-governmental citizens and groups and the states in which they live, the consensus is that the numbers are growing. Newsweek recently reported an estimated membership in militia groups of 100,000 (Morganthau 36). Attorney General Janet Reno was warned in October 1994 that militia groups exist in 47 states (Applebome 33). Many of these people, males and females, are white supremacists who perceive themselves to be "'dispossessed'" by their country, as the leader of the White Aryan Resistance Tom Metzger characterizes their lives (Applebome 33). These dissenting voices are heard by thousands of listeners on public and short wave radio programs in which they advocate their causes and seek to increase their number of compatriots. Not unlike the people with whom they disagree, patriotism and Christianity often are the common values through which they make their appeals. The American Revolution slogan "Don't tread on me" typifies their reaction to governmental control. Neighbors of chief bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh in Kingman, Arizona do not find his hatred of government "particularly unusual," the New York Times reports:

> People here condemn the killing and bloodshed in Oklahoma City,
> and say the perpetrators should be promptly strung up. But in
> nearly the next breath, conversations turn to the 'socialistic'
> practices of the Government, ranging from taxing cigarettes and
> whiskey to not allowing people to shoot mountain lions. They also
> rail about Attorney General Janet Reno and her 'whole alphabet' of
> law enforcement agencies, and what they see as the possibility
> that foreign soldiers, who are being trained in secret locations,

will soon be coming door to door to confiscate citizens' beloved
weapons. (Kifner B9)

It is not only persons speaking from the extreme right margins of
American society, then, who share the concerns and sympathies if not the
violent methodology of the Oklahoma bomber(s) and other anti-
governmental militia members. Even the most mainstream of criticisms
coming from Republican politicians have been questioned as to their
influence on the more radical consequences of anti-governmental
rhetoric.

The Oklahoma memorial service eulogies, as I listen to them,
marginalize not only the most vicious of these dissenters, the bomber(s)
in particular, but by implication all of the listeners who have views
different from the pro-governmental ones held by the speakers and many
assenting auditors. Therefore, rather than gather comfort about the
deaths, injuries, and sorrow among my fellow citizens and rather than
gain insights about ways to heal the divisions that led to this war-like
act, I am more deeply troubled after the memorial service than before.
The eulogies perpetuate the world view occasioning them—a federal
government and a community of citizens embroiled in an increasingly
violent relationship.

Unity is a dominant theme in the eulogies by Clinton, Graham, and
Keating. Despite the division among American people that the bombing
makes graphically apparent, the eulogies purport that Americans are
united. Clinton represents "the American people" and speaks for the
"nation" and to his "fellow Americans" (B8). His separation of
Oklahomans who are "mean and selfish" from those who retain "the

capacity for love and caring and courage" as well as his planting of a
dogwood tree as a reminder of "the life of a good person" suggest that
the bombers and their ideological sympathizers are not among the
"Americans" Clinton speaks for or to. Graham likewise divides his
audience by announcing "to those who masterminded this cruel plot and to
those who carried it out, that the spirit of this city and this nation
will not be defeated." Similarly, then, those persons who question
their government's power can expect to be defeated by it. Keating's
introduction most clearly establishes the parameters around this
eulogistic occasion in which some Americans but not others can
participate: "Today we stand before the world and before our God
together, our hearts and our hands linked in a solidarity these
criminals can never understand. We stand together in love." Thus his
oration permanently excludes the people who most need to love and be
loved by their Oklahoman, American community. Citizens with anti-
governmental political convictions are not part of "our" communities as
Keating enumerates them: "neighbors . . . fellow Americans . . .
families . . . heroes and heroines [the rescuers] . . . children . . .
God." Each orator also supports the concept of unity that he carves out
by placing it within a larger context. Clinton positions the justice he
promises within the current tradition of justice-seeking as he recalls
the Pan American Airlines terrorist disaster. Graham invokes the
ancient tradition of Job's suffering as similar to the suffering of
Oklahomans, and Keating reminds listeners that they have been "strong
through the generations" and will be "stronger yet through this terrible
ordeal."

In contrast to the unity that these eulogists praise and with which they comfort, the person(s) who bombed the federal building and by implication people of similar beliefs are dehumanized, demonized, and disenfranchised. Clinton's eulogy dehumanizes them by never referring to the bombers as human beings. They are "those who did this evil" and the "dark forces that threaten our common peace." Graham's eulogy demonizes them, calling their violence an example of the "mystery" of "evil." Although this evil is something we cannot understand in this life, Graham explains, we can know that "there is a devil, that Satan is very real and he has great power," as the bombing illustrates. Keating's eulogy disenfranchises the bombers and their ideological sympathizers from the lessons to be learned from this destructive event. Only the united mourners "can reach beyond its horrible consequences" and make the "journey through darkness" to light. Like the initial and immediate speculations that the bombers would be non-Americans or non-whites, then, their otherness is emphasized in the eulogies.

As each man speaks, the purposes of praising the dead, honoring the rescue workers, and comforting the bereaved give over to other persuasive intentions. In a rhetorical moment providing the opportunity to persuade his audience that he is a mighty political leader, Clinton encourages his audience to join him in a search for justice. This mission translates into expulsion rather than resolution of difference among Americans. "To all my fellow Americans beyond this hall," he declares, "I say one thing we owe those who have sacrificed is the duty to purge ourselves of the dark forces which gave rise to this evil." The purge is a fight between oppositions:

> They are forces that threaten our common peace, our freedom, our way of life. Let us teach our children that the God of comfort is also the God of righteousness. Those who trouble their own house will inherit the wind. Justice will prevail. Let us let our own children know that we will stand against the forces of fear. When there is talk of hatred, let us stand up and talk against it. When there is talk of violence, let us stand up and talk against it. In the face of death let us honor life. As St. Paul admonished us, "'Let us not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.'

His message of vengeance teaches children to control hierarchically rather than to negotiate dialogically their differences. His resolve for justice, requiring that the dead's "legacy must be our lives," drives the dead as an immortal wedge between assenting and dissenting Americans.

Granted the occasional moment to preach to the nation, Graham aims to persuade his auditors to convert or re-dedicate their lives to God. He warns his listeners that without God all hearts are "deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. That's one reason we each need God in our lives." His message of salvation shores up human beings' relationship with the Creator as he concludes, "It is better to face something like this with God than without Him." His message does not, however, elaborate about the ways that having God in one's heart enables people "to pray and forgive and love" with each other. Graham's brief mention of these genuinely unifying acts—praying, forgiving, and loving—acts that are capable of transforming relationships among people with differing world views goes undeveloped. They are the only words in the entire memorial service that speak for unity of all Americans, and they are overwhelmed by the persuasion to salvation that dominates Graham's eulogy.

Rhetorically positioned to speak as the leader of every citizen of the state he governs, Keating argues for solidarity among all Oklahomans. He repeats the theme of justice in Clinton's oration, confident that God is "a God of love but he is also a God of justice" and that federal investigation "will bring us to justice." He echoes Graham's emphasis on closeness to God because "He assures us, once again, that good is stronger than evil, that love is greater than hate." His particular emphasis on community--"we have each other" and "we are one . . . with one another"--insulates the bereaved and isolates the hated. Thus his words separate the state he intends to solidify.

Eighty-six people died in the explosion of the Branch Dividian compound near Waco, Texas as the infernal conclusion of a battle between dissenters and the federal government. Two years later to the day almost twice as many people died in Oklahoma City. In looking to the future, the question for ceremonial discourse is this: Did the national memorial service for the victims of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building create a rhetorical occasion that makes it more or less likely that violence will occur again? Its eulogistic praise of the dead persuades its audience to vengeance, salvation, and solidarity. In each eulogy, the message is that good, Godly people will remain divided from and powerful over evil, un-Godly ones. Therefore, violence will be their ultimate method of communication. The opposition of good versus evil separates the persons who need to be united if future violence is to be avoided. However much the bereaved abhor the unjustness of their loved ones' deaths, eulogistic words that create hierarchy only serve to encourage the same kind of divisive, violent act as the one occasioning

this memorial service. Imagine the hostility swelling in persons who shared the sentiment if not the violent methods of the bombing suspect(s). What were the Americans who feel dispossessed and threatened by their government feeling and thinking as these eulogists portrayed evil and pledged justice? What was the effect of their world view being discounted rather than taken into account? Just as I feel the violent tension rise between Pericles and myself in my response as a silenced reader, so too could I sense the same difficulties brewing as America's leaders spoke during this ceremonial occasion on a spring Sunday afternoon. By emphasizing a God of righteousness and a country of laws in order to maintain justice, these eulogies foreground the differences that escalate civil war between a government and its dissenters.

As this contemporary instance of epideictic suggests, the need for responding with critical consciousness is crucial for assenting readers. How unlikely it is that the orators and auditors of the Oklahoma memorial service consciously wished to perpetuate the violence that has caused such enormous grief and horror. Nevertheless, unthinking assent leads to a lack of awareness of the deeds that words perform. When orators and writers depend on the traditional forms that ceremonies have called for, their words act in ways they do not realize. When listeners and readers participate in unthinking assent, they ignore the consequences of their uses of language. The epideictic moments in which audiences are least likely to be hostile are the moments in which they most need to be active readers, critically re-making the text and scrutinizing the actions--incipient and overt--that proceed from words.

The moments in which they are most emotional are the instances in which they are most likely to overlook the consequences of seeking release from their grief and rationale for their anger without also taking the next, most important step of looking underneath the apparent divisions between good and evil in order to create a more humane thirdness and thereby get farther along in human relationships.

A re-envisioning of ceremonial occasions, perhaps especially eulogistic ones, is not easy. It asks people to give up the comfort of the familiar. It calls for a re-thinking of what communities want and expect their ceremonies to do. But it is precisely the recognition that ceremonies will do something, consciously or unconsciously, that should encourage their re-invention. Using the occasion of eulogistic words in Oklahoma City to begin the process of coming to terms with differences rather than widening their gaps could have provided a healing remedy that would make it more likely that nonviolent acts would constitute the future. Some of the participants in the Oklahoma memorial service were ready for such a task. On the morning of the memorial service in Oklahoma City's First United Methodist Church, which served as a holding facility for bodies and body parts and which was the home church of three bereaved families, members prayed for whoever bombed the Federal Building. As Don Gutteridge, the church member who led the prayers reflected, "'Obviously it's difficult when you look at the carnage and see the wreckage of lives to know that the people that have done this are in God's sight his children. . . . We don't want to admit that, but we have to'" (Bernstein B7). As New York Times journalist Dirk Johnson talked with people who attended the service in person, he observed,

"there was anger, even shame. For all the talk about the innocence of the heartland, some noted, the terrorists did not appear to be foreigners from some hard-to-pronounce sects, but young men bred, presumably, with the values of America" (B7). In response to this similarity among killer and killed, one participant commented, "'There's so much hate in this country. . . . All of us need to look into our hearts and say, 'What's wrong? What's going on here?'" Another person hoped to find "the beginning of healing" at the memorial service. My husband watched the service with the need "to suffer the grief in order to better understand the horror of this human choice." Expressed at the ceremonial moment of eulogy, these attitudes suggest the possibility of transforming epideictic occasions into the genuinely persuasive and deliberative instances that language equips them to be.

Before turning to the implications of this choice for ceremonial rhetoric in chapter five, chapter four investigates a rhetorical situation that at first glance seems to be the opposite of the eulogistic occasion. Whereas epideictic theory believes that the war eulogy, with all its ceremony, will not be persuasive or deliberative, composition pedagogy assumes or hopes that the classroom essay will be. The expectation of persuasion and deliberation, however, is not sufficient assurance for its dynamic practice. The next chapter investigates the metadiscourse of students who were supposedly engaged in deliberative discourse. As the analysis of their comments indicates, their writing often could be aptly described as traditional epideictic discourse, as ceremonial display. Chapter four illustrates that a hierarchical theory of language (writer/reader, meaning/consequence,

form/content, text/context, word/deed) leads with its inaccuracy to destructive consequences. Furthermore, a transformative theory (with the shaping elements of a rhetorical situation in dialogical relationship) leads to authentic communication in which persuasion and deliberation occur and the word's deed is negotiated.

CHAPTER IV

COMPOSITION ESSAYS: IN SEARCH OF AUTHENTIC CLASSROOM WRITING

Epideictic in the Composition Classroom

The seed for this chapter's investigation of epideictic practice was planted in a very early conversation about my dissertation with Dr. Hephzibah Roskelly, perhaps when I asked her to direct this project. I had been thinking for some time about the implications of epideictic in the scene of the war eulogy. As I enumerated the problems I saw in traditional concepts of epideictic, which chapter three illustrates, she leaned forward and said something like, "And think about this in terms of the classroom! What could be more 'ceremonial' than the composition essay? Our students only write for the present moment occasioned by our assignment, and all they want is our praise for filling in whatever form we give them." In spite of the pedagogical goal for students to write persuasively (or deliberatively or argumentatively), essay writing in composition classrooms often is marked by writers who do not really persuade; readers who do not really deliberate; goals and forms and scenes that do not change—all of which render the word deedless. This kind of classroom discourse, we agreed, is as deadly as the war eulogy—deadly for students to write and teachers to read with its corpse-like texts. Furthermore, although the discrepancy between aim and outcome is particularly obvious in a composition course designed to generate deliberation, and a concern commonly held among teachers of any composition course, deadly writing also is a familiar problem to

teachers and students in any course that requires students to write. Teachers and students in literary studies, for instance, struggle with writing that lacks genuine meaning and consequence beyond the completion of an assignment, weak prose that reveals the writer's lack of interest in the topic about which she or he writes and thus fails to engage the reader, and interpretations too ill-supported to influence the classroom's work of learning its subject matter.

Epideictic theory, unintentionally, describes this comatose pedagogical discourse. It is "display rhetoric" in which a writer "displays his rhetorical skill" and readers "observe and judge that skill" (Consigny 281-82). Ancient as the definition is, it explains the Purpose in a contemporary student ceremoniously producing a text as a display to be judged—a performance to be graded—by the teacher. An artificial rather than real Scene for writing further drains it of any significant effect beyond graded performance. The student is not "constrained by a practical exigence [and] is at liberty to advocate any position whatsoever, regardless of how frivolous, as long as it affords him an opportunity to exhibit his rhetorical prowess" (Consigny 281). Classrooms commonly "create epideictic occasions . . . in order to have opportunities for expressing and reformulating [their] shared heritage" (Condit 289). In other words, they perpetuate the same kind of school writing to which students and teachers have become accustomed, which further explains the familiar ring in the ancient definition of display rhetoric. The Agency for this writing makes content inferior to form and conflates display as both its means and end: "Like ritual, in which _what_ is said is less important than _that_ it is said, the value of

epideictic is intrinsic--the seemingly impractical value of being 'a significant action in itself'" (Carter 217-18). Thus classroom writing is performance for performance's sake seeking praise for praise's sake-- "academic discourse" at its most intellectually impotent. Teachers are its real Agents, although they may pretend that students have an Agent's power to make meaning with and of their writing. As Sullivan's analogy of the epideictic orator::teacher indicates, teachers "have the authority to tell students the way things are [but] choose instead to support generalizations with good reasons out of respect for the students' rationality" ("Ethos" 125). Students, aware of this power relationship despite the teacher's attempts to bamboozle them with "good reasons," question teachers about exactly what they expect in an assigned piece of writing: How long should it be? How many sources should it cite? Should they, can they, do they have to give their opinion? Can they use the personal pronoun "I?" How will it be graded? The nature of the questions suggests a filling in of form rather than a creating of meaning, and it illustrates students' bewilderment about whether school writing can or must have any real meaning for them at all. Given these elements of motive along with the fact that "the master is already human, the pupil a mere candidate for humanity" (Sullivan Rhetoric 208), authentic writing from the student seems an impossible dream.

Poulakos' theory argues for a dynamic epideictic that describes a much more enlivening rhetorical situation for classroom writing:

> Conceived as the site of a critique or transformation of the
> social order, the genre of epideictic oratory can no longer be
> understood as a stable ground upon which tradition leaves its
> unalterable traces and attains an intelligibility that persists

across time. Rather, the totality of works that make up the tradition of epideictic oratory must be understood as a historical register that supplies us with a heritage of conflicting valuations among participants of various societies at various times. ("Towards" 161)

Rather than perpetuate classroom writing as a universal discursive Act unchanged by and unchanging of particular Agents, Purposes, Agencies, or Scenes, Poulakos' theory resuscitates it as an occasion for writers and readers to critique, transform, and negotiate the values among them.

