Familiar to most anyone with knowledge of U.S. history, antebellum Indian removal likely evokes a drama comprised of two roles: on one hand, Indian peoples as represented by elite Cherokee activists, and, on the other, their political antagonists in the nascent states' rights movement, among whom the infamous Andrew Jackson stands both as agent and symbol. What may be surprising, however, is that Americanist scholarship on Native removal similarly reduces it to an overarching Indian-Anglo binary. As against a two-worlds model that frames removal writ large in terms of a single political dualism, I argue that regionally specific forms of Native dispossession around the time of the Indian Removal Act (1830) yield different narrative assemblages of Indian identity. Further, these assemblages correspond with differences in the historical conditions of settler colonialism in different parts of the country, conditions irreducible to a single narrative premised on the territorial claims of the United States. Combining work in the field of Native studies by scholars such as Gerald Vizenor and Jodi Byrd with post-structuralist insights into the relationship between narrativity and historicism, this dissertation develops a geographic paradigm that emphasizes the ways in which both Native and settler actors use linear narratives of history to fashion claims to territory. Each chapter situates the work of an Indigenous activist of the period (the Cherokee spokesperson Elias Boudinot, the Pequot minister William Apess, and the Sauk warrior Black Hawk) in relation to non-Native political and literary texts that lay claim, whether implicitly or explicitly, to lands otherwise held by these activists’ respective nations.
Accordingly, the project argues for a change in the conceptualization of Indian identity. Rather than a vexed yet essentially referential signifier for Native peoples, Indianness as a narrative construct marks the point at which uneven and at times competing territorial claims by different settler actors gives way to a portrait of the historical necessity of a given claim. What is more, this narrativity becomes available to Native peoples themselves as these regional struggles unfold. Insofar as it renders a linear historicity in the service of land claims, narrating Indianness gives Native activists a means to represent place-based Indigenous sovereignty to audiences not inclined to make sense of this concept.
For Joen, whose history it is my joy to witness.
This dissertation written by Jason Scott Cooke has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Committee Chair ________________________________

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Date of Final Oral Examination ____________________________
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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION: FROM A HISTORY OF REMOVAL TO THE HISTORICITY OF SETTLER COLONIALISM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowing Indian Land</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispossession at the Limits of History</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From History to (Settler) Historicity</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>INDIANIZING CHEROKEE CIVILIZATION: HISTORICIZING (SETTLER) SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NATIVE SOUTHEAST</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revising State Sovereignty: Historicizing Indianness in the Wake of Cherokee Civilization</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Playing Historian: Familiarizing Settler Belonging</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repositioning Savagery in Elias Boudinot's</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;An Address to the Whites&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>HISTORICIZING INDIAN CHARACTER IN NEW ENGLAND: (DIS)PLACING NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY IN CHILD, SEDGWICK, AND APESS</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hobomok's Surrogate Fatherhood</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sublating Magawisca's Nature</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Characterizing a History of Violence in William Apess's <em>Eulogy on King Philip</em></td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>REALIZING NATIVE DISPOSSESSION IN THE OLD NORTHWEST: FRONTIER HISTORICITY, TERRITORY, AND INDIAN WITHDRAWAL IN KIRKLAND AND BLACK HAWK</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indian Withdrawal and the</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Future-Anterior Territory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boosting (the Backwoods) to a New Frontier</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: FROM A HISTORY OF REMOVAL TO THE HISTORICITY OF SETTLER COLONIALISM

In April 1829, a Cherokee delegation led by John Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, met with President Jackson's Secretary of War John Eaton to protest the administration's insistence on removal. Though not the first, this meeting gained added urgency by the recent discovery of gold on Cherokee lands that were also claimed by Georgia. In addition to intensifying already massive settler encroachments, the discovery led the state to annex the lucrative territory, thus beginning its infamous legislative assault on Native political autonomy. Eaton's response predictably rehashed the arguments for Native occupancy laid out in *Johnson v. McIntosh* (1823), in which Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall excavated and normalized a centuries-old doctrine of discovery. Yet Eaton did so toward what must have been a stunning assertion. In addition to tracing the supposed precedents for state sovereignty, he found the immediate cause of intensifying violence and state aggressions alike to be the "course" taken by the Cherokee in "establishing an independent, substantive, government" within Georgia's borders (qtd. in Prucha 45). The irony was not lost on Cherokee activist Elias Boudinot. He would respond in the *Cherokee Phoenix* the following June that his people "have always had a government of their own" and Georgia a pretext for its usurpation; yet nothing was said of the impossibility of adapting such governance when his people observed "savage laws" (Boudinot 108-9). He hammered the point. In retrospect, it could
not but seem that "the illustrious Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were only tantalizing us" by encouraging "the pursuit of agriculture and Government" (Boudinot 108).

Taken together, these claims illustrate the historical and geopolitical dynamics at the heart of this project. Positing anachronistic Indianness (here a polity that previously either lacked "substance" in its autonomy or existed under the thrall of "savage laws") organizes a linear historicity that functions as a claim to Native space. What do I mean here? As the following chapters will demonstrate, settler juridical and territorial maneuvers against place-based Native sovereignty during the antebellum period involve narrating Indian identity as consisting in an ontologically-grounded anachronism, what Jean O'Brien has described regarding New England historiography as a process of firsting (settlers) and lasting (Natives). Rather than argue that this feature of antebellum historiography reflects a deeply embedded process of settlers writing Indians out of time, a process that Maureen Konkle contends reveals the fundamental racism behind Indian removal, this study proceeds in the opposite direction. In short, I do not take the sense of homogenous time supposedly indexed by non-Native historiography for granted as a construct from which Indians can be written out, so to speak. Instead, the production of this very sense of History, the production of a linear narrative of time that is de facto oriented to settler presence, state governance, and the continued colonization of Indigenous peoples, constitutes a geopolitical maneuver against place-based Native sovereignty, but one that does not register as such precisely insofar as it appears as the
given background, the foundation, for any intelligible claim to political sovereignty in the first place.

The term settler historicity encompasses the notion that the narrativity of linear time both sustains and facilitates the dispossession of Native lands by different settler actors. As a methodological tool, this concept draws on the work of scholars such as O'Brien and Konkle, who address the ways in which non-Native historiography helps to produce a historical consciousness that places Native peoples in a position of alterity. However, in place of reading this feature of antebellum writing as expressing a more fundamental logic of racialization, which I feel obscures rather than clarifies the workings of settler colonialism, I transpose it into a geopolitical framework within which neither a coherent, one-size-fits-all "Indian" identity nor the settler/U.S. rights to Native space are simply given in advance. In making this move, I place the work of Hayden White, Michel Foucault, and Gerald Vizenor in conversation with one another.

White has spent an entire career exploring what can be conceived as the moral-ideological roots of historiography. For him, the writing of history, insofar as it relies on narrative, presupposes a conception not only of a given social order, but one whose givenness depends upon a set of axiomatic ethical relationships embodied in notions like "the people," for instance. He refers to the late-Roman Annalists to make this point: "What is lacking in the [chronological] list of events" that impedes a sense of "regularity and fullness is a notion of a social center by which to locate [these events] with respect to one another and to charge them with ethical or moral significance" (11). Such lists do indeed give a sense of the expansiveness of time; what they lack is grounding within a set
of relationships whose interplay gives the notion of society its life, its basic dynamic. Conversely, insofar as historical narrative does come to provide this sense of fullness (of both events and the actors engaged in them), its reproduction over time exerts a powerful influence on the possibilities entailed in the concept of society moving forward. Put another way, the narrativity of history across a range of discourses, including but exceeding historiography, reinforces dominant social formations by “making [them] desirable” as indices of reality (20).

White's insight into the ideological efficacy of history writing clears the space for thinking about the narrativity of history as a maneuver against place-based Native peoplehood. The problem that arises in shifting the narrativity of History (as it relates to a certain view of social normativity/order) beyond the frame of historiography proper and into a geopolitical matrix, within which different settler and Native actors vie for territorial sovereignty, relates to causality. For White, historians do not intentionally seek to foster a specific ideological view of social relations, but they do so nonetheless insofar as the objective relationships taken to comprise social "reality" contribute to the narrativity of History in the first place. But how does this insight relate to colonization and the dispossession of Native lands, which seems like an intentional process, especially when considering the political maneuvering that led to the Indian Removal Act of 1830? The first step here is to recognize how the historicity of Indian removal already endows Native dispossession with a linear coherence: the Removal Act initially evokes Cherokee Removal, calling to the fore Andrew Jackson and the Trail of Tears. As such, this narrativity lends to a kind of historical amnesia regarding the geopolitical complexity of
Indigenous struggles against different forms of settler colonialism during the antebellum era.

The differences in forms of dispossession of Native groups by a wide range of settler, state, and colonial actors are quite drastic. In short, while for the Cherokee people, removal policy represents a clear shift away from civilization policy, for Native nations of New England there was never anything like a uniform, institutionally-sanctioned drive to "civilize" the Indian in the first place. By the antebellum era, the patchwork of guardian and reservation systems deriving from late-seventeenth century colonial policy had become so embedded in public praxis and consciousness alike that it is no stretch to suggest that peoples like the Pequot, Narragansetts, and Wampanoag fell outside of the frame of the period's predominant "Indian Question." By contrast, for Indigenous nations of the Midwest and beyond, there would be no such concerted effort until well after the Civil War, especially after the unilateral termination of treaty-making by the U.S. Congress in 1871 (through a rider attached as an afterthought to an appropriation bill) made it simpler to deny that place-based Native peoplehood constituted a political sovereignty irreducible to the juridical purview of the settler state. And yet, even if civilization policy in its own context, around the turn of the nineteenth century, represented a somewhat coherent approach to diplomacy with Native nations, it nonetheless met with mixed responses among the southeastern peoples that the federal government were most interested in civilizing, given their large land bases and potential for armed conflict on a broad scale. As is well established (and will be discussed at length in chapter one), Boudinot's remarks certainly do not signify the mass acceptance of either
the material or ideological contours of Euramerican civilization by the whole of the Cherokee people.

Accordingly, in bracketing the centrality of Cherokee removal, this study emphasizes the role that settler historicity plays in organizing different struggles over different Native spaces (different geographic regions of the country) almost simultaneously. Michel Foucault's thinking is helpful here in building on the work of White. Where White identifies a certain fundamental social/ideological/moral efficacy bound up in the reproduction of historical narrative, Foucault's work in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, a text that acts as retrospective methodology for his earlier books like *Madness and Civilization* and *The Order of Things*, shifts away from a perspective hinging on the writer/historian as the agent of historicism (and the ideology that it relays) and toward one that privileges the autonomy of discourse. For Foucault, discourses (which I take as including but exceeding historical narrative or historiography proper) are more than "groups of signs" in the sense of a set of terms and relationships that merely refer to "contents or representations" beyond them; they are rather "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (*AK* 49). Foucault would build on this idea going forward as he began to develop the concept of genealogy, but this articulation is useful in thinking about the intersection between non-Native portrayals of Native space and figurations of Native peoples, on one hand, and the politics of dispossession, on the other. Following his work in the *Archaeology*, settler historicity can be thought to comprise a maneuver against place-based Native peoplehood in that it sustains representations of sovereignty that foreclose Native claims to land and
governance. Furthermore, such a maneuver can be understood as cohering apart from the will of any individual settler actor, such as (perhaps especially) Andrew Jackson.

Foucault's thinking here further dovetails nicely with that of Gerald Vizenor, since the very idea of "the Indian" can be understood as a discursive object, as Foucault presents the concept: the "reality" of "the Indian" derives largely from the networks of non-Native discourses that render it visible or legible over time. Vizenor's concept of the post-Indian gets at a similar notion. As he argues, the “Indian” cannot be separated from a teleology, that of American history, that normalizes the concept of "discovery" to the point that Indigneous peoples seem unimaginable apart from the colonial/European binary that this concept embeds. Vizenor further contends that reality can be conceived of as a process of hyperreality corresponding with an embedded demand on the part of different social actors that the world present something “real.” Insofar as the basis for such expectations is a certain representation of the past, however vague, what we might label as settler or non-Native hyperreality casts Native peoples either as “simulations of the ‘absolute fakes’ in the ruins of representation, or the victims in literary annihilation” (Manifest 9). Building from this view, this project asserts that the “Indian” is not a thing that exists prior to a discourse that constructs it; rather, Indianness poses itself as doomed, lost, tragic and backwards as a function of colonization, which suggests that its supposedly essential features demarcate relations of power rather than the excavated remnants of a permanently eclipsed authenticity. In a sense, what the following chapters seek to do is to take Vizenor's thinking here seriously as a foundation for a different kind of historicist inquiry into antebellum dispossession. The networks (involving disciplines
like anthropology, sociology, etc.) that inform the "Indian" can be understood as inseparable from the continuing project of Native dispossession writ large.

Therefore, rather than read Native dispossession through the prism of (Cherokee) removal, I examine how Native dispossession entailed producing a historicity organized around Indianness so as to license specific and irreducible juridical and territorial maneuvers against different Native peoples across the geopolitical map. Each chapter focuses on settler colonialism as it manifests within a particular region. Chapter one focuses on Cherokee removal in the southeast. The second chapter is grounded in the reservation-based Indigenous peoples of New England. The last chapter looks at settler expansion into the territory referred to as the Old Northwest and that culminated in the highly publicized Black Hawk War of 1832. Limiting the time-frame of the study to twenty-five years, I argue that these different geopolitical dynamics make for distinct arenas of conflict during the antebellum period, an era often homogenized as one for which, as Kevin Bruyneel puts it, "removal was the order of the day" (15). Nonetheless, settler historicity plays a role in the unfolding of each arena, as it comprises perhaps the most indispensable mechanism for rendering the claims to Native space by settler actors as a foregone conclusion, or as a matter of historical necessity.

And yet, precisely because this narrativity enters as a maneuver in a more fundamental and ongoing struggle over specific lands, the kinds of claims to sovereignty that it facilitates also become available to the above-mentioned Native activists, insofar as they speak through the frame of Indianness. As each chapter will show, the working of settler historicity in each region involves recourse not to a single, generic trope of Indian
savagery, but rather to a particular formation of Indian identity as it emerges within the struggles over land and sovereignty unique to the region and the Native peoples in question. In the southeast, the trope of the backwards, anachronistic savage emerges as a means of consolidating settler claims to Cherokee space within the framework laid out by civilization policy. In New England, the trope of the noble, virtuous Indian warrior modeled on King Philip justifies the continued maintenance of reservation systems in ways that exploit Native lands and resources. In the Old Northwest, the trope of the exotic, receding or withdrawing Indian consolidates a notion of the region as a "frontier," an effectively extra-political domain that forecloses the intelligibility of Native territoriality and sovereignty. However, as I will show, each of these frames provides Native activists with a means of resisting ongoing settler colonialism precisely insofar as they represent maneuvers within multiple struggles over land and sovereignty that were ongoing and open-ended. Accordingly, the central claim that I make with regard to historicist scholarship dealing with either representations of Indians by non-Native authors or Native texts is that these frames of antebellum dispossession are reducible neither to a single Indian-Anglo binary nor its corollary, a master narrative of Indian removal.

Undoubtedly, the passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 marks a turning point in U.S. Indian policy from an amalgam of ambivalent civilization measures and sporadic land cessions via treaty to a formal program of coercive removal that also modeled elements of later reservation policy. However, representing that act as a clean historical break within a larger narrative of Indian-Anglo conflict diverts attention away
from how the "Indian" functions as a signifier within the broader power relations that envelop and inform this very shift in policy. Regarding the ways in which generic tropes of Indian identity (reflected in such figures as Squanto or Pocahontas) have helped to shape non-Native historiography on U.S. westward expansion, Elizabeth Cook-Lynn writes that to conceive "history without such ubiquitous colonial and imaginative notables would be to recognize that American historians have provided an interpretation designed to protect the colonial version of events" (36). As Cook-Lynn's observation suggests, the writing of history can be understood as extending the relations of knowledge and, consequently, of force that underlie colonization. Insofar as it impedes an understanding of colonization as an ongoing project, such historiography can be conceived as representing the contemporary condition(s) of Native peoples as, at best, an accident, an arbitrary effect of the passage of time, rather than the latest moment in a consistent if uneven project of genocide. Working from this insight, I contend that a historicity predicated on the textual production of aberrant Indianness traverses not only the whole of debates on Native sovereignty, but it also runs the gamut both of literary visions of expansion and settlement by non-Native writers and of juridical and extra-political claims to territory by settler actors.

These chapters collectively ask how historicizing Indianness works as a discursive maneuver within simultaneous and yet uneven struggles for land and sovereignty. Each chapter will situate a well-known work by an Indigenous activist (specifically Elias Boudinot; the Pequot activist, writer, and Methodist minister William Apess; and the famed Sauk war chief Black Hawk) in relation to non-Native texts that reference the
places whose expropriation these activists sought to resist. I argue that narrating an imaginary Indian ontology, or "Indianness," as a temporally anterior construct retroactively endows settler claims to territory with a narrative cohesion that effaces place-based Indigenous peoples' claims to the same, even as it opens the possibility for resistance in making such Indoanness available for the representation of Indigenous place-based peoplehood. Put another way, historicizing Indoanness generates the condition of possibility both for articulating a sovereignty that forecloses Native land claims and, with regard to Indigenous activists themselves, for resisting the dispossession of lands—precisely by appropriating Indoanness as a frame for casting territorial or place-based belonging in terms of a linear history. Given this geographic/geopolitical focus, then, the statements by Eaton and Boudinot are representative of the crux of this study only insofar as they are metonymic, not metaphoric, of the ways in which historicizing Native space conditions land claims and/or representations of territory.

**Knowing Indian Land**

To insist on viewing the U.S. as a settler state is to recognize that the nation is not only predicated on both the dispossession of Indigenous land and the colonization of Native forms of governance, but also that it is still engaged in processes of dispossession and colonization. Cook-Lynn pointedly summarizes the matter in asking whether the term postcolonial accurately describes the contemporary situation of Indigenous peoples. Since many of them still have treaty lands held in trust by the federal government and live in the context of "tribal governing systems [that] are nonfunctional as tribally focused
structures," Native nations, she observes, can legitimately ask when "did we leave the colonized state?" (Cook-Lynn 29). From one angle, the answer here would be after removal, which gradually becomes the dominant policy framing in the decades leading to the Indian Removal Act. However, this approach not only takes the history of the United States for granted as an organizing paradigm, but in so doing it casts "removal" as a single agenda foisted by the federal government onto place-based Native polities. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the pressures on Native groups to assimilate or remove, and later simply to remove, were themselves diffuse and polymorphous across the early American political field. Foregrounding the role that discourses of Indianness play in making the representation of History available as a maneuver against different Native peoples in this way intends to push against a historicist methodology that presupposes the universality of removal as, if not exactly uniform in terms of its local sociopolitical manifestations, nevertheless something like an epistemic modality, a common denominator, of the real historical relationships between Indian and Anglo actors at the time. In turn, it intends to resist an interpretive framework that casts recognition by the state, and rights within it, as the zero degree of Native activism during the period. This project's emphasis on the irreducibility of different regional struggles against settler colonialism to a single narrative of "removal" is a step, in other words, toward rendering the geopolitics of place-based sovereignty as the primary horizon for a historicist study.

I therefore follow work by Native scholars such as Glen Coulthard in centering the study on the complex dynamics of settler colonialism. Coulthard observes that
Indigenous anticolonialism "is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around the question of land—a struggle not only for land in the material sense" but one also informed by "the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential knowledge" (13). One strength of this way of thinking about dispossession and its resistance is that it locates formations otherwise generically and somewhat ambiguously cited as Native belief systems instead as part and parcel of an essential struggle over land. In turn, Coulthard's analysis suggests that the political dimension of conflicts involving questions of territorial boundaries, pre-existing treaty obligations, or settler encroachments and/or government malfeasance already contains what we might conceive of as competing epistemological registers.

Of course, one might say that any culture simultaneously inhabits and (re)produces a worldview as an immanent extension of its shared practices, a sense of the world that certainly includes, even presupposes, a unique conception of space and relation to collectivity that shapes one's agency on a fundamental level, something like Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus. However, I take the work of scholars such as Coulthard, Jodi Byrd, and Lisa Brooks instead as reinforcing the insight that conflicts over territory involve positing land in an abstract, material sense that appears both as the obverse of political notions of territory and prerequisite to the very concept of culture. In other words, the de facto intelligibility of "land" in its given material sense, to use Coulthard's language, effectively enacts, and not only depends upon, a geopolitical claim to space. Put another way, representing "land" in either an aesthetic or politico-juridical mode already comprises a maneuver in struggles over territory as they unfold. The
representation of land in non-Native discourses already comprises a maneuver against place-based Native sovereignty, just as contrary to popular belief, the territory covered by U.S. settlement never amounted to a vast and empty wilderness awaiting its next stage of development in the coming of civilization.

Scholarship in Native studies has long stressed that the dispossession of Indigenous lands both exceeds and problematizes a political frame oriented toward the state that benefits from such dispossession. As Coulthard puts it, foregrounding place-based Native sovereignty, as rooted in traditional modes of peoplehood and governance, emphasizes the fact that "like capital, colonialism, as a structure of domination predicated on dispossession, is not 'a thing,' but rather the sum effect of the diversity of interlocking oppressive social relations that constitute it," even as capitalism has acted as a motor force in the fracturing of place-based Indigenous sovereignty (Coulthard 15). Linda Tuhiwai Smith includes among such interlocking relations the proliferation of anthropological and historical knowledge of Indigenous peoples, knowledge that traditionally presumes the universal validity of the core social and philosophical elements of Euramerican culture. Referring to conceptions of human nature that inform methodological objectivity in the humanities and social sciences, but that remain indebted to Euramerican social norms, Smith observes that what "makes ideas 'real' is the system[s] of knowledge, the formations of culture, and the relations of power in which [they] are located" (50). Presuppositions like what "an individual is" are so thoroughly enmeshed in the organizational principles of society that they quite literally "constitute reality" (Smith 51, emphasis added).
Smith's analysis usefully theorizes how knowledge-production works as a colonizing process in time. To the degree that ideas such as the political abstraction of the individual, the mathematical abstraction of space, and the representation of time premised on the apparent perfectibility of society each precondition the processes of inquiry that create knowledge, they cease to register their own political and historical contingency in providing the means of representing Native peoplehood. For Smith, such ideas come to "underpin notions of past and present, of place and relationship to the land," and as they do so they not only represent Native peoples to the West in racist and reductive ways, as holdovers from an earlier epoch, but they also radically transform "the land and the people…in the spatial image of the West," thereby extending the colonization of Indigenous lands without necessarily evoking the notion of colonization (53). As noted above, Vizenor has made a similar argument. He writes that “social science [and] anthropologies are at last causal methodologies…not studies of anthrops, human beings, or even natural phenomena," but instead the "remains, reductions of humans and imagination to models...social science is institutional power, a tragic monologue in isolation” (Vizenor “Trickster Discourse” 187). Rather than leading one to fetishize an Indian identity as essentially consisting in a spiritual/magical connection to (another abstraction of) land beyond the reach of fallen Old World methodologies, Vizenor's work proceeds in the opposite direction. It forges a connection between the geopolitics of territory and the knowledge of Indian identity.

Vizenor draws heavily on French post-structuralism and especially the later work of Jean Baudrillard to argue that the Indian, as an apparently given, axiomatic ethnic
identity and therefore a notion prerequisite to any non-Native study of Native peoples, is a simulacra, a copy without an original. For him, "the Indian" as recognized by both academic and mainstream non-Natives alike signifies "the absence of natives"; such "simulations of the Indian, as the absence of natives, are the documents of discoveries, cultural studies, and surveillance" (Fugitive 15-16). Read together with the perspectives of Coulthard and Smith, the point to be stressed here is not simply that any such representation of Natives amounts to a version of colonization, nor that such knowledge-production justifies the continued political expropriation of Indigenous land and sovereignty. Rather, the point is that the separation between false or biased representations of Indigenous peoples, that nonetheless register as objective recognitions of Native history or peoplehood, on one hand, and what can be considered the material dispossession of Indigenous territory, on the other, is itself a false divide, but one that is produced through discourses of Indianness. Narrating "Indianness" generates a crisis of authenticity with regard to actual Indigenous peoples. However, this efficacy, I argue, has long enabled settler actors to lay claim to Native spaces not simply by discounting the claims of particular Native groups, but more fundamentally by rendering a supposedly authentic Indian subject whose inevitable temporal anachronism creates the basis for settlers to generate an extra-political claim to Native space on the basis of a supposedly transcendent History.

In a certain sense, the foundation for this argument is nothing new. Vine Deloria, Jr.’s 1969 text Custer Died for Your Sins already offers the theoretical insight that this dissertation develops into a thesis on the function of historicity in removal-era
dispossession. Deloria writes that the mountains of anthropological research designed more or less to "capture real Indians in a network of theories has contributed substantially to the invisibility of Indian people today" (81). Rather than an allegory, invisibility for Deloria indicates a rather precise mechanism. Such work contributes to the mythos of a "'real' Indian" whose proliferation across social space causes actual Indigenous peoples "to feel that they are merely shadows of a mythical super-Indian," thereby producing a "sense of inadequacy" that non-Natives themselves reinforce "in order to support their influence over Indian people" (Deloria 82). Later in the same chapter he lambasts non-Natives' inability to make the connection between the destructive impact of termination policy and the impoverished conditions of reservations. He observes of the Oglala Sioux reservation at Pine Ridge that economic hardship and its associated problems partially stem from non-Natives who may sincerely believe that they are helping matters, but for whom real "problems and real people become invisible before the great Romantic notion that the Sioux yearn for the days of Crazy Horse and Red Cloud," adding that Natives are inevitably redefined in ways recognizable to non-Natives, "even if that means re-Indianizing them according to a white man's idea of what they were like in the past and should logically become in the future" (92). Even though it paves the way for later work in Native studies, Deloria's analysis offers a practical example of how knowledge-production rooted in Euramerican concepts of space, personhood, and the like interlock with the political processes of dispossession.

Of course, the recognition of economic underdevelopment, and the charity that perhaps follows from it, is not the same as recognizing place-based sovereignty. But the
more important insight for this study is that a historicity organized around a caricature of Indian identity, as hyper-masculine warrior in this case, enact such colonizing knowledge. The core feature of the portrait of Indianness that Deloria references involves (re)presenting Native peoplehood as grounded in, or reducible to, a linear temporality, one that, although it depicts Indians as disjointed from the present, nevertheless conforms to the broader narrative arc supposedly manifesting in settlement itself. To be clear, the trope of the Indian Warrior qua Red Cloud or Crazy Horse does not merely obscure an awareness of the federal government's role in the colonization of Native peoples. Rather, I read Deloria's examples as implying that a historicity organized around the notion of the fallen Indian warrior facilitates the continued dispossession of Native appeals in the name of an ostensibly verifiable truth of the past. To draw a comparison to the antebellum era, such work accords with Steven Conn's argument that the naturalists and proto-anthropologists who engaged with Indian history in the early-nineteenth century placed Natives writ large into the impossible position of having an ability to "experience decline, without ever having experienced a reciprocal rise" (Conn 32).

One could suggest that the twentieth-century anthropologists and historians that Deloria takes to task suffer from the same cultural biases and misperceptions as their early-nineteenth century counterparts when these fields were emerging. However, the very notion of misrepresentation here preserves a narrativity within which Native peoples are vanishing, receding, etc., which has the corollary effect of repositioning an abstract notion of land, in its given material sense, as the a priori backdrop against which such vanishing takes place. I would accordingly argue the opposite. Representations of an
axiomatic Indian identity that registers in temporal terms as receding, vanishing, etc. continue to extend and reinforce conditions of dispossession in keeping with, if not their intended purpose, their efficacy at the level of knowledge production. Deloria himself gestures to this idea in claiming that pure anthropological research on Native peoples boils down to "an abstraction of scholarly suspicions concerning some obscure theory originally expounded in pre-Revolutionary days and systematically checked each summer since then," despite also implying that the reservation system, and the captive Native populations it makes available, is required for anthropology to do this work (81). Following the more recent scholarship discussed above, however, what would it mean to situate the interplay between knowledge of Indianness and processes of land theft as constitutive of colonization in the shift from civilization to removal policy?

Dispossession at the Limits of History

Answering this question involves thinking of antebellum Indigenous dispossession in terms of multiplicity, but it also involves asking how the signifier "Indian" coheres these politics such that local aspects of regional disposessions register either as variations on a theme, or deviations from the norm, of removal. The capacity for this signifier to level geopolitical difference seems related to the fact that, as Vizenor suggests, Indianness has a history and autonomy apart from the peoples it comes to designate. Accordingly, thinking of dispossession in terms of regional (dis)continuity as it relates to a broad range of discourses requires separating the Indian from Indigenous peoples. As Mark Rifkin has argued, although a scholarly focus on "figurations of
"Indianness" in non-Native texts intends to refute the mythos of the vanishing Indian, this approach nevertheless largely "'stabilizes' settlement as a dynamic that inheres in Native bodies, rather than understanding it as a phenomenon that shapes nonnative subjectivities, intimacies, articulations, and sensations separate from whether something recognizably Indian comes into view" (Settler 4,7). What would it mean, then, to think about textual moments that clearly involve a trope like the vanishing Indian apart from its predominant acceptance as an axiomatic designation for Native peoples? A first step in this direction would be to suggest that moving away from the transparency of the (historical meaning of the) Indian toward the conditions of possibility for settler sovereignty, involves moving from the "Indian" toward Indianness. Accordingly, these chapters situate Indianness less as a racist distortion of actual Native groups, a flawed but essentially referential signifier, than a discursive element that more crucially allows for the appearance of an axiomatic claim to territory by settler actors exactly when and where such claims were far from axiomatic.

Suspending the referential meaning of the signifier "Indian" isolates and foregrounds the discursive work that otherwise goes missing in its apparent signification. Isolating Indianness so as to foreground the intersection between knowledge and land theft runs another risk, however. Regarding the tendency in post-structuralist theory to position Indianness as a preliminary and constitutive clearing for social critique rather than as a topos subject to critical intervention itself, Jodi Byrd observes that the "Indian—as a threshold of past and future, regimes of signs, alea, becoming, and death—combats mechanisms of interpretation through an asignifying disruption that stops, alters,
and redirects flow” (17). Insofar as post-structuralist criticism takes off from an already overdetermined notion of Indianness, qua polyvocality, multiplicity in the face of the Enlightenment legacy of a coherent subject-object, self-Other binary, and the like, it is often obliged to evade rather than engage the geopolitics involving Native groups. This means that, for my project, Indianness cannot simply register as shorthand either for an anti-systemic residue exceeding even the most dispersed forms of antebellum colonization, the ghost in the machine of dispossession, or, similarly, a sign of the incoherence of settler claims in the abstract. The narrativity of Indianness, I hope to show, retroactively conditions specific claims to land and sovereignty in specific regions, although one of its effects is to dissimulate this very specificity. This argument, however, involves bracketing a mode of analysis that understands colonization as a coherent project in time.

Approaching the production of History in this way allows for historicity to be foregrounded as a tactic in the simultaneous (re)production of different regional forms of dispossession. History occupies a central and yet paradoxical position among the interlocking relations that Smith and Coulthard identify. To the degree that historical reflection presupposes the disciplinary and institutional form of such reflection, history appears as one discourse among many others. Its privileged position both in academia and mass culture alike is simply not possible without the emergence of modern historiographical methodologies during the late Enlightenment. One can acknowledge that, following Arif Dirlik, the wide reach of Euramerican historiography has rendered the world in its image, fashioning the origin narratives of western societies as a universal
teleology, one predicated upon an embedded "rational humanist subject," to the point of casting, and thereby subjugating, Indigenous temporalities as stages in the universal course of a world-historical progress (65). However, insofar as representations of Indianness were integral to the emergence of the methods of such history in the first place, the latter would seem to be predicated on settler colonialism rather than vice versa. As Steven Conn has observed of the antebellum United States, non-Native writers, artists, and historians increasingly represented Indians as beyond "progressive, chronologically-marked time," which reciprocally helped to create the conceptual and discursive space "to conceive of their own history as the unfolding of linear progress" (31).

To be fair, a more or less standard postcolonial critique of Eurocentrism does not simply grant history an exceptional position among the antecedents of global oppression. As Dirlik notes, the "globalization and universalization of Eurocentrism would have been inconceivable without the dynamism it acquired through capitalism, imperialism, and cultural domination" (73). That said, the critique of postcolonialism over the last generation or so in the field of Native studies has provocatively foregrounded its compatibility with multi-cultural liberalism and, accordingly, its complicity with the settler state and the continued colonization of Indigenous peoples. As Cook-Lynn writes, the shift away from "traditional, political, and institutional analysis to cross-cultural criticism embeds itself in the colonial paradigm," the proof of which is that many accept that both "postcolonial discourse is a done deal" and "postcoloniality is a real thing" for Indigenous peoples of North America, despite the fact that Native peoples' efforts to reclaim lands and sovereignty have never abated (31). Cook-Lynn's biting remarks lead
one to speculate that the Indian-Anglo binary that provides the organizing template for much literary and historicist scholarship dealing with Native affairs also enacts this kind of foreclosure of Native sovereignty, even as it seeks to demonstrate how colonization consists in the writing of Indians out of time.

For instance, Susan Scheckel writes that as early-antebellum "debates over the status and rights of Indians…unfolded, Indians emerged as nationally liminal figures" and that, in turn, "nineteenth-century Americans reified 'the Indian' into an object of contemplation," the production of which helped to define U.S. national identity (11). Representations of U.S. collective identity in time can never fully break away from tropes of Indian pathos because the latter are deeply intertwined with the former from the beginning. Though persuasive on the surface, Scheckel implicitly predicates the emergence of the Indian on a prior, somewhat disconnected political wrangling over the meaning of Native sovereignty as translated within the matrix of normative political rights. And insofar as the figure of the Indian enters the discussion already detached from the sphere of politics, such an approach not only reduces "the Indian" to the role it plays within nascent portraits of US national collective identification, but it also reifies the sphere of politics apart from the noted debates over Native sovereignty, despite how the intelligibility of the former would seem to be intimately bound up with the latter.

To the degree that such representations of Indianness appear to partake of rather than to disclose the workings of American exceptionalism, recent critiques of U.S. imperialism in American studies offer a useful counterpoint. Analyzing the institutional and cultural dynamics of American exceptionalism can indeed help one to grasp how a
universal, abstract equality that manifests in the rights of citizens and that, as such, provides the basis for collective identification with/through the nation-state, actually depends upon the systematic marginalization of specific groups within the body politic. As David Kazanjian puts it relative to the early-nineteenth century, although "one nation's citizens as a whole were meant to be formally and abstractly equal to another nation's citizens, the exceptionalism that characterizes nationalism…constructs hierarchies that belie such equality" (4). While the nation-state registers as the guarantor of universal freedom(s), and simultaneously fashions itself as the threshold through which abstract freedom passes increasingly into the materiality of lived experience, it is also that which imposes limits to the scope of formal liberty in the present through its laws. Yet, as Russ Castronovo observes, since marginalized subjects on the other side of the law are not made wholly invisible, they exert a counter-pressure that renders visible its contingency. "The laboring body, licentious body, mesmerized body, emancipated slave body, and corpse," he writes "all possess (and are possessed by) senses of historicity" that, apart from any will to resist hegemony, nevertheless "add particularistic and hence disruptive doses of memory and difference to both the nation-state and the public sphere" (17). This basic idea of contingency as opening onto a counter-hegemonic historicity is integral to my interpretation of the role of Indianness as, not only consolidating, but resisting settler claims to Native space at the level of knowledge-production.

Although such work challenges the tendency within literary studies to situate tropes like the vanishing Indian as more cultural than political, it still encounters problems when confronted with place-based Native peoplehood. For instance,
Castronovo's analysis is compelling in that it does not take for granted the identity formations (raced and gendered subject positions) that would ostensibly emerge as functions of power. His approach situates the political contours of U.S. exceptionalism as an immanent feature of antebellum social life, clearly bracketing the "seemingly completed constructions of national, state, and public identities" so as to show how "the foundations of those identities—notwithstanding…scholarly consensus or liberal agreement—are accidental and contingent" (Castronovo 22). However, since the implicit axis is the degree to which a concept like citizenship maps onto bodies within the juridical bounds of the state, the relationship between the United States and the land itself remains exceptional when the focus shifts toward Indigenous peoples. For Castronovo, the trope of the stoic, suicidal Indian functions to confirm abstract "freedom as a noncultural, eternal value and [to make] the fate of Native Americans a matter of individual proclivity, ahistorical and natural" (35). This trope marks the edges of a subject-position de facto aligned with the life of the body politic, the material and political content of which emerges in harmony with the stratifications already contained in the era's emerging concepts of blood and race.

Yet the "fate of Native Americans" appears as a historically-given narrative, comprising the backdrop against which this delimiting function of the Indian-as-trope accrues significance. In this way, situating Indianness, specifically portraits of noble Indian suicide, as the liminal yet indispensable edge of liberty nonetheless often presumes an arc of history within which all Indigenous peoples suffered a single fate. Further, treating this fate as historically given positions the difference of Native peoples
as synonymous with the difference that marks any other minority or oppressed subject position before the state, thereby reinforcing the primacy of the latter as the condition of possibility for the social field writ large. Such an approach paradoxically effaces the resistance(s) of these peoples to dispossession as it continues to unfold. Studies in settler colonialism are helpful here. Patrick Wolfe's argument that U.S. imperialism amounts to a "logic of elimination" that makes it "a structure [rather than] an event" pushes against the methodological primacy of the United States; despite shifts in policies and modalities of dispossession in history, settler colonialism for Wolfe nonetheless amounts to a "complex social formation and a continuity in time" (388, 390). As against work that inadvertently normalizes Native dispossession and genocide as a thing of the past, Wolfe's position that such dispossession is systemic indicates that there is more to the story than the typical narrative admits. Far from a peripheral phantom within American history, this systemic excess is directly constitutive of the United States as a settler state.

While drawing on such work, this project will nonetheless bracket the view of settler colonialism as forming a system, continuity, or logic in time. Certainly, Wolfe's point is well taken from one angle. Representations of U.S. history, especially popular history, do indeed tend to portray American Indian dispossession as an event, one usually symbolized by the Trail of Tears and Cherokee Removal more generally. As argued above, American Studies at times similarly frames Indian dispossession as an event in the past, even if such framing is neither explicit nor intended and despite that such work often challenges commonplace views of U.S. history and the hierarchical presuppositions such views entail. However, it strikes me that one problem with a systemic view of U.S. -
Indian affairs over time, or a view within which history/time itself boils down to a systemic, (post-)colonial logic, is that it too quickly yields a binary frame that collapses under the weight of all that it obscures, simplifies, or simply excludes. Returning to the statements by Boudinot and Eaton opening the present discussion can demonstrate this problem.

**From History to (Settler) Historicity**

Boudinot's criticism of Eaton's claim foregrounds a deception that initially registers in two ways. If the founding fathers were men of their word, then Jackson's pivot toward removal amounts to political sophistry organized around a moralized discourse of necessity, itself rooted in the belief that all Natives are inexorably determined by "wandering habits…so peculiar to the Indian character" (Eaton 46). The implication is that Eaton merely seeks to evade decades of treaties between the Cherokee and U.S. that provide manifest evidence of the former's status as a distinct political body. Referencing figures associated with an earlier era of diplomacy and treaty-making thus serves to indict both Jackson's paternalism and the land grab that it tries to hide. From a contemporary perspective, though, the suggestion that the political-economic assimilation of U.S. norms and forms was always a tantalizing ruse seems nearer the mark. Boudinot's comment inadvertently locates the subversion of Native sovereignty as constitutive of any and all Indian policy in the first place. And to the degree that it reveals a foundational civilization policy as the lie it always was, the rebuke offers a compelling allegory for the actual tenor of U.S.-Native relations borne over time.
Although both views are persuasive, each one strains to accommodate the specificities of, in this case, Cherokee removal. As will be discussed in the first chapter, the Cherokees had indeed always had a government of their own, but it was traditionally comprised of semi-autonomous, matriarchal, and clan-based townships, structures whose legitimacy is at best deflected in the phrase "savage laws." The very policy measures that Boudinot here implicitly validates were crucial in moving away from these institutions. Furthermore, by 1829 there were effectively not one but two Cherokee governments: the one that Boudinot represented and the other consisting of Lower Town Cherokees who had emigrated west more than a decade earlier. Conversely, treating Eaton's comments as an extension of Jackson's racism (and/or of a systemic racism) effaces how the tension between South Carolina and the federal government on the issue of nullification inflects removal discourse. Cracking down on South Carolina and Georgia would have forfeited Jackson's ethos as a states' rights advocate and weakened his shot at reelection in 1832. Political motivations aren't the only factor(s) complicating this equation, however. That Georgia's actions intensified after the discovery of gold suggests that the market value of Cherokee land, as an additional source of state revenue played into the racist rhetoric circulating around Native groups in the region as much as any concern over the legitimacy of state sovereignty and territorial control.

And the interpretative dilemmas do not end there. Patricia Limerick observes that scholarship on the American West has tended to iron out the complexity of events until "the tales reach compliance with the platitude 'There are two sides to every story,'" despite that "in the history of the encounter between Indian peoples and EuroAmericans,
'two sides' is an astonishing undercount" (xviii). One can argue that historicizing settler colonialism faces the same conundrum, albeit on the other side of the coin. Although Eaton and Boudinot's exchange suggests a metaphor for Indians' struggles against colonial and U.S. depredations writ large, reflecting a chicanery seemingly fundamental to Anglo dealings with Indigenous peoples over time together with its unmasking by the latter, the historical facts themselves do not comply. They not only resist being marshalled into such a tidy Indian-Anglo binary, but they threaten to disarticulate it from the inside.

If our understanding of the motivations and mechanics of U.S. Indian policy during the early-antebellum era does not easily conform to the period's own political, cultural, and juridical dichotomies, though, such that the Indian/Anglo binary proves a distorting rather than a revelatory paradigm, then how does one examine the relationship between Native dispossession, (settler) sovereignty, and history at this crucial juncture? First, this project's focus on a very narrow period intends to control for the drift toward a uniform binary that becomes more cumbersome and problematic when stretched over long periods of history. But is it enough to supplement dominant historiography with more nuanced, local histories focused on specific episodes or events within the larger narrative of historical dispossession?

Linda Tuhiwai Smith answers this question with a resounding No. "History," she writes, "is mostly about power. It is the story of the powerful and how they became powerful," further adding that this "relationship with power" contributes to the colonial status quo in which Indigenous peoples are "excluded, marginalized, and 'Othered'"
(Smith 35). From this view, history is not that important for Natives, since "a thousand accounts of the 'truth' will not alter the 'fact' that Indigenous peoples are still marginal and do not possess the power to transform history into justice" (ibid.). Put simply, calling for more history (or more literary studies, anthropology, etc.) does nothing for Native peoples if that call takes settler sovereignty for granted. As Elizabeth Cook-Lynn writes, the perpetual failure of "American scholars" to confront "their own history and treatment of the indigenes, and how they have allowed their interpretation of that history to shape their own cultural identities" has contributed to a "fog of history obscuring the idea that tribal nations are extraconstitutional" entities (24).

The dominant approach to Indian history, typified for her by a text like Dee Brown's Bury my Heart at Wounded Knee, fails to grasp, despite the apparent political sympathy, that Native nations "do not exist as a part of the U.S. constitutional structure," that they remain, in other words, "separate countries" (Cook-Lynn 24). By contrast, what might be termed settler historicity does not initially appear that much different from American exceptionalism, except that it underscores the narrativity and contingency of formations that the latter presents as having a truth-value or certainty embodied in the past itself. Both cohere around some notion of the people, an artificial unity that, like the state it is taken to reflect, emerges as rooted in the land itself. Put simply, from one angle the form of appearance of both settler historicity and American exceptionalism alike is simply History. Again, as Hayden White has argued, “the authority of the historical narrative is the authority of reality itself...the historical account endows this reality with form” (20).
Accordingly, these chapters should not necessarily be understood as presenting a muted dialogue between non-Native writers and political figures and their Native counterparts. The focus on representations of Indianness across these chapters does not mean to suggest that different settler actors and Indigenous groups were, or are, equal participants within a zero-sum struggle over territory. I agree with Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz's assessment that part of the problem with contemporary literary scholarship dealing with Native matters lies with "trendy postmodern studies" centered on conceptions of Indian-Anglo encounter that presuppose, if not a specific modality of communication or cultural connection that traverses the Indian-Anglo divide, a notion of dialogue that transcends the factors and forces of dispossession (5). Heavily influenced by Richard White's opus *The Middle Ground*, recent scholarship on varieties of the Indian-Anglo encounter, for instance by Joshua David Bellin, Laura Mielke, and Phillip Round and exemplified by the recent anthology *Native Acts: Indian Performance, 1603-1832*, focus on issues of "'cultural change' and 'conflict between cultures,'" anthropological updates of Mary Louise Pratt's contact zone that paradoxically enable academics to avoid "fundamental questions of the formation of the United States and its implications for the present and future" (Dunbar-Ortiz 5). As Dunbar-Ortiz suggests, such work is merely the latest incarnation of a model of cultural inclusivity that became the vanguard of historical revisionism borne of the spirit of the 1960s. Despite its progressive ideals, this methodological shift would not extend to the colonization of Native peoples in the U.S., since the "fundamental unresolved issues of Indigenous lands, treaties, and sovereignty could not but scuttle the premises of multiculturalism" (5).
Therefore, the aim in demonstrating the geographic divergence among historicizations of settler presence (and Indian absence) and the responses by Indigenous actors (Indian presence and settler contingency) is *not* to try to reflect the whole story, so to speak, of antebellum removal. "Awareness of the settler-colonialist context of US history writing," Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz argues, "is essential if one is to avoid the laziness of the default position and the trap of a mythological unconscious belief in manifest destiny" (6). Rather than interpret this mandate as a call for studies of the antebellum period that will supplement and perhaps deconstruct the dominant narrative of Indian removal, this project displaces the settler-colonialist context(s) of US history writing into a geographic and geopolitical paradigm that does not presume the centrality or givenness of the state. Put another way, instead of amounting to another ur-narrative organized around an Indian-Anglo binary, the settler-colonialist context of US history writing itself is here the object of analysis. Reading two or more non-native texts against a familiar Native text is designed to emphasize the manner in which historicity enters as a means of retroactively consolidating settler claims to Native space, on one hand, and providing a means of resistance for Native actors at the level of knowledge-production, on the other. However, this dynamic varies from region to region, and as such it is irreducible to a single binary consisting of white settler actors racializing and thereby negating the claims of Indians. This study accordingly comprises an effort to demonstrate the multivalence of struggles organized around/over the land and the way(s) in which historicity works as a maneuver within these struggles, which I contend are as irreducible to a single Indian/Anglo binary as their respective spaces.
The first chapter, "Indianizing Cherokee Civilization: Historicizing (Settler) Sovereignty in the Native Southeast," focuses on the ways in which positing an anachronistic Indian savagery helped to cohere different and, at times, competing claims to Cherokee space in the shift from civilization to removal policy. The chapter essentially argues that specific portraits of Indian savagery correspond with specific juridical dilemmas involving settler actors; these portraits enable otherwise overlapping, partial, and contingent (and wholly illegitimate) claims to Cherokee land to appear grounded in a transcendent historical necessity, to the exclusion of competing claims. After tracing this dynamic in William Gilmore Simms's story "The Two Camps," which I argue attempts to supplement state claims to Cherokee space by insisting on the irredeemable savagery of the Cherokee, I turn to Elias Boudinot's famous 1826 text "An Address to the Whites." I argue here that, in light of the ways in which the discourse of anachronistic savagery coheres the shift away from civilization policy, one can read Boudinot as appropriating the figure of the Indian savage as a means of legitimizing Cherokee civilization for a non-Native audience.

The second chapter, "Historicizing Indian Character in New England: (Dis)placing Native Sovereignty in Child, Sedgwick, and Apess," suggests that the mythos of noble Indian character as it surfaces in literary discourses in New England helps to consolidate the continued, exploitive supervision of reservation communities. The chapter explores Lydia Maria Child's *Hobomok* and Catherine Maria Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie*, in terms of the reproduction of a hopelessly idealized and virtuous Indian character. In short, I argue that this character enables both writers to imagine nascent
American republicanism as an inherently egalitarian formation, albeit one within which residual forms of Old World tyranny obscure and impede the possibility of realizing its true social potential. Both novels imagine Indian character as ethical, self-sacrificing, and fated to introject itself into settlement in ways that help to clarify and thereby propel the state's own commitment to civil liberty. However, in so doing, they simultaneously participate in longstanding notions of an authentic Indian character permanently lost to history, notions that were integral to the emergence of the guardian and reservation systems. As against this kind of permanently deferred Indian nobility, William Apess's *Eulogy on King Philip* draws on the symbolic currency associated with such character to render ongoing struggles against settler oppression visible to a non-Native audience. In so doing, Apess reverses the valence of such virtue. His text brackets a historicity that casts Indigenous peoples, especially in New England, as having degraded beyond a primordial Indian virtue; it thereby represents ongoing settler colonialism for an audience not accustomed to such a concept.

The third and final chapter in the project is "Realizing Native Dispossession in the Old Northwest: Frontier Historicity, Territory, and Indian Withdrawal in Kirkland and Black Hawk." In it, I argue that settler expansion into the region known as the Old Northwest involves representing the territory in terms of frontier historicity. In essence, the figure of the frontier works to deflect place-based Native sovereignty in portraying a sense of the landscape as already characterized by Indian withdrawal. However, rather than simply justifying expansion after the fact, the trope of Indian withdrawal is prevalent in the earliest geopolitical discourse on the region (in a U.S. context). From this angle,
this narrativity is integral to the geopolitical sense of the territory in the first place, and it primarily works to undermine, in advance, forms of Native political autonomy that pose a threat to U.S. claims. In foregrounding the trope of Indian withdrawal as a geopolitical maneuver, I discuss how Kirkland's text incorporates this historicity and, as such, helps to legitimize settler claims to space, even as the text is critical of the forms of predatory banking that destabilize the national economy. The chapter then turns to Black Hawk's text, which I situate as intervening in the transiting (in Jodi Byrd's sense) of regional Indigenous space to the United States. Black Hawk's biography draws on the trope of Indian withdrawal, but in mobilizing the frame of receding Indianness, it effectively re-historicizes the Black Hawk War, resisting the binary logic of the frontier and, instead, portraying settler expansion into the region as comprised by a series of largely fraudulent and violent maneuvers against place-based Indigenous alliance networks.
CHAPTER II
INDIANIZING CHEROKEE CIVILIZATION: HISTORICIZING (SETTLER) SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NATIVE SOUTHEAST

For supporters of the Indian Removal Act (1830), the notion that the Indian was inexorably mired in an earlier stage of history supported the view that civilization policy failed in presuming that Natives could be assimilated. Just weeks prior to the signing of the Treaty of New Echota (1835) legalizing Cherokee removal, President Jackson asserted before Congress, “All preceding experiments for the improvement of the Indians have failed” and that it seemed “an established fact that they can not live in contact with a civilized community and prosper” (Jackson 22). Southern politicians reiterated these claims after the Cherokees' forced removal four years later. In an 1840 address to the Georgia Historical Society, Judge William Law, who had earlier served on the panel in Georgia v. Tassels (1830), affirmed that the "Cherokees of Georgia formed no essential exception to the universal failure" of civilization policy: while “[g]lowing descriptions [had] indeed been given of their rapid march...notwithstanding individual instances of decided improvement and advancement, the great body of the tribe remained, despite of all efforts, unchanged and unchangeable" (Law 18).¹ Insofar as Law and Jackson indirectly refer to the process of westernization spurred by elite Cherokees beginning in the early-nineteenth century, the racism underlying these and similar statements appears obvious. Nonetheless, reading such assertions as expressions of racism obscures their political efficacy in consolidating settler sovereignty. Grounding
Cherokee removal in an ontological Indian intractability, a construct verified by history, gives it a retroactive moral necessity that belies its political contingency.

This chapter will argue that such assertions are integral to making historicity function as an extra-political claim to Cherokee lands. In positing the irreducible limitations of the Indian subject, Law and Crawford render an impression of narrative closure, a portrait of historical necessity, that displaces not only the different politico-juridical crises faced by Georgia and the federal government, but the difference between these crises as well. Beyond a symptom of the racialization of Indians, however, I suggest that the moral necessity organized around Indianness derives from the narrativity put into motion through civilization discourse. Representing the contingency of settler land claims as necessities born out of a specific portrait of Native abjection casts the norms and forms of settler civilization as constitutive of the political and juridical orders writ large. Accordingly, these statements more than justify removal after the fact. For the texts that follow, narrating an anachronistic Indian identity as the supposedly real, historical grounding of the social body functions as an extra-political claim to Cherokee territory in the face of a Cherokee Nation refusing to remove. However, insofar as civilization discourse itself retroactively generates this supposed historical relationship between a more or less generic Indianness and what constitutes normative belonging or peoplehood, I argue that such historicity was not only available but indispensable to elite Cherokees. Elias Boudinot's "An Address to the Whites" appropriates this same narrativity toward historicizing Cherokee nationhood in terms a settler public would understand as demonstrating authentic progress and a legitimate claim to place.
Foregounding the role of Indianness in consolidating extra-political claims to Native land in the southeast builds from the insight that typifying Native peoplehood as a residual and stunted formation justifies U.S. expansionism. The dominant framework for conceiving this process has been the civilized/savage binary. Kevin Bruyneel argues that this binary rationalizes U.S. Indian policy by enabling “the dominant group [to form] the boundaries of its own internal identification by...establishing what the group is not via the construction of a 'constitutive outside'” (8). Inscribing this outside in forms of Native peoplehood reaffirms settler sovereignty by casting the state as entitled to rule and accordingly licensed to deflect and negate Native land claims. Similarly, Joanne Barker contends that framing Natives as lacking “the full qualities of sovereign nations...because they had not evolved into civilization, into an agricultural society in which people owned and cultivated the land for God and country” enabled early architects of U.S. Indian policy to position the federal government as the "absolute authority to recognize tribes as dependent and uncivilized" and then subjugate these peoples "to its power" (33). In foregrounding the role that (representations of) indigenous peoples play in U.S. political and cultural formations, this work has crucially positioned settler colonialism as central rather than peripheral to U.S. political and social intelligibility.

I part with the civilized/savage paradigm, however, to the degree that it posits a uniform, binary racialization as the catalyst for southeastern removal. Reflecting on the role that race played in the move away from "the Enlightenment dream" of Indian assimilation central to civilization policy, Reginald Horsman writes that, by the early-nineteenth century, decades of conflict between Natives and settlers in the southeast
“served to confirm the frontiersman and their representatives in their hatred of the Indians” (55).² Albeit inadvertently, this statement shows how the focus on racialization tends to subjectivize the turn toward removal, endowing it with a narrative coherence that its unfolding never had. Instead of foregrounding a binary racialization as the historical cause of this turn, my argument begins from Michel Foucault's methodological insight that the unities (the positivities, objects, or concepts) of a discourse must be pulled apart from their "virtual self-evidence" in order to determine what questions and relations they enable (AK 24). From this view, the shift toward Cherokee removal exceeds the framework of a binary project of racialization insofar as civilization discourse never offered, nor did it seek to offer, an adequate reflection of southeastern Native peoples qua Indians. As Foucault might put it, such Indianness was never “the verbal translation of a previously established synthesis,” nor its mistranslation in retrospect, but rather an effect of power relations working across multiple fields of knowledge (AK 55). The Indianization of the Cherokee as anachronistic savages intensifies from within the frame of civilization discourse as a means of historicizing the success or failure of this same policy, and as such it is embedded in the growing struggle for sovereignty over Cherokee land.

Bracketing the binary focus on race enables new questions regarding Cherokee removal to come into view. For instance, T. Hartley Crawford, a Jacksonian Congressman from Pennsylvania and later Commissioner of Indian Affairs under Martin Van Buren, paints a very different picture of Indian anachronism than that of Law's unchangeable Cherokees, despite the fact that both men supported removal. In 1838, just
months after Cherokee removal had begun, Crawford proposed to Congress his plans for Natives both recently removed to Indian Territory and those peoples, like the Osage, who were already there. Linking education in manual labor to their capacity future socialization, he writes that to "teach a savage man to read, while he continues a savage in all else is to throw a seed on a rock” and that saving the Indian from the "idleness of his life" requires first improving "his morals…by teaching him how to farm" (420). Both Law and Crawford posit Natives as primitive and anachronistic. Yet Crawford implies that they might still be assimilated as citizen-subjects through manual labor, despite both Law’s 1840 assertion that Cherokees were in fact “unchanged and unchangeable” and the earlier Tassels' decision that similarly argues Indians had remained fixed in a state of imbecility since discovery. How can we have two opposing views on Cherokee "civilization" by men otherwise ideologically aligned as advocates of removal and states' rights more generally? Were they not prone to the same racist attitudes that invoked relatively fixed images of “Indian” difference?

The discrepancy between the portraits of Indianness offered by Law and Crawford shows not only that the recourse to Indian anachronism for policy justification is systemically uneven, dependent upon who needs to justify what with regard to Cherokee land. It also demonstrates how historicizing Indianness resolves these very gaps and contradictions in the form and/or degree of Indian incapacity narrated. The specific features of this incapacity register as the ontological root of Natives' preclusion from normative settler society and sovereignty in ways that retroactively legitimize the particular needs of the actor in question. Georgia does not have to explain its illegal and
genocidal actions in pressuring the Cherokee Nation and forcing removal since Indians were immutable after all. By contrast, the federal government still has a moral obligation to uplift the Indians recently removed insofar as Indians can indeed be assimilated and redeemed.

