The fundamental question this dissertation seeks to answer is how late-Victorian horror fiction produced fear for its contemporary audiences. This study argues that the answer to this question lies in the areas of rhetoric—more specifically, oratory—and the body. This may seem unremarkable, but the notion of a rhetorical body was problematic for Victorians due to suspicion of eloquence and anxiety over the instability of bodies. This ambiguity is expressed through recurring images in horror fiction of the destruction of the monstrous body—typically through cutting—in relation to rhetorical performance and display. This study appropriates a medical term to refer to this phenomenon, disarticulation, which means amputation. Disarticulation, then, becomes a form of control of the transgressing body. It is expressed in society and literature in three forms, either as allusions or direct representations: public execution, including torture and dismemberment; anatomical dissection and its suggestion of vivisection; and aestheticization, which refashions death as life. Proponents of these practices claimed that they produced social order, scientific knowledge, and art. In the larger culture, however, they produced horror. But disarticulation is just one explanation for the fear produced by late Victorian horror fiction. This study also speculates that dread is produced by epideictic, which seems peculiarly present alongside other Classically-inspired rhetorical performances and displays in the five primary texts selected for examination: 

*Frankenstein* by Mary Shelley; *Dracula* by Bram Stoker; *The Island of Dr. Moreau* by
H.G. Wells; *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* by Robert Louis Stevenson;

and *The Picture of Dorian Gray* by Oscar Wilde.
DECLAMATION AND DISMEMBERMENT: RHETORIC, THE BODY, AND DISARTICULATION IN FOUR VICTORIAN HORROR NOVELS

by

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: RHETORIC AND RENEWAL

If rhetoric died in Britain in the 1800’s, it rose from the grave before the end of
the century as something monstrous and frightening. The starting point for this study is
the premature burial given rhetoric in the nineteenth century. As Susan Jarratt writes,
“Though the Romantics are beginning to attract some attention … the death of rhetoric
remains virtually unchallenged as the reigning metaphor for the second half of the
century” (73). One of the scholars who does challenge rhetoric’s obituary is Don Paul
Abbott. “A remarkable number of critics and historians have proclaimed—sometimes
with dismay, sometimes with delight—the death of rhetoric,” Abbott states (105). But
rhetoric did not expire by the early nineteenth century due to linguistic nationalism and
Romantic aesthetics, he argues: it actually enjoyed a renaissance. Interest and optimism
about rhetoric were kept alive by the elocutionists, foremost among them Thomas
Sheridan. In an age when men such as David Hume, Oliver Goldsmith, and Richard
Polwhele were lamenting British ineloquence, Abbott explains, Sheridan asserted that
restoring oratory to its rightful place at the head of the liberal arts curriculum would
revitalize language, religion, and liberal learning in England (117). According to Abbott,
the nation’s renewed interest in oratory is evident in eighteenth-century anthologies of
parliamentary speeches (120). After citing Sheridan’s belief that Shakespeare and Milton
owed much of their success to “‘their skill in oratory’” and that rhetorical education “‘would precipitate a cultural renaissance,’” though, Abbott offers nothing on rhetoric’s potential impact on literature (qtd. in 118). However, rhetoric can be seen as having a profound impact on British literature in the nineteenth century, and its impact may seem odd and unexpected. Rather than leading to what might be expected—the production of classically-inspired epics reflecting political, religious, and military unity—rhetoric inspired a violent literature of horror that interrogated claims about rhetoric’s motives, methods, and efficacy.

Attitudes toward rhetoric in nineteenth-century horror fiction are decidedly negative. The basis for this claim is the frequent presence of rhetorical performance and display in the literature in connection with the destruction of the body or suggestions of the destruction of the body. This study appropriates a convenient medical term to refer to this phenomenon: disarticulation. In a medical sense, disarticulation refers to amputation, but it is also a term with a general sense that can also be applied to human speech. Disarticulation, therefore, can be applied both to the body and its utterances. The trope involves the sundering of textual bodies leading to somatic destruction or transformation. Its primary images are of the penetration, cutting, and dismemberment of the body. These can be the bodies of characters involved in oratory as well as those of their audiences. The destruction of the body by any means is disturbing and profound. As John Knott writes, “The human body is man’s oldest and most important symbol” (13). He elaborates, “Even the very notion of a knife cutting into a human body is charged with emotion” (18). This study equates rhetoric with a bladed instrument. Disarticulation is
succinctly captured by Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe, whose Faust imagines “rhetoric” as having an “edge” that “glints and cleaves” and “By which you curl the shavings of mankind” (*Faust* ll.554-5). Through Faust, a teacher of rhetoric, Goethe expresses an anxiety toward the subject that can also be said to characterize the British Romantics and Victorians. On the one hand, rhetoric could be used, as Sheridan believed, to unify a diverse nation, advance social progress, promote cultural production, and inspire religious devotion. On the other hand, it could be used, as in revolutionary France, to deceive, manipulate, judge, subject, and terrorize people. The main theory of this study is that rhetoric informs the characterizations and plots of some of Britain’s most popular *fin-de-siècle* horror stories, including *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* by Robert Louis Stevenson, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* by Oscar Wilde, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* by H.G. Wells, and *Dracula* by Bram Stoker. It is a rhetoric preoccupied with monstrosities, informed not only by ancient but also contemporary medico-juridico-scientific practices that disciplined those bodies by destroying them for public consumption. As a discursive system that claims bodies, it reduces them to parts, hybridizes them, displays them, and silences them. Rhetoric, therefore, is depicted as a monstrous, antithetical activity that not only produces monstrosities but also destroys them.

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1 Although this comprehensive term may be used elsewhere, the only source in which I have encountered it is Janet Rago’s essay “*Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*: A ‘Men’s Narrative’ of Hysteria and Containment.”
Within the aesthetics of late-Victorian horror novels, the body becomes a rhetorical object. Rhetoric, in these novels, is depicted primarily as oratory, one of the precedents established by Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein*. The body can be depicted as acting, or it can be depicted as being acted upon, both in the context of rhetorical performance or display. Of course, such a literary aesthetics is not only problematic because it involves rhetoric, which Britons suspected: it is also problematic because it involves the body, which Britons contested. Clearly, conflict lies at the very heart of this aesthetics, and that conflict has the potential to inspire terror. Borrowing from Soviet theorist Mikhail Bakhtin, Helena Michie explains that not all nineteenth-century bodies were viewed as equal. Conceptions of bourgeois and aristocratic bodies were based on classical standards in that they tended to be seen as “impermeable,” “closed off and separate from the bodies of others” (Michie 408). These bodies were static and, in theory, not susceptible to the transformative power of rhetoric. On the other hand, lower-class bodies were seen as grotesque and permeable. “The grotesque body,” Michie contends, “is porous, its boundaries blurry …” (408). These bodies were open and susceptible to influence. This division between bodies based on class was pressured throughout the nineteenth century, and it was largely obliterated in the horror fiction of

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2 Bakhtin’s critical project in the early twentieth century involved recovering ancient and medieval paradigms as part of his analyses of the scatological Renaissance French novels that made up *Gargantua and Pantagruel*. These satirical books, written by the humanist Rabelais in the early sixteenth century, tell the stories of father-and-son giants and their adventures, which often relate to the corrupt body and its unpleasant processes. Bakhtin labels this suppressed and ignored subgenre *grotesque realism*, and argues that its fragments persisted into the nineteenth century.
the late Victorian period, where upper-class characters are transformed into monsters. Perhaps the best known example is *Jekyll and Hyde*, in which the gentleman Jekyll becomes the bestial Hyde; but there other examples in *Dracula*, and even subtler ones in *Dorian Gray* and *Moreau*. The obvious implication here is that there is no essential difference between the bodies of the affluent and the bodies of the poor. Anatomical science helped tear down these distinctions, as the knowledge gained from the dismemberment of poor bodies was transferred to the treatment of affluent bodies. Victorians tried to preserve class distinctions even in death through funeral science; but Jani Scandura points to the irony in the fact that the photographed bodies used to promote embalming to wealthy customers were most likely the appropriated corpses of the poor gussied up to look like gentlemen (15). Scandura reveals that the embalmer … had the authority to play deadly tricks: as the costumer and the makeup artist to the dead, he knew that corpses had no essential class identity beneath their prettified appearance. The embalmed corpse became a threatening signifier of deception in a culture where appearance was all. (16)

So, by the late nineteenth century, the hierarchy of bodies based on social station had all but collapsed into the category of the grotesque, although the upper classes resisted the theory that a shift had taken place. What this meant was that all bodies, regardless of social position, had the potential to become monstrous and subject to control and possible destruction. This frightening prospect is reflected in the most popular horror fiction of the period, with its depictions of the coercive social control of the transgressing body—rhetorical presentation, judicial dismemberment, penal
dissection, and funerary and artistic aestheticization. Recovering these practices—even some of them lost since the early nineteenth-century—can help modern readers better understand what late Victorians found frightening about their horror fiction. Of particular interest is the peculiar presence of epideictic—or ceremonial speech most closely associated with the ancient funeral oration—and its inverted role of generating dread and division rather than euphoria and unity among audiences. With this in mind, this study posits an etymological link among the words *declamation*, *monstrosity*, and *epideictic* as displays involving the body intended to send some sort of message.

At its most basic level, disarticulation is reflective of two European historical and cultural practices: elocution and execution. Both practices can be read as means of controlling bodies as rhetorical objects in the context of public display. The bodies presented as most in need of correction through elocution and execution are those found to be monstrous, or marginalized in some way. Like execution, elocution involves both discipline and display of the body. Led by men like Sheridan, John Walker, and Gilbert Austin, the elocutionary movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped resuscitate classical rhetoric in England by marketing it to men at the edges of the growing empire who wished to integrate into proper society and improve their station in life. Interestingly, two of the writers included in this study, Wilde and Stoker, were from Ireland. A third, Stevenson, was from Scotland. A fourth, Shelley, spent part of her adolescence in Scotland. Likewise, the foremost elocutionists, Sheridan, Walker, and Austin were outsiders from Ireland. And elocution was largely about control of the body and the refashioning of the identity. An important aspect of elocution is declamation, or
forceful oratorical performance involving control of voice, emotion, body, and, in some cases, impersonation. Elocution, therefore, was about disciplining and norming bodies—two interests it shared with execution. Execution, as treated in this study, goes beyond the simple fulfillment of a judicial death sentence to the exhibition of torture, mutilation, and dissection of condemned individuals as admonitions to people called to witness and participate in these spectacles, which continued well into the nineteenth century. These practices were meant, at least in part, to terrorize people, and that is what they did for many generations. Therefore, they had a rhetorical dimension, and that rhetoric persisted in the collective imagination and in print long after their public spectacles had ended.

Two ancillaries of execution are dismemberment and dissection. As add-ons to judicial sentences, dismemberment and dissection have been completely lost to modern audiences, but they were very familiar to nineteenth-century Britons. The terror of the French Revolution as an inspiration for British Gothic fiction has become a commonplace among literary historians, but England had a long history of dismembering criminals before the late 1700’s. Foucault writes that in Europe, “England was one of the countries most loath to see the disappearance of public execution” (Discipline and Punish 14). He speculates that this may have been due to the faith the nation had in its criminal justice system, but it was most likely because the country did not want to lessen the deterrence of its laws during the social unrest of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (14). For much of the nineteenth century, executions were performed in public for people to witness. They were intended not only to serve justice but also to serve as admonitions
for those who might break the law. These forms of justice must be recovered and examined alongside horror fiction texts to recognize their influence.

Liberal reforms eventually abolished public torture, and executions were hidden from public scrutiny. Likewise, live dismemberment to produce social order became postmortem dissection to produce scientific knowledge. However, the terror that these spectacles inspired simply passed into print. Removing the dismemberment of criminal bodies from public view and replacing it with textual reports helped create the medium in which literary disarticulation grew. Mary Ellis Gibson notes this transformation in an analysis of Robert Browning’s *The Ring and the Book* alongside the popularity of the sensation novel: “Private reading about crime replaces the public spectacle of hanging and criminal dissection” (77). Foucault writes that one effect of closeting the drama of trial and execution was the creation of a new form of literature: the detective story (*Discipline and Punish* 69). The connection that Foucault makes here could be extended: penal reform also gave birth to the horror story, including tales of the supernatural, fantastical, and uncanny. The horror story crystallized the sense of terror inspired by public executions and carried it forward for future generations to experience. As disturbing as the spectacles of torture and execution must have been for audiences, they were also significant events in the lives of their communities. They served at least three important functions: they provided an entertaining catharsis by allowing audiences to witness and to a certain extent participate in executions, they reaffirmed the normative standards of the community, and they assured the public that the law had force. While nineteenth-century horror fiction can be seen as performing the same functions, it does
not offer exact reproductions of judicial torture, dismemberment, and execution like those that Andrew Fleck analyzes in Thomas Nashe’s *The Unfortunate Traveller*. Fleck has the grisly executions of Cutwolfe and Zadoch, as well as Nashe’s descriptions of massacres and epidemics, to consider as he ponders the significant relationships between the foreign “body reduced to its parts” and disciplined (296), the “tropes of the body politic” (314), and English nationalism. Even without these spectacles, nineteenth-century horror fiction performs the same functions of catharsis and reaffirmation. In so doing, however, it interrogates those functions by exposing their moral relativism and coerciveness.

The horror, controversy, and social unrest inspired by dismemberment and dissection easily obscure the reality that they helped found a new aesthetics based on the body. The aestheticization, or refashioning, of the grotesque body in *fin-de-siècle* horror fiction is an offshoot of sixteenth-century anatomy. Just as the body yielded social order under the executioner’s hand, and scientific knowledge under the anatomist’s hand, it yielded new meanings under the artist’s hand. Tim Marshall writes, “In the anatomy literature there is much slippage between the surgeon, the dissector, the murderer—and then the writer and the artist: after all, artists have relied on anatomical dissection, and writers vicariously kill” (13). The iconoclasm of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood involved the painters’ depictions of anatomical rather than stylized bodies. Though sensational at the time, their art has come to emblematize the Victorian period in many ways. But bodies were not just written about and used as models in painting: they also became a medium for enbalmers in a growing funeral industry whose methods for refashioning bodies included not only penetration and cutting but also painting,
costuming, and posing to create the illusion of genteel life and conceal biological corruption. A major figure in the aestheticization of the body was Andreas Vesalius, a professor of anatomy at the University of Padua, who in 1543 published his *De Humani Corporis Fabrica*, an illustrated tome that would revolutionize the conduct of dissections. *De Fabrica* challenged the authority of second-century Roman physician Claudius Galen and eventually helped displace him. Vesalius had a grand vision of anatomy that incorporated but also transcended the physical bodies of the dissector and his subjects. This vision included the merger of anatomy and art, as well as anatomy and theater. A similar vision can be found in late-Victorian horror fiction.

Rhetoric in *fin-de-siècle* British horror fiction, therefore, can be seen as a means of controlling grotesque, unstable bodies alongside the more violent and visible methods of execution, torture, dismemberment, dissection, and aestheticization. These relationships constitute disarticulation, a trope which expresses the tension between speech and the body by yoking oratorical performance and somatic destruction. In late-Victorian horror fiction, all bodies are subject to disarticulation, not just the murderer and robber traditionally judged as transgressing, criminal, and monstrous. This awareness is one of the sources of the fear inspired by this literature.

**Chapter Overview**

Applying the theory outlined in this introduction to a study of the selected novels will involve the following basic steps: locating disarticulation in the texts by identifying their main rhetorical performances and depictions of bodily dismemberment, dissection, or aestheticization; analyzing their use of declamation and its relationship to the
monstrosities in the novels; pointing out the association of the main characters with criminality; explaining the presence of epideictic in the stories; acknowledging, where possible, these same patterns in other works by the same writers; and sharing relevant biographical details about the authors.

The second chapter of this study presents background crucial to an understanding of disarticulation in late-Victorian horror fiction. That background includes three basic elements: the elocutionary movement, which focused on normalization and regulation of the body through speech and rhetorical performance; declamation, an ancient rhetorical training exercise and elocutionary practice with links to monstrosity and epideictic as displays involving the body; and the “Death of Cicero Tradition,” which began in Rome as a collection of declamation exercises and persisted centuries later in the union of oratory, violence, and bodily dismemberment informing disarticulation.

Chapter three focuses on Frankenstein as a foundational work in the study of rhetoric in horror fiction. Published in 1818 and revised in 1831, Frankenstein depicts a monster delivering a classical oration to persuade an audience. It is the centerpiece in a highly rhetorical novel that helps establish Mary Shelley’s negative attitude toward persuasive speech. The novel reflects Shelley’s the classical learning alongside her husband, Percy Shelley, and her admiration of the great Roman orator Cicero, whose death and dismemberment factors significantly into the theory of disarticulation outlined in this study. Frankenstein also offers readers early glimpses of the use of epideictic to generate dread and discord. In this way, the novel helps serve as a benchmark for the study of the development of epideictic in fin-de-siècle horror fiction, where its presence is
even stronger. *Frankenstein*, therefore, helps illustrate the link this study posits between monstrosity, declamation, and epideictic.

While leading off this study with a chapter on *Frankenstein* may seem logical, following up with a fourth chapter on *Dracula* may illogical. But these two novels are the great “bookends” of nineteenth-century British horror fiction, and *Dracula* shows how much the subgenre progressed over seventy-nine years. Indeed, *Dracula* offers the strongest example of disarticulation in that it seems to gather up all of the forms and patterns presented in the other novels analyzed in this study. Seen as such, *Dracula* is not just a novel about a vampire, it is a vampiric novel. It feeds off the others. The primary focus of chapter four is judicial dismemberment as one of the four Victorian practices involving coercive social control of the transgressing body. The others are rhetorical presentation, penal dissection, and aestheticization. One of Stoker’s short stories that helps establish his interest in execution practices is “The Squaw.” Linked to rhetorical performances by Abraham Van Helsing and Count Dracula, judicial dismemberment effects disarticulation in the novel. The main victim of dismemberment is the undead Lucy Westenra, whose slaying is evocative of early-modern executions. But Dracula and the vampire women at his castle in Transylvania are also dismembered. Van Helsing’s oratory is forensic and deliberative, seeking to prove that vampires exist and building consensus to destroy them. Dracula’s, on the other hand, is epideictic. His speech closely resembles the model funeral oration presented by Socrates in Plato’s *Menexenus* in that it praises the war dead and allows them to speak. Plato intends this figuratively, but Stoker presents it literally in that Dracula is undead. Dracula’s epideictic also transforms his
English audience through Jonathan Harker from gentlemen into savages who resort to criminality to destroy the count.

Chapter five focuses on two novels, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* from 1894 and *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* from 1886. The main focus of the chapter is penal dissection as a means of social control that also advances scientific knowledge. Both books were written by men deeply influenced by science. Wells’s pedigree included schooling by T.H. Huxley, Charles Darwin’s foremost defender. Stevenson initially set out to become an engineer, but became a writer and a scientific hobbyist with interests closely aligned with Darwin’s. This affinity with Darwin is expressed in Stevenson’s short story “The Scientific Ape,” which also interrogates the practice of vivisection. *Moreau* and *Jekyll and Hyde* both contain images of the cutting of the body. In *Jekyll and Hyde*, Jekyll—who lives in a compound with an old anatomy theater—uses chemistry to vivisect and double himself as a monster based on the Victorian ape-man trope used to lampoon Darwinism. In *Moreau*, the doctor vivisects beasts, which, in the context of Darwin’s blurring of the animal-human boundary and the Victorian social concerns about animal welfare, can be seen as stand-ins for human subjects. The images of the cutting of the body in both books are informed not only by the penal dissection of criminal corpses but also by the horrifying reality that any body, be it of a rich or poor person, that could be stolen from a funeral home or graveyard could end up on an anatomist’s table, where it would be stripped of its identity and dismembered. Stevenson’s concern with the practice of grave-robbing to supply medical schools with cadavers informs his short story “The Body-Snatcher.” This anxiety over the
destruction of bodies is joined, in both books, to oratory. The main rhetorical performance in *Moreau* is the doctor’s explanation and defense of his vivisection project. The byproduct of Moreau’s project, however, is the epideictic of his Beast People, which bestializes the novel’s main character, Edward Prendick. The rhetorical moments in *Jekyll and Hyde* are more subtle and revolve around the character of Gabriel John Utterson, Jekyll’s attorney and the novella’s finder of fact. The book’s main rhetorical display is declamation, as Utterson reads letters by the departed Jekyll and his scientific rival Hasty Lanyon and thereby assumes their personas to unravel the enigma of the murderous Edward Hyde. The epideictic emanating from the monster Hyde frightens and disgusts onlookers. It invades Utterson’s dreams and transforms him into a primitive hunter in nocturnal London. The ultimate monstrosity of Utterson’s declamation is that it wholly consumes him. The novella, having shifted to Lanyon’s and Jekyll’s first-person statements, never returns to the third-person narrator that hovers near Utterson in telling the first part of the story. In the end, the book proves to have an incomplete frame, and Utterson’s character is never recovered.

The sixth chapter of this study focuses on *The Picture of Dorian Gray* from 1891 and its concern with the aestheticization of the human body in relation to rhetorical performance. Aestheticization is used here in two senses: the body as an inspiration for the art, and the body as a medium of art. *Dorian Gray* is perhaps the finest expression of disarticulation in late-Victorian horror fiction. All of the elements noted in the other works examined in this study are present in *Dorian Gray*, including manipulative rhetoric and the destruction of the body through means that seem distant echoes of execution.
practices. Moreover, *Dorian Gray* contains two sources of epideictic: the declaimer Henry Wotton and the ghastly portrait of Dorian Gray. Wotton is a declaimer because his words seemingly are not his own. At least some of his words originate with critic Walter Pater and reveal Wilde’s inspiration and possible reaction against the Art for Art’s Sake movement. Wotton’s friend, the painter Basil Hallward, says that Wotton’s words are insincere. Nevertheless, the sophistic Wotton’s epideictic praising beauty and youth, coupled with Hallward’s enchanting portrait of Dorian, transform the young man. He becomes a monstrous hybrid of humanity and art known ironically as “Prince Charming” with no integrity between body and soul. In this way, art is portrayed as vampiric in that it drains the life of its subject and replaces it with a horrifying double. The premise of *Dorian Gray*, of course, is that while Dorian’s portrait ages, he does not. His grotesque portrait becomes a reflection of his soul. Wilde was an erudite classicist, and Dorian’s concern for his soul can be traced to Plato’s dialogue *Gorgias*, which attacks rhetoric as deceitful and posits that justice cleanses the soul of the offender. Dorian, however, never faces punishment for his crimes, which include Hallward’s murder and the destruction of his body. Hallward is killed just after Dorian shows him the corrupt portrait. The epideictic power of the portrait repulses Hallward and reveals to him Dorian’s true nature as living corpse. This makes Dorian a prototype of Dracula, like another of Wilde’s characters, Simon de Canterville. “The Canterville Ghost” also suggests Wilde’s interest in the aestheticization of the body and execution, which is more fully expressed in his play *Salome*. 
CHAPTER II
THE BACKGROUND: RHETORIC AND MONSTROSITY

In his 1981 essay “Why We Crave Horror Movies,” author Stephen King asserts that “the horror movie is innately conservative, even reactionary” in its depictions of monstrosities and their destruction, and the feelings of essentially normality the genre restores in its audiences (562). Much the same could be said of late-Victorian horror fiction: it is reactionary, searching primarily Classical and Renaissance history for familiar rhetorical forms and patterns to construct the unfamiliar as monstrous, judge it as abnormal, and then destroy it. This is one approach to understanding disarticulation as a trope that figures rhetoric as a coercive form of discipline seeking to normalize and control transgressing bodies. It is a project that in late-Victorian horror fiction is doomed to failure due to British suspicion of eloquence and anxieties about the recalcitrance of grotesque body.