The significant difference in the epideictic theorized by Poulakos and that of his contemporaries is his move beyond dichotomy and toward dialogical thinking. Berthoff, alluding to the philosophy of C. S. Peirce, points to the significance of Poulakos' move in a warning about the limits of dichotomous thinking:

[U]ntil and unless we base our pedagogy on a triadic semiotics, all dichotomies will be hazardous and we will find ourselves defenseless against divisions like critical/creative, subjective/objective, cognitive/affective, and reading in/reading out. ("Killer" 16)

Furthermore, she underscores Poulakos' dialogical thinking as a matter of theoretical and practical choice: "There are no dichotomies in reality: dichotomizing is an act of mind, not of Nature" ("Killer" 13- 14). Writing does not, after all, have to begin and end with categories. "Criteria for definition," she explains, "are developed not by asking 'Is it X or is it not?' but by asking 'What does it mean to say that thus and so is X rather than Y?' And not asking it once but continually . . ." ("Killer" 15, my emphasis). To re-envision classroom writing as something more generative than display rhetoric requires this

"'continuing audit of meaning'" (she quotes I. A. Richards) into what students are doing with their classroom essays and why.

In order to illustrate the epideictic nature of pedagogical discourse, I conducted research in three of my sections of English Composition II (ENG 102), the second-semester writing course at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. The goal of this course as stated in the University's Undergraduate Bulletin is "[p]ractice in writing responsible public discourse. Students write extended, informed arguments on issues of public concern" (119). The course is intended to focus on "deliberative" essays as one of the three kinds of writing taught in the pre-requisite English Composition I (ENG 101) course, which introduces students to the "aims and strategies of informative, deliberative, and reflective writing" (119). As I worked to manifest this goal in my teaching of English Composition II, I became increasingly invested in occasioning the discovery of argument rather than requiring the writing of "deliberative" or "argumentative" essays.

I taught two of these sections, 01 and 02, in Spring Semester 1994 and ENG 102-03 in the following Fall Semester 1994.[17] The second half of these two semesters was conducted similarly. Each class worked on individual research projects, which included three finished, graded pieces of writing: a study proposal, an annotated bibliography (which were grouped together as one essay for ENG 102-01 and -02), and the research study itself. Topics were required to arise from the context of the class's readings and/or discussion. Class colleagues were intended readers, and students worked in small groups developing the writing-in-progress. For the first half of the Spring 1994 sections (01

and O2), students read and discussed assigned texts and wrote one long, graded essay on a topic drawn from the reading and class discussion for colleagues as readers. Throughout the semester, they kept a portfolio of reader responses and ideas for future writing. They also kept a journal for thinking about themselves as writers. In the first half of the subsequent Fall 1994 section (O3), students also read assigned texts. Their portfolio included all the inventive and exploratory writing that had been assigned to both the portfolio and journal during the previous semester. Rather than write one long essay, they wrote four short ones with colleagues as intended readers. I gave them evaluative comments on each short essay and one letter grade for the entire collection. In all three sections, I commented on journal and/or portfolio entries about every two weeks, giving a final grade based on the percentage of required entries made. The student-selected general topics for the Spring 1994 sections were gender myths and myths of individual opportunity, chosen from possibilities in the reading collection entitled <u>Rereading America: Cultural Contexts for Critical Thinking and Writing</u> (Colombo et al). In Fall 1994, the general topic was learning, chosen by me and for which I collected a group of texts in a McGraw-Hill Primis reader.

At the end of each semester, I asked students to complete a "Writer's Questionnaire" for my composition research and to sign a consent form permitting me to study their writing and report my findings (see Appendix A for the Spring 1994 questionnaire, Appendix B for the Fall 1994 questionnaire, and Appendix C for the consent form). The questionnaires were essentially the same, although the Fall version's

order was rearranged and the last three questions were changed in order to elicit comments more directly about writer-reader relationships. The questions were designed to prompt student descriptions of relationships among themselves as writers and their writing, their readers and responses from them, and aspects of context in or out of the classroom that influenced their writing. I advised them that the questionnaires would be kept in the English Department Office until I turned in course grades. Of the 52 students enrolled in the three sections, 49 (94%) responded to the questionnaire and gave their consent. The three non-participants were absent on the day I gathered data.

In order to discover the nature of epideictic as these students perceived their writing experiences in these composition classrooms, I studied each student's responses to the questionnaire holistically for the ways in which they characterized relationships between 1) writer and reader (Agent-Act), 2) meaning and consequence (Purpose-Act), 3) form and content (Agency-Act), and 4) text and context (Scene-Act). By "epideictic," I should reiterate, I do not mean just the essay, or Act, itself. Rather, I refer to the entire rhetorical situation including Agent(s), Purpose, Agency, and Scene. I intentionally did not conduct a textual analysis of their essays in order to avoid fossilizing the Act or foregrounding what I as the teacher had to say about their writing. Their metadiscourse, students talking about the dynamics that made their writing seem living or dead to them, illustrates the epideictic occasion. They describe the motives shaping their discourse.

To gather their sense of the writer and reader relationship, I listened especially to comments about colleagues and me as their readers

and about being a reader of colleagues' writing and of published writers' work. For relationship between meaning and consequence, comments about grades, evaluation, and small group workshops were most significant in eliciting what they determined were the aims of their writing. The form and content relationship was analyzed according to the relative emphasis placed on writing process and writing product, often-heard through comments about journals and portfolios as compared to essays, and also through characterizations of their writing as "fake" or "real." The relationship between text and context became apparent through responses about ways writing, reading, and talking informed each other and about logistical constraints on their writing. Features of the metadiscourse informing my interpretations included strength and tone of voice, clarity and reiteration of particular points, details recounted about pieces of writing, movement between particular observations and general interpretations, and word and phrase choices from cliche to innovative prose. I also placed responses against the background of other thoughts that they had shared with me about their writing throughout the semester.

As I listened to the ways these students described pedagogical discourse, four variations of classroom epideictic emerged: 1) Students who represented all four relationships in dichotomies were most clearly display writers or, in other words, they were engaged in display (or ceremonial) epideictic. 2) Conversely, students who described all four relationships dialogically were authentic writers, engaging in authentic epideictic. 3) Students who indicated a majority of dichotomies shaped their writing were primarily display writers with emerging authenticity.

4) Students who talked of a majority of dialogical relationships were primarily authentic writers with lingering display. Analysis of the 49 responding students revealed that 15 (31%) of the students were engaged in display epideictic, 6 (12%) in authentic epideictic, 15 (31%) were primarily display writers with emerging authenticity, and 13 (26%) were primarily authentic writers with lingering display (see Appendix D). Comparing the two clusters of display writers with the two clusters of authentic writers, the totals across all three classes were two-thirds (62%) display and one-third (38%) authentic.[18]

These clusters of students immediately suggest that the category of epideictic as display rhetoric or performative discourse as well as the category of deliberation for classroom writing of argumentation are insufficient concepts for understanding the writing that occurred in these classrooms. My inductive categorizing of the students into four groups provides a heuristic for discovering what did occur. It serves as a tool for pulling out and then thinking about the destructive and constructive aspects of these rhetorical occasions in order to continue composition pedagogy's audit of meaning in school writing. The point here is not to establish the categories of "display" and "authentic" writers and writing (and their combinations), but to use these terms as guides for initiating--not concluding--further thinking about the epideictic quality of pedagogical discourse. As Berthoff explains the way in which dichotomy creates categories of A and non-A, they serve not as an indicator of reality but as an instrument toward discovering dialectic:

> But what about sea and land? Surely one is really, actually wet
> and the other is really, actually dry. Well yes, wet and dry

> constitute a dichotomy and so do sea and land, as abstract—or
> mythical—categories, but where does one end and the other begin,
> at the shore? There is no line in nature that establishes that
> difference. The fact is, rather, that land and sea constitute a
> dialectic, which is now happily called The Coastal Zone.
> ("Killer" 14).

With this heuristic intention in mind, the following discussion

describes each of the four groups.

Display Writers

In their responses to the "Writer's Questionnaire," 15 students

expressed all dichotomous relationships shaping their classroom

epideictic. Of the four hierarchies, the most pronounced was the

meaning/consequence split, as evidenced by an emphasis on grades to give

their writing its only meaning. There were three variations of display

writers: the belligerent, the bright, and the bland.

The Belligerent: Larry (03), one of five belligerent display

writers, was hostile about grades. When asked how the grading system

affected his writing, he responded "It hurt it, never knowing what grade

I really had." (He received written evaluations but no letter grade

until near mid-semester.) His recommendation was to "trash it, get a

real grading system. Inexact, uncertain." Yet the research project,

which grouped three individually graded pieces of finished writing

(study proposal, annotated bibliography, and research study), also

frustrated him:

> They were useless and served a purpose only in the sense that they
> have successfully disillusioned me from taking further English
> courses when writing and reading (if there is a purpose) happen to
> be things I greatly enjoy.

Larry also believed that contexts of school and work oppressed the discourse he might have written. In a postscript voluntarily added to the questionnaire, he referenced his lifestyle in order to emphasize the impossibility of his own research and writing having any meaningful consequence. The "research paper had no real significance, I didn't have time (w/19 hrs. & a job) to conduct the necessary amount for it to be valid (eg 100's of questionnaires)." (Larry clearly did not believe my assurances that quantity was not a necessary indicator of quality research.) Given these pressures along with his grading concerns, Larry wanted to write things that were, I suspect, forms he had written in previous English classes and had received good grades for. He suggested for the research project that I "[f]orget it, lose the assignment. Do a book review or a fiction/non-fiction story for the E.O.Y. [end-of-year?] project." The form of his research project was not one he felt willing and/or able to write; hence, the content suffered.

Larry's writing "was always fake in this class," and he resisted opportunities designed to make it more real, as comments about his journal further illustrate. He advised, "if you must have journals, picks [sic] diff. topics. lose all the feelings & reader/writer relationship stuff. it is disinteresting." Not surprisingly, feedback about sharing his writing with colleagues and me was harsh: "teacher as reader is fine, classmates have no business reading what I write." He also did not like being the reader of group members' work, not wanting "to pick apart people's papers who don't ask me to w/ their own free will." Yet, after telling me to discard virtually everything I had done in the course, he concluded by affirming the hierarchy of teacher-reader/student-writer:

> P.S.—You are a great teacher and are knowledgeable in your field, however your teaching style is contradictory to my learning style. I really was uncomfortable having others read my stuff, I could present it, but not share it. It is nothing personal tho, you are a really nice lady. (my emphasis)

He signed with a smiley face character and his initials. His choice of words were especially revealing about his discomfort. He was used to "present[ing]" or displaying his writing for teachers, but he had never genuinely "share[d]" it with readers or, evidently, been asked to connect with it himself.

Cassie (01), on the other hand, was a belligerent display writer intimately connected to her texts and just as unintimately distanced from her readers. As a result, the issue of grades became a lightening rod for her concerns. When asked what made her writing feel real or fake, she responded, "no offense, but all of my writing felt fake. One bad grade after another just prompted me to write what fulfilled the requirement." (Cassie's course grade was a "B.") Her determination to "fulfill[] the requirement" or perform the form was not always a useful approach. She was "confus[ed]" by the piggy-backed second and third essays of the research project: "The link between essays 2 & 3 was not clear. (It was, but where one ended & the other began wasn't.) It seemed like an extended essay, not two separate ones." She accurately described the assignment, although she could not manage it within the paradigm of writing assignments that I was requiring her to move out of. Her desire to choose essay topics, allowing her to "create better writings when there are less limits," was a request for freedom from readers' responses, particularly teachers' grades. Similarly, she preferred to author her comments orally rather than respond in writing

as a reader to the assigned published texts, as she explained why discussing was more interesting than reading: "The discussions were our realities, our take on life."

One of Ruth's (03) comments especially illustrated the difficulty that all five belligerent display writers had with grade-as-meaning and teacher-as-reader of their writing. In responding to the question about real and fake writing, she drew a line from my statement "We do it just to get the grade." and wrote in the margin "so true." She then wrote in the allotted space for her answer, "I believe from the begning [sic] of the semester my writing 'felt real' to me." The contradiction between the two responses suggested that Ruth was playing the display game of giving the teacher what she wants, a game she described in another response about her colleagues and me as her readers: "Writing for my teacher as my reader was just like 'clock work.' Writing to my colleagues was tough. I have never had other students comment on my writing." To write "for" someone (a teacher) was performance; to write "to" them (her colleagues) was communication.

The Bright: Five of the students who stand out in my memory as the best or potentially best writers in these three composition sections revealed themselves to be display writers through their questionnaire responses. Jayne (02) articulated the tension between the goals of being a good student and a good writer. In describing what made her writing feel real or fake, she wrote:

> I feel fake in my writing when I try to please the teacher in order to get a good grade. Any thoughts and revisions added or done to my papers with only the teacher in mind makes [sic] me feel as if I'm not writing for myself, or for my readers, but for a grade. I feel more 'real' in my writing when I can set my own pace, structure, and ideas in my essays.

Yet Jayne was deeply invested in her graded writing, especially
concerned about the finished pieces:

> The only grades that I considered important in here were my essay
> grades, and they were _very_ important. I get uptight when I write
> for a grade, so when I failed my first essay (for not documenting
> correctly), then damn it all if it's going to happen again.

Jayne cried in my office during one or two of our meetings to discuss
her work, mentioning the pressure she felt to succeed in all her
courses. Her choice to incorporate secondary sources in her first
essay, a strategy I neither mentioned nor encouraged for the assignment,
was significant. Rather than willful plagiarism, it was, I imagine, a
choice in stress management to do the same kind of writing for which she
had received excellent grades in high school (without adequate
documentation instruction). Documentation problems aside, it was an
intelligent and articulate interpretation and synthesis of her readings.
In responding to the prompt inquiring about what else other than grades
encouraged the student's writing during the semester, Jayne continued
describing the influence of grades: "I also think of a graded paper as
proof of the worth of my work. It's like 'here it is--my blood, sweat,
and tears--and this grade is what someone thought of my ideas and
effort.'"

Jayne's worry over her grade shaped the way she interpreted the
assignments. She envisioned them as forms, none of which she preferred
to fill. She explained that

> the first [essay] was more like an 'English' paper. The last two
> seemed more like psych. reports. I don't like to think in such a
> structured manner. I'd rather write things that I can imagine []
> would show up in a newspaper or magazine.

The form overpowered the content in her composition writing, whereas she was unaware of journalism's "structured manner." Her focus on the finished, graded essays also divided her texts from their context. Thinking about a general topic neither helped nor hindered her writing; "it just helped [her] to think about essay topics." Interestingly, however, she "liked the class discussions" and suggested that the class could have been improved by having more of them. She also distanced herself from the exploratory writing. The portfolio sometimes was "busy work" and felt "strained," although other times it was "kind of helpful." Some of the journal prompts "seemed kind of cheezy," yet others were "kind of informative." Thus the reading, writing, and talking were significant to her texts; however, she either ignored or felt constrained by their influence given her focus on graded texts.

Other bright students had mastered the art of display while remaining untouched by the significance of their writing. Lee (01), for instance, a graduating senior with honors in business who had already secured a full-time position with a nationally reputable employer, wrote:

> The grade is the motivating factor in my writing. Because I would not voluntarily chose [sic] to write. I need that (grade) as a guide for me. It influences my decision about whether or not to do the assignment--most importantly how much though[t] goes into it. Without the grades--my effort would most likely diminish.

These students believed they were authentic writers when "authentic" and "academic" were equated. As Anne (03) put it, ". . . we are in school; what we are learning is great, but it all boils down to a grade." Her comments and suggestions about the grading system indicated the

willingness of a bright display writer to do whatever the teacher wanted

in order to earn her praise:

> Sometimes I couldn't understand exactly what your comments asked
> of me. . . . Just be a little more clear in explaning [sic] your
> evaluating process: what you're looking for, what is most
> important etc.--"

Rita's (02) advice emphasized the necessity of grades. "Definetly

[sic], do not stop grading school writing or it will never get done,"

she wrote. Not surprisingly, her portfolio with its ungraded individual

entries "was busy work. Again, not to say that parts of it weren't

enjoyable, but I feel as if it really had no relevance whatsoever to

what we were pursuing in the course, other than keep us writing along."