After providing a brief political overview of the transition from civilization to removal policy, the chapter will explore the different juridical articulations of Indianness in relation either to a civilizing Cherokee Nation or its memory. Juxtaposing Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) and Georgia v. Tassels with Crawford's 1838 statement shows how Indianness yields a subjectivity with different consequences for state, federal, and Native sovereignty rooted in the same concepts mobilized by civilization policy and/or the doctrine of discovery. The point developed here is that inquiry into the historicity of Native peoplehood yields portraits of Indianness that differ in accordance with the juridical and/or political needs of specific settler actors at a particular time, suggesting that the discursivity of Indian subjectivity renders historicity available as an extra-juridical maneuver within a juridical and political frame. The chapter will then turn to Law's 1840 oration and William Gilmore Simms' 1843 short story “The Wigwam and the Cabin” to examine how, beyond removal, the crisis of sovereignty shifts form: what does it mean that political and archival history now includes the forced removal of a civilizing Indian people? How does the presence of this memory impact the givenness of Georgia history as a claim to place? Here, Indianness provides the basis for imagining a historical relation to land organized around the moral necessity of settler peoplehood given the historical inertia of Indian savagery. Finally, the chapter will close with a discussion of
Boudinot's 1826 “An Address to the Whites.” Scholarship on this essay largely presents it as rife with "cultural" contradictions. However, I argue that Boudinot deploys a generic Indianness as a frame for his identity in order to represent Cherokee progress as an authentic historical movement, a becoming of the Cherokee people. The text accordingly appropriates the same narrativity as the settler actors discussed. Mobilizing the historicity made available through discourses of inassimilable and residual Indian savagery enables Boudinot to register place-based Cherokee sovereignty for a non-Native audience.

**Revising State Sovereignty: Historicizing Indianness in the Wake of Cherokee Civilization**

Reading Boudinot's “An Address to the Whites” as legitimizing/historicizing Cherokee nationhood by appropriating figurations of Indian savagery requires situating the latter in the context of federal efforts to civilize the Cherokee. At the same time, providing historical background on these efforts will help to frame this historicity as an extra-juridical maneuver, one that emerges to resolve the different juridical dilemmas created by a civilizing Cherokee Nation. In the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, Washington's Secretary of War Henry Knox argued that promoting missionary societies, western-style education, and surplus farming among Native peoples bordering the U.S. would make them more open to land cessions. In addition to purchasing lands illegally encroached upon by settlers, early treaties between the U.S. and the Cherokee included provisions for distributing “livestock, agricultural implements, tools, and instruction,” as Theda Perdue and Michael Green observe, “so that Indians could be transformed from
hunters to farmers and herders” (Cherokee Nation 27). As Natives morphed into proto-nuclear family units modeled after idealized patterns of settler home-making and agrarianism, they would realize that they did not need so much land. This policy approach was rooted in wishful thinking, however. Its implicit function was to deter full-scale war with the Cherokees (unfeasible given the federal government's depleted resources) while deferring the question of the status of Native sovereignty.

Time was on the United States' side insofar as a metaphysics of husbandry promised to dismantle sovereign Cherokee peoplehood from the inside out. Yet, things changed as the push to assimilate Cherokees led them to adapt westernized forms of governance as a means of resisting further land cessions. Removal then emerged as an alternative policy option in the early-nineteenth century, fueled both by Georgia's designs on Cherokee land and a growing rift between Upper and Lower Town Cherokees centered on the latter's mistrust of westernization and frustrations with illegal settler emigration. Jefferson first proposed voluntary removal as a negotiation tactic to get southern states to quit their competing claims to lands later covered by the Louisiana purchase, claims that supposedly derived from their respective colonial charters. As the last state to hold out, Georgia agreed in the Compact of 1802 to cede its claims to the U.S. in exchange for the termination of all Native claims within its borders. Federal efforts to force southeastern natives either to accept allotments or relocate west of the Mississippi then ramped up.

The U.S. persuaded large groups of Lower Town Cherokees to emigrate in 1809 and 1819. This pressure only galvanized Cherokee political reorganization, especially in
the wake of the Treaty of Fort Jackson (1814) which saw the Creek cede to the U.S. 23 million acres as compensation for the Red Stick War (Heidler 13). Formed in 1809 to advise the National Council in its negotiations with the U.S, the Cherokee Standing Committee morphed in 1817 into the National Committee, an elite panel that worked to prevent land cessions by reinforcing a nationalist ideology in the Council. The Cherokee Nation soon passed laws preventing the sale of land by emigrating Cherokees, revoking the Chickamauga emigrants' citizenship, and establishing the death penalty for anyone who sold land without its consent. Finally, in a shift away from governance through decentralized, matrilineal clan networks, an 1820 law created a bicameral legislature with eight districts, each with a court that answered to one of four circuit judges, and 32 Council members; the Committee was fixed at 13 members selected by the Council for two-year terms (Garrison 55).

This process of political adaptation soon culminated in the 1827 adoption of a constitution modeled after that of the United States, a move that Georgia saw as plainly violating the Compact of 1802. The mounting tension between already conflicting state and federal powers, on one hand, and a Cherokee Nation increasingly recognized as "civilizing" on the other, climaxed with the discovery in 1828 of gold in Dahlonega, a Cherokee town within the lands claimed by Georgia. Beyond dramatically worsening settler incursions and violence, the discovery led the state government to annex a large segment of Cherokee territory within its claimed borders. In 1829, the state extended jurisdiction over the remaining territory supposedly under its purview, nullifying Cherokee governance and authorizing the militia to seize those who violated Georgia
These actions set the stage for two Supreme Court cases, *Cherokee Nation v Georgia* (1831) and *Worcester v Georgia* (1832), that would establish important precedents for future Indian policy but did little at the time to limit Georgia's actions. In the former, Justice John Marshall ruled that since Native nations are domestic dependents rather than foreign nations proper (the genesis of the ward-guardian paradigm for U.S.-indigenous relations), the Supreme Court conveniently lacked proper jurisdiction. Since it could not hear the case, it could not determine if Georgia's laws violated U.S. treaties with the Cherokee or whether they exceeded the powers constitutionally allotted to states.

In *Worcester v. Georgia*, the Supreme Court in an appellate decision argued that Georgia both violated the U.S. constitution and infringed upon the Cherokee Nation as a “distinct, independent political community, with boundaries accurately described,” although Marshall framed these communities in terms of the newly formulated ward-guardian relationship with the federal government (*Worcester v. Georgia* 184). Despite their ardent resistance, however, Elizur Butler and Samuel Worcester, ABCFM missionaries whose arrest for working in Cherokee territory created the case, requested a pardon from Georgia governor George Lumpkin. Other southern states then proceeded with their own territorial agendas, virtually mocking the decision. Taken together, Georgia's annexation laws, years of unchecked emigration, and the federal government's de facto commitment to removal splintered elite Cherokee leadership into two groups: the anti-removal majority associated with Chief John Ross and the treaty party, led by John Ridge, Stand Watie, and Elias Boudinot. After Alabama and Tennessee followed Georgia's lead in seizing Cherokee territory, the treaty party, or Ridge faction, signed the
Treaty of New Echota without the support or approval of the National Council. Despite petitions and memorials facilitated by Ross calling for the treaty to be nullified, federal troops captured the remaining Cherokees on their lands in Georgia in 1838 and imprisoned them in stockades. They would be released a few months later to begin a forced march to Indian territory.¹¹

Discourses of Indian savagery are integral to the unfolding of these events. To the degree that efforts by the Cherokee elite to represent the adaptation of settler cultural and political-economic forms as progress reinforced an underlying claim to political sovereignty, they provoked questions about the territorial and juridical limits of state and federal power. In so doing, Indian claims to civilization problematized settler sovereignty as merely an extension of the norms and forms associated with U.S. politics and settler sociality more generally. The emergence around this time of concerns over the legality of a state within a state (imperium in imperio) reflects this problematization.¹² Furthermore, that these concerns were coextensive with a turn toward the positively archaic doctrine of discovery to determine the scope both of federal and Native sovereignty alike suggests that intensified portraits of Indian savagery reinforced the primacy of settler claims to place by enabling their historicization where juridical claims stumbled. Although this turn initially occurs in *Fletcher v. Peck* (1810), the Marshall court would offer a more nuanced portrait of the powers conferred through discovery in *Johnson v. McIntosh* (1823).

While *Johnson* does not directly involve the Cherokee, the historicity that it makes available as a legal precedent for settler sovereignty would provide Georgia with
crucial ammunition to defend its claims. In a way, one can view Marshall's arguments in both *Cherokee Nation* and *Worcester* as mitigating the effects of rendering a fantastic(ally overdetermined) narrative of discovery as the real historical basis for a notion of Native occupancy. For Marshall, the event of discovery apparently yielded two methods for terminating an already limited native title: “discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or conquest [and] a right to such degree of sovereignty as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise” (*Johnson* 8).13 Invoking settlers' limited “circumstances” already indicates the paradox of this ruling. If the doctrine of discovery magically triggers absolute rights to land, why turn to the role that practical contingency played in supposedly creating them? Doesn't narrating the historical contingencies involved in the creation of supposedly absolute powers over territory already negate any claim to the absoluteness of those powers? Marshall perhaps means to suggest that the only real contingency involved concerns the mode(s) of implementing these rights from that point forward, which extends to considering the character and conditions of Natives' resistance to purchase and/or conquest. Yet, the a priori status of the precedent appears already undermined by the historicity that throws it into relief in the first place.

The reason the ruling moves to the historicity of the rights created at discovery seems clear. Turning to such an archaic doctrine obviously begs the question of its juridical relevance within a modern U.S. context, but this opening allows Marshall to develop what amounts to a genealogy of settler sovereignty, presented as a history of the transfer of the rights of discoverers. He argues that the “power possessed by...the United
States to grant lands, resided, while we were colonies, in the crown,” that this power has been “exercised uniformly” over lands held by natives, and finally that, since its validity “has never been questioned, its continued existence...must negative the existence of any right which may conflict” with it, namely the idea of “an absolute and complete title in the Indians” (Johnson 17, sic). Federal sovereignty derives from discovery insofar as the privileges generated by that event have been uniformly enacted over time, with consistency and without challenge. The reasoning is clearly tautological, but the pivot toward historical narrative within the decision itself generates the backdrop that supposedly necessitates the powers that Marshall describes as unfolding logically from this imaginary point in the past. This double maneuver comes together in the ruling’s emphasis on the “uniformity” of the power inaugurated at discovery. Insisting on the historical continuity of settler sovereignty tries to shore up a narrative whose very necessity precludes the rights that it supposedly confers. The underlying problem with the ruling, then, is that as federal juridical sovereignty and Native occupancy come to find common ground in the rights and relations among settlers and Natives created at discovery, the juridical relevance of this necessity seems further away, only really cohering in the narrative of historical continuity, speculative at best, by which Marshall links the present with the distant past.

The buck only stops at the imagined wildness of Indians themselves, a savagery whose historical consistency grounds settler sovereignty as a function of conquest. Marshall argues at length that settler “claims [to land] have been maintained and established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword,” suggesting that U.S. rights
to land were sustained over time by one of the two modes allotted by the doctrine of
discovery (Johnson 18). Conquest then describes the real history that followed
discovery. Yet, this concept's position begins to shift here. Initially one of two seemingly
abstract modes of enacting the powers of discovery, "conquest" now also names the
history that retroactively legitimizes the juridical integrity of that event: “However
extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into
conquest may appear...if a country has been acquired and held under it,” then it
necessarily “becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned” (Johnson 19).

Historical and juridical necessity coalesce, however, in a reflection on Indian polities:
“Although we do not mean to [defend] those principles which Europeans have applied to
Indian title,” they may nevertheless “find some excuse...in the character and habits of the
people whose rights have been wrested from them”; “the tribes of Indians...were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn...from the forest”
(Johnson 18). Representing Indians as irrational and unproductive in both their
apparently intractable tendencies toward warfare and their reliance on hunting creates and
sustains a historical narrative that frames the "right to occupancy" as an adequate
retrospective conceptualization of Natives' supposedly authentic and more or less
consistent mode of existence. As civilization advanced, Indians gradually left the “soil, to
which the crown originally claimed title...no longer occupied” (Johnson 19). The shift to
historicizing intractable Indian savagery lends the ruling a narrative cohesion that covers
over Marshall's waffling logic.
The civilizing Cherokee Nation appears exempt from this story, however, an omission that Georgia duly noted. *Johnson v. McIntosh* proved integral to the legal defense of Georgia's assault on the Cherokee Nation in *Georgia v. Tassels*. In Elizabeth Povinelli's terms, Marshall's historical analysis of the smooth conquest of Indian savagery situates territorial sovereignty as a “materiality of inheritance,” a fantasy “of substance that posits a material legacy beyond the control of a person or society” (203). Rather than simply legitimizing U.S. title over its Indian counterpart, Indian fierceness yields a historicity that situates the juridical order writ large as a material consequence of Native peoples' irreducible incompatibility with settler governance. Put another way, ontologizing Indianness (as unproductive “fierceness” over time) renders a narrative that precludes any Native sovereignty beyond occupancy insofar as real, savage “Indians” fought settlers and lost, leaving the land to those who followed in the wake of these battles. Yet the court likely didn't anticipate that “Indian” incompatibility would provide a juridical template for those antagonistic toward federal and Cherokee sovereignty alike, giving states' rights advocates a means to limit both at once.

Despite not receiving as much attention as the Supreme Court decisions, *Georgia* offers perhaps the most concise and provocative synthesis of Georgia's claims to Cherokee territory. It would also prove influential as other southeastern states turned to the courts to dismantle Native sovereignty within their borders. The case involved a Cherokee man, George “Corn” Tassels, accused of murdering another Cherokee within their territory. Drawing on the authority of civil and criminal codes extended illegally through annexation, the state militia seized Tassels before he could be tried by the
Cherokee government. That this action violated both Article 1, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution (which gives Congress the right to regulate commerce with native groups) and existing treaties between the U.S. and the Cherokees was no problem, though, as the state intended to use this case to legitimize its prior legislative maneuvers. The historicity generated in *Johnson* would allow the Georgia judges to argue that, insofar as the state's colonial charter manifested the powers created at discovery regarding the lands in question, the state rather than federal government was the true sovereign power over the Cherokee in Georgia.

However, appropriating Marshall's precedent of discovery as conferring absolute powers to conquering nations entails a revision of *Johnson*'s historicity of conquest. This revision occurs through a shift in the portrait of Indianness that sustains the narrative and juridical validity of reading contemporary state sovereignty as a real extension of those powers. The judges first assert that the relationship between the state of Georgia and the Cherokee derives from “the principles established by England towards the Indian tribes occupying that part of North American which that power colonized” (*State* 157). The ruling appears initially concerned to root settler sovereignty in the colonization of particular lands. Framing the rights conferred via discovery as contingent upon the colonization of specific lands enables them to build on certain elements from *Johnson*, especially the notion that Europe claimed “‘ultimate dominion,’” while departing from others, like Native occupancy (ibid.). Presented in this way, settler sovereignty reads as a place-based power. While public opinion and conduct toward Indians may change dramatically over time, as “strongly marked in the records,” these changes do not impact
the “actual relations which ought to exist, and do actually exist between governments formed by European descendants and the aboriginal tribes” (State 156). For Georgia, discovery quite literally grounds a sovereignty that cannot change over time.

From there, the ruling attacks the basis for recognizing Native sovereignty already mobilized by Cherokee advocates. They argue for instance that the federal regulation of commerce between Native nations and settler citizens proves that the Cherokee do not constitute a sovereign state. They also observe that, since “no treaty can be found” in which an “Indian tribe” has agreed to allow another government to “alienate and transfer its territory,” the inability of the Cherokee Nation to cede its land to anyone but “the State of Georgia [and] the United States,” per the notion of occupancy, shows that discovery founds an “exclusive legal right” of settlers “to the land within their charter” (State 159). These arguments anticipate the panel's key departure from Johnson in the portrait of Indian imbecility. Where Marshall specified two modes of terminating Native title (purchase and conquest) with the supposed “fierceness” of Indian resistance to settler immigrations generating a history of conflict legitimizing federal oversight, Georgia offers two different paths, amalgamation and colonization, arguing instead that the “habit, manners, and imbecile intellect of the Indians” at discovery made both untenable (State v. Tassels 161). Judged incapable of complying either “with the obligations which the laws of civilized society imposed, or of being subjected to any [such] code of laws,” Indians lived in a territorial and juridical limbo (ibid.). Where Marshall references a potent and organized militarized Native resistance (implying some degree of territorial autonomy), Georgia posits Indianness as a subjective predisposition toward stuntedness, an
atemporal and ontological lack that renders Natives, then and now, incapable of any collective agency whatsoever. Neither violent resistance nor treaty agreements, in other words, would reflect the minimal, reflexive awareness required even for a limited conception of Native title.

The shift toward an enduring Indian imbecility accordingly casts Marshall's categories of conquest and purchase as misunderstanding the doctrine of discovery. Yet, insofar as federal courts held judicial review, such a claim lacked the juridical authority to overrule the precedent for federal oversight established via those categories.¹⁵ This image of imbecility, however, as denoting an intractability effectively unchanged since discovery, less justifies Georgia's claims than it retroactively realigns the supposed powers created at discovery fully with the “common mass of discoverers,” a phrase (awkwardly) gesturing to an originary settler public entitled to Cherokee land (State 161). In this way, ontologizing a static Indian imbecility allows the panel to revise the geopolitical history of conquest in Johnson and, therefore, to draw on its articulation of sovereignty while suiting that concept to its own ends. Unlike in Johnson, the Indians of Georgia do not move at all, except to make “secret and bloody attacks upon white settlements” (State 162).¹⁶ Rather, society developed in their midst as a function of the privileges accorded to those original “discoverers,” privileges that implied a certain responsibility toward the unfortunately stunted Indians despite their occasional aggressions. “Humanity” required, the panel argues, that these peoples “should be permitted to live according to their customs and manners; and that they should be protected in their existence, under these customs and usages, as long as they chose to
adhere to them” (*State* 161). Confronted with a stunted population and the paradox it entailed for the normal modes of enacting sovereign powers, the originary “common mass” of settlers tolerated Indians in accordance with the principle, if not the protocols, of a sovereignty grounded in discovery.

The aim in comparing the different historicizations of Indianness in *Johnson* and *Georgia* is not simply to show that federal and state powers alike turned to racist justifications for settler sovereignty. Rather, the narrativity of Indianness qua savagery yields competing settler actors a particular historicity suited to the unique juridical and territorial dilemmas posed by a civilizing Cherokee Nation. Jill Norgren argues that the *Georgia* ruling shows that the core principle of the doctrine of discovery, as established in *Fletcher* and *Johnson,* "encouraged state officials to make the claim that their extension of state jurisdiction over the Cherokees was legal” (95). Instead of merely rationalizing otherwise illegal maneuvers, however, I would argue that the turn to imbecility in *Georgia* sustains a genealogy within which the legislative annexation of Cherokee territory and the extension of criminal and civil jurisdiction over it are always-already legal. Casting Indians' primordial stuntedness as historically ossified renders the colonial charter as an expression not only of an originary power dynamic, but of one that has never changed. The powers created at discovery through the colonization of Georgia's lands remain embodied in the settler public that still exists on the lands specified by the charter, and the latter's continued legitimacy, as validated by the federal government in the Compact of 1802, attests to this fundamental dynamic. By contrast, Marshall's history of conquest reads as a narrative embellishment hiding the fact that federal sovereignty is
an unlawful usurpation of states' rights, given that it lacks the necessary grounding in a place-based relationship organized at discovery.

Yet, these portraits of Indianness do not neatly correspond with an intensifying states rights' debate. Jackson's administration resuscitates Georgia's portrait of Indian imbecility after the Indian Removal Act for opposite ends: as the basis for a discourse of moral improvement and labor justifying a new Indian policy, as reflected in his 1835 insistence to Congress of the need “to protect and if possible preserve and perpetuate the scattered remnants of this race” (“Message...1835” 22). This newfound confidence in the possibility of Indians' social redemption presupposes a shift in the portrait of imbecility as inexorably, ontologically static, a shift corresponding with the multi-faceted problem created in removing southeastern native groups, in particular a civilizing Cherokee Nation, to Indian territory. First, the obligation to honor newly determined boundaries per the Indian Removal Act limited the federal government's access to lands it otherwise understood as within its domain. Further, insofar as the Cherokee were removed because they supposedly could not live close to a supposedly civilized public and survive, simply reviving an older civilization policy would not have enabled access to these lands. Finally, although the stunted Indianness of Georgia provides a figure of subjectivity that at the very least deflects the political question of Native sovereignty, U.S. legal geography after removal nonetheless entitles the Cherokee to some place, and states’ rights advocates like Jackson both helped to create and then affirmed this entitlement in pushing for removal.
Written only a few months after the forced removal of Cherokees, the 1838 "Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs" by Indian Commissioner T. Hartley Crawford coalesces this shift in imbecility and the new subversions it allows at the level of federal Indian policy. The problem with Indians, he argues, is that they never learned the value of laboring for private property, which alone can lift them out of the muck of unproductive sociality facilitated and symbolized by their tendency toward shared landholding. Educating Indians in the value of such property holding is crucial, and Crawford suggests that such a program involves vocational training rather than the focus on arts, letters, and spiritual salvation ostensibly characteristic of an older civilization policy. While the "principle lever by which the Indians are to be lifted out of the mire of folly and vice...is education," the "learning of the civilized and cultivated man is not what they want now...You must lay the foundations broadly and deeply, but gradually, if you would succeed" (Crawford 421). Accordingly, to promote literacy and “liberal” learning among Indians, Crawford opines, without first training them in manual labor is to “throw a seed on a rock”; “if you would win an Indian from the waywardness and idleness of his life, you must improve his morals, as well as his mind...by teaching him how to farm, how to work in the mechanic arts, and how to labor profitably” (Crawford 420). For Crawford, only by focusing on the vocational aspects of husbandry and agrarianism (making civilization policy into a 4-H program) can the federal government save Indians from an aimless future. This training will extend the norms and forms of civilization insofar as it targets the working body first. Only then will the mass body, the Indian polity, show signs of development.
In *Georgia*, however, there was no Indian polity. There, ontologizing Indianness as an ossified incapacity for civilized life framed Native peoplehood as a set of arbitrary and static formations, nothing more than habits expressing the irreducible limitations of Indian subjectivity in social terms. Whereas in Crawford's report positing a different essence of imbecility yields a newfound openness to forms of manual training organized around agrarian homemaking, which allows the practice of holding lands in common to be problematized in a set of recommendations to the President and Congress. Describing the pitfalls of communal ownership of land, Crawford warns that if the lands guaranteed to different native groups via treaty continue to be held as "joint property, the ordinary motive to industry (and the most powerful one) will be wanting. A bare subsistence is as much as they can promise themselves. A few acres of badly cultivated corn about their cabins will be seen, instead of extensive fields, rich pastures" (425). Evoking pathetic images of failing farms, dilapidated dwellings, and incipient starvation, this representation of shared landholding reads as impeding the cultivation of normative drives presumed as critical to any and all social development, even as it also poses as symptomatic of the lack of such drives and the society they would sustain. Indian stuntedness registers as a set of habits reinforced by idleness on a broader, sociological scale, and an earlier civilization policy presumably encouraged such idleness insofar as it favored the mind over the body.

The narrativity of Indianness, its capacity to signify at times radically different formations of Native subjectivity and/or sociality by way of the same term, accordingly serves Crawford in qualifying the political status of the peoples removed west of the
Mississippi. However, it does so not only by rendering a supposedly ossified Indian subject now redeemable via "imbecility," but also in maintaining this concept's ostensible grounding in history, thereby mobilizing the symbolic authority that the latter confers to settler actors. Characterizing shared landholding less as a determinate feature of native governance and more as an amalgam of stunted drives situates it as the psychosocial basis for the Indian's lagging behind in the world-historical march of civilization. Should the U.S. fail to seize the opportunity to inculcate an ethic of hard work, along with the normative desire it realizes in the subject, "Laziness and unthrift will be so general as to not be disgraceful," as the "history of the world proves that distinct and separate possessions make those who hold them averse to change" (Crawford 425). Where the norms and forms of labor oriented toward the pursuit of private property manifest an axiomatic historical progress, presumably evidenced in the endurance and growth of the societies they engender, common landholding by contrast suggests less an alternative, and protected, governmentality than retrograde historical movement.

Though one can interpret the text as suggesting that so-called civilization and common property index mutually exclusive formations, this view downplays the critical temporal dynamic at work. As Crawford puts it, “Unless some system is marked out by which there shall be a separate allotment of land to each individual...you will look in vain for any general casting off of savagism. Common property and civilization cannot co-exist” (Crawford 424-5). Common property and the norms and forms of civilization, as organized around the pursuit of private property, are less concretely antagonistic social formations than different polarities (regressive and progressive, respectively) of a world-
historical tendency toward progress. No longer anchored in an immutable ontology, "savagery" problematizes Indian communalism in terms of the tension between imbecility and normative, vocational labor while inflecting this tension with historicity. Cast as a form of savagery, communal landholding indexes a failed and fading past, but not a fated future. Insofar as the self-perpetuating forms of desire integral to the work one does for one's own private property index living history, they index futurity and a way perhaps to save Indians from themselves.

Shifting the narrativity of "imbecility" accordingly introduces a historicity that altogether cleaves questions of governance and sovereignty, however limited, from the reflection on landholding in Indian territory. Suggesting that Indians' "laziness and unthrift" form a vicious cycle of squalor and defeatism recalls Shona Jackson's observation that the “state...force[s] a particular resolution of the ego in favor of political-citizen-subjects” who then reproduce the "forms of capital accumulation or the arrangement of capital” that condition their psychosocial existence; such “labor for being” revolves around an injunction to work that yields “two senses of right (emotive-psychic and material)” (94, 55). Building from Jackson's analysis, the discursivity of Indianness yields a portrait of native plasticity at the level of the laboring body. The form of this usurpation is quite literally a matter of time. Casting the “Indian” as a potential citizen-subject, capable of being straightened into a hard-working, surplus-farming Christian, resolves the problem of extending imperial oversight by representing federal interest in protected native lands as an effort to bring these communities out of the past and into the normative present. Instilling in Native populations, not peoples, a desire for
normative labor registers as a means to improve Indian “waywardness,” thereby transforming native peoplehood from a bunch of lazy communists into a hard-working community de facto annexed to the state in the history to come.

Finally, the trope that coheres this newly discovered urgency, displacing any question of juridical and territorial limits against the backdrop of a seemingly axiomatic world-historical progress, is the normative home. For Crawford, private domesticity organized as proto-nuclear homemaking symbolizes both the foundation and the pinnacle of the history of world civilizations. His recommendations pivot on the assertion that the "foundation of the whole social system lies individuality of property," as the drives reinforced in its pursuit alone have "produced the energy, industry, and enterprise that distinguish the civilized world and contributes more largely to the good morals of men…With it come all the delights that the word home expresses" (425). Internalizing the coordinates of a labor-conditioned desire for the home, then, promises to speed the “Indian” along the course of history and away from savagery, a notion that here maintains the gap between common landholding and legitimate political governance by positioning the former as what the latter leaves behind. Without private property and the desire that it conditions, via the laboring subject, Natives will “never rise beyond a certain point” in world history (Crawford 425). Meaningful social relationships are borne out of the desire for an idealized settler domesticity; reciprocally, the home is the site that (re)conditions the affective bonds comprising normative, supposedly legitimate kinship. Insofar as it also manifests as proto-nuclear homesteading, the desire for the home will
remain a crucial trope for Georgia as it attempts to historicize its newfound belonging after exiling the Cherokees.

**Playing Historian: Familiarizing Settler Belonging After Cherokee Removal**

To this point, I have been tracing the ways in which positing Indian savagery facilitated an extra-juridical historicity by which different settler actors, with different territorial and political agendas, could stake a singular claim to Cherokee space. Each historicization of settler privilege, however, entails a shift in the essence of Indian stuntedness, as this figuration marks the point at which questions of juridical right, increasingly intertwined with the visibility, if not the recognition, of Cherokee "progress," give way to an extra-political narrative of the necessity of civilized intervention. Taken together, these discrepant portraits of Indianness-within-history throw into relief the different and irreducible crises of settler sovereignty created by an apparently civilizing Cherokee Nation. Although the chapter will shortly explore Boudinot's "An Address to the Whites" through this lens, I will first examine William Gilmore Simms's text "The Two Camps" (1843) in terms of the same dynamics. The intent is to show the interplay between historicity, Indianness, and settler normativity as conceptualizing Anglo settlement even beyond Cherokee removal. Doing so will also serve to indicate these factors' embeddedness in Boudinot's earlier context as conditioning, but not wholly determining, the effort to endow Cherokee nationhood with a historicity that would signify a legitimate claim to place.
While the Cherokees' forced march in 1839 gives Georgia territorial and juridical control over the former's lands, the problem of legitimacy does not end there, since history now records what southern lawmakers worked so hard to foreclose, namely an organized Cherokee resistance whose claims manifested an appeal to civilization. Regarding the normative basis of historiography, Hayden White observes that the events of history “appear to be real precisely insofar as they belong to an order of moral existence, just as they derive their meaning from their placement in this order,” adding that such events "find a place in the narrative attesting to their reality" only if they are perceived as either lending "to the establishment of social order or fail[ing] to do so" (23). For White, the task of the historian is always minimally presupposed. Events are only available to historicization if they register some collective morality; at the same time, narrating these events reinforces this sense of the social order as an immanent unfolding of such morality among a population. Historiography would seem to support the retroactive (re)casting of removal in terms of an overlapping ethical and historical necessity, as in the advent of the "people" of the south. Yet, since Georgia used state apparatuses to pursue a deliberate and vicious campaign against a nation claiming civilization, the same events that mandate a return to history also render that return fraught with contradiction. History should reflect the moral necessity of Georgia's relation to the land within its borders, but the reflection itself requires (re)framing a forced removal.

Simms's "The Two Camps" does more than merely supplement a fraught history by way of its fictionalization, however. In claiming to represent the real "border history
of the south," the tale yields a historicity organized around the homesteading settler patriarch, whose willingness to treat Indians fairly reflects a moral edifice that also forecloses possibility of Cherokee civilization (Simms “To Nash Roach” xxxiv). As an effect of a series of uneven political maneuvers and state interventions, however, removal was never perpetuated by a coherent, homogenous settler public in the first place. The "people" supposedly responsible for removal has no concrete historical referent. Still, making this notion appear is indispensable to rendering Cherokee removal meaningful. Simms's need to posit a true history, so to speak, implies Georgia's crisis of belonging, but it also makes possible the appeal to an idealized settler experience that retroactively coheres an imaginary public. Among the “first who settled on the southern borders of North Carolina” and still living “so late as 1817,” Daniel Nelson, the text's protagonist, represents less “the dead body of the fact [than] its living spirit” (Simms “The Two Camps” 33). This spirit, namely that of "old Daniel Boone...a more common one than is supposed,” coalesces around the relationships that emerge in the effort to found a home among hostile Indians (ibid.). In this way, "The Two Camps" provides for (a retroactive fantasy of) a moral relation to the space of Georgia, a relation that eludes historiography proper.

Although not as celebrated today, Simms was widely popular in his own time, making his work an apt vehicle to explore the reconstruction of belonging in the post-removal south. By 1845, he was already known as a literary talent, with Martin Faber: The Story of a Criminal and The Yemassee: A Romance of Carolina, a promising historian with The History of South Carolina, and an emerging critic. The Wigwam and
The Cabin drew positive reviews on both sides of the Atlantic. Edgar Allan Poe claimed it displayed a “genius” that were Simms a “Yankee, would have been rendered immediately manifest to his countrymen.” Following Annette Kolodny, taking Simms at his word that the literary artist is the “true historian” involves attending to the “underlying symbolic and psychological structures that give meaning to history” (The Lay of the Land 116). Simms presents "experience" as indexing such meaning. He writes briefly in the preface of the realistic aspects of his often gothic tales: “I can answer for it, confidently, that these legends represent, in large degree, the border history...I have seen the life—have lived it...my material is the result of a very early personal experience” (Simms “To Nash Roach” xxxiv). In fact, The Wigwam and the Cabin was initially planned as one book of a two-volume collection, initially titled Tales of the South, comprised of a set of southeastern frontier tales and another focusing on plantation and city life.

Suggesting that this work reflects a truth of southern history that escapes the archives hinges on the text's portrayal of settler "lived experience" as an authentic representation of emigration, and this authenticity presupposes both normativity and narrativity. Daniel Nelson both embodies the appeal to an originary settler life and provides its framing device, his recollection rendering bits of the history involving the Cherokee Nation into a generic template of folk memory. The importance of Nelson's masculinity for conceptualizing "border history" in terms of this memory is clear from the beginning. The narrative opens with a heterodiegetic narrator that conditions the audience to identify with Nelson before shifting the tale to his perspective, suggesting the degree to which the embodied settler comprises the crucial fantasy object by which to
construct a shared southern history. The text compares the hackneyed quality of most contemporary fiction to the stories that might be heard by a “sort of recluse, hale and lusty, but white-headed” whose “budget of experience” yields a “rare chronicle” that “breathes life into his deeds” (Simms “The Two Camps” 33). Among the “first who settled on the southern borders of North Carolina,” Nelson was still living “so late as 1817,” the year he “removed to Mississippi,” but died only three months later, as “an old tree does not bear transplanting easily” (Simms “The Two Camps 33). Nelson registers as thoroughly rooted in the soil, which casts the recollection of his earlier days, his "chronicle," as almost ontologically coextensive with regional history given its relation to place. The phallic imagery of an "old tree" doubles this mapping: his life has so penetrated the land that it now signals the land's natural virility or potency on its own.

As the hyper-masculine essence of place-based belonging, Nelson's labor lays the seed for the spirit of settlement to emerge from the otherwise "inert facts" of history. His life story covers all of the major events between the Cherokee and the U.S. up to the first removal crisis, including the Red Stick War (1813-14) involving Creek, Shawnee, and U.S. forces. Set five years after he first emigrated, his narrative could reference either the movements of militias from the Carolinas, Virginia, and Georgia into Cherokee territory in modern Tennessee during the Revolutionary War in 1782, or a second major outbreak of violence when white squatters who had refused to vacate Cherokee territory, per the 1785 treaty of Hopewell, murdered the Upper Cherokees' principal chief, Old Tassels, and provoked nearly a decade of hostilities. All we know for sure is that he emigrated when the region was still “thickly settled with Indians...the favourite hunting-grounds for
several of their tribes” (Simms 33). As measured against Nelson's agency, Native peoplehood registers something like a natural pre-history of the space, an undergrowth barred from evoking legitimate land tenure in its distance from the enterprising settler. I would argue, however, that these vague references to actual Native-settler interactions are less sloppy historicism than a determinate effect of framing the narrative through Nelson. The aura of masculine agency foregrounds an efficacy that permits historical imprecision insofar as that efficacy posits a more fundamental referent, namely the desire to create and protect a home.

Before shifting to Nelson's view, the heterodiegetic narrator further underscores this efficacy, linking the idealized laboring body to the impulse to start a family, an impulse that provides the form and content of quasi-diplomatic powers. A “stalwart youth...tall, with a fiery eye,” he and his companions are described as men for whom “danger only seemed to provoke their determination...and mere hardship their frames appeared to covet” (Simms 33). The settler's agency provides the frame, both body and paradigm, for diplomacy with "Indians." Such men “had no fear...to make a home and rear an infant family in regions so remote from...civilization. They had met and made...a sort of friendship with the Indians, and in [their] superior vigour…their greater courage, and better weapons, they had perhaps come to form a too contemptuous image of the savage” (Simms 34). Nelson would seem suited for a job in Crawford's vocational training program, but Simms moves quickly from this emphasis on settler agency and the false confidence it instills to Nelson's own view. However, the capacity to create "a sort of friendship" not only attaches quasi-diplomatic powers to a set of idealized motivations
organized around settler homesteading, doing so also deflects any possible questions regarding settler depredations through the extra-political connotation of such a relationship. "A sort of friendship" then suggests an extension of the ethics organized around homemaking into what we would identify as political history, insofar as such diplomacy derives from the sexual/ethical dynamics of Nelson's paternal obligation to protect his family.

Put another way, insofar as the settler's embodied agency expresses a desire for the normative home, the morality associated with the latter conditions the text's geopolitical imaginary; the settler's over-confidence implies a generalized, baseline suspicion of Indians. This coupling of (hetero)normative morality and the imagined geopolitics of settler expansion recalls Scott Lauria Morgensen's argument that “[m]odern sexuality arose in the United States as a method to produce settler colonialism, and settler subjects, by facilitating ongoing conquest and naturalizing its effects” (117). The desire to create and protect a "home…remote from…civilization" exerts a claim that needs no legal articulation insofar as it founds the legitimacy of such claims. In turn, Natives appear more or less incompatible with formal diplomatic measures to the degree that they mark a potential threat to this desire. This suspicion, then, marks the baseline for representing geopolitical instability. Nelson's story begins at a time when his "wild neighbors" were "becoming discontented" due to other "tribes, more frequently in contact with the larger settlements of the whites—wronged by them in trade, or demoralized by drink—complain[ing] of their sufferings"; such happenings could not but make these "worthy settlers...anxious at signs which warned...of a change in the peaceful relations"
that had held to this point (Simms 34-5). Representing the violence, largely due to settler encroachments, that characterized Native-settler affairs in the late-eighteenth century as a potential threat to settler families both flattens the specificity of Cherokee protests, as merely "Indian" discontentment, and casts the settler homestead as a politically neutral element in its perceived morality.

What we might think of as distancing actual history in the idealization of settler desire and its positioning as the true motor of history does not register as such, as the shift to Nelson's homodiegetic narration totalizes the father's anxiety. As the rumors of incipient Indian attacks grows too loud to be ignored, Nelson, like “a good husband,” informs his family of the rumors of escalating discontentment. In this passage, he takes his daughter "now five years old, upon his knee...and [looks] upon his infant boy," after which he feels his "anxieties very much increase," and begins scouting the area (Simms 35). This scene encapsulates the text's basic representational strategy. Indian unrest elsewhere generates an affect, organized around familial concern, that normalizes settler incursions into Native space insofar as Indians appear given to irrational, unpredictable, and often alcohol-fueled outbreaks. However, I want to underscore the narratological aspect of this (dis)placement here. As Nelson interacts with his family, his growing anxiety over their safety itself becomes a narrative object, what we might think of as the father's gaze. The children, situated as innocent and trusting dependents, take up their father's attention and spur him to action. He holds them, looks at them, and worries over them. By contrast, as readers, we are preoccupied with the anxiety elicited in the father by the children: we see him seeing a potentially horrible fate for his family, which
presents him as a man of conscience justified in his actions and, conversely, represents geopolitical instability quite literally as an inscrutable thing that exists outside and separate from this normative center. To see with Nelson is to see (by way of) his concern.

Conventional historiography cannot achieve this kind of condensation of the supposed meaning of Native-settler affairs. William Law's 1840 history of Georgia, for instance, tries to mediate the difficulty in historicizing removal by turning a “glance” to the region's indigenous history (16). Cast almost as an aside, this turn occurs after Law charts colonial history to the revolution, but before any discussion of state history. In this way, it amounts to a formal-chronological displacement of the more recent history of Cherokee resistance. Relocating the recent fact(s) of removal to a point just before the symbolic advent of modern state- and nationhood, however, suggests that part of the task, and the burden, of historical narrative is to explain events in which historical and moral necessity diverge in relation to the dominant social order. Law's glance ontologizes Indianness to help shore up this crack in the edifice. He describes southeastern Natives as “hordes of savages, the Muscogee or Creeks, the Cherokees, the Chickasaws, and the Choctaws” alike, different in name only: “They were all characterized by similar habits, customs, and pursuits, although in fact distinguished as nations, (if nations they might be called)” (Law 16). Building from the groundwork he helped to provide in Georgia v. Tassels, Law implies that distinct southeastern nations were nothing more than indeterminate masses beneath their merely nominal designations.

Taken together with the chronological displacement of regional Native history, however, implying that southeastern nations are/were ultimately arbitrary variations on
the same savage theme obviously ignores what many would have known, certainly Law himself since he served on the panel of judges in *Georgia*. The "glance" at a supposedly primordial, irreducibly "Indian" history obscures the fact that the Native peoples subsumed under this category had different political relationships with the U.S., different treaty histories, different patterns of resistance and removal, and, above all, claims to sovereignty that were legitimate at least to the degree that they resulted in the U.S. advocating removal. For Law, positing a stubbornly homogenous savagery would seem to make any discussion of more recent political history redundant. However, I would suggest that the glance conjures more than it can possibly deflect. Rather than preempting any discussion of Cherokee removal, such a "glance" at Native history foregrounds only foregrounds its own necessity. Positing a homogenous Indianness attempts to homogenize the political histories involving different Native groups, in particular that of the civilizing Cherokee, and thereby shift them to a point anterior and tangential to what signifies the essential plot structure of Georgia history. Yet, this very attempt reads as a departure from that essential narrative, which raises, rather than closes, the question of its relation to the latter.

By comparison, Simms's focus on the settler's supposed lived experience renders such geopolitical discord a family affair. After Nelson decides to make a more concerted effort to patrol the land, the story turns on a series of gazes that develop his anxiety. The first occurs one night as Nelson investigates a campfire and discovers perhaps the motif of captivity narratives: a group of Indians surrounding a young woman. Terrified for her safety, he hesitates only momentarily before leaping into the mix, hoping to take the
warriors by surprise and free the girl. Precisely when he enters, however, the scene disappears. Nelson is alone in the woods, no fire and all quiet except for a faint groan. Following the sound, he discovers an Indian boy suffering from an apparent tomahawk blast to the skull.

The tension manifests as the paternal reaction that propelled Nelson to leap into the fire yields only the unmistakable groan of a wounded Indian, which crucially now occupies the affective space just associated with Nelson's child. The scene foregrounds the role that familial concern plays in interpreting the meaning of this seemingly random act of violence by reflexively inscribing this tension in the father's gaze. Discovering the boy, Nelson considers how he would feel if his own son was left in such condition: “I thought, if so be I had a son in such a fix, what would I think of the stranger who should go home and wait til daylight to give him help!” (Simms 40). The point is not necessarily that the singularity of the settler's act here suggests a humanitarianism that exceeds, and thereby conceals, the invasion of Cherokee lands by Georgia citizens. Rather, the text positions the ethics of settler homemaking as simultaneously the agency and the narrative prism, the content and the form, integral to the essential meaning underpinning any "border history of the south."

Put another way, the text less displaces real history than it organizes and facilitates a historicity of ethics that marks the legitimacy of settler presence. In keeping with the texts discussed earlier, this historicity involves positing a real, fundamental confrontation with Indianness predating and requisite to civilized society. This staging occurs through Lenatewá, which is the name of the boy/prince Nelson has discovered and
saved from certain death. During his six-week stay with Nelson's family, the settler intensifies his patrols and soon discovers a band of Indians in the immediate area. After apparently realizing Nelson is on to them, and that their plot to capture the Indian boy failed, they make “the woods ring with the war-whoop,” suggesting to Nelson they mean to give “a regular siege” (Simms 42). This shadowy Indian plot mainly serves to create an existential crisis within the home, as Nelson considers how little he knows of the boy. However, this sudden uncertainty only makes the quick decision to trust him, despite that Nelson fears he could very well wind up cutting "the throats of my wife and children,” all the more pronounced as an index of the ideal patriarch's baseline ethics: Nelson can't believe “after all we had done for him, that he'd be false...” (Simms 42). The next morning the boy had “thrown aside all that I gave him," stolen back his bow and arrows, and fired an arrow with a tuft of his hair attached through one of the “loop-holes” (cabin windows) into a tree, alerting the outsiders to his presence.

Read against/through Nelson's suspicion, Lenatewá's sudden assertion of generic Indian difference throws into relief normative homemaking as constitutive of the bonds of trust that form the matrix of emerging society, not in the least insofar as they have the power to impact Indian affairs outside the home. The spatial register of the home here comes to double its moral exceptionalism, rendering it that which marks the "border" in Simms' history. In the context of Nelson debating whether to trust the boy, the two together witness an impromptu Indian council, spurred by the arrow, during which the party splits into two factions, a majority led by an “old white-headed chief” and the remainder by an intimidating “dark-looking fellow” (Simms 43). The boy explains that
the former is his “father or grandfather” and the latter his “uncle,” who we also learn attacked his nephew in order to usurp his place as heir to his grandfather/father's sovereign power. Lenatewá then asks Nelson if he intends to kill the uncle, to which the latter responds with an emphatic “No… I will shoot none. I am for peace. I would do good to the Indians and be their friend. Go to your father and tell him so” (Simms 44). Lenatewá's narrative posits “Indian” difference in terms of failed patriarchy, a botched patrilineal transfer of power rooted in the absence of normative homemaking and the ethics it facilitates.

Still, relaying this information to Nelson simultaneously marks the boy's newfound loyalty to Nelson, implicitly aligning him on the side of peaceful domesticity. The home becomes a barrier marking the space between extra-political morality and the pre-political Indianness beyond insofar as it becomes the site from which Indian "discontentment" comes into view, quite literally. While Nelson's investment in his home organizes the perception of Indian affairs, however, it does not evoke a sense of impermeable difference, even as the lack of such homemaking presents Natives' dysfunctional social organization as the residual influence of anachronistic kinship formations. Just before leaving to engage the Indian party, Lenatewá affectionately pats Nelson's daughter, which Nelson interprets as indicating "you shan't be hurt—not a hair of your head!"” (Simms 44). Through this spontaneous gesture, which suggests an investment in Nelson's home, the text implies a capacity for Natives' to adapt, but since this capacity registers wholly through Lenatewá, it emerges as dependent upon familial concern that Nelson manifests. Adaptation presupposes assimilation to settler norms,
which in turn suggests that only the ethics organized around settler homemaking can produce discernible and legitimate change.

At this point, the historicity of settler ethics organized around the home begins to cohere. The view from the home presents Native alterity less as consisting less in any determinate cultural content than in a paradoxical, though amendable, relation to the present, one underscored by formal aspects of the brief chapter following Lenatewá's exit. Consisting of a single paragraph, this chapter depicts Nelson watching from the window as an outbreak of Indian violence rapidly unfolds. The "young prince" Lenatewá engages his father/grandfather, the "king," and then points toward his uncle; the king gives a "war-whoop," sending a volley of arrows raining down on the uncle; and, finally, this outburst ends the conflict as quickly as it began, as “all the arrows had been aimed at the one person, and when he sprawled, there was an end to it: the whole affair was over in five minutes” (Simms 44).

If the idea were simply to cast Indians as inexorably primitive as compared with settlement, to simply insist on a one-size-fits-all civilized-savage binary, one could imagine Simms allocating more than a paragraph to describing such barbarity and refusing to resolve the episode so abruptly. Combined with Nelson's position as onlooker, through whom we view the outburst as a potential danger to the family inside the home, the passage accordingly foregrounds not simply the difference but the distance, spatial and temporal, of Native violence. Though the quick termination corresponds with the view of Native peoplehood as inept patriarchy, within which collective peoplehood reads as an anti-democratic tendency toward monarchical centralization that cannot but end in
self-defeating violence, it also suggests the transience of such forms of peoplehood and the governance supposedly underpinning them. By emphasizing the speed of the "whole affair," the assassination gives an impression of Indian sociality as fleeting in its irrationality, an impression reinforced in the narrative concision. Simms' use of flashback doubles this effect: the episode is entirely in past tense and contains no direct speech. Read against the mute spectacle of Indian violence (viewing from the window, Nelson sees all but hears nothing, which renders the outbreak uncannily silent), the narration of the event throws the sense of time out of joint. Nelson paradoxically seems to be recollecting the conflict as it unfolds, situated between his readership and a violent spectacle of fleeting Indianness. From this angle, his doubled position (before the window back then, but addressing us now) historicizes settler-Native violence as a brief, belated conflict wholly reducible to the Indians themselves and sealed away in the past.

This doubling, I argue, synthesizes the ideological efficacy of Simms' "true historian" par excellence: Anglo settlement's role in border conflict disappears in the settler's essential view. And this disappearance, as with the discourses of savagery prior to removal, derives from positing, not simply reflecting on, the ontological and/or ethical capacity of the Indian Subject, here represented in Lenatewá's emerging loyalty to Nelson's home. After returning from the violent outburst, the boy tells Nelson that he had convinced his father (the "king" or “Micco Glucco”) to lay down the “red stick” and enter into “terms of peace,” since the boy himself survived the initial attempt on his life. This diplomatic maneuver poses the desire of the uncle to ascend the Cherokee power structure as the true cause of the violence around Nelson's home, thereby correcting the
earlier "rumors" that dispossession and fraudulent trade, involving alcohol, were the cause of Native unrest. The boy reveals that the “old Micco [Lenatewá's father/grandfather]...had only consented to take up the red stick because it was reported by...the uncle [who] had good reasons for getting him out of the way—that he [Lenatewá] had been murdered by the whites” (Simms 44-5). On one hand, these new "inert facts" reinforce Indianness as conducive to war. The absence of normative homemaking yields large, umbrella formations that tend to implode, the form of which is an explosion of jealousy and violence. On the other, this information reaffirms the settler home as the (extra-)political agency of territorial stability. Lenatewá here confirms that the earlier decision to save the boy, rooted in the transferability of fatherly concern, proves in the end the act that restored the region's peace.

Lenatewá's complex displacement of southeastern Native formations bears further unpacking, however. First, “micco” is a Creek term. Second, Cherokees, like Creeks, are matrilineal, and the uncle, not the biological father, serves as the primary male figure for his sister's children in traditional kinship formations. Third, the faction that Simms appears to reference in the Red Stick War actually consisted of an alliance between Shawnees and Upper Town Creeks (the red stick being associated with Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa's pan-Indian collectivism), but here the "red stick" becomes a token of generic “Indian” belligerence, not in the least as it serves to indicate Cherokee, not Creek, responses to illegal settler emigration in the Carolinas some two decades prior to this conflict. Finally, Nelson admits that, although many people will recall that “war” and “how the Carolinians humbled them at last,” he didn't then realize that the young man he
had saved “was the prince of a tribe only, and not the nation” and was therefore limited in his capacity to protect Nelson's family, given that the conflict “was a national warfare, in which the whole Cherokee people were in arms” (Simms 45). Neither deriving from a westernizing elite nor resembling anything like Cherokees' traditional matrilineal, clan-based governance, the Cherokee Nation here registers as a vague, arbitrary formation, more or less coextensive with the total number of constituent "tribes," which seem to refer to separate patrilineal clusters like the one headed by Lenatewá's father/grandfather.

Considering that Simms limits Nelson's life to 1817, and places the story decades before, the various conflations and distortions in Lenatewá's narrative suggest an omission of the Cherokee resistance that began in 1817, the year the educated elite reorganized the Standing Committee and began aggressively centralizing Cherokee governance. In Simms' south, by contrast, Cherokee "nationhood" registers an ambiguous formation that passed away long before more modern political events. This representation avoids the obvious twists and turns of Law's more formal history, though, insofar as privileges Nelson's experience as a narrative device: the text presents Cherokee civilization less as a political formation to be denied legitimacy, in retrospect, than as a capacity for moral behavior facilitated through contact with the homestead. Put another way, the capacity for civilization emerges only through Lenatewá's voluntary actions taken on behalf of Nelson's family, and these actions anchor the middle of the narrative. After Lenatewá provides the real reasons for the Indian conflict outside of Nelson's home, the story jumps forward considerably. After a decade of relative stability, during which Lenatewá sheltered Nelson's family from whatever violence threatened to break out,
widespread conflict once again erupts across the countryside. In a double of the opening ghost scene involving the captured girl, Nelson tracks a band of Indians suspected of stealing horses to their campfire, only to find Lucy surrounded by warriors.

Lenatewá's sudden appearance beside Nelson in this passage signals the reversal of the opening scene's logic, in which finding the suffering boy confirmed both the efficacy and universality of the ethics rooted in a desire to protect the home. Here, an actual captivity scene involving Nelson's daughter results in a crisis that will be resolved by Lenatewá's loyalty, the ethics he has adapted ostensibly through his familiarity with Nelson's family. By intervening, though, Lenatewá also restores a hysterical Nelson to his normative, masculine self: “...his soft tones, made me know that the young prince meant to be friendly, and I gave him my hand; but the tears gushed out as I did...[crying out] 'My child, my child' "'Be man!' said he, 'come!'... ““But will you save her, Lenatewá?”" (Simms 49). Of course he will. The “young prince” distracts Oloschottee, the son of the earlier disgruntled uncle who attacked Lenatewá, as Nelson attacks the lone guard and saves his daughter. By helping both to restore the settler family and to return the father to himself, Lenatewá crucially reintegrates Nelson's autological status as patriarch, rendering him whole again.

This dialectical exchange, whereby Nelson's fatherly concern creates an alliance that proves indispensable to his family's survival as it also reshapes the Indian, reaches its normative climax in the last episode, as Lucy and Lenatewá fall in love. Afraid her daughter “‘has a liking for that redskin,’” however, Nelson's wife (a spectral presence if there was one, nearly totally absent) insists he spy on them to determine the extent of
their relationship (Simms 54). Nelson admits his reluctance ("'Twarn't a business I was overfond of...[but I] did pretty much as she told me...[though it] always gave me a sheepish feeling..."), which in turn casts his wife's sentiments as racist insofar as they totally ignore Lenatewá's loyalty and contribution to the family (Simms 54). Nelson gives the couple some distance, watching from the cabin window and therein doubling his earlier view onto Lenatewá's confrontation. The difference now, however, is the fear that he might be seen: his reluctance to spy on the couple suggests a genuine shame. In a radical inversion of the earlier window gaze, here the portrait gazes back, which marks the real confrontation as taking place within Nelson himself in the form of the embarrassment of a loving father.

The earlier distancing (formally, temporally, narratively) of Indian alterity thus draws to an intense point of critical self-reflection in the settler himself, underscoring genuine historical progress as the evolution of the settler's ethical orientation. While watching the Indian he saved propose to Lucy, Nelson realizes that he already accepts Lenatewá for his son: “‘...if I had seen the lad running off with the girl...I'd never ha' been the man to draw trigger...’”; “‘I didn't fear Lenatewá, and I didn't fear my daughter...’”; “‘...is any picture in this life more...beautiful than two young people jest beginning to feel love for one another[?]...’” (Simms 54-5). Nelson's reflection suggests the breakdown of his earlier, objective stance while watching the violence unfold among Lenatewá's people. However, this breakdown appears to be on the wrong side of the ideological divide. The result of Nelson's awakening is that Lenatewá emerges as already included in the symbolic matrix organized around settler homemaking: “‘...I could see all
their motions…what was I to do, if [he was] offering his hand to marry Lucy, and she willing…how could I refuse him when I was willing?” (Simms 55). To the degree that the father accepts the Indian youth as a son-in-law, the passage implies that such recognition has the capacity to reshape the moral and symbolic edifice that has proven so integral to regional peace.

At the same time, however, this recognition only further entrenches the bonds that both comprise the home and organize the father's morality as indices of a supposedly legitimate capacity for dealing with Indigenous peoples, a capacity at once extra-political and efficacious. In this way, the most dynamic agency within the text remains those ethics and, in turn, the homestead that founds them by cultivating desire. In the end, normative homemaking itself emerges as the essential, dynamic matrix of any and all sociality. Again, conventional historiography tries but fails to portray settlement as this kind of catalyst for history proper in its reliance on the "inert facts." Law's aforementioned "glance" at Indian history expresses sympathy only insofar as it insists that Natives were endowed with "habits immutable as nature" that made them largely resistant toward "the influence of civilization and the admission of improvement"; given this ontological inertia, Indians "present the spectacle of a 'moral phenomenon,' at which we wonder, and for whom we sympathize, but over whose destiny we have no control" (Law 17). The actuality of unchecked and illegal settler emigration into Cherokee space, the seizure of lands, homes, and infrastructure, a state legislature operating in violation of its powers, a superior court intent on delegitimizing both Native sovereignty and federal
oversight over Indian affairs—these facts (almost) fall away in pondering the "moral phenomenon" that an ontologically fated removal presents in hindsight.

Yet, since Law is dealing with historiography, the sign that the record of these events are still there is this very shift to sympathy in the place where that record should be. Cherokee resistance becomes a present-absence: “Where is the posterity of the red man who once inhabited this land, now so changed by the meliorating hand of civilization, industry, and art?... a melancholy sentiment [pervades] our bosoms…” (Law 17, sic). The obvious implication is of course that Natives are no longer present because they failed to assimilate. However, the condition of possibility for this very implication is the prior disavowal of the meaning of Cherokee civilization and, in turn, of removal. The shift from the political to the ethical disavows, and thereby names, the historical events that structure Law's narrative discourse in their very absence.

Nelson's paternalism indexes values that are transcendent, however, which is to say they aren't bound to a timeline. The corollary of these ahistorical ethics is that Indianness amounts to a drag on the normative present, its "wild," irrational social formations constantly devolving into outbreaks of violence against which the homestead signals movement forward in time. The text's conclusion confirms this truth of history.

Before Nelson can formally welcome Lenatewá into the family, a “‘war-whoop’” sounds (Simms 55). The father grabs his rifle and looks back only to see Lucy on the ground and Oloschottee bearing down on Lenatewá. Nelson already knows it is blood revenge, as “an Indian never forgets that sort of obligation,” thereby positing an irreducible savagery as the mechanism that prevented the Cherokee from entering into civilized relationships
with settlers (Simms 55). Before he can fire, Lenatewá is struck dead; Nelson then kills the attacker and gives a “whoop for all of the world as if I was an Indian myself” (Simms 55). And though Lucy recovers, she never marries, as she never recovers from the Indian's loss. Through Lenatewa's death, the text both ejects the possibility of any lasting union between settlers and Indians—through no fault of settlers—and privileges sympathy, not politics, as the essential frame for conceptualizing the (im)possibility of place-based Native sovereignty in history.