Understanding disarticulation is aided by a knowledge of the immediate rhetorical background of nineteenth-century Britain. This background was conducive to bodily tropes, especially those associated with monstrosities. It included not only the disciplining of the voice but also of the body to shape into an instrument capable of conveying meaning. The background features three basic elements, each of them interconnected. The first element is the elocutionary movement, which transmitted
ancient forms and patterns and also focused on the body as a rhetorical object that had to be figuratively divided into parts to achieve control of expression. The second element is declamation, an elocutionary concern with links to monstrosity and epideictic as displays involving the body. And the third element is the “Death of Cicero Tradition,” a collection of Roman rhetorical exercises that linked declamation and dismemberment. All of these elements are detectable in various forms in *Frankenstein, Dracula, Moreau, Jekyll and Hyde*, and *Dorian Gray*.

**Elocution and Assimilation**

The elocutionary movement was essentially a phenomenon that originated in the British Romantic period, with an epicenter in Ireland. It focused on the effective delivery of speeches through control of the voice, body, and emotions in. Philippa Spoel describes the elocutionary movement as a “proliferation of handbooks and public lectures on the fifth canon of rhetoric,” delivery (“The Science” 5). The elocutionary movement has largely fallen into obscurity; but in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the elocutionists’ lessons found a receptive audience and their philosophies spread throughout Britain. Three of elocution’s foremost purveyors were Thomas Sheridan, John Walker, and Gilbert Austin. Each man added his own emphasis to the movement, which had a “significant cultural influence” (Harrington, “Remembering the Body” 68). Sheridan and Walker concentrated largely on training the voice, while Austin concentrated on training the body. All three were Irishmen, indicating the interest of men on the margins to assimilate into proper British society. Jean Dietz Moss writes that Sheridan “was well aware of the impediments to professional advancement that the
regional accents and dialect of Irish students presented” (401). Moreover, these were British subjects whose bodies were often demonized as grotesque and inhuman. Lisa Wade writes that, like people of color, the Irish were often caricatured and satirized as apes as a tactic of imperial oppression. So, passing for English would require more than just proper enunciation: it would also involve training the body. “What was needed, Sheridan believed was … the proper finish for a gentleman, thus enabling him to play and effectual role in society,” Moss writes (400). Clearly, an education that involved a certain amount theatrical training was in order, and both Sheridan and Walker had been actors before they became teachers. Indeed, Sheridan’s work in two Dublin theaters, which also included serving as a manager like the Irish Stoker more than one hundred years later, opened his eyes to the need for “tutoring actors in proper diction and gesture” (Moss 399). As former actors, Sheridan and Walker were understandably interested in the theatricality involved in declamation, a concept that will be defined later in this chapter. Unlike Sheridan and Walker, Austin was a clergyman. Their mutual concern, however, was teaching regulation of speech and the body, the assumption being that individuals did not naturally possess the self-control needed for effective oratory and proper social interaction.

The most famous of the elocutionists, Sheridan is often associated with “natural” delivery. To train orators, Sheridan stressed the importance of oral reading and regulating “hurtful or dangerous” passions to produce positive emotions (qtd. in Harrington , “Remembering” 72). He posited that there was a “language of the passions” and drew a distinction between it and the “language of speech” (qtd. in 72). According to Sheridan,
words actualize emotions, “which suggests the potential power that speech practices have in shaping the inner emotions of the speaker” (75). The idea was to associate not only words but also gestures with the “right feeling” (75). This association allowed for control of the student—control of himself and control by society—through the instructor and textbooks. Central to Sheridan’s program for controlling emotions was reading aloud with the proper expression. Teachers often modeled the reading, and students imitated their teachers. Imitative reading trained students in socially acceptable speech and also taught them to control their emotions, which Sheridan—like other rhetors before him—believed would “have powerful, long-term effects on the dispositions of students” (80).

Dana Harrington points out the Classical origins of imitative reading in Plato, who praises the study of poetry and the eulogies of great men as crucial to character development. On the other hand, Plato believed students should be discouraged from imitating women, bad men, and the insane (80-1). Through Socrates, Harrington writes, Plato expressed that imitative reading was a way to control the mind and body as well as speech. Socrates asks, “… have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle into habits and (second) nature in the body, the speech, and thought?” (qtd. in 81). Imitative reading was intended not only to help students identify with great characters but also to absorb their ethics. Harrington points out that Quintilian later presented reading as a process that “engaged the entire body,” teaching a student such lessons as when to breath, when to pause, how to inflect his voice, and when to speed up or slow down (82).
Like Sheridan, Walker was concerned primarily with the voice; however, Walker is often associated with “mechanical” delivery. He accepted the link between voice and emotion and believed that intoning correctly would produce the corresponding feelings. In oral reading, he taught that pronouncing words accurately resulted in the correct feelings and allowed the speaker to read with expression. Walker is best known for the notational system he developed to indicate to students when to raise and lower their voices. He called these movements “inflections.” Also marked were “circumflexes,” which were turns of voice which involved rising and falling inflections (Fritz, “From Sheridan” 77). Under Walker’s method of instructions, teachers would show students how to read passages, and the students would be asked to imitate the teacher. The teacher would also mark texts to indicate inflections and pauses (78). As for gesture, Walker believed that assuming postures associated with emotions could affect students’ emotions and aid in delivery. Using the body as a rhetorical object, however, was disputed. Dana Harrington explains that Walker was aware of the disputes surrounding gesture in oratory, and recommended that it be “used as a last resort” (85). Instead, Walker recommended that speakers first use their imagination to produce feeling, and the “bodily movements … associated with this passion” would “then automatically follow the directions of the imagination and will” (Harrington, “Remembering ” 86). Walker was also concerned with orators’ expression of emotions through facial expression and gesture. His *Elements of Elocution*, for example, contains descriptions of the effects of more than sixty emotions affecting the face and body. Spoel argues that including these descriptions is inconsistent with Walker’s emphasis on self-restraint in oratory. But, she
says, Walker justifies including them “on the basis that practicing the physical expression of passions may assist the student to recapture these emotions during performance” (“Rereading” 88).

While Sheridan and Walker were primarily concerned with training the voice, Austin focused on the body in his *Chironomia: or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery*. “Chironomia” means “the art of gesture” (Fritz, “From Sheridan” 85). Debra Hawhee notes that in the ancient Greece the term also referred to shadowboxing (153). True to his avocation as an amateur chemist, Austin in his *Chironomia* strives for scientific precision. The book is best remembered for its numerous engravings and notations that prescribe bodily motions to complement oratory. Austin writes that his system is intended to “‘produce a language of symbols so simple and so perfect as to render it possible with facility to represent every action of an orator throughout the speech … and to record them for posterity for repetition and practice, as was all common language recorded …’” (qtd. in Fritz, “From Sheridan” 86). Although *Chironomia* may seem excessive and absurd today, Charles A. Fritz writes that the book, “with its mechanical treatment of action exercised an enormous influence upon elocutionary writers for a long time …” (88). Indeed, *Chironomia* has almost come to epitomize elocution. G.P. Mohrmann writes that it is “the best single introduction to the elocutionary movement” (“The Real Chironomia” 19). Of Austin’s scholarship, Mohrmann writes that “nothing in the elocutionary movement can begin to compare with it” (20). All of the elocutionists scavenged classical ideas and reformulated and synthesized them, but Mohrmann writes that Austin’s is remarkable for its number of quotations, including fifty from Cicero (21). And Cicero
looms large over disarticulation in that rhetoric and dismemberment intersect in his body. Austin’s *Chironomia* is also significant for its embodiment of rhetoric. The treatise exhaustively identifies basic positions and movements of the body, feet, arms, hands, and fingers, with numbers to show sequence and letters to show direction. Among its annotated illustrations—which were plagiarized by a number of other works during the nineteenth century—are ones showing the correct position of the feet, including the foot that should be bearing the weight of the body and the one that should be used for balance. Others show hand gestures. Perhaps the best known illustration depicts a male speaker inside a sphere.\(^3\) It resembles Leonardo da Vinci’s “Vitruvian Man” drawing, which is intended to show the ideal proportions of the male human form. Austin’s spherical diagram indicates “the elementary positions and symbols of notation that make up (Austin’s) system” (Spoel, “The Science” 21). Spoel writes that this “division of the body into parts” aids in analysis (18). Taken as a whole, however, Austin’s illustrations suggest the dismemberment of the body, with diagonal, vertical, and horizontal lines that seem to partition the speaker's body. This inference is not inconsistent with Spoel’s conclusion that *Chironomia’s* “science of bodily rhetoric aims at normalizing the implied speaker’s body” (23). She writes that part of the work’s appeal for “Austin’s implied students” is that it “offers a technique of bodily discipline that … will help them to maintain or improve their social rank and professional identities” (24). The figurative breaking apart of the body, therefore, represented a way to discipline, reformulate, and

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\(^3\) See figure 1.
normalize it to conform to middle-class social standards. In addition to its classical origins, Austin’s *Chironomia* is reflective of the “new bodily canon” that Mikhail Bakhtin traces to the Renaissance. This canon not only saw the body as distinct from other bodies and complete, but also emphasized its “individually expressive and characteristic and expressive parts … the head, face, eyes, lips…,” Bakhtin writes that the “exact position and movements of this finished body in the finished outside world are brought out, so that the limits between them are not weakened” (321).

The link between elocution and the body perhaps makes it easier to understand how Sheridan’s utopian vision of national renewal through rhetorical instruction may have been unsettling. Evidence of Britons’ negative attitudes toward rhetoric are clearly displayed in *Frankenstein*, *Dracula*, *Dorian Gray*, *Moreau* and *Jekyll and Hyde*, the depiction of rhetoric is ambiguous, at best. Possible explanations for this reaction include Britons’ aversion to theory and their suspicion of eloquence. Moreover, Britons generally had a negative view of ancient Athens, and, by association, rhetoric. Karen Whedbee writes:

… eighteenth-century historians and political commentators considered the Athenian democratic experiment to have been a contemptible failure. In Athens, speakers … distorted and fabricated the truth in order to extort money and property from wealthy citizens. The demagogues of Athens achieved power by appealing to the ever-changing emotions of the crowd rather than to law or moral principle. (74)

Thus, rhetoric was seen as playing a role in the destruction of Athens. A clear parallel can be drawn here between ancient Athens and revolutionary France, which scholars have
argued helped inspire Gothic literature in England. Radicalism in France also led to more a reactionary government in England, where political dissenters were subject to harsh punishment. This leads to the final reason that elocution may have generated anxiety among Britons: it was actually a product of France, or at least a Frenchmen (Howell, “Sources” 6). Scholars generally concur that the elocutionary movement in England began with the translation of Michel Le Fracher’s *Traitte de l’action de l’oratuer, ou la Prononciation et du geste*. The treatise was first translated into Latin in 1690, making it available to the rest of Europe, and then into English in 1702. It was reprinted in English in 1727. Le Fracher was another figure who confused categories. He was born in Geneva in the late 1500’s and eventually became a Protestant preacher and theologian before his death in Paris in 1657 (6).

It seems significant, then, that the ascendance and popularity of elocution in England was contemporaneous to the French Revolution. Like execution, elocution involves both discipline and display of the body. However, elocution’s bodily rhetoric was also problematic, as the body itself was increasingly becoming a site of anxiety and conflict due to the political and scientific revolutions that enthralled writers and readers. As Spoel points out in her analysis of Sheridan’s and Walker’s systems, the elocutionary movement reconfirmed the “undeniable but uneasy status of pathos and bodily rhetoric within the rhetorical tradition” (“Rereading” 89). By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the seeds of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution had already been planted by men such as his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin. The idea that species were not static and fixed but could change over time through random mutations greatly contributed to
understanding of the human body as fluid and unstable. Indeed, much of the nineteenth
century’s fiction of horror, the uncanny, and the supernatural reflects the notion that
evolutionary time can be collapsed and that individual bodies can mutate in a relatively
brief time span rather than numerous bodies over multiple generations. Borrowing from
writer William Hope Hodgson, Kelly Hurley labels these changing, grotesque bodies
“abhuman” (5). These hybridized bodies are presented as objects of fear, corruption, and
disgust beyond the power of words to describe. All of the monstrosities examined in this
study are hybrids of one sort or another, and all of them have the power to inspire the
type of dread that Hurley describes. This study relates that power to epideictic.

Declamation

So, elocution had to do with delivery. And central to elocution was declamation, a
concept with many shades of meaning. Like elocution, declamation largely disappeared
from rhetorical education after the nineteenth century. However, while elocution was
mostly forgotten, declamation as a term remained in currency and took on the meaning of
hyperbolic speechmaking (“declamation”). Declamation was part of the larger subject of
epideictic, or ceremonial, ritualized oratory. Declamation began as a training exercise for
students in ancient Greece, where it later “became a prestigious form of performance art”
(Webb, “Rhetoric and the Novel” 527). It grew out of the “progymnasmata,” or the
elementary exercises first referred to in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum of the fourth century
B.C. These exercises required students to retell fables and parables, which they were to
amplify with “paraphrase, illustration, comparison, and citation” (Conley 31). As the
students progressed, they were assigned the argumentative exercises of refutation and
confirmation to critique stories. In commonplace exercises, they elaborated on stock
themes. Practicing encomium and vituperation, students were asked to praise a person or
thing for being virtuous or blame it for being wicked, the basis for epideictic. Comparison
exercises required them to evaluate two people or objects. As part of impersonation, or
prosopopoeia, they would assume the character of a historical or fictional figure and
present monologues that they had composed. Exercises in description, or ekphrasis, asked
students to describe something in vivid terms. Thesis assignments required students to
argue a general claim about a topic. Finally, students would participate in exercises in
which they would argue for or against an issue of law, either real or imagined. More
advanced students would go on to compose declamations on selected topics with
deliberative or forensic themes (31).

As in Greece, declamation served as a training exercise for students in Rome and
was “at the heart of … aristocratic education” (Roller 110). Matthew Roller writes that
Roman declamation involved two basic exercises, suasoriae and controversiae.
Suasoriae were exercises in deliberative oratory depicting a famous figure from literature
or history debating courses of action. The student declamer’s assignment was to urge one
course of action over another. Controversiae were exercises in forensic oratory
presenting fictional legal cases and problematic applications of laws. The student
declaimer had to argue from one side of the case or the other (110). Declamation in these
forms has been most closely associated with the early empire of the Augustan age, but
similar exercises can be found in earlier sources, such as the Rhetorica ad Herennium and
Cicero’s rhetorical works from the first century B.C. (110). In addition to Cicero,
Antony, Octavian, and Pompey were all trained through declamation, according to the Roman historian Suetonius (111).

Additional links are revealed through a deeper study of declamation’s history. Students participating in declamation exercises were asked not only to consider contradictory social values and disturbing situations. “Over and over again,” Thomas Habinek writes, “the controversiae require the student to consider relations between fathers and sons, men and women, and powerful men and their social inferiors” (68). A number of declamation scenarios have been handed down by Seneca the Elder. Many feature a tyrannical figure, whether it be a leader or a father. In one scenario, a young man’s father refuses to ransom him from pirates, so the son agrees to marry the pirate chief’s daughter to gain his freedom. When the young man returns home, however, his father orders him to divorce the pirate chief’s daughter and marry a wealthy woman to gain her property. In another scenario, a man rapes two women in one night. Under Roman law, a woman can force her rapist to marry her or order him to be executed. The declaimer in this case must ask himself what would happen if both of the women choose to marry the man, or if one chooses to marry him and the other demands his execution. In yet another scenario, a king grants slaves permission to kill their masters and rape their mistresses. One slave refuses, and defends his mistress’s virginity. When her father returns from exile, he gives her in marriage to the slave. But the son opposes the father by charging him with insanity (68-70). Ruth Webb writes that this Roman “taste for paradox and the macabre” was also characteristic of “sensational declamation themes” in ancient Greece (528).
Dismembering Cicero

It is through Roman oratory that dismemberment merges with declamation in what has come to be known as the “Death of Cicero Tradition.” This macabre tradition consisted of various declamatory exercises inspired by the stories surrounding the assassination and dismemberment of Cicero. Cicero’s discursive body is of great significance to disarticulation. He himself promoted the concept of the integration of the body and rhetoric, and he encouraged the use of the body as a rhetorical instrument. Motions of the hands, fingers, arms and feet should be carefully choreographed to emphasize emotion and communication in a natural language beyond words. In this way, the body speaks. “Action, is as it were, the language of the body, and therefore ought to correspond to thought,” Cicero writes in *Da Oratore* (294). William Forsyth, who wrote a biography of Cicero in 1865, recognized the fusion of body and rhetoric in the great orator, writing that his “‘whole body was instinct with the fire that burned upon his lips, and the accents that rambled upon his tongue found corresponding expression in the movement of his limbs,’” (qtd. in Rosner 171). The destruction of Cicero’s body, therefore, was freighted with rhetorical meaning. Depending on the legends one adheres to, Cicero was either killed by decapitation, or killed and then beheaded in 43 BC as a result of Marc Antony’s proscriptions. Accurate or not, sources indicate that Cicero’s body was further mutilated after his death when one or both of his hands were cut off. This dismemberment supposedly symbolized Cicero’s posthumous punishment for writing against the Triumvirate. As part of Cicero’s punishment, his head and hand(s) were reportedly affixed to the rostrum and displayed in the Roman Senate in a gruesome
show of power against one who had declaimed against the state. Roller points out that displaying Cicero’s body parts in the Senate was symbolic because of its “close identification with Cicero’s life’s work” (121). Depending on the source one consults, Antony’s wife Fulvia may also have taken part in mutilating Cicero’s body out of revenge for his famed eloquence. According to the legend, Fulvia took Cicero’s severed head and shoved hairpins in his tongue. Historians have found it impossible to sort through these stories and piece together an accurate account of Cicero’s death. But historical truth does not matter here. What does matter is that, early on, declamation as a rhetorical exercise was linked to violent dismemberment and mutilation in practices used to train normative males, many of who would go on to assume positions of leadership in Rome. Roller writes that “the vivid description of violence wrought upon the body (e.g. torture, execution, dismemberment), is widely present in both the declamatory and non-declamatory treatments of Cicero’s murder” (122). He also explains, “Such violence is a common topic of declamatory descriptio” (122).

**Monstrosity**

Declamation, therefore, was originally a rhetorical training exercise that engaged students’ imaginations and asked them to adopt personas to deliver formal speeches. This training, Thomas Habinek writes, taught students to “impersonate a wide variety of characters, from slaves to gods, foreigners to Roman heroes, male and female, young and old, indiscriminately” (68). Some of these characters and situations were disturbing, if not horrifying. In this way, rhetorical training exercises helped forge an enduring link between declamation and monstrosity. Fully understanding this link requires readers to
momentarily set aside associations of *monstrosity* with something frightening, freakish, unnatural, or large. The word *monster* has had multiple definitions throughout the years, and many of those definitions found their way into nineteenth-century culture. A forerunner of the modern word *monster* in the Old French of the twelfth century was *mostre*, which meant a “prodigy” or “marvel,” according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*. One correspondence found in the *OED* is an obsolete early modern definition of *monster* as a verb meaning “to assume the appearance of greatness.” Here is a clear connection to *declamation* as the act of assuming the persona or a great historical figure to deliver a formal speech. The links, however, do not end with one possible meaning. Another archaic definition of *monster* found in the *OED* is “to exhibit” or “to point out as something remarkable.” This usage is true to the Latin origin *monstrāre*, meaning “to show” or “point” (“monster”). The same word is the origin for the French *montrer*, and the English “demonstrate” (“demonstrate”). As Michel Foucault points out in *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, “monsters” are “etymologically, beings or things to be shown” (68). Foucault refers specifically to the practice of publically exhibiting insane people, a practice that continued in England until the early nineteenth century. Foucault writes that according to a House of Commons report, “lunatics” at the hospital in Bethlehem were being exhibited on Sundays, with spectators being charged a penny. The annual revenue from the displays totaled nearly 400 pounds, indicating 96,000 visits per year (66). The insane people in these shows come closer to the modern sense of the word *monster* as something abnormal or deformed, something freakish. Yet another meaning for the word *monster* is suggested by
the Latin word *monēre*, which means “to warn” (“monster”). The meaning of *monster* as a warning is explained by Chris Baldick: “In a world created by a reasonable God, the freak or lunatic must have a purpose: to reveal visibly the results of vice, folly, and unreason, as a warning” (10). So, both “declamation” and “monstrosity” can be construed generally as a display involving the body intended to send some sort of message. In this sense, “declamation” and “monstrosity” approximate the meaning of *epideixis*, the root of epideictic, whose “nearest equivalents in English are ‘display,’ ‘show,’ ‘demonstration’” (Carey 237). Hawhee writes that “*epideixis* primarily meant a material or bodily display…” one that “becomes manifest via discourse” (175). This link to *epideixis* adds another consideration, which is that no display is possible without an audience and its reaction. Hawhee cites Simon Goldhill’s point that “‘*epideixis* requires an audience’” (qtd. in 175). She also states that “viewers … are not passive recipients of the display and the knowledge it produces…” (176). Drawing on other scholarship, Hawhee writes that epideictic requires observation and judgment: “…epideictic discourse demands an active evaluation and response” (176). This is an important concept for this study, which claims that nineteenth-century horror fiction uses epideictic to produce fear in audiences by depicting characters’ encounters with monstrosities such as Frankenstein’s creature, Dracula, Edward Hyde, the Beast People, and Dorian Gray. Epideictic is evident in the characters’ negative reaction to the monstrosities, their inability to express it effectively in speech, and their transformations after the encounters.

One way declamation was transmitted to nineteenth-century writers of horror fiction was through the elocutionary movement, which stressed rhetoric as a means of
controlling marginal bodies and speech. Declamation—with its links to monstrosity and epideictic—also offered writers a source of frightening characters and scenarios constituted through rhetoric. Perhaps the best examples of declamation in nineteenth-century British literature are the dramatic monologues of Robert Browning and Alfred Lord Tennyson. These poems isolate historical speakers—some of them monstrous, such as the Duke in Browning’s “My Last Duchess”—within a rhetorical performance before imagined audiences. They cast readers as members of those audiences, attempt to deceive them into believing that they are actually listening to the historical personages speaking, and invite them to make a judgment. Similar rhetorical moments are found throughout nineteenth-century horror fiction.