Any pleasurable or otherwise meaningful consequence for Rita was an

unexpected, nice but not necessary, side benefit to her completion of

the school assignment.

The Bland: As I recall the writing and participation of these

last five display writers, nothing seriously flawed or outstanding comes

to mind. As do the belligerent and the bright, these bland display

writers looked for grades to give meaning to their writing in the

classroom. They also paid special attention to the form of their

writing. Annette (01) described herself as

> very much a grade oriented person--I try to do my best to get a
> good grade b/c my grades & GPA are [inevitably?] what matter;
> however, if I wasn't being graded, I still would try to do well,
> rather than being slack b/c I would want the instructor to know I
> can do a good job; as well as for myself.

Praise, whether it came through a grade or the teacher's respect, was

more important to Annette's writing than, as she tagged her comment, her

own relationship with it. Journal writing about herself as a writer and her writing was advantageous only in terms of what it told her about how to finish written products. She "didn't really come to any conclusions about [her]self as a writer through [her] journals [] although [she] analyzed what [she] need[ed] to do better in essays." Likewise, the portfolio reader responses were often "busy work" in which she "just spat something out to get it done" even though they got her "thinking analytically, creatively and critically." They also "kept [her] writing so [that she was] not so 'stiff' when assignments came up." Her image casts portfolio writing as preparatory calisthenics for bigger, essay gymnastics. She liked building the research study on the study proposal and annotated bibliography because it "was kind of easy to write b/c it follow[ed] #2's form." Annette was so convinced that she could fill in the forms of her essays that she proposed a gender study of women in business through an analysis of the movie Broadcast News without having seen the movie, following the suggestion of a girlfriend that it would prove sexist treatment of women, an interpretation that she could not support once she finally watched the movie.

Susan (O1) also was a grade-driven bland writer who saw the portfolio and journal writing as fake, purposeless. "Journal entries are of no entries [interest?] to me," she explained. "They can be written 5 mins. before class and serve basically no purpose—the only reason I did it was for a grade." She would have rather done "something more challenging like writing a couple of 2-3 page essays." The portfolio writing was "busy work" because, she assumed, any points about their reading assignments would have come up in class discussion without

them. Thus the contexts of written, read, and oral texts were unrelated in Susan's mind. Amy's (02) attitude was a little different from Susan's, yet ultimately as egocentric. She liked the journal writing because it was writing about her writing, unlike the portfolio writing that required her to understand what another writer was saying. The readings, she thought, were "kind of dull," but the discussions were "interesting." Kevin put the problem with portfolio and journal forms in a teacher-reader/student-writer hierarchy by noting that the helpfulness of his portfolio "depended on what you had me writing about" (my emphasis).

Summary of Display Writers: In their own ways, all of these display writers demanded, resented, expected, and/or were resigned to their classroom writing being shaped by hierarchical relationships. Some of them insisted on the traditional dichotomy of teacher-reader/student-writer, while others inverted it. The pressure of grades to give their writing its meaning was so strong in these writers as to collapse meaning and consequence into one. Thus their writing became artificial or "fake" with its only purpose being to obtain a praiseworthy grade. With the teacher as the only essential grader-reader, despite reading responses from their colleagues, writer-reader relationships also became artificial. In order to obtain the grade they desired, they viewed composition writing as a performance of whatever form the teacher requested. The performances occurred outside of the real, concrete classroom's context--the writing, reading, and talking occasioning them--as they attempted to situate themselves within a more familiar if more un-real, abstract school context. They were fearful

and/or resentful of me as the reader-teacher-grader requiring them to make their writings read, meanings consequential, forms contentful, and texts contextual.

Authentic Writers

The number of authentic writers in these three composition sections, six, is two and one-half times less than the number of 15 display writers. These six students talked about their ENG 102 experiences in dialogical terms, bridging writer and reader, meaning and consequence, form and content, and text and context. As a result, they transformed artificial, abstract school writing into authentic, concrete writing occasions.

Don (01) talked about making his writing meaningful for himself while also acknowledging the importance of grades. In responding to the questionnaire's suggestion that students often write in school just to get a grade, he asserted:

> I feel the writing that was done this semester was not just to get
> [a] grade. In class we searched for ideas/topics that would
> interest the writer. When you write about something interesting,
> you write for yourself and a grade.

He also put the grade in perspective in speaking about what encouraged his writing:

> I believe whenever you are writing for course credit the thoughts
> of what grades you may get [will] always be there, but when you
> find something to write on that really gets your interest,
> sometimes the grade is not all that important.

Don's comments do not force choices; they facilitate movement between writer and reader as well as meaning and consequence. Form and content

were synthesized in Don's remarks about his research project, portfolio, and journal. He liked the connection between the second (study proposal and annotated bibliography) and third (research study) essays because the second "gives you a place to start your research. You know what you are looking to get from the research." His portfolio served its inventive aim, "helpful in finding an idea or topic." The journal worked even better. It was "very helpful" because, as he noted, it "allowed me to look back at myself as a writer and see if I feel any different before and after the course." He felt process and product working together in the development of writing and writer. Don's sense of the relationships between writers and readers and text and context blended in comments about class discussions. He saw that "when you discuss a topic as a group, it helps the writer individually to take a position when writing his/her own paper. . . . Overall, I believe the class discussions were the key to the class." Don's arguments in all his finished writing were well-developed from class discussion, and he situated his writer's point of view according to this real sense of his readers.

When I recall Don's puzzled questions to me earlier in the semester about his grades and the new kinds of writing I was requiring of him, his questionnaire responses indicate that he shed several traditional school expectations in order to become an authentic writer in ENG 102. Furthermore, his writing continued to have relevance for him after the course was completed. In the subsequent semester he came to visit me, wanting to be sure he had the final version of his research study with my comments on it in order to adapt it for an oral

presentation in one of his business major courses. He was obviously pleased with his work's meaning and with the opportunity to share it with another audience.

Mitch (03) talked about getting beyond the teacher grade-giver as his only reader in order to achieve authentic writing. My providing evaluative comments without a grade the first half of the semester helped. Mitch assessed, "I found that I could write without worrying about what grade I would receive on each paper." He recommended that I "[k]eep using it [this grading system]. It is helpful to writers b/c they don't have to worry about 'pleasing the teacher' on each paper." Like Don, Mitch referred to himself as a "writer" rather than a "student" when not in a display mode of teacher-pleasing. Mitch re-cast writer-reader relationships in order to accomplish authentic discourse. In comparing what it was like writing for his teacher and for his colleagues, he noted: "Writing for the small group to read helped me get passed [sic] writing for the teacher. I tried to focus more on them than on the teacher as my reader." He also valued responding to colleagues' writing-in-progress because he "felt like [he] had some input to their writing & tried to help them become better writers." The goal of being a better writer superseded being a better student.

Mitch was not unaware of the teacher's guidance, however, as his comments about the context for conducting and reporting his research indicated:

> Maybe give a little more time to actually conduct experiment. I felt a little rushed doing it. The deadlines set for each piece (eg Study Proposal, Bibliography, etc) helped me get it done, otherwise I probably would have done the study yesterday & written the paper last night!

His humor alluded to conversations he and I had about the time it takes
for a writing process to proceed. The rewards for managing his process
for the research project were apparent in comments about real writing:
"The research paper felt real to me because it was something I had
actually gone out & observed. It was also the end of a process started
long ago & it gave me a sense of accomplishment." Form and content
worked together in his project, and Mitch knew when their dialogic had
reverted to hierarchy. In journal writing, he noted, "[t]rying to meet
the 4 page a week assignment made me feel like I was doing busy work.
The first two pages were usually more insightful than the last two."
The first two, in other words, were contentful; the last two were form-
filling. Comments from Stacey (03) about the journal treated its
fluctuating meaningfulness as natural. She noted that "[s]ome times
[sic] I wrote with feeling and others I just wanted to get my 4 pages
for the week done. I think the journals work well. I also think this
is to be expected," she concluded, drawing an arrow to her comment about
their variability. Also like Mitch, she found colleagues' and teacher's
evaluative comments helpful in getting her to stop "'writing for the
grade'."

The respect for and pride in their and their colleagues' writing
evident in Don and Mitch's comments also came through in Marie's
responses (01). "I believe all the essays we have done made the writing
seem real," she declared. "I did great and interesting studies, as
other students did, on topics of concern in our society. This was
wonderful and fun, not just for a grade." A balance between writing for
her own interest and writing better because she knew a teacher-reader

would evaluate with a grade was also reflected in comments about what encouraged her writing:

> The encouragement, other than a grade, that made me do the writings is that we got to choose topics that were of importance to us. That encouraged me to want to do the essays just to find out information on my own. The grading of course made me want to do it even more.

Marie's "of course" suggested that she took school and grades in stride as she got into her "great and interesting" work. These comments also bridged worlds of school and society, as she contextualized her work with her colleagues' and their larger, shared world. Mitch agreed, noting that reading and discussion "helped open [his] eyes to other aspect[s] of learning and helped [him] realize more what was going on around [him]."

Jack (03) and Ted (02), two of the least traditional students in these three sections, were also two of the six authentic writers. Although Jack was a non-native speaker of English and Ted had a learning disability, neither of these potential encumbrances manifested in a greater desire to perform the form for the teacher. Jack's comments illustrated a genuine aim of communication in his writing. In comparing what it felt like to write for his teacher and colleagues, he wrote, "It was the same thing for me. I just wanted to get my point across." His preference for comments rather than grades emphasized his desire to know whether his communication was effective. He explained, "I personally understood more the comments than a letter grade so I think this method worked fine for me." He also recommended that "[m]aybe you could give more comments on each of the paragraphs of the writing." The journal

was the only writing that confounded Jack. He could not "see the use of it," and it was hard to write because he was "not used to it." The function of the journal was unclear to Jack and, as an authentic writer, he often resisted writing in it, unwilling merely to fill a form, even if he also was unwilling to explore its potential usefulness.

Ted, on the other hand, was more flexible than Jack about exploratory writing. He understood the portfolio's intent to help writers explore ideas even when they think they have none. He noted that

> if I did get into [the topic], it was help in getting me to write down all my thoughts and getting them to flow. But on the other hand your [sic] not always going to get to write things you can get into, so when those came up they helped me to deal with them.

He also took the journal as an opportunity to do something he had not done before: "It made me stop and think what type of writer I am and how I write and why." The influence of one relationship on another can be heard in the following comment expressing the way a change in purpose affects the writer's relationship with reader and text:

> Well, when writing the essays, which is a bigger grade [,] of course the influence is there to make it the best you can do. I feel this is important and needed, but when writing the portfolios & journals there is not as much influece [sic] to do anything except to get thoughts down on paper which also is important and helpful.

Ted also used the intertextual context of his writing in the research project to his advantage, allowing it to diminish concerns about "comming [sic] up with topic ideas" and the "recomended [sic] number of pages" for his essays.

Summary of Authentic Writers: Unlike the display writers, who voiced concerns with various strains of rebellion, these authentic writers talked with a confidence and respect for their rhetorical situations. They developed comfortable relationships with their readers, teacher and colleagues alike. They were enthusiastic about the consequences of their writing, having put grades in perspective with other meanings that were as or more important to themselves as writers and to their readers. In order to achieve their purposes, they employed forms as tools for shaping their writing's content and vice-versa. Their texts arose from the various discursive contexts of their classrooms, and they also perceived the classroom as relevant to contexts beyond it. They took responsibility for making exploratory writing in journals and portfolios meaningful and contextual. Rather than succumbing to or inverting hierarchies, they transformed them dialogically. These writers accomplished the authentic writing as I attempted to occasion it for all of the students in these three composition sections.

Primarily Display Writers with Emerging Authenticity

The "Writer's Questionnaire" elicited 15 students who transformed one of the four dichotomous relationships between writer/reader, meaning/consequence, form/content, and text/context. Many of these students, I recall, began the semester with overt obligatory attitudes about their enrollment in ENG 102 and became openly delighted about their emerging authenticity by semester's end. I have arranged the description of these students according to the emerging authentic relationship that distinguishes them from the 15 students completely

engaged in display writing. The most dynamic changes were apparent in comments indicating that students had negotiated the pressures of teacher-as-reader and grade-as-meaning. These writer-reader and meaning-consequence relationships were practically inextricable from one another as students emerged from display writing. Therefore, although I discuss Wendall as speaking primarily about his emerging writer-reader relationship and Kris about meaning-consequence, their comments evidenced the overlap.

Writer-Reader Relationship: Wendall (02) expressed himself as an emerging writer who was learning to negotiate what he said to whom. He was one of the few students who made a point to discuss his grades with me on more than one occasion during the semester. In one meeting, he asked me the point-blank reader/writer question, "What do I need to do to get an 'A' from you?" His question represents the intimacy between writer-and-reader and meaning-and-consequence in classroom writing. My suggestion, designed to make him more aware of their mutual influences, was that he start looking for a reason to write other than his grade because it would make his writing more interesting, both for him to write and me to read. He did and, as a result, his research study was authentic for him. It "actually felt like real research for personal benefit, not just a grade." The tension he balanced was complex, however, as reflected in his comment about grading's influence and other encouragements: "Grading saved my life. If it wasn't for my D-, I wouldn't have gotten A's on my last two essays. The interest in my study was as important in making me writ[e] it for a grade." Wendall received a "D-" on his first essay because I read it as an ill-

supported, racist argument unconvincing for the intended readers in our class. We talked individually a great deal about evidence and audience as he tried to understand why his essay had failed, especially considering he thought he had brought to the piece the same hard-hitting tone that his last semester's history teacher valued. Given his comments about the research project and his recommendation to continue small group workshops (along with my perception of Wendall as a student who would welcome the opportunity to be forthright on a teacher's end-of-semester questionnaire), Wendall's lesson suggests not one about manipulating words in order to satisfy teachers. Instead, it was one in learning about connecting one's words with a real reader or two.

Meaning-Consequence Relationship: Kris (01) articulated a shift in the way grades influenced her writing process over the course of the semester. In recalling her first essay, she wrote, "At first the grade made me upset and not want to write but I also want[ed] to pass so I kept going. When the grade got better so did my writing." (Actually, her writing got better, then the grade.) She continued talking about grades on the back of the questionnaire:

> A grade can often effect [sic] a persons [sic] writing in a
> negative way. Society is lead [sic] to believe that a grade is a
> basis for how smart a person is but that is inaccurate. A grade
> is a letter out of the alphabet and means nothing except that you
> had a good day or a bad day.

Although Kris's discounting of the worth of a grade swung the pendulum to another extreme, she at least was moving toward a confidence in her intelligence. Kris was one of the weakest writers at the beginning of Spring 1994, and she told me with resigned acceptance on several

occasions early in the semester that she "just could not write."
Although she "hated writing the first essay," she concluded her
questionnaire with a note much more positive than I imagined she would
sound about this class: "I think the class was great. I enjoyed it all
together [sic] and only perhaps [would] pick a diffrent [sic] topic for
essay #1." Kris's sense of a real context for her process also
developed, as her final comments about personality differences
indicated: "Also you are a morning person and I am not. I would take
this class later in the day so I could enjoy it more."

Form-Content Relationship: Ben (02) became aware of writing as
process rather than just product during the semester and therefore his
writing became more than just forms to complete. What made his writing
feel real, he enumerated, was "the way we've approached the essay;
1)rough draft 2)revision 3) revision workshops and 4) final drafts."
Until he began the process of writing the research study, he did not
understand the ways in which it would be different from his study
proposal and annotated bibliography. ". . . [O]nce I started it," he
noted, "I realized they would be pretty different . . . . these two
essays were interesting because it was a hands on kind of experience."
Process and product, form and content did not always blend in Ben's
writing, however. His portfolio writing was done "basically for
completion" and his journal, he did not think, "benefitted me in anyway.
Revision workshops were my advantage." Ben remained focused on
finished, graded pieces of writing, exclusive of inventive writing that
he only completed for credit. Emphasis on grades kept him from
transforming dichotomies any further than he did, and he advised me of

the importance of grades for students' motivation: "I know that if you didn't grade essays but it was a pass/fail course then the essay would never be as good. The grading makes people put effort into it, in order to achieve a good grade." Yet with his research study, the piece of writing he valued most, he transcended the purpose of grade. In our last class meeting, I confessed that I was sorry that I had not planned time for each writer to report a bit of his or her findings to the entire class. Ben concluded his questionnaire with this suggestion for making the class better: "Like you said about sharing our studies. We all worked hard on them and it would have been more of a benefit to share them rather than just getting a grade." Earlier in the semester, Ben would not read his colleagues' writing-in-progress prior to workshops. Thus this comment suggested the impact of transforming the form/content split.