The historicity rendered through the morality organized around settler homesteading produces a break, here reflected in the failure of sympathetic identification due to another, (un)predictable outbreak of Indian violence, between the normative present and the past. Put slightly differently, drawing on this morality winds up producing Indianness as a cypher for that which remains recalcitrant beyond even the best feelings and intentions. Oloschottee's grievance signals a historical inertia that cuts into the authentic display of normative romance from an unseen point on the horizon, literally leaping into the frame from the background. His linkage with the Cherokee practice of blood revenge casts this leap as the return of an irreducible Indian alterity, one that presents Cherokee peoplehood as, beyond what the "inert facts" concerning their claims to civilization may suggest, an irrational, violent, and ultimately fleeting formation. Finally, that Nelson simultaneously emits a "war whoop" as if he himself were an Indian signals that his reflexive and ethical retaliation out of fatherly concern enacts a claim to indigeneity, insofar as the page is turned on the violence it could not prevent. The "whoop" marks Daniel Nelson's full emergence the "true spirit" of the so-called
"border history of the south," the symbol of a moral edifice that renders any memory of Georgia history after 1817 a curious footnote.

In "The Two Camps," Daniel Nelson's familial concern facilitates the representation of history as oriented to an idealized settler experience, that of the sturdy yet compassionate patriarch that, for Simms, reflects the moral truth of southern border history. As imagined through Nelson's experience, Indianness emerges as an irreducible, irrational drag on the present, an inertia that mitigates against whatever influence settler ethics may have on (re)shaping the Indian's capacity for civilization, even as this framing retroactively coheres settler experience as the moral edifice of southern history. As the text's conclusion shows, this edifice neutralizes the role of settler incursions in the actual process of state formation: the failure of civilization in relation to the Cherokee emerges as a sudden, violent sundering of the otherwise productive feelings organized around normative settler homemaking, an explosion of the moral and historical inertia of non-normative Indian peoplehood into the present. Cast as metonymic of the lived experience integral to border history, this last outbreak of Indian discontentment forecloses any need to engage with the political history of removal as represented by the Cherokee Nation's progress toward civilization. In this way, Simms' story also manifests contemporary multicultural liberalism's complicity with settler colonialism more generally.\(^{28}\) Nelson's seemingly authentic affection for Lenatewá anticipates the ethic of tolerance whose own condition of possibility is the degree to which the tolerated subject is conceivable within a discourse of humanity, the disavowed center of which is the ontological givenness of liberal (citizen) subjectivity and its normative social formations.
Repositioning Savagery in Elias Boudinot's “An Address to the Whites”

The sense of closure evoked by "The Two Camps" recalls Derrida's notion of exorcism. For Derrida, celebrating the specter of one's antagonist after defeat doubles as an assurance that “what used to be living is no longer alive, it does not remain effective in death itself” (59). Lenatewá's death elicits an affect, a lament, that presupposes a larger historical narrative: the Cherokees' successful assimilation to settler society was cut short by the irrational and violent nature of Indian peoplehood writ large. Nevertheless, if this view was actually believed by anyone, Simms included, the story would be an exercise in redundancy. The "Two Camps" therein shares a crucial feature with the texts discussed earlier. It posits a supposedly real, fundamental Indianness, predating and requisite to modern society, as the basis of a historicity that retroactively legitimizes settler belonging. Positing Indian savagery, the specific content of which varies in each of the texts discussed, provides the basis for depicting civilization as the temporal extension of the norms and forms of settler morality, sociality, and/or political-economy, thereby rendering an extra-political claim to the lands of a civilizing Cherokee Nation.

It is crucial to recognize that "civilization" has no concrete historical referent, however. It can be made to register an extra-juridical or –political claim to land, one rooted in history, only insofar as agrarianism, euramerican modes of governance, and settler cultural forms signify neither political sovereignty nor abstract nationhood in and of themselves. Instead, as I've suggested, positing Indianness encodes these elements with a historicity that exceeds their otherwise limited capacity to function as political and territorial claims. Put another way, narrating savagery as a set of ontological features
enables a notion of the "people" to emerge that displaces the need for, and therein the lack of, a political or juridical claim to space. From this perspective, this final section hopes to reframe the notion of savagery with regard to the well-known Cherokee activist Elias Boudinot, who, prior to his turn toward removal in the aftermath of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, was perhaps the most visible of those working to combat removal pressures on the basis of Cherokee civilization. The traces of Indian savagery in this text, I argue, are the means by which Boudinot appropriates a generic Indianness through which to narrate the historical becoming of the Cherokee as a coherent people irreducible to the United States. Focusing on his 1826 pamphlet "An Address to the Whites," I contend that positing savagery allows for a historicity that authenticates Cherokee progress while nonetheless differentiating it from the settler governance on which it was increasingly modeled.29

"An Address to the Whites" was written to secure the funds for what would become Boudinot's primary vehicle for influencing the public, The Cherokee Phoenix. Launched in 1828, the newspaper quickly gained subscribers all over the United States. As Theda Perdue notes, Boudinot's position as editor allowed him to display to whites and Cherokees alike all "the remarkable accomplishments of his people" by publishing a wide variety of content, such as “official correspondence and documents, legislation passed by the National Council...notices of weddings, school examinations, meetings of temperance and other societies, and revivals” (“Introduction” 16).30 Put differently, one of the paper's key effects was to signify "Indian" modernity to these different constituencies by framing Cherokee adaptations of euramerican sociopolitical and
cultural norms as progress. However, this strategy entailed not only showcasing the Cherokees' rapid appropriation of settler technology, governance, and culture, but also framing these adaptations as constituting "progress" by way of the terms and concepts made public through an earlier civilization policy.

Civilization policy remained a dominant discourse for framing for U.S.-Cherokee diplomacy well into the 1820s, shaping the so-called "Indian Question" that emerged in the nascent debate over removal. As such, its political appropriation on the side of Cherokee sovereignty was by no means unique to Boudinot. Rather, civilization discourse generated a historicity that conditioned the political and conceptual field of Native affairs writ large. As Maureen Konkle suggests, the Cherokee elite largely sought to counter euramericans “removing them from time to time [in order] to deny them political autonomy and equality by insisting that they have always been in time and [were] rapidly...becoming a modern Indian nation” (Konkle 79). Konkle adds that, as a consequence of this strategy, these same elites forged a vexed relationship to traditional Cherokee culture. Despite that, for them, the “object of being understood to be in time” was not assimilation but rather “to continue as an autonomous Indian nation,” nonetheless “claiming Eurocentric time” yielded “political and intellectual impasses [on] the value of traditional knowledge and history,” as shown by their representation of “traditional life” as “an earlier moment in the history of the tribe” that needed to be left behind to be “in order to…advance in civilization” (Konkle 79). Although this approach to political recognition challenged Natives' fatedness to vanish by demonstrating that they
already lived in time, it nonetheless had the ironic effect of distancing the Cherokees from their own cultural past.

While Konkle rightly reads the publicizing of changes in political-economy as attempting to validate Cherokee nationhood in terms of shared modernity, the social and political-economic norms of civilization signal neither modernity nor legitimate governance as if intrinsically. Rather, as I've argued, narrating Indian savagery, in some form, is integral to this equation. Indianness anchors the historicity that registers settler sovereignty as an extension of modes of habitation that signal productivity and/or morality, and these modes service an extra-political claim to southeastern territory among settler actors with divergent sets of territorial and jurisdictional agendas. Rather than a tragic but unintended effect of Cherokee progressivism, then, the distancing of tradition that Konkle highlights can instead be read as the condition of possibility for claiming sovereignty on the basis of a modernity organized by a latent or residual civilization discourse in the first place.

Reading Boudinot in this way involves first examining how he foregrounds the difference of contemporary Cherokee peoplehood as compared with its traditional formations. The text poses the Cherokee towns as the benchmark for assessing true progress: the “rise of these people in their movement toward civilization, may be traced as far back as the relinquishment of their towns” (Boudinot “An Address” 71). On its face, this statement somewhat obviously suggests the colonization of traditional Cherokee governance. The norms and forms of settler belonging gain purchase as symbols of legitimate governance as Cherokee lands come under further duress, which
can be interpreted as suggesting that turning away from certain Native formations is the price to be paid for territorial sovereignty. However, referring to the towns also throws into relief a sense of historical movement without necessarily turning to the norms of forms of civilization. The towns anchor an objective portrait of progress toward a supposedly more organized and recognizable state while nevertheless grounding that state as an extension of the governance they formerly embodied. The "rise of the people," not the origin of Cherokee autonomy, traces its emergence from the Cherokee towns. In this way, the content of what is "relinquished" matters less than both the represented notion of relinquishing itself and, especially, the impression of autonomous political agency that it presupposes. The reference to the towns' position, both rhetorically and as generic markers of a geopolitical space irreducible to settler claims, suggests that the specificity of the represented content, i.e. what makes the towns savage, non-normative, etc., serves to evoke a sense of linear time by way of juxtaposition.

Casting Cherokee townships as residual formations here opens onto the text's general strategy. This passage shows an implicit awareness that place-based Cherokee sovereignty is tethered to a historicity whose Subject is the becoming of the “people,” a process that only gains coherence over against “imbecile” forms of collectivity generally and ambiguously cited as “Indian.” It is no coincidence that Boudinot foregrounds this generic Indianness early in the essay, before noting the Cherokee towns. He opens by claiming that he is “aware of the difficulties which have ever existed to Indian civilization,” and denies neither “the almost insurmountable obstacles which we ourselves have thrown in the way of this improvement,” nor “that difficulties...remain";
nevertheless, of those remaining challenges “there are none that may not easily be 
overcome, by strong and continued exertions” (Boudinot “An Address” 69-70). The text 
primes the distancing of the Cherokee towns with this reference to the supposed obstacles 
to "Indian civilization," not Cherokee peoplehood, suggesting again that the towns serve 
to index a linear, more or less generic historicity organized and made available through 
Indianness. I would suggest that the operative phrase here, though, is "we ourselves," 
which not only indicates a collective of which Boudinot remains a part, it also renders 
this sense of collectivity by way of his own rhetorical presence. This passage clearly 
mobilizes generic Indianness in a manner that both plays on and problematizes its racist 
associations, retaining its distinctiveness while emptying it of its notions of intractable 
imbecility. However, in so doing, it conveys an impression of political agency. By 
slotting the towns into the position of alterity made available in the reference to a "Indian 
civilization," the text renders the "obstacle" to progress and its overcoming, as a 
condition of the legitimacy of that progress, as indeed reducible to Indianness, albeit 
construed as a social rather than an ontological dynamic. In so doing, Boudinot begins to 
articulate a notion of place-based Cherokee peoplehood that does not depend on settler 
emigration for its apparent movement toward civilization.

I should note here that I acknowledge that the westernized forms of governance 
that elites, such as Boudinot himself, were championing did involve a deliberate, radical 
shift away from traditional Cherokee governance, a shift that is difficult not to read in 
terms of colonization. Mark Rifkin persuasively demonstrates that Cherokee political 
centralization entailed the subalternization of non-elite Cherokees and that the discourse
on Indian nationhood tends to obscure this dynamic. As he writes, narratives of “Indian national identity” “shape the 'storytelling' of native collective identity” in ways that “efface the imperial and class genealogies of the discourse of 'nation'-hood,” forcing out of the picture forms of peoplehood that contradict sanctioned patterns of belonging (Rifkin “Representing” 80). My focus on Boudinot's appropriation of Indian savagery toward historicizing Cherokee nationhood complements this analysis. Rather than a transparent reflection on the Cherokees' progress toward actual, "authentic" political modernity, modeled on the settler state, the process of stratification, the silencing of traditional Cherokee culture in the emergence of what can be imagined as a hegemonic class, can be read as also requiring a narrative of national becoming in order to signify legitimate, place-based statehood for a settler public.31 The appropriation of Indian savagery toward creating a historicity that can function as a claim to sovereignty for a settler public is also a legacy of this process of subalternization.

To come at this point from a different angle, while Boudinot's rhetoric certainly evokes a process of colonization, one can assume that an industrialized Cherokee Nation, modeled on the United States and functioning as a fully independent political entity, was not an inspiration for Henry Knox's civilization policy. Boudinot has to persuade a settler audience to understand what we read as subalternization, aligning Cherokee governance with settler political and social normativity, as nonetheless justifying separation from the settler state. The point is neither to blame nor absolve Boudinot, however. Rather, it is to suggest that, contrary to the view that the Cherokee needed to write themselves into history for a public that understood Indians as anachronistic, persuading this public of the
legitimacy of place-based Cherokee nationhood involved adapting the discursivity of Indianness, qua savagery, so as to legitimate Cherokee belonging in the extra-political terms, the linear historicity, established by decades of civilization discourse. By framing town and clan-based governance as residual forms of political functioning, the text casts these structures as instances of generic Indian anachronism that condition an equally generic and linear sense of historical movement qua progress, thus creating the historicity that can then frame the adaptations spurred by Cherokee elites as an authentic process of development undertaken by a distinct political entity. Priming the reference to the towns with both the comments on "Indian civilization" and Boudinot's reflexive self-narration enables Cherokee tradition to evoke the locus of a historical sequence, a "progress," that his audience would read as authentic and yet as irreducible to that audience and its governance.

This strategy involves disarticulating settler emigration from civilization. As long as the norms and forms of the latter are yoked to the presence of non-natives, rendering these norms and settler-state governance as an artificial unity, one can suggest that, as does the panel in Georgia v. Tassels, such adaptation merely signals the Cherokees' readiness for political assimilation. From this perspective, the memorable question that opens the text—"What is an Indian?"—is integral to the sense of diachronic movement, the emergence of the Cherokee "people." Narrating this emergence pivots on working within the frame of Indianness rather than negating its racist connotations outright. Boudinot directly appropriates this term and all of its connotations with the assertion that “You behold here an Indian, my kindred are Indians, and my fathers sleeping in the
wilderness grave—they too were Indians. But I am not as my fathers were—broader means and nobler influences have fallen upon me” ("An Address" 69). Since knowledge of how his fathers “were” appears already available to his audience, the opening hinges on presuming a given Indianness in order to problematize the body of associations that are conjured in this term. Boudinot emphasizes the implicit racialist thinking embedded in this term by remarking on the ubiquity of the "stale remark—’Do what you will, an Indian will still be an Indian,’” paradoxically situating his own Indianness as proof of its fallacy, which then more fully comes into view by juxtaposing what was presumed as the "present history of Indians" with "the nation to which I belong" (ibid.).

As read within the frame of an emergent bio-logics of race, the capacity for change that he embodies does not extend to all Natives. While for those “unacquainted with the manners, habits, and improvements of the Aborigines...the term Indian is pregnant with ideas the most repelling and degrading,” he observes, nonetheless “such impressions...although they hold too true when applied to some, do great injustice to many of this race” (68, my emphasis). If such tropes unfairly stigmatize Boudinot, wouldn't all Indians suffer their gross inaccuracies, since the problem appears to be that the “Indian” categorically signifies intractability, an unchanged and unchangeable essence as Law would later insist? Why foreground the obvious limits of racialist thinking only to reassert them in a historical frame?

Scholarship tends to read this contradiction as symptomatic of Boudinot's elitism and accordingly vexed relationship to his own culture, and he would certainly seem to suggest that only those Natives capable of performing whiteness have a claim to
futurity. However, considering the context allows us to read the text's ironic affirmation of “Indian” savagery as integral to representing a Cherokee nationhood that increasingly resisted articulation within extant political discourses. The text and speaking tour aimed to solicit donations in order to fund a college and to acquire two sets of types, in Sequoyah's syllabary and in English, for the paper that would become the *Cherokee Phoenix* (Perdue “Introduction” 12-13). On authority from the Cherokee National Council, Boudinot visited several major cities, including Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Charleston, and raised around $1500, enough only for the printing press. Since it occurred on the cusp of the ratification of the Cherokee Constitution of 1827, the tour aimed at consolidating and publicizing changes in Cherokee political-economy nearly two decades in the making, and as such it marks the beginning of a concerted effort to broadcast (and normalize) Cherokee sociopolitical differentiation to a vast non-Native audience that would carry through Boudinot's early years as editor of the *Phoenix*. However, those who donated to the Cherokee cause during Boudinot's tour likely understood their charity more ambiguously, as organized around in Perdue's words a “belief in common humanity [that] dominated both religious and secular thought” rather than as lending support to a state within a state, an argument (*imperium in imperio*) pro-removal advocates in the Georgia legislature were already making (“Introduction” 13).

Yet, if Boudinot intended not only to signify political sovereignty but to persuade an audience of the legitimacy of this notion, while avoiding political references to statehood that would have polarized the very public whose support he needs, why not mention existing treaties between the U.S. and the Cherokee Nation? Gesturing to earlier
treaties would at least have indicated a precedent for the U.S.-Cherokee political relationship that Boudinot largely evades but seems intent on addressing. Such a reference might have made a modern "Indian" nation seem less like an historical anomaly, as the public likely would have had at least an awareness of the Cherokees' numerous treaties. As Lomawaima and Wilkins observe, the Cherokees were obviously skilled in diplomacy, having literally centuries of experience in managing the demands of complex political theaters and nearly a century of treaty-making with European states and their political descendants. By 1817, they had negotiated "ten colonial treaties with southern colonies and the British between 1721 and 1783 and nine treaties with the United States, beginning in 1785" (Lomawaima and Wilkins 80). In some ways, however, the problem here is with the treaty itself. If the existence of treaties proves not only that Cherokees acted as sovereigns but further understood that their "consent was required before any actions were taken that might adversely effect their nation" even within an emerging ward-guardian paradigm, the treaty-form itself was nevertheless the vehicle by which settler-state actors eroded Native sovereignty and territory in the southeast (Ibid. 81). To the degree that civilization policy subversively deferred the question of Native sovereignty as it simultaneously pillaged indigenous land-holdings and promoted illegal settler migration, treaties extended and reinforced pressures on southeastern Native groups to assimilate or vacate.36

Despite the fact that referencing treaties would seem to develop the portrait of Cherokee collectivity he intends to convey, Boudinot never mentions a single one—and not because he was either clumsy or unaware of them. Rather, their omission reflects the
difficulty at hand: to legitimize an appeal to Cherokee sovereignty by way of a
civilization policy that had long worked to foreclose Native political autonomy and self-
determination going forward. In the context of this foreclosure, drawing on a generic
Indian difference mobilizes a historicity that can begin to articulate Cherokee political
autonomy insofar as it first cleaves civilization from settler emigration. Boudinot's
opening self-Indianizing is the first step in this process. After summarizing Indian history
as given to the “ravages of savage warfare, to the yells pronounced over the mangled
bodies of women and children,” thereby generating a stereotypically Indian brutality,
Boudinot reflexively appropriates this brutality (“You here behold an Indian”),
presenting himself evidence that a real “Indian” can indeed improve. In so doing, the text
provides something of an Indian genealogy: “my kindred are Indians, and my
fathers...But I am not as [they] were...I was not born as thousands are...in a lonely cabin,
overspread by the forest oak, I drew my first breath...in a language unknown to learned
and polished nations” (Boudinot 69). Mobilizing the tension between savagery and
adaptation, Boudinot's evocation of the predominant stereotypes of Indian (in)capacity
introduces temporality and sociality into the concept. Although he is not “as his fathers
were,” the text implies he no less belongs to them or the “thousands” who also
presumably lack the “language" of settler civilization. By the same token, his apparent
improvement far from disavows a connection to those thousands. Rather, his personhood
becomes the prism for (re)conceptualizing that polity. In this way, the appeal to generic
Indianness, not Cherokee-ness, qua savagery registers a sense of continuity within a
notion of difference.
This polarity is crucial for the text's representational strategy. Cleaving civilization from settler emigration so as to frame (settler) "progress" as reflecting a place-based Indian continuity requires some notion of "savagery" to posit a minimal temporal and geopolitical distance from settlers. If appropriating savagery in this way enables an extra-political claim to space through the historicity it facilitates, thereby opening to a portrait of place-based Cherokee nationhood, then would seem to require speaking/writing from within the frame of “Indian” difference. Just as Boudinot foregrounds a relation to place on the basis of turning away from the towns, here the turn away from his "fathers" also suggests that the specificity of the represented content is subordinate to the representation of historical "movement" that the reference allows. The text also foregrounds this collective movement early on within a world-historical frame. Prior to framing his own Indian identity, he writes, “Though it be true that he is ignorant, that he is a heathen, that he is a savage; yet he is no more than all others have been under similar circumstances. Eighteen centuries ago what were the inhabitants of Great Britain?” (“An Address” 69). The answer is obviously not “Indians,” but like them. What appears as a proto-anthropological point, that Natives are far from essentially ossified and fated to disappear, creates a foundation for narrating Indian self-determination by way of a historicity modeled on settler nationhood. At the same time, the passage evokes a claim to space, priming the later reference to the towns, insofar as it displaces savagery from an ontological condition of Indianness, such as in Georgia or Johnson, into a state constitutive of the process of civilization writ large, a state from which any given “race of
beings,” settlers included, enters History proper, a notion that appears to consist in a supposedly universal teleology of social evolution.

These passages may be thought of as (re)occupying the “Indian” so as to uncouple civilization from U.S. settlement while casting its norms and forms as transcendent historical structures. In fact, conditioning the difference of Indianness as one of separate autonomous development, rather than of ontological intractability, enables Boudinot to foreground the geopolitics of settler emigration as anything but bringing civilization to Indians. Regarding the Cherokees’ movement away from their traditional towns, the text notes that this process essentially began “when game became incompetent [for] their support, by reason of the surrounding white population” (71). This formulation implies that changing subsistence patterns from widespread hunting to localized agriculture derived not from settlers’ influence, but from their negative impact on Cherokee communities, in particular the withering of hunting lands via illegal settler emigration and fraudulent treaties that had already ceded large chunks of territory to the U.S. The shift to farming is thus presented as a concretely historical necessity created by the pressure that encroaching settlers placed on the Cherokee people. Relaying the extent of this shift, Boudinot adds that “there is not a single family in the nation, that can be said to subsist on the slender support which the wilderness would afford,” a claim that reverses the typical valence of the normative settler homestead toward portraying the damages wrought by unchecked settler incursions (71).

The text then works on two fronts. On one hand, it defamiliarizes the difference of Indianness, shifting it from an index of ontological incapacity to one of peoplehood, from
that which temporally delimits the genesis of universal History for a non-Native public to that which signifies a historicity both recognizable and irreducible to this public. On the other, it separates the norms and forms of civilization from settler presence, working through the sense of distance rendered by the appropriation of Indianness to throw into relief settler emigration as a problem. However, that this distancing of settler normativity from U.S. territorial and juridical control in the southeast follows from the earlier move, that of shifting the valence of Indianness in more general terms, suggests, as does the text's omission of treaties, that mobilizing a historicity using the terms of civilization discourse involves more than merely appropriating a generic Indian anachronism or simply showing its mutability after all, as does Crawford after Cherokee removal. Conversely, just proving that the Cherokees have adapted the forms and norms of settler modernity fails to justify their separation from the settler public to which these norms tend to adhere. In this way, Boudinot's self-framing is more than just a provocative opening. Rather, it holds together the basic strategy, bringing together these two fronts as two sides of the same coin. By adapting a generic savagery as a frame for his own identity, Boudinot changes the difference associated with Indianness from radical alterity to collective, alien(ated) mutability, thereby retaining it as a category through which to gesture to territorial sovereignty by foregrounding Cherokee adaptations.37

Still, one could suggest that, insofar as civilization discourse conditions his rhetoric, Boudinot might have begun his essay by detailing Cherokee progress, rather than deferring this more relevant and probably more compelling material for his audience. Were the aim to simply reverse the racist implications of Indianness, he might
have done so. An imagined incapacity for meaningful labor was certainly a recurrent feature of narrations of Indianness, one that often served to negate Native forms of peoplehood as constituting legitimate governance. A particularly striking example from Law's 1840 text indicates both the embeddedness and the utility of this link between Indian labor and sociopolitical organization. What begins as a glance in his text transforms over a few pages into a strong gloss of Natives' abject relation to normative sociality as supposedly evidenced in history:

As it regards their civil and political condition...nothing among these tribes...bore the semblance of an established government. They lived gregariously, as wandering hunters, without unity or compact as a people...with no other ideas of laws than...a few immemorial customs. Each distinct community was again [divided] into tribes or families; many inhabit[ing] the same town. Each tribe [was] distinguished by some appellative usually derived from the brute creation or vegetable world[.] (Law 16)

In place of “any semblance of an established government” was a generally diffused condition of strict necessity, a general incapacity for any “unity or compact as a people” except as “wandering hunters.” Law narrates an absolute division within history proper between the normative track of settlement and that occupied by Natives, a vicious, 'natural' cycle of overbearing necessity, arbitrary social formations and governance, and indeterminate social organization—a state devoid of any capacity for productive relationships. Law's discourse accordingly gives an example of what Steven Conn has identified as the emerging tendency, at the time, to view natives “as part of natural, rather than human, history” (30).
However, representing Indian governance and sociality as lacking any meaningful structure hinges on linking them with supposedly unproductive modes of labor, namely hunting. The reliance on hunting, for Law, explains Indians' apolitical state as driven by a necessity that resulted in their constant migration and therein prevented the emergence of any discernible organization. Yet, the difference of hunting presupposes settler agrarianism in order to explain, in supposedly objective terms, the deficiency and, now, non-existence of Indian governance and social organization in Georgia. The reference to hunting as a collective form of labor, then, anchors the specific ideological aim here, which appears to be to register the necessity of removal without naming it as such. Native peoples' reliance on hunting provides the supposedly material basis for representing the real contingency of removal in terms of an ontological and historical givenness to wandering. And insofar as the Cherokees just wandered west of the Mississippi, the people of Georgia are vindicated for a crime not only that they didn't commit, but that was never committed.

But, again, if the coupling of hunting and (the lack of) governance is so strong, why does Boudinot not begin by laying out the ways in which the Cherokees have not only adapted settler modes of political-economy, but have developed them so successfully as to outperform many, if not all, of the surrounding Anglo communities? To this point, I would observe that Law's passage not only shows a persistent equation between Indian hunting, wandering, and lack of "unity…as a people." It also demonstrates, as I've argued, that settler modes of agrarianism and associated tropes of
civilization only signify a moral and hence extra-political relation to place insofar as they are measured against, both conceptually and historically distanced from, Indian-ness.

By orienting the audience to the generic difference of Indian-ness early in the text, Boudinot articulates Cherokee adaptations as reinforcing the unity of a people, to use Law's phrase, without having to justify their continued separation from the settler state. The difference of Indian-ness provides the conceptual, diachronic basis for a representation of movement organized as a shift among the Cherokee population. The text observes that although “there are many who have commenced a life of agricultural labour from mere necessity [and] would gladly resume their former course of living” such biases “are individual failings and ought to be passed over”; leaving these failings aside, “it cannot be doubted that the nation is improving...in all those particulars which must finally constitute the inhabitants an industrious and intelligent people” (Boudinot 72). The point appears to be that whatever desire Cherokees might have for traditional ways of living, like the towns associated with them, such desire constitutes merely a bump in the road toward legitimate nationhood. The unification or reconstitution of a people is not the same as its creation ex nihilo, however. The individuals mentioned do not confirm the narratives of vanishing Indian-ness that were already beginning to circulate in New England, narratives that denied the historical continuity of Native peoplehood. Boudinot dispels this possibility early on by insisting that his aim is not to give a "detailed account of the various aboriginal tribes…known to you only on the pages of history, and there but obscurely," provided "all the colouring of prejudice and bigotry" (Boudinot 70). He adds that neither is it his purpose to consider "the remnants, of those
who have fled with time and are no more…[only] monuments of the Indian's sad fate"; instead it is to offer "a few disconnected facts" concerning the "present improved state and future prospects of that particular tribe called the Cherokees to which I belong" (ibid.).

The tension between these passages suggests two different views of the Indian, as ossified and archaic as opposed to having the capacity for adaptation, that map onto two different views of the Indian in history, or of the Indian's relation to history. I would suggest that this tension less reflects the need to write Indians into a history from which they have been exiled, however, than that the imaginary qualities of Indianness (as rooted in primordial and ambiguous savagery that impedes normative social development) are themselves paradoxically integral to conceptualizing and then (re)producing a linear historicity organized around Cherokee peoplehood. The exceptions to the rule of progress in Cherokee country that Boudinot notes are a matter of "individual failings" rather than the "Indian's sad fate," a trope that he suggests mostly registers the biases of earlier generations of settlers. Yet, Cherokee progress still remains within the constellation of Indian civilization, as the text makes clear throughout ("When before did a nation of Indians step forward and ask for the means of civilization?" he asks toward the end), a constellation whose actuality and possibility Boudinot portrays himself as symbolizing ("An Address" 77). From this view, then, any reluctance to embrace the norms and forms of civilization is not symptomatic of the Indian's tragic destiny insofar as it is reducible to individuals rather than Indianness.
Changing the difference of Indianness thus provides the conceptual clearing for a narrative premised on the historical movement of a particular Native people in relation to specific lands in the southeast. As Boudinot observes, “It cannot be doubted that the nation is improving...in all those particulars which must finally constitute the inhabitants an industrious and intelligent people” (72). The difference of that industrious and intelligent people comprising the present and future Cherokee Nation presupposes the semantic, ideological clearing generated by the appeal to Indianness. Only by first establishing a primordial Indianness in terms of generic savagery does the frame of anachronistic “Indian” identity become available to render a narrative of political-economic adaptation with coherence as development. Working within the terms provided by civilization discourse, Boudinot posits an Indianness that conforms to settler narrations of civilization but that in so doing crucially differentiates Cherokee from settler belonging, remaining consistent with the normative and temporal trajectories embedded in such discourse while bracketing their capacity to function as de facto territorial and juridical mappings of settler authority.

The condensed allusions to Cherokee tradition qua "savagery" throughout the text serve the larger purpose of keeping the diachronic and geopolitical difference provided by Indianness in view, even as they are metonymic of the term's conceptual phasing across the text, so as to signify both the autonomy and differentiation of Cherokee progress. For instance, Boudinot observes that in “many places the word of God is regularly preached and explained, both by missionaries and natives,” adding that “in no ignorant country have the missionaries undergone less trouble and difficulty in spreading
knowledge of the Bible” than in Cherokee territory (Boudinot 73). He himself would have known that this claim was misleading, as was the notion that the “Cherokees have had no established religion of their own” (Boudinot 73). In a similar vein, he specifies three developments of “late occurrence” that “must certainly place the Cherokee Nation in a fair light”: the “invention of letters,” the “translation of the New Testament into Cherokee,” and finally, not the adaptation of supposedly superior forms of civil government, but simply the “organization of Government” (Boudinot 74). Neither the bias reflected by these statements, attributable to Boudinot's own elite status, nor their accuracy as indices of actual Cherokee demographics are at issue here, however.

Rather, the point is that the text's references to Indianness generate a baseline notion for historical Cherokee peoplehood that enables each instance of adaptation to evoke the deliberate movement, not the formation, of a people. While the Cherokee alphabet “may be greatly simplified” it nonetheless serves “all the purpose of writing”; the translation of the New Testament ensures that the “shrill sound of the Savage yell shall die away”; and political centralization, “though defective in many respects, is well suited to the condition of the inhabitants. As they rise in information and refinement, changes in it must follow” until they “arrive” at the point they may be “admitted into all the privileges of the American family” (Boudinot 74-5). In contrast to interpreting this passage as Boudinot writing the Cherokee Nation into history, where the obstacle to recognizing Cherokee political autonomy as symbolized by treaties, western forms of governance, and the like derives from Anglo culture's having so consistently written Indians out of modernity, I would instead suggest here that Boudinot himself is the one
writing the Indian out of time. He cannot appropriate a historicity conditioned by
civilization discourse without doing so. By deploying "savagery" as an anachronistic
frame for conceptualizing improvement, and clearly foregrounding the locus of that
movement in these instances as, if not wholly originating with the Cherokee, at least
coextensive with an agency embodied in the broader population writ large, qua Indians,
Boudinot generates a sense of historicity that by charting a shift in the population
presupposes the coherence of the Cherokee people, as a distinct political body, doing the
shifting. The narration of progress, in other words, retroactively coheres the polity that
progresses.

In this way, appropriating Indianness enables the text's sociological appeal to
"progress" to reflect the "movement" of a people and, in turn, a relation to place. The
relation between Cherokee capacity for civilization and their existence as an independent
polity appears perhaps most directly in the tabulations Boudinot offers as evidence of
their industrialization. He indicates, “In 1810 there were 19,500 cattle; 6,100 horses;
19,600 swine; 1,037 sheep; 467 looms; 1,600 spinning wheels; 30 waggons; 500 ploughs;
3 saw-mills; 13 grist-mills, & etc. At this time there are 22,000 cattle; 7,600 horses;
46,000 swine; 2,500 sheep; 762 loom; 2,488 spinning wheels; 172 waggons (sic.)” and
the list extends to infrastructure, including schools, ferries and “a number of public
roads” (“An Address” 72). Insofar as the geopolitical integrity of the borders containing
this progress was a matter for debate, the impression of productivity and growth here
depend on Boudinot's mobilization of Indianness, in particular the sense of linear
historicity this term enables. At the same time, insofar as these moments presuppose
Boudinot's identification as Indian, a term for some "pregnant with ideas the most repelling and degrading," they reinforce its capacity to signify the movement of a people, as opposed to merely a stunted and anachronistic ontology ("An Address" 68).

Considering that for a settler public the meaning of Cherokee territoriality and its borders—legal, political, social—was anything but axiomatic, Boudinot's foregrounding of Indianness enables a notion of peoplehood to come into view only insofar as it renders difference as distance. "An Address to the Whites" seeks to persuade a settler public of the legitimacy of Cherokee progress and to disprove that the “Indian” is irredeemably savage and historically ossified. In so doing, the text revises the alterity of Indianness from that which frames the rights of different settler actors to Cherokee lands, grounded in history, to that which marks the exception, both in the normative sense of progress and of political distinction, of the people adapting the norms and forms of settler civilization. In terms of his own self-Indianization, Boudinot remains metonymic both of this capacity and the process of becoming it implies for the duration of the text. Signaling the future, however, would seem more difficult insofar as it threatens to close the gap between settler and Indian historicities, thereby potentially raising the incongruity of a nation within a nation. Affirming the difference of Indianness in the frame of linear, normative historicity substitutes a temporal boundary grounded in “improvement” for a geopolitics of settler jurisdiction. But where, to what, does that historicity point in the end?

In short, it points to heteronormative couplehood. In closing his text, Boudinot consistently refers to the Cherokee Nation as a feminine agency. As he writes, “She is at this instant, risen like the first morning sun, which grows brighter and brighter, until it
reaches its full glory,” gesturing to a futurity that promises to reward the audience's investment at that point when “[s]he will become not a great, but a faithful ally of the United States” ("An Address" 77). The progress of which Boudinot himself is metonymic is that of a masculine throwing off of the shackles of historical determinism, but leaving these shackles behind births a jurisdictionally distinct nation characterized as an essentially feminine companion to the United States. Boudinot extends the metaphor: “In times of peace she will plead the common liberties of America. In times of war her...sons will sacrifice in your defence...She asks not for greatness; she seeks not wealth; she pleads only...to become respectable as a nation”; the Cherokee Nation asks not for territorial sovereignty but only the chance “to enlighten and ennoble her sons, and to ornament her daughters with modesty and virtue” ("An Address" 77-8). The geopolitical and juridical difference entailed in the Cherokees' becoming a national people, and what this difference means for territorial and politico-juridical between the nations going forward, is recast as the naturalized difference of heteronormative couplehood and its associated notion of normative domesticity.

Drawing on normative gender dynamics at the end of the text registers the future geopolitical agency of Cherokee nationhood through the morality associated with settler homemaking. Boudinot casts autonomous, territorial Cherokee governance as woman's work, framing the future relationship between the Cherokee Nation and U.S. as a domestic partnership. Mobilizing the gendered dynamics of homemaking registers the continued difference of Indian civilization while deflecting the crucial juridico-political parallax of territory, sovereignty, and authority. While one could suggest that this trope
avoids a more overtly political representation of Cherokee nationhood going forward, it
would not make much sense to suggest that Boudinot seeks to evade what civilization
discourse works to foreclose. Rather, as the texts by Crawford and Simms in particular
suggest, and as the basic strategy of civilization policy shows, rendering the norms and
forms of settler civilization, here normative homemaking, as the moral locus of the desire
that grounds a normative and therein justified relation to place involves positing
Indianness as that which exceeds this edifice, whether through ontological or historical
inertia, or both. Insofar as the relationship between normative homemaking and
Indianness derives from a discourse that seeks to civilize, so as to subvert, Cherokee
landholding, these elements already form an artificial unity, which makes them available
to Boudinot. However, at the same time, there is no necessary, fixed relationship between
the two, as both the various configurations of Indianness across the texts in this chapter
and the necessity of linking such norms and forms to Indian identity in the first place
bears out. I would suggest, then, that Boudinot here transmutes the normative framework
that would seemingly disqualify the territorial claims of the Cherokee Nation into that
which marks its exceptional horizon in terms of the same linear historicity.

Finally, one could suggest that Boudinot merely anticipates an emergent
ward/guardian paradigm, normalizing the binary formulation and formation of a two-state
system. Besides the fact this paradigm had not yet received its formal-legal articulation,
however, I would suggest that the text's foregrounding of the agency of motherhood at
the end is in keeping with the adaptability of generic Indianness in its relation to settler
norms and forms. Furthermore, this trope enables Boudinot to present Cherokee futurity,
its path toward "equal standing with other nations of the earth," as a bildungsroman ("An Address" 69). Where the text begins by declaring its purpose to "labor for her respectability," by the end that national subject/people is seen "rising from the ashes of her degradation, wearing her purified and beautiful garments, and taking her seat" among those nations (69, 77). Feminizing the movement of the people serves to retain a conceptual distinction between Cherokee nationhood and the U.S. by transposing that relationship into one of a "faithful ally" to its domestic partner. Again, though, this framing does not simply deflect the threat implied by its political distinction for a public that saw its own belonging as an extension of supposedly transcendent norms. Rather, appropriating these norms as the shape of a future union conveys the continued "movement" of the Cherokee Nation as a moral necessity in terms Boudinot likely perceived as already available to his audience.

As an elite Cherokee groomed to serve a public role as spokesperson, Boudinot worked to represent his people in terms of a discourse that had, by 1826, long provided the rhetorical and ideological framing for political relations. After two major waves of Cherokee emigration west, the Red Stick War, constant incursions by settlers into southeastern Native territory, and nearly four decades of U.S. malfeasance within the treaty system, Cherokee leadership increasingly banked on the symbolic efficacy of the rhetoric of progress to publicize and politicize place-based belonging. Given the dilemma of how to represent Cherokee nationhood by way of the very discourse that had worked
to foreclose the legitimacy and real possibility of such a formation, Boudinot's text shows that appropriating and affirming a generic Indian savagery provided a throughway to historicizing the Cherokees' political centralization and political-economic changes as legitimate structures of civilization. Appropriating "savagery" as the alterity from which normative, authentic—yet de facto—claims to place emerge enables Boudinot to register the legitimacy of Cherokee sovereignty by inhabiting the generic difference of Indianness.

Put another way, the specificity of Cherokee claims gain coherence as a legitimate process of place-based state formation only insofar as settler-state actors articulate their own claims to space in relation to anachronistic Indianness. From this view, this latter term emerges as a means of articulating a claim to Cherokee land where its political mechanisms falter. In this way, the difference of Indianness is inhabitable not because Natives are the natural referent for such discourse. Gerald Vizenor has long argued that the “Indian has no referent but a simulation” (*Fugitive* 36). Building from this insight, this chapter argues that settler historicity, as an extra-juridical maneuver working within a political and juridical frame, less brackets actual Native peoples than it retroactively constitutes temporal narratives of belonging for non-natives. Following Foucault's thinking on the artificial unities that comprise discourse as discussed earlier, Indianness qua "savagery" becomes a tool for Cherokee elites in the context of nascent debates over the removal of southeastern Native groups precisely insofar as it is widely deployed by different settler actors toward their own appeals to territorial sovereignty. As the discussion of *Georgia v. Tassels, Johnson v. McIntosh*, and Commissioner Crawford's
report to Congress demonstrate, the discursivity of Indianness, its narrativity, makes it subject to appropriation and recombination in politically opposite ways depending upon who is claiming what, and when, with regard to Cherokee land.

After removal shows this will to land and sovereignty persists. Georgia loses its axiomatic moral legitimacy insofar as history now documents the illegal and genocidal intervention into Cherokee sovereignty that constituted removal. The memory of stockades and the forced march west trace political events that simply could not have happened if Georgia's position was axiomatically legitimate in the first place. In Simms' text, Georgia's recent geopolitical aggressions go missing in the spirit of Daniel Boone, which retroactively orients the reader to a moral edifice for the "border history of the south" organized around the ethics of an idealized settler-father. Like Law's primordial Native imbeciles, Lenatewa's love for Lucy, his devotion to Nelson, and his demise changes the referent of Cherokee civilization from a radical effort (even toward its own people) to adapt settler political structures in the fight against settler colonialism to a capacity to be integrated within a normative matrix of settler sociality, a capacity tragically overdetermined by the stubbornness of genealogical savagery. As in each of the texts discussed, narrating southeastern space and geopolitics by way of a tailored "Indian" identity here represents the archival memory of removal in terms of the Indian's intractably perverse relation to normative habitation, thereby historicizing a generic Indianness in the space, discursive and territorial, where the Cherokee Nation should be.
Georgia v. Tassels, discussed below, was a provocative challenge not only to Cherokee claims to lands otherwise located within the boundaries of the state of Georgia, but also to the view that the federal government had a greater claim to sovereignty than the states. It involved a Cherokee man, George 'Corn' Tassels, convicted and found guilty of murdering another Cherokee within the boundaries of Cherokee territory in northwest Georgia. The crime occurred on lands the state had recently seized through a series of legislative acts designed more or less to destroy the Cherokee Nation and acquire its lands, known as the Georgia codes. As the question of jurisdiction had to be resolved before the trial, John Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, saw the case as a possible way of getting the question of Cherokee sovereignty before the Supreme Court through the appeal process. However, the Georgia appellate court used the interlocutory appeal to articulate the state's claims to sovereignty, attacking the legal foundations and precedents for Cherokee landholding. Relying heavily on U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall's legitimation of the doctrine of discovery in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), the panel viewed Natives as, in Marshall's words, “rightful occupants of the soil” who lacked “rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations” since the discovering “nations of Europe...asserted and claimed the ultimate dominion in themselves [and] power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives” (The State v. Tassels 157). In its view, annexing Cherokee land and nullifying Cherokees' laws merely enacted a privilege the state had inherited from Great Britain and never relinquished. The case was then returned to trial court, where Tassels was quickly found guilty and then ordered to an expedited execution by Governor Gilmer, with approval by the state legislature, so as to quickly terminate the grounds for Marshall's impending review, of which Gilmer had been informed. As Tim Alan Garrison writes, in “hanging Tassel, Georgia...demonstrated the contempt it held for the Supreme Court and the notion of federal supremacy. The state rejected the federal government's authority over Indian affairs, ignored the strictures of U.S.-Indian treaties, and threatened to instigate a war with the Cherokees” (123). See Norgren, The Cherokee Cases, 95-9 and Garrison, The Legal Ideology of Removal, 111-124. For more on the doctrine of discovery, see Lomawaima and Wilkins, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law, 19-63.

Horsman adds that Jackson's opponents adapting the same contrastive rhetoric of Indian inferiority and Anglo-Saxonism shows belief in Natives' capacity to assimilate was “beginning to give way to the racialism of the mid-nineteenth century” across the board (Horsman 59). In a similar vein, Jill Norgren observes that while the Cherokees seemed to have “committed themselves to a multiracial continent populated by different nations,” the general public “who had been uncomfortable with the idea of Indian separateness” by the 1820s “began to criticize the possibility of Indian acculturation” (39). And Tim Alan Garrison points out that ideas of racial determination and “Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism” had become so “deeply embedded in white minds,” saturating politics, philosophy, and the culture at large, that even William Wirt, the Cherokee Nation's hired lawyer, employed them in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (29). Wirt argued that “theories of Anglo-Saxon superiority [were] flawed,” as the “purported successes of Anglo-American culture” over that of the Cherokees could not “be attributed to racial purity,” inadvertently highlighting the deep purchase of a race-based epistemology (Garrison 29). At the very least, it appears that it was easier for advocates of the Cherokee Nation to question whether blood determines the arrangement of social space than to present the Cherokees' obvious appropriation of settler political and economic norms as a legitimate adaptation.

Notes

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As a side note, Crawford's emphasis on the necessity of teaching Natives the value of manual labor appears especially cynical given that the results of the Cherokees' own hard work, namely the development of farm land and a number of mills, contributed to the perceived value of their land in the first place, prior to the discovery of gold. As Green and Perdue put it, in the buildup to the Indian Removal Act, as Georgia passed legislation annexing Cherokee territory and parcelled out land for state lottery, “the chance to get a free farm kept the attention of individual Georgians focused on the Indians” (71). Consider also that the terms of the Treaty of New Echota (1835) in addition to obligating the U.S. “to pay $5 million, cover the cost of various claims levied by and against the Cherokees...and set aside money for schools, orphans, and a national fund, and pay the cost of removal to and subsistence in the West during the first year” also stipulated that the U.S. “appraise and compensate for the value of all improvements left behind” by the Cherokees (ibid. 112).

To be clear, from the beginning the U.S. focused on circumscribing Cherokee political autonomy. Like their southeastern counterparts, the Cherokees had signed a treaty with the federal government under the Articles of Confederation. Article III of the Treaty of Hopewell (1785) states that the Cherokee acknowledge themselves “to be under the protection of the United States of America, and no other sovereign whosoever,” while Article IX gives Congress “the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such a manner as they think proper,” a principle more fully worked out in the series of Trade and Intercourse Acts that (in theory) limited white encroachment and fraudulent land cessions by requiring licenses for trading and entering into Native territory.

After the boundary fixed by the 1785 treaty and its accompanying provision that the Cherokee could punish transgressors “as they please[d]” failed to stem emigration from the Carolinas and Georgia into Cherokee territory, the federal government negotiated a new treaty at Holston (present-day Knoxville, Tennessee) that sought to deflate escalating hostilities by reaffirming much of the previous treaty. However, the latter treaty effectively rewarded illegal white settlements by purchasing the land for the squatters in question. A number of land-ceding treaties followed. The resentment toward white settlements on Cherokee land in present-day Kentucky and Tennessee helped to propel a more centralized political resistance to land cessions. This centralization only amplified the existing tensions between Upper and Lower Town Cherokees, however, tensions that manifested in the 1807 execution of Cherokee chief Doublehead, a famed Chickamauga warrior made speaker of the nation in 1796, mainly for ceding away a large portion of Cherokee hunting grounds. In addition to frustration with the United States' unwillingness to curb illegal emigration, the Lower Towns were equally disconcerted with the course westernization was taking with regard to traditional political structures. Rather than unproblematically registering social progress and national unity, the centralization of Cherokee peoplehood undertaken toward regulating and diminishing land cessions via treaty itself gradually diminished the political importance of the traditional towns. At a macro-level, the result was the stratification of the Cherokees into a representative elite attuned to the demands of capitalist political-economy, as a means to stave off U.S. inroads into national autonomy, and the broader masses who were increasingly estranged from decision-making processes. See Wilkins “Young Chief” in Cherokee Tragedy, especially 37-45; Rifkin “Representing the Cherokee Nation” boundary 2, Fall 2005; Green and Perdue The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears, 23-41; Heidler and Heidler, Indian Removal 3-9; Garrison The Legal Ideology of Removal, 14-41.

Although the Cherokees had sided with the United States against the British and the Shawnee Confederacy in the War of 1812, a conflict that soon catalyzed the Creek civil war and the Red Stick war, frontier settlers in the southeast still doubled down on their desire for supposedly free land, clamoring for the federal government to terminate native claims in the region.
The Chickamaugas refer to a group of Lower Town Cherokees who persistently resisted settler hostilities and movements into their territory with force. Led by Dragging Canoe in the late-eighteenth century, the group sided with the British during the Revolutionary war but gradually broke away from the main body of Cherokees in the early nineteenth century and emigrated as a result of constant violent incursions. See Wilkins, 11-20 and Justice, 36-42.

For more on the development of the National Council, the National Committee, and the impact of land cessions on broader Cherokee political reorganization, see Garrison *The Legal Ideology of Indian Removal*, esp. 45-58; Norgren *The Cherokee Cases*, esp. 41-6; Green and Perdue “Civilizing the Cherokees” in *The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears*. For a perspective on the impact of political reorganization on Cherokee sociality, in particular the ways in which the formation of a centralized Cherokee national government with jurisdiction over its territory displaced kinship networks, both marginalized women through new criteria for citizenship and rendered resistance to Christianization and/or the laws passed by the Council as an archaic radicalism, see Rifkin “Representing the Cherokee Nation,” esp. 67-72.

Cherokees were integrated into the state as individuals without recourse to legal protection from theft or violence to property as they could not testify in court and Georgia judges could not accept Cherokee laws as defense (although a later act enabled Cherokees who owned improvements on their land to testify in court after the land lottery). Those citizens who opposed removal faced criminal charges if they were found to encourage the Cherokee to remain, and they faced up to six years of hard labor if found guilty. People who argued that they were acting in accordance with Cherokee laws in defending their land faced additional penalties. Creeks had to provide documentation from the Creek federal agent if they wished to enter Georgia and could only remain for ten days, as the legislature feared the development of alliances that could strengthen the Cherokees' resolve. White people who were living in the annexed territory after 1831 had to take an oath of allegiance to the state for which they would receive documentation, although white men married to Cherokee women and federal agents were exempted. This component was primarily directed toward missionaries like Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, who along with nine additional missionaries were arrested in 1831 for operating on Cherokee grounds without a permit. In 1832, Georgia began to survey Cherokee lands after the legislature authorized the governor to do so in the absence of a removal treaty, so as to facilitate the lottery of Cherokee lands. The governor was also authorized to seize gold deposits and station militia in order to prevent trespassing. See Garrison 103-112 and 169-75, and Green and Perdue 78-85.

The missionaries were advised to accept the pardon by their sponsoring body, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Butler and Worcester were specifically arrested and jailed for working in the area without the necessary state permit and refusing to sign an oath of allegiance to the state, offenses which both derived from the Georgia codes passed in a flurry in the late 1820s as the state sought to destroy place-based Cherokee sovereignty. Since the two accepted the pardon, the ruling's precedent was never tested in the conflict between the Cherokees and Georgia, although it would become an important touchstone for later efforts to reverse elements of allotment and termination policies.

For more on *imperium in imperio*, see Garrison, 131-2. The argument that Indian nationhood violated this principle would contribute to the arguments by pro-removal advocates in the Georgia legislature for the primacy of state over native sovereignty. Garrison also points out that contesting this argument formed a key component of William Wirt's argument in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*. As Georgia aggressively moved to annex Cherokee lands, the debate over removal increasingly turned on whether the Cherokee Nation was to be considered a foreign nation or whether it existed in another, more ambiguous relation to the federal government, the latter which John Marshall would codify with his notion of domestic dependent status in *Cherokee Nation*. For John Marshall's discussion in this decision of why the Cherokees did not constitute a foreign nation, which included combining an a priori assertion of settler title to land with the notion that Natives lived in a state of pupilage with regard to the U.S., see Prucha 58-9. For President Jackson's slightly earlier discussion of the same point from a different, more explicitly geopolitical angle organized around states' rights, see Prucha 47-8. For an overview of the emergence of domestic-dependent status for Native nations, in particular the Supreme Court's role via Marshall's decisions, see Barker 29-35. For more on how domestic-dependent status emerges out of competing views on the doctrine of discovery, see Lomawaima and Wilkins 22-62. For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's trajectory from *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* and *Worcester v. Georgia* with regard to the legal limits of native occupancy, states' claims to sovereignty, and the scope of the rights attached to the Cherokee people construed as a nation, see Norgren 98-122.

*Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. William McIntosh* involved a dispute over the proper claim to two large sections of land in Illinois. The plaintiffs inherited lands that were purchased from the Piankashaws prior to the Revolutionary War. As Garrison points out, the lands in question were deemed Indian country in the Proclamation of 1763, which made the Appalachian mountain range a political boundary between the colonies and Native territory, although they also partially overlapped with Virginia's original charter of 1609 (87). The defendants had received a grant to the same lands by the United States in 1818. The U.S. acquired Virginia's claim to the lands in 1784 and after the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 began surveying and selling lands collectively referred to as the Old Northwest, despite that several Native groups living in the region still claimed the space. Marshall ruled in favor of McIntosh, arguing that Native groups had a right to occupancy only, could sell or cede lands to the United States only, and that the latter held political sovereignty over all territory on the basis of the doctrine of discovery. See Garrison 87-97 and Konkle 17-19.

Here we see the tenuousness of discovery as a basis for sovereignty. According to Marshall's reasoning, in the absence of a proper proof of purchase, so to speak, Native peoples' acknowledged right to occupancy of these lands had to have been extinguished by conquest; otherwise, either the powers of sovereignty created by doctrine of discovery and as laid out here are not absolute (i.e. this precedent itself, rather than native 'title,' is the limited construct), or U.S. title to these lands is not valid in terms of these powers. Conquest in this passage moves from a means of implementing the powers of sovereignty that took effect at discovery to paradoxically the locus of this sovereignty itself, as the end of the ruling seems to indicate.

In fact, the state legislature expedited the death of George Tassels before a writ of error from Marshall arrived informing the panel of judges that its decision in *Georgia* would be reviewed. Insofar as it effectively terminated the basis for the review, killing Tassels prevented the panel's precedent for state sovereignty from being overturned and protected the legalization of the state legislature's annexation of Cherokee space. See Garrison, 120-4.

The panel makes the latter reference in the context of discussing the aforementioned Treaty of Hopewell, specifically an article that mandated the Cherokee give notice of their intention to go to war. Rather than indicating a nation-to-nation relationship, a bit of diplomacy that could validate a legal notion of Cherokee sovereignty, the panel argues that this particular article was rather a necessary and "salutary restriction which was the origin of, at least, one approach towards the habits and usages of civilized man" (*State* 162).
This biopolitical use of the trope of the home draws on Mark Rifkin's argument that the settler state exerts and naturalizes its power through a compulsory heterosexuality comprising "an ensemble of imperatives that includes family formation, homemaking, private property-holding, and the allocation of citizenship, a series of 'detachable parts' fused to each other through discourses of sexuality," which indigenous peoples perpetually threaten to disarticulate and thereby disclose as an imaginary basis for sovereignty (Rifkin *When Did Indians Become Straight* 37).

For instance, Elias Boudinot, in a letter from August 1832 addressing his forced resignation as editor of the *Cherokee Phoenix*, writes the following: "Has not our oppressor...overlooking the sacred obligations of right, not only infringed upon our political rights, but has actually...taken possession of one-half of our country...think for a moment, my counymen, the danger to be apprehended from an overwhelming white population...overcharged with high notions of color, dignity, and greatness...They should have...our sons and daughters...be slaves indeed" (168). The point is not only that both Boudinot's turn to removal and Ross's resistance, along with the Cherokee memorials, exist as archival materials in a material sense and therefore, along with the collective memory of removal, cannot be denied. Boudinot's turn toward removal itself develops pointed critique of the supposed civility of the white establishment in Georgia. The archival record of Cherokee resistance in all its complexity radically deconstructs settler claims to Cherokee lands on the basis of a historical or moral necessity rhetorically cast as the march of civilization.

Edgar Allan Poe, *Essays and Reviews* 904, originally printed in *Godey's Lady's Book*, January 1846. Poe wrote this review and another in the *Broadway Journal* to stand by the claims made in his initial 1845 review of the volume in the latter. In addition, Poe had already expressed a similar opinion of Simms in the *Democratic Review* of December 1844, prior to the publication of *The Wigwam and the Cabin* though likely in response to some of its stories already in circulation, like the widely popular "Grayling; Or, 'Murder will Out."” There he insisted that “leaving out of the question Brockden Brown and Hawthorne...[Simms] is immeasurably the best writer of fiction in America. He has more vigor, more imagination, more movement and more general capacity than all our novelists (save Cooper), combined” (Poe *ER* 1342). See also John Caldwell, “Introduction” xvii to xxii.

Kolodny references a talk Simms delivered, coincidentally enough, to the Historical Society of the State of Georgia in 1842, the same group to whom Law delivered his lectures on Georgia history in 1840. In the talk, later reprinted as “History for the Purposes of Art” in his 1846 volume *Views and Reviews in American Literature, History and Fiction*, Simms observes that by giving “'shape to the unhewn fact...relation to the scattered fragments’” and uniting “‘the parts in coherent dependency’ the artist ‘endows, with life and action, the otherwise motionless automata of history’” (qtd. in Kolodny, *The Lay of the Land* 116). This is a view of the writer of fiction that Simms would repeat over his career and that as we can see nearly perfectly mirrors Hayden White's definition of the historian as one who endows facts and events with the kind of meaning found in a culture's fictions.

See Guilds “Introduction” page xviii and xxvii n. 4.

See Wilkins *Cherokee Tragedy*, 10-27. Simms' reference seems to be the outbreak of violence between the 1785 treaty of Hopewell and the 1794 peace terms negotiated between President Washington and a Cherokee delegation at Philadelphia that involved ceding a large section of land illegally occupied by white squatters. This was a chaotic phase in the Cherokee history, as settler emigrations spurred numerous attacks and counterattacks on both sides. Consequences of illegal settler encroachments onto Cherokee space during this time were the secession of the Chickamaugas, the increasing division between Upper and Lower Town Cherokees, and, as Wilkins narrates in detail, the execution of Lower Town chief Doublehead for ceding away the Cherokees remaining hunting grounds in modern day Kentucky. See also Green and Perdue, 27-37.
Put another way, over against Nelson's extra-political masculinity, the land itself implicitly registers as an empty space awaiting annexation to such men by way of a Lockean ethic of labor-based ownership. For more on the relationship between labor and the right to land in Locke's thinking and its implications for representations of native landedness, see Rifkin "Romancing the State of Nature" in *Settler Common Sense*.

In narratological terms, Nelson is at once the homodiegetic focalizer (the actant within the scene looking out from the window back then) and the scene's heterodiegetic narrator (addressing the reader now), suggesting the degree to which Simms' narrative framing overdetermines the conflict as not only a wholly indigenous conflict "out there" but also as (always) already over.