This chapter has examined the background of disarticulation as a trope in late-Victorian horror fiction that figures oratory as a form of discipline seeking to normalize unstable bodies, ultimately through the coercion and violence expressed in images and threats of dismemberment. This background includes the elocutionary movement, with its emphasis on intense training not only of the voice but also of the body as part of the science of oratorical delivery. Among elocution’s methods was imitation, both in reading and in oratory. Imitation in oratory was often part of declamation, an oratorical training exercise dating back to ancient Greece that asked students to assume the persona of a historical figure to deliver a famous speech or to resolve a dilemma. The role-playing often involved sinister scenarios and characters, which seems appropriate considering declamation’s etymological links to monstrosity and epideictic as displays involving the body. One set of declamation exercises was inspired by legends surrounding the slaying
and dismemberment of the great Roman orator Cicero, who emphasized the use of the body in oratorical delivery. Practiced in England through much of the nineteenth century, declamation exercises helped forge the peculiar link between oratory and violence that informed the rhetorical education of the professional classes and that can be located in late Victorian horror-fiction.
Figure 1. Spherical Illustration from Gilbert Austin’s *Chironomia* (“File: Chironomia Sphere”).
CHAPTER III
MONSTER AS ORATOR IN FRANKENSTEIN

By the end of Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel *Frankenstein*, the protagonist, Victor Frankenstein, is a ruined man. Frankenstein begins life full of promise. Doted on by his loving parents, he is sent to one of the finest universities in Europe. However, Frankenstein is a tragically flawed character. He is a secretive man driven by his obsession to conquer death, create life, and have his creation worship him. His corrupt ambition consumes him and leads to the deaths of his innocent friends and family members. His final obsession is to destroy the monster he has created. Pursuing the creature to the Arctic, Frankenstein is rescued by a crew of English explorers on an ice-bound ship. On board the ship, the dying Frankenstein tells his life story to the captain and the novel’s scribe, Robert Walton. He warns Walton to beware if he encounters the creature: “‘He is eloquent and persuasive, and once his words had even power over my heart; but trust him not. His soul is as hellish as his form, full of treachery and fiendlike malice’” (165).

*Frankenstein* is a foundational novel for the study of rhetoric in nineteenth-century horror fiction for its compelling depiction of monster as orator. It establishes the crucial link between declamation, monstrosity, and disarticulation that can be found in later horror fiction. Disarticulation is present in *Frankenstein* in that the monster is the
product of cutting. His liminal body—destroyed, dismembered, reconstructed, and reanimated without memory, identity, conscience, or soul—is depicted as using rhetoric in a forceful, emotional speech. Indeed, his eloquence constitutes his monstrous nature, which leads him to destroy William Frankenstein, Justine Moritz, Henry Clerval, and Elizabeth Frankenstein. The creature is monstrosity through and through. However, the rhetorical nature of Frankenstein is not limited to the creature’s speech and deed. His oration simply is the centerpiece of a novel with a clear rhetorical theme, which is the manipulative, self-serving, and violent nature of persuasive speech. Although the monster can be seen as declaiming, the true declaimer is Frankenstein, who recalls the creature’s speech for Walton. Frankenstein also uses rhetoric, albeit unsuccessfully, in his efforts to get Walton and his crew to continue their journey. Walton serves not only as the audience for the novel’s rhetorical performances, but also as a scribe and arbiter of the truth. Walton successfully resists Frankenstein’s impassioned rhetoric, and he also criticizes the creature’s false rhetoric. This chapter considers the rhetoric of the creature’s entreaties to Frankenstein as following the pattern of a classical oration. As such, the speech can be seen as carefully planned, rehearsed, and lacking sincerity.

**Classical Influences**

That Frankenstein has classical influences is indisputable. The subtitle, The Modern Prometheus, makes clear that Greek mythology is at least one of those influences. What is not so obvious is the extent of some of Shelley’s other classical influences, including rhetoric. Her use of rhetoric in the depiction of monstrosity reveals her deeper engagement with the classics. One of Shelley’s first influences was Percy
Shelley, who was her lover when she began writing *Frankenstein* in 1816, and her husband by the time it was published in serial form in 1818. Percy Shelley served as her co-author as well as her mentor, editor, and literary agent. Mary Shelley received no formal schooling. She was schooled at home by her father, the radical political philosopher and writer William Godwin. After running away with Percy Shelley in 1814, Mary Shelley was left to educate herself. Percy Shelley, on the other hand, received the elitist education that only the sons of well-to-do families would have received in his day to prepare them for public life. Percy Shelley’s classical learning undoubtedly influenced Mary Shelley’s intellectual curiosities and the production of the novel. His reading selections apparently sparked Mary Shelley’s interests in the classics. Studying the couple’s early reading lists in Mary Shelley’s surviving journals, one sees that Percy Shelley’s selections are heavy with the classics, including Cicero, Petronius, Suetonius, Livy, Seneca, Plutarch, Herodotus, Thucydides, Theocritus, Plato, Aeschylus, and Sophocles. Mary Shelley’s early reading lists, on the other hand, include mostly novels, poetry, and polemics, and later grew to include selections from the classics. Over the next few years, however, she was reading widely in the Greek and Roman classics, according to her journals. Her yearly reading lists and daily journal entries show specifically that she read selections from Homer, Pliny, Lucian, Horace, Cicero, Virgil, Tacitus, Ovid, Plutarch, and Suetonius. She also read Gibbon. By the time Mary Shelley began *Frankenstein* she was a budding classicist. This interest was piqued by Percy Shelley, who was fluent in Latin but still learning Greek (Wittman 90). Mary Shelley began studying Greek on her own in September 1814, “less than two months after her
elopement with Percy,” observes Ellen Herson Wittman (88). Mary Shelley’s determination to learn Greek “betrays a desire on her part not merely to learn from Percy but to hold her own in an area where Percy had as yet little advantage” (90). Mary Shelley began learning Latin in 1815 (90). In 1818, Percy and Mary Shelley worked together on a translation of Plato’s *Symposium*. Percy Shelley was a student at Eton when he was introduced to Plato. At the time, “the influence of Plato was considered subversive as compared with that of Aristotle” (90). This is significant, as Plato’s influence may have shaped *Frankenstein’s* essentially negative presentation of rhetoric as a false and misleading practice, one that is concerned with swaying audiences and winning arguments rather than with leading people to truth and advocating best actions.

Critics continue to find much material to work with when studying Mary Shelley’s classical influences in *Frankenstein*. Terry W. Thompson points out in his 2008 article “‘Victor, He Is Murdered’: Greek Stage Decorum and the Five Killings in *Frankenstein*” that the reports of the reports of the deaths of William, Justine, Henry, and Elizabeth are similar to the reports of off-stage slayings in Greek tragedies such as *Medea, Oedipus Rex, Agamemnon, Electra*, and *Antigone*. Thompson writes that given Mary Shelley’s self-documented love of Greek tragedy … and considering the many other Greek influences that permeate the pages of her first novel, the restrained manner in which she presents the monster’s … killings offers telling and meaningful echoes of classical stage decorum. (65)

In an earlier article, Thompson focuses on Mary Shelley’s reading of Ovid in 1815 and the parallels between Hercules in *Metamorphoses* and the creature in
Frankenstein. “In many ways,” Thompson writes in his 2004 article “‘A Majestic Figure of August Dignity,’” “Victor’s forlorn and unnatural creature offers poignant echoes of Hercules, the greatest and most fearsome of all the heroes in Greek Mythology, yet also one of the loneliest and most tragic figures in the Western canon” (36). Another article—“Testimony and Trope in Frankenstein” by Sara Guyer—examines the functions of the tropes of prosopopoeia and apostrophe, “figures that it relies upon for its presentation and the constitutive tropes of the romantic lyric” (98). Using prosopopoeia, a speaker or writer addresses as an audience as an imaginary or absent person. In many cases, the person is absent due to death. Both Plato and Cicero use this rhetorical device in their dialogues by “speaking” through other characters, such as Socrates and Crassus. In Frankenstein, Victor uses prosopopoeia when he retells the creature’s story to Walton. And, in Walton’s narrative, both Victor and the creature become figures of prosopopoeia.

The Shelleys moved to Italy in March 1818, and during an outing in December 1818 visited Cicero’s tomb in Gaeta. In a journal entry dated December 30th, Mary Shelley explains that the tomb was “erected on the place where he was murdered in the midst of the olive wood” (241). Shelley was captivated by the beauty of the scenery, which overlooked a bay “sanctified by the fictions of Homer … and the ruins of the Villa of Cicero …” (241). The tomb, Shelley writes, is about a mile from the ruins: “A poet could not have a more sacred burying place in an olive grove on the shore of a beautiful bay—sheltered by the range of bleak hills which contrast with the beautiful wooded plain at their feet” (241). The serenity of the setting described by Shelley, however, belies the
violent nature of Cicero’s death and the legendary mutilation of his dismembered head, which constitute a defining moment in disarticulation.

Shelley’s poetic meditations on Cicero reveal the affinity she felt for the great Roman orator whose ideas on rhetoric had such a profound influence on Frankenstein. Indeed, Shelley seems to have closely followed Cicero’s *De Inventione* in crafting the creature’s oration to Frankenstein, which begins near the end of Volume II, Chapter II, of the 1818 text and continues to Chapter IX. This speech can be broken down into the various sections that Cicero identifies in *De Inventione*: introduction, narration, partition, confirmation, refutation, and conclusion.

**The Monster’s Oration**

Before analyzing the monster’s speech, it is first enlightening to analyze his body. Of course, the creature’s body is assembled from other dismembered bodies. He is not born: he is manufactured. For this study, the most significant tie between the creature and the classical world is this notion that bodies and their dispositions can be recreated. In ancient Greece, men were not born orators: they were built into orators. Their bodies were not naturally invested with rhetoric: it was ingrained into their bodies to the point that it appeared natural. The term Debra Hawhee has coined to describe the concept of the creating a person’s nature is *phusiopoiesis*. The theory here is that “the body’s constitution can be remolded so that it is more suitable for further training” (93). The body, then, and its instincts can be rebuilt. Hawhee says that “Aristotle suggests that habits become so ingrained in a person that they become almost instinctual responses and
most closely approximate a ‘natural’ state” (95). This reconditioning was accomplished through the “Three Rs”: rhythm, repetition, and response (141).

In fourth and fifth centuries BC, this education took place in the gymnasium, a space for physical exercise but also for rhetorical training. It was a space for talking and exchanging ideas (114). The epicenter of rhetoric was Athens. Hawhee writes that gymnasia were prime gathering spots for itinerant sophists, as were the agora, or marketplace. “Apparently, all of Athens was swarming with sophists,” Hawhee writes. “These mobile teachers were particularly drawn to the spaces where they were likely to be most visible to potential clientele: the agora and the gymnasium both served this function” (111). Within these spaces, Hawhee writes, a “specific syncretism” took place “between athletics and rhetoric ….” It was “a crossover that contributed to the development of rhetoric as a bodily art: an art performed by and with the body as well as the mind” (111). Gymnasia were where “citizen production” took place. “It was in the gymasia that most of Athens’ future leaders were trained, a least to some degree,” Hawhee writes (116). Music from aulos, a wind instrument similar to a bagpipe, set the tempo for “the practice, regulation, and production of bodily movements” (138). Two of the primary methods for “habit formation” were repetition and imitation. Students imitated their instructors. “The teacher … must offer himself as a model,” Hawhee writes, for there is “a portion of the art of oratory that cannot be transferred through explicit discussion of composition, arrangement, and style” (151). Part of what was being taught through modeling was bodily control, or deportment. Hawhee explains that “training in deportment took on a bodily manner, with attention to self-presentation,
bodily carriage, standing, sitting, and walking” (151). This training had not only to do with the “polite,” Hawhee says: it also had to do with the “politic” (152). Observers made inferences about character based on the body. This was the “habituated practice of bodily reading,” Hawhee states, drawing on Aristotle’s belief that character is judged through body (152). Here we see an emphasis on impersonation and bodily control that will persist in declamation through Roman oratory and the elocutionists directly into the nineteenth century.

A final concept that must be considered in the study of bodily reformation through rhetoric and athletics is agōn. Agōn means “contest or struggle” (15). It is more than simple sparring or competition with a goal of victory: its emphasis is on the struggle itself as crucial to the development of body and “virtuosity,” or aretē (17). Aretē, Hawhee explains, “was an ethical concept … associated with bodily appearance, action, and performance as much as it was conceived of as an abstracted ‘guide’” for action (17). Agōn could refer to physical trials or rhetorical trials. Both types of struggle prepared students for the rigors of public speaking. Hawhee writes of the “sheer bodily strength” that scholars believe was “required to deliver powerful, effective speeches” in large venues, some of them outdoors (153-154).

Ancient Greek speakers, therefore, projected a certain monstrousness, a larger-than-life physicality and presence. This is just one of the characteristics that Shelley’s creature shares with classical orators. He is depicted as being physically large with incredible endurance. Spying on his adopted family, the DeLaceys, from his secret hiding place, he learns through instruction and imitation. He is also affected by the music that
they play. His *agōn* involves wandering in the wilderness, where he is rejected and even shot. All of these experiences shape his reconstructed body and his character and prepare him for his oratorical challenge, which is to persuade Frankenstein to create a mate for him. To achieve this goal, the creature—whose primary model is Milton’s Satan, another great literary orator—must overcome Frankenstein’s vehement objections and minimize what Frankenstein strongly suspects and will soon have confirmed, that the creature killed William and brought about Justine’s execution.

Both the creature and Frankenstein treat the rhetorical occasion as something of a legal proceeding. The creature sees it as a civil dispute. He asserts his “‘right’” (111) and demands “‘recompense’” (73). Frankenstein, on the other hand, sees it as a criminal prosecution. He accuses the creature of having “‘diabolically murdered’” William and Justine (72). The creature replies, “‘The guilty are allowed, by human laws, bloody as they may be, to speak in their own defence before they are condemned. … You accuse me of murder; and yet you would, with a satisfied conscience, destroy your own creature’” (73–4). Here, and throughout his oration, the creature makes it clear that he is familiar with the law—a primary arena of rhetorical endeavor. Law is one of the subjects that he manages to learn during his time in the German wilderness spying on the DeLaceys, a French family living in exile. Significantly, when the creature later confesses to killing William, a child of about five years, he calls the slaying “murder” (110), not manslaughter or some other lesser offense. Recounting the crime, the creature says that after he abducts William near his family’s home in Geneva and learns he is a Frankenstein, he tells him, “‘… you belong to my enemy—to him towards whom I have
sworn eternal revenge; you shall be my first victim.” Grasping the boy’s throat “to silence him,” the creature kills him. This is not a “tragic accident,” as Thompson describes it (“A Majestic Figure” 39). The creature is not remorseful. On the contrary, he celebrates the murder: “I gazed on my victim, and my heart swelled with exultation and hellish triumph: clapping my hands, I exclaimed, “I, too, can create desolation …”” (109). After strangling William, the creature says he steals a locket with a picture of the boy’s dead mother Caroline Frankenstein and secretly hides the locket in the folds of Justine’s dress. He knows what will happen if the servant girl is found in possession of the locket because he is familiar with the “sanguinary laws of man” and has “learned how to work mischief” (110). For his part, Frankenstein says that he agrees to hear the monster partly to find out if he really did kill William: “I eagerly sought a confirmation or denial of this opinion” (74). And the creature casts Frankenstein in the role of his judge and juror: “Oh, Frankenstein, be not equitable to every other, and trample upon me alone, to whom thy justice, and even thy clemency and affection, is most due” (73). He adds, “Listen to my tale: when you have heard that, abandon or commiserate me, as you shall judge that I deserve” (73). As we will see, such flattering language is part of the creature’s strategy for swaying Frankenstein and getting him to agree to create a female companion for the monster.

Exordium

According to Cicero’s De Invenzione, the purpose of the exordium is to bring “the mind of the hearer into a suitable state to receive the rest of the speech; and that will be
effected if it has rendered him well disposed towards the speaker, attentive, and willing to receive information” (I.XV). Cicero writes that the exordium ought to have a great deal of sententiousness and gravity in it, and altogether to embrace all things which have a reference to dignity; because that is the most desirable effect to be produced which in the greatest degree recommends the speaker to his hearer. (I.XVIII)

It has two divisions. The first is a beginning in “plain words” that will disarm the audience and thereby avoid raising any “suspicion of preparation and artificial diligence.” The second division is language “calculated to enable the orator to work his way into the good graces of his hearers.” Cicero identifies five types, or “causes,” of exordiums: honorable, astonishing, low, doubtful, and obscure.

Using these terms, the creature’s exordium is best considered as “astonishing,” which describes a rhetorical situation in which the orator and audience are alienated from one another. In such a hostile situation, Cicero advises that it is still necessary to obtain an audience’s good will. If the audience is “excessively alienated … then it will be necessary to have recourse to endeavours to insinuate oneself into their good graces,” Cicero counsels. In other words, the orator must present himself in a positive light in an effort to win the audience’s favor and defuse their animosity. Another piece of advice that Cicero presents is that an orator should not present the second part of his speech, the narration, “in an unseasonable place” (I.XXI). He should also promise that he will be brief and “that we will in a very short time prove our … cause” (I.XVI).
The creature seems to follow Cicero’s advice carefully. During his exordium, the creature repeatedly pleads for a hearing: “I entreat you to hear me...” (72). “Listen to my tale.” (73); “But hear me.” (73); “Hear my tale....” (74); “...listen to me....” (74). While Frankenstein heaps insults on the monster, calling him not only a “wretched” and “abhorred” devil, but also a “fiend,” the creature maintains his dignity as he speaks with deference to his creator: “I am thy creature, and I will be even mild and docile to my natural lord and king....” (73). Clearly, the creature uses this ingratiating language to appeal to one of Frankenstein’s weaknesses—his vanity. Earlier in the novel, Frankenstein describes one of his motives for creating life: “A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs” (34).

The monster tries to begin establishing his good character in his exordium: “I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous” (73). He repeats: “I was benevolent; my soul glowed with love and humanity” (73). When Frankenstein resists his rhetoric, the monster sounds as if he is considering his oratorical strategies: “How can I move thee? Will no entreaties cause thee to turn a favourable eye upon thy creature” (73). The exordium has its desired effect on Frankenstein. After initially refusing an audience with the creature, Frankenstein agrees. He says that he considered the creature’s “arguments ... and determined to listen to his tale” (74). He continues: “I was partly urged by curiosity, and compassion confirmed my resolution. ... For the first time, also, I felt what the duties of creator
towards his creature were, and that I ought to render him happy before I complained of
his wickedness” (74). Before beginning his narration, the creature also seems to be
following Cicero’s advice when sees to Frankenstein’s comfort by inviting him out of the
cold into his hut. He says, : “… the temperature of this place is not fitting to your fine
sensations” (74). Well into his narration, the creature also indicates his concern for time
and says that he will quicken the pace: “‘I now hasten to the more moving part of my
story’” (86).

Narratio

Cicero writes that narratio, or narration, “is an explanation of acts that have been
done, or of acts as if they have been done” (I.XIX). The narration is a statement of
particulars of a case, and the creature’s is central to his argument. Scrutinizing the
creature’s narration, one can discern several themes, all of which are introduced in his
exordium: he is essentially good and has been turned evil by the abuse he suffers at the
hands of mankind; he has been wronged by his creator; he has fine sensibilities and is
affected by beauty, literature, music, and learning; he has been excluded from human
society based on his appearance; and he has powerful emotions and a capacity for
violence.

Establishing that he is an essentially good is of the utmost importance to the
creature’s argument. As Cicero points out in De Inventione, “Good-will will be procured
… if exploits are mentioned which have been performed … with bravery, or wisdom, or
humanity” (I.VVI). The monster’s kindness and bravery must also seem to outweigh the
despicable crimes he has committed in killing an innocent child and effecting the
execution of a guiltless girl for the slaying, not to mention arson.

The creature recalls that he performed acts of kindness and generosity for the
DeLaceys after witnessing their love for one another and learning that they have been
exiled from their home country, that they lead lives of poverty and toil, and that they are
going hungry. One of the first kindnesses that the creature says he performs for the
cottagers is to stop stealing food from them and to begin living on “berries, nuts, and
roots” that he scrounges in the forest (82). He also tells Frankenstein that he collects
firewood for the DeLaceys, clears the snow from the path to their cottage, and does other
chores typically performed by Felix, the son and brother. All the while, he remains in
hiding. He says the cottagers are “‘greatly astonished’” by the occurrences, “‘and once or
twice I heard them … utter the words good spirit, wonderful …’” (85). Even after he is
violently and painfully rejected by the DeLaceys, the monster says that he performs an
act of heroism by saving a girl from drowning in a “‘rapid’” river and tries to revive her,
only to be shot by a “‘rustic’” with a gun (108).

Another theme of the creature’s narration is his belief that he has been wronged
by his creator, who abandoned him right after his “‘birth.’” In one of Frankenstein’s
many Miltonic allusions, the creature declares in his exordium, “‘I ought to be thy Adam;
but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed’” (73).
Indeed, the monster’s descriptions of his wanderings after he is abandoned by
Frankenstein seem intended to cast himself as a babe in the woods and produce guilt in
his creator. One recalls Frankenstein’s own description of the newly resurrected creature
as an infantile being: “His jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while a grin wrinkled his cheeks” (38). A short time later, the monster is wandering alone. He is cold, hungry, thirsty, exhausted, and confused, and his senses are not fully developed (76). “I was a poor, helpless, miserable wretch,”’ the creature tells Frankenstein (75). At the DeLacey’s cottage, the “kennel’” that he monster secretly dwells in is beside a “pig-stye’” (79). He sleeps in “straw” like an animal and lives like a rodent in the shadows, emerging only in the DeLacey’s absence.

Despite the hostile feelings that the monster argues that he develops as a result of his mistreatment by humans and his outcast status, he tries to impress upon Frankenstein that he is a sensitive being deeply affected by beauty, literature, music, and learning. Like his maker, the creature takes pleasure in nature. One of his first memories is of gazing at the moon (76). He takes pleasure in the songs of the birds in the forest (76). He loves the sights and smells of flowers blooming in the spring, and the “pale radiance” of the stars in the “moonlight woods” (88). The monster is captivated by the “beauty” and “gentle manners” (81) of the cottagers. He is charmed by the strains of the elder DeLacey’s guitar, which produces “sounds sweeter than the voice of the thrush or the nightingale” (80). Later, when Safie joins the family and the creature hears her play DeLacey’s guitar, the music “at once drew tears of sorrow and delight from my eyes” (88). From the DeLaceys, he learns language, “a godlike science … I ardently desired to become acquainted with….’” (83). He also learns world history—including the “stupendous genius and mental activity of the Grecians’” and the “wonderful virtue of the early Romans”’—as Felix reads to Safie from Volney’s *Ruins of Empire* (89).
“These wonderful narrations inspired me with strange feelings,”’ the monster says, as he ponders mankind’s duality: “‘He appeared at one time a mere scion of the evil principle, and at another as all that can be conceived of noble and godlike’” (89). The creature also learns independently. In the woods one night, he says he finds a trunk containing three books: *Paradise Lost, Plutarch’s Lives*, and *Sorrows of Werther*. “‘I can hardly describe to you the effect of these books,’” the monster tells Frankenstein. “‘They produced in me an infinity of new images and feelings, that sometimes raised me to ecstasy, but more frequently sunk me into the lowest dejection’” (97).