Journal and portfolio writing were more significant for Patricia (01) than Ben. Her initial attention to surface details of finished products developed into a deeper sense of things to attend to in her writing process because of this exploratory writing. "Grading has influenced my writing because it has made me think about grammar, punctuation, etc.," she explained, then describing how things changed:

> Writing became interesting to me after awhile. It wasn't such a struggle because the journals and portfolios forced me to be open-minded . . . . and to think more. I already had ideas about topics before starting a paper because I was constantly thinking while writing portfolios.

She listed the advantages of her journal as "more thought put into writing" and "more feed-back from teacher." The connection between her

writing and thinking processes was evidenced in her concern that the topic for the beginning of the semester was "much too controversial" in the face of the open-mindedness she was discovering through her exploratory writing.

Text-Context Relationship: Other display writers indicated a heightened sense of their writing's contexts. Alice (03) perceived all her writing for the course intertextually, finding the connections beneficial. She saw how "one built on the other" in the series of texts comprising the research project, and she also reflected on this pattern in the first half of the semester. Comparing the research project to the first two short essays of the semester, she noted they were "just like the interviews [,] compiled to get the class data. You can see the progress of ideas." Alice was glad not to have the pressure of grades at the beginning of the semester, claiming, "You don't feel hindered by a bad grade. You learn how to improve your writing before the final grade." She advised, however, to "give grades on the first few essays, but don't make them count."

The context of class discussion was particularly important for other writers. Beverly (02) appreciated the influence of talk on her writing and thinking. "It helps your writing," she explained, "because as a group you hear different opinions that you haven't thought of before but will enhance your writing." Discussions of gender myths were "interesting because you heard different ideas & beliefs." She spoke on behalf of the entire class for big and small group discussion: "I think these are helpful to all of us." Bruce (02) suggested that I add more class discussion in future sections because "it brought out some great

ideas in people." Ultimately, however, he believed that "you really do have to grade the students, even though it does force them to write." A great idea, evidently, only went so far on its own volition in the composition classroom.

Summary of Primarily Display Writers with Emerging Authenticity: Each of these students, primarily engaged in display writing, demonstrated some development as a dialogic writer. Their respect grew for their readers, themselves as writers, their writing processes and products, or the living scene within which they wrote for a semester. Most often, if they were transforming the dichotomy between writer and reader, they also were beginning to re-think the emphasis of grades as the conflated meaning/consequence of their writing. If they were discovering relationships between form and content, they were less likely to let go of the need to define their writing in terms of grades. They gained, however, an awareness of themselves as writers, not just as students, and of their writing as process, not just product. The writers who felt an enhanced reality for the context of their discourses often expressed pleasure about the course even while continuing to worry about their grades. Through these transformations, then, these display writers with emerging authenticity were farther along than their colleagues who were completely engaged in display writing.

Primarily Authentic Writers with Lingering Display

Thirteen students, one more than twice as many as the six fully authentic writers, gave responses to the "Writer's Questionnaire" suggesting they were primarily authentic writers with lingering display. Each of these students talked about their writing experience in ENG 102

in terms of three but not four dialogical relationships, or in terms of two that were expressed with notable strength and clarity. I have arranged their description according to the lingering threads of display writing that distinguish them from the six authentic writers.

Writer/Reader Relationship: Although bridging other dichotomies, Gary's (01) recounting of his essays suggested that awareness of the teacher-as-reader overwhelmed some of his writer's choices. He stated that the first essay "was a little fake. Perhaps because I didn't like the topic." Gary's choice to write about marital rape laws, never explicitly discussed in our work with gender myths, seemed like a typical choice for an "English argumentative essay"; I wondered if he had written on it for a previous class and was looking for an easy out. He made a more meaningful choice for his research project. "The third [essay] was real writing to me. Since I believed in what I wrote," he concluded, "it really helped me write it. I felt that I did the third essay more for myself than the grade." When he gave himself authority over his choices, the consequence of a grade likewise became more controlled. Gary also took ownership of his journal while testing the waters with his teacher-reader. Its advantage, he noted, was that "I could throw a lot of stress or anger, or my feelings onto the journal. I felt that it was _my_ journal & I could write whatever I thought. The disadvantage was that you were going to read them!" He also perceived his texts in connection with other students' writing, which in turn "helped [him] revise [his] own topic" and "showed [him] that many different people have a different assessment of what individual

opportunity really is," an awareness gathered from class reading and discussion that informed his research project.

Unlike Gary, Carol represented several nearly authentic writers who, while feeling a balance between writers and readers when they were the writer, demonstrated a lack of ability to interact similarly when they were in the reader's position. Although her writing was real when it was "personal," for instance, in talking about "opinions on our wrt. process, our exploring paper topics, [and] research for final essay," it was fake when "responding to writing in book," meaning the assigned reading of published discourses. In her assessment of the readings and discussions, she wrote: "[T]he readings were boring to me. I liked the discussion but these are topics all of us will never agree on or reach a solution about—frustrating." Carol's frustration suggested she had not yet figured out how to negotiate to her fullest satisfaction writer-reader relationships. Other than this dichotomous relationship, her comments illustrated an authentic writer. She was encouraged by "getting involved personally with issues" therefore yielding meaningful journal and research writing. She recognized that "grading [journal responses] would be impossible: better to let students respond as they wish." Her sense of her research study's context informed her understanding of her "intended readers' previous attitudes about [her] subject."

Meaning/Consequence Relationship: Not surprisingly, six of these nearly authentic writers focused on grades. Lindsey (01) admitted:

> Honestly, the grading of my essays affects my writing a lot. If there were no grades, I would do the writing, but I'm sure I wouldn't put as much into it. I would much rather read!! Besides

my grade, though, I was encouraged to write to express a few ideas and look into what I thought about a few others.

Her portfolio aided her expression and investigation. Although it was half the time "busy work," she recalled that her ideas for the first essay and research project began as portfolio writing, which was "kind of magical, how [they] popped out of the class writing from [for?] me!!" Similarly, she found the journal advantageous for its insights and "clues" about her writing. She described the context of class reading and discussion as "excellent" because "it is so interesting to see how each student chooses the individual subjects!! It's fun!! . . . When you take one topic, you get so many ideas and opinions back--which helps everybody!!" The context for Lindsey's work was so relevant that she "wouldn't have minded sharing [her] 2nd/3rd essay with the class and also hearing about their studies!!"

Vicki (01) matter-of-factly figured the meaning of grades as primary in the larger school picture:

> Since we are all concerned about our grades especially since we have to apply to schools for our majors w/ certain GPA's I think our grades were important. Also I think we want to improve on less adequate grades and if you know its [sic] going to be graded your [sic] going to do it. The interest of the subjects also encouraged me to do the writing.

Mary (03), however, was anxious to move beyond this superiority of grades over other meaning for her writing. In comparing writing for her colleagues and teacher, she expressed dissatisfaction with her emphasis on grades, noting:

> I didn't really mind writing for you although I tend to worry too much about the grade and not on my work's content. I enjoyed writing for my colleagues b/c it was interesting to hear their

> comments, feedback, suggestions, etc. I found myself more
> enjoying their reading my work than you (no offense) but the
> pressure is off when I was evaluated by them on my work.

The static nature of a grade was highlighted by Mary's wording--she got a "grade" from her teacher, but was "evaluated" by her colleagues.

In spite of this lingering display of meaning/consequence, dialogics in other relationships were woven by these students. Wanda (03) spoke to the significance of real readers, writing that "[w]hen you know that people actually care about what you are saying and will take real notice to what you write, you seem to be more aware and precise." Jed (02) connected form and content as he remembered the difficulties he had understanding the requirements for the study proposal and annotated bibliography. He could not get the image of a finished argument out of his mind and "got confused" about the piggy-backed essays. He finally saw, however, that it helped him "plan [his] research in advance," concluding that "both essays really have to be connected to make the idea clear & effective."

Form/Content Relationship: Zach (01) was one of two primarily authentic writers held back by an emphasis on form, the issue that Jed resolved by semester's end. As a writer with little experience in exploring and developing topics, Zach was overwhelmed by the requirements of a project incorporating primary and secondary research. He felt that "[t]he final result of the last 2 essays was more in depth. I kind of got tired of the same material." His topic's content, as a result, could not carry the weight of a research project. Yet he intuited the difference that time and thought gave his writing as he described his portfolio writing: "If I did the portfolios the day

before class they would be interesting, but if I waited till before class, the only think I accomplished was busy work." In terms of dialogics, Zach was one of the writers who benefitted most from a keen sense of classroom context. His writing felt real because it "was discussed thoroughly in class [and] [m]any topics that are discussed in society were discussed in here." His situation influenced his writing's meaning: "The class in general encouraged me because I wanted to keep up with everyone and be able to participate." He also valued the class readings and discussions for the ways they allowed "some of us [to] relate and then others [to] learn[] how the 'other side' is."

Context/Text Relationship: Although a number of students throughout all of these clusters commented generally about the logistics of student life (usually complaining that I had required too much writing), Bud was the student who alluded most persistently to the ways in which a school context overshadowed his discourse. His writing felt fake at the beginning of the semester because he perceived he "had to write about a topic [he] had no interest in. It [his writing] felt real when [he] did [his] final paper on something [he] wanted to write about." Similarly, he thought it was "fine" that the class discussed a general topic together; however, he believed "it hurt [him] to have to write about what everybody talked about." His parenthetical disclaimer, "(Maybe I misunderstood the aim of the first paper.)," was noteworthy because the topic requirements for the first and final essays were the same in terms of their need to connect to the class reading and discussion. Bud, I suspect, began the semester automatically assuming that his teacher would dictate his topic from among uninteresting school

choices. Therefore, he did not negotiate a text suitable for both him and his readers until our work was farther underway. Portfolio and journal writing helped his thinking, but "when given all the time" became "busy work." Bud, in his mid-20s, was returning to college for a second time while working nights as a bartender and planning to marry soon. Despite these contextual pressures, he could articulate the connection between reading, writing, and talking: "The readings seemed to help us express ourselves orally in class and verbally in the portfolios and journals. Writing and talking about them made them interesting." He ended up with a research project that he "was interested in [] grade aside."

Summary of Primarily Authentic Writers with Lingering Display: Most of the authentic writers with lingering display suggested that the last dichotomy to be transformed in order for them to become completely authentic writers would be the writer/reader or meaning/consequence relationship. The writer/reader relationship was often inverted rather than negotiated, as some students connected with the teacher-as-reader, but could not negotiate their own position as reader of texts laden with authority as published material assigned by their teacher. With varying tones of acceptance or agitation, students spoke about grades as the ultimate motivator and point of their writing. A minority of these nearly authentic writers wrestled most explicitly with form/content or text/context issues. Form oppressed content. Texts were relinquished to a school context while real class situations were ignored when the writing persisted with lingering display. One or another dichotomy, then, kept this group of students from not quite developing into fully authentic writers.

Summary

In shaping display or authentic writing, all four groups of English 102 students suggest the primary significance of the writer-reader and meaning-consequence relationships. In the most extreme of display writers, meaning and consequence were conflated into the one Purpose of grade. In contrast, fully authentic writers found other reasons to give their writing meaning, along with its grade. Accompanying these respective perceptions of grades, display writers were more likely to resist their teacher and/or colleagues as readers, while authentic writers developed working relationships with their teaching and collegial readers. Comments from display writers were marked with frustration and resentment; authentic writers expressed satisfaction and pleasure. As a result of dichotomies, display writers saw their writing as forms to perform or to rebel against in a context that was either irrelevant to or oppressive of their discourse. Alternatively, writer-reader and meaning-consequence dialogically led students to discover ways to form their thinking in contexts that resonated for them, their topics, and their readers.

Display writers with emerging authenticity suggested the intricate weaving of writer-reader and meaning-consequence relationships. When one began to emerge dialogically, the other was not far behind. Form-content and text-context were less likely to be the dominant emerging dialogical relationship, although it was possible for change toward authentic writing to begin with them. As writer-reader or meaning-consequence were usually the first relationships to emerge, they were also the last to be transformed fully, as the primarily authentic

writers with lingering display illustrate. Even as those two relationships were developing dialogically, tensions still were present, and students expressed dissatisfaction similar to that of writers more fully engaged in display writing. Just as form-content or text-context infrequently led transformation, so too were they occasionally the last dichotomies to linger in nearly authentic writers.

In this research, writer-reader, meaning-consequence, form-content, and text-context all were illustrated as dynamic relationships. In addition to maintaining the dichotomies of epideictic theory by some students, hierarchies also were inverted or transformed by others. The dynamic, fluctuating nature of the epideictic developed among these 49 students within and across the four clusters of writers suggests that classroom writing is not necessarily a static rhetorical situation, or a matter of ceremony. Teachers, grades, genres, and school do not necessarily have to pre-determine the writers that students must be and the writing that they must do, even though this research indicates they most often do. Therefore, epideictic theory inaccurately constructs hierarchies of writer, meaning, form, and text over reader, consequence, content, and context.

More significantly, this analysis of epideictic practice uncovers the destructiveness that results from efforts to enact these inaccurate concepts of language use. When the theoretical hierarchies were maintained or inverted, writers and readers became embattled, pitting persuasion against deliberation. Students who demonstrated writer/reader opposition, as constructed in epideictic theory, expected no deliberation from their teacher-reader, in lieu of an anticipated

praiseworthy grade. Students inverting the opposition into a reader/writer relationship gave up any real persuasive aim and wrote whatever they believed the teacher and/or school requested. When students wrote with an emphasis on meaning over consequence, as epideictic theory hypothesizes, their only or dominant purpose was to get a satisfactory grade. When they inverted the hierarchy, they resisted grading altogether. In terms of form and content, students enacted the theoretical dichotomy when they found no connection with their writing and attempted instead to fill form, more often in journals and portfolios but also in essays. Conversely, students who flipped the dichotomy rebelled against any constraint on the expression of their ideas. As epideictic theory would have it, some students saw their texts outside of real context, having little or no relevance to the reading, discussing, and exploratory writing they were doing as they developed finished pieces of writing. Conversely, the context of school inhibited texts that students imagined they could write in a context/text hierarchy.

In contrast to writing the flawed and debilitating epideictic of display, other students wrote dialogically. In this authentic writing, the relationship between writer and reader enabled students to enact persuasion and anticipate their teacher's and colleagues' deliberation. Their dialogical sense of meaning and consequence was grounded in worthwhile reasons to write beyond, but not exclusive of, graded evaluation. Students who developed a working relationship between form and content saw writing as a matter of both process and product; writing was a formative act of creating rather than a filling of forms already

created by someone else. Students who negotiated text and context saw other forms of thinking (reading, discussing, and exploratory writing) shaping their texts and, in turn, their texts affecting the readers and issues related to that thinking. With each student, then, something was lost in a dichotomous relationship, while something was gained in a dialogical one. Students invested in display writing implicitly and probably unconsciously believed in epideictic theory's draining of deliberation, consequence, content, context, and—ultimately—deed from their discourse. They gave over to ceremonial school writing. Conversely, students invested in authentic writing implicitly and perhaps more consciously believed in the inextricable connection between words and deeds. They transformed ceremony into an occasion for negotiating symbolic action.

Epideictic theory does not accurately explain what happened in these composition classrooms. More significantly, it overlooks the destructive nature of the dichotomous relationships advocated in its hypothesizing and displayed in these epideictic occasions. Furthermore, epideictic theory ignores the potential for a more constructive outcome. In the terms of the pentad, this student metadiscourse raises several questions about theory of the epideictic Act. Who is the Agent of this writing—the student or the teacher? What role of Agent can the students' colleagues play? Why do these students write—for the Purpose of grade or for some other reason? How do these students write—by filling in a form or by forming as Agency? Finally, where is the Scene for their writing—an abstract notion of "school" or a real classroom? Likewise, my reader response to Pericles' war eulogy raises questions

about who its Agents are or can be; what its real Purpose is or should be; how it does or should go about achieving its Purpose; and whether its Scene is or can be universal or particular. The way rhetorical theory answers these questions will suggest whether it wishes to continue shaping rhetorical practice as a perpetuation of display by orators and students or as a facilitation of the negotiation of values and ideas in ceremony and in school.