It should be noted that this plot *vaguely* recalls the assassination of Lower Cherokee leader Doublehead by The Ridge and a few Cherokee allies who no longer trusted him on the basis of Doublehead's unsanctioned selling of tribal hunting grounds. The crucial difference is the role of federal government agents played in bribing Cherokee leaders for land so as to bypass both Cherokee governance and the stipulations of earlier treaties is posed instead as a tragic and wholly intra-native contest for power.

*Justice Our Fire Survives the Storm*, 32.

Perhaps the most blatant oversight on Simms' part is that the Red Stick War and the Creek civil war out of which it grew developed in 1813, just a few years before Nelson's death in 1817. For more on Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa's resistance, see Colin G. Calloway, *The Shawnees and the War for America*, esp. 138-54.

For an analysis of this complicity, see both Byrd, xvii-xxvi and Konkle, 28-36.

Much of what follows in this section resists the tendency to see Boudinot as a traitor and then to project his break with Ross as the horizon against which all of his prior work is interpreted. This horizon is well established. Boudinot would become a key member of what come to be known as the Treaty Party, the pro-removal faction of the Cherokee elite also referred to as the Ridge faction, the group that signed the Treaty of New Echota on December, 29 1835. Unauthorized by the Cherokee National Council, the treaty party obligated the Cherokee to surrender all of their lands east of the Mississippi for territory in Indian Country along with funds to remove ($5 million), compensation for lost improvements, subsistence for the first year after removal, and future monies for the development of infrastructure. The party negotiated over a two-day period with John Schermerhorn, who was authorized and pressured by Jackson to get a document signed in Cherokee territory. Twenty members of the Ridge faction, including Boudinot and Major Ridge, worked on the treaty and then turned it over to a vote by 86 male Cherokees, most of whom lived in the area under intense pressure by settlers and the Georgia legislature. The treaty passed 79-6 and was later signed by Stand Watie and John Ridge in Washington. It passed by a one-vote majority in the Senate the following May. Jackson ignored protests that it was illegitimate and signed it, setting May 23rd 1838 as the date for removal. The Ross party attempted to have it nullified to no avail. The treaty's illegitimacy has rightfully received much of the scholarly attention on this period, along with the political fallout within the Cherokee Nation that led to a civil war and the assassination of members of the Treaty Party, including Boudinot. Receiving less attention, however, is that the Georgia legislature passed legislation just prior to the treaty council at New Echota authorizing all winners of the previous state lottery of Cherokee lands to take their possessions on November 25, 1836. Given the federal government's unwillingness to change course after the decision in *Worcester v. Georgia* and the re-election of Jackson in 1832, this piece of legislation perhaps signified to the Ridge faction the utter futility of Ross's insistence on holding out for better terms, emboldening them to sign the treaty despite the obvious risk to their lives. See Ehle, *Trail of Tears: The Rise and Fall of the Cherokee Nation*; McLoughlin, *After the Trail of Tears*; Peyer, *The Tutor'd Mind*, esp. 166-223; Perdue, "Introduction," in *Cherokee Editor*; Perdue and Green, *The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears*; Wilkins, *Cherokee Tragedy*. 
Perdue notes that there is at least one documented instance of the paper reaching Germany. For more on the Cherokee Phoenix's development, content, and political context, as well as its role in shaping the 'question' of removal and conveying an image of the Cherokees as a civilized peoples, see Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy, 194-213 and Peyer The Tutor'd Mind 183-206.

Although this stratification extended to diminishing women's roles in governance, Cherokee women were not silent on political matters, instead drawing on their traditional roles as horticulturalists and providers for the broader people to persuade the Cherokee National Council against removal and allotment in the tense period around the second removal crisis. See Kilcup, Fallen Forests 21-41.

The Superior Court of Georgia would argue just four years later that if “the Cherokees now say, they have advanced in civilization, and have formed for themselves a regular government” then this only shows that “they are there in a situation to be brought under the influence of the laws of a civilized state—the state of Georgia”; Cherokee civilization only demonstrates that “the obstacle which induced...Georgia to forbear the exercise of the rights [derived from] Great Britain, as the discovering nation...no longer exists, if the Cherokees or their counsel are to be believed” (The State v. George Tassels 161-2).

For more on the bio-logics of blood in their relation to Indian affairs in the nineteenth century, see Cheyfitz, "The (Post)Colonial Construction of Indian Country," esp. 15-40.

Perhaps largely as a consequence of Boudinot's involvement in the Treaty of New Echota, much of the criticism around his life and work tends to focus on the degree of ambivalence or conflict he might have felt based on his position between two cultures, and to what extent this psycho-cultural division explains his 'turn' from one of the most passionate representatives of the Cherokee Nation to an architect of its removal west. If not “so thoroughly Christianized that he did not understand the religion of his own people,” as Theda Perdue puts it, referring to his representation of Cherokee religion in this particular text, Boudinot has been nonetheless posed as a tragic in his intercultural positioning (Cherokee Editor, 81, n. 14). Perdue accordingly reads his acculturation as conditioning an elitism that led him to misrepresent his people. Bernd Peyer modifies this stance a bit, though culture is still the critical axis. He sees in Boudinot's writing “little evidence...of a problem of self-understanding either as a Christian or as a member of the Cherokee Nation,” arguing that he seems to have reconciled these tensions by considering himself "to be a very privileged sort of Cherokee" (222). As with Perdue, Peyer understands Boudinot's elitism as alienating, such that the question of his involvement in the Cherokee resistance opens onto a question of his relation to traditional Cherokee culture. Peyer suggests that Boudinot “was not really much farther away from or closer to Cherokee tradition than John Ross the 'patriot'” after Worcester v. Georgia proved to be a toothless precedent with which to combat Georgia's encroachments onto Cherokee lands (223). However, reading the “Address” as an ironic prelude to his signing of the Treaty of New Echota presumes not two discrete, otherwise hermetically sealed cultural spheres as its most relevant signifying environment but, in so doing, presumes removal as fated despite its political context, thus priming the move to psychodynamic and cultural heuristics precisely because we already know the history. As Bethany Schneider argues, this perspective paradoxically locates Boudinot's agency beyond the purview of each culture thought to have influenced his actions. Cultural conflict here “deeply affects and molds [Boudinot] but it is in essential opposition to him...the individual fails to do the right thing and that failure is reserved for the individual; it defines him. It is blamed on culture but in the end it belongs to the individual who, however much he may be corrupted or conflicted by culture, is in the final instance not of culture” (157). Reading Boudinot as torn between two roughly hermetic spheres of influence ironically enough yields a portrait of an individual who somehow transcends his determinist shackles just enough to make a defining mistake, reifying a psychologizing framework in the ostensible shift to a sociopolitical or historical context for his work.
For more on *imperium in imperio*, see Garrison, 131-2. As he points out, contesting this argument formed a key component of William Wirt's argument in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*. As Georgia aggressively moved to annex Cherokee lands, the debate over removal increasingly turned on whether the Cherokee Nation was to be considered a foreign nation or whether it existed in another, more ambiguous relation to the federal government, the latter which John Marshall would codify with his notion of domestic dependent status in *Cherokee Nation*. For John Marshall's discussion in this decision of why the Cherokees did not constitute a foreign nation, which included combining an a priori assertion of settler title to land with the notion that Natives lived in a state of pupilage with regard to the U.S., see Prucha 58-9. For President Jackson's slightly earlier discussion of the same point from a different, more explicitly geopolitical angle organized around states' rights, see Prucha 47-8. For an overview of the emergence of domestic-dependent status for Native nations, in particular the Supreme Court's role via Marshall's decisions, see Barker 29-35. For more on how domestic-dependent status emerges out of competing views on the doctrine of discovery, see Lomawaima and Wilkins 22-62. For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's trajectory from *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* and *Worcester v. Georgia* with regard to the legal limits of Native occupancy, states' claims to sovereignty, and the scope of the rights attached to the Cherokee people construed as a nation, see Norgren 98-122.

For more on the ways in which treaties worked to manufacture an impression of consent on behalf of Native peoples to land expropriation, see Rifkin *Manifesting America*, 39-49. From this angle, Konkle's claim that “No one can ever deny the fact of treaties or of their necessity” is therefore deeply ambivalent with regard to the debate over Cherokee removal (Konkle 63).

I take this notion of changing difference, where the actual concept of difference itself can be shown as having a capacity for plasticity and self-differentiation, from the work of Catherine Malabou, in particular *Changing Difference: The Feminine and the Question of Philosophy* and *What Should We Do With Our Brain*?

As Joel Martin observes, Christianity was mostly confined to elite Cherokees, which made up a relatively small portion of the total population. Among the roughly fifteen thousand Cherokees in 1830, "only thirteen hundred" Cherokees practiced Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, or Moravian faiths, which were the four Christian denominations practiced in the area at the time (Martin 234). Martin adds that most of the norms and forms of settler civilization were actually practiced by a relatively small portion of the total population; the vast majority of Cherokees continued their traditional religious practices well into the antebellum period. See his "Cultural Contact and Crises in the Early Republic" for more.
CHAPTER III

HISTORICIZING INDIAN CHARACTER IN NEW ENGLAND:
(DIS)PLACING NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY IN CHILD, SEDGWICK, AND APESS

The previous chapter argued that the discursivity of Indianness in the context of southeastern Native removal served to cast Cherokee land claims as collective progress toward normative nationhood, even as it enabled pro-removal actors to historicize territorial sovereignty in ways that concealed the contingency and unevenness of their individual positions. However, the sheer incongruity of the removal argument was not lost on Cherokee advocates at the time. Jeremiah Evarts, author of the William Penn essays, insisted that if Georgia needed the U.S. to acquire lands supposedly already under its own jurisdiction, then it, rather than the Cherokee Nation, was the domestic dependent. Nonetheless, such fantasies of entitlement were not limited to the south. Evarts also asserted that “[f]rom the settlement of the English colonies in North America to the present day, the right of Indians to lands in their actual and peaceable possession, and to such form of government as they choose, has been admitted by the whites,” as attested by the fact that for “one hundred and fifty years, innumerable treaties were made between the English colonists and the Indians, upon the basis of the Indians being independent nations” (106). If this were the case, however, what then happened to New England Native peoples, who by this time had endured fraudulent land cessions and encroachments, broken treaties, and the structural poverty that accompanies capitalism for nearly the entire period he offers as proof of the unprecedented nature of Georgia's
actions? Presuming his sincerity, how do we account for an activism on behalf of “Indian” rights (not Cherokee) that nearly rewrote history, but required a disavowal of colonization no less egregious than the removal agenda it opposed?

The short answer would be that Evarts, like most everyone else, believed that New England Natives had vanished. Scholarship has demonstrated that the northern opposition to removal accepted this mythos if only insofar as Native groups seemed unable to withstand the conflicts, diseases (including alcoholism), and reduced means of subsistence that came with accumulated land cessions. Brian Dippie has shown that, for anti-removal Whigs, the Cherokee Nation was the exception proving that “Indians could coexist with white men” and that “the rule of decay need not be universal” (Dippie 65-6).

To this point, Daniel R. Mandell observes that northern Democrats and Whigs alike embraced the narrative of Native degeneracy, suggesting that it had indeed “become the dominant paradigm in the region” for historicizing US-Indian affairs (Tribe, Race, Nation 184). Beyond their status as political allegories, then, the portraits of colonial history offered in reformist novels such as Hobomok and Hope Leslie likely appeared as accurate revisions of the collective past to the degree that they challenged the biases of earlier Puritan historiography, thereby casting this earlier narrative modality as a distortion of real events in colonial history that were integral to the nation's founding.

However, rather than situate vanishing Indianness as false consciousness (by holding the Cherokee to be the exception that disproves the rule, Indian rights activists nonetheless misrepresent actual colonial history), this chapter will argue that the portraits of bygone “Indian” character, typically associated with the Wampanoag leader King
Philip, are metonymic of ongoing settler colonialism in New England, in particular the use of historicity to justify guardian systems. These works sustain and extend a narrativity of Indian decline and degeneration that allows settler actors to imagine themselves at the waxing cusp of linear historicity over against residual New England Native groups, namely through positing an idealized, decidedly non-tribal Indianness as the prelapsarian point at which Natives were oriented to the aims of settlement. In turn, William Apess's *Eulogy on King Philip* can accordingly be read as reverse discourse, disrupting this historicity by foregrounding the continuity of settler depredations within the frame already generated by Indian virtue.

By depicting regional Native peoples as declining, early-nineteenth century historians in New England portrayed Anglo settlement as a historical break over against prior indigenous peoplehood, as Jean O' Brien's work makes evident. Repeating this ur narrative, namely that “Indians had vanished from their vicinities,” had the cumulative effect of purifying “the landscape of Indians [through] a degeneracy narrative that foreclosed Indian futures” (O' Brien 143). Such notions gained further empirical validity as concepts of “racial mixture and culture 'loss’” developed coherence, which portrayed “the Indianness of New England Indians” as having “diluted...to the vanishing point” (O'Brien 202). And yet, historicizing Natives as declining was nothing new by the 1820s. Amy Den Ouden shows that narratives of Indian decline were part and parcel of efforts to undermine Native communities from the very beginning of English settlement. This chapter will take this historicity into account by reading for the ways in which the discourse of vanishing Indianness fosters a prelapsarian notion of Indian character that
reinforces settler sociality as not simply progressive (vis-à-vis savage Indians) but, rather, gives portraits of settler domesticity and normativity coherence as marking forward movement in history on the basis of their ethical universality, thereby sublimating the geopolitics of land claims as a struggle over tyranny in time.⁷

In contrast to the trope of familialism as it emerges in the discourse on Cherokee removal, however, here romanticized and idealized notions of Indian character, as indexing a kind of altruism emerging organically from Nature, provide settlers with a means to narrate colonial history apart from the cycles of oppression and tyranny characteristic of Puritan patriarchy. Identification with an idealized, noble Indian virtue (rather than distance from Indian savagery) helps to cohere a sense of the possibility for emergent republican principles to traverse oppressive formations within the settler political sphere. Put another way, identification with such Indian virtue casts contemporary obstacles to the expansion/expression of egalitarianism as residual forms of tyranny, associated with the Old World rather than the New. The problem, however, is that the very trope of an impossibly ethical or virtuous Indian character itself derives from the discourses used to implement and justify guardian and reservations systems in New England over time, systems that exploited Native peoples, land, and resources, and that William Apess dedicated much of his life and work to exposing. From this view, given that this narrativity was already deeply embedded in negating Native land claims, the early-antebellum discourse of noble, vanishing savagery, mostly associated with the Wampanoag leader King Philip, less indexes New England ambivalence on the national “Indian question” than it extends the narrative undermining of Native claims to place.
This approach entails reading for the ways in which the ethics associated with Indian character retroactively cohere Anglo settlement (and the U.S.) as an axiomatic, even inevitable historical project, one that does not so much claim as subsume the land to the temporality that it manifests.

This reading further involves parting with the more recent tendency to treat such novels in allegorical terms, a break that in turn calls for rethinking the possible referent(s) for such representations of sympathetic Indian character. Scholarship on antebellum Native vanishing, however, tends to presuppose this relationship, linking Indian character both to the national removal debate and an interest in mythologizing the moment of founding in the midst of the nation's bicentennial. This view holds that America's newness on the world stage tasked post-revolutionary generations with cobbling together a coherent national identity, and reflecting on Indian history was an obvious place to start, although such reflections were just as obviously vexed. As Susan Scheckel writes, on one hand, the romantic notion that Natives were a “dying race” from the “distant past” made them perfect subjects to signify the “prehistory of the nation” (8). On the other, however, if Natives enabled writers to reflect on national identity, the history they called to the fore “also represented that which had to be denied” so as to sustain “a coherent image of the nation” (Scheckel 12). Although historicizing Native peoples grounded the U.S. nation-state, it also threatened to undermine the young nation's claims to exceptionalism. The sympathy expressed for the noble savage, a central element of U.S. place-making as early as Jefferson's commentary on Logan's Lament, offers an important
bait and switch: emotionally compensating for an ongoing project of nation-building that would lose its moral grandeur if it were seen instead as the movement of empire.

Yet not everyone reads such affect as assuaging Anglo guilt within the frame of national history. Laura Mielke for instance argues that Lydia Maria Child's *Hobomok* (1824) brings “the Euro-American heroine into emotional and physical intimacy with the American Indian hero” seemingly only to “destroy or repress that intimacy”; in so doing, it encourages readers to reconsider Indians' place in “the national family” at the very moment they are being “pushed from the foreground into history” (*Moving* 17, 19). More than nationalist ideology, Child's revision of history from this angle offers an alternative to removal by mobilizing forms of sincerity and fellow-feeling associated with domesticity, taken as an extra-political domain. The novel's emphasis on “the necessary authorship of conscience in society and the rule of the heart in marriage” promotes a “sympathetic relationship” between whites and Natives that poses sectarian intolerance as a thing of the past and gestures to the possibility of new, cross-cultural bonds going forward (*Mielke Moving* 18). Rather than primarily negotiating the contradictions of Indian history within an emergent national narrative, sympathy here performs a new paradigm for U.S.-Indian politics modeled on Richard White's notion of the middle ground, a space “in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages” in which cultural misunderstanding creates “new meanings and through them new practices” conducive to bilateral reciprocity and exchange rather than unilateral domination (xxvi).
Two diametrically opposed views then derive from efforts to historicize the politics of vanishing Indianness. Either such tropes assuage liberal guilt within an emergent frame of national identity, or they profile a third space of U.S.-Native political relations based on a shared humanity that emerges out of cultural interactions between Natives and whites. Yet this either/or framework presumes that southeastern removal, given its spectacular nature and its significance in US history, exhausts the political terrain of antebellum Native dispossession. The “Indian” question effectively means the “Cherokee” question, and novels such as *Hope Leslie* and *Hobomok* are usually taken as allegorizing one political position or another with regard to this debate, which could be interpreted as ironically implying that Wampanoags, Pequots, and their neighbors had indeed vanished, or at the very least reinforcing the notion at the level of methodology. However, the point is not merely that such criticism effectively doubles the erasure of New England Native peoples. Rather, bracketing this allegorical framework enables one to examine how the narrative condition of possibility for such sympathy with the Cherokees is a linear historicity anchored in casting reservation communities as given to deviance and/or degeneration.

This chapter focuses on the ways in which narrating Indian character retroactively presents New England settlement as an axiomatic structure in ways that efface historical and ongoing conditions of settler colonialism, manifest in guardian and reservation systems. Insofar as it helps to articulate the egalitarian potential of a nascent Republicanism, an imaginary and utterly archaic Indian nobility allows non-Native actors, represented in novels like *Hobomok* and *Hope Leslie*, works to foreclose a view of
New England reservation communities as struggling to maintain their land and autonomy. Noble Indian character facilitates a prelapsarian “Indian” that throws antebellum Native peoples into relief as residual and therefore partial entities, as inexorably out of joint with time and place. The sign that this discourse is metonymic rather than metaphoric of settler colonialism (and material rather than purely ephemeral with regard to the geopolitics of New England reservation communities) is that the temporality of Indian virtue/authenticity emerges against the genealogical background provided by tropes of settler homemaking. The modes of sympathy and sentimentalism crucial to generating progressive politics, according to Elizabeth Maddock Dillon, hinged on tropes of domesticity, which worked to “produce the freedom of the liberal subject through [narrating] affective abundance and nonutilitarianism” (Gender 203). Scenes of domesticity clear the space for an excessive subjectivity that, in turn, defamiliarizes and thereby resists the political status quo. Yet, in laboring for a social milieu that necessarily exceeds them, the Indian siblings, lovers, mothers, and fathers in these texts anthropomorphize the roots of political reform as already “freely” existing in nature and thus constitutive of the social order writ large. The sympathy for Natives elicited in texts such as Hobomok and Hope Leslie in turn casts contemporary Native communities under guardianship as more lingering than living, thereby extending the efficacy of narratives that long underpinned reservation systems.

The chapter will examine Lydia Maria Child's Hobomok and Catherine Maria Sedgwick's Hope Leslie, for the ways in which each imagines Indian character as essentially ethical, self-sacrificing, and proto-egalitarian in ways that depict the reform
and expansion of civil liberty within the state as constitutive of any and all meaningful political engagement. By predicating political change on recognizing the historical and ethical primacy of Indian exceptionalism, each novel intensifies the efficacy of narratives of Native decline and may be seen therefore as synecdochic of regional settler colonialism despite their progressive politics. By contrast, William Apess's *Eulogy on King Philip* demonstrates how this discourse on character paradoxically opens a path to Native resistance internal to anachronistic Indian virtue itself. To eulogize Philip is to foreground an ensemble of relations of dispossession otherwise obscured through settlement's narration and introjection of a bygone and authentic Indian character. Juxtaposing contemporary Native struggles against the legacy of guardian systems with a racially-inflected revision of the dominant portrait of King Philip's magnanimity presents Indian character as noble but not vanishing. Apess's text therein breaks with a narrativity that otherwise presents the unjust dispossession of Indigenous peoples in New England as a tragic, primordial event rather than an ongoing condition of possibility for settler belonging.

**Hobomok's Surrogate Fatherhood**

While sympathetic portrayals of Indian character in the mid-to-late 1820s galvanized the northern opposition to Cherokee removal, they also contributed to the belief that the Wampanoags, Pequots, Narragansetts and their regional neighbors had been vanquished in the seventeenth century. Rather than merely illustrating how little antebellum New Englanders knew about history, citations of Indian extinction are as old
as the colonies themselves and, as such, constitutive of the very fabric of New England historiography. Depicting Native peoples as given to decline yielded the means for undermining their self-determination by making dispossession appear as an extra-political and inevitable phenomenon, as historical necessity. Moreover, this use of narrativity to (dis)qualify or even negate Native land rights appeared as early as the aftermath of the Pequot War, which quickly became the touchstone for enmeshing “claims of legality (the 'rights of conquest') with the construction of historical events” (Den Ouden 13).10 Exploring how the notion of inevitable Indian decline develops in colonial New England will provide the background for demonstrating how *Hobomok* extends this colonizing ideology, namely by grounding the ethics of settler egalitarianism in a primordial Indian virtue.

The notion that the massacre at Fort Mystic in 1636 by English (from Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay), Narragansett, and Mohegan forces destroyed the Pequots still resonates. Yet from their inception such narratives facilitated a historicity that furthered settler territorial interests. For example, Connecticut declared the Pequot tribe *extinct* in the Treaty of Hartford that ended the war and divided Pequot captives between the Narragansetts and Mohegans while reserving their lands for the English. Nonetheless, as early as 1638, one year later, Pequots began returning to traditional locales along the Thames River, forming groups that were recognized as the Pequot communities of Mashantucket and Stonington within five years (Mandell *King Philip's War* 17-18). Connecticut later reneged on the assertion of Pequot extinction by acknowledging not only their survivance but their entitlement to lands by creating reservations not once, but
*twice:* in 1651 at Noank (which was later fraudulently allocated to the town of Groton, in the early-eighteenth century) and again in 1683 at Stonington (Den Ouden 15).

Apparently, colonists played fast and loose with the meaning of extinction.

Far from merely delusional thinking, however, Connecticut's insistence on Pequot destruction represents a deliberate use of narrative to foster English hegemony where outright dominance was not possible.\(^{11}\) The rise of guardian systems after King Philip's war both embodied and relayed the geopolitical efficacy of this historicity. Guardians were tasked with helping to care for the sick, overseeing tribal finances, and protecting lands from encroachers. Native peoples' reduced land bases (through land cessions) made these tasks difficult to accomplish alone, undermining these groups' capacity to support themselves and thus forcing individuals to work off the reservation as day-laborers on nearby farms, in commercial fishing, or as indentured servants bound out to white households. While Native petitions encouraging governments to abide by their own laws helped to create guardianships, and reservation communities often utilized guardians to protest further expropriations (despite the fact that these appointees, at times, were themselves the ones illegally selling lands), that these peoples “needed” such protection simultaneously reinforced the image of the Indian, in the abstract, as rapidly declining past the point of autonomy.\(^{12}\) Further, guardians facilitated government investigations into competing land claims by assessing the condition of reservation communities in terms of settler domestic, political-economic, and religious norms. Such inquiries broadly served to deflect “questions concerning the illegitimacy of colonial justice and the illegality of dispossession” through portraits of Indian illegitimacy, thereby chaining
Native land rights that were often explicitly protected by colonial/state law to the
genealogical question of whether such communities were going extinct, at what rate, and accordingly whether they in fact “needed” the lands in question (Den Ouden 90).\textsuperscript{13}

By monitoring and depicting reservation communities in terms of such norms, guardian systems framed New England Indigenous polities as largely regressive formations, which, in turn, further consolidated these norms as the very form of historical progress and, as such, supposedly axiomatic indices of sovereignty. For instance, a 1731 committee report solicited by “Groton proprietors” (Connecticut) interested in the nearby Mashantucket-Pequot reservation began by seeking “a true understanding of the Exact number of Pequit Indians in Groton viz of all males sixteen years and upward” (qtd. in Den Ouden 177, sic). Since reservation communities on the whole did not share settler heteronuclear norms, determining the status of the community by counting only males, whom authorities probably knew were away for long periods working in various trades, likely intended to convey an image of the group as degenerating en masse, thereby facilitating the expropriation of their land and resources (Den Ouden 178).\textsuperscript{14} However, and more fundamentally, such “objective” assessments retroactively endowed settler norms with not only moral but \textit{temporal} coherence as marking forward movement in time insofar as they frame Native polities as failing to reproduce. In this way, Native self-determination and resistance both to settler encroachments and sequestration of protected lands come to signify both deviance and anachronism in the same stroke.\textsuperscript{15} Native modes of habitation appear as symptomatic of “Indian” degeneration insofar as they depart from a normative historicity organized around (the ethics of) settler homemaking. In turn,
predicating any assessment of the legitimacy of Native objections to illegal settler encroachments on an investigation into the condition of the people in question (where proximity to settler norms for labor, homemaking, etc. comprises the methodology) already de-politicizes those objections, and Native claims to land more generally, by casting them as tokens of a residual and characteristically “Indian” recalcitrance.

The impact of widespread narratives of Indian vanishing in New England on reservation groups makes for a very different discursive relationship, then, than that between Indian anachronism and Indigenous sovereignty in the southeast. As discussed in the last chapter, discourses of Indianness in the context of southeastern removal pre-empt Cherokee claims to their own vast territory by positing a residual Indian intractability: despite what they may say, the Cherokee are still Indian and inexorably so, a linkage that drives a wedge between Cherokee nationhood and what passes for a modern, meaningful claim to land. In antebellum New England, however, as Jean O'Brien's work has shown in particular, longstanding narratives of Indian degeneration and the reservation systems they perpetuate cast antebellum Natives as less rather than more “Indian.” From the vantage of interested settler actors, the Indianness of southeastern Native groups sticks to them no matter what, while that of their New England counterparts tends to decline, even to the point of degenerating entirely. This difference has roots in regional variations in settler colonialism. In the south, Native groups remained quite powerful up until the early 1800s, controlling a very large section of territory; casting the so-called Five Civilized Tribes as irreducibly Indian presented their autonomy as essentially extra-political and
therein as incongruent with the kind of sovereignty typically associated with European nationhood.

Unlike in the southeast, however, the broader territorial struggle over sovereignty in New England is effectively over by the 1820s, and Natives peoples there cannot as easily signify “nationhood” in the first place. State governments had long appropriated the right to monitor reservation groups, to determine the validity of Native claims, and purportedly to defend the integrity of land boundaries. Nonetheless, increased demand for Native resources such as timber and access to more farmland led colonial and state governments to abide less and less rigorously by their own laws and directives regarding reservation groups. In addition, Natives groups' steady resistance to settler encroachments and depredations, most famously evidenced by the Mashpee “revolt” of 1833, persistently sought to foreground the fraudulent extraction of reservation resources, often as a violation of the principle of guardianship itself since these positions were ostensibly meant to prevent such depredations. However, as in the discourse on southeastern removal, tropes of normative family formation here also function to consolidate settler claims to land. Mandell notes that the basic principle for appointing guardians to oversee affairs for reservation groups was grounded in the common-law notion that “orphans or mental incompetents with property should have a 'father' to manage the estate and supervise his or her future” (Behind 145). Tropes of fatherhood fertilize state interventions into Native affairs by simultaneously obfuscating treaty-based land rights of Native groups, on one hand, and rendering Native ways of being as
declining in terms that, for non-Natives, appear to supersede reservation politics, on the other.

As a result, such familial tropes retroactively organize history writ large as a genealogy of settlement, within which the peoples, places, and modes of belonging that fall outside of its normative social, political, and juridical frameworks emerge as inevitably past-tense, residual formations. And since this historicity portrays Native groups as belated and fading given an apparent inability to adequately attend to their own affairs, it also opens the space for future intrusions into Native self-determination given a moral necessity, a pseudo responsibility of fatherhood, to work on behalf of peoples that history had apparently left behind. The discourse on Indian character, in other words, forecloses meaningful Native sovereignty from the present by endowing the state with the symbolic position of surrogate father to vulnerable Natives, a discursive relationship that basically licenses the continued theft of resources. Hence, the Indian problem in New England is not that Indians remain "authentically" savage despite the trappings of settler civilization, but instead that nothing seems to prevent (nothing could have prevented) Indianess from degenerating further and further from its originally autonomous (and noble, virtuous, etc.) character over the years—but the effort to intervene has to be made, nevertheless.

Understood in this way, one can suggest that New England narratives of Native peoples as temporally out of joint with regard to an earlier, self-sufficient and supposedly authentic Indianness, increasingly organized around patrilineal norms and the sociopolitical gender roles they entail, justify expropriating Native lands and resources
through the production of poverty on reservations (land cessions were often made to cover debts). Such narratives retroactively cast government oversight as a form of surrogate fatherhood that is structurally necessary given the apparently deteriorating "condition" of Native peoples on reservations, when, in fact, such oversight itself negatively impacts Indigenous self-determination to the degree that it facilitates the expropriation of resources, the limitation of Indigenous governance, and the erosion of land bases. In this way, the narrativity of authentic Indian character quite literally represents the continued expropriation as a moral necessity.

By giving shape not only to the idea that Natives had declined, but that they had degenerated from a prior state within which they could and ostensibly did act as their own “fathers,” with all of the symbolic capital attached to this term in a patrilineal society, settler political-economic and domestic norms create a historicity within which New England Indianness is always receding, therein distancing actual New England Native peoples from their supposed historical identity and, in turn, from their lands.¹⁷ In this way, the discourse organized around guardian systems conditions Child's own surrogate/vanishing Indian father in *Hobomok*, just as the portrait of this character as a thoroughly, *naturally* altruistic subject provides this discourse with a prelapsarian, idyllic Indianness. Authentic Indianness thus becomes available to “naturalize” settler subjectivities that challenge the (racist and patriarchal) status quo given its prior attachment to the land, and this bygone “Indian” character manifests as an idealized father/patriarch. Insofar as his contribution to political modernity hinges, in Dana Luciano's terms, on a chronobiopolitics of family formation and character, *Hobomok*
more than illuminates the fault lines within antebellum society. His noble character signals the difference (a naturally ethical Indian fatherhood) that must be integrated if the social matrix is to survive and the nation to live up to the promise implied in its founding. As such, his vanishing anchors a historicity that is integral to the novel's egalitarian vision yet indebted to narratives organized around settler genealogy that had long served to deflect reservation communities' claims to land.

The novel revolves around Mary Conant, daughter of the leader of an early Puritan settlement at Naumkeak (Naumkeag, or Salem). Barred from her true love, the Episcopalian Charles Brown, she is increasingly estranged from her father and the broader community, until Charles's death coupled with that of her mother leads her to marry Hobomok, a trusted Wampanoag ally. After Charles returns, however, having not drowned at sea after all, Hobomok persuades Charles to take his place and nobly heads west, asking only that Charles “be kind to my boy” (Child Hobomok 140). Substituting a law of affection for that of the absolutist patriarch, Hobomok's sacrifice creates a bi-racial and multi-denominational family that symbolically reconciles a fledgling community still plagued with the divisions its founders fled. As expected, the text's reception was less than enthusiastic. An 1824 review calls its plot “bad...and inartificially managed,” making for an “unnatural” or, “if the author pleases, improbable and unsatisfactory” narrative. However, that Child skillfully marshals the body of “traditions and historical facts” to evoke 1620s Plymouth redeems the work from “the censure and the oblivion” its plot would otherwise insure. The review thus deflects Child's political allegory through an aesthetic critique: that such “facts” are tethered to natural racial and gender hierarchies.
compensates for her forgetting that “interest...must be preserved, without [violating] probability; for every reader is a competent critic on such a production” (“RED WOOD”).

Framing Hobomok and Mary's marriage as a literary faux pas in this way passively reinforces the forms of inequality that the novel targets by appealing to audience expectations. By contrast, Child appears to have grasped that historical fiction can short circuit oppressions apparently authorized by the past. Nonetheless, the “improbable” aspect crucial to Child's allegory appears less that Hobomok nobly heads west than that he marries an Anglo woman and has a mixed-race son before going. Vanishing Indianness primes both positions, and the novel invokes this paradigm from the start. Contemplating how far civilization has progressed in such a short time in the new world, the narrator observes modernity as consisting in a deep interrelatedness of society and nature that traces back to the echo of a primordial Indian hunter:

I never view the thriving villages of New England...without feeling a glow of national pride, as I say, “this is my own Native land.” A long train of associations are connected with her picturesque rivers...and...her busy cities, which seem everywhere blushing into a perfect Eden of fruit and flowers. The remembrance of what we have been, comes rushing on the heart in powerful and happy contrast. In most nations the path of antiquity is shrouded in darkness...with us, the vista of time is luminous to its remotest point...Two centuries only have elapsed, since our most beautiful villages reposed in the undisturbed grandeur of nature...[where] echoed nought but the song of the hunter...the fleet tread of the wild deer. (Child Hobomok 5)

The opening sweep synthesizes tensions between civilization (“busy cities”) and nature (“picturesque rivers”) by tracing the present back to the primordial labor of the Indian hunter, thereby cohering and grounding settler modernity in the primacy of Native
peoplehood. Merging with the “fleet tread of the wild deer,” his labor yields an “echo” that both presents a portrait of nature as primordially balanced sociality, on one hand, and as grounding a specific attachment to the land that inaugurates and sustains a linear history oriented to settlers, on the other: “with us, the vista of time is luminous to its remotest point.” Unlike with the doctrine of discovery, then, within which primordial Native presence signified terra nullius, the novel depicts an originary state of nature that, far from an impediment to meaningful sociality, amounts to an organic condition of possibility for a historicity that, while European in origin, nevertheless stands as an alternative to the Old World with its "shrouded" origins and, ostensibly, its equally convoluted and chaotic political history. That nothing “echoes” but the hunter's call suggests a fullness that “naturally” (from nature but also therefore without any social obstacle or “disturbance”) traverses both the bounds of settlement and the later society (“our beautiful villages”) that retroactively emerges as the modern synthesis of two worlds.

In addition to differentiating new world possibility from the legacy of old world shadows, a nod to the religious sectarianism that propelled Protestant migration, Indianness dialectically mediates settler society, forming the essential ontological root of a distinct temporality—a shift from wandering pre-history to directional history qua progress. The “echo” of the hunter's prior presence anchors and sustains a spontaneous “train of associations” that traces to the present, endowing settlement with more than a reflection on the past: more crucially, settlement here gains status as indigenous. By framing the present as the genealogical outcome of a natural historicity, Indianness
ultimately registers as a present-absence that sustains settler collective identification. The hunter materializes the non-passage of settler belonging (how can Protestant emigrants ever truly belong here?) as the trace of an almost archetypal memory emanating from the land itself, and the authenticity of this trace memory lies in its spontaneous, involuntary, and embodied character, a sudden, blushing “remembrance of what we have been.”

Yet, this universal reverberation emerges not merely from an “Indian,” but the “Indian,” a stereotypically masculine one. Indian presence yields the difference constitutive of an encompassing sameness, disclosing what appear as tensions endemic to modernity instead as an organic progress (“everywhere blushing into a perfect Eden”) by registering the symbolic value attached to fatherhood. As with the early-eighteenth-century inquiry into Mashantucket degeneration noted above, Indianness sustains a narrativity through overdetermining (romanticizing) the ethico-political significance of the labor of men, on one hand, while, on the other, endowing such labor with meaning as both gesturing to and overlapping with a universal necessity supposedly traceable in history itself. The givenness of patrilineal succession might then be thought as the invisible frame, the minimal symbolic sameness, that aligns Indianness with settler land claims and thus allows its synthesizing presence to resound in the first place. Positing an originary and homogenous Indian masculinity “naturalizes” a critique of antebellum stratifications in terms of the givenness of settler reprosexuality. From this view, authentic Indianness is inevitably past-tense, as the only quantum of Nativeness that remains past its introjection is its memory, which the novel will encode as the self-sacrifice that marks true fatherhood (as opposed to intolerant patriarchy).
The opening primes us to read Hobomok's appearance to Mary as manifesting this archetypal Indian “fatherhood” de facto oriented to settlement. The narrator (an ancestor whose journal is the source of the narrative) sees Mary engage in what appears to be witchcraft, a motif that draws her apparent antinomian tendencies into alignment with Salem's later witch trials of 1692-3. She cuts herself, uses her blood to jot down some text on a white sheet, and then walks around in a large circle, chanting, presumably out of earshot. The blatant occultism presents her refusal to give up on her desire as a willingness to transgress the Puritan social order, a transgression to which the forest beyond Salem appears receptive. Water gleams “like fitful flashes of reason in a disordered mind,” which not only evokes her turmoil but also suggests an uncanny lifeblood, a lifeline offering a path away from stultifying orthodoxy. Such agency is directly associated with Indianness: the ancestor narrating the scene indicates that the “trees stood forth in all the beauty of that month which the Indians call the 'moon of flowers’” and “called up the spirit of devotion in me” in order that the “heart might be kept from the snares of the world” (Child Hobomok 12). Mary, however, lacks such fear, and her intrepidness thus registers as a step beyond the epistemic domination of the Puritan community. Therefore, while Native peoplehood provides a cypher for a power-knowledge grounded in the land, its coherence as such depends on the willingness of settlers to act. Agency falls to the Anglo, and Indian “nature” here registers both as a place “away” from settlement, a space of potential liberation, on one hand, and the subjective (counter-hegemonic) orientation that drives one to such a place, on the other.
Mary is going Indian, cutting loose with the established ways of the world, which becomes clearer when Hobomok, not Charles, leaps into the center of her ceremonial circle. Far from either the stunted, anachronistic savage of *Georgia v. Tassels* or the declining Indians slowly vanishing under the watchful eyes of government-appointed overseers across New England, Indianness here is imagined in its supposedly authentic and original state, which entails a capacity to transpose the whole of society structurally and temporally away from political hypocrisy and looming ideological conflict, which the novel allegorizes in the Puritans. Although Mr. Conant's entrenched resistance to other arrivant Protestantisms provides the novel's touchstone for Puritan intractability, the pious minister Frances Higginson most poignantly expresses the relationship between dogma and hierarchy: “the threshold of hell is paved with toleration. Leave hidden matters with God, and difficult texts of scripture with elders of the church” (Child *Hobomok* 65). Child takes a dig at the entrenched Standing Order through Higginson. By bracketing scripture as the purview of the elite, men like him create the artificial conditions whereby their authority appears divinely mandated.

Mr. Conant's deteriorating relationship with his own family encapsulates the impact of such dogma on the social body, however. After his wife dies and Mary leaves home, Mr. Conant admits that perhaps “Christians were too apt to mistake the voice of selfishness for the voice of God”; having witnessed his wife “dying amidst the poverty which his religious opinions had brought upon her,” he wonders whether “earthly motives had nothing to do with his hatred of Episcopacy” (Child *Hobomok* 119). Though already stripped to its Calvinist core, Mr. Conant's humility is only fully defrocked after
it destroys his family. Puritanism appears contingent upon a “worldly” intolerance of difference, suggesting that while the scenery has changed, the basic ideological constellation of righteousness has not. From this perspective, Mr. Conant's “cold mask of austerity” less symbolizes a corrosive influence on society than it represents an internal corrosion, an intrinsic failure of Anglo civilization discernible in the patriarchal reproduction of tyranny in the New World. His Puritannical mask corrodes both sides of public/private axis insofar as both “domains” of normative social order are reducible to a metaphysics of patriarchy; fragmenting the broader community and estranging his own daughter are twin effects of a hierarchical belief system that cannibalizes the same collectivity that it engenders. To fail as a father is then to fail as a leader: the “mask” Mr. Conant cannot see that he wears registers as the sign that settler genealogy is not yet reborn, that it is still haunted by the shadows of old-world sectarianism in the barely discernible trace of “unnatural” patriarchal dogmatism.

By contrast, Hobomok's ethics provide the means to rehabilitate the given interior/exterior configuration of settler sociality from the “inside” out—through the home. Hobomok is capable of intervening however insofar Indianness does not directly negate the intolerance symptomatic of Puritanism's negative genealogy. Rather, he manifests a pre-social “nature” beyond/anterior to it that exerts a pull on those, like Mary, who suffer its impositions, guiding these subjects toward relationships more expressive of their genuine desire, unconstrained by dogma and hence productive rather than corrosive with regard to the larger Puritan, proto-American social project. Hobomok actually says very little in the course of the novel; he is as silent as he is noble. On one hand, without
settlers there to initiate forward momentum, the openness of Indianness remains the raw materials of a more just community. Hobomok's Indianness consolidates the notion that History simply doesn't happen until settlers arrive. On the other, however, positing such Indianness as quite literally the ground from which history emerges renders its natural virtue in the service of cleaving fatherhood from its patriarchal roots, thereby also opening up the space for an alternative historicity organized around proto-egalitarian ethics.

The vehicle for historicity as the novel imagines it is an open subjectivity, which manifests in the narrator's first description of Naumkeak. As viewed from the ship's deck, the shore “seemed in a profound slumber,” leading the arrivant to view himself “as a drop in the vast ocean of existence” and in turn to shrink “from the contemplation of human nothingness” (Child Hobomok 7). Where Puritan intolerance maps onto a corrosive disposition, a legacy of old-world politics, the narrator's experience, although it stops short of realizing the utter arbitrariness of dogmatism, clinging to what it knows, offers the possibility of symbolically reconfiguring the social order writ large through (settler) self-actualization. Correlative to this subjectivity, the “natural” capacity for Indianness to reorient settler social order congeals through the novel's binary paradigm for Indian character, in which Natives fall into one of two categories: “good” ones aligned with settlers and the “bad” ones who want to destroy them. Where Hobomok's love for Mary orients him to settlement, his counterpart, the Wampanoag sachem Corbitant, is described as “a stubborn enemy to the Europeans, and all who favored them” (Child Hobomok 30). This set of orientations to settler affairs renders authentic Indianness antecedent to
“tribal” affairs, which, as in *Hope Leslie*, appear as second-order formations at best, peripheral to the tyranny/liberty dyad immanent to settlement.

The text develops this idealized version of prelapsarian Indian character through its use of archival materials, within which an ur narrative of Indian decline surfaces as a series of historical distortions, pushing out of the frame Native forms of peoplehood and the complex geopolitical and trade networks within which they, along with the British settlements, were enmeshed. First Hobomok's summoning plays not only on the antinomian heresy and later witchcraft trials but also “Hobbomock” as the name of a healing spirit actually worshipped by local Wampanoag groups at the time. Puritan chroniclers took the name as referring to the devil himself and evidence that Natives were devil worshipers; Child accordingly gives the actual Hobomok a spiritual twist in keeping with her unitarianism.22 Like his more famous counterpart Squanto, the historical Hobomok was a Wampanoag adviser and diplomatic ally to Plymouth colony in its earliest years. In 1621, Hobomok, Squanto, and Tockamahamon, a lesser-known diplomatic figure, were captured by another Wampanoag band led by the actual Corbitant, a minor sachem who had aligned with the Narragansetts out of suspicion of the Wampanoag leader Massasoit's treaty with Plymouth the previous year. Although he was hostile to Plymouth's increasing militarism and efforts to subordinate smaller Native bands, and did in fact lead a small Narragansett-Wampanoag faction to attack Massasoit's village (not Plymouth, as in the novel), Corbitant was far from the Tecumseh-like architect of vast pan-Indian conspiracy that Child imagines. Similarly, Hobomok was a relatively minor figure whose claim to fame was that he alone escaped this kidnap
attempt and informed Plymouth's Governor Bradford, who in turn sent Miles Standish and a group of troops to intervene.23

These distortions fashion authentic Indianness as oriented to settlement and bad, “tribal” Indianness (given to forms of peoplehood irreducible to the settler domesticity integral to colonial space) as pitted against it. In turn, they further throw into relief a parallel between bad Indians, namely Corbitant and his forces, and bad Anglos, namely most Puritans. Each threatens to obstruct the genealogical (reprosexual) dialectic central to settler history and political modernity more generally. The latter corrodes the dominant social order from within. Mr. Conant's drive to keep Naumkeak a community of true believers by exiling other Protestant groups keeps the Anglican Charles Brown from marrying Mary. The former mirrors this corrosiveness “outside” settlement in a geopolitical setting, thereby reinforcing settlement's centrality. Corbitant first enters the plot having been “among the Pequods of late,” frustrated “that he had in vain offered their war-belt (in token of alliance against the English) to Miantonimo,” the Narragansett leader (Child Hobomok 30). While, the novel relies on deeply embedded and embellished narratives of Pequot hostility to frame Corbitant's malevolence, the malcontent sachem aims to destroy settlement primarily out of “an affair of love,” being the “kinsman” of the “once betrothed bride” that Hobomok abandoned for Mary (Child Hobomok 31).

Although his machinations seem to protest the geopolitics of settler expansion (he warns Hobomok among others that, unless the Natives band together, the “red men...will soon be as an arrow that is lost in flight”), Corbitant's presence more fundamentally casts Pequot deviance as rooted in a resistance to “natural” settler genealogy embodied by
Hobomok's attraction to Mary (Child *Hobomok* 31). Further, Corbitant has a “mind more penetrating and a temper more implacable than most of his brethren” and a “prophetic eye [that] foresaw the destruction of his countrymen,” a vision that marks him both as exceptional relative to a homogenous Native population and as symbolic of Indian decline (Child *Hobomok* 30). Those, like Hobomok and Mary, who follow their hearts (extending the narrator's “open” subjectivity beyond the fear that causes it to recoil into what it knows) are cast as expressive of “natural” freedom and a cunning of history in the shape of settler genealogy. Those who resist, namely the unlikely pair of Mr. Conant and Corbitant, stubbornly impede this uncanny progress. These figures are cast as exerting a drag on history, their negative, degenerative characterizations signaling forms of historical inertia themselves destined to drop away—which Corbitant himself accomplishes not even halfway through the novel.

Similarly, the only confrontation between Hobomok and Corbitant reinforces the centrality of settlement. One day, en route to visit the Conants, the former stumbles upon his nemesis in the woods beyond Salem, preparing an attack. He proceeds to inform Mr. Conant, disrupting a meeting with Massachusetts Bay’s Governor Endicott and Mr. Oldham, presumably the trader whose later murder was a real catalyst for the Pequot War, to alert them to “a number of Indians in ambush in the woods below” (Child *Hobomok* 40). Rather than assist in the roundup, Hobomok stays back to protect Mary and her mother “with the quick eye of love, and the ready arm of hatred” as the settlers unceremoniously capture the bad Indian (Child *Hobomok* 41). Where Corbitant's vengeful character flattens Native resistance into an excessive and irrational drive rooted
in an outmoded allegiance to “the tribe,” already here a thing of the past, Hobomok's allegiance to Naumkeak, which is intertwined with his love for Mary, conflates aspects of guardianship with heteronuclear homemaking. More specifically, Hobomok's unwavering devotion to Mary and Salem more generally portray noble Indianness as originally consisting in a spontaneous attachment to settlement that transcends the public/private divide, an inversion of the later paternalistic discourse of Indian degeneration characterizing state oversight of New England reservations across the eighteenth century. Taken together, then, Corbitant and Hobomok render collective Native peoplehood as a barely diegetic and generic “groupness,” which might just as easily characterize the stubborn Puritans. In turn, the movement of historical time emerges as a process of distancing settlement from such comparatively archaic, even dogmatic forms of attachment, an equation that hinges on Hobomok's feelings for Mary, which we learn trace to her having helped his sick mother before the Conants relocated from Plymouth to Salem. The bifurcation of Indian character into good (forward-leaning/normative) and bad (regressive/deviant) men then retroactively organizes the historicity of New England settlement around feelings of attraction, longing, jealousy, and anger in ways that efface Native territoriality and sovereignty, on one hand, and render settler presence fully constitutive of political and social modernity, on the other.

If Child suggests that “questioning the dogmas of a culture which relegates nonwhite, non-Christian peoples to inferior status necessarily entails joining with those peoples in throwing off the yoke of the Great White Father,” as Carolyn Karcher argues, the ethical and devoted Indian character that facilitates this alliance nonetheless renders
actual Native polities and reservation communities peripheral at best (“Introduction” 
*Hobomok* xxv). Further, the drive for more land for English settlements and the pressures 
on trade networks for wampum, corn, and furs that intensified Native rivalries 
(particularly that between the Pequot and Narragansetts which would lead to the 
Narragansetts and Mohegans siding with the English during the Pequot War) go missing 
in the novel's history. However, there is no contradiction here if we consider that the 
historicity of Indian decline—bracketing Native self-determination through the guardian 
systems—conditions the intelligibility of New England history writ large, as this 
historicity would also condition any effort to pressure patriarchy. Elizabeth Dillon writes 
regarding sentimental literature that depictions of “women and children” who “maintain a 
home without making their work visible as labor” exert pressure on the dominant 
contours of the free, liberal subject (as white, male, privileged) by articulating “an 
abundance of affect that bespeaks the essential freedom of all who occupy the home” 
(202-3).

Signifying the non-utilitarian aspect of domestic labor (the labor of love) 
becomes paradoxically crucial to representing the free subject's newfound freedom, 
which opens that signifying process to potentially counter-hegemonic permutations of all 
kinds. However, one can suggest that the representational condition of possibility for this 
non-utilitarian dynamic to signify political resistance in term of the novel's historical 
milieu is the simultaneous embedding of Indianness as a residual formation, such that 
reservation communities become implicitly cast as beyond “domestic” space and, in turn, 
unable to generate any meaningful political efficacy in themselves. From this view,
Hobomok's relationship with Mary less appropriates a “representative” Indian identity in Mielke's terms than it generates a discursive surplus in the form of prelapsarian Indian character in keeping with the narrativity that Den Ouden identifies. By doing so, the text transmutes the intimate, timeless freedom associated with the sentimental home into a natural-metaphysical principle of the world, an association that further substantiates a view of antebellum reservation groups as existing out of time.

The novel temporally displaces reservation communities and thereby effaces the politics of reservations more generally through Hobomok's figuration within an inverted paradigm of settler homemaking qua homesteading in the wilderness (an Indianized space of nature creates the affective conditions for the home). Child depicts the connection between Mary and the noble Indian as deriving from a natural and originary “mingling” of pathos. During the hunting episode, Hobomok and Mary's mutual attraction moves from a guarded openness into an extended metaphor on the potential for Indianness to soften Puritannical intolerance. It opens with Hobomok sharing “descriptions of Indian Nations” with Mary, during which we learn that the Native is only eloquent around Mary, while she perhaps “listens with too much interest” (Child Hobomok 84). Although Hobomok's stories stand in sharp contrast to the dead letter of doctrine, in that they are actually interesting and prompt Mary to seek permission to join the hunting party led by him and her father, the narrative does not elaborate on the content of any such stories. Rather, they merely seem to hold the diegetic space of a vague and anthropomorphic outside, a sociality beyond Puritan settlement whose lack of
historical specificity underscores its implicit aim to limit such settlement, to cast its totalizing worldview as non-All.

The hunting passage that follows further develops the earlier theme of a disorienting openness (the narrator's view of Naumkeak from the ship) by combining it with the motif of synthesis from the opening primordial Indian hunt(er). As the party enters the woods, they spot the Native group across the plain, “winding along the opposite woods...torches carried upon poles high above their heads, casting their lurid glare on the mild, tranquil light of the evening” (Child Hobomok 88). As the two parties come together to form a single line, the merged group is described as unifying “heathen and christian, social and savage, elegance and strength, fierceness and timidity” into a single “light” that bisects the darkness (Child Hobomok 89). Child focuses the allegory by having the “merged” party come across a single deer in an open field, evoking the opening “echo” of the hunter. Seeming to identify with the animal, Mary asks Hobomok not to kill it, but he has already fired: the “deer sprung high into the air...and Hobomok stept forward to seize the victim...[as] he brought it up to Mary...its slender sides [were] heaving with the last agonies of life, and she turned away from the painful sight” (Child Hobomok 89 sic). Mary's discomfort provides a metaphor for the pain of discovering her own feelings for Hobomok, especially insofar as they appear fated to separate her from Naumkeak and her father. However, that the scene hints at the possibility of a “mixed” community, with the two groups gradually falling into line and becoming oriented toward the same horizon, suggests that this impossible desire is the painful requisite for broader social harmony, a state of coexistence that quite literally exceeds the comparably narrow
political and theological bounds of settlement. In this way, normative romance provides a link between (imagined) settler and Indian polities by opening onto a temporal horizon in generational and reprosexual terms.

Mary's shock upon discovering Charles' death at sea begins the final movement of this dialectic catalyzed by natural and noble Indian character. This moment can be imagined as depicting her symbolic death, the obverse of which is the opportunity for a new social matrix (oriented to settler familial norms) to arise. Put another way, insofar as her desire organizes the novel's political trajectory, Mary's grief marks the point at which the socio-symbolic edifice of Puritanism crumbles. She is described as suffering a “partial derangement of...faculties,” a “bewilderment of grief that almost amounted to insanity” yet that cannot be expressed precisely due to its excessiveness (her heart refused “to overflow”) (Child *Hobomok* 120). That she returns unconsciously to her mother's grave in such a state frames her loss as a sudden, radical ejection from all meaningful community. Dana Luciano argues that early-antebellum mourning both “appears as the inescapable condition of life in linear time, which inevitably severed...foundational bonds [of affection and sympathy], and furnishes the impetus for memory to reconnect to the form of truth they represented” (27-8). In suddenly appearing out of nowhere (again) to drape a blanket over Mary in her grief, Hobomok embodies such a horizontal attachment, at once a lifeline and a re-membering that returns her not only to the land of the living but to linear temporality and to historicity.

Hobomok's act disrupts Mary's ambiguous, “de-subjectivized” melancholy and creates in its place a “sense of sudden bereavement, deep and bitter reproaches against
her father” that endows her once more with psychosocial or “ego” coherence (Child *Hobomok* 121). The novel positions the Indian's authentic act, and what appears as a reversal of popular captivity motifs, as what finally enables Mary, and the reader, to break with patriarchy. Further, read against the background in which stultifying Calvinist dogmatism literally erodes the community inside and out, Hobomok's act/agency catalyzes *historical progress* by enacting this break from the stunted, dogmatic past. More precisely, the Puritannical past retroactively comes to be read as *stunted* and therein essentially ahistorical only after Hobomok intervenes in Mary's grief. Recalling his appearance in the “mystic circle,” Mary experiences a “broken and confused mass” of thoughts, upon which she returns home to give her father one last chance. Stoic to the bitter end, he answers by nearly destroying the Anglican prayer book she had received from Charles, producing the “fatal resolution,” namely to go Indian (Child *Hobomok* 121).

Hobomok’s marriage to Mary, then, registers as not only as an alternate timeline but one deriving from and rooted in the New World. Further, that the text emphasizes her volition in accepting his hand in marriage (“I will be your wife, Hobomok, if you love me”) and portrays it as a radical revising of women's agency. The voluntary decision to marry, even if a devastating grief catalyzes its voluntariness, is an act that “naturally” transgresses otherwise apparently impermeable racial and theological borders (Child *Hobomok* 121). Such border-crossing is underscored in Mary's somnambulistic state during the ceremony itself, which both suggests her passage beyond the matrix of normative custom and poses Hobomok's impact on the broader social order as affective
and extra-political. Yet the condition of possibility for narrating this notion of mediating, progressive agency is that Indianness already appears within the universal symbolic frame supposedly comprised by reprosexual heteronormativity.

During the wedding ceremony, the “oldest Indian” issues a series of “short harangues” on the duties of men and women in marriage that would have appeared perfectly ungodly to Mary Wollstonecraft or Mercy Otis Warren decades earlier: “he dwelt upon the duty of the husband to hunt plenty of deer for his wife, to love her, and try to make her happy; and that the wife should love her husband, and cook his venison well, that he might come home to his wigwam with a light heart” (Child Hobomok 125). Hobomok's “natural” ethics and devotion orient Mary's desire away from hierarchy, but they only signal a new path insofar as they perpetuate the symbolic constellation associated with settler homemaking, which, again, retroactively frames settler genealogy as fully coextensive, even synonymous with what it means to have history. In this way, insofar as authentic Indian virtue performs its potential labor within a settler milieu suffering from excessive patriarchal tyranny, it paves the way for its own disappearance within that economy through the reprosexual logic of normative homemaking. In this way, the novel frames forms of Indian peoplehood that exceed the framework of this economy as inauthentic; the peoples living on reservations signal something like partial Indians insofar as they have not (yet) fully disappeared into, or been absorbed through, settler sociality.