The creature’s feelings of dejection from learning lead to another theme in his narration: his anguish at having been excluded from human society based on his monstrous appearance. The text offers a few glimpses of the creature’s appearance before his narration begins. For instance, Frankenstein tells Walton that he decided to make the creature of “gigantic stature; that is to say, about eight feet in height, and proportionally large” (34) to simplify his construction. As he recounts for Walton the night of the monster’s restoration, Frankenstein states, “I saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open” (37). Later in the same chapter, he gives a fuller description:

His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of his muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost the same color as the dun white sockets in which they were set, his shriveled complexion, and straight black lips. (37)

Later, Frankenstein says that the creature’s “unearthly ugliness rendered it almost too horrible for human eyes” (72). Early on, the monster is unaware of his ghastly
appearance. One of the first indications occurs when he wanders into a hut and frightens an elderly man so badly that the man runs away “with a speed of which his debilitated form hardly appeared capable” (78). The creature says the man’s reaction surprises him (78). When he finally sees his reflection in a pool of water, he has difficulty recognizing himself: “‘At first I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification’” (85). The cottagers’ rejection of the monster traumatizes him and sends him on a quest to find his creator. He emphasizes the arduousness of his winter journey, using heroic terms to refer to his “‘labours’” (108) and “toils” (109) as he endures snow and ice. “‘My travels were long, and the sufferings I endured intense,’” he says. “‘The agony of my feelings allowed me no respite’” (107). The monster concludes his narration by telling Frankenstein, “‘I am alone, and miserable; man will not associate with me…’” (110).

Another of the creature’s themes is that he is an emotional being with a capacity for violence. At several points during his narration, the creature says that he cries. “‘I sat down and wept,’” the monster says, recalling that he was overwhelmed by hunger, thirst, cold, fear, and pain he felt Frankenstein abandoned him (75). After learning that the cottagers have been abandoned their home in fear, the creature has a cathartic “gush of tears” (107). Later, he cries out of joy: “‘Soft tears again bedewed my cheeks, and I even raised my humid eyes with thankfulness towards the blessed sun. …’” (107). The creature also appreciates other people’s feelings. He watches as Agatha is moved to tears and sobs by the music her father makes. He says, “‘I felt sensations of a peculiar and
overpowering nature: they were a mixture of pain and pleasure, such as I had never before experienced …’” (80). He is touched by the sacrifices that the children make for their father by going without food, unknown to him. “‘This kind of trait moved me sensibly,’” he tells Frankenstein. He says that he empathizes with the cottagers: “‘…when they were unhappy, I felt depressed; when they rejoiced, I sympathized in their joys’’” (83).

The creature’s emotions of joy and sadness are overshadowed by his negative emotions—anger, hatred, and rage. Meditating upon the “‘injustice’” of his gunshot wound, the monster says that “‘a deep, deadly revenge’” is the only compensation for him (108). Previously described was William’s murder. However, the creature describes another of his crimes—arson—in his narration. Although no one is killed or injured in the blaze, it reveals much about the monster’s character. Filled with rage at the departure of the DeLaceys and “‘unable to injure anything human,’” the creature burns down the family’s deserted home. On a windy night, the creature first destroys the family’s garden then sets fire to the cottage. In a frightening scene, the “‘fierce wind’” causes the monster to go into “‘a kind of insanity in my spirits, that burst all bounds of reason and reflection.’” Lighting the fire, the creature says he “‘danced with a fury’” and let out a “‘loud scream’” (106). After he is sure no one will be able to save the cottage from burning to the ground, the monster says he flees. The creature describes his state of mind by comparing himself to Milton’s Satan: “‘I, like the arch fiend, bore a hell within me; and … wished to tear up the trees, spread havoc and destruction around me, and then to have sat down and enjoy the ruin’’” (104).
It may seem odd for the creature to confess his crimes to Frankenstein, the maker he hopes will restore his happiness, but the creature clearly has a strategy for overcoming the damage these disclosures may cause the case he is pleading. The monster tells Frankenstein there was a time when he was ignorant of violence and could not understand it. It was not part of his character. He says the seed of violence was planted in him through mankind’s example in Volney’s *Ruins of Empire*, and at first he was repulsed by this violence (90). Moreover, the creature’s admission of his crimes can be seen as a courtroom ploy known as *dicaelogia*, in which a defendant confesses but defends his actions as necessary or justified (Lanham 35). In the eyes of a jury and in public opinion, such a maneuver can subtly shift blame away from the accused and toward the accuser, calling into question societal hypocrisy or systematic injustice. The creature’s implied argument is that, yes, he killed William and framed Justine, but he was the victim of an earlier crime, a far greater crime, in his very creation as a hideous monster who was abandoned in a hostile world where he would be feared and detested.

*Propositio*

Cicero writes that a *propositio*, or proposition, is a brief “arrangement of the subjects to be mentioned in an argument, when properly made, renders the whole oration clear and intelligible” (I.XXII). The *propositio*, or proposition, of the creature’s oration comes at the end of his narration, when he finally reveals his purpose to Frankenstein. Once again, he seems to follow closely Cicero’s advice. Overall, the monster’s proposition is brief, occupying just three sentences, less than half a paragraph of the novel. He states a point on which both can agree, that the creature he has been excluded
from human society. He leads up to the next matter on which he is about to speak by observing that “‘one as deformed and horrible as myself would not deny herself to me. My companion must be of the same species, and have the same defects.’” He then states his demand: “‘This being you must create.’” In the next paragraph, Frankenstein refers to this as the creature’s “proposition” (110).

**Confirmatio**

Cicero writes that the *confirmatio*, or confirmation, is “that by means of which our speech proceeding in argument adds belief, and authority, and corroboration to our cause” (I.XXIV). It brings into sharper focus the speaker’s argument. As Cicero writes, in a confirmation, “… it appears to be not an inconvenient course to disentangle what is not unlike a wood, or a vast promiscuous mass of materials all jumbled together …” (I.XXIV).

The monster’s confirmation begins at the outset of Chapter IX, with Frankenstein “‘bewildered, perplexed, and unable to arrange my ideas sufficiently to understand the full extent of his proposition’” (110). The creature then presents his demand clearly, along with his arguments: “‘You must create a female for me, with whom I can live in the interchange of those sympathies necessary for my being. This you alone can do; and I demand it of you as a right which you must not refuse’” (111). The creature’s main arguments in support of his demand are, first, Frankenstein alone has the power to produce a mate; and, second, that this mate is the monster’s right.
Refutatio

Frankenstein’s initial refusal (111) to grant the creature’s request leads to the next section of his oration, the refutatio, refutation. Cicero writes that “Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing” (I.XLII). Corbett and Connors point out that counterarguments can be refuted through reason and emotion (279). The creature uses both types of refutation.

The first objection that Frankenstein raises to the creature’s demand is the danger a second creature would pose to mankind: “‘Shall I create another like yourself, whose joint wickedness might desolate the world’” (111). The creature responds, “‘I am content to reason with you’” (111). He goes on to say that he is an object of hatred, but that he would live peacefully alongside man if that was possible: “‘But that cannot be; the human senses are insurmountable barriers to our union’” (111). If he cannot be loved, then he will be feared; and he will seek revenge against mankind and his maker. Again, he threatens Frankenstein: “‘I will work at your destruction, nor finish until I desolate your heart, so that you curse the hour of your birth’” (111). As the creature speaks, his anger grows. Frankenstein observes that “a fiendish rage animated him” and “his face was wrinkled into contortions too horrible for human eyes to behold” (111).

Regaining control of his temper, the creature again emphasizes his rationality. “‘I intended to reason,’” he said. “‘This passion is detrimental for me …’” (111). He continues by restating his request: “‘What I ask of you is reasonable and moderate; I demand a creature of another sex, but as hideous as myself’” (112). However, the
monster’s next ploy is to appeal to Frankenstein’s emotions, and particularly his ego and
vanity: “‘Oh! My creator, make me happy; let me feel gratitude towards you for one
benefit!’” (112). The strategy works, and Frankenstein begins to feel persuaded: “I was
moved…. His tale, and the feelings he now expressed, proved him to be a creature of fine
sensations; and did I not, as his maker, owe him all the portion of happiness that it was in
my power to bestow?” (112).

The monster senses Frankenstein’s “change of feeling” (112) and continues his
appeal, repeating that he will exile himself along with his new mate to the “‘vast wilds of
South America’” (112). He presents an idyllic image of him and his mate living in their
own Eden where nature will satisfy all of their needs: “‘The picture I present to you is
peaceful and human, and you must feel that you could deny it only in the wantonness of
power and cruelty’” (112). Seeing “‘compassion’” in his creator’s eyes, the monster all
but prostrates himself before his maker. At the same time, he reminds his audience that
he is employing rhetoric deliberately. He says, “‘…let me seize the favorable moment,
and persuade you to promise what I so ardently desire’” (112).

Frankenstein, however, is still not convinced, and he tells the creature to “cease to
argue the point” (112). His second objection is that the creature, a social animal, will not
be content to remain in “‘exile’” (112). He fears that the creature will again seek human
society, and he will again be rejected. This time, though, he will have a helper to aid him
in his “‘task of destruction’” (112). But the monster is undeterred. He repeats his promise
to “‘quit the neighborhood of man’” and live “‘in the most savage of places,’” where he
will find the sympathy of a companion and lose his “‘evil passions.’” Then, at the end of his life, he says, “‘...I shall not curse my maker’” (113).

Feeling the power of the monster’s rhetoric, Frankenstein says, “His words had a strange effect upon me. I compassionated him” (113). He says, “I had no right to withhold from him the small portion of happiness which was yet in my power to bestow” (113). Still, Frankenstein is concerned that he has no reason to trust the creature, who might very well be deceiving him. He asks the monster, “‘Might not even this be a feint that will increase your triumph by affording a wider scope for your revenge?’” (113). This concern raises the larger question of whether the creature’s entire tale has been a fabrication and his emotions insincere. In De Inventione, Cicero never states that a narration must be truthful, only that it “appear like the truth” (I.XXI). Few, if any, of the details in the monster’s story can be independently corroborated. Even if Frankenstein wanted to try to confirm the tale, he could not, for he has essentially become a hostage. The creature tells him, “‘We may not part until you have promised to comply with my requisition’” (110).

Interestingly, the creature does respond to Frankenstein’s concern that he might be practicing deception with an avowal of his honesty. Instead, he responds indirectly, in a head-shaking manner, with a question: “‘How is this?’” (112). He tries to shame Frankenstein by saying, “‘I thought I had moved your compassion, and yet you still refuse to bestow on me the only benefit that can soften my heart and render me harmless’” (113). The creature then restates his earlier refutation, that he will be reformed by love. He says, “‘My vices are the children of a forced solitude that I abhor; and my
virtues will necessarily arise when I live in communion with an equal’” (112). In a paradox, the monster states that, even though he will be cut off from humanity, the “‘affections of a sensitive being’” will make him like other men: “‘I shall … become linked to the chain of existence, from which I am now excluded’” (113).

*Peroration*

With this final refutation, the creature’s speech ends. The *peroration*, or conclusion, is provided by the thoughts of Frankenstein as he reflects on “the various arguments” the creature “had employed” (113). Cicero writes in *De Inventione* that the “conclusion is the end and terminating of the whole oration” and that it can take three forms: “enumeration, indignation, and complaint” (I.LII). From Cicero’s description, enumeration is similar to recapitulation, or summary. It takes “matters which have been related in a scattered and diffuse manner” and collects “together … for the sake of recollecting them” and bringing them “under our view” (I.LII). Cicero’s thoughts on using complaint in a conclusion are also significant for Frankenstein. Cicero writes that complaint “is a speech seeking to move the pity of the hearers. In this it is necessary in the first place to render the disposition of the hearer gentle and merciful, in order that it may the more easily be influenced by pity” (I.LV). If such a conclusion is handled properly, Cicero writes, “the minds of men are greatly softened” and they will be “prepared to feel pity, while they consider their own weakness in the contemplation of the misfortunes of another” (I.LV). Cicero identifies sixteen “topics” for a complaint:

The sixth topic is one by which the person spoken of is shown to be miserable, when he had no reason to expect any such fate; and that when he was expecting
something else, he not only failed to obtain it, but fell into the most terrible misfortunes. (I.IV)

This topic corresponds directly to the creature’s sufferings: his rejection by the cottagers, the gunshot wound, and the “‘labours’” and the “‘toils’” he later experiences. These are his agōn. In reviewing the major strands of the monster’s oration, Frankenstein considers “the promise of virtues which he had displayed on the opening of his existence, and the subsequent blight of all kindly feeling by the loathing and scorn which his protectors had manifested towards him” (113). Frankenstein says he also weighs the creature’s “power and threats” (113). In explaining his decision to honor the creature’s request, Frankenstein says that it arose partly from concern for mankind and the creature, but it is also clear that he is motivated by the same hubris that creature appealed to during his oration: “After a long pause of reflection, I concluded, that the justice due both to him and my fellow-creatures demanded of me that I should comply with his request” (114).

Frankenstein’s creature is a product of disarticulation in that he is produced by cutting. He is formed of dead body parts sutured together and resuscitated. To construct his creature’s mate using the same process, Frankenstein eventually travels to a remote area of Scotland. Having overcome his disgust at the thought of assembling a second monster from dead matter, he begins his project. However, he aborts the project after he discovers that the creature has followed him to Scotland. Describing a moment of epideictic shock reminiscent of the first time he saw his creature (37), Frankenstein recalls catching the monster spying on him in Scotland and observing: “I trembled, and
my heat failed within me; when, on looking up, I saw, by the light of the moon, the
daemon at the casement. A ghastly grin wrinkled his lips as he gazed on me…” (130).
Frankenstein says he is “trembling with passion” when he destroys the female monster he
is creating. He says that he “tore to pieces the thing on which I was engaged” (130). It is
a significant moment, not only because it incenses the monster and motivates his murder
of Clerval and Elizabeth, but also because it expresses Frankenstein’s desire to do what
he cannot do to the creature: act on his loathing and dismember the monster’s grotesque
body.

Frankenstein, Walton, and Rhetoric

Although the creature’s oration is the dominant focus in this analysis of

Frankenstein, it is not the only occasion when a character uses rhetoric in the novel. On
the contrary, the monster’s oration to Frankenstein is presented within Frankenstein’s
speeches to Walton and his crew, which are in turn presented within Walton’s discursive
letters to his sister. Clearly, Frankenstein and Walton—who share many similarities—
both have rhetorical motives and functions within the novel.

Frankenstein employs rhetoric unsuccessfully when he tries to persuade Walton to
take on his quest for the monster. This effort begins quite subtly, after the crew finds
Frankenstein near death and floating on a “large fragment of ice” (12). Frankenstein,
however, does not ask for help. Instead, he wants to know where the ship is headed.
Walton is stunned. He writes to his sister:

You may conceive my astonishment on hearing such a question addressed to me
from a man on the brink of destruction, and to whom I should have supposed that
my vessel would have been a resource which he would not have exchanged for the most precious wealth the earth can afford. (12-13)

Ironically, Franke
stein does indeed see Walton’s ship as a potential “resource” in his pursuit of the creature, and he is “satisfied” and boards the vessel when Walton tells him that they are bound for the North Pole “on a voyage of discovery” (13).

On board the ship, Frankenstein’s oration to Walton comprises most of the novel. It is not as focused, structured, and purposeful as the creature’s oration, perhaps due to Frankenstein’s grief and exhaustion, or perhaps due to his weaker rhetorical skills. One recalls that Frankenstein and the creature are educated differently. Both are largely self-educated, as is Walton. However, Frankenstein focuses on occultism, natural philosophy, and chemistry. In some ways, the monster has a more formal education than his maker, studying the classics and the moderns. Walton, on the other hand, says he read his uncle’s volumes about sea-faring voyages of discovery and later Homer and Shakespeare. His thwarted ambition is to become a poet. Failing at that, he becomes an explorer.

Frankenstein, tragically, lacks many of the qualities that a rhetorical education could have provided. Likewise, the creature lacks a formal rhetorical education, so the development of his moral being is also stunted. Although he is eloquent, he is not virtuous. He lacks aretē. He is not the “perfect orator,” the “good man” trained in the “science of speaking well,” envisioned by Quintilian in his Institutes of Oratory (XV.33). A reflection of his creator, he is motivated by self-interested motives rather than by any concern with the greater good. In Frankenstein, eloquence hides baseness. It pours forth from the characters’ inner torment, as it does with Satan in Paradise Lost, whose
deformity, wicked spirit, and misleading rhetoric loom over the entire novel. As the poet sings of Satan in *Paradise Lost*:

…horror and doubt distract  
His troubled thoughts, and from the bottom stir  
The hell within him, for within him hell  
He brings, and round about him, nor from hell  
One step no more than from himself can fly  
By change of place … (IV.18-23)

Although Frankenstein is not as accomplished an orator as his creature, he uses some of the same methods. For instance, he dwells on his sufferings through the losses of his family and friends. He also confesses his crimes in desecrating bodies for his project, but he makes it clear that his motive is noble, to eliminate death. The proposition of Frankenstein’s lengthy narration is to enlist Walton’s aid in destroying the demonized creature. If I die, Frankenstein says,

…swear to me, Walton, that he shall not escape; that you will seek him, and satisfy my vengeance in his death … if the ministers of vengeance should conduct him to you, swear that he shall not live—swear that he will not triumph over my accumulated woes, and live to make another such wretch as I am. … thrust your sword into his heart. I will hover near, and direct the steel aright. (165)

Frankenstein urges the crew to continue northward when they falter. Their cowardice provokes Frankenstein and prompts him to deliver a rousing oration in Walton’s cabin. He reminds them of the glory they sought in the voyage and the courage they knew would be required of them to succeed. Drawing on what sound like his own motives, Frankenstein tells the crew, “You were hereafter to be held as the benefactors of your
species…’” He mocks them for wanting to “‘shrink away’” at the “‘first imagination of danger,’” and go down in history “‘as men who had not strength enough to endure cold and peril; and so, poor souls, they were chilly, and returned to their warm firesides.’”

Continuing his mocking oratory, Frankenstein tells the crew that they did not have to travel so far and work so hard to drag their captain “‘to the shame of defeat, merely to prove yourselves cowards.’” His conclusion makes striking use of the trope of simile, and makes a significant reference to an unnamed “‘foe’”:

> Be steady to your purposes, and firm as a rock. This ice is not made of such stuff as your hearts might b…. Do not return to your families with the stigma of disgrace marked on your brows. Return as heroes who have fought and conquered, and who know not what it is to turn their backs on the foe. (170)

Walton notes that Frankenstein delivers his oration “with a voice so modulated to the different feelings expressed in his speech” and “with an eye so full of lofty design and heroism.” It is not the first time that Walton comments on Frankenstein’s eloquence before the crew: “…when he speaks, they no longer know despair; he rouses their energies, and, while they hear his voice, they believe these vast mountains of ice are mole-hills, which will vanish before the resolutions of man” (169). However, Frankenstein’s oration to the near-mutinous crew in Walton’s cabin ultimately fails. Walton “cannot withstand” his crew’s “demands” and decides to return home, his “hopes blasted by cowardice and indecision” (173). On his deathbed, Frankenstein says his earlier “‘motives’” were “‘selfish and vicious’” (174). But he repeats his request that Walton kill the creature—if not in the Arctic, then wherever they might meet. He leaves
Walton to weigh his arguments for the creature’s destruction: “‘But the consideration of these points … I leave to you’” (174).

Just as the creature casts Frankenstein in the role of judge for his oration at the heart of the novel, Frankenstein places Walton in the same role at the end of the novel. He is asked to become a recorder of the tale before he becomes a participant. Up to this point, Walton has simply recorded Frankenstein’s story, transferring it from oral to written form. When Frankenstein discovers that Walton is recording his story, Frankenstein becomes Walton’s editor. His main focus is dramatizing his meeting with the creature at Montanvert. He does not want his “‘narration … mutilated’” (166).

With Frankenstein dead, Walton focuses on shaping his own narration and putting it to use for his own rhetorical purpose, which will be to provide some explanation of why he ended his expedition before reaching his goal. One recalls that Walton aspired to be a poet, but failed. His search for a northern passage and the source of magnetism in a mythical “region of beauty and delight” (5), of “country of eternal light” (6), leads him to a wasteland of icy darkness made even more inhospitable and dangerous by the destructive passions he finds in Frankenstein, the creature, and himself. He nevertheless makes a great discovery. He encounters what every aspiring writer longs for—a story. After giving in to the crew’s demands to quit the expedition, Walton also says that he needs “philosophy … to bear this injustice with patience” (172). However, the story at this point has no ending, and it requires one appropriate to the overall rhetorical nature of the novel. Walton provides this ending in his audience with the creature. He writes to his
sister, “…the tale would be incomplete without this wonderful and final catastrophe” (175).

Walton meets the creature after the monster sneaks on board the ship, only to find his creator dead. He is alerted to the creature’s presence by the sound of a voice in the cabin where Frankenstein’s body has been laid. Entering the cabin, Walton finds the creature wailing over the coffin. The monster’s appearance is so “appallingly hideous” that Walton momentarily forgets Frankenstein’s rhetoric and his duty to slay the creature (175). He is rendered speechless by the monster’s “unearthly … ugliness” (175).