As language often divided into the categories of epideictic and deliberative, war eulogies and classroom essays have things in common that categorical differences cloud and that a theory of rhetoric as one use of language denies. The theoretical insufficiency and practical consequences that follow from destructive choices in epideictic have been illustrated in chapters three and four, as has the potential for stronger theoretical explanation and more constructive outcomes. Chapter five draws these similarities together and explores implications for moving rhetorical theory and practice farther along toward real peacemaking and authentic classroom writing.

CHAPTER V

EULOGIES, ESSAYS, EPIDEICTIC: REUNITING WORD AND DEED

As disparate as war eulogies and classroom essays might at first seem, these occasions of cultural and pedagogical discourse as illustrated in chapters three and four suggest foundational similarities. The same inaccuracy and destructiveness result in both of them when dichotomies dictate the relationships shaping the discourse-- writer/reader, meaning/consequence, form/content, text/context, or their inversions. When the relationships work dialogically, the eulogy and essay generate peaceable negotiations within and among the discursive Act, Agent, Purpose, Agency, and Scene. These similarities point to implications for theoretical and practical choices in all discourse. As Ronald and Roskelly advocate, "looking beneath the surface" (7) of differences emphasized by categories and discovering similarities across categories leads to the transformation of the deliberative/epideictic dichotomy and to a recognition of the larger concept of the rhetorical nature of all uses of language. An epideictic occasion is a rhetorical occasion, just as a deliberative occasion is rhetorical. In either category, language is unnaturally twisted with damaging results when its persuasive nature is ignored and its deliberation marginalized. A drawing together of the common ground in my reading of Pericles' "Funeral Oration" and my students' writing of essays illustrates.

In the "Funeral Oration," Pericles as writer and I as reader were clearly in conflict. I struggled against his superior and my inferior

position in the writer/reader hierarchy, and their lack of resolution left the relationship tainted with potentially greater violence. The English 102 writers who resisted their teacher and/or colleagues as readers took a stance similar to Pericles'. They wanted readers to agree and praise with nondeliberative deed, just as Pericles expected his auditors to do. The students who gave up their author-ity as writers, wanting or expecting the teacher to assume it, inverted the hierarchy into reader-teacher/writer-student. Or, perhaps these students actually maintained the hierarchy while reversing roles within it. Perceiving the teacher--not themselves--as the real writer of classroom compositions, they assumed the passive, non-Agent status that I resisted in the war eulogy.

The potential for generative discourse, on the other hand, emerged in my genuine response to Pericles' persuasion, indicating that co-Agents are one curative for the violence festering in epideictic characterized as nonpersuasive and nondeliberative. Similarly, constructive discourse developed when students asserted themselves as equal partners in their writing's meaning-making and accepted readers as responsible respondents. In these moments, writing became a means for affecting both the writers' and readers' attitudes and behaviors about the particular issues investigated, proving that for all human agents, "[u]nderstanding comes to fruition only in the response" (Bakhtin 282).

Pericles overtly claimed that his eulogistic words had little real meaning by conflating praise as both its Agency and Purpose. Students who wrote with the primary goal of a praiseworthy grade also collapsed means and end. In both cases, the harm was clear in the discursive

outcomes. Pericles' eulogy consciously persuaded to deadly acts, and students, often unconsciously, did not persuade themselves or their readers with dead essays. When other meanings grounded the discourse, productive outcomes appeared--in my response, the opportunity to investigate war and peace ideologies; in students' writing, the occasion to discover and communicate through language. By embracing meaning, the eulogy and the essays shaped the consequences that would result from their use.

Denying persuasive intent, either consciously or unconsciously, also meant denying discursive content. With Agency and Purpose conflated, Pericles treated his oration as a vessel for repeating history's words, just as students completed assignments by limiting writing process and product to time-worn, form-filling performance. Alternatively, when students treated words as content, form became a process for creating an Act, rather than a meaningless Act itself. My response likewise opened up the eulogy to new ways of creating alternate insights into political and social paradigms. In both cases, rather than determine mean with end or vice-versa, forming and the thing formed generated a variety of means for a diversity of ends.

Disavowing the real contexts of discourse, Pericles and some students wrote as if all funerals and all classrooms were the same. Therefore, texts were inappropriate for the real, present Scene and damaging to possible, future Scenes. Pericles forced his past and present's ideology on future generations of readers and writers; students advanced to a new semester with petrified writing and reading that probably was similar to their previous classroom discourse. In

contrast to the universal treatment Pericles and students gave to discourse, other readers and writers worked to make context part of meaning. I advocated a re-thinking of the influence of Pericles' eulogy on my world, and students argued for re-searching into matters important for the well-being of their own and their readers' worlds. Realizing that texts are informed by and informing of contexts, we saw words perpetuating deeds.

As the war eulogy and the classroom essay illustrate, then, hierarchical relationships in discourse lead to violence. When writer, meaning, form, and text dominate reader, consequence, content, and context, power struggles emerge and inversions only reverse who or what gets silenced. On the other hand, dialogical relationships allow all parts of the rhetorical situation to develop, change, reinvigorate—to get farther along. Writer _and_ reader, meaning _and_ consequence, form _and_ content, text _and_ context are shaped in mutually dependent ways. With all the dynamics of language working in concert, language is an instrument for growth. With the dynamics functioning in conflict, it is a tool only for more conflict. These examples of the uses of language illustrate Kenneth Burke's philosophy of language. Language is symbolic action. All language does something. All words are deeds. All words persuade. Rhetoric is all language use. A definition of rhetoric as the act of using language emphasizes the power of language: to use language is to _do_ something with it. Language is the symbol-tool with which human beings shape all occasions. Rhetoric is the name for putting hand to tool, of taking word from mouth. It is the act of utterance. To argue, then, as my dissertation's title indicates, for a

"reuniting of word and deed" is to argue for a conscious acknowledgement of the indivisible nature of word and deed in theory, and to argue for the shaping of practice in light of that union. To deny this perception of language is to deny responsibility for deciding what to do and for what gets done with words; it is to perpetuate deadly consequences of discourse such as those that result from traditional war eulogies and students' ceremonial essays.

Categories of discourse, from ancient to contemporary theory, do not build from a foundation of word as deed. The old epideictic category does not nor do new, improved ones. Rather than continually re-define and re-describe categories and metacategories of discourse in order to stabilize "a bewildering array of confusing and overlapping terminology" (Beale Pragmatic 3), discourse would be better served by the acknowledgement of all language use as part of a universe of discourse in which human beings seek to communicate with one another in human, worldly, consequential rhetorical situations. Rather than a structuralist model for these discourses, a more helpful model would "locate language within the individual rather than external to the individual," as Barbara Johnstone explains (39, my emphasis). It would help answer the question, "'Why does this particular utterance take the shape it does?'" and thereby account for interactions between the human agents so often marginalized in "external" models. Further research of war eulogies and classroom essays, as well as other discourse occasioned by ceremony and school, can contribute to an understanding of peaceful and warring options in uses of language. This work should analyze rhetorical situations for the ways each one moves between display and

authenticity and the ways each persuades and engenders deliberation. It should not aim for comprehensive typification of these instances, as an external model would.

The persuasive and deliberative nature of rhetoric moves theory away from focus on "what" shapes exist and to an interest in the "why, how, who, when, and where" of shapes. Epideictic and deliberative discourse are no different in this essential theoretical regard. As chapter two explains, the purpose of this investigation of the epideictic category is to blur categorical boundaries, not re-draw them. "Epideictic" or "ceremonial" discourse are workable names for discourse occasioned by a culture's ceremonies, but they should not prescribe a category of discourse for ceremony's sake. Similarly, school writing (or "academic discourse" as it is often called in current pedagogical discussions) describes discourse occasioned by school, but it should not prescribe writing for school's sake. No discourse in ceremony or school should be performed for performance's sake and judged for judgment's sake. Words need to do something of deeper purpose for writers, readers, and the little parts of the world occasioning them. No teacher, student, class, or school has to settle for academic discourse for the sake of perpetuating academic discourse; it is a reductive act of institutional preservation. Similarly, no culture has to settle for ceremonial discourse for the sake of ceremony; it is a futile act of trying to hold the world still. Rather, a more productive maxim by which to guide the teaching and practice of rhetoric would be Bakhtin's proclamation: "An independent, responsible, and active discourse is the fundamental indicator of an ethical, legal and political human being"

(349-50). If such a discourse is taught in school, it also will serve as a fundamental indicator of the discourse's society.[19]

It makes a difference whether we begin, as Burke does, with rhetoric as all language use or whether we end, as Beale does, with rhetoric as one use of language. As Lakoff recommends, rhetorical theory needs to make the most accurate and humane choice, and as Ronald and Roskelly assert, composition studies need to transform dichotomies. The way to transform the dichotomy of these two schools of thought, rhetoric as all language use and rhetoric as one use of language, is to put taxonomizing in the service of understanding and managing what we do with words and why. In that way, categories can be constructive tools for rather than tyrants of the theory and practice of all uses of language. This shift in emphasis from product to process follows the wider evolution that Geertz traces in modern refigurations of thinking about thinking, as genres have been blurred and the emphasis on "a laws and instances ideal of explanation" has shifted to "a cases and interpretation one" in inquiry about how, rather than what, human beings think (19).

The chief theoretical implication of this dissertation's argument about the division of word from deed in discursive categories, then, underscores the presence of choice among answers to Burke's question about language use, "What is involved when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?" (Grammar xv). Rhetorical theory, of which Beale's project is just one example, denies that persuasion and deliberation are involved in many uses of language by categorizing rhetoric as only one use of language. As a result, this theory inflames

violence in language by privileging writers over readers, meanings over consequences, forms over contents, and texts over contexts. In a hierarchical theory, language is a weapon with which to divide. Rhetorical theory that articulates ways that all language persuades and is deliberated, such as Burke's corpus, instigates peaceful, working relationships among writers and readers, meanings and consequences, forms and contents, and texts and contexts. Rather than the a-human, a-worldly, a-consequential discourse that results from categorizing rhetoric, the generative power of dialogical thinking invites real negotiation of deeds advocated through words. In a transformative theory, language is a weaver of relationships.[20]

The choice, then, is not whether language is a tool, but what kind of tool it is. If rhetorical theory acknowledges word as deed, practices can be implemented that occasion constructive, rather than destructive, discourse. Should theorists and practitioners so choose, discourse can provide rhetorical occasions for real peacemaking and authentic classroom writing and whatever other world-shaping activities rhetors value. With an increased consciousness about what it means to use language, practitioners choose what they will do with their words in infinite instances of communication, rather than achieve little, with limited awareness, by filling the prescriptions of words' categories. As Edward Sapir notes: "Language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols" (8). Therefore, as other rhetoricians have claimed on the grounds of Sapir's pioneering work in modern studies of language, "we are responsible for what we do with it"

(Britton 276). In these closing pages, I can merely sketch two

scenarios in order to suggest a few ways to facilitate generative use of

language in ceremonial and pedagogical occasions.

Pericles' war eulogy and the many others in its tradition do not

model constructive rhetoric for discourse of ceremony. Texts in other

ceremonial occasions--commencement, keynote, and acceptance speeches,

for instance--have invited transformative practice. The Chair's keynote

address for the 1995 Annual Convention of the Conference on College

Composition and Communication was an instance of making epideictic or

ceremonial words matter for the real people and place comprising its

rhetorical situation. Unlike traditional epideictic orators, Jacqueline

Jones Royster acknowledged language as symbolic action, treating both

speaker and listeners as its Agents:[21]

> I feel this morning, as I imagine that many African American women
> before me have felt, a compelling desire to make this rhetorical
> moment matter, to have it be something more than just a ritual
> experience at an annual convention of people who are interested in
> rhetoric, composition, literacy, and communication. I have
> experienced an overwhelming urge to say heartfelt things, to lay
> bear my mind and soul in such a way that all within the sound of
> my voice will know that my intent is to make it quite impossible
> for any person who is at all inclined to listen to what I have to
> say to go away feeling the same as when he or she sat down.
>
> I want this experience to be, for all who are willing, an active,
> if not an activating experience, one in which my voice swirls its
> way, as the voices of women before me, not just toward ears but
> into minds and hearts, and even into the pits of stomachs. In
> making this statement, I acknowledge that I come from an ethnic
> community that believes that the human voice is an instrument for
> transcendence, transformation, even liberation, that the using of
> it and the hearing of it should be a visceral experience and not
> just an intellectual exercise. We believe that the voice is an
> instrument of change, internal and external. So, what I really
> want is for this message to burrow its way into the bone marrow
> and to latch on tenaciously to the fibers of humanity in this
> room, so that my words matter, so that they make a positive
> difference for somebody, somewhere, sometime. (1)

Royster laid claim to some authentic thing happening as she, her speech, and its auditors came together in a meeting room in Washington, D.C. on the morning of March 23, 1995. Furthermore, Royster accepted the challenging responsibility of making her speech a conscious, ethical act:

> Please note that I'm fully aware that the task, as I am describing it, is easier said than done. It strikes me, though, that I consider myself no exception to the rule that African American women who speak out do so quite often with a rather bold agenda. When we are granted the privilege of a podium, any podium, but especially one with a crowd like this, rarely do we feel that we can afford to waste the moment on the privilege of just speaking. Always, it seems, we're compelled to consider that this opportunity may indeed be, if not the only one, the best one, and we have to make it count. We're compelled to speak with a clear and present sense of an old saying, 'If not now, when; if not me, who?' Always, it seems, forces demand from us that we dedicate ourselves to the principle of good use. (1-2)

Rather than "just speaking," theoretically the task of a ceremonial orator, the "good use" to which Royster put her speech was an argument about the theory and practice of voice, and her thesis explicitly announced her intention

> to suggest today that a shift in paradigms is long overdue and to propose that a reinvention of paradigms, especially around the notion of 'voice,' would permit a fuller range of interpretive positions to be recognized and valued in the construction of knowledge, the shaping of discourse, and the making of policy and practice, even in places like colleges, universities, and classrooms. (3)

Her argument did not provide all the answers, as epideictic rhetors are theorized to do. Rather, it posed crucial questions: "How can we teach, engage in research, write about, and talk across boundaries with others, instead of for, about, and around them? . . . How do we

listen?" (15-16). "The goal," she asserted, "is better practices so that we can exchange perspectives, negotiate meaning, and create understanding with the intent of being in a good position to cooperate, when, like now, cooperation is absolutely necessary" (16). Likewise, her speech did not pose praise as its Act or Purpose. Praise of voice, dialogical language, education, or teaching was not her speech's point. Her argument posed the problem of paradigms of voice and their consequences as an issue for her and her audience to investigate in these few moments together and then to continue working on in future deliberations.

A new paradigm for voice and the changes it would necessitate as Royster was describing it could not have been a universal value touted in her speech, given the diversity of thinkers who might have been in her audience that morning—CCCC 1995 participants including Beale and Miller, Kinneavy and Swales, Clark and Sullivan, whose disagreement about rhetorical theory and practice this dissertation has cited. (It is interesting to speculate about the ways in which taxonomists in Royster's audience might have measured her explicitly persuasive use of this "epideictic" occasion.) That her argument was not built of straw is also recognizable in the larger context of her speech. It was addressed to audience members who are currently in the midst of conversations and conflicts persisting at institutional levels among high school, two- and four-year colleges, community colleges, and public and private colleges and universities about the teaching of language. Furthermore, the ethnic and racial diversity of her audience is noteworthy, especially given the speech's emphasis on the relationships

among non-white and white voices. Her audience included African American, European American, Native American, Middle Eastern, Hispanic, and Oriental members about whom it would be naive to. assume a complete agreement on the ways that ethnic and racial similarity and difference guide and should guide American classrooms. Royster exposed this diversity, noting that as an African American woman, she spoke as other African American women have "with a rather bold agenda" and "in the face of challenge" (2). She cited The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994) as recent disturbing evidence of differing world views "in our very own field" (6) and, as well, she spoke to people of color who need to "set aside [their] rights to exclusivity in [their] own home cultures" (7).