The novel represents this process of absorption or introjection in the birth of their child. While Hobomok's chivalry opens a path forward for Mary, it does not fully
materialize as a shift in the trajectory history, and finally represent Puritannical Naumkeak itself as a residual formation, until the birth of their son. Although Mary is not coerced into marrying Hobomok, she nonetheless feels shame as she adjusts to married life in the wigwam, suggesting the drag that the normative Puritan establishment continues to exert; transgressing authority entails an affective self-disciplining. In turn, the novel suggests again that authentic Indianiness primarily intervenes at the most intimate level of individual affect, rather than of “tribal” geopolitics. Mary feels as if her “own nation looked upon her as lost and degraded, and, what was worse, her own heart echoed back the charge” (Chile Hobomok 135). Her shame thus represents a prolonging of her grief, construed as a prolongation of the psychosocial trauma of breaking with settlement after Charles' death (and note that Child slips here: Mary's grief retroactively casts settlement as a nation, suggesting the contemporary political terrain in which she intends to intervene). When Mary looks at the “‘bone of her bone, and flesh of her flesh,’” however, she feels “more love for the innocent object, than she thought she should ever experience” (Child 136). Hobomok's lifeline, and the shift it enacts within a historicity predicated on settler genealogy, only fully materializes when he fathers Mary's child, which conveys the allegorical point that race is an artificial construct, a product of the social as opposed to the natural body. However, Hobomok too is by and large exiled from his people for marrying a white woman. The “truth” to which Mary is reconciled is then also that of the naturalness of private domesticity. Authentic Indianiness is thus individuated, reducible to an ethic of character that throws the “tribe” into relief as an incoherent and “unnatural” half-formation. Moreover, this authenticity “naturally”
materializes as a nuclear home that produces a “mixed-blood” son, suggesting that the 

bio-cultural uniqueness attributed to Indianness, in its orientation to settlement, dissipates 

along the genealogical channels it produces.

Introjecting Indianness into the Conant household casts the proto-nuclear unit as 

fundamental to intelligible sociality and reaffirms settler (even patrilineal) genealogy as 

the form in which historicity discloses itself. Reading the novel as allegorizing the 

artificiality of a divided or stratified America—and then seeking to transcend such 

divisions—then misses the point that imagining Hobomok as an instance of ethical Indian 

fatherhood is integral to presenting settler modes of belonging as organic in their 

relation(s) to the land over time. Reading the novel as a political allegory only holds 

insofar as we presume that Hobomok's Indianness maps onto a coherent notion of Native 

collectivity, however generic. Accepting this point, however, necessitates accepting that 

such a notion naturally tends toward the proto-nuclear family unit, or at the very least is 

compatible with this unit. The corollary of Hobomok's individuation and introjection into 

an originary homestead, making it the basis of a genealogy of “progress,” is that, in 

contrast to the discursive terrain of the southeast in which intensified Indianness signaled 

an unbridgeable gap between Native ontology and settler familialism, Indianness here 

anchors settler genealogy to the land by providing its “natural” link. Hobomok's paternity 

is transmitted through heteronuclear domesticity, and its transmission not only re-centers 

forms of fellow-feeling presumed as integral to social bonds but endows this site with a 

temporal movement that transcends the stasis of normative homemaking. The paradoxical 

sign of such movement, the form of this sublation, is that idealized Indian ethics become
less “Indian” as they are introjected into the home: Hobomok jr. is “less” Indian than his father, but after his birth this “lesser” degree of Indianness seems utterly beside the point, a crude means of indexing the meaning of Hobomok's act. Put another way, by way of its introjection in the settler home, Indianness itself undergoes a permutation, shifting from a corporeal, bio-cultural essence attached to Native peoples to a transmissible signifier for ethical authenticity.

The novel's final turn realizes this introjection and inversion of Indian character. While out hunting, as expected, Hobomok encounters a figure he initially believes to be Corbitant but who turns out to be the long-lost lover, Charles. The novel then climaxes with a non-duel in which two men of feeling take turns offering to disappear forever. Despite the fact that he and Mary now share a child, Hobomok knows that her heart lies elsewhere, and he cannot but place her desire above his own. Persuading Charles of this point, Hobomok wins (or loses) and heads west, asking only that Brown “‘be kind to my boy’” (Child 140). Before going, however, he takes care to dissolve his marriage with Mary “‘by Indian laws,’” the last, self-effacing index of Native political autonomy, which he communicates by letter, prompting Brown to observe to the Collier household that the Indian's “conduct is all of a piece, noble throughout” (Child 146). Adding to this nobility is that Hobomok heads west to effectively die alone, now doubly alienated, fated to “‘be buried among strangers’” none of whom “‘shall black their faces for the unknown chief’” (Child 140). His decision to leave is thus presented as an ethical act of the highest order. In turn, this parting gift causes Charles and Mary to adopt and (re)name his son as Charles Hobomok Conant, which sublimates the father's ethical act in the form of
commemoration. If the renaming renders the boy as the material legacy of his biological father's sacrifice, the boy's adoption becomes the sign that Hobomok's impact on Mary's desire permanently alters the genealogical makeup of settler historicity. This bio-cultural shift is confirmed as the adoption reconciles Mary to her father, who takes to his grandson out of equal parts “consciousness of blame” and a “mixed feeling of compassion and affection,” indicating that Hobomok has inadvertently restored the most stoic of Puritans to his most fundamental humanity (Child *Hobomok* 149).

For Child, Indian character redeems the nation in time by virtue of its capacity to feel a spontaneous love and compassion that transcends the arbitrary divisions endemic to settler modernity. Hobomok does not intend to redeem settlement but does so nonetheless, which attests to the “natural” efficacy of his act and, by proxy, the authenticity of his character. His sacrifice, however, is at the same time *a voluntary removal*, not simply an exit from settlement but a total exile from any meaningful community. Although binary opposites, Hobomok and Corbitant consolidate and refract Native peoplehood writ large as historically vanished except for reservation communities, such as the Penobscot and Abenaki peoples Child knew in her youth and whose different modes of living indicated alternatives to racist patriarchy precisely insofar as the people themselves registered as relics of a bygone era. Further, if Hobomok's voluntary removal erases the possibility of an Indian ethics independently deriving from outside of settlement, his son's adoption accomplishes the same erasure inside. While Charles Hobomok Conant goes on to become a “distinguished graduate at Cambridge,” becoming a message from the New World to the Old, the narrator notes that since his “father was
seldom spoken of...by degrees his Indian appellation was silently omitted” (Child
Hobomok 150). The adopted Native son, the introjected, biocultural remainder of Indian
character, then gradually loses his ability to mark indigenous peoplehood in the name that
“silently” disappears as the mediating term between doctrinal authority and dissenting
love within settler sociality. It simply and precisely goes without saying that Indianness
will become fully integrated and therefore “civilized” once this gap is bridged.

While one could suggest that civilization policy presents the frame for thinking
the very concept of Native rights in the novel, one would have to add that Hobomok
junior's mixed-blood body renders legible the nation's capacity to overcome its internal
divisions. I would argue that the subtle invocation of conversion at the end less shows the
novel's historical limitation than it indicates how temporality and narrativity associated
with an otherwise effectively ahistorical Indianness provides the means of presenting
assimilation and conversion as forward-moving social modalities. Put another way,
referencing conversion in any deliberate way would already be redundant in terms of the
novel's logic, as Hobomok's lasting gift is that of a blank Indian body by which to index
the ethics of the very liberal imaginary that the novel offers as the horizon for any Native
policy. By contrast, Native futurity becomes not so much political nonsense as beyond
the grid of intelligibility, as there is only one future, that of the nation-state whose
borders lose their status as such in the sublation of Indian fatherhood and the implicit
debt his ethics bestow on the Anglo population to labor on behalf of the Indian. The sign
that historicizing Indianness as such is constitutive of the novel's national imaginary is
that the text positions the reader as indebted to Indian character and, in turn, that this debt
can only be repaid by remembering, which is to say by way of narrativity. But this injunction to remember might be thought as the discursive form of a very real foreclosure of reservation peoples as signifying anything other than past-tense, partial subjectivities. Introjecting Hobomok, the ethical Indian father, sustains a historicity within which the (im)possibility of future assimilation is the only path forward for New England Natives.

**Sublating Magawisca's Nature**

For Child, Hobomok fathers a historicity within which the dogmatic, absolutist patriarch falls away in the emergence of a bio-culturally “mixed” patrimony. By contrast, Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie* (1827) imagines even a sympathetic father (quite different from Mr. Conant, Mr. Fletcher is described as a man of conscience and feeling) as limited in his capacity to contribute to an egalitarian social order. Nonetheless, the novel posits a linear historicity oriented to settlement by generating an idealized, prelapsarian Indianess, the ethics of which serve to cohere US claims to Native space. As Mark Rifkin argues, the novel maps the complex arena consisting of unevenly aligned English in terms of settler domesticity. The plot, he writes, manifests a “kin-aesthetic [that] divorces Native family formation from the questions and concerns of sovereignty, using tropes of kinship to signal...Indian openness to bonding with whites rather than the autonomous functioning of indigenous polities” (*When* 141). Much of this effacement occurs through Magawisca, for whom the Fletcher household provides the matrix for an evolution from mediating Indian-English strife to articulating a one-size-fits-all Indian nationalism, albeit one apparently fated to vanish on the horizon. However, although the
text may be thought of as going further than *Hobomok* in its critique of proto-nuclear, patrilineal domesticity, the vehicle for this critique is nevertheless a narrativity of bygone Indian character, the exceptional ethics of which serve to consolidate settler claims to land in time. By uniting Hope and Everell and thereby resolving the novel's concern over the reproduction of tyranny, Magawisca's didacticism comes to present normative couplehood as aligned with a transcendent Nature and, accordingly, as an index of historicity insofar as it marks the introjection of natural virtue into settler society.

As with *Hobomok*, *Hope Leslie* constellates character through a transatlantic family affair, one centered on a refusal to sacrifice nascent egalitarian principles in the face of Old-World hegemony. Sir William, a lawyer who has amassed a fortune and gained his way to “courtly favour,” selects his nephew, William Fletcher (Hope's adoptive father) to marry his daughter out of a desire to bequeath his name along with his wealth (Sedgwick 7). His only stipulation is that his brother steer the boy away from “the philosophy and rhetoric and history of those liberty-loving Greeks,” lest he come to stray from “unquestioning and unqualified loyalty to his sovereign” (Sedgwick 8). Sir William defends popish Anglicanism only insofar as it is sanctioned by the monarchy: his only allegiance is to the social order that has allowed him to acquire power and prestige.

However, the desire to transmit his name with his estate also reads as a desire to transmit the broader socio-symbolic system within which the accumulation of exorbitant wealth and influence materializes a difference between the elite and the masses, a distinction that his own climb up the social ladder shows to be illusory. In Elizabeth Povinelli's terms, Sir William seeks recourse to whatever means necessary to engineer a “materiality of
inheritance” that would endow his symbolic position with a “metaphysics of substance,” an impression of necessity “beyond the control of a person or society” (203). Although the novel fully develops such parasitism in Sir Gardiner's character, Sir William inaugurates this theme in terms of a preoccupation with essence and appearance that runs across the text, specifically the notion that the appearance of legitimate authority may mask a perverse will to power at odds with the equilibrium that should characterize a democratic social order.

At the same time, Sir William's desire to pass on his name indicates that the novel thinks about political and social discord largely in terms of transatlantic, linear genealogy. Concerned only with consolidating and further legitimizing his position through fabricating a family line that will retroactively naturalize his standing and path in life, Sir William lacks the kind of passionate attachment that characterizes his nephew, whose “fidelity to what he deemed his duty could not have been subdued by the fires of martyrdom” (Sedgwick 10). Young Fletcher's resistance is problematic not only because it jeopardizes the line of inheritance that would finally consolidate the uncle's privileged status, but because it more fundamentally threatens the very logic of such a transmission. Sir William makes it clear that “no daughter or guinea of mine shall ever go to one...infected with this spreading plague,” but the threat discloses the real danger (Sedgwick 8). If this “plague” spreads, the symbolic matrix within which daughters and guineas substantialize one another and thereby naturalize a gendered social hierarchy will also dissolve. Fletcher's stubborn idealism threatens to shift the symbolic coordinates of the social matrix writ large away from hierarchical social order and toward democratic
openness. The solution? Ship all of the Puritans, a bunch of “mad canting fools,” to New England so as to “enjoy with the savages that primitive equality, about which they make such a pother” (Sedgwick 7-8). The spatiality of geopolitics proper initially registers as a means of resolving an Old-World political struggle that plays out on the terrain of genealogy: the elite do not so much seek to persecute those responsible for the “plague” of liberty so much as to export them to a place where they will not infect the future. Natives accordingly enter the text first as a trope through which to figure the ideological distance of what is implicitly framed as a “tribal” commitment to community, on one hand, and yet (from the inverse, ironic angle) as a kind of generic, zero-level sociality, one “naturally” devoid of the artifice and oppression associated with Old-World hierarchy, on the other.

Sir William's comment would appear to imply that the novel positions Indianness as a projection of settler sociopolitical strife. However, if young Fletcher's revolutionary ire indicates a passionate attachment to freedom, it is nonetheless a curiously empty one in terms of ideological content. The threatening religious zeal that his uncle believes more properly belongs among the Indians is devoid of any of the finer points of Calvinism, which marks a real difference between Sedgwick's novel and Hobomok. Child devotes space aplenty to the theological and political differences among emigrant Protestant groups. Here, by contrast, Sir William discovers his nephew to be full of a “lofty independence” (he fails to bow) that strikes the former as “an unknown [and] mysterious power” (Sedgwick 9). After deciding to leave for the New World, forfeiting his cousin's hand so as not to betray his principles, he is depicted as shunning “earthly
passions [for] the cause of liberty and religion,” which the narrator adds typified the Puritans as a whole (Sedgwick 12). In sharp contrast to actual dissenting and separatist Protestantisms, Fletcher's agenda appears to consist in little more than an embodied individualism, one that cross-references “liberty” and “religion” but fails to fuse them into a single radical program, much less one that can ground a community. This paradoxically empty conviction opens onto the novel's critique of the gendered aspect of the political sphere. In merging a postrevolutionary discourse of liberty with Protestant separatism, Mr. Fletcher's individualism appears potent enough to shift the broader milieu away from tyranny, and the novel's dilemma in turn manifests as a problem of enacting or realizing this shift. Part of the problem, however, appears to be Fletcher himself.

As it emerges through the opening backstory, the novel's dilemma emerges as a question of how to found a free society—how to transform “lofty independence” from a generic commitment (one cause or ideological content among others) into a constitutive component of social space (its fundamental formal principle). Sedgwick implies that the real paradox is that the necessary vehicle for such a shift, Mr. Fletcher's own mobility, becomes a problematic content in itself as soon as it breaks away: the break then retroactively appears less as a drive to recreate society than a need to retreat from it and to recoil into whatever enclave is afforded through his status as an elite male. The novel underscores this point in the relative impotence of Fletcher's ethics as a patriarch of feeling. Upon emigrating to Boston only to discover that even a “religious republic” is prone to an “out-break of heresies,” he moves yet again, to a remote area outside of the sparse settlement at Springfield (Sedgwick 16). Although Fletcher opposes his uncle's
parasitism in the name of “liberty and religion,” his capacity to opt out of any extended social conflict by picking up and moving west makes him the ironic double of his uncle. The novel seems to suggest that the substance of young Fletcher's “political and religious delinquency,” his commitment to “liberty and religion,” cannot materialize given his sheer tendency to emigrate. As such, his vision consists in little more than a “mysterious” aura of self-governance that characterizes those “men of genius—men of feeling—the men that the world calls visionaries...[but who] cannot brook the slow progress to perfection” (Sedgwick 10,16). Impatience too, the novel implies, is a luxury, which the text underscores by framing Fletcher's recourse to emigration as an ironic form of privilege rooted in the patriarchy from which he seeks to escape—not everyone has access to such mobility.

Insofar as it is coextensive with his gendered mobility, Fletcher's “feeling” then emerges as problematically masculine given its tendency to defer (through emigration) confronting extant forms of oppression. On one hand, his final to Springfield “removal” draws the ire of the increasingly domineering Puritans. Yet, on the other, it places his family in danger, an aspect Sedgwick emphasizes by having him absent during the attack on his homestead that kills both his wife and infant child. The text accordingly comes down quite hard on male privilege, suggesting that the larger, epistemic problem with the political sphere has to do with patriarchy and patrilineal succession in general. If then, as Patricia Kalayjian suggests, by shifting the “temporal setting of her narratives” Sedgwick implies that “patriarchy continuously reinvents itself as a repressive force, claiming all rights for itself and forbidding...the rights of others,” the impatience and inefficacy of
men of character like Fletcher prove historical catalysts for such reinvention (69). The novel casts such men as constituting a hidden hand behind the failure to (re)invent an ethical social order.

However, Fletcher's character does introduce the importance of intuition in the novel, as a means of seeing past external appearances through to the natural character they may conceal, and this capacity functions in the text as a dividing line between those committed to justice and to the status quo. Hope, Everell, and Magawisca each come to register as more attuned than most to the underlying character of those around them, as well as more compelled to act on the suffering of others, but they, like Fletcher, run into the problem of being alienated within the dominant milieu on the basis of this very awareness. Young Fletcher is specifically depicted as having the capacity to “feel” when the dominant order is out of sync with a higher universal law, but his mobility winds up removing him from the scene where he could effect change. Similarly, despite their intuition, the Fletcher family's privileged position in relation to the community (Fletcher and his children are not members of the servant class) renders them symptomatic of a society that cannot replicate itself in terms of its own supposedly transcendent principles. This gap is crucial. Mr. Fletcher and in turn Hope and Everell register as lacking some element that would enable them to materialize their intuition within the social edifice itself, but each is unaware of their own limitations. The matrix that makes possible the intuition and conviction modeled by the members of the Fletcher family is itself limited to the givenness of settler sociality, belief systems, and governance.
I am not suggesting that the novel presumes an image of the public sphere and political strife as detached from the politics of land claims. Rather, the appeal to an idealized Indian character frames the political horizon by supplying the ethical backdrop against which political affairs internal to settlement emerge as subject to, or overdetermined by, “earthly passions.” Magawisca's enigmatic yet ambivalent display in the trial that closes the novel anthropomorphizes this ethical horizon in the form of an appeal to liberty. Referring to Gardiner's plot to ruin her character and thereby preempt her incriminations, she insists that Winthrop and the broader community “not wait for him to prove that I am your enemy...Take my own word, I am,” which she immediately follows with conventional rhetoric of vanishing Indianness: “the sun-beam and the shadow cannot mingle. The white man cometh—the Indian vanisheth” (Sedgwick 292). Rather than argue, as does Maureen Tuthill for instance, that this sentiment indicates the novel's problematic investment in removal ideology broadly conceived, I would only suggest here that such discourse positions Magawisca's Indianness as the obverse of the impulse that Fletcher represents. She is, of course, not the enemy of the Fletcher household, which provides the affective scene that nurtures the settler impetus toward liberty. Instead, her comment refers to the state/colonial apparatus that presumes sovereignty over her, and yet this resistance dovetails with the foreknowledge that Indian polities are fated to disappear. If Fletcher is an ideological form (resistance to tyranny) without a corresponding content, in the sense of a clear trajectory or program, then Magawisca reads as an ideological content (a capacity to engage and resist the tyranny of hierarchical oppression directly; her comments occur in the context of the trial that closes
the novel) without a corresponding form in the sense of a social matrix both to which she
belongs and that accordingly stands to benefit from her action.

In slightly different terms, Magawisca is the vanishing mediator that synthesizes
the Old and New Worlds. By refusing the judgments of the state apparatus, she publicly
aligns Winthrop's own government with the Old-World ethico-political matrix
symbolized by Sir William in a manner that neither the younger Fletcher, Everell, nor
Hope can do without facing exile. On one hand, then, she transposes resistance to
tyranny, already a defining trait of a distinctly “American” commitment to “liberty and
religion,” from a localized impulse to escape into a project that transcends and thereby
has the capacity to reshape the dominant social order. On the other, however, as Rifkin
writes, the “text seems to speak as if Magawisca's mourning for her mother, and the
feelings of guilt she seeks to prompt in Winthrop for not fulfilling his promise [to her
mother of kindness toward her children], were capable of encompassing the meaning of
the attempted destruction and erasure of the Pequot people” (When 139). As a figure of
difference, Magawisca extends the forms of affect organized around normative settler
homemaking beyond their moorings in Anglo settlement, presenting them as integral to
the intelligibility of Pequot genocide and therefore as requisite to its representation. The
scene of this transposition is key. By challenging the state's pretensions to condemn or
acquit her, Magawisca's act of rhetorical sovereignty discloses the racism of the majority
of Anglos. In turn, her allusions to Sir Gardiner's papism and then Rosa's secret gender
reveal both his duplicity and, by proxy, the court's own fallibility. This chapter ends with
the narrator noting the “strange contrariety of opinion and feelings” in the courtroom, the
people “guided by the best lights they possessed, deciding against her—the voice of nature crying out for her” (Sedgwick 294). However, in generating this palpable discord Magawisca's narrative actually effaces questions of jurisdiction and territorial claims that provided the backdrop for the Pequot War, displacing the historical specificity of Pequot displacement itself in favor of a generic resistance borne out of an equally generic Indianness. Her performance therefore transforms the scene into one of settler collective (self) recognition and thereby represents historical change as the process by which state apparatuses become realigned through the influence of a natural ethics that exceeds society proper. Indeed, read in this way, the settler courtroom itself comes to manifest settlement's structural openness to an evolution beyond the false consciousness that blinds its actual polity.

Again, though, it is Magawisca's fullness, her overdetermined meaning as a cipher of supposedly authentic and noble Indian virtue, that enables her character to harmonize settler society and to posit a rhetoric of liberty oriented to settlement as a concept that, as it were, exists freely in nature. Her performance during the trial suggests that the primitive equality of the savages consists in a recognition of shared humanity that has the capacity to redirect the state's tendency toward persecution. The Pequot heroine emerges as the novel's true visionary, in a way its anti-Fletcher. She is, like him, both principled and passionate, but lacking the kind of privileged mobility that seems only to impede social regeneration. This lack registers as a form of agency: sacrificing her arm to save Everell from death at her father's hands positions her character as the inverse of Mr. Fletcher's impotence. This “Indian” efficacy further shows in her good faith in reuniting
Faith and Hope on Nelema's behalf, her refusal to secure her freedom by helping Gardiner remove Rosa from the picture, in sparing Rosa's humiliation at the expense of providing testimony that could help prove her own innocence, and, also in the trial scene, in echoing Patrick Henry's demand for “death or liberty,” a claim that can be understood as retroactively naturalizing a uniquely (yet no less generic) American discourse on political freedom (Sedgwick 293). She appears able to intervene in the dominant order on the side of justice insofar as she emerges from outside the socio-symbolic dynamics of settlement. However, just as the reference to Winthrop's promise to her mother consolidates her ethos in the courtroom, the authenticity of her character initially emerges through her willingness to negotiate her father's “tribal” drive toward vengeance. If Indian-Anglo violence is cyclical, as Sedgwick implies, normative genealogy provides the concept for thinking it as such (especially as Mononotto's “tribal” vendetta hinges on the death of his wife and child at Fort Mystic). The outside that she represents, in other words, is already an extension of a supposedly universal ontology predicated on settler sociality.

Magawisca's character, therefore, also crucially mediates between received narratives of Anglo-Indian history and normative modes of settler belonging, which makes her central to the novel's sociopolitical critique, as scholars have noted. Mary Kelley observes that by having Mononotto seek his revenge after Magawisca narrates her version of the destruction of Fort Mystic, Sedgwick shows that “committed Christians had a capacity for barbarism equal to that which they attributed to the indigenous population” and thus resists the tendency to attribute such episodes to Natives' supposed
savagery (xxxiii). Kalayjian similarly argues that by situating Magawisca’s account of the war after that of Digby, a veteran of the conflict who is also loyal to the Fletcher household, Sedgwick depicts a moment of empathy within which “the savagery of the white soldiers resignifies the term 'savage,'” effectively de-racializing and recasting it as “a gendered signifier” (67). Jeffrey Insko suggests that Sedgwick's extradiegetic narrator demonstrates an awareness of the “mutability of historical truth” by commenting upon and at times reframing key passages, such as Hope's reunion with Faith and Magawisca's description of horrors of the Pequot War earlier (183). The narrator's frequent commentary, he contends, yields a sense of anachronism that indicates Sedgwick's awareness of the power of narration to intervene in historical narrative. From this view, the novel is “less concerned with an objective...recovery of a remote period...than with bringing disparate periods in time into productive relation,” so as to force the reader to confront racial otherness, thereby foregrounding “the perils and potentialities of a nascent multi-cultural democracy” (Insko 199, 183).

Despite her shifting alignments, or rather by way of them, Magawisca amounts to the novel's ethical center in forcing even those who see through and oppose tyranny (namely Hope) to confront the deeply embedded racial and cultural limits to their altruism. Although this scholarship draws attention to Sedgwick's recognition that the narrativity central to historical fiction can be used toward counter-hegemonic ends, it does not generally link this recognition to the ur narrative of Indian degeneration that developed in relation to reservation communities. Insko, for instance, observes that the text's “argument for historical relativism—bringing the past into relation with ever-new
presents...is duplicated in the text's representation of the racial other”; the text relates its “racial politics to its historiographical interests” and argues “not just for historical relativism but for a brand of cultural relativism as well” (Insko 199, 197). Insko suggests that the text intervenes in the discipline of history by foregrounding the role that religious bias plays in structuring its truth claims, and insofar as it does so, it also makes a parallel intervention into the emergent racial politics of the public sphere by deconstructing notions of stereotypically “Indian” savagery. Through Magawisca, the text represents political and historical representation as effectively separate networks.

If Indianness is primarily imagined, as in Hobomok, as the vehicle by which an ethical Nature beyond Anglo civilization comes to intervene within the latter, a notion that indexes the possibility whereby those settlers who practice an ethical intuition come to gain a reflexive awareness of such ethics and become able to reflect it into an originary social matrix, Indian character comprises the vehicle for this potential reflection. Further, the introjection of such ethics into settler sociality comes to signify progressive movement in time, away from the destructive historical cycles that characterize Old World England and that amounts to the re-inscription of tyranny into the social body over time. To be fair, Magawisca's Pequots are also represented as given to such cycles, namely through the text's muted portrayal of Mononotto. Yet, the Pequots themselves register as aberrations of the generic Indianness typified by Magawisca, and this Indianness furthermore amounts to the element that enables Anglo settlement to save itself from itself. The repeated sacrifices that Hope and Magawisca make across the text draw both figures into alignment with the younger Fletcher's own resistance to his uncle's
overtures to give up his religious and political delinquency (Sedgwick 121). Yet
Indianness does more than articulate the text's preoccupation with an ethics that can cut
through the stubbornness and irrationalism of both Indian and Anglo hierarchies. If, as
the novel seems to suggest, patriarchy problematizes Indian and Anglo socialities alike,
one of the reasons would appear to have to do with the belief in an Indian-American
binary in the first place. Fletcher, Hope, Everell, and Magawisca, along with Fletcher's
wife, each recognize to varying degrees how such stock conceptions of identity mask
one's authentic character. Yet Jennet's overt racism combined with the eagerness of the
wider community not only to accuse Nelema and Magawisca of witchcraft but to believe
they are indeed hell-spawn together suggest that such binarism does exist. Insofar as the
majority of people see through such formations, by way of them, these reductive tropes
map reality for settlers and, in turn, Native peoples as well. The paradox is that
Sedgwick's representation of Magawisca relies on a version of the same binarism to make
this very point.

Magawisca's narrative of the Pequot massacre attests to the materiality of such
stereotypes. Organized around her own family's suffering, and in particular her brother's
dramatic death, her account as told to Everell implies that the massacre was partially a
function of settlers' failure to recognize the honor and humanity that characterizes Natives
and Anglos alike. In turn, such beliefs contribute to a reactionary belligerence on the part
of Native groups, an effect represented here by Mononotto's drive to avenge his wife and
son. Sedgwick suggests that this drive radicalizes him into actively working to form a
pan-Indian alliance organized around the Mohawks. Rather than simple foils for one
another, then, Hope and Magawisca represent different degrees of recognition of the true state of Nature obscured by such binarism. As the novel progresses, Sedgwick dialectically aligns these perspectives. The second volume resolves the tension between patriarchal justice and ethical-feminine Nature, which exists on both sides of the Indian-Anglo divide, through the logic of the debt that brings the women together. Magawisca tells Hope in the graveyard that Nelema “blessed you” and that as “the hand of death pressed her throat...she made me swear to perform her promise to you” (Sedgwick 187).

In keeping her promise, Magawisca transforms the dyad consisting of her sacrifice (of her limb, her standing with her father, etc.) and that of Hope's altruism (sacrificing her own character for the sake of Nelema, first, and later Rosa) into a linear sequence organized around the possibility of family reunification. In so doing, she emerges as the prophet of a unifying afterlife, and her ethos gestures to a supposedly real space beyond the veils of Indian-Anglo binarism. After noting their mothers' graves, a device that gestures to a common humanity by way of the irrational destruction that comes with warfare, Magawisca asserts that “the Great Spirit looks down on these sacred spots, where the good and the peaceful rest, with an equal eye...their children are His children, whether they are gathered in yonder temple...or bow to Him beneath the green boughs of the forest” (Sedgwick 189).

Sedgwick here reverses the valence of the Indian-as-savage by attributing to the Pequot heroine the text's clearest expression of a something like a Unitarian theological framework, and nearly a proto-transcendentalist one, as Magawisca is not depicted as Christian in a text that goes so far as to reference the influence of French Catholicism on
Native groups to the north, such as the Abenaki. The ethico-political consequences of this framework become clear as, despite siding with her father, Magawisca chides Hope for not being able to get past the shock of her sister being married to Oneco, an “Indian, in whose veins runs the blood of the strongest, the fleetest children of the forest...Think ye that your blood be corrupted by mingling with this stream?” (Sedgwick 188). Magawisca presents the categories of race deriving from emergent bio-cultural, proto-scientific, and civilizational discourses as illusory, contingent constructs, positing racial/cultural/spiritual hybridity as something like an immanent truth or fundamental condition of existence, one from which patriarchal tyranny departs in its intolerance of difference and fear of the Other. If her lessons contradict those of settlement, they also gesture to a horizon, a truth to come, and in this way her ethics/character reconfigures the perspectival distortions that have plagued settlement to this point as what can only be imagined as world-historical stages in the course of an all-encompassing progress.

Magawisca becomes the cypher for a linear historicity, the form of appearance of which is Anglo settlement's ethical improvement—a movement not so much toward as through Indianness.

This movement manifests in Magawisca's didacticism, which can be seen across the novel but gains its full expression at the end. Her lessons defamiliarize Indian-Anglo binarism by orienting Hope and Everell to what the text situates as an absolute spiritual horizon, a deeper unity that transcends the illusions characteristic, even constitutive of the socio-political sphere. Magawisca catalyzes settler self-recognition, but in the process of inadvertently orienting the youth of settlement toward an ethico-political in keeping with
the spirit, if not the politics, of settlement, she gradually becomes symbolic of the same horizon to which she refers. The graveyard scene's didactic overtones underscore this point. Hope's horror at Faith/Mary's marriage implies she cannot fully share in the truth of the ethical nature that Magawisca here brings to the fore, despite the fact that Hope intuits it in the world around her. Insofar as the latter serves as the novel's focal point, however, the text here renders the Pequot heroine out of joint not only with settlement's elite (white male) ruling class but also its radical, individualistic protagonist in Hope. Her Indianness gestures to the possibility of a greater social cohesion in time, but this gesture itself articulates a temporal disjuncture that retroactively naturalizes settlement as the site from which history proper begins. Magawisca not only possesses knowledge of the ultimate unity of all beings, but she implicitly realizes its value for settlers, gesturing to a state of existence to which Hope and by proxy all of settlement should tend, should emulate as closely as possible in this world. In this way, Magawisca's Indianness eclipses Native claims to self-determination in New England. Authentic Indian character emerges in the text in its opposition to both masculinist hierarchy and emergent true womanhood, and insofar as it does so, it serves to signify settler futurity in ways coextensive with the continued justification of guardian systems through supposed fallenness of an original and noble Indian virtue.

In the escape scene, before she gets the locket containing Everell's portrait as a consolation prize, Hope makes it clear she cannot stand the thought of parting with her Indian friend, blurting out that “your noble mind must not be wasted in those hideous solitudes!” (Sedgwick 332). Magawisca scolds Hope for making such a suggestion:
“Solitudes!...there is no solitude to me; the Great Spirit, and his ministers, are every where present and visible to the eye of the soul that loves him; nature is but his interpreter; her forms are but bodies for his spirit...the rushing winds...the summer breeze” and of course the stars that shine “alike on your stately homes and our forest domes” (Sedgwick 332). Revealing to Hope her biases for the last time transmutes the image of coexistence into one of historicity, within which Native forests give way to settler progress, as Magawisca takes her leave. This temporal register gains additional backing as we learn that Winthrop's government decided to release her so as to prevent a martyrdom that would unify the uneven Native groups around settlement into an anti-English coalition. As an embodiment of liberty, Magawisca's taking leave to the west quite literally presents settler expansion as the movement of history.

Yet, such a passage also clearly anticipates the image of the Indian as nature's wise steward that still characterizes much popular discourse on Native peoples, intimating the ambivalence of Sedgwick's views of contemporary Native peoplehood. Maureen Tuthill persuasively reads such ambivalence against the background of the Sedgwick family's failed missionary endeavors among the Stockbridge Natives “combined with their eventual purchase of the last remaining lands of the Stockbridge tribe,” suggesting that Magawisca's voluntary exile at the end of the text perhaps symbolizes the notion that Native removal was inevitable (105). There is nothing ambivalent, however, in the text's positioning of Magawisca as on the side of truth when it comes to narratives of Indian-Anglo conflict typified by the Pequot War. The narrator observes that her recounting of the attack on Fort Mystic to Everell was beyond “merely
changing sculptors to give the advantage to one or the other...but...putting the chisel into the hands of truth, and giving it to whom it belonged” (Sedgwick 53). Rather than merely one account among many, Magawisca's view of the conflict is positioned as the version. Her narrative is depicted as testifying to the fact that Natives were victims of an outrageous and unwarranted display of brutality by settlers. This perspective situates her at the intersection of the three domains of history, politics, and religion (the natural, “pagan” ethics that enable her to save Everell and thus perpetuate the novel's reconfiguration of ethics organized around the home).

Sedgwick writes in the preface that while she “is aware that it may be thought that the character of Magawisca has no prototype...Without citing Pocohontas, or any other individual, or authority, it may be sufficient to remark, that...we are confined not to the actual, but the possible,” essentially reversing the terms of the review of Child's Hobomok (Sedgwick 6). Portrayals of Natives as static savages bely the enlightenment wisdom that “elements of virtue and intellect are not withheld from any branch of the human family,” a point Sedgwick qualifies by observing that the “difference of character among the various races of the earth, arises mainly from the difference of condition” (Sedgwick 6). Far from an “unnatural” abuse of historical traditions, Sedgwick's Magawisca is possible, even probable, insofar as biased views of Native peoples, perspectives embodied by characters as different as Jennet and Governor Winthrop, are part and parcel of the archival source materials. If these characters index a racism integral to the general orientation of Puritan historiography and colonial archives, which is to say integral to antebellum views of Natives as well, then Magawisca by contrast gives
narrative form to the notion of a “human family,” and in so doing, she discloses Sedgwick's own revisionist impulse. Her character articulates the concept of a shared humanity that shows the discourse on savagery to be small-minded precisely insofar as it appropriates the historicity charted by the archives.

The novel theorizes that Anglo settlement becomes “civilization” by gaining insight into the epistemic roots of its seemingly irresolvable tensions, and Magawisca's didacticism is the diegetic element that puts the characters on the path to this knowledge. Indianness in this vein has less to do with signifying actual Native groups than providing the discursive element by which a linear historicity already oriented to settlement shifts its ethical valence. Imagining Indianness as reducible to a view onto true nature harmonizes the opening rift between “liberty and religion” and rejuvenates social space by sublating the dangers of patriarchy (Sir William's will to power, Sir Gardiner's duplicity and profligacy, and Winthrop's sheer capacity to be duped) through the “nature” of normative love. If we pair together Magawisca's removal (which reinforces the antebellum notion that the destruction of Fort Mystic marked the genesis of a more general and inevitable Indian decline) with that of Esther, then the text casts such love as not only extending the forms of feeling associated with domesticity into broader social space (both East and West, insofar as Esther returns to England) but as that which, as such, transcends the “earthly” obsessions sustained by the false consciousness of binary ideologies. Romantic love emerges as the true motor of historicity, that which Puritan historiography truly denies but is essential to nationhood going forward. The obverse of this resolution, as with Hobomok, is that in becoming a marker of settler historicity,
Indian character forecloses the capacity of Indianness to register the living history of New England Native peoples.

**Characterizing a History of Violence in William Apess's *Eulogy on King Philip***

The previous discussions of *Hobomok* and *Hope Leslie* sought to illustrate how narrating a prelapsarian Indian character actively generates, rather than reflects, a linear historicity within which New England settlement emerges as an ethical project in its relation to Native space. Imagined as “probable” representations of early Anglo-Native conflict, the ethics, sacrifice, and suffering of characters like Hobomok and Magawisca depict authentic Indianness as perpetually temporally out of joint, which in turn implicitly overdetermines the territorial and juridical claims of New England Native peoples in the antebellum period. Historicizing a quintessential Indian character as indicating a natural repository of virtue open to settlement, insofar as it is construed as something like an ontological principle or tendency already embedded the landscape, casts settlement as having introjected (and predicated on the capacity to introject) this “natural” and ethical element. This framing of Indianness, then, casts reservation systems in New England as spaces where the degraded trace of that primordial Indian exceptionalism slowly dwindles to nothing. In this way, such narratives endow settler domesticity with a sense of temporality, of movement forward that in turn presents the continued maintenance of reservation space as, at best, a tangential concern with regard to the "Indian question"; such oversight simply appears as the course of history writ large. Narrating Indian character, then, does not so much resist as foreclose thinking about New England Native
communities in terms of political and juridical sovereignty. Despite the apparent political sympathy toward Native peoples evidenced in the turn away from tropes of Indian savagery, works like *Hobomok* and *Hope Leslie* can be understood not simply as perpetuating a generalized notion of Indian vanishing, but more fundamentally as extending the longstanding role that a narrativity of Indian decline played in negating New England Native peoples' claims to sovereignty. In other words, rather than tokens of a generic “Indian question” that takes Indianness for granted as a relatively stable and coherent signifier, these works mobilize the discursivity of Indianness to historicize sovereign Native peoplehood as not only a thing of the past, but more crucially as a natural (extra-political) formation sublated in the ascendancy of political progressivism within a settler public sphere, therein deflecting the claims of reservation-based peoples in antebellum New England.

By the time William Apess would deliver his *Eulogy on King Philip* (1836), his last work, a decade after the publications of *Hobomok* and *Hope Leslie*, the mythos of the noble savage had been well established in American literature. John Augustus Stone's massively popular *Metamora; or, The Last of the Wampanoags* (1829) featured the popular stage actor Edwin Forrest portraying a highly stylized version of Metacom (King Philip), further sedimenting the Wampanoag leader as a reminder to settler audiences that the U.S. was indeed born out of the destruction of Native peoples. Although such caricatures of noble savagery helped to galvanize northern support against removal, as Apess prepared his *Eulogy* the Treaty of New Echota had been signed, while the Mashpees were still struggling to eject their intractably pious minister Phineas Fish.
in Bernd Peyer's words, such works had “already begun to salvage Metacom's 'character' from the malignant stereotypes created by Increase Mather's and William Hubbard's biased seventeenth-century accounts,” the Eulogy implies that this salvaging retained a fidelity to the modes of knowledge production at the core of the region's settler colonialism (160). One can suggest that the Eulogy fervently attempts to name this failure that resisted naming, drawing on Philip's characterization as a noble Indian warrior so as to historicize settler colonialism in New England and therein break with a linear historicity that consigned both Anglo malfeasance and Native sovereignty to the distant past.

In drafting the Eulogy after working with the Mashpee and developing a reputation as a compelling orator, Apess likely recognized that the narrativity of Indian character organized around King Philip conditioned political sympathy for Native peoples, for better and for worse. Though honoring the fallen Wampanoag leader provides the text's rhetorical purpose, Apess's project more precisely aims to “bring before you beings made by the God of Nature” (277). However, the intent seems less to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the stereotype as it applies to actual Native groups than to mobilize the tension between savagery and noble Indian character to throw into relief what appears as a genealogy of systemic cruelty and violence toward otherwise peaceful Native communities. To promote “Justice and humanity for the remaining few” of Philip's “grateful descendants,” Apess emphasizes in opening, is the purpose of one “who proudly tells you the blood of a denominated savage runs in his veins” (Apess 277). Rather than merely catering to a general interest in Indian affairs and supplementing
Indian and/or colonial history, Apess suggests that Philip serves as a means to an end, a vehicle for reframing Native politics in the present by drawing on the recent shift away from heathen savagery and toward noble Indian character in the early-antebellum era, a shift that, as Jean O' Brien and Steven Conn have shown in different ways, can be understood as integral to an emergent historical consciousness in New England.

However, although noble Indian character and the heathen savage map onto different political positions regarding an antebellum "Indian question," one more or less organized around the Cherokee Nation's highly publicized struggles, within the frame of New England Anglo presence they nevertheless enact the same settler historicity, predicated on the narrativity of inevitable and primordial Indian decline, that constituted a fundamental component of settler colonialism in the region. Accordingly, making this historicity appear less obligates Apess to identify as Indian, construed as a "real" identity-formation suppressed by a racist discourse, than steers him to emphasize both the magnanimity of Philip's character, on the one hand, and its irreducibility to frames of history organized around settler domesticity, couplehood, and their ostensibly axiomatic relationship to modernity and, in turn, to political sovereignty, on the other. He adds of these "beings" that, while their "purer virtues remain untold...[ and the] noble traits that marked the wild man's course lie buried in the shades of night," yet for "those few remaining descendants" who stand as "the monument of the cruelty of those who came to improve our race and correct our errors" the memory of the Wampanoag leader lives on: "even such is the immortal Philip...held in memory by the degraded but yet grateful descendants who appreciate his character; so will every patriot, especially in this
enlightened age, respect the rude...son of the forest...Where, then, shall we place the hero of the wilderness?" (Apess 277). What is crucial from the outset is less the Native leader's greatness than that this greatness is remembered by his "degraded" descendants. In Derrida's terms, raising the specter of Philip gestures to an even more spectral presence in the form of a Native audience that occupies two positions: that of reservation peoples who stand as witnesses to a history of dispossession and genocide (a spectral double of Apess's actual audience) and that of the impossible remainder of a supposedly long eclipsed Indigenous peoplehood. By eulogizing Philip, Apess recodes a trace of New England Indianness that usually signifies an ever-receding past and, as such, demarcates the break of (settler) modernity instead as a diachronic cut across historical epochs, such that the destruction typically consigned to a distant past through the discourse of Indian character registers instead as alive in the present by way of the genealogical formation this figure makes possible.

Apess's strategy can therefore be seen as de-centering the symbolic value attached to Philip within his own eulogy so as to historicize indigeneity, to give discursive form to New England Native dispossession and survivance. While Apess draws on the discourse of noble Indian character in opening up the possibility of eulogizing Philip before a settler public, he quickly doubles back and questions the implicit spatio-temporal structure of such an event, within which a cohesive community remembers and mourns one who has passed. Placing Philip, a phrase that suggests both geographic and historical placement as much as a reassessment of the perceived limitations of Indian character more generally, here involves re-aligning the audience with those "descendants" who
already hold the correct estimation but who are not among those gathered. To place Philip means to see him with Native peoples, as Natives see him; Apess asks his audience to view history from the angle of the still “burning elements of the uncivilized world” (277). Eulogizing a Native leader whom he describes as “the greatest man that ever lived upon the American shores” provides the occasion to present a genealogy that, while it cannot but appear “buried” from the angle of the foreclosure enacted through renditions of Philip's historical importance, pathos, etc., nonetheless turns out to be not quite eclipsed (Apess 290). Far from manifesting an ontogenetic rule of decay, Natives emerge as those in whom the “God of Nature...has planted sympathies that shall live forever in the memory of the world” (Apess 277). As Eric Wolfe suggests, Apess positions Philip in direct contrast to “Logan's 'apocalyptic history, in which no one remains to mourn”; to the contrary, “for Apess the relationship to loss signifies the continuity of communal traditions” (16). The paradox, however, is that narrative portraits of the Wampanoag leader provided the archetypal example of a prelapsarian and virtuous Indian character and, as such, endowed the ur narrative of settlement's break from an Indian past with truth-value.

Apess aims to foreground the tension that manifests around Philip's representativity, I would argue, so as to make visible the gap between Indianness and indigeneity. As we have seen with both Hope Leslie and Hobomok, representing Indian character in terms of an inevitably past-tense ethics of Nature forecloses indigeneity as a viable position from which to resist dispossession. Since Indianness (the Indian) is effectively out of joint with the normativity and hence the temporality of settler
modernity in New England, precisely because it functions to produce this notion of disjunction, actual Native polities lack the rhetorical and epistemic space from which to claim self-determination and sovereignty. In a way, Apess repurposes what might be taken as the presumed object of the discourse: honoring Philip's character by remembering his history creates a frame through which Native "beings," not Indians, come into view precisely as paradoxical and opaque figures. Crucially, Native peoples here remain unknown to his audience. Apess defamiliarizes the dominant discourse of Indian character by suggesting that the ongoing conditions of Native dispossession remains yet “buried in the shades of night,” which is to say beyond the “light” of settler history and modernity, and in turn beyond settler juridical and territorial claims to place (277). Liminality here is less a cultural condition to be overcome than a trope that begins to render a seemingly totalizing New England historicity as not-All.

The key to this shift is his discussion of the motivation for eulogizing Philip. By foregrounding the question of why Apess is doing what he is doing, the text extends the symbolic value associated with noble Indianness to sustain what Wolfe describes as a counter-narrative of indigenous survivance. Philip's popularity provides the occasion to render the positive traits associated with his character as a frame to throw into relief the violence of settlers toward Natives. Before anything like a historical record of Philip's actions emerges, Apess's audience is met with a heretofore invisible “monument of the cruelty of those who came to improve our race and correct our errors,” a kind of epistemic stain in historiography and nature alike that, read by way of the glory of Philip, marks the suffering and betrayal experienced by Native peoples as ongoing conditions of...
colonialism (277). Insofar as Philip is not only a known historical figure but already laden with pathos given his defiance in the name of liberty, his nobility (its symbolic currency) creates the rhetorical space to reverse the framing of Indigenous peoples on reservations in New England as declining. Apess asks the audience not only to view the famed Indian leader, but to do so from the vantage of Natives (as “natural beings”) who not only also remember him, but, more importantly, who are there to remember him despite centuries of what reads as systemic projects of cruelty toward New England Native peoples.

In like Hobomok and Hope Leslie, a binary Indian-Anglo narrativity displaces the relation between the violence of warfare and territorial claims through the reader's implicit identification with a hopelessly idealized Indianness. Indian character is altruistic and natural, and as such it is capable of representing an egalitarian impulse away from the tyranny of Old World hierarchy and thereby purifying the notion of civilization, as it were. By contrast, marking the occasion to eulogize Philip excavates, renders immediately present, some sense of this otherwise obscured and/or effaced relationship in the form of settlers' failure to live and act by their own supposedly universal principles of humility and goodwill, traits that, though stereotypically Christian, nevertheless were increasingly associated with "the Indian." Speaking of settlers as Christians, Apess writes that if “they were like my people, professing no purity at all, then their crimes would not appear to have such magnitude. But while they appear to be...more virtuous, their crimes still blacken” (300). Apess undoubtedly would have understood that he was transposing a certain enlightened understanding of the applicability of Christian virtue onto the more
traditional historiographic representation of Native peoples as savages within the Protestant theological constellations characterizing early America. By so doing, however, Apess not only extends the modern break with a Puritannical representation of the Indian-as-heathen-Other, but he also inverts the framing of exceptional Indian character within the historical fiction of his day, using Philip's virtue to portray the crimes against Native peoples, and therein sovereign Native peoplehood as a concept in itself, as far from relegated to the distant past.

From a slightly different angle, Apess's path to the main idea, namely to lay bare how those “in the wisdom of their civilized legislation, think it no crime to wreak their vengeance upon whole nations and communities,” can be conceived as preparing the ground for an act of symbolic violence against the linear historicity (framed through primordial Indian virtue) that forecloses Native self-determination (278). Backing into the continuity of violence toward Native peoples in New England perhaps appeared the only course he could take. Simply appealing to the rights of Indian peoples outright would seem to fail insofar as Indianness is the very formation whereby New England Native peoples appear as residual, waning versions of their former selves. However, by orienting the audience to the possibility of a different perspective of Philip taken by his “degraded” heirs, Apess theorizes the destruction of Native peoples often dramatized by way of hyperbolic figurations of primordial Indian virtue instead as a historical continuity. He states that he expects that “every patriot” will similarly come to “respect the rude yet all-accomplished son of the forest, that died a martyr to his cause,” and further that such respect should “melt the prejudice of those who are in possession of his
soil, and only by right of conquest” (277). The text therein presupposes what New England historiography precludes at the level of accepted/acceptable historical knowledge, namely that Natives remain dispossessed of their lands. Werner Sollors writes that the plethora of noble Indian chieftains portrayed in literature and on the stage had become “pseudo ancestors” by “sacralizing new forms of postrevolutionary citizenship based on the doctrine of consent” as they cursed the rapacious white settlers closing in on them (129). Here, that injustice does not dissipate through settlers’ adaption of natural, supposedly Indian norms over against old-world tyranny. Rather, it extends into the present insofar as the sons of the forest, a phrase the Boston audiences likely would have associated with Apess given his autobiography a few years earlier, embody the dispossession of Philip’s “soil,” which in turn, renders precedents like the doctrines of discovery and conquest as decidedly unnatural legitimations of settler claims and the violence enacted to secure them.

In this way, by writing in the frame of noble Indian character, eulogizing Philip can be thought of as resignifying notions of “nature,” already bound up with his symbolic value as a key figure in revisions of colonial historiography, instead as indices of Native landedness (290). Apess draws on his ethos as a Methodist minister to reconfigure a conventional encoding of nature as an imaginary zone that exceeds settlement but remains nonetheless oriented to it in terms of the counter-hegemonic relations that find articulation there. Before launching into the catalog of settler depredations making up the bulk of the text, Apess observes how “inhuman it was in those wretches, to come into a country where nature shown in beauty, spreading her wings over the vast continent,
sheltering beneath her shades those natural sons of an Almighty Being...whose virtues far surpassed their more enlightened foes” and “work to enslave a free people”; to enact such a project “and call it religion...outstrips the revelation of God's word...thou pretended[,] hypocritical Christian, whoever thou art” (Apess 279). Nature here signifies so many different things that it nearly unravels. It denotes a quality of the country prior to European discovery, a metaphysical extension of the land that amounts to a form of agency (“sheltering” Native peoples), a quality of Natives themselves attesting to their unique genealogy, and, within the latter, a concept that allows Christian monotheism to appear as a transcendent, universal epistemology, even an ontology. Yet the charge of false religion at the end retroactively consolidates these competing dynamics as merely different facets of a prior presence. Describing settlers as working to “enslave a free people” under the banner of Christian civilization represents a violence that otherwise appears long eclipsed, reducible to a primordial event like the Pequot war, or King Philip's war, etc., instead as constitutive of the historical project of Anglo settlement.

Using the term slavery in this passage short-circuits the sense that violence toward Natives is a thing of the past, and Apess likely meant to appeal directly to abolitionist sentiments in the crowd.30 However, a critique of emergent racialism is prevalent not only in the Eulogy but throughout his work, especially in his autobiography and the vitriolic essay “An Indian's Looking-Glass for the White Man.” Barry O'Connell argues it is possible to read the Eulogy as appropriating the “patriotic language of the dominant culture and switching its referents” in these moments so as to disclose the “almost seamless ideology of a racist republicanism that cloaked itself in universalistic language”
Cheryl Walker also notes that Apess's “use of mirroring” subverts the “terms of national discourse” and thereby exposes “its racist exclusionism” (172). The promise of equal rights had not borne out in history, and by foregrounding race Apess would have communicated to the perceptive in his audience the limitations in even progressive Whig politics. More broadly, Philip Gura suggests that the incendiary revision of history Apess offers in the *Eulogy*, exposing the anti-Indianism of colonial historiography, serves mainly to give “the lie to the white attempt to write this warrior” and by proxy all Natives “into oblivion” (111). Apess aimed to show that his people were “no more...'savage' than white men [and] King Philip was not a 'beast,’” realizing that as long as “contemporaries refused, as the Puritans had..., to acknowledge their common humanity with people of color, tragedies like that of King Philip's War, then being replicated in Florida” with US attempts to remove the Seminole “would continue” (137-8).

While there is no doubt that Apess felt solidarity with the effects of settler colonialism everywhere, the so-called Mashpee revolt just three years earlier likely shaped this identification. During this episode, Apess helped the Mashpee to hold their state-appointed guardian to account for decades of persistent malfeasance; he was adopted into the tribe prior to championing them and afterwards published an extensive account of these events in his infamous *Indian Nullification*. Following Maureen Konkle, one should be wary of overemphasizing the text's racial dynamics at the expense of diminishing the role of historiography in licensing land theft. As she points out, for Apess, the “providential 'extinction' of Indians...is not providential at all, but rather the result of whites' desire for Indian land,” what they tell themselves to justify taking it, and
finally “the dissemination of that knowledge to the point where it becomes...widely accepted” (Konkle 142). Regarding the tendency to read the *Eulogy* through the critical lens of race relations, however, I would suggest narratives of “vanishing” less impede a recognition of Natives' common humanity than Indianness, as a cypher for primordial and bygone virtue, configures antebellum political and cultural discourses (historiography and literature) in New England in such a way that undermines extant Native communities' capacity to navigate the politics of reservation systems. While one can read the text as disclosing a racism rooted in history that still plagues the settler body politic, the *Eulogy* more fundamentally intervenes in the linear historicity whereby settler modernity emerges out of (the mythos of) an introjected Indian exceptionalism.

As the opening recalibration of Indian “nature” demonstrates, the extra-political configuration of Philip's virtue provides the frame through which to present New England Native communities as noble, but not vanishing. Asking “Who is Phillip?” problematizes his typical framing as a pseudo-ancestor for a progressive settler public. Apess notes that Philip was a descendent of Massasoit, the Wampanoag leader who allied with Plymouth colony, one known for “peace and benevolence toward all men” (Apess 277). However, Massasoit's ethical character shows less in the simple fact of his allegiance than in the manner in which he bore settlers' insults to his goodwill. His reputation is validated by the historical record, which shows he countenanced with a “patience and resignation” that would “do justice to any Christian nation” a litany of “injuries upon injuries...robberies and barbarous deeds of death...committed by the American Pilgrims” (Apess 277). While the text presents Indian virtue as characteristic of all Native peoples, and in turn implies
that settlers consistently fail to live by the ethical principles, the subtle effect here is to draw on the genealogical trope made possible through the discourse of Indian character to not only to render visible crimes against Indians, but to portray such crimes as indeed crimes against committed against sovereign Native peoples. By extending Philip's ethos as one who resisted unjust settler incursions onto other Native peoples, Apess foregrounds a continuity of settler depredations that otherwise signal the unremarkable background of New England history and, by so doing, creates the space to represent Native peoplehood as exceeding the juridical purview of Anglo settlement.

The text accomplishes this shift by crucially extending the crimes against the Wampanoag outward, connecting them to key scenes of atrocities also committed by English emigrants against Abenaki, Massachusetts, and other peoples as well. This differentiation cuts against the narrative tendency to conflate any and all crimes against Native peoples as against a single Indian people or tribe, a configuration that enables such violence to be consolidated and deflected as a single, spectacular event that happened long ago. In this way, Apess's (mis)placement of Philip defamiliarizes the same archival knowledge of New England history that Sedgwick, Child, and a host of other non-Natives had already drawn on in bringing colonial history to life for settler audiences. The audience learns of Edward Harlow’s (though O’Connell notes that Apess likely confused Harlow with Thomas Hunt) capturing of 29 Natives likely associated with Massasoit and his unsuccessful attempt to sell them in Spain in 1614 (Apess 279). He follows the description of this passage by describing a Massachusetts woman “nearly one hundred years of age” who complained to “the Pilgrims” in 1622 that a Captain Hunt
had recently captured three of her children, only to receive “a few brass trinkets” in return (Apess 280). The text drives home the cruelty underlying this episode by drawing on racial discourse to bring the injustice to the fore. “O white woman!” he writes, “What would you think if some foreign nation...should come and carry away from you three lovely children” only to be met with what amounts to excusing the perpetrator of such an act: “Sirs, where are my little ones?’...'It was passion, great passion.'...Should you not think they were beings made more like rocks than men?’” (Apess 280 sic). Those who committed such atrocities register as unfeeling, even inhuman, which in turn sheds light on the degree to which biased historiographers have unjustly inflected the historical record. However, while the text utilizes racial discourse to establish a comparative frame by which simultaneously to approach and to assess a history of injustice toward New England Natives, the vehicle for representing Indianness as a “race” in this passage is an appeal to normative domesticity, in particular the appeal to the bond between the mother and child presumed as an axiomatic and effectively timeless moral structure.