Walton’s reaction to the monster is another of the novel’s epideictic moments, for, up until this point, there has been no way to corroborate the creature’s existence and, therefore, his deformity. Rather than creature, he could have been a creation of Frankenstein’s imagination, or perhaps a rhetorical device. Thus, Frankenstein establishes the definition of epideictic as the power of monstrosities to produce intense fear and disgust in an audience at an essential level. To borrow a popular expression, it is a “gut reaction.” This definition of epideictic may seem contradictory to those that explain epideictic as a ceremonial oration, one given at a funeral or some other significant gathering. In Plato’s Menexenus, Socrates comments on the power of epideictic to put an audience in a state of euphoria through praise. Readers must keep in mind, however, that there is a crucial division at the heart of epideictic. Defining epideictic as one of the three branches of rhetoric, Aristotle says in Rhetoric that it is “oratory” that “either praises or censures somebody” (2:2159). In other words, epideictic is split between two counterparts, two opposing principles. It is its own dark double, its own contradiction.
Walton’s speechlessness before the creature is brief before his disgust pours forth. After the creature laments Frankenstein’s death, Walton speaks in a “tempest of passion” (175). He rejects the monster’s “repentance,” saying it comes too late. He also says that if the creature had listened to his conscience earlier, Frankenstein would be alive. In reply, the creature gives what is the novel’s first indication that he is sorry. Walton says he is moved by the monster’s “misery,” but then he recalls Frankenstein’s warning about the creature’s “powers of eloquence and persuasion,” and his “indignation” returns (176). “‘Wretch!’” Walton says, “‘… it is well that you come here to whine over the desolation that you have made’” (176). He then alleges that if Frankenstein were still alive, the monster would still be seeking vengeance, not “‘pity’” and forgiveness: “‘Hypocritical fiend! … you lament only because the victim of your malignity is withdrawn from your power’” (176). The creature denies this, saying he is not seeking commiseration: “‘No sympathy may I ever find,’” he says (177). Instead, the creature laments his lost “‘virtue.’” He is the “‘fallen angel becomes a malignant devil’” who says that even he cannot believe his “frightful catalogue of … misdeeds (177): “‘I have murdered the lovely and the helpless’” (178). But, once again, the creature seeks to justify his sins by saying that others sinned against him. “‘Was there no injustice in this?’” he asks (177). Saying that he hates himself more than others could hate him, he tells Walton that he will carry out his own execution by fire. He envisions the “‘funeral pile’” consuming his “‘burning miseries’” and causing him to “‘exult in the agony of the torturing flames’” until the fire dies, his body turns to “‘ashes,’” and his “‘spirit’” rests (179).
In telling his story to Walton, Frankenstein mentions his early interest in the occult: “The raising of ghosts and devils was a promise liberally accorded by my favorite authors, the fulfillment of which I most eagerly sought …” (23). Frankenstein believes he was always unsuccessful, but the creature proves otherwise. His emphasis on his “spirit” at the end of the novel suggests that he is a spirit of rhetoric uttered into being by his creator. After bringing about destruction, he will dissipate into nothingness, like the spoken word. The creature has no name, just as Aristotle says rhetoric has no real subject of its own (2:2156). And, like rhetoric, the monster is patchwork of different textual bodies and systems. Furthermore, he is all eloquence and no virtue, for no moral core has developed in him. Finally, the creature—often identified with his creator under the name of Frankenstein—has lived on in spirit to become a rhetorical boogeyman summoned since the nineteenth century in dialogues and debates about controversies as diverse as slave emancipation and human cloning. The creature conveys Mary Shelley’s Platonic recognition of rhetoric’s potential as an instrument of evil. Consequently, eloquence is highly suspect. Frankenstein and Walton only reinforce these notions. A study of the context of *Frankenstein* shows that both Mary Shelley and her husband, Percy Shelley, were students of the classics, so they would have had numerous models for the character’s rhetoric in the novel. The ancient who seems to have had the greatest influence on the creature’s oratory is Cicero and his *De Inventione*. This influence is most noticeable in the structure of the creature’s oration to Frankenstein. Frankenstein and Walton are also crucial to the novel’s rhetorical nature. Although Frankenstein is a declaimer who clearly uses languages for persuasion, he ultimately fails as an orator.
Walton resists both Frankenstein’s and the creature’s impassioned eloquence, and in his hands their story becomes a fable about mankind’s inability to control not only its passions and technology, but also its rhetoric.
CHAPTER IV
EXECUTION AND DISMEMBERMENT IN DRACULA

The link between execution and performance in English literature was forged in Elizabethan England several hundred years before Bram Stoker wrote Dracula. In her analysis of the slayings in Thomas Kyd’s gory and influential Senecan revenge play The Spanish Tragedy, Molly Smith points out that the Triple Tree, the “first permanent structure for hangings in London,” was built at Tyburn in 1571, “during the same decade which saw the construction of the first public theater” (218). Smith writes that 6,160 people were hanged at Tyburn during Elizabeth’s reign:

Elizabethans were certainly quite familiar with the spectacle of the hanged body and disemboweled and quartered corpse. In Kyd’s treatment of the body as spectacle, we witness the most vividly the earliest coalescence of the theatrical and punitive modes of Elizabethan England. (217)

Spectators could buy seats and rent rooms in houses overlooking the scaffold, while vendors sold food as well as literature about the condemned prisoners’ crimes. “In short, hangings functioned as spectacles not unlike tragedies staged in public theaters,” Smith writes (218). She speculates that “the success of Kyd’s play might be attributed to the … ingenious transference of the spectacle of public execution with all of its ambiguities
from the sociopolitical world to the cultural words” (229). Stephen Greenblatt detects the same merger, suggesting that its traces can be seen throughout the early modern period and beyond (qtd. in Smith 229). Indeed, the spectacle of public executions persisted in England until the Capital Punishment Amendment Act of 1868 (Gibson 77), deeply conditioning people to associate performance with the punitive destruction of bodies. Simply abolishing the spectacle, however, did not dissolve the association. It simply drove it entirely into the realm of literature. Mary Ellis Gibson writes that by the 1870s, the criminal body has disappeared: the text, the body, and the trial then come to substitute for the spectacle of the criminal’s public torture, execution and dissection. The criminal, once anatomized in the operating theater, is now anatomized in the text. The once displayed in the public execution, is now displayed in the trial and in the text. (75).

Although Gibson is discussing Browning’s *The Ring and the Book* and its parallels to the sensation novel, her words could easily be applied to *Dracula*. Although no trials are depicted in the novel, their elements are certainly present: judgments moved by rhetoric, and the destruction of deviant bodies. Chronologically speaking, *Dracula* is the last among the *fin-de-siècle* novels included in this analysis. However, it most clearly demonstrates the persistence through the Victorian era of Mary Shelley’s use of classical rhetoric in the production of horror fiction. *But Dracula* does not simply bear witness to the persistence of classical rhetoric: the novel incorporates declamation and intensifies its relationship to disarticulation. Indeed, control of the body through eloquence and dismemberment is at the heart of the novel. Moreover, among the novels included in this study, *Dracula* most effectively introduces epideictic, a branch of rhetoric that
figuratively allows the dead to speak, making it seem the most vampiric of Aristotle’s three branches of rhetoric. In Plato’s *Menexenus*, an odd dialogue devoted to the Athenian funeral oration as epideictic, Socrates describes oratory as penetrating the body: “The speaker’s words and the sound of his voice sink into my ears…” (951). A creature of the ancient past who is as mysterious and paradoxical as he is frightening, Dracula is the locus of the epideictic mode in Stoker’s novel. Opposing him is Abraham Van Helsing, a figure of the medico-juridico-scientific establishment whose rhetoric is solidly forensic and deliberative. His rhetoric figures Lucy Westenra as monstrous and results in her destruction in a process reminiscent of early-modern European traditions of public execution and dismemberment. In this way, *Dracula* establishes a pattern of two rhetorical currents running counter to one another, one of them rational and the other sublime, generating a discursive tension that disarticulates textual bodies constituted beyond normative Victorian standards.

**Declamation**

Dracula’s desire to refashion himself into an Englishman through speech is one of novel’s elocutionary concerns. The count’s plan to emigrate to England that sets the entire story in motion. Dracula never really explains what he plans to do in England. To the visiting Jonathan Harker, he simply expresses excitement at the prospect of being part of a large city: “‘I long to go through the crowded streets of your mighty London, to be in the midst of the whirl and rush of it humanity, to share its life, its change, its death and all that makes it what it is’” (26).
Stoker presents Dracula’s purpose only through the inferences of his enemies, who surmise that the count intends to colonize and conquer England, which at the time was the center of a global empire. What is clear is that Dracula desires to fit in. He initially detains Harker—figured as a stereotypical Briton—in the castle to perfect his English. Harker, then, is forced into the role of an elocutionary instructor. Dracula tells Harker, “You shall, I trust, rest here with me a while, so that by our talking I may learn the English intonation; and I would that you tell me when I make error, even of the smallest, in my speaking” (26). Dracula’s desire to gain social acceptance through speech directly corresponds to the elocutionary movement’s efforts to refashion men from the margins of the expanding British empire into gentlemen (Abbott 119). It was just one of the threatening aspects of elocution. Some saw the erasure of an old identity and the creation of a new identity as monstrous. Philippa Spoel points out that, as Irishmen and Scots, many of the leaders of the elocutionary movement “inhabited the periphery of the socially polite world that their … instruction promised to make available to their students” (“Rereading” 64). And the elocutionists themselves had benefitted from the “increasing social fluidity of eighteenth-century British culture” (65). Spoel quotes Thomas P. Miller: “‘Elocutionists were resented by some for blurring class distinctions’” (64). This was revolutionary, revealing elocution’s Romantic impulse. Andrew McCann writes that the “entire project of elocution was based on the notion of an apparently apolitical subject integrated into moral and aesthetic norms that held for all men regardless of class” (223). Underlying fears about the obscuring of class distinctions were anxieties that bodies were essentially the same: grotesque and unstable.
As noted earlier, declamation was instrumental in the rhetorical training that offered marginalized men the chance to assimilate into British society. Jean Dietz Moss writes that declamation was an important part of rhetorical education until the late nineteenth century at Trinity College, Dublin (388), attended by both Stoker and Oscar Wilde. For years students practiced declamation weekly alongside another rhetorical training exercise, disputation, although disputation had begun to fade from the curriculum by the late 1800s (388). A disputation at one Trinity College rhetorical society became so “heated” in 1773 that the chairman wrote a seven-page warning to members about coarseness and bad language in debate. The topic of the disputation was a beheading, that of Mary Queen of Scots, with most of the students siding with the tragic victim (407-408). Another “perennially provocative question” put to students was whether the government had the right to execute prisoners for any crime (407).

When Dracula speaks to Harker about his nation’s history, Harker detects the declamatory nature of the count’s speech, and he conveys its elocutionary effect. He notes Dracula’s theatricality and oratorical skill. He remarks that Dracula uses “we” when he refers to his ancestors and sounds “like a king speaking” (33). He also gives readers an indication of the emotion of Dracula’s declamation, in which he plays the role of tyrant: “He grew excited as he spoke, and walked about the room pulling his great white moustache and grasping anything on which he laid his hands as though he would crush it by main strength” (33). Dracula’s speech is inflated and theatrical, both in these passages and at other points in the novel. Dracula and earlier Victorian works, therefore, bear witness to the legacy of declamation as transmitted through the elocutionary
movement. Ruth Webb explains that declamation was significant in the development of Greek literature. The same can be said of nineteenth-century horror fiction. Webb writes, “The study of declamation provided a training in the representation of character and of a complex fictional word, complete with relations between people and a developed social and cultural background” (“Rhetoric and the Novel” 529). Declamation was likewise useful to nineteenth-century horror writers such as Stoker because it gave them familiar means to depict the unfamiliar and the strange. Here, the intimate link between declamation, monstrosity, and epideictic proves quite useful. Declamation constitutes monstrosity and the effect it produces for audiences, which is epideictic.

The stock characters of ancient declamation exercises are echoed in Dracula. Already noted has been Dracula as tyrant. And the seemingly irrational father figure emerges in Van Helsing as he discusses his intentions toward Lucy’s body. Seward and later Holmwood react to Van Helsing as if he has lost his mind. When Van Helsing tells Seward he wants to dismember Lucy by cutting off her head and taking out her heart, Seward is shocked. “The poor girl is dead,” Seward says. “Why mutilate her poor body without need?” He says this would be “monstrous” (149). Van Helsing appeals for and receives Seward’s trust in the matter, but then he calls off his plan, saying somewhat cryptically that it is “too late” because a servant had stolen a gold crucifix from the room in which Lucy’s body is lying (150). Only after reading newspaper accounts of the “bloofer” (159) does Van Helsing revisit plans to dismember Lucy’s body that seem bizarre to Seward. He tells Seward, “I shall cut off her head and fill her mouth with garlic, and I shall drive a stake through her body.” Seward shudders at the thought of
“mutilating” Lucy’s “body” (179). Van Helsing again meets resistance when he asks Holmwood, “May I cut off the head of dead Miss Lucy?” An appalled Holmwood at first refuses, but then is persuaded by Van Helsing to agree.

**Dismemberment**

Bodily dismemberment in *Dracula* is evocative of the “Death of Cicero Tradition.” Legends of Cicero’s mutilation would not have been alien to late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century Britons. Mary Rosner writes that fascination with ancient Rome persisted in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Edward Gibbons’s 1781 *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* remained popular, and other histories were published throughout the nineteenth century. “Rome was the fashion,” Rosner writes (167). During the same period, many new biographies of Cicero were reprinted and new ones published, along with collections of his works, orations, and letters (167-168). “His life story was entertaining and didactic,” Rosner writes (181). The elocutionists also perpetuated interest in Cicero by praising him, criticizing him, and borrowing from him in their treatises (158-164). “Interest in Cicero continued even while the status of rhetoric and of classical education fell,” Rosner states (164). What’s more, the stories of Cicero’s dismemberment at the hands of his political enemies would have sounded familiar to Britons, whose own criminal justice system destroyed bodies as rhetorical objects not only to punish but also to admonish. Generations dating back to the nation’s earliest history had witnessed the protracted spectacles of state-administered torture, dismemberment, execution, and display of body parts. They were socially familiar with brutal forms of justice that have been completely lost to modern audiences. Dorothy and
Thomas Hoobler point out that Mary Shelley’s childhood home on Skinner Street in London was a hundred years from the Old Bailey, a venue for numerous hangings. At a double hanging in 1807, twenty-eight spectators were trampled to death. An abattoir in the vicinity regularly filled the air with the cries of livestock (46). And among the thousands of spectators for Marie Manning’s hanging on November 13, 1849, was Charles Dickens. Manning, a Swiss domestic servant, had been “convicted along with her husband of killing her lover” for his railroad shares (Mullen C5). Dickens, who watched the execution from a rented rooftop, wrote that he was appalled by the spectacle. American writer Herman Melville watched from another rented rooftop nearby (C5). Although it would be difficult to assess fully the impact that these spectacles had on the lives of Britons, it is still worth recovering them and examining them alongside horror fiction texts to gain some understanding of their influence on writers. Public torture, dismemberment, and execution were meant to shape people’s lives. They were not only intended to serve justice but also to serve as warnings for those who might break the law. Executions, therefore, had a clear rhetorical purpose.

England had a homegrown tradition of slaughtering criminals, both before and after execution. For Englishmen at the turn of the eighteenth century, however, the French Revolution presented the foremost example of dismemberment. When Percy Shelley wrote in and 1816 letter to Lord Byron that the French Revolution was the “master theme of the epoch in which we live,” he said more than perhaps even he knew (qtd. in “The Romantic Period: Topics”). The “terror” presented the spectacle of judicial dismemberment on a grand scale. Between 1793 and 1794, revolutionary courts sent
more than 16,000 people to the guillotine. Thousands more died in massacres or perished in prisons while awaiting trial and execution (Gough 2). Horror stories of thousands of public beheadings made a profound impression on Britons that lingered well into the nineteenth century and impacted their culture. It provided the historical setting for Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities, which critic Elana Gomel argues exhibits a “bodily synecdoche.” It is a “rhetoric of the fragmented body,” Gomel writes: “This rhetoric … operates on all levels of the text, reducing the body to a collection of disjointed parts…” (“The Body of Parts” 49). A Tale of Two Cities was published in 1859. In the following decade, the French terror echoes in Count Guido Franchescini’s rhetoric as he awaits execution for the slayings of his wife and her parents in The Ring and the Book. Although the poem is set in Early Modern Italy, Franceschini imagines his execution by a “man-mutilating engine” similar to a guillotine (XI. 204-5). In one of the finest expressions of disarticulation, Browning’s villain says that at the moment of his beheading, a “master-stroke of argument / Will cut the spinal cord” (231-3).

While England was spared from a history-altering upheaval, her people were not spared from a certain amount of tyranny as a result of the French Revolution. In response to the revolution in France, the British government became more defensive and reactionary, fearing similar rebellions among radicals at home and threats from across the English Channel. Britons, however, shared a long history of public torture, dismemberment, and execution with France, Germany and other European nations. These spectacles were official pronouncements. They were judicial and political, as Michel Foucault writes in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (47). According to
Foucault, a crime has as its victim not just the person against whom it is committed, but also the sovereign power inherent in laws (47). Public execution, Foucault theorizes, repairs the “injured sovereignty” (48). It is the “most spectacular” display of sovereign might (48-9). Foucault writes:

And this superiority is not simply that of right, but that of physical strength of the sovereign beating down upon the body of his adversary and mastering it: by breaking the law, the offender has touched the very person of the prince; and it is the prince—or at least those to whom he has delegated his force—who seizes upon the body of the condemned man and displays it marked, beaten, broken. The ceremony of punishment, then, is an exercise of terror. … The public execution did not re-establish justice; it reactivated power. (49)

As in any rhetorical situation, the audience’s reaction to and possibly their participation in an execution—including any judicially prescribed torture and dismemberment—were an essential component. “An execution that was known to be taking place, but which did so in secret, would scarcely have had any meaning,” Foucault states (58). Calling the public to watch an execution was meant frighten them, but it was also an invitation for them to act as “guarantors … of the punishment … because they must to a certain extent take part in it” (58). Witnessing an execution was the right of the people, and they sometimes participated by humiliating and assaulting condemned criminals (59). This participation forged a tenuous bond between the monarch and the people. “The vengeance of the people was called upon to become an unobtrusive part of the vengeance of the sovereign,” Foucault writes (59). The result was a certain measure of sanctioned disorder, as “the sovereign tolerated for a moment acts of violence, which he accepted as signs of allegiance…” (59). The danger was that the crowd might turn against the
sovereign and protest the execution as unjust, possibly assaulting the executioner and
rescuing the condemned individual. Foucault writes that

the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty than in those rituals
intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of power; never did
the people feel more threatened, like them, by a legal violence exercised without
moderation or restraint. (63)

This solidarity between the people and their criminals could be threatening to the
sovereign, who tried to break it through “penal and police repression” (63). The
audiences of public executions also embarrassed the sovereign through the people’s
overall idleness, rowdiness, disorder, and criminality (63). “It was evident that the great
spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the very people to whom it was
addressed,” Foucault writes (63). Even though public executions were not intended as
entertainment, they had a “carnival” (61) and “festival” nature “in which violence was
instantaneously reversible…” (63).

In addition to the embodied rhetoric present in the spectacle of execution, there
was spoken rhetoric. One attraction of the gallows or scaffold was the words that might
be uttered there. The state’s interest was for the condemned criminal to confess and
legitimize his or her sentence, fulfilling a final requirement of the law (66). While some
condemned criminals used the final moments to ask forgiveness and warn witnesses not
to duplicate their sins, others did not. With nothing left to lose, they were free to “curse
the judges, the laws, the government and religion,” Foucault writes (60). “The public
execution allowed the luxury of these momentary saturnalia, when nothing remained to
prohibit or punish,” Foucault states. “Under the protection of imminent death, the
criminal could say everything and the crowd cheered” (60). Molly Smith writes, “In such
circumstances, the formal efficacy of the execution diminished considerably and events
could easily transform into celebration of the condemned victim’s role as a defier of
repressive authority” (221). The importance of these final utterances is attested to by the
rise of a literary genre called “gallows speeches” or “death songs.” The content of these
speeches had to conform to a certain rhetoric, including an acknowledgement of the
condemned person’s crime and the justice of his or her conviction. While some of these
published reports likely were accurate, many were probably embellished to conform to
the requirements of the law. “Justice required these apocrypha in order to be grounded in
truth,” Foucault writes (66). Another important function of these broadsheets was to
transfer the judge’s written punishment, which remained secret until the time appointed
for the execution, to the body of the condemned criminal (66). In this way, text was
figuratively transferred to body. Through sanctioned violence, the sentence was inscribed
on the body, which was then publically displayed for viewers to see and recorded for
them to read.

Rhetorical Performance and Disarticulation

The body is central to Dracula’s two main rhetorical performances. Dracula’s
performances occur in Chapter III and in Chapters XIII-XVI. The first is delivered by
Dracula, and the second by Van Helsing. Both performances resume in parts of later
chapters. Central to the rhetorical performances of both characters is the body as proof:
Dracula’s proof is his own body while Van Helsing’s proof is Lucy Westenra’s body.
Both bodies suffer brutal disarticulation, but the brutality is most evident in the undead Lucy’s destruction. Of all of the episodes of disarticulation considered in this study, Lucy’s methodical butchering most closely parallels early-modern European traditions of public execution and dismemberment. Stoker’s interest in torture and execution is also suggested by at least one of his short stories, “The Squaw,” published in 1893 after Stoker and Henry Irving visited Nuremberg’s historic torture tower while touring the Lyceum’s Faust on the continent. This connection to the continent is underscored in Dracula through Van Helsing and his frequent trips between England and Holland. While at the Nuremberg tower, Stoker and Irving saw the “Nuremberg Virgin,” a sarcophagus-like execution device lined inside with iron spikes. A similar device impales and crushes the obnoxious American Elias P. Hutcheson in “The Squaw” (Haining 85). In the story, however, a young woman only witnesses the accidental execution. In Dracula, a young woman is purposefully executed. Even Dracula’s eventual disarticulation at the end of the novel cannot compare with Lucy Westenra’s. What is even more unsettling about Lucy’s execution and dismemberment is that it is carried out by the heroic men of the novel, rallied by Van Helsing. Van Helsing plays the paradoxical role of early-modern executioner, who serves justice but is stigmatized by his connection with criminality and death. Like Van Helsing, early-modern executioners had assistants, Joel Harrington points out. This detail further reduces the degrees of separation between Dracula and the men who seek to destroy him. Even the crucial distinction that Dracula’s violence is sexualized, involving penetration and the transmission of blood, largely disappears when one considers that Van Helsing also penetrates Lucy’s body repeatedly and that he,
Holmwood, Seward, and Morris all give her blood transfusions before her death. Van Helsing recognizes the sexual nature of these transmissions, and it amuses him. The conflict between Dracula and Van Helsing suggests that even though epideictic may seem frivolous and superficial compared to the more direct and forceful forensic and deliberative modes, its influence can be far more pervasive and enduring.

In some respects Van Helsing’s forensic and deliberative rhetoric seems more potent and successful than Dracula’s. After all, his rhetoric is that of the official word, of legislative assemblies and courtrooms, and of science halls and textbooks. It is easily equivocated with fact and evidence. It is the most familiar to readers, and it is the most abundant in the novel. Van Helsing simply talks a lot more than Dracula. Van Helsing’s rhetoric is, by far, the more conspicuous. It is also more brutal, partly because readers can “see” its end results of his rhetoric in the executions of Lucy, Dracula’s vampire women, and Dracula himself. But the skepticism of Van Helsing’s audience suggests that his is not the more influential rhetoric, at least not in and of itself. John Seward, Arthur Holmwood, and Quincey Morris resist Van Helsing’s arguments until they finally see the undead Lucy. Without this proof, his rhetoric most likely would fail. Dracula, on the other hand, seemingly has no point to prove, other than the superiority of his heritage. His epideictic rhetoric is about display. Its results are subtle, if not hidden. For instance, readers do not see Dracula repeatedly feeding on Lucy. In its own way, however, Dracula’s rhetoric is far more effective than Van Helsing’s. It is about creeping influence, not persuasion, and it best exemplifies the Aristotelian notion that rhetoric is about “transforming souls” (Lockwood 64).
Van Helsing’s argument begins when he shares with Seward a newspaper article about children who had gone missing in Hampstead and been found later with puncture marks in their necks. Seward, Van Helsing’s former student, has called on his assistance in diagnosing and treating Lucy’s baffling illness. Van Helsing does not immediately share his theory with Seward, but instead tries to lead him to the discovery through dialectic. It is a frustrating approach for Seward, but one that Van Helsing feels is necessary to bypass Seward’s scientific mind. It seems a straightforward, rational argument would surely fail. Van Helsing says,

You do not let your eyes see nor your ears hear, and that which is outside your daily life is not of account to you. Do you not think that there are things which you cannot understand, and yet which are; that some people see things that others cannot? (170)

In Van Helsing’s mind, this skepticism is a shortcoming of science, a “‘fault’” (171). He begins to circumvent science by rattling off a list of questions about natural phenomena. In so doing, Van Helsing uses the Classical rhetorical strategy of anaphora, or the repetition of similar words and phrases in successive sentences and clauses (Farnsworth 16). In Van Helsing’s speech, these phrases are “‘Can you tell me’” and “‘Do you know.’” The effect is to make the listener, Seward, feel intellectually humbled and more open to explanations of phenomena beyond the physical world. Near the end of this dialectic, which is recorded in Seward’s diary on “26 September,” Van Helsing expresses this strategy: It’s not the “‘big truth’” people see first, but the “‘small truth’” (Stoker, Dracula 172-3). Using this strategy, Van Helsing draws Seward closer to his theory. The
last of Van Helsing’s questions deals with blood-sucking bats that drink from cattle and horses. Seward asks, “‘Good God, Professor!’ … Do you mean to tell me that Lucy was bitten by such a bat; and that such a thing is here in London in the nineteenth century?’” (172). Waving off Seward’s exclamations, Van Helsing continues his list of anaphoric questions until Seward becomes “bewildered.”: “…he so crowded on my mind his list of nature’s eccentricities and possible impossibilities that my imagination was getting fired” (172). The success of Van Helsing’s rhetoric is signaled by Seward’s request for an explanation: “‘Tell me the thesis, so that I may apply your knowledge as you go on’” (172). Seward finds Van Helsing’s response even more bewildering: “‘My thesis is this: I want you to believe … To believe in things that you cannot’” (172). Van Helsing wants Seward to have faith, which he defines for him through an anecdote: “‘…that which enables us to believe things which we know to be untrue’” (172). Van Helsing’s final question to Seward in this dialectic is whether the same creature that made the puncture wounds in the Hampstead children’s necks also made the marks on Lucy’s neck. Seward says yes, but Van Helsing says he is wrong: The wounds on the children “‘were made by Miss Lucy!’” (173).