Thus, unlike traditional epideictic, Royster's speech aimed to persuade people inclined to assent to her words as well as those who might dissent from it. Her audience was a diverse, not homogeneous, group of respondents. Nevertheless, the speech did not aim to propagandize its message or coerce its audience. She acknowledged each auditor's option for participation in active response, speaking to "any person who is at all inclined to listen to what I have to say" (1). Rather than laying claim to all people for all time, the speech aimed to "make a positive difference for somebody, somewhere, sometime." The auditor's choice between active and passive response was reiterated in the speech's conclusion to "members who are listening" (19). Royster's comments were common sensical for this rhetorical occasion's text and context. Given the tradition of ceremonial discourse, it would have been highly unlikely that everybody who attended this opening session of

CCCC 1995 assumed that its keynote address could or would make a difference in their or other persons' lives should they, indeed, listen.

As one optimistic yet skeptical audience member, I attended the opening session hoping for a meaningful experience in its keynote address. I wanted something to think about, something to inspire and provoke my teaching, something to enrich and strengthen its philosophy and practice. I did not want praise or lip service. I was ready to be an assenting reader if the orator gave me something worth assenting to. As soon as Royster began speaking, I began taking notes. These were ideas I would want to think about further; they were worth noting. I wrote down points as she made them, sketching bits of her evidence and snippets of direct quotes. I also began a dialogue of sorts with her. I glossed her comments in my own words, summarizing and synthesizing them as if Royster and I were talking to each other. She, for instance, valued the principle of "good use"; I wrote in my notes "(prag)" in order to remember to think about the pragmatic ideology of this speech. She placed herself in the tradition of African American women, four in particular, and I wrote "(notice it's [a] trad[itionally] marginal voice [speaking here])" in order to think further about who is allowed to be a ceremonial orator in ostensibly inclusive contemporary rhetorical scenes. Her aim for a "visceral" and "intellectual" experience I put in rhetorical terms: "(pathos + logos)." As she spoke of her chosen role as "negotiator" among disparate voices, I recognized it as a description of my own role, although I had never articulated it in that way for myself. Thus I noted "(my own visc[eral] and intellec[tual] response) as the way I position myself among other teachers of writing.

Additionally, my notes were punctuated throughout with asterisks, underlines, exclamation points, and question marks as indicators of my making meaning of this speech. I emphasized her comment about the need to "talk but <u>also listen</u>!"; I noted she encouraged teachers to "talk <u>with</u> deans + legislators" (rather than <u>to</u> them); she argued, I highlighted, for voice to be "well spoken <u>and</u> well <u>heard</u>*."

A portion of Royster's speech talked about her concern that "story" is not integrated well enough as a legitimate method of interpretation in English studies. It is often seen as a way to "delight" but not to be "transformative" and is therefore rendered as "'the droppings of birds,'" as she quoted Audre Lorde (11). Her comments prompted me to think about one of my concerns about oral public discourse, one that I thought needed to be more pointed in her argument about voices being genuinely "heard" and "believed" and "believable" (12). Similar to Royster's complaint that her scholarship has been reduced to delightful storytelling by her auditors and by traditional voices who have spoken before her, my own scholarship has been reduced to performance for performance's sake by some of my listeners and by voices who have been less eloquent than mine. I recalled occasions in which I have presented conference papers and afterward auditors have commented about the formal aspects of my delivery, about what a "good speaker" I was. But what about my <u>argument</u>, I wanted to ask. Was this nothing more than momentary eloquence? Their praise was well-intentioned, I know, but too narrowly focused to convince me that they had actively deliberated my point. I would not mind so much that they disagreed with my point or decided it was ill-made, if I could at least

gain their conscious consideration of it. As Royster talked, I thought about wasted moments among teachers and scholars in academic conferences occurring daily across the nation. I made a note, wondering what Royster, as a dramatic and riveting presence at the podium, would say about this issue of voice and ceremony.

One of the key issues in Royster's argument for a new paradigm of voice was to affect the limits still constraining non-white voices. Her value of genuinely shared, equal status of voices among all races is one that I shared with her as I entered into this ceremonial occasion. Her speech, however, did not serve merely to remind me of a belief I already held and to let it go at that. As she talked, I began to pull up scenes from my teaching and to re-evaluate them in terms of Royster's titular theme, "When the First Voice You Hear Is Not Your Own." I thought of several of my black students and my sense that something attributable to our racial difference had been askew between them and their liberal white teacher. Why was Dee so withdrawn? Tanya so belligerent? Anne so aggressive? Tyrone so appeasing? I thought about class discussions on racial issues. What kept so many white, black, and other non-white students from entering into these discussions? What accounted for the sense of embarrassment in the room? What was the significance of Kris and Mary expressing weariness at the suggestion of racial problems? What transpired when Chuck blurted out how sick-and-tired he was of hearing about black people's problems in the face of white men's difficulties and Therina scrawled in her journal during that class,

". . . angry upset mad furious ignorant people hate dislike evil death sorrow life . . ." and then would never write about the instance and her reaction to it again, although I kept encouraging her to do so?

Royster's speech was asking me to re-negotiate my teaching as it had and would unfold, and I was doing it. As a teacher who herself argues for a dialogical, dramatistic philosophy of language, I became more conscious of the implications of this argument as a result of actively deliberating Royster's. At the end of Royster's speech, I was less satisfied with the way that voices speak and are listened to in my classroom. Although I believed that I invite all views and all voices to be shared, I was more intent on observing for moments in which I silence unintentionally, assume erroneously, and miss opportunities unknowingly as I work to create a dialogical classroom in which all voices, whether they agree or disagree, can move toward a peaceful consensus for living together. Since CCCC 1995, I have continued to think about the implications of Royster's words for my teaching. Rather than walk away from that ceremony just as I had walked in, assenting to the concept of an inclusive paradigm for voice, my teaching values and methods were strengthened, invigorated, challenged. This ceremonial speaker—this human being and her words—mattered and matter to me. I left that meeting room, as Royster aimed for me to, having had an intellectual and visceral experience whose incipient acts will be played out more overtly as time goes on. Because I was willing and able to deliberate consciously, rather than unthinkingly assent to a speech that said things I generally agreed with, Royster's hope was realized. Her

words would "make a positive difference for somebody, somewhere, sometime" (1).

Unlike the silence which Pericles commanded at the end of his war eulogy, Royster concluded the keynote address by inviting her auditors to speak because "voicing at its best is not just well-spoken but also well-heard" (19). Admitting the absence of a "formal mechanism for members who are listening to talk back," she informally extended the invitation by providing her mailing addresses, repeating the information for anyone who was late in finding pencil or pen. "Thank you for listening," she closed. "I look forward to hearing from you soon." As the inveterate note-maker, I was prepared to record Royster's address when she provided it. Moreover, as a deliberative listener, I was ready to continue my active response and "talk back." In a chance crossing of paths in a hotel lobby a day after her speech, I introduced myself and advised Royster of her words' meaningfulness for me and that she could expect to hear from me. My response, of course, was not universal. During the address, I had glimpsed people around me to observe their responses. A couple of women in front of me were softly "amening." Two women to my right sat stiffly with tight lips. The woman to my left said that the speech was "wonderful" as we stood and applauded; she had been reading student papers the last third of Royster's words.

Royster's epideictic is enabled by a theory and practice of language, like her own argument about voice, that seeks cooperation rather than coercion among its people, language, and world. It is no coincidence, then, that Royster's introduction implicitly argues for a new paradigm for ceremonial discourse; that she embraces rather than

evades a persuasive purpose in her speech; that she crosses the boundaries between epideictic and deliberation erected by theoretical taxonomies that would keep her from making her argument, asking her questions, and inviting her audience's deliberation. War eulogists have much to learn from orators such as Royster if they are to transform their occasions from death-denying to life-creating ones, as Royster enabled one ceremonial moment to thrive.[22]

The composition classroom also can be a site for constructive rhetoric. I taught my three sections of English 102 in the spring and fall of 1994 with a belief, like Royster, in the dialogical nature of language and with strategies to implement practices undergirded by that belief. Although most of my students did not enter these classrooms with convictions like my own, some of them did experience growth from deadly display to lively authentic writing. Mary (03), for instance, did not meet some of the basic requirements of the rhetorical situation in her first essay. By semester's end, she went above and beyond what the situation asked. In her first piece of finished writing, an interview of one of her colleagues, Mary did not even learn how to spell the name of her peer, Sara, correctly. The essay consisted primarily of easily-attained facts displayed in simple subject-verb sentences: "Sarah [] was born on. . . . She and her family have lived in. . . . Sarah told me her most valuable characteristic is. . . ." The surface level of the interview and the monotony of the prose fulfilled the law but not the spirit of the assignment. In contrast, Mary gathered and synthesized data for her final research study from three sources via three research methods (an interview of a county official, a survey of

two groups of high school students, and on-site observations of two high

schools). Her study led readers into an investigation of her topic with

this writing:

> Because I felt that equal funding is so important, and also
> because I did not think the funding of our county's schools was
> equal, I decided to speak with. . . . The allocation of state and
> local funds is therefore not based on the wealth of the students
> but on the number of students per school on a per pupil basis.
> After interviewing [] and realizing my initial impression was
> inaccurate, I decided . . . to investigate two high schools, one
> comprised of a lower income district and another of a higher
> income district and to determine whether there are disparities
> between the two schools.

Mary makes clear the study's point and rationale in order to ensure that

her readers will understand and get involved, too. Mary, her teacher,

and her colleagues got to know about county funding in a way that we

never got to know Sara. The writing was real.

Ben (02) also wrote authentically, overt about the relevance of

his research for him and his collegial readers in the initial paragraphs

of his study:

> As you read this essay there is homosexual bashing both physically
> and verbally all over the world. . . . It happens and we all know
> it, but who is it that does it? . . . As we had our discussions
> in class about gender myths and homosexuality I . . . realized
> that the homosexual issue was one that most of the guys who spoke
> in class felt really strongly about. . . . We, as men [,] acted
> like we couldn't be persuaded to look at the homosexual myth in a
> different outlook as we might be able to be coaxed into a
> different view about gender myths. This made me think about doing
> a study that might benefit the class and maybe help me to also
> change my outlook on homosexuals.

A significant accomplishment of Ben's writing is that, in fact, it did

change his thinking. In a journal entry written at the completion of

his research project, he wrote:

> I, before, this essay, was one of those males that would have
> circled yes I'm prejudice[d] against homosexuals. My research
> helped me to realize that there is no need to be prejudice[d]
> against them and be so empty minded. I feel that these papers
> benefitted me in the respect of my attitude towards homosexuals.
> I still don't understand them, so now I need to research why they
> are what they are.

Ben's self-directed interest in further research is quite different from
the form-filling he expected to perform at the semester's beginning. In
his first journal entry, he wrote: "I basically entered this class
because it was under my options <u>to fill a requirement</u>. . . . I also
looked at my past English classes and realized that those have been
basically <u>my best performance classes</u>" (my emphasis).

Mary and Ben's authentic writing can be explained in part by the
research project assignment occasioning it. Prior to Spring 1994, I had
taught English 102 for three semesters. According to departmental
guidelines informed by rhetorical taxonomies, I required my students to
write three, discrete "persuasive" essays (or "deliberative" or
"argumentative" essays as they are synonymously called) for their major
writing. A third of the way into the Spring 1994 semester, I could not
persist with this pattern. As usual, my students and I were rushing to
finish one piece of writing in order to get on to the next one. I knew
by the time we got to the third essay, nobody would have the time to
discover an argument they genuinely wanted to make, much less the energy
to make it. The pressure of finished writing was putting my students
and me in the position of faking it; they did not want to write and I
did not want to read. Rather than persuading, they were displaying
persuasion, and I was asking for the harmful epideictic--performance for
performance's sake--that my dissertation was arguing against.

After discussing the problem with Dr. Roskelly, I devised the research project assignment. Students' authority was enhanced by the assignment requiring them to be the researcher and therefore primary knower about that which they were writing. They observed and interpreted their own creations in the various kinds of data they gathered. They put secondary research in the service of their own primary work, rather than treat it as the onerous task of summarizing what anybody or everybody else has said. They discovered actual rather than arbitrary connections between their writing and the classroom of people and ideas in which it occurred. Small group readers got to know the projects of their colleagues, commenting on writing-in-progress from the research's proposal to final reporting. Suggestions for the project came from their small group members and me throughout its development as ideas were brainstormed, research questions were revised, secondary readings were assessed, options for organization were considered, and interpretations were made that often yielded unexpected findings.

Evaluative comments as well as final grades were given to each of the three major parts of the project, but the writing took on meaning beyond the grade—the proposal needed to be written in order to do the study; the secondary research needed to be done in order to contextualize the primary research; the research needed to be reported in order to convince the class of what the writer had discovered. Persuasion became a matter of inviting deliberation. They saw their words doing something. Unlike previous semesters of English 102, these composition classes did not fixate on the completion of products—three "persuasive" essays—and did attend to the development of process. Thus

both process and product became more manageable and meaningful. It had
not been impossible for authentic writing to emerge in earlier classes,
but it became significantly more probable with the Spring 1994 re-
vision.

More than anything, I think, the research project assignment gave
students time, time that writers need for invention, drafting, revising,
and editing. The work of invention, crucial to authentic writing,
likely benefitted their projects the most. Because the assignment
allowed students time for discovering their arguments, writers
subsequently had a real reason for finding out how other people's ideas
were similar to and different from their own and, further, how they
might begin--and want to begin--communicating about those intersections
and diversities. Just as Royster in her epideictic discourse argued for
her voice to be heard in a speech arguing for a re-visioning of voice as
an "instrument of transcendence, transformation, even liberation," so,
too, did the students and teacher in these classrooms put voices and
ears to "good use."[23]

The constructive and destructive consequences illustrated in these
chapters on epideictic discourse suggest priorities for all rhetorical
practice. Practice needs to be more comfortable with the chaos of
writing and thinking processes. Pedagogy needs less emphasis on graded,
finished pieces of writing in the same way that culture needs to give
less attention to wrapping an event, completing its spin, or explaining
away a deeper, ever-developing understanding of it. Essays and eulogies
ought to want less praise and agreement in order to gain more insight
and ideas. They need to open up, not shut down, inquiry. Mary Rose

O'Reilly describes the way that a primary concern with process leads to meaningful products with constructive outcomes in the classroom and, therefore everywhere else:

> But I want to suggest, once again, that the things we do in the classroom are not morally neutral. When we taught 'the old way,' we would tell our students to, in effect, go home, lock the door, take in a lot of caffeine, and produce five hundred words on the life cycle of some Australian mammal; when we did that, we were shaping a certain kind of intellectual life. If we, by contrast, respect the inner world of the student, try to help her gain access to it and to express it with power and authority to a community of listeners, we are crafting a different future. (52)

Practice needs to stop protecting power and start sharing it. "The word in language is half someone else's," Bakhtin advises rhetors and readers (293). Therefore, they need to navigate the power of communication together in order to change both writer and reader, rather than perceive argument as the aggressive supplanting of one's world view as the Truth over all others'. Unlike the banking concept of education which Freire criticizes for its objectifying of students both inside and outside of school (57), rhetorical practice ought to look beyond static traditions that guide cultural and pedagogical purposes in order to see dynamic aims in which teachers _and_ students are learners, speakers _and_ listeners possess reasoning minds and beating hearts, and in which persuasion _and_ deliberation are mutually _in_clusive acts requisite to the negotiation of any symbolic act. It ought to embrace change rather than fear it.

Culture and pedagogy should count on more difference than sameness in the contexts of texts. Every language is a world view, and "[e]ach word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its

socially charge life" (Bakhtin 293). Common scenes, such as funerals and classrooms, will occur again and again. Their eulogies and essays, however, do not have to repeat their predecessors by rote. The best way that practice can inform future scenes is by embracing the relationship between language and life. "To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it," as Freire expresses it in his pedagogy for the oppressed (76). To silence the conversation within and among the dynamics that constitute use of language—Agents, Purposes, Agencies, Scenes, and Purposes—is to breed adversity. "To silence is to sow the seeds of further tumult," O'Reilly warns (131).

The foremost place to acknowledge and assume responsibility for words as deeds is the classroom, which serves daily as a microcosm for the other cultures students inhabit and will inhabit. Students' conscious enactments of words as deeds are crucial not only in the composition classroom, but in all classrooms. In O'Reilly's work for peace inside and therefore outside the classroom, she notes that "second only to what happens between parent and child, what happens in the classroom determines the shape of culture and evolution of consciousness" (7-8). Following the advice from John Woolman, eighteenth century Quaker abolitionist, to "begin by making peace within our small spheres of influence," O'Reilly points to "the seeds of war in the interactions of the typical classroom"; for instance, in the ways questions are asked, discussions invited, and grades given, all of which imply destructive, war-like attitudes about power and authority (21-22).