Such tropes of normative family formation surface in the Eulogy precisely insofar as they were integral to New England historicity, as evidenced by both Hobomok and Hope Leslie. However, if these tropes render an Indian authenticity that de facto legitimizes settler control of Native space by positing reservation communities as illegitimate with regard not necessarily to settler sexual and domestic norms per se, but rather to the refraction of such norms through a bygone Indianness that did in fact manifest such qualities, then the mediation of Indian character can be thought as affording a strategic reversal of such normativity. The discourse of noble, natural Indian
character entails an embedded notion of settler normativity, yet the discursivity of this character, its essentially generic quality, nonetheless renders settler normativity available to Apess to challenge the foreclosure of Native landedness and self-determination. This challenge, I would argue, coheres in the multiplication of settler depredations that the text reveals after mobilizing such normativity as an overarching framework. In this section, the text moves quickly through a catalog of abuses toward New England Natives in the first few decades of Anglo settlement (Miles Standish's preemptive strike on Wituwament's Massachusetts group, Chicataubut's tragic response to the robbing of his mother's grave, the slaughter of a group of Wampanoags by Captain Thomas Dermer, Plymouth protecting Squanto despite his intention to murder Massasoit). The reference to the motherly sentiments of white women is situated as a universal appeal to sympathy, and it primes the audience to read this list as indicating settlers' failure to reciprocate the hospitable treatment they received from different Native groups, a point he reinforces in this section by constantly referring to the relative weakness of settlement as compared with far more established Native peoples. The kidnapping occurred around the same time, 1622, when Plymouth and Weston settlers were in dire straits and Natives responded by giving them supplies. “Had it not been for this humane act of the Indians,” he observes, “every white man would have been swept from the colonies”; in the face of such atrocities, Massasoit and later Philip can only be said to have “exercised more Christian forbearance than any of the governors of that age or since. It might be said he was a pattern for the Christians themselves” (Apess 280, 283). Evoking the Christ-like qualities of King Philip was not necessarily provocative or even uncommon, as Christian typology
contributed to the narrative configuration of vanishing Indian nobility. What is unusual, though, is Apess’s allusion to such qualities to throw into relief the failure of settlers to abide by their own teachings.

In this way, the text utilizes the symbolic value associated with noble Indian character to throw into relief “civilization” as a cover for land theft and genocide. Apess clearly intends to convey an image of white savagery, suggesting that such behavior is mystified by historiographers like that of the “eminent divine” Increase Mather, for whom the caricature of Natives as hell-spawn created to test the faith and commitment of Christian settlers serves as a methodological principle. However, the text works to connect this mystification to the predominant tropes of Native vanishing, showing the latter as similarly effacing the conditions of contemporary Natives. Apess notes that if New England historiographers observe that Indigenous peoples in the seventeenth century were “large and respectable,” then the fact that settler duplicity and violence appears as a constitutive feature of New England settlement suggests that they have been “destroyed” not by “fair means” but instead by “hypocritical proceedings, by being duped and flattered...We might suppose that meek Christians had better gods and weapons than cannon” (285). If Natives are not creatures of Satan, they did not simply vanish. And if they did not vanish, as Apess attests by framing himself as a “denominated savage,” then their “destruction” registers as an ongoing project. As he writes, “although the Gospel is said to be glad tidings to all people, yet we poor Indians never have found those who brought it as messengers of mercy...therefore...the 22nd of December and the 4th of July are days of mourning and not of joy” (Apess 286). Retroactively casting the founding of
Plymouth colony in December of 1620 as the beginning of a history of violence and theft from the perspective of Native peoples frames the birth of the United States as, far from realizing an enlightened commitment to liberty for all, an extension of such violence construed as an originary project of settlement.

Crucially, though, foregrounding the character of Massasoit, Philip, and all New England Natives by proxy as models of “Christian forbearance” does not challenge British and later US claims to land outright. Refusing a linear arrangement that begins with the Puritans and ends with various forms of colonialism of his own day, Apess instead goes for a rapid-fire pace marked by juxtaposing scenes of Puritan misdeeds with allusions to contemporary political situations involving Natives, like the Cherokees, and direct appeals to his audience to consider such depredations from Native peoples’ views. Read against the direct reference to the doctrine of conquest, the multiple temporal frames comprising Apess's narrative design undermine the primacy of settler claims to territory, positing the presupposition of an axiomatic Native land-based sovereignty within a discourse otherwise predicated on the narrative foreclosure of such a concept. He writes that “I appeal to you, who value your friends and affectionate mothers, if you would have [them] robbed...without calling to account those who did it,” pointedly adding that should another “nation...come to these regions and begin to rob and plunder all that came in their way, would not the orators of the day be called to address the people and arouse them to war for such insults?” (282). Depicting the abuses suffered by Natives across history by supposed Christians as analogous to the destruction of idealized bonds comprising settler domesticity generates a sense of moral outrage, one that the temporal
discordance characterizing the narrative design moves toward an impression of Native nationhood as irreducible to settler historicity precisely insofar as it emerges as rooted in the “common property” of the land itself (282).

From this view, we can situate one of the crucial functions of Apess's praise for Philip. The text repeatedly insists that the Wampanoag leader was not only “the greatest man that ever lived upon the American shores,” but more pointedly one whose greatness consisted partly in prophecy and partly in something akin to a natural impulse toward ethical behavior, an innate drive to do good even by those who he knew would wrong him and his people, and both elements here clearly partake of the dominant discourse on Indian nobility. In Apess's words, Philip “knew there was great responsibility resting upon himself and country, that it was likely to be ruined by those rude intruders around him, though he appears friendly and is willing to sell them lands for almost nothing” (Apess 290). An authenticating sign of Philip's "natural" ethics is their constancy, but what remains constant is his sense of obligation to his people and country, which manifests as a resistance to settler encroachments subsumed by a more general willingness to negotiate. The text stresses that Benjamin Church could not bring down the Wampanoag leader except through “treachery,” by turning his own people against him; that “it was not the Pilgrims that conquered him [but] Indians” in the end; and that “no one in history can accuse Philip of being cruel to his conquered foes” (306). In these moments, Apess inverts the ubiquitous image of Philip as hopelessly surrounded, defiantly grieving a destiny he cannot avert, stressing instead the role of land cessions and broken treaties in the conflict. By doing so, the text utilizes Philip's last stand, so to
speak, to embed the land in question as always-already Native, not fated to become an Anglo nation. Foregrounding Philip's character both prior to and during the battle with invasive colonists positions Native land-based sovereignty as background, as already at the level of the text's symbolic horizon, a condition of possibility not only for Philip's actions but, as such, also for the sympathy that Apess's eulogy elicited in his predominantly non-Native audience.

These moments cleave the vanishing from the noble, the savagery from the natural being. The text underscores the efficacy of this maneuver both by refusing to adapt a purely chronological narrative sequence and by presenting such noble Indian character as ultimately irreducible to historically significant or “exceptional” figures like Philip or Massasoit. The text is peppered with scenes of Native goodwill betrayed by prejudiced whites such as the Native man from “Kennebunk...remarkable for his good conduct, and who received a grant of land from the state and...did all that lay in his power to comfort his white neighbors, in sickness and death,” only to be forced to witness the death of his child alone when the tides turn; the man removes himself from the company of whites and heads “to join the Canadian Indians” (Apess 289). Further, Apess gives no date for this particular story. Instead, he positions it as synecdochic of a broader history of betrayal and dispossession of Native peoples by settler communities, a history whose truth-value he reinforces by describing his own experiences with anti-Indianism, such as being treated with suspicion by an inn-keeper who, upon learning that Apess was Native, “was unwilling to sleep opposite my room for fear of being murdered before morning” (305). Such behavior cannot but be read as diametrically opposed to the
hospitality of figures like Massasoit and Philip, and, as such, these scenes also gesture to Native peoples’ primordial rights to the “soil.” Philip's heroics thereby open onto a history of dispossession (and removal) that is not a function Native degeneracy but rather the insincerity and duplicity of Anglo “civilization.”

Eulogizing Philip enables a framework through which to convey self-determination as a socio-ethical constant, a historical “norm” in itself, to a public not inclined to make sense of such a concept. The corollary of this move is that Native peoplehood emerges as a living rather than an eclipsed or bygone formation, but also one that remains irreducible to settler governance and jurisdiction. From this angle, reservations and guardians read as proof of the continuation of the foundational settler violence that Apess represents by way of the discourse on a primordial Indian ethics, rather than as necessary and/or charitable institutions designed to preserve a degraded race. By eulogizing King Philip, Apess refashions noble Indian character to underscore the sense that violence toward place-based peoplehood in New England is an ongoing, constitutive element of settler sociality, and he does so formally by dispensing with a straightforward chronological arrangement. The Eulogy moves back and forth across multiple historical frames, yielding a fragmented (or rhizomatic) composition that registers the deep continuity and cohesion of settler depredations through the consistency of “Indian” character in its engagement with Anglos. Native self-determination, and not the twinned ascendancy of settler domesticity and governance, provides the organizing paradigm for Apess's historiography. The text's complex narrative design corresponds with a drive to portray settler violence as, in Lisa Brooks's words, a single “fire
[spreading] across the landscape, waging destruction,” with Apess all the while taking care to emphasize that neither the “fire nor its creators are indigenous or natural to [this] landscape” (214). As Brooks further observes, Apess also discusses Puritan violence largely using passive voice, which enables him “to portray colonization as a force that seems to have a life of its own,” while reserving agency for those in the present who can yet learn to see such violence for what it is and work “to prove Philip's prophecy wrong” (214). Apess's eulogy for Philip mobilizes the discourse organized around the tragic Native icon to disrupt the linear historicity oriented to settlement that his character typically sustains, implicitly revealing this narrativity itself as a maneuver against sovereign Native peoples rather than a truth grounded in the seemingly empirical fact of Indian degeneration.

Eric Wolfe observes that the “ultimate direction” of Apess's *Eulogy for King Philip* “is toward the future. Apess reopens a dialogue with loss, the past, and history in order to imagine a different relationship to and within the present. For Apess...that future clearly lies in the direction of a revivified Indian sovereignty” (19). Yet, what does it say about the possibility of imagining such a future that it takes the form of a eulogy for a figure already embraced by white audiences, if only as a caricature of supposedly authentic Indian virtue and pathos? What does it suggest about the possibility of such a Native futurity that the very form it takes is a reframing of what happened long ago? Albeit in different ways, Catherine Maria Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie* and Lydia Maria
Child's *Hobomok* both facilitate the ur narrative that Jean O'Brien identifies as a constitutive element of New England historiography, namely that settler history takes off from, and gains coherence against, deliberate and repeated representations of Native peoplehood as a thing of the past. Insofar as this narrativity draws on notions of Indian decline that long served to negate and displace Native claims to land, it further entrenches Indianness as a co-incidence, in Sara Ahmed's terms, of temporal, sexual-moral, and geopolitical disjunction that functions to orient land and sovereignty away from Natives and toward settlers and settlement. The supposedly natural ethics of primordial Indianness provide an imaginary link that enables settler historicity to emerge as an organic, ethical relationship to Native territory, the path those ethics have taken in time.

Reading the noble Indian character of 1820s reformist literature as an extension of the narrativity underlying policies such as guardianship involves rethinking the view that the historicism of such works mainly serves to allegorize a single antebellum “Indian question.” Writers such as Catherine Sedgwick and Lydia Maria Child obviously made use of historiography and archival materials in putting their works together. However, as Ahmed writes, the archives themselves “take 'form' insofar as they are intended for action” and if they allow “documents to dwell, then they, too, are orientation devices, which in gathering things around are not neutral but directive” (118). From this perspective, the issue is not necessarily to determine how, in what ways, such literature reflects a more fundamental demonization of Indians at the level of national politics or a project of imperialism construed as an overarching binary formation, in which US Anglos move against American Indians, with each of these latter groups suggesting effectively
real subject positions. These latter methodological orientations rely on narrative structures generated at the level of historical knowledge in the context of ongoing and essentially uneven acts of settler colonialism.

Rather than read the virtues associated with Indian character as problematizing the “Indian question” understood in relation to southeastern Native removal, one can read such character as extending the colonizing knowledge that, in turn, consolidates settler claims in New England on the basis of History. That writers such as Child and Sedgwick promote identification with Indianness in terms of a linear historicity oriented to Anglo settlement can be read as part and parcel of the very same historicity that, as Den Ouden shows, served to deflect the petitions and claims of New England Natives in the first place. Put another way, both Hobomok and Hope Leslie, albeit differently, extend an archival narrativity organized around Indian degeneration insofar as they presuppose a primordial Indian virtue existing in nature but that primarily serves to re-orient settler sociality and/or governance before it vanishes. From the angle of Native self-determination, the consistent function of such narratives is to produce the sense of an absolute, extra-juridical break between the colonial past and the post-colonial present that precludes understanding New England Native peoples as legally protected polities with rights to land. By eulogizing King Philip, however, William Apess destabilizes a historicity that justifies the continued oppression of reservation communities in New England.
Notes

1 The following material comes from Evarts' 1829 pamphlet “A Brief View of the Present Relations between the Government and People of the United States and the Indians within Our National Limits,” which summarized the major points of his William Penn essays for The National Intelligencer and doubled as petition that supporters could mail in to Congress. After laying out the Constitutional basis for Native sovereignty, given the exclusive treaty-making powers of the federal government combined with the fact of treaties existing between Natives and the U.S., Evarts argues with respect to the recent 1826 Creek cession, “If the territory was acquired from the Creek nation, it was manifestly the property of the Creek nation before it was thus acquired,” that if it was acquired by the U.S. via treaty then “it was because the Creeks, being a nation, could not dispose of it” any other way, and that “If it was acquired for the use of Georgia, it follows that Georgia had not the use of it previously” (qtd. in Green and Perdue 108). Clearly, it was not difficult to see through the rhetoric that (poorly) justified Georgia's arguments in court and its extension of police power over Cherokee territory in its borders.

2 Evarts was likely aware of this history in some form. Yet, this is not his only oversight concerning historical recognition of Native sovereignty by the U.S. On one hand, he ignores reservation communities that still existed, the coerciveness of treaties like the Treaty of Hartford (1638) that tried to write the Pequots out of existence, and 'lapses' in the consistent recognition of Natives' rights to their own forms of government, like the near eighty-year period in which Connecticut's position with regard to Mohegan sovereignty was left disputed and indeterminate. On the other, he ignores the fact that the U.S. deliberately blocked the so-called Five Civilized Tribes who had sided with the British during the Revolutionary War from its peace negotiations, thereby effectively writing out their land claims in the meeting that determined territorial sovereignty and geopolitical borders that would mark the conflict's formal end. The intent of treaties with the Five Tribes from the post-revolutionary and early-national periods he frames as evidencing respect and precedent for Native sovereignty can be seen from this view as already undermined by a subversive drive to steal Native land. See Hoxie, This Indian Country, 13-43.

3 Recall that the Indian Removal Act of 1830 was no landslide victory for the southern Democratic bloc; it barely got out of Congress, passing the House of Representatives 101-97 and the Senate 28-19 (Heidler and Heidler 25).

4 The mythos of the vanishing Indian in New England is well established, in Native studies and literary studies alike. See Dippie, O'Brien, Mandell's Tribe, Conn, Den Ouden, and Sollors. For more on how the concept of vanishing Indianness came to shape the response to removal policy, as well as a discussion of antebellum explanations of this concept in ways that broke with notions of racial determination (such as by citing the consequences of warfare for instance and/or the use of alcohol as a means of trade), see Dippie 32-78.

5 Mandell points out that alongside racist portrayals of Natives as drunken vagrants, Democrat-leaning papers astonishingly also ran articles celebrating King Philip as a foremost historical example of the noble, vanishing Indian. One in particular observed that there “is a kind of grandeur in the character of the Indian warrior which fills the mind of the beholder with admiration. We here see the man in his Native, untamed, undegenerate supremacy...Such was Philip, the hero of Mt. Hope” (qtd.in Mandell Tribe 183).

6 See Den Ouden Beyond Conquest, esp. “Dilemmas of Conquest” and “Manufacturing Colonial Legitimacy.” One of Den Ouden's crucial points is that not only were notions of conquest and extinction discursive tools by which to subordinate Native groups from the very beginning of settlement, Mohegan and Pequot peoples in particular redeployed the same narratives toward their own
survivance as a means of translating and asserting their continued peoplehood and claims to land. With regard to the Pequots' constant petitioning of the colonial government across the eighteenth century, she writes that “what was troublesome for government officials was that Pequots—impoverished and desperate as their circumstances were...had produced and sustained kin and community ties on their own terms, and in the face of a history that had demanded their annihilation. In so doing, did they not also perpetuate their collective rights to their reservation land?” (Den Ouden 34).

For an extended discussion of this theoretical point, that of the gathering of forward momentum under the sign of Indianness construed as a bygone presence, see Rifkin Settler Common Sense, 25-31.

In addition to Scheckel, see also Renée Bergland and Werner Sollors. Bergland for instance writes that although spectral images of Natives “threaten the American national project, they also nationalize imagination. Guilt over the dispossession of Indians and fear of their departed spirits sometimes function as perverse sources of pleasure and pride...because they signify a successful appropriation of the American spirit” (19).

Note, for example, that in the aforementioned William Penn petition, Evarts strengthens his argument by adding that colonial power had always held “rights of soil and sovereignty [to be] inherent in the Indians, till voluntarily surrendered by them” (Evarts 106, my emphasis). An individuated Native subjectivity, not the tribe, legitimizes “Indian” rights to land and sovereignty. If situated in terms of the administration of the guardian systems and the widespread notion that Natives had been conquered early in colonial history, however, such rhetoric implies that contemporary peoples who lived on reservations in New England were not truly Indians, since if they had surrendered their land rights at conquest there would be no reservations.

Den Ouden illustrates this point through a remarkable reading of the history of reservation politics and Native petitions in Connecticut from the seventeenth century through to the present. A particularly blatant example of how the narrativity of conquest/extinction services settler sovereignty occurs in the context of Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705). Mohegan sachem Owaneco, the son of Uncas (yes, the Uncas, the one who allied with British colonists and led the Mohegans against the Pequots in the conflict of 1636-8) had petitioned Queen Anne in 1704 to force Connecticut to recognize Mohegan land claims and return land that had been illegally appropriated. The Queen ordered a commission to be formed to investigate and rule on the matter. During the proceedings, “Mohegan leaders reminded the Connecticut government that the historical relationship between Mohegans and colonists had been one of alliance, since Mohogan men had performed military service on behalf of the colony from the time of the Pequot massacre” (Den Ouden 92). Connecticut officials responded by rewriting the narrative to argue that Mohegan lands were already ‘conquest lands,’ arguing that, contrary to already established history, Uncas was in fact not a legitimate sachem, nor even a crucial ally. In fact, Uncas was subordinate to the Pequot sachem Sassacus all along, and only his “disgust” with the latter caused him to “put himself in with som that followed him in service of ye English against the Pequods”’; this meant that since the Pequots were conquered, “all their Adherents and Subjects, whereof all the Moheags were a part, were [also] conquered,”’ and that Uncas was only retained or tolerated beyond this point as a manager, having been “made a sort of Sachem” by Connecticut (qtd in Den Ouden 96, sic). Of course, the point here is that the malleability of New England narratives of history underscores the fundamental lack of any legitimate claim to Native space by colonial governments, even by their own standards. For more on Pequot and Mohegan efforts to resist further expropriations of their lands by foregrounding their continuity on the land, reminding settler governments of the terms of their own laws and treaties, and reversing the discourse of conquering and extinction by asserting their friendship with colonists more generally, see Den Ouden, 65-180. For more on the Mohegan's petitioning of Queen Anne in particular, the imperial commission's decision to uphold Mohegan land rights, and Connecticut's flat refusal to acknowledge the decision, see Den Ouden 91-119, Lisa Brooks 64-83, and Yirush 133-41.
It is crucial to recognize that the Pequot War far from established settler hegemony, however. The Narragansetts quickly morphed from ally to enemy as they began to accuse the Mohegans of harboring Pequots in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Hartford, on one hand, and sought to tighten diplomatic relations with the powerful Mohawk of the Iroquois confederacy (rather than become permanently aligned with the English), on the other. Further, the constant pressure by Anglo settlers for more and more land for townships made whatever stability occurred between the Pequot War and King Philip's War (1676-8) tenuous at best. In fact, as Salisbury notes, if anything, the Mohawk, not English governments (even as the United Colonies), constituted the major stabilizing force in the region in the middle years of the seventeenth century. See Salisbury “Indians and Colonists,” 85-92 and Mandell King Philip's War 13-30.

In some cases the guardians appointed by colonial governments were the very ones who kicked Natives off of their lands (See Den Ouden 69). Given such malfeasance, it is important to recognize that, as Den Ouden also observes, Natives persistently asserted their rights to land and called on governments to uphold their end of the bargain. The first law to codify Natives' rights to reservation lands, passed by the Connecticut General Assembly in 1680, was in response to complaints from Pequot leaders (along with representatives of Mohegan, Paugussett, and Niantic peoples) that the government had failed in its various agreements to protect lands previously reserved for these communities. The resulting law made it clear that the lands in question had been allocated “to them and their heirs forever” (qtd. in Den Ouden 24).

Similarly, Ed White has shown that givenness to conspiracy also comprises one of the essential narrative traits of Indian deviation. The fear of a Pequot-led conspiracy helped to create the conditions for the Pequot War of 1636-8 was not fully reducible to a simple notion of Natives “being savages” he suggests but rather in the emerging view that the Pequots had “functionalized their purported savagery for strategic purposes” (E. White 441). This casting of an essential capacity for conspiracy develops “portability...insofar as it transfers mastery from Pequots to their imagiNative and imagined heirs, the Narragansetts” after the war and further still to other Native groups going forward (E. White 442). Given this discursive portability, wherein a shifting ethnography developed with regard to the Pequots yields the constant “stage upon which conspiratorial...actors perform,” the consistent motif in policy and historiography alike of pan-Indian conspiracy as a basis for monitoring New England Native groups can be thought of as firmly anchored in “this earlier moment when the Pequots, and then Narragansetts, are understood as transcendent Indians,” or when the “Indian” first emerges in a New England context as signifying a tendency toward conspiracy and sabotage (E. White 464).

Den Ouden further notes that in this case although the committee ran into a problem in the large number of Mohegans and Narragansett men on the reservation, indicating that “kin ties expanded access and, potentially, rights to reservation land for a larger Native population,” such networks would in the decades to follow register as proof of Indian deviance and degeneration, especially as tribal rolls made it easier to determine heads of household and therefore which members of the community had legitimate title to land on the basis of pure or “royal” blood (178). For more on the emergence of notions of “royal” blood and the increasing use of rolls and histories as racializing tools anchored in normative settler genealogical formations, see Den Ouden, 176-201.

This argument is indebted to Sara Ahmed's insight that archival materials might be understood as only taking “form' insofar as they are intended for action” and further that if they allow “documents to dwell, then they, too, are orientation devices, which in gathering things around are not neutral but directive” (118). The “objectivity” of such archival materials is oriented to settlement as a condition of possibility, such that in appearing as source materials they lose their status as maneuvers.

“De-Indianizing” regional Natives by framing them in terms of patrilineal genealogy can be seen as Ruth Herndon and Ella Sekatu observe in the emergence and proliferation of the term “mustee” to refer to Native children (Narragansett in particular) bound out to white households. As they write, “where clerks record the parentage of these 'Mustee' children, it is always the mother who is identified as Indian” while that of the father is not recorded, suggesting that “officials considered the child to have a non-Indian father” (126). As they further point out, the proliferation of such categorizations and their ambiguity (some individuals being recorded differently as Indian, Negro, or Mulatto over a period of years) had serious consequences for Native peoples' capacity to transfer land and rights to subsequent generations. Since Native groups were largely matrilineal, framing Native land rights in terms of patrilineal inheritance enabled settler governments to deny individuals claims to lands held in common; by “denying 'Mustee' children an 'Indian' father, officials prepared the ground to deny these children any rights” they might have later claimed as “descendants of Narragansett or other Native fathers (ibid.).

See Luciano, 5-12.

The more common approach is to read Hobomok's vanishing as proof of Child's ambivalence regarding Natives. This ambivalence would not have been limited to Child, but rather a staple of antebellum thinking on Native rights given the nascent debate over civilization policy. Daniel Mandell writes that despite Child's condemnation of Puritan fathers, the novel's “ending reflect[s] a common prescription of how to civilize Indians, and the more general Whig willingness to consider racial intermarriage as the best means for their survival” (Tribe 179). Karcher also points out that Child's first novel synthesizes the roots of many of the political positions that she would develop more fully throughout her life; “Hobomok uncannily predicts Child's career as a reformer and anticipates many of the causes she would espouse: justice for Indians; protest against antimiscegenation laws and other forms of racial discrimination; women's rights; religious toleration” and by casting racial intermarriage in a positive light shows “a paradigm for race-relations that differ[s] radically from James Fenimore Cooper's” (Ibid.). From this perspective however, supporting Native rights appears fully compatible with a social philosophy predicated on equality under the law and, as such, not exactly incompatible with settler governance. Laura Mielke implies that the Native husband's vanishing amounts to an ethically questionable conclusion. Despite emphasizing the capacity for Indian-white relations predicated on reciprocal feelings, the novel nonetheless fragments such a union and leaves Hobomok as a belated, largely “symbolic presence” correlating with the “willed physical absence” of Natives from contemporary society (Moving 18-19). Finally, Joshua David Bellin points out that, despite her reformist views, Child's belief in the radical inclusivity of Christianity, as articulated in her later research on world religions that culminated in her call for an 'Eclectic Church,' leaves no place for Native religious views, an absence that more or less indicates that Child failed to see such beliefs as indicative of a modern and autonomous culture. He writes that, for Child, although “Christianity rebukes its own insularity and intolerance [in] owing its existence and vitality to spiritual diversity,” which is in turn measured in its capacity to accrete “forms of holy aspiration from all ages and nations,” at the very same time her work shows a persistent “failure to see Indians in the tapestry of spiritual diversity” (Bellin 88). To corroborate his point, Bellin pointedly observes that she evades Indian religions even in her last work, Aspirations of the World (1878), despite that such literature was “widely available (if not reliable) by this time” (ibid.).

In a broader sense, the opening shows that the novel conforms with the notion that efforts to historicize Anglo civilization in the early-nineteenth century both reinforced and reflected a more general anxiety over what appeared as the cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of empires. Such an understanding implied that the U.S. was not exempt from the cunning of history, and historians compensated for this pattern by gradually shifting the “cyclical” aspect of history onto “the people progress was displacing” by framing them as genealogically given to regression (Conn 32). Natives were thus increasingly narrated as a priori differentiated from “the chronologically marked time [that alone] measured the history of Euro-Americans” (ibid.). Both cause and effect, Natives' transformation into “a people with a
past, but without a history” disciplined "proper" history as a linear, Anglo-oriented narrative of constant progress, a doubly-silencing affair insofar as sealing Natives away in this way also implied they could not “function as their own historians” (Conn 21).

21 I borrow the term reprosexual from Dana Luciano. See Sexual 9-12.

22 See Salisbury, Manitou 42-4; 135-8.

23 Salisbury, Manitou 118-20.

24 Child appears to combine elements of two distinct episodes, however: Hobomok's kidnapping and escape from the Narragansett-Wampanoag faction led by Corbitant, after which he warned Plymouth in 1621; and his participation in a later attack on Massachusetts peoples by Plymouth colonists at the request of the failed colony at Weston (Wessagusset) in 1623. The latter is the only armed conflict in which Hobomok is known to have participated alongside English settlers. Further, Salisbury points out that Plymouth was not initially inclined to assist the settlers at Wessagusset. In addition to adding competition for limited corn supplies from the surrounding Native communities, the non-Separatist founder Thomas Weston was a London merchant with an eye toward expanding northward; despite the fact that he had also helped to finance Plymouth, the latter saw him as competition. Furthermore, the Weston settlers disrupted diplomatic relations by stealing corn from the Massachusetts, who in turn aligned other Native groups against trading with the newcomers (125). With corn supplies diminished and Natives no longer open to helping them, the former went to Plymouth and asked for a military intervention. Plymouth only agreed after learning from Massasoit of a potential uprising led by the female Massachusetts sachem Wituwamet (not the male Wampanoag Corbitant) was in the works, as she had been seeking a broader coalition against the English, likely due to the Westoners stealing corn. During the attack, Standish's small group killed seven Natives and thus terminated the overblown threat of conspiracy while intimidating the smaller Native communities in the surrounding area. Here, however, the scene basically serves to write Corbitant out of the novel through his capture. See Salisbury Manitou 125-35.

25 See Mandell King Philip's War 5-31, Salisbury, Manitou 110-140, and Vaughan 75-82. Salisbury points out that according to Phineas Pratt's 1662 history of the first generation of English settlers, Hobomok sought refuge from his own people among the Plymouth colonists (Salisbury Manitou 271 n.13).

26 See Karcher "Introduction" xv-xvii and Shreve for different representations of this general approach. While my argument builds from Shreve's point that the novel "struggles to produce a vision capable of accommodating the entire spectrum of religious diversity in the United States without sacrificing the particularity of historical faiths," I contend that a discourse of Indian character that amounts to an antebellum extension of longstanding narratives of Indian decline integral to the maintenance of New England reservation systems is the narrative condition of possibility both for imagining and articulating such a vision (659). Accordingly, I am decidedly at odds with the claim that evidence of Child "actively wrestling" with the "complex legacy of the systematic exclusion, massacre, and disinheritance of Indians by European settlers" is the novel's positioning of "Indian religion...as a distinct and felt presence in the religious landscape, consisting of a pliable polytheism, an intricate ritualism, and a primary sense of wonder and awe produced through the observation of nature" (Shreve 667-8).

27 See Karcher, "Introduction: The Indian Question."

28 See Gura 105-6 and Sollors 109, 119.
29 Harvard-appointed minister Phineas Fish hung around for 6 years beyond the Mashpee Act of 1834, which organized the reservation as a township with the people holding rights to self-governance, finally leaving (though involuntarily, by force) in 1840. The Mashpee would remain an 'Indian district' until 1870, when the state incorporated the district as a town and divided the land into parcels for sale. For more on Apess's efforts in the so-called “Mashpee revolt,” see his Indian Nullification. See also Brooks, 186-197, Campisi, 106-117, O'Connell, xxxv-xxxviii, and Konkle, 132-4.

30 Apess had long had connections with important abolitionists in Boston. He first moved to the city in 1831, shortly after David Walker published his Appeal ...to the Coloured Citizens of the World (1829) and found a natural audience for his provocative brand of Methodism. With roots going back to the postrevolutionary era, the Methodist and Baptist networks created by working class African American communities were well established and had an impact on the nascent Whig platform. Apess's preaching in these circles appears to have earned him a reputation very quickly. He was mentioned by Samuel Drake in his popular Indian Biography (1832) before being invited to speak in April of the same year with Edward Everett and the Cherokee activist Elias Boudinot in opposition to removal at the Federal Street Church, a venue made prominent by William Ellery Channing, who in addition to being an integral figure in the antislavery community was a highly influential Unitarian minister at the time. Apess's appearance here apparently went over well, leading William Lloyd Garrison to mention him shortly afterwards in the Liberator. See Gura, 57-67.

31 See Sollors for a reading of the influence of Christian typology on tropes of Indianness in the antebellum U.S.

32 However, while recounting these forgotten episodes attests to a history in the margins, the point is of course less that white Whigs did not know the full story and more that these scenes of social interaction gesture to the possibility of cohabitation and ethical relationality beyond the dominant paradigm of Anglo modernity and Native degeneracy/extinction. We see this in the selectiveness of Apess's Eulogy; he leaves out quite a bit of historical material that would give a fuller, more accurate account of the complexity of colonial dispossession, including the complex economic and political alliances and networks that comprised the 'real' of seventeenth century geopolitics and constituted the matrix out of which King Philip's War was born. For more on this history see Mandell, King Philip's War 5-59 and Salisbury, "Indians."
CHAPTER IV
REALIZING NATIVE DISPOSSESSION IN THE OLD NORTHWEST:
FRONTIER HISTORICITY, TERRITORY, AND INDIAN WITHDRAWAL
IN KIRKLAND AND BLACK HAWK

In February of 1803, just months before the hastily-conducted Louisiana Purchase gave the U.S. rights to nearly 828,000 square miles of land across the Mississippi river, Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to then-governor of Indiana territory William Henry Harrison concerning Native lands in the vast region known as the Old Northwest. Given that the correspondence was "unofficial and private," Jefferson sought to acquaint Harrison with "a more extensive view of our [Indian] policy...[so] that you may the better comprehend the parts dealt out to you in detail through the official channel" (1118-9). The unofficial agenda involved using government-sponsored trading houses, per the Trade and Intercourse Acts, to "promote [a] disposition to exchange lands" by running the "good and influential among them" into debt, as when debt rises "beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands" (1118). Where an earlier civilization policy sought to leverage trade and shift Native norms en masse, thereby undermining the attachment to lands over time, Jefferson's vision transforms that deception into outright economic coercion. "In this way," he affirms, "our settlements will gradually circumscribe...the Indians" and force them either to assimilate as U.S. citizens "or [to] remove beyond the Mississippi," adding that "in the whole course of this, it is essential to cultivate their love" (ibid.). The president ends by insisting that
what has been shared in this communication would "be improper to be understood by the Indians," ostensibly since it might have jeopardized the coercive expropriation of lands (1120).¹

Since distributing items of husbandry here provides the means to acquire Native territory through predatory lending, the text could be interpreted as merely revealing the hidden logic of an Indian policy grounded in ideas of civilization and humanity. Yet, ending the criticism at this point would miss how discourses of Indianness prove thoroughly integral not only to Jefferson's policy framing, but also to the geopolitical space that it references. For instance, the same text later comments on a "favorable opening" for implementing this policy. "The Cahokias [being] extinct," Jefferson observes, "we are entitled to their country by our paramount sovereignty. The Piorias…have all been driven off…and we might claim [their lands] the same way…The Kaskaskias being reduced to a few families" might also entertain ceding everything but "as much rich land as they could cultivate…in a single fence" (1119). Imminent extinction, however, the Indian motif in New England, here registers as only one variation of a more generalized westerly disappearance. Indianness also evokes both a state of "being reduced," with a chance of rejuvenation on enclosed family farms, and a capacity for being "driven off," which presents Native polities as herd-like formations incapable of any meaningful collectivity. More importantly, however, Jefferson situates these examples differently than one might expect. Insofar as Natives in the region are already withdrawing, receding Indianness emerges as a constitutive feature of the geopolitical landscape within which his policy of cultivated indigence would take effect.
The territorial gestalt that otherwise appears anterior to specific policy maneuvers, then, itself relies on ambiguous concepts, like "paramount sovereignty," that presuppose a narrative image of Indians heading west, both geographically and existentially.

Jefferson's letter to Harrison accordingly manifests what I term frontier historicity. As an ur-narrative, this historicity casts overlapping conflicts among a multitude of settler and Indigenous actors in the region as the inevitable movement of civilization writ large. Literary scholarship on the frontier mythos has well established the relevance of such binary thinking to the intelligibility of U.S. expansion. Nonetheless, this scholarship tends to frame the discussion in terms either of cultural regeneration or the third space. Either the frontier motif primarily consolidates a distinctly American cultural imaginary, or it misrecognizes the role of the middle ground in settler-Native conflict(s). The latter paradigm supposedly offers a corrective to an older Turnerian framework. However, the middle ground is methodologically problematic to the degree that it poses "settler-Indigenous conflict as an inevitable product of cultural differences and misunderstandings," as Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz puts it, a view that can be taken to imply that "violence was committed equally by the colonized and colonizer" (8).² By contrast, this chapter approaches the representation of the geopolitical space in which such cultural contact or violence would have occurred as a colonizing maneuver through knowledge production. Frontier historicity might be said to involve two aspects: first, the representation of real and often violent dispossession of Native peoples in the region as an extra-political movement of "Indians" beyond settler cartographic space; and second, the conflation of this Indian movement beyond such space with movement out of time.
Taken together, this historicity renders land available to settlement insofar as it depicts Native peoples as fated to "recede" west. However, rather than read this historicity primarily as an ideological mystification of dispossession after the fact, a view that presupposes the settler arrangement of (and claims to) geopolitical space, I argue that the supposedly real and inevitable movement west by "Indians," a movement that traverses the spectrum of regional Indigenous polities and thereby collapses their different claims and geopolitical situations into a single fatedness to withdraw, is indispensable to framing the Old Northwest as a distinct region within which Anglo settlement appears as coextensive with an abstracted process of territorial organization.

I therefore build on Dunbar-Ortiz's criticism by arguing that, rather than a primarily retrospective phenomenon that rationalizes real geopolitical expansion at a cultural level, positing Indian withdrawal conditions the destabilization of Native space in advance. As Jodi Byrd argues regarding Deleuze and Guattari's theory of de-territorialization, which she observes poses the "Indian" as a symbol of non-hierarchical becoming magically outside of the West's otherwise totalizing claims to truth, what "we imagine to be outside of and rupturing to the state…already depends upon a paradigmatic Indianness that arises from colonialist discourses justifying expropriation of land through removals and genocide" (14). The colonizing maneuver that Byrd identifies, namely imagining Indianness as both geographically and metaphysically "beyond" known space, I would argue is integral to producing the geopolitical coherence of the Old Northwest in the U.S. context in the first place. As Jefferson's letter shows, the reference to regional Native groups creates the impression of a geographic space already oriented to settler
governance despite lying beyond its juridical purview. In this way, the narrativity of Indian withdrawal defers the recognition of place-based Indigenous sovereignty, paradoxically, in the very form of recognizing regional Native groups. In other words, narrating withdrawing or receding Indianness registers a waning temporal threshold of geopolitical intelligibility in the region, a discursive point that implicitly casts Indigenous peoples as homo sacer and, in so doing, renders the visibility of their apparently ontological and as such inevitable hardship as an index of the region's inevitable orientation toward Anglo settlement in time.

As will be discussed below, the earliest U.S. discourse on the region, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, posits Indian withdrawal as an inevitable historical outcome. Given the primacy of this document, one can suggest that the frontier space in which the U.S. already enjoys "paramount sovereignty" does not exist in any objective sense apart from the portraits of Indian withdrawal that emplot a configuration of this space. As Dunbar-Ortiz observes, even the academic progenitor of the frontier thesis, Frederick Jackson Turner, gestured to this narrativity. Turner long ago pointed out that the U.S. has engaged in violence toward Native groups "'from the beginning of the Republic,'" but that this work of the "'colonial system'" has been "'hidden under the phraseology of 'interstate migration' and 'territorial organization'" (Dunbar-Ortiz 8). Following this assertion, I argue that Jefferson's text is notable in that it shows the continuity of a foundational narrativity yoked to the articulation of geopolitical space as territory. The narrativity of Indian withdrawal produces the geopolitical conditions for such violence precisely in offering what appears merely as a description of the landscape
(Indians withdrawing either "over here" and/or "over there"). In this way, frontier historicity maps the space of the Old Northwest by (re)producing, through the retroactive symbolism of such withdrawal, a sense of the territory (and here I mean a sense of the very land itself) as de facto oriented to the United States.

From this view, popular frontier literature of the early-antebellum era reads as actively extending the colonization of the greater Ohio valley and beyond. This is the case even with a text like Caroline Kirkland's 1839 booster novel *A New Home, Who'll Follow*. Kirkland sets this work apart from more overtly romanticized frontier novels both by pushing in the direction of literary realism and by sharply criticizing a culture of speculation, fueled through predatory banking, for creating massive economic crashes like that of 1837. However, the text's imagining of agrarian communalism as a more sustainable mode of production in frontier Michigan requires narrating Indianness as a deteriorating and largely subaltern element. This figuration generates a historicity that deflects extant Indigenous claims to the region as failed and fading modes of belonging, thereby clearing the space for settler grass-roots collectivism, as embodied in the rise of the fictional town of Montacute, to register as authentic indigeneity. Charting the growth of Montacute displaces fraudulent, illegal, and usually violent incursions into Native space as constitutive of territorial "organization" by casting the Indian as an irrevocably alienated figure, one whose incapacity for village life evokes a sense of historical inertia, of lingering beyond the expiration date. By contrast, *The Life of Black Hawk* should be read against this repetition of a historicity that forecloses place-based Native sovereignty. In offering a scathing account of settlement's role(s) in creating and perpetuating the
conflict, the written translation of the Sauk war chief's life story foregrounds the uneven forces of dispossession and genocide, forces otherwise deflected through twin notions of territorial development and state formation. It does so, however, by appropriating and speaking through the rhetorical frame made available by the trope of Indian withdrawal.

Developing this thesis involves thinking the narrativity of Indian withdrawal in non-Native texts apart from whatever prejudice their authors may have had toward Natives, whether personal biases or those that might be said to characterize antebellum culture at large. This chapter positions violence toward place-based Native peoplehood west of the Mississippi and north of what would be federally designated as "Indian country" as structural rather than intentional, and in making this distinction I follow Slavoj Žižek's differentiation between subjective and objective violence. Where subjective violence can be understood as a willed harm performed by one social actor (individual or group) toward another, objective violence by contrast corresponds with the otherwise "smooth functioning of our economic and political systems"; objective violence pertains to the background that otherwise appears given in advance: it produces a "zero-level standard" view of reality that is necessary in order to "perceive something as subjectively violent" (Violence 2).³ From this view, the fact that tropes of Indian withdrawal misrepresent or misrecognize sovereign Native peoples matters less than the ways in which these portraits cast the Old Northwest as already a temporal extension of US jurisdiction in its representation as "territory," apart from the political enactment of any specific claims or treaty-processes. That said, the aim in making this distinction is
neither to excuse nor rationalize the role(s) played by specific actors, like Jefferson, in displacing Native peoples.

Rather, it is to argue that if, following Ned Blackhawk, violence toward place-based Native peoplehood comprises an indispensable element of U.S. expansion, especially through installing "new social and racial orders" necessary for the proliferation of state power, such violence is not limited to the force associated with episodes of violent engagement over the land (9). To the contrary, an objective violence toward the intelligibility of place-based Native sovereignty can be theorized as thoroughly immanent within the region's discursive (re)production as a known space. Insofar as it is organized around receding Indianness, frontier historicity casts land otherwise held by sovereign Native groups, not as claimed by settlement per se, but as axiomatically aligned with the U.S. through the objective notion of territory, a notion inseparable from ongoing processes of settler colonialism and within which Indianness becomes a marker of the inevitability of processes of state formation. The chapter will therefore begin by exploring how this historicity enters geopolitical discourse on the region, and I argue in what follows that it enters as a structural deflection of Native sovereignty.

The U.S. inherits more than its claims to the territory from Britain. It also inherits a recognition of place-based Native sovereignty in the Proclamation of 1763, albeit a tentative one, and the forecasting of Indian withdrawal in the 1787 Ordinance can be read as responding to this earlier recognition. In short, U.S. plans to annex the broader region require addressing Native presence within a geopolitical frame, but at the same time any such address threatens to undermine U.S. claims to sovereignty. Reading the deflection
involved in the transition between these documents, however, requires foregrounding the actual course of U.S. expansion, which will be detailed in the next section. First, I will provide background information on both the economic and political realities of expansion and the history of conflict between settler and Native groups before moving to discuss the Ordinance as inaugurating a colonizing discourse at the level of knowledge-production. From there, I will examine how Kirkland's text incorporates the same narrativity and thereby normalizes U.S. juridical claims in relation to extant Indigenous sovereignty through embedded tropes of Indian withdrawal. Finally, I will explore how Black Hawk's text can be understood as intervening in the juridical and geopolitical orientation of Native space to the U.S. enacted in frontier historicity. Insofar as it draws on exoticized aspects of the war chief's celebrity, this intervention involves turning the supposed inevitability of Indian withdrawal back on itself. In mobilizing the frame of receding Indianness, Black Hawk fashions the symbolic currency afforded by his fame (and conditioned by the frontier motif) into a means to re-historicize the conflict itself, reframing Sauk dispossession as a cascade of betrayals and depredations by a host of divergent settler actors with no legitimate claims to Native land in the Old Northwest.

**Indian Withdrawal and the Future-Anterior Territory**

Contrary to popular history, the myth of the Anglo frontier farmer as the sociological backbone of the Old Northwest's transformation from underdeveloped backcountry to a rising network of bustling regional hubs on this side of the frontier was, and remains, decidedly mythic. From about 1760 to the Civil War, the region stretching
from the upper Great Lakes through Ohio and westward from the Appalachians to the Mississippi underwent seismic shifts in both population growth and geopolitical stability. According to James Belich, one period from 1811-1819 saw an influx of 403,000 emigrants, mostly in the Ohio valley and after 1815, that "tripled the population to 800,000," while a comparably dramatic surge began decade later with the completion of the Eerie Canal (91). In themselves, these surges were not synonymous with political-economic development, however. As Belich shows, the more sustainable growth in local economies frequently began after the bubble popped on a boom phase. When panic over either economic instability or rumors of Indian violence scattered settlers in nascent urban centers, venture capitalists picked up the crumbs, acquiring farmlands, factories, and distribution enterprises for cheap and turning them toward exportation back east by utilizing equally cheap transportation. Accordingly, the "Anglo explosion was bust-driven as well as boom-driven," meaning that the political-economic infrastructure associated with U.S. expansion "was built like a coral reef on layer after layer of fiscal corpses" rather than through a process of trickle-down civilization (Belich 206). Far from the stubborn fantasy of hardy Anglo stocks fighting off Britain and then populating an otherwise empty landscape, the real trajectory of rising US influence in the region consisted of these sporadic and recursive cycles of capital, goods, and encroaching settlers booming and busting, together with a sustained resistance to such incursions by different Native coalitions.

Illegal emigration into and settlement of Native space, and the often violent disruption of existing diplomatic and trade networks that it entailed, comprises the base-
level factor in this trajectory, as evidenced by the fact such disruptions precede the formation of the United States. The same settler incursions that earlier gave Britain fits only intensified in the post-revolutionary period, as settler groups poured into Shawnee, Miami, and Delaware lands by way of the Ohio river in the early 1780s. These emigrations set up years of violent conflict, as the colonies were even less committed as states to curbing populations on the perimeter. Some states even incentivized illegal encroachment into the lower Ohio Valley at this time, ostensibly as a means of settling lands supposedly included under their colonial charters. When Native groups responded to these encroachments and depredations with force of any kind, settlers would, in Sarah Miller's words, resort "to their own brutality, condoning their attacks and killings as protection for their settlements regardless of whether Indians were friendly or not. Punishment for killing an Indian seldom occurred" (39). Miller adds that news of such attacks traveled throughout the eastern US and across Native territories, complicating treaty proceedings, such as at Fort McIntosh in 1785. Further, such violent incursions often found support in American militia groups operating in the area.  

This phenomenon, namely the non-sanctioned support of illegal settler encroachment by militia groups, climaxed in the early 1790s. The defeat in 1791 of General Arthur St. Clair's militia, comprised both of US soldiers and private citizens (largely the encroaching settlers themselves), by Blue Jacket's confederacy of Shawnee, Miami, Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawas, among others, demonstrated the continued potency of a well-organized Native military resistance. Although this was the worst ever defeat of US forces by a Native confederacy, the US countered with General Anthony Wayne's
defeat of a smaller, splintered version of the same group at the Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794). This latter defeat led to the Treaty of Greenville in 1795, which saw Native representatives cede most of Ohio, a southeastern chunk amounting to two-thirds of the territory, and parts of Indiana, including present-day Chicago. As Colin Calloway puts it, this cession paved the way for a "population tsunami" that transformed the region in a very short time (Shawnees 109). It also opened the door for further illegal encroachments and depredations, such as the 1804 treaty between the US, represented by William Henry Harrison, and four Sauk warriors (unauthorized to cede territory) at St. Louis that exchanged all of the Sauk homelands east of the Mississippi for a one-thousand dollar annuity; Black Hawk would later refer to this treaty as "the origin of all our difficulties" (19). The 1795 treaty also catalyzed the Shawnee leader Tenskwatawa's creation of a pan-Indian confederacy (his brother, Tecumseh, had in fact refused to sign it, and he probably viewed the dispossession of southeastern Ohio as unresolved), which in turn set the stage for Black Hawk's resistance two decades later. The Sauk warrior clearly presents his resistance as stemming from the confirmation of the original cession of the Sauk village of Saukenuk in 1813 and his justified refusal to remove west of the Mississippi per its fraudulent terms.

Given this trajectory, in which peripheral settler economies were wrecked, salvaged, and wrecked again, and treaty boundaries drawn, illegally traversed, and redrawn per newer land cessions, the frontier mythos becomes a vexed concept. Do the narrative elements of the frontier motif primarily mystify each critical sequence in this history after the fact? Or, rather, does the symbolic currency of a frontier historicity,
organized around anticipations of Indian withdrawal, derive from its role in offering, in advance, a descriptive image of the territory, one within which future settlement appears as a foregone conclusion? The latter possibility involves thinking US involvement in the region together with the production of a frontier concept that (re)organizes the cyclical, sporadic, and violent nature of state formation. To this point, settler emigration enters the early political discourse on the region precisely as a geopolitical problem, one that helped to articulate an early formulation of Native sovereignty. The area known as the Old Northwest is first designated as an Indian reserve by the British in the Proclamation of 1763, which the crown supported precisely because it did not want an expanding frontier.

In the aftermath of the French and Indian War, in which Britain usurped France as the dominant transatlantic power, the Ottawa war chief Pontiac formed a coalition of regional Native groups (including Ottawa, Ojibwe, Potawatomi, Shawnee, Miami, and Delaware peoples) to resist militaristic British governance, speculative economic practices that supplanted French networks in the fur trade, and the increasing problem of unsanctioned Anglo settlements. Usually called Pontiac's War, this widespread conflict led Britain to rush the Proclamation and hopefully stabilize the region by prohibiting settlement beyond the Appalachians. Despite that it was ultimately ineffective in curbing settler depredations, however, the discursive act of positing an Indian-Anglo boundary represented Native peoples in terms other than indolent nomadism, implicitly negating the assumption that Indians were antithetical to the kind of political collectivity implied by borderlines. Even if Britain never intended to honor the boundary it delineated, the delineation itself attested to Native peoples' territorial autonomy. In this way, the 1763
document remains an important touchstone, as it marks a clear historical precedent for the non-Native acknowledgment of Native rights to land preceding the formation of the United States.\textsuperscript{6}

As a failed resolution for settler emigration that nevertheless reflects a degree of Native territorial autonomy, the Proclamation can be understood as a genealogical precursor to the later frontier motif. Positing a fixed geographic boundary that organizes Native territory as a space denied to colonial settlement provides the geopolitical baseline against which future U.S. claims would be articulated. Given what we know of the history of expansion into the Ohio Valley, the production of a new notion of territory in the U.S. context could be said to gradually foreclose the implication of Native territorial autonomy in the Proclamation's boundary formation. As posited against the boundary marked by the Appalachians (both a natural and political border between British subjects and "Indians"), the frontier concept less divides geopolitical space(s) than it creates a permeable edge beyond which geopolitics of sovereignty lose their grounding in the present, thereby drawing territoriality into alignment with settler sovereignty in the US context. As it shifts in the wake of the Proclamation's geopolitical mapping, the frontier motif would have to entail a retroactive movement enabling it to evacuate the very same provisional Native sovereignty that it evokes on its face, but without signifying this retroactive movement. This split points toward the production of Indianness as signifying withdrawal. The question now becomes: where does this trope of a frontier organized around Indian withdrawal emerge in US geopolitical discourse?
The short answer is with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was drafted as the U.S. faced difficulties on several fronts. The very real threat that Native resistance in the Ohio valley and beyond would again yield a powerful pan-Indigenous coalition was only one problem. On one hand, architects of the federal government needed to reach a compromise between large states that had given up their western charters and their smaller counterparts, while also reducing the chances of future insurrections by unpaid and disaffected revolutionaries on the perimeter. On the other, Britain had established representative assemblies in the newly-created provinces of New Brunswick in 1784 and Ontario a few years later, governments that would have been "quite attractive to 'Late Loyalist' American settlers in the 1790s and 1800s" (Belich 167). On top of war debts accrued by the federal government and Britain's continued presence (in Canada but also in key positions, like Detroit, which they never left as mandated by the Treaty of Paris), the chance that U.S. citizens might colonize lands still under Britain's yoke conditioned the drafting of territorial protocols. As Belich suggests, British presence in Canada can be viewed as pressuring the United States to continue to extend the franchise in its plans for expansion, so as to shore up what had to be seen as a failing state. Instead of incorporating the territory by extending the borders of states with western charters, the ordinance initiated a process of cloning autonomous state governments on the periphery. By tethering autonomous governance to emigration rather than chaining the territories to eastern state governments, which was at least a theoretical possibility in keeping with the original charters, the design resolves these various difficulties through the seemingly perfunctory act of laying out protocols for integrating territory. Indianness enters as the
discursive means of transiting, in Jodi Byrd's terms, the radical contingency of violent incursions into Native territory in defiance of boundary lines into an image of the necessary and orderly, even autonomous organization of the region over time.

The Ordinance veers from the earlier evocation of Native autonomy, even as it appears similarly to acknowledge Native claims. After Virginia gave up its extensive western charter in 1783, federal actors began a series of negotiations with Native groups in the region. Taken together, treaties with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix in 1784, with Ojibwa, Wyandot, Delaware, and Ottawa peoples at Fort McIntosh a year later, and with the Shawnee at Fort Finney in 1786 ceded the western portions of Pennsylvania and New York along with most of eastern Ohio. The Ordinance, drafted by Jefferson the next year, then declared that the region in its entirety, beyond lands already ceded, would contain from three to five separate states; it also drew territorial borders for three of these and laid out a process for transforming the territories into states. Male suffrage would depend on prior US citizenship in the east, possessing a freehold of at least fifty acres in the territory, and having been a resident in the latter for two years. Men could vote for representation in the general assembly from their county/township when its population reached five thousand. Reaching a population of sixty thousand "free inhabitants" in the territorial district would finally trigger admission to statehood. Clearly these protocols are dependent upon, even tethered to, settler emigration. But there was one major problem: Native nations still controlled most of the territory. The Ordinance mediates this bind by referring to future-anterior land cessions. Regarding the creation and enforcement of laws in the territory, Section 8 states that a governor assigned by Congress to each territory
would create counties and townships "in parts of the district in which the Indian titles shall have been extinguished" ("Transcript").

Referring to land cessions in the future-anterior tense seems little more than Jefferson's obligatory nod to (at least the generic idea of) Native sovereignty. In fact, the point of this section appears to have been to ensure that settler expansion within the territory didn't outpace the reproduction of juridical power, as it also dictates that the laws of a given territorial district will apply evenly to the whole district. However, if the act presumes state formation as an inevitable historical outcome, it does so through forecasting the eventual cession of Native lands. Jefferson writes that "Indian titles" will have been ceded by the time the protocols go into effect, but this reference, and in particular its future-anterior tense, can be conceived as a deflection in the form of an acknowledgement. It allows the necessary reference to autonomous Native peoples to serve as its own deferral, negating Indigenous territoriality in the discursive act of its very acknowledgment. Instead of sovereign entities with uneven and overlapping territories wholly irreducible to US claims and juridical power, "Indians" emerge behind their titles as a paradoxical, fleeting group(ness), hinging on the very claims they presumably hold. "Indian titles" then register as paradoxical objects, only posited as substantial insofar as they will fade. In contrast to Britain's geopolitical line, then, the boundary image manifest in the Ordinance displays what we might identify as the frontier mythos. However, insofar as the notion of Indian withdrawal registers as an objective element of the "territory" in question, it also embeds settler emigration as a narrative feature of the land
itself, as indexing the possibility of its future organization and, as such, endowing the land with a temporality that orients it to the state in extra-political terms.

One might ask if the Ordinance forecloses permanent land-based Native sovereignty in order to clear the space in which to outline its protocols, why mention such cessions at all, since it isn't likely the text was drafted for a Native audience in the first place, much less addressed to one? The reason involves a delicate political arena in which matters of U.S. statecraft entailed complex geopolitical dynamics. Drafting any plans whatsoever for annexing the territory at the very least necessitated referencing Native peoples, and not only because the Proclamation establishes a precedent. Rather, any territorial plan that failed to address Native "title" would have registered as incomplete, especially for framers already divided by competing state interests. However, since Native claims were many and uneven, the possibility existed that some groups might not cede lands. Although it was likely inconceivable that Native territory could remain off limits to expansion for the fledgling government, omitting Native peoples entirely would have failed to persuade large and small-state partisans alike of US stability during a tumultuous period. It is important to recall that the Northwest Ordinance is passed by the Confederation Congress only a year after Shay's Rebellion, and at the same time as the process of drafting and ratifying the US Constitution, which would come to replace the Articles of Confederation just two years later. The inability to raise tax revenue doomed the latter, as the federal government had difficulty raising a militia to quell the rebellion. I suggest that the Ordinance's content reflects these very real concerns over the stability of the United States government moving forward. For instance, it enables surveyed lands
(following the creation of townships on lands ceded by Native groups) to be purchased by private interests, thereby providing a critical revenue stream for the federal government.

From this view, the future-anterior negation in the act/form of recognizing Native rights to land, positing "Indian titles" as destined to be ceded, does not simply naturalize settler emigration. Rather, narrating such land cessions casts both illegal encroachment and the processes of state formation it sustains as indices of the region's futurity, abstracting their violent and contingent aspects through the narrative and temporal extension of the territory itself. Insofar as the future-anterior tense deflects any possibility that Natives might reject the terms, so that the necessary cessions appear as foregone conclusions, settler emigration emerges in the document as already coextensive with the next phase of the life of the territory, as a necessary movement away from the ambiguous, quasi-political nothingness comprising its current "Indian" state.

Rhetorically, the Ordinance leaves no question that actual settler populations in the region will reach numbers sufficient to trigger the mechanisms for republican machinery laid out in the protocols; it is only a matter of time before the territory "organizes."

Inverting this equation foregrounds the manner in which frontier historicity organizes the acquisition of Native lands at the level of knowledge-production. Positing inevitable Indian withdrawal, through the reference to future-anterior land cessions, generates a narrative within which state formation in Native space appears as a normative and logical sequence of events, as a given historicity against which the violent resistance of various Native groups to settler incursions will appear as deviations from the path of progress. In this way, a vague fantasy of fated and homogenous Indian withdrawal retroactively
coheres a territorial gestalt within which illegal settler emigration appears as a historical necessity.