In this manner, Van Helsing presents his real thesis. Seward’s initial reaction is anger and disbelief; but Van Helsing forecasts the next step of his argument, which is offering proof, if Seward will follow him. Seward’s next reaction is significant: it is more appealing to continue in disbelief and ignorance. “‘A man does not like to prove such a truth….’” Seward thinks to himself (173). But Van Helsing promises that “‘proof will be relief’” (174). The ultimate proof that Van Helsing will offer is Lucy’s undead body. Van
Helsing’s argument sets up one of the most horrifying Gothic scenes in nineteenth-century British literature: Van Helsing and crew’s encounter with the vampiric Lucy at the Westenra tomb.

Perhaps no other body in English literature carries more rhetorical significance than does Lucy Westenra’s body, with the possible exception of Caesar’s body in William Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*. The viewing is set up by Van Helsing, who proposes that Seward to spend the night “‘in the churchyard where Lucy lies’” (174). Seward is fearful of the “ordeal” he senses before them, but he agrees. Before witnessing Lucy’s body, however, Van Helsing and Seward examine one of the Hampstead children and determine that the wounds on his neck are indeed similar to those that Lucy suffered before her death. This detail is significant, for Stoker depicts Van Helsing as using the rhetorical strategy of presenting a less convincing proof on his way to presenting the conclusive proof. Moreover, it is a child’s body that is presented as proof on the way to Lucy’s tomb, where the men of the novel will finally behold the grotesque perversion of the female body, from a site of mothering and giving life to one of consuming and taking life. In the Westenra crypt, Van Helsing and Seward prepare to open Lucy’s tomb. “‘You shall yet be convinced,’” Van Helsing promises (176). Seward compares the thought of opening Lucy’s tomb to her sexual violation. They find the sepulcher empty. Seward is shocked, and Van Helsing continues his argument. “‘Are you satisfied…?’” he asks (176).

In this epistemological vacuum, Seward seeks alternative explanations. “‘I felt all the dogged argumentativeness of my nature awake within me…,’” says Seward, who
responds that the sight only proves that Lucy’s body is missing. Van Helsing applauds his “‘good logic,’” but asks how he explains the empty tomb. Seward raises the possibility that the corpse was stolen by a “‘body-snatcher,’” but even he doubts this counterargument. (176). Clearly, Van Helsing’s persuasion is working, but only Lucy’s body—reanimated through vampirism—will serve as conclusive proof. Even seeing a ghostly “white streak” in the dark churchyard a short time later and finding a child there do not convince Seward (177). The following night, Van Helsing and Seward find Lucy’s body returned to the tomb. Seward remarks that Lucy looks like she is alive (178). But Seward is perplexed, not “convinced,” even as Van Helsing tries to make full use of the body as proof by pulling back Lucy’s lips to who her teeth “‘shaper than before’” (178). “Once more, argumentative hostility woke within me,” says Seward, countering that someone could have placed the body in the tomb since the previous night (178-9). At this point, Van Helsing fully reveals his thesis, that Lucy was bitten by a vampire and has become a vampire. The altered body is the evidence that Seward had been lacking. “This turned my blood cold, and it began to dawn upon me that I was accepting Van Helsing’s theories . . .,” Seward says (179). A few passages later, Van Helsing offers a conclusion with summation of all of the proofs of Lucy’s vampirism: the wounds in her throat, the similar wounds in the child’s throat, Lucy’s body reappearing in the empty coffin, and her lifelike appearance in death (180).

As Van Helsing considers the most effective ways to anticipate the counterargument of Lucy’s fiancé Arthur Holmwood, Lord Godalming, and convince him of Lucy’s vampirism, readers learn that Seward is again losing certainty. “Yesterday,
I was almost willing to accept Van Helsing’s monstrous ideas; but now they seem to start out lurid before me as outrages on common sense,” Seward says after a “good night’s sleep” (181). In daylight, he continues searching for other explanations and even entertains the notion that Van Helsing has become “unhinged” and that he was responsible for moving Lucy’s body (181-2). Having witnessed none of the proofs Seward has seen, Holmwood is even more resistant to Van Helsing’s thesis that Lucy “might be Un-Dead” (183). The final proof for both Seward and Holmwood comes later that night, when they confront the vampire Lucy entering her crypt. Joining them is Quincey Morris, the Texan. In his journal, Seward describes Lucy as a “dim white figure” carrying a child “at [her] breast.” She is wearing “cerements of the grave” and her “sweetness” has turned to “adamantine, heartless cruelty, and the purity to voluptuous wantonness.” Her “lips [are] crimson with fresh blood” that has “trickled over her chin and stained the purity of her lawn death-robe” (187). Like a “cat” she gives an “angry snarl” at the men and “growls” like a “dog.” Her “eyes [are] unclean and full of hell-fire, instead of the pure, gentle orbs we knew.” As “callous as a devil,” she flings the abducted child to the ground and tries to seduce Holmwood, who groans at her “cold-bloodedness” (188). Through these descriptions, Stoker conveys that the vampire’s influence has changed Lucy’s body, making it sexual, and her spirit, making it animal. She has lost her life, her innocence, and her humanity. In death, her identity has been erased. With the body as proof, Van Helsing’s argument is utterly convincing.

In many ways, Dracula could be read as a culmination of the trope of disarticulation in Victorian horror fiction. In deploying disarticulation, Stoker was well-
served by vampire folklore handed down through the ages. Like rhetoric, vampires descended from antiquity, with each generation adding to the discourse. Daniel Farson surveys many of the methods reportedly used to kill people through to be vampires, including impaling the heart; beheading and burning the body, and scattering ashes on a river (108-16). “It is obvious that Bram Stoker learnt of such stories during his research,” Farson writes (114). Stoker’s clearest and most graphic use of this folklore can be found in the killing of the vampire Lucy, an event which occurs near the heart of the novel. Even Dracula’s slaying pales in comparison to Lucy’s destruction. Stoker uses discussions of Lucy’s dismemberment among Van Helsing, Seward, and Holmwood to build tension leading up to the actual moment in the tomb when Holmwood drives a stake through Lucy’s undead body. Seward reports,

Then he struck with all his might. The Thing in the coffin writhed; and a hideous, blood-curdling scream came from the opened red lips. The body shook and quivered and twisted in wild contortions; the sharp white teeth champed together till the lips were cut, and the mouth was smeared with a crimson foam. (192)

Mina is threatened with the same horrific fate if she becomes a vampire like Lucy, although her execution never has to be carried out. Van Helsing does destroy the three female vampires at Dracula’s castle. In one of just two instances when Van Helsing contributes to the epistolary Dracula’s string of journal entries, diary pages, ship logs, notes, letters, news clippings, transcripts, memoranda, and telegrams, he recounts his “butchery” of the three vampire women. He describes the “horrid screeching as the stake drove home” and “the plunging of writhing form, and lips of bloody foam” (320). He
writes that “hardly had my knife severed the head of each, before the whole body began to melt away and crumble into its native dust….” (320-1).

Although Stoker had hundreds of years of vampire lore to draw on in depicting Lucy’s death, the details parallel early modern executions, particularly those in Germany as described by Joel Harrington in *The Faithful Executioner*, based on the long-running journal of an executioner in Nuremberg. Although Van Helsing is not German, his association with the continent is emphasized through his repeated trips between England and his home in Amsterdam. And at one point in the novel, Van Helsing exclaims in German, “Mein Gott!” (169). Significantly, this moment occurs as he reads a newspaper account that, in his mind, suggests that Lucy has become a vampire and that she must be destroyed. The subsequent chain of events quickly leads to Lucy’s execution, and her role as condemned criminal. One of the first indications of this status is Lucy’s “lawn death-robe” (187), which is “white” (177). Joel Harrington writes that before early modern executions, prisoners were robed in “white linen execution gowns” (78). Just as Van Helsing has Holmwood carry out Lucy’s staking, early modern executioners also employed assistants: “Most master executioners supervised the procedure but left the actual dirty work to their more dishonorable assistants” (Harrington, *The Faithful Executioner* 61). But the most striking similarity is the method of Lucy’s execution. Harrington writes that the legal slayings of women posed a special challenge for executioners. Hangings were avoided, as they “allowed spectators to see under [women’s] skirts,” while “beheading was typically reserved for honorable men.” For women, the most common form of execution in the Middle Ages was “live burial under
the gallows” (68). This horror is raised in *Dracula* when Holmwood misunderstands Van Helsing and asks if Lucy has been buried alive (183). It is a reaction that Van Helsing anticipates (180). He tells Holmwood, “I did not say she was alive ... I go no further than to say that she might be Un-Dead” (183). Live burial was considered so violent and so cruel that it was largely eliminated through penal reforms in the early sixteenth century. Often practiced in its place was drowning in a sack, which concealed the prisoner’s death underwater. Live burial was, however, retained for women found guilty of infanticide (Harrington, *The Faithful Executioner* 68). The undead Lucy, of course, is preying on children when Van Helsing detects her and the vampire hunters execute her. The problem with live burial was that the condemned women sometimes fought back against the executioner, gaining the crowd’s sympathy (68). Harrington notes that in such cases, the crowd could turn on and attack the executioner (87). To expedite live burial and to show pity, the condemned women could be killed with a stake through the heart (68). Stoker recreates this moment of execution when he writes of Lucy’s execution: “Arthur never faltered. He looked like a figure of Thor as his untrembling arm rose and fell, driving deeper and deeper the mercy-bearing stake, whilst blood from the pierced heart welled and spurted up around it” (192). This execution is interpreted in *Dracula* as freeing Lucy from evil and restoring her soul (192). The notion of execution as an act of compassion

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4 Although it is generally believed that Stoker did not know a great deal about the historical Dracula, it is intriguing that Dracula’s older brother Mircea was tortured and buried alive by Christian enemies in 1447 (Goldberg and Itzkowitz 39).
is also present in early modern executions. Joel Harrington notes that the “condemned prisoner” was “traditionally referred to as the ‘poor sinner’” (xvii).

**Epideictic**

While Van Helsing’s rhetoric is clearly forensic and deliberative, Dracula’s is epideictic. To understand this, we must first set aside the notion that for a discourse to be rhetorical, it must be intended to persuade an audience and prove something. While this is the goal of forensic and deliberative rhetoric, it is not necessarily the goal of epideictic. Epideictic speeches are typically presented at ceremonial occasions, from funerals to graduations. They typically praise their subjects, though they can also place blame. Thus, these speeches reveal the values of the cultures in which they are composed and delivered. One of the best-known examples of classical epideictic is Pericles’s oration for the Athenian war dead, which is recorded by Thucydides in his *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. Analyzing Pericles’s civic-minded speech, we find that it praises Athens as much, if not more, than it does the nation’s war dead. Pericles begins by honoring Athens’s ancestor, who handed down the country “free to present time by their valour” (396). He praises Athens’s constitution and democracy, just laws, recreation, and openness to foreigners. When it comes to saluting Athens’s military, Pericles compares the country to Sparta, where boys “from their very cradles by a painful discipline seek manliness…” (396). In contrast, Athenians live as they choose and face danger when necessary with their land and naval forces. Athenians also avoid excess by cultivating “refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy…,” and by using “wealth” for fighting poverty (397). Pericles says that Athens’s power is proof of the
superiority of her ideas. And, he says, Athens’s greatness also means she has more to lose than other nations. Pericles says that the deaths of those who fought for Athens are also “definite proofs” (397) of her greatness, and that those deaths may also redeem of any of their “imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad …” (398). In their deaths, they resisted aggression rather than submitted, “met danger face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune” found glory (398). “So died these men as became Athenians,” Pericles eulogizes. “You, their survivors, must determine to have as unaltering a resolution in the field…” (398).

Clearly, Pericles’s memorial oration is a panegyric to the Athenian ideal of balance. In Dracula’s epideictic speech, however, all balance is lost, as the count presents what sounds like a military history of his nation—a history that exalts war, treachery, and conquest. In Dracula’s view, war is an essential part of the animalistic nature of his people, the Szekelys: “We … have a right to be proud, for in our veins flows the blood of many brave races who fought as the lion fights, for lordship” (33). Dracula’s epideictic is marked by frequent references to the body, its parts, and its fluid. He speaks of the carnage of war and a lone figure emerging from the “bloody field where … troops were being slaughtered” (35). He asks, “Where ends the war without a brain and a heart to conduct it?” (35). He claims that the Dracula were the “heart’s blood” of the Szekelys and “their brains” (35). He also refers to the “Dracula blood” and their bloodline. He declaims that he is a descendant of Attila the Hun, and that he sprang from a people whose blood mingled with those of “witches” and “devils” (34). Dracula’s emphasis on his bloodline is significant, for he wins adherents by chaining them to his
bloodline and thereby enslaving them. Later in the novel, during his attack on Mina, he tells her, “And you ... are now to me, flesh of my flesh; blood of my blood; kin of my kin ...” (252). Dracula’s reference to his ancestor’s “brains” is also significant, for Van Helsing associates Dracula with his brain several times. For example, Van Helsing says of Dracula, “‘That mighty brain and that iron resolution went with him to his grave, and are even now arrayed against us’” (212).

Dracula’s encomium to war continues as he tells Harker that the Huns repelled an invasion force from northern Europe and Asia that included “‘Berserkers’” who fought like “‘werewolves’” (34). Later, the Magyars charged the Szekelys with guarding the frontier against Muslim invaders. When the Magyars and Szekelys were defeated, the count claims it “‘was a Dracula’” who fought back by crossing the Danube and defeating the Turks in their territory. According to Dracula, this was a battle that was repeated through the ages. In addition to praising the Szekelys, Dracula also blames one of their princes—an “‘unworthy brother’” —for betraying them to the Turks and bringing “the shame of slavery on them!” (35). But when the Szekelys liberated themselves from the Hungarians, they were led by Draculas. The count says that “‘the Szekelys—and the Dracula as ... their swords—can boast a record that mushroom growths like the Hapsburgs and the Romanoffs can never reach’” (35). Dracula mentions freedom, but it is clear that his definition of “free” people are those who conquer others rather than those who are conquered by others. For the count, the *agōn* of war is the norm, and he laments its loss: “‘The warlike days are over. Blood is too precious a thing in these days of dishonourable peace; and the glories of the great races are as a tale that is told’” (35).
Dracula’s epideictic does not end with his speech in the castle. After he leaves his homeland, his rhetoric becomes mostly embodied, marked by his strange appearance, wardrobe changes, and shape-shifting. His eyes are among his most notable physical features. Harker describes them in his journal: “His eyes were positively blazing. The red light in them was lurid, as if the flames of hell-fire blazed behind them” (43). In Whitby, Mina sees Dracula’s “‘red, gleaming eyes’” in the darkness as he bends over Lucy (88). Later, Lucy recalls the “‘red eyes’” (19). While these repeated descriptions of Dracula’s eyes may have been included simply to produce a frightening effect, they are also reminiscent of what Debra Hawhee refers to as “Greek vision.” According to Hawhee, the Greeks believed that the eyes had agency in that they emitted fire that interacted with the outside world. “In other words,” Hawhee states, “the fiery eyes were thought to extend outward, to meet the flames that were issuing forth from things ‘outside,’ and in the mingling of flames, in the joining of light, to comprise an altogether new body …” (178). Dracula’s creation, the vampire Lucy, is described as having the same “‘eyes … full of hellfire.’” And she has the same epideictic power. As she flirts with the spellbound Holmwood, her voice has “diabolically sweet … tones…” Seward compares it to the “tingling of glass when struck” and says it “rang through the brains even of us who heard the words addressed to another.” When Van Helsing confronts Lucy with a crucifix, she becomes enraged and her “eyes seemed to throw out sparks of hell-fire…” (Stoker, *Dracula* 188). Hawhee writes that the notion that the eyes emitted flames helped engender “ancient epideictic logic” that display required interaction with an audience
(177), which is present in Lucy’s graveyard scene and also in Dracula’s speech in his castle.

When Dracula speaks in England, the theme of warfare, treachery, and conquest he establishes with his epideictic oratory in the castle is carried over into the rest of the novel. As with Van Helsing, all of Dracula’s utterances constitute a single rhetorical performance. As the novel progresses, Dracula continues in the epideictic mode, incorporating England and the vampire hunters as blameworthy in his rhetoric. Recalling that Eastern Europe once served as a firewall protecting the West against the spread of Islam, Dracula says to Mina: “‘Whilst they played wits against me—against me who commanded nations, and intrigued for them, and fought for them, hundreds of years before they were born—I was countermining them’” (251-2). Later, Dracula boasts of his conquests of Lucy and Mina to the vampire hunters: “‘Your girls that you all love are mine already; and through them you and others shall yet be mine—my creatures to do my bidding and to be my jackals when I want to feed’” (267). Even the fifty boxes of earth that Dracula has shipped from his castle to England can be read as part of the count’s epideictic: The earth from his home country sustains him and serves as a tribute to the land of the Szekelys. It is worth remembering that the earth of Dracula’s homeland is soaked with blood, making it a part of his body as well. He tells Harker, “‘Why, there is hardly a foot of soil in all this region that has not been enriched by the blood of men, patriots or invaders’” (27).

Dracula’s epideictic speech is also remarkably similar to the demonstration that Socrates is depicted as presenting in Plato’s *Menexenus*. The occasion for this dialogue is
Socrates’ meeting with Menexenus as Menexenus is returning from the council chamber with news that the council will soon select a speaker for the public funeral of the Athenian war dead. He worries that the selection is coming too late for the speaker to prepare an oration. Socrates scoffs and tells Menexenus that the potential speakers already have their oration prepared and that they face the easy task of praising Athenians before Athenians. Their rhetoric is “canned,” so to speak. Socrates reveals that he already has a speech prepared for him by his teacher of oration, the famous Aspasia, who he says composed Pericles’s funeral oration. “I heard Aspasia declaim a whole funeral oration on these same dead,” Socrates says. “Thereupon she went through for me what the speaker ought to say, in part out of her head, in part by pasting together some bits and pieces thought up before …” (952). At Menexenus’ prompting, Socrates delivers the speech that Aspasia prepared for him. Although Plato’s intention in Menexenus is to expose the funeral oration as formulaic and insincere, his Socrates gives what sounds like a model speech, with the exception of metadiscursive commentary on the standard content of such a speech. As Michael F. Carter writes, “…even though Plato’s obvious purpose in the dialogue is to mock the epideictic oration, this purpose seems undercut by the oration itself” (213).

One of the most notable similarities between Dracula’s speech and Socrates’s is the representation of national history as a tumultuous cycle of invasion, resistance, war, conquest, liberty, and peace. Dracula’s speech simply replaces Athenians, Lacedaemonians, Eretrians, Persians, and barbarians with Szekelys, Hungarians, Magyars, Muslims, and berserkers. Both speeches emphasize the earth. In Menexenus,
the land is personified as a nurturing mother who nurses the warriors and then welcomes them after they have fallen in battle. She also cares for the dead soldiers’ orphans and for their aged parents. “Our land is indeed most worthy of being praised not merely by us but by all of humanity,” Socrates says (953). As in Dracula’s speech, the continuity of the bloodline is celebrated in Socrates’ speech when he says that the ancestors of the war dead “were not immigrants” who made their children “aliens in the land, but made them children of the soil” (953). The body is also referenced in Socrates’s speech. Socrates acknowledges the presence of the soldiers’ remains (953). He looks back on the generations of Athenians who fought against the Persians: “I declare that those men were fathers not only of our bodies but of our freedom…” (957). The speech also notes the irony of “bodily beauty and strength” when it is paired with cowardice (962). As Dracula does in his epideictic, Socrates praises his land as a bulwark against enemy invaders from the east. He says, “When the Persians held dominion over Asia and were trying to enslave Europe, the sons of this land checked them” (956).

Perhaps the strangest similarity between Dracula and Menexenus is the notion that epideictic orators are able to speak for the dead. In Menexenus, Socrates figuratively speaks for the dead, delivering messages from the fallen fathers to their sons, and from the fallen sons to their parents. In Dracula, Harker notes that the count spoke of his ancestors’ battles “as if he had been present at them all”—a perception that Dracula explains away as a matter of pride and of the recognition of the interconnectedness of generations (33). However, Dracula actually speaks for the dead, including himself. His funeral oration is self-inclusive and self-referential. While this may seem a point of
contrast between Dracula and Menexenus, it can be taken as a point of comparison. As
Lockwood points out, the setting for Menexenus can be dated to 387 B.C., based on
Socrates’ recitation of Athens’ history. Socrates, however, died in 399 B.C. “This funeral
oration presented as a model of speaking about the dead is itself delivered by a man
twelve years dead, who claims to have learned it from a woman also long dead,
Aspasia…,” Lockwood notes (116). Lockwood notes that Plato generally was not
concerned about accurately dating his dialogues, but the anachronism of Menexenus begs
for an explanation (113). Lockwood argues that this was Plato’s way of warning his
readers not to take Menexenus seriously—a mistake repeated by generations on into the
Renaissance (103). However, the explanation may be far less ironic, perhaps lying in the
notion that, historically speaking, epideictic is the only branch of Artistotelian rhetoric
that lets the dead make claims upon the living. From the surviving fragment of Gorgias of
Leontini’s Funeral Speech from the fifth century B.C., readers also have this tantalizing
passage spoken of the Athenian war dead:

   Wherefore thou they have died
   desire for them has not died,
   but lives on,
   though they live not, immortal in bodies not immortal (95).

Exactly to whose “desire” is Gorgias referring in these lines that blur the lines between
the living and the dead? A common assumption would be that it is the desire of the
living; however, epideictic also characterizes the dead as being capable of desire. It
allows the dead to influence the living. That influence is about transformation. Lockwood
writes, “The epideictic shapes our souls—structures our subjectivity—in a way that only a powerful and lengthy exercise of … self-examination, can undo” (127). It is interesting to consider that in the final pages of the novel, the surviving characters are still trying to “undo” Dracula’s influence. Seven years after the count’s death, the Harkers visit Transylvania and “the old ground … so full of vivid and terrible memories.” They even view the count’s castle “reared high above a waste of desolation” (326). Transylvania seems an odd choice of destinations for a pleasure trip. Why not visit Whitby? However, the return to Transylvania makes perfect—and frightening—sense once readers recognize the potency of Dracula’s epideictic rhetoric. Long dead, his influence persists, and he is still making claims on the living.