In any classroom, the language with which meaning is conveyed and constructed can be studied and practiced in its real rhetorical

situations with literal consequences. True writing across the curriculum means writing within rhetorical situations, such that writers learn to negotiate different meanings in different ways for different readers or, as Johnstone puts it, such that they come to understand that "meaning is always by someone and meaning to someone" (64). Thus students see writing as communication shaped by what they are saying to whom, rather than see "good writing" as some abstract ideal with a definition that changes every time they change teachers. When, for instance, a literature professor describes the pieces of literary criticism that he is requiring his students to write, they understand that their teacher is not re-defining the abstract, but talking about the concrete writing that will count as effective communication for the student's literary readers, purpose, interpretation, and context.

Classrooms provide occasions for students to reason together about what their words and the words of others do and can do. In these classrooms, symbol-users demonstrate the who, what, when, where, how, and why of language as symbolic action. In any course of study, students can write exploratory pieces, talk about ideas for potential development, and share writing-in-progress as they make the subjects they study matter. Through writing, reading, talking, and other modes of thinking, students can discover reasons for their coursework beyond the circumstances of school and grades. By virtue of observing a variety of arguments in process and a collection of arguments diversely completed, they illustrate for themselves the rhetorical nature of language use. They see what Johnstone sees in the nature of narrative:

"Since all stories create versions of truth, all stories are rhetorical, whether overtly so or not" (130).

When Mary Rose O'Reilly was in graduate school, a professor asked her group of teaching assistants, "'Is it possible to teach English so that people stop killing each other?'" (9). It is a question to which neither she nor I can stop answering "Yes" or at least "Maybe so" or "Let's try." If we are going to teach in a way that helps people stop killing each other, then students must learn to negotiate the deeds they advocate through words. The way they communicate in the classroom informs the ways they will communicate the rest of their lives. Writing in school, for instance, models what they as speakers and listeners will "do" in the ceremonial eulogies occasioned by their country's wars. The need for students to learn the dialogical nature of language and reality and to shape their discourse accordingly becomes increasingly apparent daily. Classrooms are situated in a world of too much violence and too little understanding of rhetoric. From international scenes to local settings, people unconsciously overlook language's power in its myriad instances and thus fail to use it to resolve violence. Still others consciously, though not always admittedly, accomplish violent ends through uses or near lack of use of language:

-- In a three-year-old war increasingly referred to as unwinnable, Bosnian-Serbs shell civilian and military locations and take United Nation troops hostage; fighting fire with fire, United Nations' "peacekeepers" bear arms and N.A.T.O. forces conduct airstrikes over Bosnia-Herzegovina; disparity grows between U.N. talks of peace and

N.A.T.O's acts of war; Bosnians warn they are preparing militarily to oust Serbs and "peacekeepers" alike.

    -- A year after war between Tutsi and Hutu African tribes results in the deaths of half a million Rwandans, most of them among the Tutsi minority population, similar slaughter threatens neighboring Burundi as Tutsi accelerate retaliations against Hutu. As in Rwanda, Hutu are the majority population in Burundi; unlike in Rwanda, Tutsi command the armed forces. In the face of Tutsi use of weapons, onlooking nations count on this split of power, Tutsi weapons and Hutu population, to stalemate massacres of extraordinary numbers, and political discussions are few and have failed thus far.

    -- On the fiftieth anniversary of Europe's victory in World War II, the "good war" of American lore in which an estimated 40 million warriors and civilians died and the idea of global violence became immeasurably costly and practically unthinkable, the words of England's Queen Mother typify idealistic commemoration: "'I do hope all of you will remember with pride and gratitude those men and women, armed and unarmed, whose courage really brought us to victory'" (Pederson 31).

    -- Within days after the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, G. Gordon Liddy, host of America's number two radio talk show, is reported to have advised his listeners that

> . . . if federal agents invade their homes, they should shoot at their heads because of the agents' protective vests. On Tuesday he reconsidered. The head is too hard to hit. 'So you shoot twice to the body . . . center of mass. And if that does not work, then shoot to the groin area.' (Lacayo "Moment" 45)

Meanwhile, Rush Limbaugh, America's most well-known talk-show host, counters accusations that radio commentary such as Liddy's and his own may motivate terrorism. He worries that "we're in danger of losing the language—the words that convey thoughts, that lead to ideas, that produce progress," yet concludes that he is "offended that we've spent the last week talking about people who weren't even there, who had nothing to do with what happened'" (39).

-- Time Warner executives deflect public acknowledgement of their own responsibility and deflate public conversation about shared responsibilities for Warner Music's controversial rap and alternative music with comments such as Chairman Gerald Levin's assertion that "'music is not the cause of society's ills'" (Zoglin 37); Robert Friedman's response, as an executive in Warner's film division, that "'It's not a movie issue. . . . It's more a music issue'" (Zoglin 38); and a record executive's defense that if Time Warner drops all its controversial music, "'[I]t won't do anything to change what kids are exposed to. It will just shift profits from one company to another'" (Zoglin 39). Simultaneously, Time Warner prepares to develop "an explicit code of behavior for artists and distributors" (Zoglin 38), following the jurisprudent model to legislate rather than negotiate the relationship between freedom of expression and responsibility for communication.

-- "Closer," the fifth cut on alternative rock group Nine Inch Nails' latest disc The Downward Spiral (on one of Time Warner's labels) begins: "you let me violate you, you let me desecrate you / you let me penetrate you, you let me complicate you" (Reznor n.p.). Reznor, the

song's writer and performer, notes in a <u>Rolling Stone</u> interview, "I probably rely too much on sexual imagery as a metaphor for control, but I'm totally intrigued by it" (Gold 52), and his interviewer concludes after a Detroit concert: "You haven't really lived, I think, until you've heard a gang of Wayne State sorority sisters moan, 'I want to f--- you like an animal,' the chorus to 'Closer'. . . . All of them sound as if they mean it" (52).

-- <u>Lion King</u>, Disney's highly-popular animated film promoted primarily for children's "entertainment," advocates the food chain as the model for a class-based society (justifying the stronger "animals" eating the weaker ones because the weak eat the carcass-fertilized grass when the strong eventually die); it promotes idolatrous subservience to monarchy as the model for government; it measures manhood by the choice to fight as if there are no other recourses for justice, and womanhood by the ability to fight along with men.

-- The commencement speaker for the 1994 University of North Carolina at Asheville graduation, Dudley E. Flood, Executive Director of the North Carolina Association of School Administrators, opens his remarks with a typical joke about brevity and humor being the most appreciated qualities of a commencement speech; his vapid if sincere message depends on the overworked image of Jonathan Livingston Seagull to inspire new graduates to learn from Jonathan's lessons of flight.

-- A University of North Carolina at Greensboro senior, writing in the student newspaper, the <u>Carolinian</u>, argues against "politically correct" language and "cultural sensitivity" by concluding: "Words do not have power" (Wagner n.p.).

-- Some graduate students at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro perpetuate display rhetoric by perceiving an English dissertation as a "hoop to jump" or a "seminar paper on steroids" or a "game" or a piece of writing that should say "whatever your committee chair wants it to say."

-- University professors and administrators across the country are identified as the intellectual leaders and policy makers that hold many of the keys needed to unlock doctoral writing from the debilitated and debilitating status of display rhetoric--as revealed in a roundtable discussion on dissertations among graduate students at the 1995 Conference on College Composition and Communication (Welch). . . .

The impulse of this dissertation is as hopeful as it is urgent. Other instances of human relationship and communication illustrate people using language, more often consciously than not, as a productive and powerful instrument. Pacifistic means are engaged and peaceful ends are accomplished:

-- After more than two decades of violence, Ireland and England negotiate conditions--including a ceasefire--for talks among all political parties invested in the future of Northern Ireland, and bloodshed has been reduced significantly as talks move forward.

-- Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk, representing two seemingly irreconcilable world views, dismantle apartheid in South Africa with conference rather than conflict and the "'rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world,'" as Mandela calls it upon assuming the Presidency, persists a year later in its work for an economically and socially equitable life for all its citizens (Masland 37).

-- A memoir about growing up in Czechoslovakia during World War II occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day concludes with a recollection of the dead that could prevent acceptance of future violence for maintaining world order. Karsten Prager cites the inscription on a small church monument standing today in his homeland, "IN ETERNAL MEMORY OF THOSE WHO DIED IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR," and interprets its significance: "The words embraced all: winners and losers, soldiers and civilians, the innocent and the guilt. . . . [I]t seemed the appropriate, conciliatory epitaph" (56).

-- In a June 1995 public opinion poll for Time/CNN on popular culture, the majority of respondents explicitly advocate personal responsibility and implicitly favor education, not legislation, for "reducing the amount of sex and violence in entertainment," believing that the greatest responsibility lies with the "American consumer" and the least with the "government" (Lacayo "Violent" 26). They recognize their own power in active responses to language.

-- Don Henley, sustaining a popular music career of over twenty years marked by personal and professional sociopolitical commentary and action, argues for ethical rhetoric in his song "If Dirt Were Dollars": "We got the bully pulpit / And the poisoned pen / We got a press no better / Than the public men / . . . These days the buck stops nowhere / No one takes the blame / But evil is still evil / In anybody's name" (9).

-- After years of silent cowboys and clever-tongued detectives most remembered for killing easily and often, Clint Eastwood creates Unforgiven, a movie that talks about and demonstrates violence

realistically, demystifying the heroes and heroics that previous movies idealize.

-- At the 1995 graduation commencement of Simmons College in Boston, Stacy Kabat, founding director of Peace at Home, an organization for the resolution of domestic violence, reflects on her experience as the daughter of an abusive father, informs her audience of the things theory explains and does not yet explain about this violence, and deliberates with these few hundred Simmons graduates about what they need to do together in order to transform the home and therefore the world into a place of peace.

-- A University of North Carolina freshman with significant writing difficulties is given the entire semester in English Composition I to complete one essay, as he learns about writing and gains confidence in his ability to write. In the subsequent semester, his accomplishments lead him to write an argument published in the Carolinian, and his teacher, one of my colleagues, cherishes his success.

-- As a University of North Carolina at Greensboro graduate student, I work through many of my struggles with a school and social history that trained me to be a "good student" and do or "display" whatever my teacher asks, and I write a dissertation that is an argument I genuinely believe and want my readers to deliberate.

-- In follow-up to the 1995 roundtable, a workshop for the 1996 Conference on College Composition and Communication is proposed in order to articulate problems and pose solutions that will enable dissertation writing to be re-interpreted as authentic writing throughout rhetoric and composition studies and beyond (Welch). . . .

Bakhtin claims that "we must deal with the life and behavior of discourse in a contradictory and multi-languaged world" (275). As suggested by these few illustrations of lost and found moments for making words matter for peaceable living, we must and furthermore we can live and communicate in a multi-languaged world. Current peace studies in psychology believe that because war is constructed in the minds of human beings, so too can peace be constructed there. A peace studies in the disciplines of rhetoric and composition similarly could say that war and likewise peace are constructed in the language of human beings. Psychology's peace studies are guided by a "vision of the world in which violent means of reacting to conflict are replaced by peaceful ones" (Schwebel 2). So, too, are rhetoric and composition guided. Burke's "Dialectician's Hymn" sings:

> If the soil is carried off by flood,
> May we help the soil to say so.
> If our ways of living
> Violate the needs of nerve and muscle,
> May we find speech for nerve and muscle,
> To frame objections
> Whereat we, listening,
> Can remake our habits. (Language 56)

Bakhtin understands: "The word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within in" (279). Booth asks: "Is this 'poem' morally, politically, or philosophically sound? Is it likely to work for good or ill in those who read it?" (Company 5). Berthoff believes: "It is not too much to claim that the composition classroom is a place where students can discover their humanity in both a moral and a political sense" (Making 22). And Freire explains: "Authentic education is not carried on by 'A' _for_ 'B' or by 'A' _about_ 'B,' but rather by 'A' _with_

'B'" (82). These thinkers neither deny nor submit to the presence of conflict in language. They argue for its transformations in order that lives may be lived more constructively.

Rhetorical theory and practice can decrease violence in the world and increase understanding of the power of words. Its challenge lies in the very pragmatic and real work of exposing the idealism and romanticism of violence that for centuries have convinced individuals and societies that war, in its myriad manifestations, is the way of the world. Or, as O'Reilly expresses the pacifist's challenge: "Violence is easy. Nonviolence, by contrast, takes all we have and costs not less than everything" (31). Therefore, if the word and the world are to move together with and toward more peaceful means and ends, no lesson could be more consequential than for teachers and students to educate each other in the right and responsibility of negotiating words as deeds.

NOTES

[1]My discussion of Burke's philosophy of language is primarily shaped by my study in his books Counter-Statement, A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives, and Language As Symbolic Action. Although the tenets I highlight here run throughout Burke's corpus, the following list identifies some of the more explicit sections related to the principle concepts I discuss. Dramatism: A Grammar of Motives "Introduction: The Five Key Terms of Dramatism" (xv-xxiii) and "Container and Thing Contained" (3-20); Language as Symbolic Action "Terministic Screens" (44-62). Language as symbolic action: A Grammar introduction (xv-xxiii); Language "Definition of Man" (3-24). Incipient acts: A Grammar "'Incipient' and 'Delayed' Action" (235-46); A Rhetoric "Persuasion" (49-55). Identification, addressedness, and the rhetorical nature of all language use: A Rhetoric "Introduction" (xiii-xv), Section I "The Range of Rhetoric" (19-46), and Section II "Traditional Principles of Rhetoric (49-65); Language "Poetics in Particular, Language in General" (25-43). Form and appeal: Counter "Lexicon Rhetoricae" (123-83); A Rhetoric "Formal Appeal" (65-69) and "Rhetorical Forms at Large" (69-78); Language "Poetics in Particular, Language in General" (25-43) and "Rhetoric and Poetics" (295-307). Pragmatic ideology and moral implications: A Grammar Section IV "Agency and Purpose" (particularly 275-91); Language "Definition of Man" (3-24), "Terministic Screens" (44-62), and "Coriolanus--and the Delights of Faction" (81-97).

²Beale refers primarily to the work of J. L. Austin in his foundational work in speech act theory How to Do Things with Words. Austin's three main categories for speech acts are: 1) locutionary (an utterance), 2) illocutionary (an utterance attempting to do something), and 3) perlocutionary (an utterance achieving the doing of something). Burke, in a discussion of Austin's theory entitled "Words as Deeds," acknowledges the fundamental difference in a theory such as Austin's (or Beale's) semiotics and his own dramatism. One example of the difference, he notes, is the "quietly jolting" compartmentalizaton of persuasion into the one perlocutionary speech act category (157), which is also the only category discussed in terms of "consequence" (159). Burke's "rhetorical" concept of incipient action runs counter to this semiotic or "grammatical" approach (161).

³Carolyn R. Miller also questions the term "aim" in discourse theory. In her influential argument "Genre as Social Action" published in 1984, she critiques Kinneavy's system: "James L. Kinneavy has classified discourse on the basis of 'aim,' an apparently pragmatic basis, but he also arrives at a closed system with four members: expressive, persuasive, literary, and referential discourse. . . . This scheme suggests a substantive rather than a pragmatic classification" (155). Interestingly, she cites Beale's critique of Kinneavy's theory as further evidence of this "fundamental problem" with aim. Yet five years later, Beale asserts a theory with the same limitation for which both he and Miller have criticized Kinneavy's project.

⁴As Burke's work does, Wayne Booth's arguments in literary theory and criticism have permanently blurred these generic boundaries that

Beale erects between literature and rhetoric (or Poetic and Rhetorical). In *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, Booth studies rhetoric in fiction, its "overt and recognizable appeal," and fiction as rhetoric, "a total act of communication" (415). In his study of ethics and fiction, *The Company We Keep*, he emphasizes consequences rather than kinds of discourse. We ought to concern ourselves "with what a novel might do to a student" (4). We ought to ask "Is this 'poem' morally, politically, or philosophically sound? Is it likely to work for good or ill in those who read it?" (5). These are Burkean questions of motive concerned with what people do to and with each other through their words.