This view calls for a different reading of the more famous Section 14 Article 3, which promises "good faith...toward the Indians" and affirms that their "lands and property" will never be "taken from them without their consent" ("Transcript"). Rather than read this passage in terms of truth or falsity, I would note that insofar as the reference to Native land cessions in the future-anterior tense comes first, the displacement/deferral of Native sovereignty delivered by way of this tense primes the significance of "good faith" rather than vice versa. Read as a qualification of the earlier assertion of land cessions, good faith registers as a diplomatic addendum to plans already made. However, it also formally subsumes (the lack of) seemingly fixed boundary lines between the US and Native peoples to the order of US-oriented historicity. By legitimizing transactions that will have happened, serving as their extra-legal guarantee, "good faith" structurally presupposes that Native land tenure and sovereignty are already compatible with Anglo/US models of contractual exchange. Most importantly, however, the allusion to diplomatic goodwill retroactively endows the earlier reference to Indian land cessions with an assurance that these lands will have been ceded ethically. The corollary implication is that any resistance to the terms of exchange offered by the U.S. (will) appear as temporary, "savage" anomalies associated with receding Indian abjection, as residual symptoms of historical change rather than of legitimate problems with either the premises or promises of actual treaties.
In this way, the violence associated with U.S. expansion into the Old Northwest should be grasped as encompassing the geopolitical representation of the region itself. The Northwest Ordinance references lands that were both claimed by sovereign Native groups and already designated as Native territory by the British in the earlier Proclamation. However, it deflects the geopolitical limitation to U.S. expansion posed by Native sovereignty paradoxically through imagining a smooth and inevitable transfer of Indian "title" to the settler state. By establishing that the protocols for territorial organization will occur on lands that "will have been ceded" by Native groups, the Ordinance casts "Indian title" as something like a temporary geopolitical condition, a form of land holding destined to give way to U.S. settlement, which in turn conveys a sense of the region as dependent upon future processes of state formation for coherence.

This representation, I argue, enacts a form of objective violence: in the matter-of-fact, seemingly pragmatic vision of expansion, the Ordinance posits a futurity against which violent Native resistance to settler encroachments reads as deviating from normative course of territorial "development." However, the displacement at work does not only target Native resistance, but rather all aspects of the tumultuous situation embroiling the U.S. The future-anterior territory created in the Ordinance displaces the fact that settler emigration (for some, a mode of capitalist exploitation, and for others, an escape from the same) over the Appalachians was largely impossible to constrain in the first place, that the region had long been characterized by warfare and remained a site likely to create powerful pan-Indigenous alliances, and that the federal government established in the aftermath of the revolution was not simply destined to survive its own
intensifying factionalism. Read against this background, the trope of Indian withdrawal involved here exceeds the frame of an imperial will-to-colonize. The Ordinance transmutes the vast and potentially devastating geopolitical uncertainty that the U.S. faced on all fronts into the certainty of a smooth, orderly process of national development ahead, and the certainty that the "Indian" will cede its lands when the time comes provides the essential ideologeme for that fantasy.

Accordingly, if frontier historicity names the process whereby settler narratives of the Old Northwest displace real geopolitical instability into the certainty that savagery will withdraw in time, this process is generative rather than reflective. In the Ordinance, "Indian title" casts Native sovereignty as substantial only long enough to be terminated through some diplomatic process. Rather than a distortion of the actual sovereignty of the Shawnee, Sauk, Fox, or Winnebago, however, the concept of "Indian title" emerges as a means of endowing the immediacy of such instability with the predictability and certainty of a linear narrative. Moreover, this translation does not register as a deflection of potential crises, I would argue, insofar as "Indian title" registers as a little piece of the geopolitical real. Although certainly an ambiguous concept within settler discourses, such title indexes an ambiguity that is historically constant in itself, a staple of the archives and one crucial for maintaining a belief in the legitimacy of settler presence on Native space.

From this angle, the reference to "Indian title" stabilizes the sheer contingency associated with future land cessions, transposing that contingency into the necessity of future exchanges through the historicity evoked through this concept. Put another way, its reference should not be read as the trace of a pre-existing, racist stereotype of inevitable
Indian withdrawal manifesting and distorting otherwise legitimate Native sovereignty. Rather, the concept of a uniformly coherent "Indian title" already in existence "out there" comprises the fantasy object whose emergence casts (posits the presupposition of) inevitable Indian withdrawal as a foregone conclusion. Further, while this certainty consolidates the vision of orderly territorial incorporation and development, it also crucially defers this idealized moment of exchange. The Indianness of "Indian title" dislocates Native place-based sovereignty from the present, while it renders the sheer violence of expansion as a series of aberrations in route to that moment of perfect and orderly transfer of land. In this way, the historicity evoked through this narrative both sustains and conditions the uneven trajectory of boom/bust economics, illegal settler encroachments, and violence between settler and Indigenous actors that comprises the destabilization of Native space and sovereignty.

**Boosting (the Backwoods) to a New Frontier**

As discussed above, the Northwest Ordinance's brief reference to Native land cessions implicitly portrays settler emigration as an orderly process integral to larger territorial aims, an orderliness that, I argue, the text inscribes into the notion of the "Old Northwest" as a coherent geopolitical space. Referring to lands that "will have been ceded" introduces a temporality that abstracts the violent processes of expansion in what appears as an axiomatic unfolding of the potential for organization already latent within the region as geopolitical space. In this way, the text renders such emigration as the motor for processes of state formation that, insofar as they follow from ethical land
cessions, appear as a foregone conclusion, as simply the next phase in the life of the territory itself and a historical necessity. The reference to inevitable Indian land cessions, then, can be understood as enacting an objective violence toward place-based Native peoplehood. The Ordinance endows the Old Northwest with a historicity that forecloses place-based Native sovereignty moving forward. In turn, literary portrayals of regional life that follow during the antebellum era, I would argue, extend the ongoing displacement of Native peoples that the Ordinance both envisions and retroactively normalizes. The point is not so much that the colonizing work of such texts is reducible to the 1787 document, however. Rather, the latter instantiates, in a U.S. context, the set of discursive relations whereby the notion of the space as "territory" enacts a violence on its own, namely through the narrativity of regional Indian withdrawal that it presupposes. Even a text like Caroline Kirkland's *A New Home, Who'll Follow?* falls within the frame of this objective violence. While the novel presents itself as offering practical knowledge of the land as against romanticized and potentially harmful distortions of life on the frontier, the condition of possibility for its turn toward a more ethical reality is a portrait of the territory sustained through the narrativity of Indian withdrawal.

First Published in 1839, the novel fictionalizes Kirkland's years living in the fledgling town of Pinkney, Michigan, which she founded along with her husband, William Kirkland, in 1837. Both educators from privileged backgrounds, the couple moved to Detroit in 1835 to lead the newly created Detroit Female Seminary. The novel far from romanticizes these events, however. As Noreen Lape concisely puts it, Kirkland writes "the permeability of the American frontier" in such a way that "teases out truth,
calling into question its very foundations and revealing its constructedness" (364). This truth entails a clear critique of the forms of predatory banking and land acquisition that precipitated the economic collapse of 1837. Nevertheless, the condition of possibility for this critique is an inverse homogenization of Indianness as place-based counter-productivity. The novel's critique of speculative banking practices and land exploitation extends neither to the received narrativity of regional Native peoplehood nor the geopolitics of dispossession that are coextensive with the rise of regional economic networks. Accordingly, what fails to register is the role that a systemic undermining of Native sovereignty (such as the inundating of Native polities with alcohol via state-sanctioned trading) plays both in making land available for purchase from the U.S. and in propelling the very forms of speculation the novel otherwise targets.

Reading the text as extending settler claims to the territory through frontier historicity calls for some additional background. William Kirkland purchased at least 800 acres of land situated roughly 60 miles west of Detroit in the context of a massive surge in emigration and capital investment (Zagarell xiii-xiv). Although the site for the town was but a tiny portion of the land ceded to the US by Wyandot, Potawatomi, Chippewa, and Ottawa peoples in the 1807 Treaty of Detroit, which included almost the entire southeast quadrant of present-day Michigan, several factors worked to inhibit emigration to this area as compared with that to the south. Its reputation as mostly inhospitable marshland, the lack of transportation infrastructure, and the perceived threat of Indian violence together stalled speculation and settlement in the years after the War of 1812 (Dunbar 156-8; 176-9). In fact, the territory did not reach statehood until 1837, two
decades after Illinois and Indiana and nearly 34 years after Ohio. However, the completion of the Eerie Canal in 1825 ignited an emigration influx that in turn catalyzed speculation in both land and minerals, fueling the volatility that led to Black Hawk's famed resistance to removing per the terms of fraudulent treaties with the U.S. Since most of the conflict occurred in western Michigan territory (present-day Wisconsin), the end of Black Hawk's War in 1832 brought a symbolic closure, one that helped create the impression of a region now "open" to seismic capital expansion, especially in the context of a largely unregulated financial system. Land sales in Michigan skyrocketed from 147,062 acres in 1830 to a record 4,189,823 acres in 1836, a total that Dunbar notes exceeded figures "for the entire country as recently as 1833" (164).⁹

Although Kirkland does reference the purchase of the site for Pinckney (here Montacute), the critique of unsustainable land speculation propped up by paper money and predatory lending references neither treaty-based land cessions nor Native resistance to settler encroachments, such as the recent and highly publicized Black Hawk War (1832). Despite the fact that intrusions into Native space helped to create the store of "government land," as the novel terms it, were part and parcel of such destructive forces, the novel effaces such intrusions entirely, which enables it to separate the forces of economic destruction from waves of settler emigration, as reflected in the novel's basic mapping of space. The text's critical import instead hinges on an early distinction between the village and the city that links the economic crash of 1837 only with the city, construed as a failed project of settlement; in this way the text compartmentalizes the practices and processes associated with unsustainable speculation, which implicitly
frames the lands surrounding cities like "Tinkerville" as effectively beyond state processes of acquisition/expansion and, as such, reducible to something like the trope of frontier wilderness even as the novel brackets the romanticization of such a framing (Kirkland 31).\textsuperscript{10} Disassociating from economic predation the fraudulent treaties and illegal encroachments that Black Hawk spent much of his adult life resisting, Kirkland frames the capitalist flows that tanked the economy as the ultimately degenerative efficacy of an unbridled acquisitiveness, one both symbolized and propelled by idealized visions of future cityscapes. Accordingly, the vision of the city symbolizes such flows, standing in contrast to an alternative potential for egalitarianism supposedly inscribed in the landscape itself. Where the "'madness of the people' in those days of golden dreams...of city-building" implodes communities before they even get started, the Clavers' (Kirklands') "plan of a village" resonates as a more authentic locus of forms of industry that prove sustainable insofar as they emerge out of the supposedly actual conditions of frontier necessity (Kirkland 4).

The plot's ethical thrust is therefore in keeping with Maria Sánchez's observation that reform novelists sought to restore "truthful meaning and truthful relations" so as to counter what was perceived as a loss of reality in the twinned frenzy of land speculation and the proliferation of unbacked banks (41). More specifically, the tension between village formation and city building doesn't wholly bracket the destructive course of unregulated expansion (as a primarily bust-driven phenomenon, with long-term economic development moving by way of the disequilibrium of unforeseen and rapid collapses). Instead, it displaces the destructive aspect from a systemic element of U.S. expansion to
the intention or drive of specific actors to take advantage of an unregulated financial system, thereby keeping open the possibility of something like an ethical process of expansion. This displacement manifests in Kirkland's plot design. The plot is essentially a tale of two cities, Tinkerville and Montacute, situated as simultaneous experiments in different logics of expansion: the wild frontier of get-rich (dis)investment schemes versus that of slow-paced, egalitarian community formation. In either case, however, movement "beyond the confines of civilization," to the "remoter parts" in which such experiments occur, reads as effectively given to settler presence in advance to the degree that Indianness signals a residual element of the landscape.

The text's realist mode initially reflects this givenness. Initially tempted to "set forth my little book as being entirely, what it is very nearly—a veritable history, an unimpeachable transcript of reality, a rough picture, in detached parts," Kirkland admits that there are "glosses, and colourings, and lights," yet the incidents and events themselves, even in their "unnatural, or absolutely incredible" character, are "to be received as literally true" (I, sic). These scenarios largely revolve around the seemingly insurmountable differences between Mary and her new neighbors. However, the narrative reporting of this discomfort provides the crucial hinge for the novel's criticism of speculation. As the various micro-narratives threaded through the narrative unfold, her own difficulty in adapting marks the distance from romanticized portrayals of the frontier. Such narratives, which are loosely associated with Mary herself as coming from a privileged background back east, emerge as hyperbolic to the degree that they depart from real conditions associated with such a life as she encounters them. Measured against
this pivot toward literary realism, more popular frontier romances read as out of touch with the periphery. In turn, as material tokens of the real hardship of such a life, bogholes, roadways built from logs, porous cabins, snakebites, wildfire, and the potency of various illnesses, especially malarial fever or "ague," gradually provide the material counterpoint to what emerge as the socio-symbolic obstacles to settlement, namely rude manners, suspiciousness of new emigrants' intentions, a pronounced sensitivity to class-based prejudices, occasional theft, and an often tenacious commitment to ignorance.

_A New Home_ therefore presents itself as trading generic conventions for accuracy, subjectivity for objectivity, and the narrative apparatus proves indispensable to rendering a tangible sense of the hard work and the day-to-day actuality usually effaced in romanticized texts. The result, as Zagarell puts it, is a departure from the "unobtrusive participant/observer" typical of travel literature, such that "her developing capacity to accommodate westerners as well as easterners constitutes one dimension of the community's development" (xxix). Narrating life on the frontier by way of the immediate difficulties it brings to bear on the narrative persona, not the least of which are the class-based assumptions of what exactly constitutes a need, extends into the novel a tension between a desire to render a "transcript of reality," its supposedly real conditions, and the fact that cultural-, gendered- and market-based constraints impact one's capacity to create such an unimpeachable transcript. Life on the frontier presents obstacles that not only force the emigrant to adapt, they also gradually throw into relief character traits that, in their disjunction from frontier reality, become obstacles in themselves. Indianness enters this dilemma on the side of reality, as marking an objective knowledge embedded in the
landscape invisible to those like Mary without experience out on the perimeter. The first mention of Natives of any kind realizes this displacement. When the party very early on encounters a rattlesnake, one of Mary's early backwoods companions declares in passing that "'the Indians call them Massisangas and so folks calls 'em too'" (Kirkland 16). The second mention of Natives performs a similar move. At one point, a party of investors are "following an Indian trail" when they become disoriented and lost, throwing into relief their unfitness for frontier life (Kirkland 16, 26).

That Indians "call" rattlesnakes Massiangas implies that Natives are present and that they are not a simple cypher for a bygone era, irrevocably lost to history and, as such, available for appropriation as a means of representing a national past. But neither do they overlap with the population designated by the term "folks," which refers to the presumably Anglo settlers who emigrated some time earlier and appear to Mary as backwoods rabble. However, as these early examples indicate, Indianness less references any particular Indigenous people, such as the Sauk or Winnebago, than it initially signifies a knowledge of the landscape that is both framed as temporally anterior and that as such, in Rifkin's words, "helps orient and provide momentum for the feeling of givenness that marks non-natives' relation to place" (Settler 31). In this way, Indianness designates an earlier era, but one not inexorably sealed away from Anglo settlement. It enters the frame not as a displaced formation, but rather as the mediated trace of a prior presence that still proves useful to arrivants and readers alike: a form of knowledge that, being rooted in the land, enables a practical sense of what it takes to live away from "civilization." As a mediated form of knowledge, Indianness further underscores certain
exploitive interests as wholly out of sync with something like the potential social ecology of the frontier. The "Indian" trail, for instance, is an impression of Natives' prior presence quite literally embedded in the territory, but it only registers as a means of demarcating the strangeness or "wildness" of the land as framed through the bourgeois norms of eastern banking culture, suggesting the fundamental ineptitude of those looking to turn a quick profit through speculation. By contrast, the backwoods settlers' appropriation of the term "Massisanga" establishes them in close relation to a praxis seemingly derived from the land itself, as does their implied capacity to follow Indian trails.

As indexing a kind of knowledge that throws into relief and thereby differentiates settler modes of adaptation in terms of their preparation for life beyond civilization, Indian knowledge accordingly helps to organize the pivot from romance toward reality by foregrounding the difficulty with two supposedly constituent elements of the backwoods: landscape and population. However, this capacity for differentiation is not exclusive to Indianness. The narrative enacts the same ordering process through juxtaposing Mary's resistance in domestic settings to the lack of customs and manners associated with eastern privilege with scenes in the "'timbered land,'" in which the shift in terrain emphasizes a corresponding shift in the perception of what constitutes necessity (Kirkland 7). For instance, an early passage describes a typical noon meal. After laying out an ostensibly rustic spread of apple sauce, mashed potatoes, pork, and "bowls of milk," the equally rustic hosts blow a horn, an almost "magical" intervention that draws "enough men and boys" from the seemingly "solitary" landscape to pack the room to the gills (Kirkland 14). Initially resolving "not to touch a mouthful," Mary is "mortified" at being virtually
compelled to eat alongside such ruffians (ibid.). The sudden appearance of a whole host of settler laborers seemingly out of thin air presents them as belonging to, at one with, the terrain in ways that escape Mary and her traveling companions. Their manners in turn also emerge not simply as unrefined as compared with the narrator herself, but as forming a cultural baseline that, given its linkage with the labor apparently necessary to make the wild habitable, shows Mary's worldview to be as much an impediment, in the beginning, to something like collective progress as the aims of the bankers who get lost while surveying the territory.

Accordingly, if Indianness enters as a place-based knowledge that helps to sort the useful from the exploitive arrivants, it is not the only path to such a critique; the power of the pastoral to reshape the community in fundamental ways exceeds Indianness since it also manifests in scenes that reflect the capacity of the settler working poor for survival and community formation apart from Native tropes. The rural working poor appear to have an efficacy all their own, which in turn implies that the praxis/knowledge symbolized by Indianness is not fully coextensive or associated with the landscape as a site for social rejuvenation. Prior Indian knowledge marks a distinct praxis organized around living off the land, but it is a receding praxis, as attested by the fact that settlers, and not Indians themselves, are the ones who relay such knowledge and ostensibly determine its usefulness. In fact, Indianness also comes to signify something like an embedded incapacity for adaptation. The novel spatially links Indian figures with Tinkerville, the city on the rise that winds up collapsing nearly as quickly as it is envisioned. After having adapted somewhat, Mary guides a far more reticent friend on a
visit to see the neighboring town, which rumors suggest is beginning to take off. The text underscores Mary's progress by having her assuage a friend who is shocked to see a real Indian: "I was terribly puzzled. It had never occurred to me that the Indians would naturally be objects of terror" to someone who "had scarcely ever seen one; and I knew we should probably meet dozens of them [on] our short ride" (Kirkland 85). Suggesting something of a failed population in their sparse, phantasmatic quality, especially as compared with the more industrious if stubborn backwoods Anglos, wandering Indians throw into relief both Mary's increasing experience with the landscape and her waxing identification as an "old" settler, to whom it falls to offer the very knowledge she earlier lacked.

When Mary and her friend get lost on this visit, she stops to ask an unnamed, random Indian if they are going the right way. While "he could not be made to understand," he nevertheless gives them "the usual assenting grunt," prompting Mary to continue. However, after failing to reach the city, they backtrack "to the nearest log hut" to ask for the road to Tinkerville, only to learn that they had already passed it: "'It a'n't long since you came through it. That big stump is the middle of the public square''" (Kirkland 85). The miscommunication finds a parallel in the actual state of Tinkerville; so far, all of the buzz and predatory lending has produced less than nothing. The moment is doubly temporalized, however: the obvious gap between what Tinkerville is/was meant to become and its actual lack of progress registers as a failed futurity, while the Indian "grunt" that leads nowhere gestures to a gap between the forms of Native peoplehood that must have existed at some point in the past and what now appears as the only meaningful,
potentially lasting form of settlement around, namely Mary's slowly developing town of Montacute. The imminent failure of Tinkerville overlaps with the apparent failure of Indian peoplehood to suggest an incapacity to create/sustain meaningful and sustainable collectivity.

In this linking of speculation and Indianness, however, the latter primes the reader's perception of the looming failure of Tinkerville rather than vice versa; the apparent givenness of Indian withdrawal sustains the passage's critique. The loitering Indians register on the side of a realism rooted in a "unimpeachable transcript" of actual life on the frontier, evidenced by the fact that Mary can't understand the grunt calls for no additional explanation. To be fair, this episode does indeed indicate that Native peoples were very much still around, inhabiting areas that they had supposedly vacated. However, by lumping all regional peoples together within the generic category "Indians," the text's recognition of these Natives also marks its extension of the narrativity of withdrawal that also characterized the Northwest Ordinance. Seeing these peoples as "Indians" amounts the discursive means by which Kirkland's realism deflects Native claims to sovereignty, the complex political dynamics of Native dispossession(s), and the political history of such dispossession and its resistance, like the conditions involving the recent Black Hawk War. By representing such Natives as "Indians," the passage generates a sense of the land as de facto given to settlers not simply insofar as these wandering subjects signal the residual trace of an outmoded way of life, but by overdetermining the failure of Tinkerville precisely as localized and not a systemic feature of a predatory capitalist network. The fact that Indians loiter around the site that should have been a public square
help to throw into relief the city's failure to live up to the vision that founded it, but this failed future does not exhaust all potential for a meaningful and sustainable habitation out on the perimeter.

In other words, the random Indian's grunt articulates the more general sense of disorientation that Mary feels upon discovering that Tinkerville is a stump. It helps to register the supposed reality of the radical, material dis-investement symbolized by the urban boom in Tinkerville. If the spasms of enterprise that create Tinkerville ultimately leave less than nothing, then the sociosymbolic gap raised through Indianness manifests that nothing: the "grunt" that leads nowhere provides an implied metaphor for a more devastating withdrawal embedded in rampant speculation qua "progress." Yet, through this very association the passage also suggests that the forms of speculation that generate such socioeconomic collapse are themselves fated to disappear. Even as Indianness acts as a quick cypher for the ineptitude of rampant, predatory capitalism, and marks the distance between such enterprise and the interests of Mary and her company, the sense of axiomatic Indian withdrawal also crucially frames the possibility of a utopian and egalitarian community free from the pitfalls of speculative capitalism and within which people from all backgrounds and social positions contribute to the common good. The narrativity of receding Indianness is indispensable to the subtle dialectic that Kirkland poses as an authentic and sustainable path of development.

This narrativity enables Kirkland to strike a delicate balance between criticizing both rampant speculation and frontier romanticism as ultimately destructive forces, on one hand, while nevertheless participating in the genre of booster literature, albeit on the
side of a communitarian ethics, on the other. Insofar as it keeps investors, rich and poor alike, focused on the future-anterior cityscape, the grand vision of a bustling metropolis rather than its stark, swampy reality, Kirkland depicts booster literature as concealing its own fraudulence in the temporality constitutive of its initial appeal. Crucial to this displacement or concealing of an unsustainable profit-motive, the force behind such spasmodic enterprise, is, in Zagarell's terms, a "commercial language...of ever-shifting and fraudulent signifiers which advance the interests of a few...at the expense of the community as a whole," and in particular the role of "image production," the visual and narrative representation of a bustling city that provides perhaps the most indispensable and constant catalyst for such stasis as Mary observes around the stump at Tinkerville (xli-xl). Booster literature involves a kind of double time in which the future promise overdetermines present skepticism regarding both the means and the feasibility of such rapid growth, and the novel suggests that this totalizing sense of a wholly imaginary possibility keeps investor desire quite literally oriented elsewhere, looking for the next Tinkerville when the current one turns out a bust.

Therefore, to the degree that the booster-driven desire behind the collapses allegorized by Tinkerville obscures any awareness of risk (hence leading to over-investment, then the unsustainable boom, etc.), Indianness for Kirkland resonates as a socio-symbolic counterpoint to the actual circulation of such images in the boom that precipitated the bust of 1837. As a supposedly organic and residual element of the landscape, Indianness helps to foreground a disjunction not simply between the "city" as it actually exists and its future-anterior form, but also between the textual circulation of
such imaginary future cities as a form of capital extraction (an anti-labor) and the possibility of more productive forms of labor rooted in the land, since Indians once lived and thrived here, though they don't any longer. If, then, Kirkland's turn away from the utterly fantastic Michigan of sentimental novels, romanticized travel literature, and booster propaganda amounts to, as Kolodny puts it, carving out for readers an "attractive" yet "responsible" role on an unformed landscape that might yet bear their especial and idealizing imprint," that carving entails (re)producing an Indianness that can signal something like the stunted possibility inherent in the territory itself. As a kind of residual and objective predicate of the territory, Indianness marks off the "land" from the pervasive incitement to invest that otherwise organizes it as space to be settled, while nevertheless retaining the coherence of "territory" as that which supersedes failed modes of Indigenous peoplehood and, in turn, as an extra-political space within which some form of egalitarian and ultimately productive capitalism might yet be possible (The Land 148).

It is no coincidence, then, that Mary's course of adaptation, positioned as metonymic of the development of village life, is framed as a shift from being an outsider among "Indigenous" settlers to one entitled to "speak for the natives," phrasing that locates generic Indian withdrawal as the point of transit for settler indigeneity (Kirkland 134, 66). Recall that the Northwest Ordinance, in referencing future-anterior land cessions, renders Indianness as a temporal predicate of the space, thereby deflecting Native autonomy and sovereignty through orienting the "territory" to the U.S. in time, or in other words rendering it dependent upon supposedly inevitable and orderly flows of
settler emigration and the processes of state formation that they catalyze. Here the sparse zombification of Natives in the text similarly suggests that Indian withdrawal establishes an indeterminate point at which the spatial bleeds over into the temporal, indexing a historicity already integral to the lands in question and within which settler governance appears unremarkable precisely insofar as it is a foregone conclusion. Put another way, Indianness signifies the possibility of a limit to cutthroat speculation inherent in the "territory" itself, not because Natives gesture to alternative lifeways so much as they make available an abstract representation of space as simultaneously anterior to and destined to pass beyond the destructive flows of capital and rabble. Although claiming indigeneity, Mary Clavers never plays Indian, at least in the sense Philip Deloria has shown to be an essential component of settler self- and national representation. Nevertheless, tropes of Indian withdrawal crucially frame the ethic of reciprocity that Kirkland presents as constitutive of sustainable, even egalitarian community formation. This ethic is founded on cultivating the environment in the broadest sense, extending to the habits and views of the local inhabitants as much as the forms of labor they perform.

Mary Clavers's embrace of frontier reality most fully expresses the development of this ethic, which calls for unpacking given its importance to Kirkland's communitarian vision. The novel's parallel forms of development in Montacute and Tinkerville pivot on the emergence of what Karen Kilcup identifies in Kirkland's second major work, *Forest Life*, as a "version of 'simple living,'" which consists of "discarding unnecessary belongings, emphasizing spiritual development, and behaving respectfully toward the environment" as well as embracing a "democratic perspective on wealth and acquisition"
(Fallen 113). Her capacity to help reshape the community derives from her own resistance to it. In other words, Montacute is not simply fated to become a model community, as village formation is neither a simple integration nor colonization of the backwoods by the monied. Generating an alternative trajectory for "that anomalous mass called society" proceeds insofar as Mary comes to realize both the hard work and the degree of collective engagement that it takes to survive on the frontier (Kirkland 76).

Again, meal times offer a privileged motif for staging the dialectic of class- and gender-based discord central to this dialectic. After having begun to acclimate, Mary claims that those newly emigrating will find the "social character of the meals, in particular, is quite destroyed, by the constant presence of strangers, whose manners, habits of thinking, and social connexions are quite different from your own" (Kirkland 52-3). Nonetheless, hope is not lost, as "the silent influence of example," she observes, "is daily effecting much towards reformation in many particulars"; the way for those accustomed to a refined routine to overcome such "evils" is to be patient and "set forth in their own manners and habits, all that is kind, forbearing, true, lovely, and of good report" (Kirkland 53). It's pretty clear why the novel wasn't such a big hit with her neighbors. Yet moments like these transform the discourse of manners, perhaps the token of class difference, into the sign that her privilege is outmoded here. For Kirkland, as Aliaga-Buchenal puts it, egalitarianism begins as "an occasion for the 'upper' and 'lower' classes to come together, forced as the reunions may be," and give prosperous arrivants a chance "to revise prejudice" and their counterparts "an opportunity to learn something of the 'refinement' of others" (71).
However, it is crucial to grasp this egalitarianism less as a coherent program or idea external to these "forced reunions," as something to which each party turns to make the meeting bearable, and instead as their immanent extension, as the very telos of village formation that the novel situates as a real possibility inherent in the landscape. As Mary gradually cedes her attachments to the forms and norms of privileged life back east, her neighbors conversely come to understand the sense of shared responsibility integral to survival as a communitarian value. The most enduring form of necessity, which pushes her beyond hermetic fright, is that of her neighbors needing her stuff. She observes that whoever "comes into Michigan with nothing, will be sure to better his condition; but wo to him that brings anything like an appearance of abundance, whether of money or mere household conveniences. To have them and not be willing to share them...with the whole community, is an unpardonable crime" (Kirkland 67). Such criminality suggests the process by which the backwoods inhabitants come to exert a symbolic pressure that has the immediate effect of loosening new emigrants' conceptions of the rights and privileges ascribed to ownership, what Mary terms "involuntary loans": "...I have lent my broom, my thread, my tape, my spoons, my cat, my thimble, my scissors, my shawl, my shoes," and, taking the cake, Mary even recalls that a friend once had a neighbor who asked to borrow her baby (Kirkland 68, 71). However, the corollary of this near-constant demand for various necessities by one's less-mannered neighbors is their knowledge of what constitutes usefulness in the "open country" (Kirkland 50). After the Clavers arrive at their log cabin, and in the context of trying to "procure a domestic" to help arrange the place (which ultimately fails, as no one on the perimeter would "'hire out!'" as a "regular
calling, or with an acknowledgement of inferior station"), Mary decides that she must "go myself to the scene of action" and arrange her house (Kirkland 38-9, 42). She discovers, however, that she has no idea what it takes to live in these conditions. As she unpacks her things only to find a larger, more "hopeless task of calling order out of chaos," her neighbors by contrast gape and gawk: "'What on airth's them gimcracks for?'
" (Kirkland 42).

The path of village formation comprises the mutual adaptation of new and "Native" emigrants adapting both to each other and to the shift in very concept of necessity itself that this doubled adaptation yields. For the latter group, coming to understand the circulation of items from the perspective of community development, rather than that of the survival of the individual family unit, involves a shift in the notion of what exactly makes land valuable. Just as Mary can get past neither her own cultural biases nor the muddy, decidedly non-picturesque character of the woods, the people she meets along the way are portrayed as subject to the tyranny of their dreams as much as that of the landscape. Their ethic of raw necessity and common knowledge are far from exempt from the more general tendency to commodify land, a view constitutive of the larger tendency toward economic instability. As one Mr. Danforth relates, describing his own early experiences in Michigan territory, "We had most awful hard times at first. Many's the day I've worked from sunrise till dark in the fields" clearing land, "but that's all over now; and we've got four times as much land as we ever should have owned in York-state" (Kirkland 22). The inverse of romanticized views of the land as empty homogenous Nature, this quantification of the landscape, Mary observes, "forms a
prominent and frequent theme of self-gratulation among the settlers...The possession of a large number of acres is esteemed a great good," despite the fact that, as she sees it, comfort level does not "abound in proportion to landed increase" but rather diminishes: "the habit of selling out so frequently makes that home-feeling...so large an ingredient in happiness elsewhere, almost a nonentity in Michigan," as these folks "spend all their lives in getting ready to begin" (ibid.). For the rustic neighbors, organic knowledge rooted in the hard work of daily survival serves a home that is infinitely deferred, if only because they do not realize that happiness is contingent on neither the number of acres one claims nor their market value. From this angle, forming a lasting community is a costly, even counter-productive endeavor.

For Kirkland, an ethic of reciprocity gradually developed through local trade (dictated by use-value rather than the exchange-value that fuels capital investment) provides the key material and socio-symbolic link to (re)align the woods and the people. These moments of material and socio-symbolic exchange coalesce into a forward yet recursive momentum whereby the distribution of necessity forms something rather than nothing. In this way, a backwoods economy predicated on land clearing and speculation slowly re-constellates its own socio-economic horizon by integrating newly-arrived settlers, those from a class position diametrically opposite that of earlier emigrants. That land can be commodified is not the problem. After all, the creation of a surplus of "government land" through land cessions with regional Native peoples entails a process of commodification. Rather, the problem as the novel stages it is that the drive toward more and more land/wealth obviates the development of local networks of exchange that
are crucial toward developing the kinds of meaningful social relations (the genesis of the "village") necessary to curb cycles of unsustainable growth and collapse. Insofar as old settlers are themselves bound up in the larger economy of speculation, they alone cannot realize the broader social potential of a ground-up emphasis on trade as informed by raw necessity; and insofar as new arrivants like Mary are resentful about moving out to the backwoods in the first place, they are not inclined to realize it either. The way out, so to speak, of the massively destructive cycles of a boom/bust economy is through the unique and immanent dialectic of community formation embodied in the development of Montacute.

In this way, the novel's egalitarian vision presupposes settler emigration. As we will see, Black Hawk himself had already made a point quite close to that of Kirkland, but one that drew a firmer distinction between trade and commodification of land ("land cannot be sold," as he famously notes). For him, the selling of land distorts, even negates the inherent, organic possibilities for collective organization entailed in trade-based relationships similar to those Kirkland describes at Montacute. Kirkland's dialectic by contrast presents land speculation as deeply problematic, but to the degree that more ethical processes of community formation nevertheless also entail the prior and supposedly legitimate cession of Native lands, the text cannot integrate the fraudulence that produces government land in the first place within the frame of its critique. Of course, this blind spot does not register as a blind spot. The text's portrait of a smooth, immanent development of sustainable community relations at Montacute, in contrast to the panic symbolized by Tinkerville, both derives from and extends a colonizing frontier
historicity, one already integral to cutthroat, rampant capitalism precisely insofar as it imagines the territory as if fated to become more organized on the path to statehood. To this point, despite taking different forms or acquiring different meanings in specific narrative moments, the trope of Indian withdrawal generally signifies an embedded, residual, and ultimately imperfect body of associations that works across the text to illuminate the problems with a settler economy. Receding Indianness both deflects prior Native claims to space, on one hand, while rendering the productivity of non-Native labor, rather than the ethics of US juridical claims, the fulcrum of legitimate belonging, on the other.

And as with the Northwest Ordinance, the failure to address actual rampant and genocidal dispossession takes the form of (what appears as) a recognition of Native autonomy. Kirkland does in fact acknowledge Native trade networks, albeit without the geopolitical function Black Hawk describes. In the context of admiring the fertility of the soil, Mary describes the "whortle-berry of Michigan," a fruit "despised elsewhere" but treasured in the hinterlands due to its improved quality (Kirkland 81). Each summer, "The Indians bring in immense quantities slung in panniers or mococks of bark on...their wild-looking ponies; a squaw, with any quantity of pappooses...on the ridge between them"; "'Schwap? Nappanee?' is the question of the queen of the forest...which means 'will you exchange, or swap, for flour:' and you take the whortle-berries...returning the same measured quantity of flour" (Kirkland 81, sic). Indian trade again manifests a knowledge of the land, but its rhetorical relegation in this instance to a supplemental digression, one reached by way of a more general focus on agriculture, doubles its
ideological displacement as a legitimate mode of production. Opening with a reflection on the possibility of gardening in Michigan, this passage seamlessly transitions into a celebration of the unlikely diversity and adaptability of the local workforce, but one that implicitly centers farming as the truly indispensable socio-economic cog. Just prior to the forest queen's arrival, Mary gushes on the sheer potential for husbandry: "Nobody can deny that our soil amply repays whatever trouble we may bestow upon it"; "Enrich it properly, and you lack nothing that will grow north of Charleston" (Kirkland 81).

Bracketing the fact that this passage ignores, for instance, that Sauk women not only farmed, but did so well enough to feed the encroaching settler rabble who fenced in their fields at Rock Island, Indigenous trading here gestures to forms of labor (namely gathering and bartering) that, while basically efficacious, nonetheless fail to signify productivity what registers as an axiomatic distance from Anglo modes of husbandry. Put another way, while Indian labor/trade evokes a praxis deriving organically from the landscape itself, it simultaneously signals a non-productive ethic of reciprocity, one that simply cannot sustain anything like the long-term economic growth and diversification associated with village life. Prior to the reference to the whortleberry, Mary again notes that "there could scarcely be a trade or profession which is not largely represented among the farmers of Michigan....Montacute, half-fledged as it is, affords facilities that one could scarce expect," including a goldsmith, various carpenters, masons, merchants, and even a backwoods dentist (Kirkland 80). The capacity to cultivate the soil begins from where the place-based knowledge/praxis of prior Indian trade leaves off. Further, Indians less utilize than rely upon hunting, gathering, and rustic forms of trade for either basic
necessities, such as flour, or money, which Mary elsewhere describes as "valueless" given "how little it will buy in the woods," which positions Indigenous networks both as signifying poverty in their simplicity and as aligned with the predatory, paper banking that winds up leaving neighboring Tinkerville a ghost town (Kirkland 120). In registering a certain untapped potential, Indian trade then registers a fading mode of production, one completely cleaved from claims to sovereignty. As such, it works to cast Anglo farming and the forms of non-Native industry it promises to support as true extensions of the terrain's latent potential for settlement and, accordingly, as legitimate indices of indigeneity.

If there is one moment of withdrawing Indianness in the text that frames land in terms of settler-oriented historicity while also (re)producing regional Native peoples as an excessive population, as aberrant with regard to the normative path toward progress symbolized in Mary's journey, it is the family of inebriated Indians that Mary describes very early in the book. In the context of still trying to get out to the village site for the first time, and lamenting the marshy, depressing terrain, Mary and her party plan to spend the night at the house of a nearby French trader, so as to maximize the time exploring and adjusting to the land. As we will see, the reference of course recalls the long history of French trade networks with regional Native groups like the Sauk, networks largely rooted in the fur trade. However, described as situated in the vicinity of "a few Indian huts," the trading house here evokes an impression of Native peoples as dependent on trade for survival (Kirkland 28). The trader lives with his "Indian wife," who is largely silent except when asked to play "the part of interpreter between the gentlemen [apparently the
Frenchman and members of Mary's party] and some wretched looking Indians who were hanging about the house" (Kirkland 29). Further, the group of "wretched" Indians includes several children, who though possessing "bright, gazelle-like eyes" nonetheless show "nothing of the staring curiosity [of] the whiter broods of the same class of settlers" (ibid.).

Mary then learns that the Indians in question "had come to procure whiskey of the trader," gesturing to a geopolitics of displacement effect ed through the proliferation of alcoholism through trade, a historical phenomenon (as Black Hawk forcefully observes) that helped to generate conditions of dispossession, both in reference to the 1804 treaty and as a feature of trading with whites more generally. In fact, Black Hawk describes how his own frustration with the whites' use of alcohol as a means of degrading and dispossessing his people prompted him at one point to destroy several containers so as to prevent their distribution. The focus in this passage, however, veers from what we would identify as the geopolitics or ethics of such trade in favor of victim-blaming. After this particular group leaves with the "baleful luxury which performs among their fated race the work of fire, famine and pestilence," it isn't long before another is "seen approaching the door with that long easy trot which is so habitual with the savage" (Kirkland 29).

Though alcohol itself is seen as "baleful," Natives' apparent propensity to abuse alcohol signals a racialized function of "fate," as much a part of their intrinsic nature as the characteristic trot, as opposed to the direct effect of real geopolitical antecedents unleashed through the appropriation of trade networks by settler rabble, private interests, and the US state over the course of the prior four decades. Later the same night, Mary
describes waking to a "hideous yelling, which to city ears could be no less than an Indian war-whoop" followed by a violent knocking at the door; everyone quiets down when, after answering, the trader assures them it was just the Indians returning for "more whiskey," and, therefore, "noting at all" (Kirkland 29).

The next morning, the trader "unblushingly vindicated himself in the matter" while discussing the previous night's events. "He said that they would get whiskey from someone—that an Indian could not live without it, and that they would pay honestly for what they got," although they would "steal anything...from the farmers" to make the payment (Kirkland 30). Mary observes that his wife, however, "listened with no pleased aspect to this discussion of the foibles of her countrymen," and seemed anxious for the guests to leave (Kirkland 30). The narrative then resumes Mary's path to Montacute. One could suggest that the representation of Indian alcoholism as racially unique and therein non-political is in keeping with the more general racialism endemic to the American public sphere at large. However, such a view would neglect the role that representing a characteristically Indian indigence plays in consolidating a vision of the territory as if destined for industrious settlement, even as Mary appears to implicitly condemn the trader's role in perpetuating such "savagery" for the sake of economic gain. It is not only that the effects of dispossession appear instead as their ultimate causality in such portraits of Indian squalor. It is also this inversion further consolidates the "Indian" as a structural non-presence whose figuration, as failed or non-productive industry, orients the territory to the US in time.
As a cypher for failed yet "natural" political-economy, the narrativity of receding Indianness in Kirkland's novel displaces the role that settler depredations (by private and government actors alike) played in producing the "government land" in the first place. Narrating Indians as if fated to recede sustains a broader historicity within which settler emigration appears an axiomatic phenomenon. Taken together, the references to Indians scattered across the text render such facts quite literally unremarkable. Rather than normalizing such emigration, however, this narrativity instead extends a sense of the territory as an ultimately extra-political space, as a landscape conducive to developing forms of exchange and collective labor that register as drawing forth the true potential for social harmony, supposedly embedded in the land, insofar as Indians signify the inevitable passing away of failed modes of peoplehood. By narrating Indianness as withdrawing, the thriving village at Montacute transmutes the actual conditions of Native dispossession into a portrait of frontier life as the unfolding of a seemingly fundamental ethic of reciprocity over time, the core element of a grounded egalitarianism that, by comparison, presents destructive flows of illegal encroachment, land speculation, and unregulated capital investment as aberrations, not catalysts, of U.S. expansion across Native space.

**Black Hawk's Parallax View**

As noted above, the booms of settler emigration and land speculation across Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin territories that Kirkland experienced firsthand in the mid-1830s, but that represent only the latest incarnation of a boom/bust trajectory
spanning decades, proceeded by way of persistent settler disruptions of Native place-based sovereignty. Although it sharply criticizes the predatory capitalism that generates cycles of economic collapse, *A New Home, Who'll Follow?* presupposes the dispossession of the Sauk and other regional Native peoples, even as the end of the 1832 conflict between U.S. militia forces and Black Hawk's band directly paved the way for the massive influx of emigrants, speculation, and predatory lending Kirkland describes. As Jung observes, despite the fact that rumors of Indian uprisings were prevalent in the years following the conflict (mostly involving the Winnnebago, a traditional ally of the Sauk), the total population of Wisconsin territory nearly tripled from 11,000 in 1836 to 30,000 in 1840—and it exploded to over 300,000 by 1850 (204-5). The end of Black Hawk's resistance is accordingly integral both to the continued dispossession of Native space in the region and to the uneven and often chaotic flows of capital and settlers that drove such dispossession.

It would then make sense to position Kirkland's text as sealing over the very conflict that Black Hawk's narrative seeks to reframe for a non-Native audience, one for which the episode likely resonated as the latest, spectacular episode in the Indian's gradual but certain decline to the west. The rise of Montacute would seem to reaffirm that narrativity of decline. The traces of Indian withdrawal embedded in the proto-egalitarian landscape would implicitly cast Black Hawk's scathing critique of the forces of dispossession as the biased and limited view of an angry warrior seeking the only victory remaining: to validate his character and his people's culture in the court of public opinion. This perspective is problematic, however. The presumption that chronological order is
essential to any historicist inquiry into conditions of dispossession that extend into the present reinforces the centrality of the settler state at the level of narrative form. The passage of time here, in the sense of historical causality, gestures to a political necessity that forecloses reading Black Hawk's text as engaged in a struggle for land, a struggle irreducible both to the duration of his so-called war and more broadly to the implied notion that the only meaningful tactics against settler colonialism transpire in military or juridical contexts. One can understand Black Hawk's text as a tactical engagement with the presumption that the U.S. was fated to develop the Old Northwest. The text can be read, in other words, as pushing against U.S. claims to Native space in the Old Northwest by disrupting the linear historicity that embeds such claims as a foregone conclusion, a historicity that coheres through the trope of inevitable Indian withdrawal. From this view, *A New Home, Who'll Follow* does not have the last word on the visibility of the geopolitics of dispossession in which it is embedded simply because it follows Black Hawk's text, if only because those geopolitics are/were ongoing.

Building from these observations, I would also add that the question of intent is largely beside the point if the focus is the symbolic foreclosure of place-based Native sovereignty. Put another way, the symbolic and discursive configuration that makes something like Black Hawk's biography desirable in the first place, as the account of real Indian war chief recorded just before he moves beyond the frontier, so to speak, is not reducible to Black Hawk himself. As grounded in a narrativity of Indian withdrawal, frontier historicity retroactively organizes a series of uneven, competing actors with different claims to Native space in the territory instead as the orderly and fated movement
of territorial organization, construed as an extra-political process insofar as it is rendered a matter of (settler) time. However, if this historicity not only precedes *A New Home* but further constellates the notion of extra-political space that surfaces in that text's image of an effectively empty landscape, if it is integral to the objective notion of territory with regard to the Old Northwest from the earliest articulation of U.S. claims to space, then it already constitutes a maneuver against Indigenous peoples in the region that works to render Native claims to space unintelligible. Accordingly, it makes sense to read Black Hawk's text not simply as entering into this framework, into the grid of geopolitical intelligibility as it is predicated on the reproduction of frontier historicity, but as disrupting this grid and its retroactive consolidation of regional Native space as already under the juridical purview of the settler state.

I therefore argue in what follows that Black Hawk's autobiography draws on the symbolic currency of withdrawing Indianness to narrate the displacement of Native peoples in the region as far from a matter of inevitable withdrawal. The text reverses the historicity such Indianness entails precisely by throwing into relief the multiple and unevenly aligned actors and agendas that culminated in Black Hawk's forced exile and the dispossession of Saukenuk. The basis for this critical move is the presupposition of place-based alliance networks. The text's intervention hinges on the relation between the historical narrative of Black Hawk's life and an ethics of exchange both organized around and integral to reproducing place-based Sauk peoplehood. Hence, the narrative less supplements a flawed history of the conflict as it unfolded within a given geographic area (the Old Northwest) than it enacts a parallax view of the space. Black Hawk's narrative
undercuts the axiomatic orientation of this territory to settler governance insofar as it articulates, within the symbolic framework generated by tropes of Indian withdrawal, that the Sauk far from simply receded/vanished to the west. Before exploring Black Hawk's implicit challenge to a historicity that presupposes the givenness of state claims, I will show how discourses of Indian withdrawal shape his public image as something like the embodiment of such narrativity, as an exoticized, living example of the trope of the Indian-heading-toward-sunset. First, however, I should explain the notion of parallax, since it is crucial to grasping how I understand his text to work.

The idea of the parallax view comes from Žižek, and it amounts to an effort to rethink the relationship between a clash of ideologies within a social milieu and the socio-symbolic and political space(s) within which competing ideologies play out. As he writes apropos Hegel's division between the Universal and the Particular, the "Universal is not the encompassing container of particular content, the peaceful medium-background of the conflict of particularities," but rather the site of an antagonism, a non-All, that the multitude of particularities attempts to "obfuscate/reconcile/master" (PV 35). In other words, there is no "neutral' reality within which [ideological or cultural, etc.] gaps occur," such as in the case of an Indian versus a Western or Euramerican representation of the same objective territory designated as the Old Northwest (Žižek PV 29). Instead, every reality is already "seen through an invisible frame," which means that the parallax view is not one view among many possible ones; parallax implies a gap, not in the sense of "two incompatible perspectives onto the same X," but between one view "and what eludes it, and the other perspective fills in the void of what we could not see from the first
perspective" (PV 29). From this angle, it is not enough to suggest that frontier historicity merely misrepresents Native rights to the space designated "Old Northwest" (or "Michigan Territory," or "Wisconsin Territory," etc.), since this approach misses the fact that the narrativity of Indian withdrawal is integral to the geopolitical and cultural intelligibility of the space in the first place. Such an approach retains the de facto orientation aligning such space with the settler state, as already the future-anterior, objective extension of state jurisdiction. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the notion of an objective space in this sense is inseparable from the frontier historicity that embeds processes of emigration and state formation in the very notion of "territory," namely through foreclosing any meaningful Native sovereignty moving forward. By contrast, Black Hawk's text enacts a parallax view: it mobilizes the very trope (that of exotic Indian withdrawal) that otherwise coheres the notion of the frontier as a supposedly "real" territorial gestalt (premised on the inevitability settler emigration, and state formation) to expose the fraudulent and genocidal dispossession of land otherwise obscured by the frontier mythos.

Non-Native discourses on the Black Hawk War began to represent him as a living symbol of exotic, receding Indianness as soon as the conflict had ended. As Cheryl Walker observes, his surrender to US forces marked the beginning of his introjection into US nationalist identity through an "outpouring of literature" on the Sauk warrior that largely cast him as "a personification of (Native) American, not just Indian, virtue" (77). The textual material surrounding his infamous surrender tour of the east coast suggests that he likely grew accustomed to such personification. As the tour progressed, Black
Hawk seems to have ushered the theme of "vanishing" himself, playing into the predominant red/white racial binary that framed him for a non-Native audience, even as this paradigm would appear largely absent from his actual biography. For instance, while at Fort Monroe, he reflected on his surrender in such a way that surely pleased then-president Andrew Jackson and his secretary of war, Lewis Cass. "You have treated the red men very kindly...the memory of your friendship will remain till...it is time for Black Hawk to sing his death song...Your houses are as numerous as the leaves on the trees, and your warriors...the red man has but few" ("Black Hawk"). Similarly, at Jefferson Barracks Black Hawk reportedly refused to be painted with a spear in hand by George Catlin, claiming that he "was forever done with spears" ("The Black Hawk"). A poem that circulated in newspapers during the tour addressed him as the "chief of a thousand warriors," but only in the context of scorning the "Old forest lion" for having the audacity to "dabble in the gore of wives and mothers,/ And kill...thy harmless pale-faced brothers," a wholly irrational, murderous impulse that largely explains why the "glowing day star" had set and "dull night...closed upon [his] bright career" (Sanford).

From a distance, it is easy to grasp these allusions to the futility of further resistance, and the framing of such resistance in terms of inhuman savagery, as overdetermining the gesture to fellowship ostensibly symbolized by the tour more broadly. Yet the relevant point here is not necessarily that the textual material generated by the tour unveils the disingenuousness of any political rhetoric of goodwill, but rather that such caricatures of receding Indian savagery function instead amount to a sufficient explanation of the actual circumstances involving the termination of Sauk claims and the
annexation of Sauk space; far from negating any claims to historical accuracy, the hyperbole of such scenes posits the presupposition of a general narrativity of inevitable Indian dispossession that functions as their implicit baseline. Further, if this discourse might be said to deflect both the history of violence and fraudulence characterizing Sauk dispossession and, more broadly, the legitimacy of Native sovereignty as a political category in the Old Northwest, then this deflection occurs paradoxically through the recognition of Black Hawk as a concrete manifestation of a more generalized temporality, one characterized by a binary narrative of white/US ascent and Indian decline. This narrativity exceeds the immediate context of the Black Hawk War, however. By focalizing Black Hawk in this way, this discourse extends the earlier framing of Indianness as fated to withdraw in the region. Black Hawk himself provides seemingly empirical evidence of a larger historical necessity at work in the region's supposed "organization," while his celebrity further extends the efficacy of this narrativity by compelling crowds of thousands to witness himself and his fellow Sauk travelers firsthand, these "noble specimens of the early race of America" ("ARRIVAL OF THE PRESIDENT").

A notable example of non-Native discourse rendering Black Hawk as a cypher for bygone Indianness occurs in George Catlin's critique of settler expansion and his sympathetic portrayal of the war chief. At the conclusion of his 1841 *Manners, Custom, and Condition of the North American Indian*, Catlin pointedly attributes Native peoples' apparently bleak future to U.S. policy and especially to the continued and ruthless displacement of Indians by encroaching settlers. He writes that, since the coming ""pale
faces" have already "thrown...their friends and connexions into the grave," Natives appear to "have no better prospect" than of "living a few years longer" and finally sinking "into the ground...surrendering their lands...to the enjoyment of their enemies" (Catlin 485). Yet such injustice will not go unpunished. The price of this surrender for "American citizens" is the "lingering terror" of one day standing "with guilt's shivering conviction" among the "accusing spirits, that are to rise in their own fields, at the final day of resurrection" (ibid.). Despite leveling what appears from a contemporary view as a charge of genocide, Catlin's eschatological vision nonetheless denies the possibility of any meaningful, much less successful Native resistance in the future. This foreclosure also surfaces in Catlin's description in the same text of the 1832 treaty council at Rock Island. In the larger context of Sauk peoples gathered to transfer their land claims to the "insatiable grasp of pale-faced voracity," he notes that Black Hawk appears as an "object of pity," a "poor dethroned monarch" left standing alone and "in dumb and dismal silence" (Catlin, 440, 447). Despite the obvious sympathy, the Sauk war chief here amounts to an already spectral presence, embodying a fallenness that doubles as a prognostication, a vision of a Native resistance that can only ever be a voice from the grave.

Catlin therefore produces an incisive critique of the motivations for expansion. Nevertheless, this very criticism presents its imagined audience as de facto heirs to Sauk lands. The doubled transiting of shame and even outrage through the image of a muted, defeated Black Hawk, taken together with a spectral din of restless and unavenged Native voices on the settler day of reckoning, expresses a powerful dissent to both cutthroat land
speculation and the politics of dispossession. However, in these passages, the figuration of Indian suffering discloses a narrativity that, though deriving from the very recognition of injustice towards Indians, casts the lands in question in terms of a settler historicity that imagines "western" space as if already under de facto U.S. purview. The lament elicited by Catlin's image of Black Hawk together with the other future-anterior Indian ghosts transmutes real material consequences of settler emigration and unchecked US expansion into a vexed yet inevitable episode in the history of the new "territory." In this sense, the figuration parallels the symbolic function of future-anterior land cessions and "good faith" in the Northwest Ordinance. Black Hawk's tragic pose consolidates the view of Native peoplehood as an effectively outmoded way of living; in this way, the apparent facticity of his defeat, as refracted through a layer of pathos, re-inscribes an objective sense of the territory as predicated on the foreclosure of Native place-based sovereignty.

Catlin's embedded narrative of receding Indianness organizes a linear temporality, a historicity, within which the geopolitics of dispossession, and the violation of treaties and borderlines they entail, give way to the Indian's drifting away before the coming of the pale-faced rabble.

Catlin's representation of Black Hawk's supposed resignation to fallenness coalesces the broader geopolitical function of the discourse on withdrawing Indianness in the region. The Sauk warrior's celebrity occupies the space of receding Indianness established in the Northwest Ordinance, even as his personhood and the occasion of his surrender, taken together, serve to verify or "realize" the experiential truth supposedly behind that abstracted narrativity. The discourse on Black Hawk's surrender therein
transits well into the antebellum era a foundational frontier historicity that casts regional Native displacement as an extra-political and temporal condition of territorial organization. As one would expect, this narrative framing surfaces in the rhetorical positioning of the warrior that opens the Life of Black Hawk. Attesting to the text's authenticity, Antoine LeClaire, the US interpreter for the Sauk, affirms in his note beginning the volume that, after completing the tour, Black Hawk called on him rather than vice versa, expressing "a great desire to have a History of his Life written...that the people of the United States...might know the causes that had compelled him to act...and the principles by which he was governed" (Black Hawk 3). In the dedication to General Atkinson that follows, Black Hawk describes the man who commanded forces against him as his "conqueror" and hopes that he "never experience the humility that the power of the American government has reduced me to...[one who] in his Native forests, was once as proud and bold as yourself" (ibid. 6). Each moment clearly participates in the same body of associations organized around fallen Indianness. Whether he intended to do so or not, Black Hawk fits the mold of a Metamora, taking one last opportunity to relate to his conquerors the tragic futility of holding out against civilization.

However, as the text quickly demonstrates, Black Hawk explodes the view that his resistance signifies such futility. As noted above, he makes no bones about locating the 1804 treaty as the root of his problems. Some context will help to explain what he means. In 1804, four intoxicated Sauk warriors, who were unauthorized to cede territory, transferred to the US the bulk of Sauk lands east of the Mississippi for a $1,000 annuity (of which Black Hawk claims his people, or at least his band, never saw a dime).
Compounding the problem, however, is that Black Hawk himself inadvertently sustained these terms by signing the treaty that closed the War of 1812. Regarding this second treaty, he laments the willingness of U.S. actors to dupe Indigenous peoples into land cessions. "What do we know of the manner of the laws and customs of the white people? They might buy our bodies for dissection and we would touch the goose quill to confirm it, without knowing what we are doing," adding that "We can only judge of what is proper and right by our standard of right and wrong, which differs widely from the whites" (Black Hawk, 44). Against the background of a narrativity that abstracts the violence of dispossession, casting it as anomalous relative to normative territorial development, Black Hawk's critique here signals the pivot for thinking his text more broadly as directly intervening in the retroactive production of Native space as territory. To the degree that conveying a Sauk "standard of right and wrong" proves inseparable from place-based peoplehood, the text already undermines the linear historicity that otherwise would predicate the Old Northwest on settler governance.

In foregrounding the fallenness of Black Hawk's position, LeClaire's opening, then, provides the means to problematize the narrativity that such a framing typically evokes. The text moves quickly to disrupt implication of inevitable Indian withdrawal intimated, for instance, in the discourse of "good faith" supposedly central to U.S. territorial claims. Before developing this reading, however, I should note that it breaks with the predominant view of Black Hawk's text either as a belated demonstration of cultural autonomy in its critique of American hegemony or as offering belated statement of cultural sovereignty in the aftermath of the war. For example, Kendall Johnson
observes that the autobiography emphasizes "the hospitality of the Sauk and Fox toward peaceful strangers" in order to contrast with US depredations, drawing attention to the text's mobilization of tokens of diplomacy, such as peace medals, to designate "America's projection of 'peace and friendship' as an act of war" (775). Johnson argues that peace medals during this era epistemically translate "Indians into the Western discourse of property in which they figure alternatively as kings, chiefs, warriors, domestic dependent nations, savages" (779). Medals serve a process of incorporating Native peoples into the "domestic language of the US," reaching "to the ground of the alien, foreign, or savage in order to carry them back" in a manner that predictably fails "to substantiate Indians as actually sovereign in their difference," presenting them instead as "savages who only think in literal terms" (Johnson 779). By contrast, Black Hawk discloses the true valence of the terms peace and friendship, such that they "not only signal dishonesty but outline the rhetorical pattern of marking peace with Indians in the act of dispossessing them" (Johnson 781).