Socrates speaks of the transformational power of epideictic in *Menexenus*, and it is present in *Dracula* as well. Socrates says funeral orators “do their praising so splendidly that they cast a spell over our souls, attributing to each individual man … both praise he merits and praise he does not … and praising the war-dead, all our ancestors before us, and ourselves, the living” (951). Socrates says this praise puts him “into an exalted frame of mind.” “Each time, as I listen and fall under their spell, I become a different man, convinced that I have become taller and nobler and better looking all of a sudden” (951). Socrates says this influence spreads to foreigners. “It often happens, too, that all of a sudden I inspire greater awe in the friends from other cities” in the audience (951). And this “high and mighty feeling, Socrates says, lasts for days (951).

As noted earlier, Dracula’s speech is self-referential and self-inclusive, features that Harker notes. Dracula is at once funeral orator and war-dead. His “city” is his
homeland. And his audience is an outsider, Harker. Reflecting on the speech later as he writes in his journal, Harker indicates that his recording of it is fragmented and flawed. But he suggests that the count’s epideictic has spread its influence on him. He writes, “I wish I could put down all he said exactly as he said it, for to me it was most fascinating” (33). Harker experiences the “awe” that Socrates says outsiders feel when they hear Athenian funeral orations (951). Dracula’s influence does not become fully apparent until later in the novel, as the words in Harker’s journal spread Dracula’s epideictic to a wider audience in England. The effect of Dracula’s influence returns his audience to a more primitive, warlike state, causing them to resort to criminality as they desecrate Lucy’s tomb, break into the count’s homes around London, and plot ambushes. They also descend into savagery in dismembering vampires. As Nicholas Rance observes, Dracula “initiates the licentiousness of his victims” (449).

Conjoined with Van Helsing’s forensic and deliberative rhetoric, Dracula’s epideictic also leads to disarticulation in the novel. This effect is most obvious in the atavism of the novel, as the men become associated with their bladed instruments and weapons. The first instance occurs innocently enough when Seward—“the lunatic asylum man”—nervously fiddles with a scalpel as he proposes to Lucy. Writing to Mina about the proposal, Lucy says that “he kept playing with a lancet in a way that made me nearly scream” (58). Then, there is Harker’s transformation into a knife-wielding warrior. His weapon is a Kukri, a knife with a large, curved blade from India. As a symbol, the Kukri suggests that the British self-possession that Harker displayed in such abundance during his journey to Dracula’s castle has been forsaken. He says, “I care for nothing now …
except to wipe out this brute from the face of creation. I would sell my soul to do it” (265). In the confrontation in London, Harker attacks Dracula, making “a fierce and sudden cut at him” (266). Missing his mark, Harker raises “the terrible knife aloft again for another stroke” at the count (266). Although Harker does not cut Dracula in this confrontation, Van Helsing says his “so fierce knife” struck dread into the count (273). Later, as the vampire hunters pursue Dracula back to Transylvania, Seward describes Harker coolly sharpening his knife, “which he now always carries with him,” as the others are in a “fever of excitement” (291). Seward says Harker’s “hands are as cold as ice” (291). He continues, “It will be a bad look out for the Count if that edge of that Kukri ever touches his throat, driven by that stern, ice-cold hand!” (291-2). Harker uses the same knife to kill Dracula in the wild fight at the climax of the novel. Mina observes from a distance and describes the “sweep and flash of Jonathan’s great knife.” She sees it “shear through the throat” (325). Seward also notes Harker’s raid physical decline from “a frank happy-looking man, with a strong youthful face” to a “drawn, haggard old man” with “white hair,” “hollow burning eyes,” and “grief-written lines on his face.” But Seward notes, “His energy is still intact; in fact he is like a living flame” (263). The “flame” is Harker’s savage, uncontrollable rage at the count for his violation of Mina. Harker, however, is not the only male character put into this state of mind. Seeing the undead Lucy, Seward says, “At that moment the remnant of my love passed into hate and loathing; had she then to be killed, I could have done it with savage delight” (188). After

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5 Although Dracula is most commonly associated with impalement, the historical figure was decapitated in 1476 (Goldberg and Itzkowitz 116).
Holmwood impales Lucy, it is Seward who assists Van Helsing with her surgical decapitation and records the procedure in his diary (193).

Of all of the men in the novel, Van Helsing is the one most closely identified with his blades. Preparing for Lucy’s dismemberment in the Westenra tomb, Van Helsing lays out “his operating knives.” Recording the incident in his diary, Seward writes, “To me, a doctor’s preparations for work of any kind are stimulating and bracing …” (190). Van Helsing removes these items black bag, which carries what he calls “the ghastly paraphernalia of our beneficial trade” (112). As he treats Lucy and his suspicions of vampirism grow, Van Helsing begins to carry his bag everywhere (123). Not only does Van Helsing carry surgical instruments, but also house-breaking and grave-robbing tools, such as a screwdriver and “fret saw” (176), and a “dark lantern” (185). Richardson writes that dark lanterns were among the common tools of burglars and body-snatchers. They were “designed to shed light where necessary, but not to attract attention” (Richardson 59). Van Helsing’s black bag is one of the links that Rance sees between Dracula and London’s Jack the Ripper slayings of the late 1880’s and early 1890’s. Rance recounts suspicions that Jack the Ripper was a “medical maniac” (446) who carried a black bag (447). A “popular assumption was that Jack the Ripper was a doctor,” Rance writes (441). Another view was that Jack the Ripper was a “punitive moralist,” a “ritualistic slauterman” crusading against prostitutes (443) and “atavistic womanhood” (447). Yet another supposition about Jack the Ripper was that he was a foreigner, like Van Helsing. “Evidently, at least the semblance of murderousness attaches not only to Dracula but to Van Helsing and his party,” Rance states (444). This is not to say that Van Helsing is a
villain, but that he occupies the problematic status of the early-modern executioner. The executioner’s official, ritualized violence was motivated by rhetoric in the reading of the sentence handed down by the court to punish and restore, and it became its own rhetoric in the enactment of the sentence. The executioner, however, was a paradox. He was a representative of the medico-juridico-scientific establishment and its forensic-deliberative world of legislation, prosecution, and execution. His main functions were to carry out judicial sentences, restore order, and admonish other would-be criminals. But these functions made him a figure of horror and loathing, a monstrosity who inflicted state-sanctioned torture and dismemberment. His powers of healing derived from the necessity to prolong the torture of prisoners for investigative purposes and to preserve them for execution. The executioner was blessing and curse. On the one hand, he was the instrument of justice with the ability to heal the body. On the other hand, he was an unclean outcast who could not be touched for fear of corruption. “People ... harbored such a pervasive fear of the social contamination at the very touch of an executioner’s hand that respectable individuals jeopardized their very livelihoods by even casual contact.” Joel Harrington explains (16). Underscoring the bond between the executioner and the prisoner, Foucault explains:

In his confrontation with the condemned man, the executioner was a little like the king’s champion. Yet he was an unacknowledgeable and unacknowledged champion ... The executioner may have been, in a sense, the king’s sword, but he shared the infamy of his adversary (Discipline and Punish 52-3).
Harrington writes that the executioner was “considered .... a type of amoral mercenary and thus excluded from ‘decent’ society in the same manner as vagrants, prostitutes, and thieves, as well as Gypsies and Jews” (16).

Acknowledging the subtle yet far-reaching influence of Dracula’s epideictic leads to the practical question of how it achieves its effect. Part of the answer is that it has the same “bewitching power” (Lockwood 102) that Socrates identifies in *Menexenus*. Twice Socrates refers to oratory as a spell in *Menexenus*. Whether or not Socrates is being ironic is irrelevant, for Dracula is recognizable as a Faust figure seeking enlightenment and power through forbidden knowledge. As the vampire hunters unearth more of his history, they learn that he was not only a soldier but also a “statesman, and alchemist—which latter was the highest development of the science-knowledge of his time” (263). They also learn that he studied the black arts at a school frequented by the devil (212). Dracula’s ethos merges magic with the oratorical skills required of a great leader. The similarity to Faust seems more than coincidental. Goethe’s play was clearly an influence for Stoker. It was one of the most popular staged by the Lyceum, with Henry Irving starring as Mephistopheles in nearly 800 performances between 1885 and 1902. “The actor’s appearance in a flowing cloak has already been mentioned as providing inspiration for the figure of Dracula,” Haining writes (85). At the same time, Christopher Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* could not have been far from Stoker’s mind, considering the novel’s other early-modern echoes. And Marlowe’s Faustus—ripped apart by devils at the end of the B-Text—is one of the most notorious victims of disarticulation in English
literature. Dracula meets a fate similar to that of the “mangled” Faustus (Marlowe 5.3.17).

Another part of the answer to question of how Dracula’s epideictic operates is suggested by Michael F. Carter in his analysis of Menexenus. Readers must keep in mind, however, that on many points the effect of Dracula’s epideictic is inverted from that of Socrates: it produces fear rather than euphoria. Carter is concerned with the importance of epideictic “in ancient Greece as well as in contemporary Western culture” (210-1). Dracula offers a different perspective, one shaped by contact with the East and the occult. This inversion is clearly signaled in the early pages of Dracula. As Harker travels to Transylvania, he writes in his journal, “The impression I had was that we were leaving the West and entering the East …” (9). Later, when Dracula cautions Harker about entering the locked areas of the castle, he says, “We are in Transylvania; and Transylvania is not England. Our ways are not your ways, and there shall be to you many strange things” (27). Carter focuses on the ritualistic significance of epideictic in ancient Greece, observing that ritual permeated Greek society in its prayers, sacrifices, oracles, festivals, and other occasions (211). He writes that epideictic has an epistemic value based on understanding rather than knowledge. Carter borrows from Urban T. Holmes in describing epideictic as “‘primordial,’” “‘primeval’” (qtd. in 214), and “‘preconscious’” (qtd. in 215); it is “‘at the expanding edge of our horizon of knowing. It is feeling and intuition, not common sense’” (qtd. in 213). Carter writes that epideictic connects “participants … to a transcendent principle”; that it creates a sense that the ordinary progression of time has been suspended; that it promotes a feeling of harmony by
unifying life’s contrarieties; and that it builds a perception of community among its members (214-5). All of these elements can be located in Dracula in one form or another, although they are inverted, ironic, grotesque, and frightening: Dracula, as a figure of epideictic, is a primeval creature whose origins are unclear and who defies time; the “transcendent principle” to which he connects characters is life after death; the contrarieties he draws together are life and death; and the community he fosters is an atavistic one bent on his annihilation.

Dracula’s epideictic ultimately succeeds by making his English enemies more like himself, thereby interrogating Victorian normative standards. It has a flawed parallel in the insane Renfield’s ultimately unsuccessful bid to gain release from Seward’s asylum. Renfield’s argument is that he is no different than the men who are keeping him locked up. Seward writes that Renfield “took it for granted that his reasons would prevail with others entirely sane” (215). Indeed, Renfield asks all of the men assembled with Seward to “‘sit in judgment on my case’” (215). In an Aristotelian analysis, Renfield’s argument for immediate release from the asylum rests entirely on ethos, not logos and pathos. His main point is that his origin and rank are equal to those of his audience. His rhetorical strategy relies almost entirely on burnishing his credentials as a member of this network. He tells Holmwood that he belonged to the same club as his father and once “had the honor of seconding” him. He expresses grief at the elder Holmwood’s passing, recalling that in his younger days he drank with him on “‘Derby night’” (215). Next, Renfield flatters Morris by praising his association with Texas and predicting a bright future for the state and the Union. Renfield then lauds Van Hesling’s contributions to
“therapeutics” and his discovery in the field of brain research. Renfield says: “You, gentleman, who by nationality, by heredity, or by the possession of natural gifts, are fitted to hold your respective places in the moving world, I take to witness that I am as sane as at least the majority of men who are in full possession of their liberties” (215). He concludes by appealing to Seward and telling the doctor that he has a “moral duty” to discharge his patient (215). Seward reports that he and the others are “staggered” by Renfield’s argument. He says that despite Renfield’s “character and history,” he was convinced “that his reason had been restored” (216). Seward writes, “I felt under a strong impulse to tell him that I was satisfied as to his sanity, and would see about … his release in the morning” (216). Van Helsing also seems moved, for when he addresses Renfield later, he speaks to him as an “equal” (216).

Although Renfield’s speech fails to persuade Van Helsing, it is yet another oratorical performance in a novel that uses rhetoric to constitute and destroy characters. This is the essence of disarticulation. Dracula and Van Helsing are the novel’s main orators, and their rhetorical performances bear traces of the influence of declamation and elocution, with their emphasis on theatricality and gesture. As a representative of the medico-juridico-scientific establishment, Van Helsing’s rhetoric is forensic and deliberative, concerned with developing knowledge, building consensus, and moving an audience. It is foregrounded and aims at its audience’s reason. As a supernatural being from the past whose origins are shrouded in mystery, Dracula’s rhetoric is epideictic, concerned with celebrating man’s primitive instincts. It is sub-rational and registers with its audience at an emotional level. Central to both rhetorics is the body as proof. Van
Helsing uses the undead Lucy Westenra’s corrupted body as proof, leading to her dismemberment and the dismemberments of Dracula’s other female vampires. Transformed by Dracula, Lucy becomes a monstrosity; but her ritualistic execution also hints at the monstrous transformation that the heroic men of the novel undergo as they feel the influence of Dracula’s epideictic. In this way, rhetoric complicates readers’ understanding of the characters in the novel and exposes the moral relativism and coerciveness of proper society. The differences between Dracula and the men who seek to destroy him are reduced by the violence that all of them commit against bodies in the novel. In their use of rhetoric, their atavistic reaction to it, and their willingness to destroy transgressing bodies, all of the characters in Dracula are marked as monstrous.
CHAPTER V

PENAL DISSECTION IN MOREAU AND JEKYLL AND HYDE

When the good doctor Henry Jekyll first transforms himself into the monstrous Edward Hyde, he gazes into a mirror and beholds an “ugly idol” (51). It is easy to imagine that in 1860, Bishop of Oxford Samuel Wilberforce looked at the advance of the new science and saw the same idol: science enshrined as faith. As men like T.H. Huxley worked to professionalize science by ridding it of Christian metaphysics, Wilberforce feared that they were promoting “Darwin’s theory” as “essentially Darwinism, a set of metaphysical beliefs in contradistinction to Christianity, masquerading as scientific fact” (Hesketh 101). According to Christopher Clausen, the displacement of religion by science resulted in atavism and engendered literary monstrosities. Clausen traces these monstrosities through numerous literary works, from the sublime in William Wordsworth’s The Prelude to the sinister in Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Hound of the Baskervilles, as he describes the frightening implications of science taken as a creed. Clausen writes, “Take nature as your moral guide, and before long you find yourself haunted by nightmares of monsters. The relation between cosmic nature and human ethical conduct was the most important intellectual problem of the nineteenth century” (239).
As Clausen suggests, one consequence of science centered on nature rather than God is the casting off of ethics. And ethics were at the heart of one of the greatest controversies of the nineteenth century: human dissection. While Dracula reflects the rhetorical significance of dismemberment as a judicial punishment and a legal admonition in enforcing Victorian cultural norms, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson and The Island of Dr. Moreau by H.G. Wells reflect the cultural practice of penal dissection. Penal dissection was a utilitarian alternative to dismemberment in that criminal bodies were used to advance the cause of scientific knowledge. However, the horrifying reality was that criminal bodies were not the only ones subjected to dissection in nineteenth-century England: any bodies that could be obtained either before or after burial could end up as objects of study for medical schools eager to advance students’ knowledge of anatomy and surgical methods. Some of these bodies were obtained legally, but others were stolen from funeral homes and graveyards. Part of the horror inspired by dissection had to do with the question of what “dead” actually meant. Opponents of dissection feared that lecturers and their students were actually cutting up viable bodies, either unintentionally or intentionally. The true horror of Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde, therefore, is not necessarily dissection, but vivisection.

In Victorian England, the subjects of vivisection were usually animals. In both Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde, however, the boundaries separating human and animal dissolve in two distinct ways: humans become more like animals and animals become more like humans. Living beings inhabiting the obscure area of hybridization between human and beast are subjected to cutting and division. That area was of great concern to Victorians
as they learned more about human origins, their empire came into contact with new cultures and species, and they struggled with the exact location of the animal-human boundary. Many resisted the Darwinian notion that there was little separation between humans and animals—a claim partly supported by the appearance and behavior of “savages” in other parts of the world. However, this conflict is evident in the rhetorical moments presented in Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde. As in Dracula, there is a layering of forensic and deliberative rhetoric and epideictic in Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde, with epideictic proving to be the most influential and enduring. Declamation is present in various forms, but epideictic transforms characters. These rhetorics, combined with depictions of and references to the cutting of the body, constitute disarticulation in the novels.

**Vivisection in the Novels**

Vivisection is part of the premise of Moreau, but it is more difficult to find in Jekyll and Hyde. Vivisection helps construct Moreau’s identity, which was based on the Frenchphysiologist Claude Bernard (Wells 197). After the main character, the shipwrecked Prendick, arrives on Moreau's island, he begins to remember details of Moreau’s past in England. A noted researcher, Moreau’s “horrors” in the vivisection of animals were exposed by an investigative journalist and by the escape of a flayed dog from Moreau’s lab (195). He is forced out of England. “The doctor was simply howled out of the country,” Prendick recalls (196). Nevertheless, Prendick—confused by his initial encounters with Moreau’s Beast People, the tortured cries he hears in his compound, and the sight of his bloody lab—is uncertain about the nature of the doctor’s
activities. His fearful assumption about Moreau’s project is that he is surgically transforming humans into animal hybrids. “I was convinced ... that Moreau had been vivisecting a human being,” says Prendick. “These creatures I had seen were the victims of some hideous experiment!” (208). Prendick fears that he will be next, that at Moreau’s hands he will meet “a fate more horrible than death, with torture, and after torture the most hideous degradation it was possible to conceive—to send me off, a lost soul, a beast, the rest of Comus’ rout” (208). Prendick, of course, is incorrect; but his error is significant. Wells was a student of T.H. Huxley, Charles Darwin’s foremost defender. And, read alongside Darwin’s theories on primitive man’s place in nature and animal intelligence and emotions, Moreau obliterates the boundary between human and beast. Simply put, animals are humans and vice versa in Moreau. This notion is reflective of the animal welfare movement, which began during the Romantic era but culminated in 1876 with the Cruelty to Animals Act. Matt Cartmill writes that this concern for animals was the result of a “tender-minded Romantic view of animals” (138) and that it has been interpreted as “largely a symbolic expression of the fear and guilt that the people at the top of Victorian society felt toward those at the bottom” (141). Critics have also helped to build a bridge between animals and humans in Moreau, pointing out that Wells saw the “connections among” animals used in scientific research and marginalized “women, workers, and non-whites“ as problematic “boundary figures” in Western scientific thought (Vint 91).

Almost a decade before Moreau, we find this sort of boundary figure in Edward Hyde. Like Moreau’s Beast People, Hyde is the product of vivisection, but the cutting
occurs at an elemental level unobservable by the naked eye. Jekyll’s project is dividing the good and evil—or the developed and primitive—aspects of his personality through the scalpel of chemistry. In Jekyll’s statement, which remains sealed until after his death, he writes that his inspiration for this project was the duality he recognized in himself at an early age and which caused him “an almost morbid sense of shame” (Stevenson, *Strange Case* 48). Jekyll writes that his studies lead him to the discovery that man is actually two beings in one and that they are continuously at “war” (48). He begins to “dwell ... on the thought of the separation of these elements” so that they each could live unburdened by the other (49). At his “laboratory table,” he also discovers that man’s “seemingly so solid body” is illusory: it is actually composed of a “trembling immateriality,” a “mist-like transience,” and an “aura and effulgence” (49). He refers to his discovery of certain “agents”—presumably chemical—that could manipulate the flesh (49). As unscientific as this may seem, readers should remember that geneticists today use restriction enzymes to cut DNA, the molecules that store biological information determining an organisms’ appearance, development, function, and, some would say, behavioral tendencies. Eventually, Jekyll creates a drug that can draw out the “lower elements in my soul” and fashion a body for them (50). Jekyll is a chemist, but the text leaves open the possibility that he dabbles in anatomy. Gabriel John Utterson, the novella’s primary narrator, says Jekyll repurposed the theatre, “his own tastes being rather chemical than anatomical...” (27). It seems unlikely, however, that Jekyll could have made his crucial discoveries without examining corpses. The novella includes the revelation that Jekyll’s house has “old dissecting rooms” (25). Utterson says Jekyll
bought the house “from the heirs of a celebrated surgeon,” and that the structure has a “theatre, once crowded with eager students …” (25). Utterson’s knowledge of what went on in the theatre perhaps accounts for the unease—the “distasteful sense of strangeness” (25)—that he feels as walks through Jekyll’s lab. It also foreshadows his own textual dissolution later in the novel. Jekyll thus has a link to a noted dissector. Utterson’s description of Jekyll’s lab as “now lying gaunt and silent” is suggestive of a corpse on a table (25). The old dissector seems even more of a presence when he is named in Lanyon’s narrative: Dr. Denman (43).

The reference to dissecting rooms at Jekyll’s home seems more than a trivial Gothic detail. Indeed, further evidence of Stevenson’s concerns with vivisection can be found in his long-lost tale “The Scientific Ape.” “The Scientific Ape” was not published until 2006. Although the date the tale was written is uncertain, it seems likely that it was composed around the time that Stevenson wrote Jekyll and Hyde. Like Jekyll and Hyde, “The Scientific Ape” has fabular qualities. In the tale, a vivisectionist similar to Moreau lives on a remote island near a colony of humanoid apes. An ape escapes from the vivisectionist, returns to the troop, and proclaims himself a doctor of vivisection. Unburdened by the religion that he claims hindered man’s advancement, the doctor’s project is to determine how long it took man to evolve, a question he proposes to answer by vivisecting humans. The doctor’s first subject is to be the vivisectionist’s baby, whom he has kidnapped: “By vivisecting men, we find out how apes are made, and so we advance,” the doctor says (402). After a brief debate on the efficacy and humaneness of
vivisection, the apes force the doctor to return the baby. The meaning seems clear: animals are more rational and just than humans.

**Dissection and Vivisection**

Coinciding with the publication of *Jekyll and Hyde* and later *Moreau* was a national debate over animal vivisection, which Darwin reluctantly defended in 1881 as a means of producing scientific and medical knowledge. Animal vivisection was part of a larger controversy over scientific methods, including human dissection earlier in the century. Both practices sparked political debate and social unrest, with citizens sporadically protesting and rioting against anatomists and their henchmen, the grave-robbers. Likewise, the controversy over animal vivisection simmered through much of the nineteenth century and boiled over in the Brown Dog riots of 1907 (Cartmill 142).

When studying the rhetorical significance of violence to the body in nineteenth-century literature, it is important to know that animal welfare activists saw little separation between beast and human in popular sentiment. The merger was one that Darwin himself encouraged using a rhetorical strategy known as *gradatio*.