Similarly, recent studies in a variety of scientific disciplines counter Beale's Scientific and Rhetorical divisions. Herbert W. Simons, for instance, introduces a collection of essays on the rhetoric of inquiry in the human sciences with this observation: ". . . the common thread in the rhetoric of inquiry movement is its rejection of the conventional split between inquiry and advocacy" (4). He concludes that "virtually all scholarly discourse is rhetorical" (9). Likewise, Charles Bazerman's *Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science* locates science dramatistically within "the large realm of situated, purposeful, strategic symbolic activity" (6). "Rhetorical analysis," Bazerman notes, "has become the grounds for radical critique and epistemological ponderings" in a multitude of academic fields in recent years (11), which underscores the importance of Burke's philosophy of language and its argument for the innately intentional--the rhetorical nature--of all language use.

[5]In his theory of the reader, first advanced in _The Implied Reader_, Iser accounts for dialogical relationships among reader, writer, text, and context. _The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response_ continues this work, providing a concise description of the implied reader in its first chapter (27-38).

[6]These, then, are the categories by which Beale's theory defines discourse. As I have mentioned, Beale's model also accounts for kinds of reality. It is an important point in terms of the scope of his project, but its details are less central to this discussion. Briefly, he constructs a quadrad that parallels the axes and aims of language. Burke analyzes world views through the lens of his pentad.

[7]Genre or discourse theory is currently a multidisciplinary field moving away from a concept of taxonomy as a product by which discourse is prescribed and, alternatively, toward taxonomizing as a process by which discourse is described. It often couples descriptions of discourses that have been written with advice about ways that similar practice can be most fruitfully taught for particular writers and readers. Swales investigates the teaching of academic and research English. Less constructively, George L. Dillon's work determines "academic discourse" as a genre different from non-academic discourse. Charles Bazerman's research illustrates genre theory working at a more local level--the report of experiment in physics. Campbell and Jamieson, whose _Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action_ did much to insure genre theory's continuance in present rhetorical studies, continue their research of presidential rhetoric, which illustrates the ways in which generic analysis "studies the links between function and

form" in order to discover "whether a given speaker chose the best from among the available means of persuasion" (Deeds 8, 13). Miller expresses for genre theory the importance of keeping form from obviating other essential aspects of discourse: "Good technical writing becomes, rather than the revelation of absolute reality, a persuasive version of experience" ("Humanistic" 616).

[8]In Aristotle's Rhetoric, 1358b and 1359a (Book I, Chapter 3) and 1367b and 1368a (Book 1, Chapter 9) are the especially relevant sections. James Berlin's discussion of the political circumstances under which Aristotle wrote Rhetoric provides a contextual explanation for the contradictions in this treatise.

[9]Chapter two of Dale L. Sullivan's dissertation provides one detailed historical review of epideictic.

[10]Theodore Burgess' turn-of-the-century discussion of epideictic (rare because of its book length) articulates conventional wisdom about epideictic, elevating it as lofty when associated with literature, poetry in particular, and demoting it as inferior when compared to deliberative or forensic rhetoric. Until the 1960s, epideictic was by and large left to its classical tradition, as explicated in histories of rhetoric such as George Kennedy's or classical textbooks for modern students such as E. P. J. Corbett's, which acknowledges the insufficiency of Aristotle's "praise-or-blame" catch-all category but nevertheless advocates its study and emulation as discourse that "is not so much concerned with persuading an audience as with pleasing or inspiring it" (40).

[11]Perelman's final book, The Realm of Rhetoric, maintains the theory of epideictic advanced in these earlier studies. He asserts that the goal of epideictic is adherence; any revolt should be punished (20).

[12]The variety of discourse that critics explore through the lens of epideictic is evident in this sampling of titles: "A Likely Story: The Autobiographical as Epideictic" (Boyle), "Epideictic Speaking in the Post-Civil War South and the Southern Experience" (Braden), "Epideictic Rhetoric and the Renaissance Lyric" (DeNeef), "Arguers as Value Adjusters: Epideictic Discourse in the Environmental Movement" (Jaehne), In Praise of Aeneas: Virgil and Epideictic Rhetoric in the Early Italian Renaissance (Kallendorf), "Korean President Roh Tae-Woo's 1988 Inaugural Address: Campaigning for Investiture" (Lee and Campbell), "Donne's Epideictic Personae" (Lewalski), "Paradigm, Persona and Epideictic: The Lovesongs of Eurythmics" (Oglesbee), and "A Dear Searcher into Comparisons: The Rhetoric of Ellen Goodman" (Scott and Klumpp). A few recent dissertations have studied epideictic in the writings of Chaucer (DiLorenzo), John Dryden (Bady), John Wesley (Jenson), William Wordsworth (Ginsberg), and Ralph Nader (Benkendorf).

[13]When I began my research in contemporary epideictic theory, I concentrated on theories most available for application in rhetorical analysis. Therefore, I did not investigate closely theories in unpublished dissertations that had not yet been followed up in published forums. Recently, the argument Gregory Clark launches in his dissertation ("Timothy Dwight's Travels in New England and New York and the Rhetoric of Puritan Public Discourse") has begun to receive public press (for instance, his article "Rescuing the Discourse of Community").

His argument and my own concur in their concerns about the latent
violence in epideictic as it currently is theorized and practiced, and
we share reservations about the constraints that Sullivan's theory
places on epideictic persuasion and deliberation. My argument does not
share, however, the idealization of nineteenth century American
epideictic advanced in his and Michael Halloran's recent essay
collection, Oratorical Culture in Nineteenth Century America:
Transformations in the Theory and Practice of Rhetoric. In this study
of a century's worth of changes in the American identity, they present
epideictic as an unchanging, traditionally conceived discourse "whose
end was to 'teach and delight,' to pass on the established values of the
culture and thus to sustain the common ground upon which arguments about
particular issues could be conducted" (2).

[14]Poulakos' representation of hermeneutics does not accurately
describe the work of all hermeneutics. For instance, the interpretive
anthropology of Clifford Geertz informs the most humane of social
transformations that could proceed from "seeing ourselves amongst
others" (16). Roy J. Howard's overview also suggests a more complex
view of hermeneutics as an interpretive heuristic and epistemology than
does Poulakos' rendering of it. The good intentions of Poulakos'
socialist stance require a more thorough-going politics of
transformation in order to move through the imprisoning oppositions he
resists. Paulo Freire's discussion of the relationship between the
oppressor and the oppressed warns of the risks in inverting power
structures (Chapter 1, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed).

[15]John E. Ziolkowski's study of ancient funeral orations,
Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens, provides a
helpful assessment of scholarship on Pericles' war eulogy. Ziolkowski
discusses the heavy debate surrounding this speech's author, date, and
alliance with or departure from the tradition of funeral orations. He
argues that the oration is Thucydides' revision of Pericles' words, that
its date is 431 B.C., and that it essentially falls within the tradition
of funeral oration as he defines the genre. More recently, Cheryl Glenn
makes an interesting case for Aspasia, Pericles' intellectual and
influential lover, as the chief collaborator and perhaps ghost writer of
this famous eulogy.

[16]Pacifism and feminism share a dialogical, relational world view
that is, as I intend these terms here, the only essential characteristic
of either ideology. The possibility of Aphasia, Pericles' lover, as the
ghost writer or co-author of the "Funeral Oration" points to gender or
sex as an oversimplified, erroneous defining characteristic of feminism
or pacifism. Clearly one of the striking differences between ancient
Athens and contemporary America is the blurring of "men's" and "women's"
business, a crucial transformation for the inclusive work of pacifism.

[17]In order to preserve student anonymity, the actual section
numbers and names of students have been changed. Appendices for this
chapter have been modified to meet University guidelines for margins.

[18]Although these three sections are treated as one pool of data in
this project, comparative study across several variables might also
yield interesting insights. For instance, there was a greater
percentage of display or primarily display writers in -02 (80% compared

to 50% and 58% in sections 14 and 06, respectively) and, as well, a greater percentage of male students (63% compared to 24% and 20% in sections -01 and -03, respectively). A cross-reference of course grade and range of display or authentic writing in each section indicates that more "B" students were fully authentic writers than students receiving other letter grades. Although the difference in grading systems from Spring to Fall semesters reveals no crucial anomalies, this variation also invites comparison, particularly given the influence of grading on students' perception of their writing.

[19]A disagreement between Gregory Clark and Dale Sullivan about the teaching of writing articulates the difference between writing in school and the "school writing" I argue against. In a CCC Interchange prompted by Clark's earlier article "Rescuing the Discourse of Community," Sullivan summarizes their teacher, Michael Halloran: "The conversational model [for teaching writing] sees discourse as a means to an end; the declamatory model depicts discourse as an end it itself" (386). The declamatory model suits the classroom better, to Sullivan's mind, because it is a place where "students expect to give performances," and since all writing requires "a mask," students are "simply practicing the art of performance." Clark responds with an emphasis on communication as an "interaction of individual and collective fortune"; therefore, "it is the quality of human relationships that is at stake" in the writing class (388). Rather than declamatory teaching, in which "what is at stake for students in a simulated performance tends to be their own reward" (387), Clark presses for the greater yet more difficult task of making the classroom an

occasion for communication in which students "learn to do it by doing it for real" (388).

[20]One way to see the difference in a hierarchical and a transformative theory of rhetoric is to look at how they play out in composition textbooks. Categories of discourse are often the dominant strategy for teaching writing. Timothy Crusius and Carolyn E. Channell's text, The Aims of Argument, indicates the extent to which taxonomies can go in differentiating discourse. Intending to make the definition of argument clearer to students, Crusius and Channell divide the category of rhetoric into four smaller ones: 1) arguments that aim "to inquire," 2) arguments that aim "to convince," 3) arguments that aim "to persuade," and 4) arguments that aim "to negotiate" (vii; the first chapter develops these definitions). It is not hard to imagine the wrinkled brows of teacher and student alike who try to get clear about whether they are, say, "convincing" or "persuading." In the tradition of Kinneavy's and Beale's theories and textbooks, The Aims of Argument directs a writer's attention to a categorical end in which the goal of writing becomes something like "I am now going to write an argument that negotiates."

Unlike the ordering of the Crusius and Channell textbook, Peter Elbow and Pat Belanoff's A Community of Writers is organized around 17 workshops designed to help students become better writers. Whereas the first chapter of The Aims of Argument defines kinds of argument for students to learn, the first chapter in A Community of Writers describes different processes for students to experiment with in order to get words on paper quickly and with confidence. A Community of Writers

emphasizes dialogical relationships; for instance, between form and content ("language is inherently both" 141), writers and readers (explaining persuasion as "sensing the other person and somehow reaching out and getting the other person to listen" 213), audience and purpose ("The goal of this workshop is to help you learn to shape your writing better by thinking more pointedly about what you want your words to do, and to whom" 420), and, as its title suggests, between the individual and the collective. Taxonomy-based textbooks such as The Aims of Argument become prescriptions for writing; otherwise, they are obsolete as soon as the categories change. Descriptions of writing process and situatedness such as those in A Community of Writers provide a more flexible, durable, and productive invitation to writing.

[21]The text from which I quote is Royster's actual speech, which will be revised and published for readers in a forthcoming issue of College Composition and Communication. I appreciate Dr. Royster allowing me to illustrate transformative epideictic with her oral text.

[22]War eulogies remain entrenched in the patriarchal world view that informs the warring behavior occasioning them and that their responses perpetuate. They are what Bakhtin describes as "authoritative discourse," which "is, so to speak, the word of the fathers. Its authority was already acknowledged in the past. It is a prior discourse" (342). It is discourse working against the heteroglossic nature of language. Royster's speech represents what Bakhtin calls "internally persuasive discourse," in which the word is "half-ours and half-someone else's" and "is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean" (345, 346). It is discourse that invites uses of language by persons

not given authority to speak in patriarchal settings. It is also no coincidence, then, that Royster, as a feminist speaker historically marginalized, chooses a way of communicating that is different from Pericles, a speaker from dominant culture. Royster's speech breaks into the "culture of silence," to borrow Freire's term, that Pericles' oration maintains.

[23]My description of what happened as my students conducted their research projects makes these classes sound more wonderful than, of course, they were. English 102 sections 01, 02, and 03, were not utopias; however, small significant steps were made with a number of students and larger, more significant ones with several others. Indeed, in classes in which I as the teacher was consciously and conscientiously inviting authentic writing, two-thirds of the students were not willing or able to accept the invitation fully as they clung to display writing. Their resistance was certainly not entirely (perhaps only minimally) their "fault," and it most likely could be explained by a school history and cultural mentality that had trained them to find out what the teacher wants and do it. As Mary Rose O'Reilly reminds teachers, "One of the teacher's hardest jobs is to break conditioning. You can't just open the cages, as do some of my friends in the animal liberation movement, and hope the poor beasts will run free. . . . Set free in the wide world they will desperately try to run mazes" (69). Change is slow.

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APPENDIX A

WRITER'S QUESTIONNAIRE (SPRING 1994)

In many ways, you are the experts on how writing should be taught in the college composition classroom. Please share your insights with me by responding to these eight questions. If you need more room, feel free to continue your answers on another sheet of paper. Take whatever time you wish.

1) One of my concerns about teaching writing is that writing in school doesn't seem like real writing. We do it just to get a grade. What have we done this semester that made your writing feel fake? What have we done that made it feel real?

2) Although I think that writing for a grade can mess up our writing, I also am concerned that if school writing is not graded, then students will not do it, or do it with enough commitment. How has the grading of your essays, portfolios, and journals influenced the writing you've done this semester? Other than your grade, what has encouraged you to do any of this writing?

3) How did you feel about the second and third essays being connected? Did it affect your writing in any way? Did writing these two related essays feel different in any way from writing the first essay?

4) In your portfolio writing, sometimes it sounded like you really got into your responses, but other times it sounded like you were doing busy work. How did the portfolio help and/or not help your writing and thinking?

5) What were the advantages and disadvantages of keeping a journal this semester that required you to think about yourself as a writer and about how you write?

6) I want students to be able to write about things that they are interested in, and I also want us as a group of writers to read, talk, and write about the same general topic of importance (which for us was the myths we discussed). How did thinking about a general topic together help and/or hinder your writing?

7) Now that we've done them, how do you assess our readings and discussions on gender myths and on myths of individual opportunity? What made them interesting? What could have made them more interesting?

8) What would you have liked for us to do this semester that we did not do, and/or that we could have done better?

APPENDIX B

WRITER'S QUESTIONNAIRE   (FALL 1994)

In many ways, you are the experts on how writing should be taught in the college composition classroom. Please share your insights with me by responding to these questions. If your response repeats something you have said on the UNCG evaluations, that's okay. If you need more room, feel free to continue your answers on the back. Take whatever time you wish.

---

1) I gave you evaluative comments on each of your first four essays and one letter grade on the whole Portfolio. In what ways did this grading system affect your writing—both its process and product?

2) What recommendations would you give me about this system?

3) The last three pieces of finished writing you did this semester were related to each other—the Study Proposal, Annotated Bibliography, and Research Project. In what ways did grouping these writings affect your writing and thinking? How did this compare to writing the four essays during the first half of the semester?

4) What recommendations would you give me about putting together this kind of research assignment? What helped you get it done? What did you need more help with?

5) One of my concerns about teaching writing is that writing in school doesn't seem like real writing. We do it just to get a grade. Were there times this semester when your writing felt real to you? When it felt fake? Describe one or two of those moments.

6) In your journal writing, sometimes it sounded like you really got into your responses, but other times it sounded like you were doing busy work. What do you think? What recommendations would you give me about journal writing?

7) How do you evaluate our readings and discussions on learning this semester? What made them interesting? What could have made them more interesting?

8) What was it like writing for a teacher as your reader? What was it like writing for your colleagues as your readers?

9) What was it like being a reader for your colleagues?

APPENDIX C

CONSENT FORM (SPRING AND FALL 1994)

ENGLISH 102

Age

Class year (eg sophomore)

Sex

Race

Year graduated from high school

Name, city, and state of high school

I give my permission for Marsha Holmes to study my writing and report her findings in her composition research. I understand that she will keep my identity confidential.

_____
(Print name)

_____
(Signature)

_____
(Date)

THANK YOU

APPENDIX D

VARIATIONS OF EPIDEICTIC IN THREE COMPOSITION CLASSROOMS

STUDENTS	SECTIONS			
	102-01 n=20	102-02 n=15	102-03 n=14	Total n=49
Display Writers	5	6	4	15
Authentic Writers	2	1	3	6
Primarily Display Writers with Emerging Authenticity	5	6	4	15
Primarily Authentic Writers with Lingering Display	8	2	3	13