Johnson usefully foregrounds the ways in which Black Hawk de-familiarizes a generic notion of goodwill and thereby discloses the violence and dispossession central to settler advances, incursions that otherwise appear as, at best, the tragic price of "progress." Reading Black Hawk in this way, as focalizing his own stereotypically "Indian" fallenness, can be further elaborated, however, and conceived as intervening in the ways in which frontier historicity frames "territory" as already an extension of U.S./settler modes of belonging. The origin narrative that opens the text draws on the increasing appeal of the exoticized Indian Other while problematizing its status as a
cypher of inevitable disappearance. In foregrounding his lineage as war chief, the text defamiliarizes settler governance and juridical power, rendering an opening that can be understood as manifesting a place-based ethic of reciprocity and, consequently, a different form of "good faith" than that of the Northwest Ordinance.

In the origin narrative, Black Hawk dwells on the moment of contact between his great grandfather Na-nà-ma-kee, who lived at Montreal before the Sac moved west to flee the Iroquois in the mid-seventeenth century, and a French explorer, possibly Samuel de Champlain. In addition to promising to return the next year with goods for trade, the explorer gives Na-nà-ma-kee a medal that confers upon him the status of war leader, a position that Black Hawk would inherit, and provides his two brothers with additional ones that make them into civil leaders. As he notes, this moment of exchange establishes what the text describes as "a regular trade" between the Sauk and the French peoples, likely referring the network of trade relations that would largely persist until the British replaced the French as the major trading force in the region at the end of the French and Indian war (9). To the degree that it locates European contact as a foundational moment, the passage may be seen as corroborating the general view of settler expansion as having a devastating historical impact as it spread to Indigenous societies, reshaping their lifeways through the advent of mercantilism.

However, as Laura Rigal notes, while Indigenous hunting and harvesting in the region had followed local ecological patterns for "at least two thousand years," the French entered this equilibrium with their fur trade around the mid-seventeenth century which persisted for over a century "without changing its basic outline" (208). Black
Hawk's origin story reflects this equilibrium by problematizing the European/Indian binary central to this kind of critical take on the destructiveness of European/Anglo contact, a binary that surfaces in different ways in the texts by Catlin and implicitly Kirkland. For example, rather than the French simply stumbling into Na-nâ-ma-kee's party by chance, the narrative positions the great-grandfather as the primary agent here, driven to look for the explorer by a message from the "Great Spirit" indicating that, if his instructions were followed, he would meet a "white man" who would become "to him a father" (9). The trade networks that derive from this moment are epistemically covered by the spiritual narrative Black Hawk relates. It is not simply that the Sauk forefather welcomes the European traveler. Rather, what appear as distinct narrative modalities in the allusions to kinship, to history and geopolitics, and to Native religion, emerge as immanent elements of a social praxis irreducible to settler colonialism. Insofar as these modalities emerge out of a nexus of relationships comprise Sauk peoplehood, in other words, the autobiography de-familiarizes the artificial unity of Anglo civilization. It thereby cuts against the narrativity of Indian withdrawal by problematizing the coherence of the very formation that ostensibly comes to fill the space vacated by Indians.

Even as the passage positions Black Hawk's ancestors as having a primary relation to place, it also conveys a sense of the interdependence of the different actors that come to occupy it, as evidenced by the subtle fact that the openness to a kind of divine revelation underlying the scene is not depicted as unique to Native peoples. Upon discovering the visitor, Na-nâ-ma-kee tells him that he had been sent by the Great Spirit to find him. The man responds with what seems to be the most ironic moment of white-
guy-playing-Indian ever. He states not only that "he was the son of the King of France," but also, pointedly, "that he had been dreaming for four years [and] that the Great Spirit had directed him to come here, where he should meet a nation of people who had never yet seen a white man" (9-10, my emphasis). The visitor adds that the Spirit told him these people "should be his children, and he should be their father," and admits to Na-nà-ma-kee in closing that when he told the King of his dream the latter merely reacted with laughter, claiming that the territory was nothing but "an uninhabited region of lakes and mountains" (Black Hawk 10). The factuality and accuracy of Black Hawk's representation of Na-nà-ma-kee's pivotal moment of contact do not really matter. What does is that their textual inclusion discloses a historicity within which trade and diplomacy, not warfare or acquisition, comprise the baseline paradigm for contact with non-Native groups. This narrative anchors the broader representation of longstanding trade networks that, as Rifkin puts it, serve to indicate "the possibility of modes of interaction between Euramericans and Indigenous peoples not based on the acquisition of land or the circumscription of Native space," networks that remained active well into Black Hawk's adulthood, even as members came and went over a long span of time ("Documenting" 688). The origin narrative therefore underscores the primacy of place-based sovereignty by situating what we would identify as an Indigenous belief system as an immanent means of organizing diplomatic relationships.

As compared with the discourse on his surrender, Black Hawk's representation of place-based Sauk networks through the origin narrative inverts the condescending suggestion of a subordination guaranteed in the annals of History. The opening passage
shifts the orientation of the geopolitical events and alliances that follow, and with which some of the audience would have been familiar, away from a teleological narrative centered on U.S. expansion and toward the reproduction of social, economic, and political bonds comprising the basic matrix of Sauk peoplehood. By the late-eighteenth century, the Sauk had developed trade connections with the Spanish at St. Louis (resulting from its transfer from France to Spain after the Seven Years War) and then re-established ties to the French there when the latter regained the territory in the early-nineteenth century, until the Louisiana Purchase. Before turning to this later history, however, Black Hawk narrates the process by which Na-nà-ma-kee gained formal recognition as a chief by the Sauk. After returning from meeting the visitor, Na-nà-ma-kee tells his father, Muk-a-tà-quet, also referred to as the "principal chief of the nation," of his dream and subsequent discovery (Black Hawk 11). The latter then relays these events to the people and affirms his son's status by giving him the medicine bundle that Black Hawk later inherits, which Muk-a-tà-quet himself describes as "'the soul of our nation'"; yet dissension arises on the basis of "so much power being given" to one so young (Black Hawk 11). At that moment, a bolt of lightning sets fire to a nearby tree. Na-nà-ma-kee tells the council that he had indeed caused the strike, thereby demonstrating the will of the Great Spirit and convincing the people of his readiness for such responsibility. The narrative then leaps forward chronologically some decades to the British defeat of the French in the Seven Years War and to the Sauk migration to Mackinac (Lake Michigan).15
As some have noted, Black Hawk's emphasis on the origins of his lineage may have stemmed from a desire to demonstrate his legitimacy as a leader, especially as compared with Ke-o-kuck, the rival Sauk chief whose openness to U.S. overtures would play a major role in persuading the people to exchange lands and emigrate across the Mississippi. Ke-o-kuck's gradual embrace of removal more or less forced Black Hawk into drastic measures to remain at Saukenuk. Although Ke-o-kuck attained his position without having killed an enemy and was of mixed Fox and French descent, he would gradually acquire both leadership over a band consisting of about 4500 Sauk and also the backing of most of the civil chiefs, traditional leaders whose authority came from clan affiliation. By contrast, Black Hawk's so-called British Band, which resisted removal per the terms deriving from the fraudulent treaty of 1804, consisted only of about 800 Sauk at the most (Jung 55-6). Against this background, narrating the spectacular confirmation of his grandfather's status conveys a lineage that helps to legitimize a course of action taken on behalf of only a minority of the nation. Rather than a means of self-validation, however, the emphasis on Ke-o-kuck's origins can be read, as Rifkin suggests, as foregrounding the ways in which the U.S. "seeks to break up regional networks, isolating Native peoples from each other and producing forms of territorial boundedness and political centralization that facilitate the extension of U.S. jurisdiction" ("Documenting" 695).

In keeping with this reading, the internal strife that characterizes the origin narrative also bears on the dynamics of this latter conflict with Ke-o-kuck. The Na-nà-ma-kee narrative formally and symbolically primes Black Hawk's break with his later
rival. Marking the dissension and its overcoming in the former narrative constitutes the 
frame for thinking the latter break constituted by Black Hawk's actions, a frame that, 
though primarily comprised of Sauk peoples also extends to those acknowledged as 
parties within the kinship-diplomatic bonds that it manifests, bonds designated in the 
recurrence of the term "father." The use of "father" to designate historical allies to the 
Sauk, as well as the many non-Native actors with whom Black Hawk confers in the 
course of the usurpation of Saukenuk, casts Sauk peoplehood as a constitutive 
geopolitical agency rather than as peripheral to U.S. and/or European presence. In this 
way, the narrative subverts representations of the space as occupied by a homogenous 
Indianness fated to recede once supposedly civilized processes of emigration and state 
formation take hold. The diplomatic bonds that Black Hawk foregrounds early in the text 
not only emphasize place-based modes of organization that run counter to a frontier 
historicity within which Indians predictably withdraw in time, but they also implicitly 
cast territorial protocols that fail to acknowledge these Indigenous networks as subverting 
geopolitical processes already embedded in the region.

From the grandfather narrative forward, then, the ethic of reciprocity organized 
around Sauk peoplehood grounds a narrative of events that problematize a reading of the 
conflict through the lens of exotic, withdrawing Indianness integral to the imagination of 
frontier space. When the U.S. acquires control of St. Louis and sends a delegation of 
soldiers up the Mississippi and Rock rivers, they meet with Black Hawk's band, offering 
gifts that include an American flag. In exchange, the soldiers request that the band give 
up their British flags and medals, which Black Hawk declines to do, stating that he
wishes "to have two Fathers!" (17). First, the possibility of having multiple alliance networks challenges a paradigm in which generic representations of "Indian" autonomy serve mainly to present settler incursions of various kinds as historically progressive. Second, this passage obviously intervenes in the multivalent notion of hierarchy associated with "fatherhood," such that adapting the kinship term to reflect Sauk geopolitical practice negates its own overtly patriarchal register. Where the term usually denotes a sociopolitical power that goes without saying (God the Father, fatherhood as a metaphor for the primacy of US political power vis-à-vis Native peoples, the father as the master of the home), Black Hawk's usage traverses such divisions, disclosing their contingency and partiality in the course of centering place-based Sauk political formations. Finally, in forcing the term to register Sauk political agency in this way, the comment gestures to a non-normative geopolitical praxis that not only precedes, but exceeds both settler modes of territorial expansion and the political geography they presuppose. In other words, by indicating the possibility for the Sauk to have multiple, seemingly incompatible alliances with different non-Native actors, the comment brackets a geopolitical orientation toward U.S. (or British) colonization and calls into question a narrativity that would facilitate U.S. expansion by depicting Native displacement as both an inevitable and an extra-political phenomenon.

As Catlin and Kirkland differently show, representing Indianness as subject to an extra-political disappearance over time generates an image of the Old Northwest as a known space already predicated on the foreclosure of Native sovereignty. This foreclosure orients the space toward settler governance in such a manner that the violence
of expansion appears as something like the historical movement of the "territory" itself, as, at best, a spectacular and wholly irrational exception to the normative course of progress in the region. By beginning with an assertion of place-based kinship, Black Hawk, by contrast, frames his break with Ke-o-kuck, his refusal to leave Saukenuk in the years leading up to the conflict, and his return to the village in 1832 from west of the Mississippi (often blamed for beginning the conflict) through the Sauk-centered forms of alliance-making first established in the grandfather narrative. This framing clears the space for a place-based ethics of alliance-making and reciprocity to emerge as embedded in the landscape yet not necessarily receding. These ethics implicitly challenge the supposed fatedness of "unsettled" lands to be integrated by the United States not in the least by representing the turn toward violence as deriving from both violations of diplomatic networks already integral to the space and illegal incursions into Sauk territory, more generally.

One passage especially challenges not only the legitimacy of U.S. juridical powers of recognition, but also the seemingly given, meta-position of territorial sovereignty that such powers retroactively legitimize. When Fox warriors avenge the murder of kin by Menomonees and Santee Sioux, the settler public in the area panics, causing the "Great Father" (the U.S. federal government) to demand that the Fox hand over the suspects (Black Hawk 68). However, the U.S. failed to intervene when the Fox were attacked in the first place, nor did they apparently make a request of them after the Fox retaliated. Black Hawk accordingly recalls that when the Fox came to him for advice, he told them that they had "done right" and that "our Great Father acted very unjustly in
demanding \textit{them} [the Fox] without ever having made a similar demand" of the other nations, adding that "if he had no right [then] he had none now" and further adding that it was "very \textit{questionable}, if not altogether usurpation...where a difference between exists between two nations for him to interfere," suggesting the lack of U.S. juridical purview (68). Black Hawk's symbolic currency as a famous Sauk warrior generates the rhetorical position from which to criticize the extension of settler sovereignty through treaty processes. At the same time, however, he also interrupts the tendency to pose Sauk, Fox, and Menominee place-based sovereignty as merely nominal variations of the same Indianness already configured as a receding predicate of the space. Just as the origin narrative cuts against the artificial unity of Anglo civilization early in the text, Black Hawk here intervenes in the transit of regional juridical power from Indigenous groups to the settler state by problematizing the tendency to conflate the sovereignties of different Indigenous peoples into a homogenous notion of Indian withdrawal.

By continually foregrounding these alliance networks, the narrative conditions an ethics both inseparable from an image of place-based Sauk autonomy and, as such, out of sync with his own symbolic position as a kind of "Last of the \textit{Mohicans} Sauk." At one point, he indicates that he and his band would not leave as ordered because they "had no agency in selling our country," and "as provision had been made in the treaty" of 1814 that ratified the earlier 1804 treaty "for us all to remain as long as it belonged to the United States," he and his group "could not be \textit{forced} away" (Black Hawk 62). This comment draws together two additional elements of the text's critique. Black Hawk asserts that "\textit{land cannot be sold}" insofar as the "Great Spirit give it to his children to live
upon," adding that "any other people" can claim land only after those living there "voluntarily leave it" and, further, that "Nothing can be sold, but such things as can be carried away" (56). He makes this comment after describing his return to Saukenuk after a winter hunt (1828) to discover not only that backwoods intruders had not left, but that they had also made further enclosures of Sauk land. At this point, he remarks that there was "no more friendship existing" between Ke-o-kuck and himself, since "only a coward, and no brave" would "abandon his village to be occupied by strangers" (Black Hawk 56).

However, narrating Black Hawk's rift with Ke-o-kuck does not intend portray the former as having an irrational attachment to ancestral lands. Rather, the political dissent with the main body of the Sauk extends both the narrative continuity and the embedded notion of Native sovereignty by way of the trope of alliance-making.

As an organizing motif, then, Sauk political processes and alliance networks portray the resistance to settler incursions as both grounded in and part and parcel of orderly diplomatic processes, thereby challenging the deflection of land cessions in the popular discourse on Black Hawk's surrender. During the above-mentioned crisis, Black Hawk continually meets with Native and non-Native (British and American) actors alike seeking advice on how to proceed. After having learned that some of the land at Saukenuk had been privately sold to speculative interests, Black Hawk determines to remain on the balance of lands originally claimed by the U.S. per the 1804 treaty. However, while coming to this decision, he meets with "the chief of my British Father" who advises him to meet with "our American father," and after this he meets with "the great chief at Detroit," each of whom give the same advice, namely that if the land has
not been sold the Sauk have a right to remain on them (60). The point to be emphasized is
neither that Black Hawk had a legitimate reason for his actions nor that they were
validated by those of non-Native military and private actors. Rather, insofar as these
meetings draw upon existing alliance networks, they signify modern instantiations of the
same form of geopolitical agency symbolized in the Na-nà-ma-kee narrative. In this way,
they manifest Native sovereignty in terms of a field of cultural production, depictions of
frontier life in terms of literary realism and historicizations of the Black Hawk War as
evidencing the red man's tragic fate, that otherwise reinforces a systemic negation of
place-based Native peoplehood.

Rather than a belated grudge, the tension between Ke-o-kuck and Black Hawk
therefore registers a complex political dynamic that, in turn, casts "being forced" from
Saukenuk as a violation on an order of ethics far exceeding the normative political and
cultural frameworks that structure settler belonging. Prior to detailing the 1831 meetings
with Gaines and the Sauk council, Black Hawk ruminates on his attachment to Saukenuk.
He observes that when he remembers "the scenes of my youth, and those of later days—
and reflected that the theatre on which these were acted, had been so long the home of my
fathers, who now slept on the hills around it, I could not...consent to leave it, without
being forced therefrom," echoing his representation of Ke-o-kuck's earlier comments to
the council on the importance of defending Sauk land (Black Hawk 62). The passage
renders a lucid expression both of Black Hawk's connection to home and of his drive to
remain and defend it from civilization in the form of backwoods settler vagabonds, armed
with booze and fences. Read together with both the portrait of Ke-o-kuck's early stance
and the detailed history of Black Hawk's lineage, one can suggest that while kinship provides the epistemic condition for interfacing with non-Native parties, it does not preclude intra-tribal dissension and political dynamics. At the same time, the narrativity of Sauk political processes casts settler incursions as themselves composed of multiple actors, an image far from either the orderly portrait of emigration reflected in the Northwest Ordinance or Catlin's more critical portrait of settler hordes. Settler emigration itself emerges as an alien phenomenon, less a civilized process of territorial development than a siege by a host of different actors with uneven aims. Upon returning to Saukenuk from the winter hunt just prior to the 1831 standoff with General Edmund Gaines, who tried more or less to intimidate Black Hawk into leaving, the latter discovers that encroaching settlers had plowed up the corn planted by Sauk women the previous season. Black Hawk determines to "put a stop to the intruders," giving them one day to leave (Black Hawk 64). Nevertheless, when one of the intruders indicates that his family "would be in a starving condition, if he went and left his crop" and promises that he would "behave well" if the Sauk leader would allow him to remain through the harvest, Black Hawk relates that the man "spoke reasonably, and I consented" (64). The obverse of this willingness to accommodate the very people encroaching on Sauk lands is an ethical refusal of violence that is grounded in a connection to place. A quintessential example is Black Hawk's adaptation of what reads as civil disobedience in his refusal to leave Saukenuk. During the confrontation with Gaines, whose intimidation tactics can be viewed as escalating the crisis, Black Hawk repeatedly insists upon his determination to "make no resistance, in
The ethics that Indigenous actors display in such moments immanently and retroactively undermine the historicity of the frontier motif as typified by Catlin, within which the blurring of socio-spatial and temporal movement creates a gap between recognizing the crimes of dispossession and the formal recognition of Native, in this case Sauk, sovereignty. Insofar as these ethics constitute a mode of relationality, of forming and sustaining connections among disparate groups in the region, they presuppose Sauk belonging by way of gesturing to the alliances that comprise regional geopolitical dynamics. They accordingly subvert representations of the territory as fated to pass into U.S. jurisdiction, pivoting away from the retroactive work of a frontier historicity oriented to the cloning and integration of supposedly "unsettled" Native lands. One political consequence of these ethics is the problematization of a reading of the text in which Sauk alliance-networks amount at most to an "Indian" alternative to U.S. republicanism. Black Hawk in fact himself offers a striking (and strikingly relevant) critique of democracy when he observes that "white people never appear to be satisfied. When they get a good father, they hold councils (at the suggestion of some bad, ambitious man, who wants the place himself,) and conclude...that this man" or someone else equally ambitious "would make a better father...and nine times out of ten they don't get as good a one again" (Black Hawk 58). As opposed to the embedded corporatism of settler democracy, which, as he indicates, is subject to manipulation by those with no
substantial ethical and familial ties to place and people, the dynamics of Sauk peoplehood that he charts are premised on an ethics rooted in sustaining the people and the land.

Black Hawk's comment presupposes a relational ethics whose various networks gesture to Indigenous modes of diplomacy, exchange, and place-making not only into which settler actors enter, but that also open up something like a series of counterfactual possibilities in the otherwise supposedly fated and hermetic break between residual and receding Indianness and the coming of civilized settler modernity. In a way, Black Hawk puts a twist on Byrd's observation that even "in its consolidation, the United States is haunted by the specters of its origins, and the displaced narratives that have been continually rewritten do not altogether disappear" (206). As with Catlin, the spectrality of an exotic and receding Indianness often yielded the point at which a grievance over Native dispossession simultaneously produced its irrevocable historicity. Here, that spectrality "haunts" the discourse from the inside, as Black Hawk extends its aura to foreground the dysfunction of the mechanisms of U.S. corporate and political culture themselves, aspects of U.S. geopolitics that also go missing in the objective representation of the "territory" as if fated to give way to settler governance (206).

Put another way, if, as Rifkin convincingly argues, Black Hawk's narrative "offers an alternative mapping to that of U.S. policy" largely through "insisting on the coherence of shared social processes that predate, and are seriously disrupted by, U.S. presence in the region," the corollary of disclosing this disruption is a counter-historicity that fractures the notion of the settler "state" to such an extent that the various U.S./Anglo elements intruding on Sauk lands cannot be said to add up to any kind of homogenous
whole ("Documenting" 686). For instance, Black Hawk's specific critique of the U.S.'s failure to follow through on promises to trade with the Sauk on credit (through Fort Madison), which he bluntly states forced most of the Sauk from neutrality to the British side in the War of 1812, registers as more than a mere failure of diplomacy and an oblique reflection of imperialist designs on the region more generally. This failure to come through with supplies necessary for the Sauk to proceed with the seasonal hunt damages relations with the U.S. and could be read as indexing a monolithic "whiteness," as an axiomatic geopolitical category; the text would seem to corroborate this view in questioning why the Great Spirit sent whites "to this island, to drive us from our homes, and introduce among us poisonous liquors, disease, and death?" (23). Nevertheless, the wound created at Fort Madison was not enough to galvanize Black Hawk into joining the Winnebago uprising over a decade later, suggesting at once that such a transiting did not mean a permanent exile and that U.S. efforts to coerce the broader Sauk and Ojibwe alliance networks into remaining neutral were at least minimally productive. To Black Hawk, such a failure to come through on trade signals a duplicity that puts his people at risk. However, the critique of U.S.-sanctioned traders also registers only as a partial critique of the military apparatus with which they are but unevenly aligned. Foregrounding a geopolitics built on Indigenous networks of reciprocity divides an otherwise seemingly homogenous United States qua civilization into its own uneven and asymmetrical actors. This division undercuts the notion of a frontier space within which receding Indianness sustains a portrait of organization that, in turn, retroactively endows settler civilization with an imaginary cohesion and unity.
In this way, criticizing the failure to come through on terms of exchange complements that of the juridical reach of settler sovereignty per the U.S. overreaching in the Fox murders. Moreover, the setter actors in each of these instances are different from the rabble that would form the bulk of the volunteer militia force, a group comprised largely of the same settlers who had earlier encroached upon Saukenuk (and the lead mines of the Sauk and Winnebago more generally over the previous five years). If we recall how the historicity evoked through future-anterior land cessions in the Northwest Ordinance renders settler emigration a structural element of the territory, its temporality, the ire that Black Hawk directs toward this rabble can be thought both as rendering this group structurally visible in their historical role as backwoods encroachers and, as such, immanently contravening a historicity within which illegal emigration loses its status as such. Black Hawk's description of how his people largely refrained from injuring those who had encroached on their lands during their winter hunts, a description that pivots on his ethical treatment of these "intruders," rhetorically aims to show to a settler audience that "we are a peaceable people" (57). However, reversing the valence of stereotypical Indian savagery involves disclosing the real, material shape of emigration and its effects: "...having permitted ten men to take possession of our corn-fields; prevent us from planting corn; burn and destroy our lodges; ill-treat our women; and beat to death our men, without resistance," his band's behavior offers "a lesson worthy for the white man to learn; to use forbearance when injured" (ibid.). Although the text situates the list of grievances as proof of Black Hawk's conduct and character, it also mobilizes an ethics
rooted in Sauk place-based peoplehood to throw into relief depredations that simply did not register as depredations within non-Native discourses on expansion into the region.

Though the backwoods rabble comprises on only one group within the dispersed but largely hostile annexation of Native space, they are shown as among the most vicious, in keeping with what historical records have come to disclose. Black Hawk notes that he would have remained at Saukenuk during the 1831 standoff and been "taken prisoner by the regulars [enlisted federal troops]" except that he was afraid of the violence he might elicit from the settler rabble who were apparently "under no restraint of their chiefs" (67). The text casts these "pale faces" diametrically opposite the "braves," a term that generally refers to Native warriors but that Black Hawk also extends to regular US troops and certain government representatives, such as President Jackson and Illinois territorial governor John Reynolds (who also commanded forces against Black Hawk). Key is that these "braves" are a crucial part of the very invasive juridical apparatus that Black Hawk heavily criticizes a few pages earlier. In fact, the text comes down most forcefully against "pale faces," whom he also refers to as "these settlers on our frontiers and on our lands" and strikingly contrasts them with whites living in the Appalachian mountains who appear to live by the principle "'do unto others as you wish them to do unto you,'" a reference that hearkens back to the geopolitical boundary line established by the British in the Proclamation of 1763 (90). And rightfully so, as those settlers who poured into the region by the hundreds of thousands after the War of 1812 and then into Winnebago and Sauk lands in particular by the thousands in the mid- to late 1820s were the primary encroachers that first drove the Sauk away from Saukenuk, settling on lands that had not
been sold and razing crops while the Sauk were away during winter. Further, these "pale faces," to whom Catlin, to his credit, obliquely refers in his journals as the insatiable hordes, not only formed the volunteer militias that determined the outcome of the war, but they also effectively began the war with the attack at Stillman's Run. Still more, they were largely responsible for the grotesque violence toward a retreating band of primarily starving women, children, and elderly desperately attempting to re-cross the Mississippi River at the Battle of Bad Axe that ended the conflict.¹⁹

Black Hawk's text occupies the imposed frame of exotic, receding Indianness to generate a narrative that, in describing the violent conflict, stresses how he tried repeatedly to withdraw peacefully and remove from his homelands. However, he was denied the opportunity to do so by a bloodthirsty white militia, on one hand, and U.S. officials who were eager to make an example of his supposedly stubborn attachment to the place of his birth, on the other. The larger point, though, is that despite such a horrific outcome, the text nonetheless refuses to view the conflict as a zero-sum game involving two sides, whites and Indians. Appropriating the narrativity of Indian withdrawal by way of Black Hawk's emergent celebrity provides the condition to destabilize both that Indianness and, by proxy, a reading that would situate the atrocity of Sauk dispossession as a merely an unfortunate page in the otherwise smooth transit of paradigmatic settler civilization. In offering a genealogical portrait of Sauk belonging, organized around Sauk alliance-networks and political processes, the narrative's representation of the conflict as a horrific, wildly uneven, and unapologetically genocidal affair cuts against a frontier
Historicity that orients the territory, writ large, to the US through figures of receding Indianness.

The text can therefore be understood as a tactic at the level of knowledge-production. Both the geopolitics and larger coherence of US expansion relies upon the narrativity of future-anterior Indian withdrawal to cast violent usurpation by multiple, differently situated, and structurally uneven settler actors retroactively as the smooth, inevitable unfolding of inevitable state formation. In this sense, the text both anticipates and corroborates Foucault's observation that the "state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities" (Birth of Biopolitics 77). Although the larger discourse surrounding Black Hawk demonstrates a continuation of an earlier frontier historicity by framing Sauk dispossession through the spectacle of exotic and belated Indianness, the Life of Black Hawk quickly problematizes that narrativity by suspending the binary, future-anterior tense whereby the temporality of residual Indianness consolidates uneven intrusions and encroachments into Native space into the smooth, linear, and destined unfolding of the territory in accordance with settler governance. By showing territorialization as consisting in a multiplicity of violations of place-based Sauk sovereignty and peoplehood, Black Hawk negates the retroactive effect whereby receding Indianness orients Native lands to the U.S. via the historicity of the Old Northwest as a "territory." Conceived as a maneuver in a broader struggle for place-based sovereignty that has not ended, the text gives the final impression that one actor, namely the encroaching politico-juridical apparatus, may yet be played off of another, the
encroaching white rabble, and that, for Black Hawk, the matter was far from settled at the council of 1832.

This chapter has sought to foreground the role that frontier historicity played facilitating Native dispossession in the Old Northwest by rendering a notion of the territory as historically oriented to the United States through the narratives of receding Indianness. By way of narrating Indian withdrawal, the very objective space in which certain agendas appear as a means to dispossess and displace Indigenous peoples retroactively appears as already predicated on U.S. governance. Kirkland locates a "forward" in the possibility of egalitarian village-making, construed as an immanent, place-based alternative to the forms of unregulated encroachment and speculation that drove expansion. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith observes, however, what "makes ideas 'real' is the system[s] of knowledge, the formations of culture, and the relations of power in which [they] are located" (51). Accordingly, the figures of receding Indianness that Kirkland describes as scattered across the landscape help to construct a sense of reality within which the immanent and organic forming of community life at Montacute registers as a sustainable and authentic relation to place, especially in relation to rampant land speculation and predatory lending. Further, the text's indebtedness to this frontier historicity marks it as extending an objective violence toward place-based Native peoplehood already envisioned in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
These tropes of Indian withdrawal do not mis-recognize actual Native groups, though they do gesture to actual mechanisms of dispossession that Black Hawk discloses in greater detail. Rather, they render Indianness as a non-presence, one that endows the territory in its objectivity as destined for settler annexation. The narrative suggestion of this withdrawal through these supposedly real figures generates an "Old Northwest" as a territory whose objectivity largely consists in its being carved out for settlers in advance. In turn, Black Hawk's text can and should be read as a parallax view onto ongoing processes of displacement and dispossession in the region. However, I want to end with a comment on the narrative impression of necessity that the arc of this chapter may imply, and I would like to do so by briefly returning to my argument concerning the emergence of this frontier historicity.

Considering that the Northwest Ordinance outlines mechanisms for integrating territory that would be adapted later by Congress and come to shape Jefferson's Indian policy as president, its future-anterior tense might read as inaugurating a policy of subversion characteristic of later settler colonialism, as the aforementioned letter to Harrison written some fifteen years after the Ordinance would indicate. At the very least, predicting a point at which Native land rights will have been ceded anticipates the more aggressive and systemic use of treaties during the antebellum era to acquire Native lands in exchange for reservations further west, payments, and goods. However, this gap between the stated or surface (formal) discourse and its actual, subversive effects can be too quickly reduced to a more fundamental drive to dispossess Native peoples. Such a reading is symptomatic of methodological approaches to settler colonialism that, in Mark
Rifkin's words, risk "shorthand[ing] its workings" by representing it "as a fully integrated whole operating in smooth, consistent, and intentional ways across the sociospatial terrain it encompasses" (*Settler* 5). Presupposing such a drive as a historical causality in itself ironically minimizes the work that the document performs, which involves not simply collapsing and effacing the specificity of Native peoples and their claims from the political grid of intelligibility, but, in this case, also the obverse maneuver: positing a historicity via future-anterior land cessions that endows the territoriality of the space in question with meaning, in the abstract, as a temporal extension of settler belonging.

I think that it would therefore be a mistake to read the Ordinance, or Kirkland's novel for that matter, as reflecting or expressing a transcendent will-to-colonize. Treating the former as "expressing" colonialism in this way paradoxically situates the effacement of Native sovereignty. In turn, such a reading presumes both the givenness of settler claims over time and the capacity of the nation to enact them at what was undoubtedly a tenuous moment in U.S. history, as if such claims only needed to be legitimized rather than implemented. As against this presumption, I would reiterate that the effect of the production of knowledge on the space of the Old Northwest as transited through receding Indianness is to generate this very sense of historical necessity as the will of transcendent subject, of a single actor behind the curtain. And, as I think Black Hawk makes clear in foregrounding the multiplicity of Native and settler actors, intrusions, and agendas constitutive of settler expansion in the region, the supposed necessity of that movement remains an imported commodity.
Notes

1 It should be noted that the letter to Harrison, though exceptional, is not the only place Jefferson underscores the coercive element of land exchange. In fact, in a letter dated just a week earlier than this one, he expressed a similar view to Benjamin Hawkins, former senator from North Carolina and US Indian agent in charge of dealing with southeastern Native peoples. There Jefferson observed that while Natives "are learning to do better on less land, our increasing numbers will be calling for more land, and thus a coincidence of interests will be produced," and pointedly added that "You are in the station peculiarly charged with this interchange, and [have] in your power to promote among the Indians a sense of the superior value of a little land, well cultivated, over a great deal, unimproved..." ("To Benjamin Hawkins," 1115).

2 The notion of the third space/middle ground can be thought pushing against an older historicism that reads the representations of Indians in non-Native literature as mainly fabricating a symbolic American identity and thereby synthesizing a unique national imaginary out of two otherwise discordant elements: a vexed transatlantic cultural heritage and the New World landscape. Sollors' Beyond Ethnicity does the latter kind of work, but perhaps the definitive text in this vein is the incredibly researched opus Regeneration Through Violence, in which Richard Slotkin lays out a trans-historical archaeology of the different uses of the "Indian" as a myth-figure, crucially showing how narrative constructions of Indianness provide a flexible series of archetypes by which to narrate the development of American social and historical consciousness. The third space model, by contrast, privileges the performativity involved in cultural encounters, for Native and settler actors alike. For more, see the collection Native Acts, edited by Bellin and Mielke. Importantly, however, the afterword of this very volume, written by Philip Deloria, notes, albeit briefly, the difficulties in taking the idea of the middle ground (which Richard White developed with regard to the Ohio Valley region) as a transposable concept that can adequately explain Native-settler interactions elsewhere and at different times.

3 For Žižek, however, the concept of objective violence is not simply an abstraction. Its historical and existential form is capitalism. The "mad, self-enhancing circulation of capital" as described by Marx "reaches its apogee in today's meta-reflexive speculation on futures"; it is therefore too simplistic to claim, he argues, "that the spectre of this self-engendering monster that pursues its path disregarding any human or environmental concern is an ideological abstraction and that behind this abstraction there are real people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources capital's circulation is based and on which it feeds like a gigantic parasite" (Žižek Violence 12). In contrast to this view, which seeks to retain the world molded by capitalism by locating its violence primarily "in our financial speculators' misperception of social reality," Žižek insists we read Marx as arguing that "the self-propelling metaphysical dance of capital…runs the show"; capitalism is Real in the sense that it determines the "structure of material social processes: the fate of whole strata of the population and sometimes whole countries can be decided by the 'solipsistic' speculative dance of capital" (Violence 12).

4 For a detailed analysis of this encroachments and the role they played in establishing a pan-Indian confederacy, see Lakomäki, 102-120.

5 For instance, Miller adds that in 1786 Colonel George Rogers Clark, the officer in charge of the northwestern frontier during the Revolutionary War, organized and conducted raids on Miami and Shawnee villages along the Wabash River supposedly in retaliation for attacks made by Native warriors on anglo settlements near Vincennes, Indiana. Clark however acted without explicit approval by the federal government (Miller 39-40).
Complicating the issue of the boundary line was a treaty negotiated between the British and Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1768, sixteen years before the more familiar one negotiated between the US and the Six Nations at the same location. Land speculators and settlers from western New York and Pennsylvania had been angling for access to land in the Indian reserve for some time. The treaty carved out a chunk by drawing a new line that began in New York and stretched down to the Ohio River, following from there all the way to the Mississippi. However, the Iroquois had no claims to the lands ceded below the Ohio river, as these belonged primarily to Shawnee and Delaware peoples. Although members of each group were at the treaty conference, neither participated in the formal process itself, nor did they authorize the Iroquois to make the cession on their behalf. Further, William Johnson, the superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern region (a position also created in the aftermath of the Proclamation of 1763), went beyond his authority in allowing a group of private land interests, tellingly called the Suffering Traders, to negotiate with the Iroquois directly, prior to formal procedures. Finally, Johnson also extended the new line to the southwest from the Kanawaha to the Tennessee Rivers, well beyond the original distance approved by the British monarchy. The regional colonial authority then ordered Johnson to give the fraudulently ceded territory back. Nonetheless, the agreement immediately contributed to the flood of unsanctioned anglo emigration in the territory in the latter quarter of the 18th century, and it simultaneously galvanized the Shawnee who lived in the southern Ohio valley to resist such encroachments with force.

Although the broader Iroquois council rejected the terms set at Fort Stanwix for their lands in New York and Pennsylvania, the US treated the agreement as legitimate. Similarly, the Treaty of Fort Finney polarized the Shawnees, as those who did not participate decried its outcome. These cessions accordingly set the stage for decades of not only Iroquois and Shawnee resistance but of broader pan-Indian confederacies in the region. See Calloway The Shawnees and the War for America 77-84 and Richter 223-5.

For More on Shay's Rebellion, in particular the role that processes of debt litigation played in catalyzing the movement, see Goldscheider.

For more on the development of the Eerie Canal and the displacement of Iroquois peoples in western New York, see Rifkin Settler, 174-7. For more on the economics of the emigration influx in the western part of Michigan territory, including mining development and, in particular, the role that the American Fur Company played in extracting resources from what would become Iowa territory and thereby forcing the Sauk to cede more of their lands in order to trade for goods, see Rigal. For more on the Treaty of Detroit, see Gilpin 43-5 and Dunbar 146. Although what constitutes present-day Michigan derives from eleven treaties, from the 1795 Treaty of Greenville to the 1842 Treaty at LaPointe, conducted with different Native groups, the vast majority of the land was transferred to the US in five treaties. These include the 1807 treaty, the 1819 Treaty of Saginaw conducted with mostly Chippewa peoples, the Chicago Treaty of 1821 with the Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomi, the Washington Treaty of 1836 with Ottawa and Chippewa peoples, and finally LaPointe, at which the Ojibwe ceded the far northwest quadrant between Lakes Superior and Michigan that opened onto Wisconsin territory, which the US cut away from Michigan the same year. In 1818, shortly after Indiana and Illinois became states, the remainders of their territories were annexed to Michigan. From then until 1834 the territory was enormous, reaching as far west as the Missouri river and containing modern-day Iowa, Minnesota, and parts of the Dakotas (Dunbar 182).

For more on the economic and political conditions that led to the Panic of 1837, see Sánchez Reforming the World, 34-41.
I use the term excessive deliberately to suggest two overlapping mechanisms. First, these Indians evoke a sense of Native peoples as tragic-yet-fated to fade in keeping with the general narrativity of the Indian as an exoticized spectacle so prevalent in the popular discourses on Natives at the time. For more on this general representation, see Conn and Richards. However, I also mean excessive in the sense of parallax, suggesting a phantasmatic remainder that cannot be included in reality precisely because its ejection/foreclosure is constitutive of the socio-symbolic texture underpinning a given view of reality. For more on this mechanism, see Žižek *The Parallax View* 20-36, *Looking Awry* 89-102 and *Event* 108-35.

Black Hawk signed the treaty with William Clark, the famous explorer and then-governor of Missouri territory, in May 1816, although the US had pressured other Native groups into signing treaties that reaffirmed various land cessions in the region the previous year. The Sauk were among the last to hold out, and, as Patrick Jung observes, the US built two forts in Sauk territory so as to force the issue, Fort Edwards in the autumn of 1815 near Warsaw, Illinois and Fort Armstrong the following spring at Rock Island. See Jung, 29-32.

Much of the scholarship on *Life of Black Hawk* rests on this kind of framing, in which the text's work, whether taken as a critique of depredations or an expression of indigeneity, reads both as belated rather than tactical and as manifesting, not mobilizing, a supposedly axiomatic Native-American binary. Arnold Krupat for instance argues that Black Hawk demonstrates a mode of elegiac expression unique to Native American peoples. This mode represents an example of what Vizenor terms "survivance" in that relaying the history of his life and interweaving traditional knowledge doubles as a means of reconstituting and extending the life of the broader Sauk nation. However, just because the text emphasizes and even foregrounds certain Sauk cultural practices does not necessarily mean that, in Krupat's words, "the story Black Hawk sought to tell in his autobiography is foremost the story of what it means to be a Sauk, i.e. a national rather than a personal story, expressing a 'communitist' rather than an individualist identity" (527). We would expect to find traces of Sauk culture in a text relayed by a Sauk, questions of intention aside. More problematically, Krupat's view methodologically presupposes a distinctly "western" division between cultural and political fields. He writes that though "Black Hawk surely wanted to make known to the whites the reasons for his resistance, he would as well have wanted to keep his story, his People's story, alive for the Sauk nation" (Krupat 543). Are these aims necessarily diachronic impulses? What allows them to be read as such, one can suggest, is the presumption that Black Hawk indeed understood the conflict as irrevocably over. However, for this to be the case, we have to take Black Hawk as speaking literally, and not tactically as I am arguing here, when he indicates his defeatedness and subordination to settler authority figures like Patterson. In short, ironically enough, Krupat's view mandates we take the very tropes of Indianness as fallen, withdrawing, and the like emerging in this very era as methodological givens. To be fair, he isn't the only one who situates the very stereotypes that Black Hawk mobilizes as entry points to a critique of settler claims to land as tools, not objects, for analysis. Laura Mielke lumps Black Hawk's text together with William Apess's autobiography to suggest that while differing in the particular forms of white depredations they outline, both texts similarly "offer living, breathing Native Americans as moral exemplars for a culture whose military success has not guaranteed moral progress" ("Native to the Question" 260). S.L. Pratt takes the underlying ontological Native-American binary that supposedly guarantees a division between "Indian" and "White" cultures so far as to offer what reads as a rationalization of the very violence Black Hawk sought to disclose. He asserts that when "a people who find meaning in a transcendent chronology come to a land, it is hard for them to gain a place at all since their approach to meaning is one that understands the world as a process of displacement. The cost of such a people's survival is the nearly inevitable destruction of places and the forms of life they sustain" (Pratt 122).
For more on the development of trade and political ties with the French in the early 17th century and the changes in geopolitical networks from that point, including ties with the Spanish and eventually the US, see Jung 15-20.

It is important to clarify that both the French and the Iroquois played roles in this emigration, and that upon reaching the Ohio valley, the Sauk gained not only new allies but new Native enemies as well, namely the Sioux, Osage, and Cherokee peoples. See Jung 12-15.

For instance, when Black Hawk describes the encounter General Edmund Gaines at a council meeting in June of 1831, after returning to Saukenuk with his band following the winter hunt, as he had claimed he would do, he claims that he responded to the latter's advice to "leave the country you are occupying" by stating that "we had never sold our country. We never received any annuities from our American father! And we are determined to hold on to our village," summarizing the rationale for his resistance in relation to the 1804 treaty. In a footnote to this passage, Gerald Kennedy writes that the refrain of "we" serves to indicate that Black Hawk meant to distinguish "between his band...and the larger Sauk and Fox nation led by Ke-o-kuck, which had accepted annuities," adding that, Ke-o-kuck being present, he also "insists upon his hereditary tribal identity to assert his lineage as a leader and implicitly to taunt the mixed-blooded Keokuck" (Black Hawk 105, n. 68).

This aspect of the text's genealogical dynamics recalls George Ironstack's observation of traditional Miami place-based conceptions of peoplehood. He writes that the Miami origin narrative demonstrates how they "differentiated other groups of humans: by the language they spoke and the place from which they came," adding that their regional neighbors were generally referred to as "elder brothers"; this place-based dynamic only came to shift gradually with the imported notion of "tribe," which ultimately provided the cartographic means for creating "legal entities that could negotiate away the title to land and thereby create a 'legitimate' context for American settlement of Indigenous lands" (187, 192).

For a more detailed discussion of these dynamics, see Rifkin, "Documenting."

Despite the fact that Black Hawk had tried to open diplomatic channels and that his group had dwindled from 1400 to around 500 due to defection and starvation, the forces that caught up showed little mercy with the retreating band during the Battle of Bad Axe, which consisted mainly of a few Sauk warriors trying to protect women, children, and elderly as they struggled desperately to swim across the Mississippi to safety. Rather than merely an effect of untrained militia, such a violent spectacle was implicitly encouraged, as President Jackson and Secretary of War Lewis Cass believed a diplomatic resolution would only encourage broader Native resistance. As a measure of deterrence, and to reassure the region's settlers, the band in Cass's words serve an "example...the effect of which would be lasting" (qtd. in Jung 120).
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: PLACING SETTLER COLONIALISM
IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY

This dissertation project explores the ways in which narrating an anachronistic Indian identity, or "Indianness," facilitates and/or sustains regionally-specific forms of Indigenous dispossession during the removal era. Because these forms map onto much longer regional histories of settler colonialism, they are irreducible to a single, dyadic interpretation of removal politics, one consisting more or less of a homogenous project of racialization. Rather, specific tropes of anachronistic Indianness (the anti-familial savage, the primordially noble warrior, and the receding, exoticized Other) retroactively consolidate various juridical, political, and territorial maneuvers against Native peoples in different parts of the country. As the previous chapters demonstrate, these tropes in other words correspond with different regional struggles over Native land. Rather than rationalizing U.S. claims writ large, each trope instead consolidates the claims of specific settler actors, which may include representatives of different federal institutions, private citizens, or figures in state government, among others, by generating a historicity that forecloses the intelligibility of Indigenous claims in the respective region. The project therefore substitutes a regional approach to the antebellum "Indian question" grounded in the primacy of Native sovereignty for a chronological one organized around settler political history. By foregrounding the multiplicity of settler claims to Native lands
within each region, this approach demonstrates the contingency involved in any given settler claim. Taken together, the regional configurations of Indianness mapped across the previous chapters show that testifying to the supposed legitimacy of settler sovereignty over specific Native lands involves positing the historical presupposition of such sovereignty, namely through historicizing Indianness.

Foregrounding how non-Native texts retroactively displace such contingency through the appeal to anachronistic Indianness also creates the space to reassess the rhetorical means by which Indigenous activists, such as Elias Boudinot, William Apess, and Black Hawk, made their different positions available to a non-Native public. From this view, speaking and writing within the frame of Indian anachronism does not merely signal these voices' indebtedness to the racialist presumptions of the period; instead, in each case the narrativity of Indianness marks the contours of a tactical engagement with the supposedly axiomatic status of settler claims to space, an engagement conditioned through non-Natives' prior mobilization(s) of an extra-political historicity to shore up territorial claims, which is to say to treat Native peoples as anything but sovereign polities. In short, one of the project's cornerstone ideas is that, for the Native activists discussed above, articulating Indigenous self-determination during the removal era required engaging with discourses of Indianness already integral to perpetuating and extending different settler claims to territory. These discourses provide the condition of possibility for resistance to ongoing settler colonialism(s). One could argue, however, that such an approach winds up privileging the same non-Native sovereignty whose apparent uniformity that the dissertation otherwise sets out to deconstruct. Doesn't
privileged the discursive and narrative modalities of settler colonialism in this way wind up paradoxically re-centering settler sovereignty, at the very least in terms of methodology? I will answer this objection in what follows, since it gestures to a possible interpretation that threatens to undermine this dissertation's central aim: to move away from a binary reading of antebellum dispossession that, far from critically intervening in the history of removal, comprises one of its legacies within both academic and mainstream discourses on the topic.

Just as Black Hawk's autobiography problematizes rather than merely supplements the narrative of settler expansion into the Old Northwest, as the perhaps tragic but nevertheless fated course of History, the regional paradigm developed in this dissertation less supplements contemporary studies on the removal era than it decenters Cherokee removal as the implied frame for conceptualizing the removal period writ large. The pivot away from a conceptual through-line organized around a linear representation of the historical period and toward the simultaneous struggles of differently situated Native groups emphasizes the various workings of narrativity as a juridical and political maneuver at the time. There is no one-size-fits-all narrativity of the removal period. Instead, there are instead different narrativities (or historicities) predicated on regional tropes of Indianness that displace particular sets of Native claims precisely insofar as they cast the particularity of settler claims instead as the advent of settlement/civilization over some version of anachronistic Indianness. The relationships between a region's history of settler colonialism and the specific portraits of Indian anachronism that surface in discourses on that region are accordingly anything but arbitrary. As the project has
illustrated, the (im)mutable savage emerges out of the treaty-based civilization policy at work in the southeast, authentic and virtuous (yet primordial) Indian character is a longstanding element of New England reservation politics, and the notion of inevitable, westerly Indian withdrawal (along with its obverse casting of organized Native resistance to settler depredations as anomalous and irrational violence) articulates the earliest U.S. claims to the Old Northwest by supplying the very sense of the territory with a future-anterior temporality, a point at which Indians will have ceded their lands and headed west.

Insofar as these relationships bespeak regional histories irreducible to a view of the removal era as predicated on a single Native/American binary, within which settler colonialism boils down to a universal project of racialization, they also underscore the fact that there is no single "Indian" identity that could adequately and evenly index all Indigenous peoples during the removal period. But, again, doesn't this point only further entrench the settler state, albeit inadvertently, by representing Native groups as a heterogeneous population distributed along an axis of settler recognition? I would respond by pointing to the crucial differences between my work and that of Maureen Konkle. While this project in many ways builds from Konkle's work, *Writing Indian Nations* treats the removal era as manifesting, in Patrick Wolfe's terms, a particular logic of elimination, namely racist Anglos' denial of the Indian's modernity and, in turn, political sovereignty. This perspective at the very least minimizes the complexity of competing claims to land and sovereignty as they unfolded in different parts of the country. Such an approach ironically reaffirms the givenness of settler sovereignty by
locating, in the place of largely distinct frames of Indigenous place-making and settler modalities of dispossessing, essentially different versions of the same underlying Indian/American binary, one premised moreover on a linear notion of History implicitly oriented to the U.S. nation-state. Presuming the givenness of historical modernity in this way both presupposes further embeds the centrality of U.S. claims to Native place. A methodology predicated on reading removal through the lens of a binary project of racialization cannot but wind up privileging a narrativity akin to those that worked to retroactively cohere different settler claims to Indigenous territory in the first place.

If non-Native scholars are going to privilege Native sovereignty in a manner that both insists that removal is ongoing, that it is still happening, and yet refuses to treat the state as itself reducible to a Man behind the curtain, so to speak, an approach that implicitly casts removal policy as the symptom of a larger, quasi-historical will-to-colonize, then we need to emphasize and continue to interrogate the irreducibility of one regional history of settler colonialism to another during the removal period. We should recognize that while, in retrospect, removal policy appears as a coherent and indeed systemic project organized a ubiquitous logic of racialization, a logic that defined the antebellum era but is only discernible from our current position long after the fact, this perspective also endows the period with a sense of uniformity and reason that its unfolding lacked. This narrative after-image of one of the most notorious periods in American history foregrounds the violence of dispossession and genocide, but it also retroactively consolidates the primacy and privilege of the settler state by representing settler actors on one side and Indians writ large on the other—a binary narrativity that
already surfaces as a maneuver against Native peoples during the removal period. As this dissertation has argued, the tremendous complexity of the politics of removal remains one of the critical blind spots in Americanist scholarship on Native history, perhaps precisely because its binary configuration is both a legacy and after-image of era itself rather than a simple methodological confusion.

In other words, the homogeneity of the removal period can be understood as a condition of possibility, although a problematic one, for even a sympathetic approach to the histories of Indigenous dispossession. To illustrate the point quickly, the aforementioned collection *Native Acts: Indian Performance, 1603 – 1832* traces the role of performativity as a means of Native self-determination across different historical epochs—but only up to the point that the Indian is removed. By contrast, Kevin Bruyneel's *The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of U.S.-Indigenous Relations* traces conflicts over boundary-making and the juridical dilemmas entailed for Native peoples working to resist the erosion of sovereignty from within the imposition of settler sovereignty. However, Bruyneel's analysis begins where the removal era leaves off, suggesting both that a binary understanding of removal politics is indispensable to the logic of the third space of sovereignty, further, that the early-antebellum moment is the indeed the point at which a properly postcolonial relationship between the U.S. and Indian nations took hold.

As against treating the meaning of removal, then and now, as a matter of historical fact, I would underscore the point at which this project converges with that of Maureen Konkle. I wholeheartedly share Konkle's emphasis on the inadequacy of multicultural
liberalism as a conceptual frame for thinking about Native peoples' efforts to resist conditions of dispossession. Insofar as Native resistance presupposes a sovereignty beyond the purview of the settler state, it accordingly exceeds a model of activism premised on securing rights denied to oppressed or otherwise marginalized subjects within the body politic. As Audra Simpson puts it, Native peoples are rarely understood in terms of "that which they are and wish to be recognized as: nationals with sovereign authority over their lives and over their membership and living within their own space" (Mohawk 16). As I see it, the politics of Native self-determination are first and foremost about recognizing and working to reinforce the place-based sovereignty of Native peoples, above and beyond any discussion/recognition of Native culture(s). In turn, working to reinforce this place-based sovereignty means for me, as a non-Native scholar working with Native history and materials, foregrounding and deconstructing the narrative structures that both derive from a disavowed legacy of settler colonialism and constitute the basis for maneuvers against Native sovereignty in the present.

There is perhaps no era within the broader history of U.S. settler colonialism greater mystified than the removal period itself, perhaps because this era remains integral to the predominant postcolonial/multiculturalist approach to Native history within and among settler academic, government, and cultural institutions. To take one final example, toward the end of his book-length essay "The (Post)Colonial Construction of Indian Country," Eric Cheyfitz takes issue with Craig Womack's well-known call for Native literary separatism and intellectual sovereignty in Red on Red: Native American Literary Separatism. Although sympathetic toward the politics underlying Womack's position,
which he sees as privileging "Native traditions of resistance to certain European cultural-political influences," Cheyfitz nonetheless warns of the tendency to slip "into an ahistorical and atheoretical view of Indian communities," adding that such a slip "is not inevitable if intellectual sovereignty is understood as political, not absolute" ("(Post)Colonial" 105). Given the material aspect of its Creek-centric focus, Womack's project would seem to avoid a problematic lapse into ahistoricism.\(^1\) After all, he himself makes clear that while the "literary aspect of sovereignty is not the same thing as the political status of Native nations, the two are, nonetheless, interdependent" (Womack Red 14). However, the crux of the matter lies with Womack's assertion that Native criticism be premised on a question that postcolonialism fails to consider, namely "how do Indians view Indians?" (Red 13). Though admitting the "justness" of an Indian literary nationalism, Cheyfitz doubts the possibility of a politically-minded criticism centered entirely on Native views of Native culture. For him, Womack's question "is inevitably mediated by how the settlers view the Indians, for federal Indian law is nothing but the Western legal view of Indians by settlers," even as this view gradually factors in both "how Indians view settlers" and, in turn, "how settlers view settlers" (Cheyfitz "(Post)Colonial" 106).

The basic point that any serious and ethical criticism of Native literature must attend to different peoples' ongoing legal and political relations with the United States is well taken. About the only consistent feature of a federal Indian policy over two centuries in the making is its wavering between moments of subversion and those of genocide. For some Native peoples the destructive impact of Anglo settlement goes back another two
centuries. Put simply, both this history and Native peoples' ongoing efforts toward self-
determination are indispensable touchstones for the non-Native reception of any such
literature. Still, one can challenge the claim that federal Indian law is "nothing but the
Western legal view of Indians by settlers." As Cheyfitz seems to suggest, mapping the
ways that oppressive interventions and exploitive land policies mediate sovereign Native
peoplehood over time appears a plausible endeavor, but tracing the latter's impact on
settler governance and society by contrast seems an infinitely more complicated task, and
possibly an incoherent one. Why should this be the case? As Cheyfitz's own phrasing
shows, the long and fractious history of U.S.-Native geopolitics presents U.S. Indian law,
its associated institutions, and the citizen-subjects that ostensibly authorize both the state
and its doctrines as altogether facets of a larger, constitutive sphere of influence
designated by the term "the West," despite the fact that this construct at best references an
artificial unity. In fact, Cheyfitz's phrase morphs this unity from a methodological
necessity to a kind of trans-historical agency in its own right, while it also casts federal
Indian law as expressing both this agency and its lineage, as the material form this view
necessarily takes and as such a testament to its power over time.

Yet is federal Indian law so thoroughly reducible to a Western "view" of Indians?
This premise yields the thesis for the present study. One effect of such a view as
discernible in political, legal, and cultural discourses is to project retroactively just this
kind of cohesive binary and its accompanying narrativity as the deep truth of the removal
era. Put another way, what if the Western view of the Indian that Cheyfitz implicitly (and
perhaps inadvertently) depicts as a causal historical principle in itself is, rather, the
retroactive effect of an appeal to historicity working within such laws and their associated discourses, an appeal that dissimulates the sheer contingency involved in any particular settler claim? From this view, a historicity that poses as an absolute horizon would be the causative element leading us to imagine an Indian/Anglo binary as the core of U.S. geopolitical relations with Native peoples. Rather than pointing to a political history silenced by the dominant culture, settler law from this angle supplies its own extra-juridical necessity through positing both its past and its future, thereby sustaining a linear narrative of History that presents itself as the condition of possibility for non-Natives' engagement with Native sovereignty. Further, the narrativity of history that enables such laws to transcend their immediate ethico-political situation(s), involving specific Native groups, is grounded in the imagined ontology of "the Indian." Yet, as this project has shown, treating this identity formation as a given category in its relation to the different histories of Indigenous peoples and their struggles against settler colonialism paradoxically reinforces settler sovereignty. It does so by introducing a seemingly authentic split between different Native polities, on one side, and the settler sociality that casts territories and peoples as already (in)compatible with the multimodal calculus of Euramerican governmentality, on the other. Foregrounding this maneuver involves bracketing the received narrativity of Indian Removal and emphasizing instead the manner in which settler-authored discourses generate a version of this very same split in the context of different regional struggles in the antebellum era. To foreground the narrativity of this binary and its different political manifestations during this time is to insist on the primacy and place(s) of Native sovereignty.
Notes

1 Womack also writes that his work "assumes that the political history of the Creek Nation, the ceremonies that form the ritual knowledge of the tribe, and the oral tradition are central to an understanding of Creek literature" (Red 17).


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