Although the dissection of humans is not integral to the plots of *Moreau* or *Jekyll and Hyde*, the practice is suggested and critiqued through the vivisection of animals in the novels. Moreover, the crimes of the characters raise questions of justice. In *Moreau*, clues point to the conclusion that Montgomery, Moreau’s dissolute assistant, fled England after committing some transgression. Prendick recalls one of his earliest conversations with Montgomery, when the man talked of his past in London. “He spoke like a man who loved his life there,” Prendick says, “and had been suddenly and
irrevocably cut off from it” (184). Exactly what Montgomery did is never explained. But it is clear that it was related to his alcoholism, and that he is in exile. He says of whisky, “It was that infernal stuff that led to my coming here. That and a foggy night. I thought myself in luck when Moreau offered to get me off”” (197). Later, Montgomery reveals he had been living the life of a destitute student of medicine when he committed “a blunder—I didn’t know any better—and hustled off to this beastly island. Ten years here!” (250). It seems certain that Montgomery committed some crime, and it was serious enough that he left England to escape justice. Like Jekyll, Montgomery is transformed by an agent that results in bestialization and loss of judgment. While Jekyll’s body is transformed, Montgomery is transported to a place where the line between human and animal dissolves. Both Montgomery and Hyde become fugitives from justice who are bestial and criminal. Montgomery fraternizes with animals, and Jekyll becomes one of them.

While Montgomery’s crime remains a mystery, Hyde’s is obvious: murder proves to be his undoing. Hyde not only kills the defenseless Sir Danvers Carew without provocation, he beats him so savagely with a walking stick that “bones were audibly shattered and the body jumped on the roadway” (22). Describing the overkill from Hyde’s point of view, Jekyll writes, “Instantly the spirit of hell awoke in me and raged. ... I mauled the unresisting body, tasting delight from every blow...” (56). According to the novella’s third-person narrator, Hyde then flees, leaving Carew’s body “incredibly mangled” (22). Jekyll recalls that once Hyde returned to his senses, “I saw my life to be a forfeit” (56). He destroys personal papers at his home, but leaves behind the key
evidence: half of the walking stick that he broke while thrashing Carew. The other half was left with Carew’s body. “It was not only a crime, it had been a tragic folly,” Jekyll writes (57). And Jekyll wonders if Hyde will “die upon the scaffold” (62) if he is captured. “Hyde in danger of his life was a creature new to me,” Jekyll writes (59). One can imagine that Hyde’s executed body—half man, half ape—would have been of special interest to nineteenth-century anatomists seeking medical and scientific knowledge. Ruth Richardson writes that the bodies of “physiological freaks” were even more valuable to anatomists than the bodies of normal people (57). Often, these remains would end up in exhibitions, without the subjects’ consent. John Hunter in the late eighteenth century built an enormous collection of curiosities for the Royal College of Surgeons containing

monstrous births (animal and human) in bottles, the skeletons of physical freaks, a cast of the brain cavity of Dean Swift’s skull, death masks, murderers’ skeletons and relics, and all sorts and conditions of medical prodigies—feet, heads, internal organs—pickled or dyed to show their peculiarities to better effect. (64)

Underlying this freak show is, of course, norming and morbid curiosity. Medical science determined the specimens that were abnormal, while the legal establishment essentially condoned the practice of collecting—often by illicit means—and displaying what had been judged incongruous. Thus, somatic monstrosity inspired coerciveness and societal monstrosity, which defended its disturbing methods and ends by invoking the advancement of knowledge. The boundary between normal and abnormal thus bled away.

The idea that a convicted criminal could have his or her body mutilated and displayed after execution as a part of a legal sentence is inconceivable to modern Western
audiences. In most criminal justice systems, it is homicide victims who undergo that degradation in the form of forensic autopsies, which are documented in writing and photographs and, in most states in the United States, placed in files that are open to inspection under public records laws. But by the late nineteenth-century in England, morbid dissection had been a criminal punishment for several hundred years. The dissection of criminal corpses for medical research began in Europe after the Papal ban against it was lifted in the sixteenth century (Cheney 100). The practice eventually entered England and Scotland, where it fundamentally altered the spectacle of criminal execution. No longer would criminal bodies be destroyed simply for retribution and admonition. Executed bodies could instead be handed over to doctors to be methodically dismembered for the purposes of medical research and education. Penal dissections are sometimes referred to as “public dissections.” However, this term is misleading. “Public” simply meant that the bodies for dissection were obtained from the government and not a private individual (Sawday 281). People were not able to view penal dissections as they had been able to view judicial dismemberments of convicted felons. This was partly because anatomy theaters were not able to accommodate such large crowds. Those who were able to witness penal dissections were mostly medical students and dignitaries. So, penal dissection represented another step in the movement away from open executions and toward the figurative transformation of body to text. Simply put, people had to read about what they once had the opportunity to witness directly.

The transformation of body to text was facilitated by public dissection, as anatomists studied executed criminal bodies as if they were books. It was a “‘dirty source
of knowledge,”” Richardson writes, quoting nineteenth-century surgeon William Lawrence (95). The dissection system transformed corpses into valuable objects of gaze and study for anatomists. Jonathan Sawday defines “penal dissection” as the “codification by statute of a set of rules under which the corpse could be dismembered after death for the utilitarian investigation of the body’s internal structure” (54).

Anatomies officially began in England in 1540, when Henry VIII united the companies of Barbers & Surgeons by Royal Charter and granted them the right to the bodies of four hanged felons each year. These grants made way for public dissection to be added to the sentences of convicted murderers. Soon, colleges across England gained rights to the bodies of executed murderers and were requiring medical students to attend anatomies as part of their education (56). The “Murder Act” of 1752 helped increase the supply of criminal bodies available for anatomies by giving judges the discretion to substitute dissection for gibbeting in the death sentences for convicted murderers. Sawday explains that the Act was the authorities’ “response to a perceived breakdown in law and order”: “What was needed, it was felt, was a punishment so draconian, so appalling, that potential criminals would be terrified at the fate which awaited them in the event of their detection. Clearly, simply, execution was not enough” (54). Even though dissection would take place out of view of the mob, it was still intended to send a clear warning to a specific audience about the consequences of murder. Sawday writes that dissection seemed like a way to reintroduce dismemberment as practiced under the Elizabethans and Jacobins (55). It also offered the benefit of advancing medical knowledge and improving surgical techniques at a time when surgery was compared to “live butchery”
(Richardson 44). However, Richardson states that penal dissection proved to be even more unpopular in England than gibbeting, which involved displaying an executed corpse in a hanging metal frame to decompose and be eaten by birds. With gibbeting, the crowd could at least see the outcome of the sentence. Although dissected bodies were sometimes displayed for people to view, the process denied them the opportunity to witness the full sentence being enacted and therefore the emotional release that accompanied it. Since dissections were performed in the enclosed space of the anatomical theater, people were left to imagine what took place there. And the imagination was fertile ground for terror. Some worried that the corpses were sexually mistreated, while others feared that murderers who survived due to botched hangings were either killed by anatomists or vivisected (Richardson 95-6).

The infamy of penal dissection is hinted at by the “Murder Act,” which made it a felony punishable by seven years’ transportation to try to take the body of an executed murderer to save it from dissection (Sawday 55). The Act also relieved anatomists from having to go to the scaffold to retrieve bodies and possibly be subjected to the violence of the mob. Instead, the bodies were to be delivered to anatomists by the sheriff or his deputies (54). Whether convicted murderers were sentenced to dissection or gibbeting, the law forbade them from receiving a proper burial and the eternal rest believed to go along with it (55). Dissection was therefore seen as a violation of religious customs as well as the ancient folklore surrounding the newly dead body. According to one superstition, there was a “period between death and burial in which the human being was regarded as ‘neither alive nor fully dead’” (Richardson 15). Belief in the resurrection of
the body also caused people to oppose dissection. While popular burial customs sought to preserve the body and its identity, dissection threatened to destroy them. “Dissection was a very final process,” Richardson writes. “It denied hope of survival—even the survival of identity after death. … Dissection represented a gross assault upon the integrity and identity of the body and upon the repose of the soul” (76). At the same time, the law left bodies in a liminal status in that they were not considered property. This made them vulnerable to exploitation by “resurrectionists,” another name for bodysnatchers:

> Although the only legal source for bodies for dissection was hanged murderers, exhumation was not technically a crime of theft; for although dead human bodies were in fact bought and sold, in the eyes of the law a body did not constitute real property, and therefore could neither be owned or stolen. (58).

Such legal deficiencies set the stage for one of the most lurid periods in British history. And the cultural attitudes that they unintentionally fostered are reflected in nineteenth-century horror fiction.

The rampant grave-robbing that took place as a result of the limited legal supply of cadavers for anatomies made the age of dissection in Britain even more macabre. Although the “Murder Act” increased the supply of dissectible bodies, it was not enough to meet the demand. As a result, stolen human bodies became goods to be bought and sold in an underground economy that stripped them of their identity and left them in pieces. Stevenson’s interest in this black market is evident in his short story “The Body-Snatcher.” Written in 1881 and published in 1884, the story is set in the 1820s when grave-robbing was rampant. “The Body-Snatchers” focuses on two Resurrection Men,
the sinister and manipulative Wolfe “Toddy” Macfarlane and the conscience-plagued Fettes. Macfarlane becomes a respected London doctor, Fettes a washed-up alcoholic. The story is told by one of Fettes’ drinking mates at the out-the-way inn, where an older Fettes spends his evenings in “melancholy alcoholic saturation” (201). Fettes is an enigma in the village northeast of London where he settled years earlier, but he shares his story after a chance reunion with Macfarlane at the inn reawakens his guilt, trauma, and rage. As young men, both Macfarlane and Fettes were medical students who supplied their anatomy lecturer with stolen corpses. Both were lab assistants: Fettes’s job was to pay for the snatched bodies that were delivered by resurrectionists in the dead of night. The premise of the tale involves the horror of murder-for-dissection, as the two corpses identified in the story, Jane Galbraith and Gray, were most likely victims of foul play. On the surface, the conflict of the macabre story is between Fettes and Macfarlane. At a deeper level, however, the conflict is Fettes’s struggle to suppress his conscience as he is drawn deeper into the corpse trade by Macfarlane. Unlike Macfarlane, Fettes does not kill anyone, but he bears the burden of guilt and fear for what he does to the bodies he helps smuggle. Fettes falls into ruin because he clearly sees the absurdity and horror of a system that relies on unspeakable violence to living and dead bodies to train physicians.

By the time of the setting depicted in Stevenson’s tale, grave-robbing had been going on in England and Scotland since the seventeenth century, with anatomists and their students stealing bodies for dissection (Richardson 54). As the black market grew, anatomists began hiring “entrepreneurs” to rob graves for them. “Anatomists, fearful of punishment, riot, prosecution, and damage to their reputation, offered money for corpses
rather than snatch them themselves,” Richardson explains (55). Richardson estimates that the trade in cadavers eventually grew to “several thousand bodies annually” (87). “Every buried corpse in the country was vulnerable to the predations of the bodysnatchers…,” Richardson writes (xv). So pervasive was the practice that when Fettes gets cold feet in “The Body-Snatcher,” Macfarlane tells him that if he is not a grave-robber, he will end up a victim on an anatomist’s table. Thus, Stevenson divides the world between those who dissect—or at least facilitate the practice by stealing corpses—and those who are dissected (215).

Richardson writes that the period of 1675-1725 was most likely when “the human body began to be bought and sold like any other commodity, smuggled or otherwise” (55). At times, body-snatchers could bribe undertakers and steal corpses from coffins before they were even buried (65). Usually, however, the work was more labor intensive. Operating in gangs mostly at night, resurrectionists used techniques that, for the most part, allowed them to remove bodies from graves without leaving a trace of disturbance. An experienced gang could do the job in ten to twenty minutes (Knott 2). Richardson summarizes the inventive ways bodies were packaged for smuggling and delivery in this new economy:

Human bodies were compressed into boxes, packed in sawdust, packed in hay, trussed up in sacks, roped up like hams, sewn in canvas, packed in cases, casks, barrels, crates, and hampers, salted, pickled or injected with preservatives. They were carried in carts and wagons, in barrows and steam-boats; manhandled, damaged in transit, and hidden under loads of vegetables. They were stored in cellars and on quays. (72)
Sometimes cadavers were also “dismembered and sold in pieces,” Richardson writes (72). Resurrection men would be paid well just for a corpse’s teeth, which dentists used to make dentures (67). As stealthily as grave-robbers operated, they were sometimes caught. The problem facing the law was what to do with the resurrection men, since the law did not recognize a body as property that could be stolen. If the body-snatchers stole clothing, jewelry, or any other items from a grave, they could be charged with felonies. However, if they took only bodies, they were usually charged with misdemeanors (Knott 2). They typically had more to fear from the outraged and vengeful mobs that confronted them after they were arrested (Richardson 78). As Stevenson writes, in “rustic neighborhoods” where grave-robbers felt safer operating, “love is more than commonly tenacious … and bonds of blood or fellowship unite the entire society of a parish” (“The Body-Snatcher” 217). Evidence of grave-robbing could cause communities to panic and rush to dig up local graveyards looking for their loved ones (88). Difficult to assess is their trauma when they discovered empty graves. Richardson speculates that

the conception of their spouse or child dragged out of the coffin, shoved into a sack, manhandled in transit, stretched out on a slab, decapitated or dismembered, and cut about by (possibly irreverent) training anatomists, may in many cases have resulted in profound psychological disturbance. (78)

Stevenson contemplates this anguish in “The Body Snatcher” when his narrator contrasts families’ expectations that their departed loved one would find eternal rest and the fate their bodies actually suffer after their graves are desecrated by “the Resurrection Man”:
To bodies that had been laid in earth, in joyful expectation of a far different awakening, there came that hasty, lamp-lit, terror-haunted resurrection of the spade and mattock. The coffin was forced, the cerements torn, and the melancholy relics, clad in sackcloth, after being rattled for hours on moonless byways, were at length exposed to uttermost indignities before a class of gaping boys. (217)

The newly dead were not the only ones at risk: the living also had reason to fear the lurid trade of criminals and anatomists after it was revealed that people were being murdered and their bodies sold for dissection. The first high-profile case occurred in 1828, when it was discovered that William Burke and William Hare had murdered sixteen people in Edinburgh and sold their bodies to anatomist Robert Knox. The Irish immigrants’ spree began after an old man died in the Hares’ boarding house owing them money, and Burke and Hare sold his body to Knox to cover the debt. Their primary method involved dulling victims with drink and then smothering them. At trial, Hare testified against Burke, who was convicted. After he was hanged, his body was publicly dissected at Edinburgh University before an enormous crowd. His skeleton is still on display at Edinburgh Medical School, and a book bound with his skin can be found in Surgeons’ Hall Museum in Edinburgh. One is reminded of the image of the “old yellow Book” which relates Franceschini’s crimes in Browning’s *The Ring and the Book*:

“…crude fact / Secreted from a man’s life when hearts beat hard …” (I. 85-6). Knox escaped prosecution, as did the accomplices.

Two years after the sensational revelations of Burke and Hare’s crimes, a similar case was investigated in the Nova Scotia Gardens slum in London in 1831. While Burke and Hare had never robbed graves, John Bishop and Thomas Williams were part of a
gang of accomplished body-snatchers. Bishop estimated that over twelve years he had sold “between 500 to 1,000 disinterred corpses to London anatomy schools” (Richardson 196). At some point, they branched out and began murdering victims to supply anatomists. They confessed to killing three people—including two boys—by drugging them and then hanging them upside down inside a well to die—a method that left no signs of murder (196). Bishop, Williams, and a third man, John May, were convicted of murdering one of the boys. May was later pardoned by the king, while Bishop and Williams were hanged before cheering crowds and their bodies dissected and exhibited. The day before his execution, Williams allegedly confessed that he and Bishop had murdered about sixty other people and sold their bodies to anatomists (197).

Murder-for-dissection is, of course, the real business of Stevenson’s “The Body-Snatcher,” which features among its characters Robert Knox before the Burke and Hare scandal. He is referred to only as “Mr. K---.” Stevenson writes:

His name was subsequently too well known. The man who bore it skulked through the streets of Edinburgh in disguise, while the mob that applauded at the execution of Burke called loudly for the blood of his employer. But Mr. K--- was then at the top of his vogue. (206)

A promising student from Edinburgh, Fettes lives in Knox’s compound, under the same roof as the dissecting room, and is charged with keeping the theatre in order, overseeing students, and paying for the bodies that are brought in at night by the “unclean and desperate interlopers who supplied the table” (207). The narrator says that Fettes and Knox were always worried about having enough corpses, and they chose to overlook
evidence that murder was being committed to supply their students. “There was no understanding that the subjects were provided by the crime of murder. Had that idea been broached to [Knox] in words, he would have recoiled in horror…,” the narrator says (208). Still, Knox is culpable for not taking the matter seriously, for insisting that Fettes ask no question of the “ruffians” who showed up at the dissecting room door with bodies and thereby encouraging his associates to engage in murder for dissection (208). And Fettes, who silences his conscience with alcohol and “blackguardly enjoyment,” goes along with Knox: “He understood his duty, in short, to have three branches: to take what was brought, to pay the price, and to avert the eye from any evidence of crime” (208). By the time Fettes begins to resist the trade, it is too late. Macfarlane tells him he has become too involved. Besides, Macfarlane says, almost all of their dissection “subjects have been murdered.” The best thing to do, he says, is to look the other way (210). For Fettes, however, squelching the conscience is easier said than done. When a drunken Gray jokes that Macfarlane would stab him if he could, Fettes says, “‘We medicals have a better way than that,’” said Fettes. “‘When we dislike a dead friend of ours, we dissect him’” (211).

By the time that Stevenson published “The Body-Snatcher,” efforts had been made to limit the black market in corpses. A growing awareness of bodysnatching, the safeguards taken in cemeteries to try to stop it, the proliferation of medical schools, and the prosecutions of anatomists who received stolen bodies all increased pressure on the British government to increase the supply of cadavers legally available for dissection. The result was the Anatomy Act of 1832, a utilitarian plan that aimed to relieve the shortage by expanding the supply to include the unclaimed bodies of people who died in
workhouses, hospitals, and prisons. It was modeled on a French system that had worked well (Knott 3). The Anatomy Act stipulated that if no one claimed a body within seven days to give it a proper burial, it could be sent to a medical school for dissection. The Act also required anatomists to be licensed, bodies sent for dissection to be documented, an official fee to be paid for the bodies, and the cadavers to receive proper burials. The Act, however, offered little relief for the poor, who for years had been easy targets for body-snatchers due to inexpensive burial practices. Critics charged that the Act made poverty a crime. Mary Ellis Gibson writes, “This reform …simply effected a transfer of legal dissection from criminals to the poor, thereby suggesting a basic connection between poverty and crime” (79). John Knott argues that historians have long overlooked the trauma that the Anatomy Act and dissection had on Britain in the nineteenth century. Knott writes that the “poor and laboring population viewed the Anatomy Act with absolute horror.” It was variously referred to among the people as “The Dead Body Bill,” the “Dissecting Bill,” and the “Blood-Stained Anatomy Act” (1). People were roused by conspiracy theories that the Anatomy Act and the New Poor Law were intended to work together to starve and murder people in prisons, workhouses, and hospitals and then butcher their bodies (2). “Were the two Acts not designed to work in harmony, grinding up the bodies of the poor?” Knott asks rhetorically, summing up the suspicions of the poor (1).

Darwin’s Influence

An understanding of the rhetoric of Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde is further aided by a knowledge of Darwin’s theories and their impact on Victorian culture: theories
which emphasized that humans—and their bodies—are part of nature. When discussing transgressing bodies, none were perhaps more objectionable to Victorians than the atavistic bodies of evolutionary anachronisms—like Hyde—who not only offended sensibilities but also broke laws and threatened social order. Montgomery, who socializes with the Beast People in Moreau, is another example. Darwin helped supply the traits of such characters. In works such as The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex and The Expressions of Emotions in Man and Animals, the divisions separating savages and animals largely disappear. Jeanne Fahnestock writes, “The ancient opposition between human and brute was seriously challenged in the nineteenth century when various theories of evolution, culminating in Darwin’s, were publically aired” (75).

Drawing from the lexicon of nineteenth-century imperialism, Darwin frequently uses the term “savages” to refer to Africans, Native Americans, Asian Indians, and Aborigines. Aside from even the lowest human’s superior mental powers, Darwin saw little difference between savages and animals in the struggle for existence. In fact, he suggests that savages are intermediaries between humans and animals. They are throwbacks to civilized Europeans in an earlier state. These attitudes form the core of Darwin’s thought on many topics, including his opposition to inhumane treatment of animals.

Although Darwin published his theory of competitive fitness in 1859 in On the Origin of Species, he did not apply the theory to humans until 1871 in The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. In arguing that humans are a product of evolution, he blurs the lines between humans and animals. “Savages” become animal-human hybrids in Darwin’s The Descent of Man. Darwin achieves this largely through the use of
gradatio. Fahnestock points out that Darwin makes effective use of *gradatio* in *On the Origin of Species*. One of his most famous uses of *gradatio* can be found in chapter two, in which he undermines the stability of the concept of species (113). However, Darwin’s use of *gradatio* in *The Descent of Man* is even more pronounced, as he searches for the line dividing human and animal. It is a search that informs *Jekyll and Hyde* and *Moreau*. Part of Darwin’s purpose in *The Descent of Man* is to erase the binary between human and animal by showing that they share numerous similarities. His project can be expressed in the following structural chiasmus: the bestializing of humans and the humanizing of beasts. It is a rhetorical figure that consolidates the Victorian period’s interest in primitive man, moral degeneracy, and animal welfare. The crisscross nature of the figure points toward an intersection based on shared characteristics, and that is what Darwin tries establish in *The Descent of Man*, and what readers can see Stevenson extending in *Jekyll and Hyde*, and Wells in *Moreau*. The picture that all three writers paint of man in nature is decidedly dark and disturbing, characterized by violence to the body. Impulses that all three texts share are the demonization and destruction of the hybrid, as represented by the “savages,” the Beast People, and Hyde. These monstrosities are partly constituted through others’ rhetoric, and they all face disarticulation.

In *The Descent of Man*, Darwin clearly believes savages are intermediaries between civilized men and animals. He does not believe, as some scholars and clergy of his day, that man came into existence, then lapsed into savagery (143, 145). He describes uncivilized people in some of the wickedest terms possible. They are immoral, superstitious, lacking in reason, intemperate, masochistic, sexist, domineering, violent,
warlike, bloodthirsty, cruel, sadistic, unsympathetic and inhumane. Many of these observations could be made of Edward Hyde. Almost a decade later, and in an enchanted island setting removed from London and reminiscent of Circe’s, Prospero’s, Comus’s, and the Houyhnhms’ domains, Wells feels freer to describe his Beast People’s savagery. In the Beast People, Prendick comments on many of the same characteristics that Darwin catalogues in primitive humans. Prendick also notes that Moreau has given the Beast People the Law, a religious code similar to the biblical Ten Commandments, to follow. They chant it. Their litany of the Law’s stipulations contribute to its rhetorical character.

Describing primitive people, Darwin writes that they are unable to distinguish between subjective and objective impressions (94). In other words, they do not know the difference between reality and fantasy. He portrays the superstitions and religious rites of savages as particularly lurid, writing of human sacrifices, ordeals by fire and poison, and black magic (95). He writes, “These miserable and indirect consequences of our highest faculties may be compared with the incidental and occasional mistakes of the instincts of the lower animals” (96). Darwin dwells on savages’ cruelty. For example, North American Indians leave the weak to die, he writes, and Fijians bury their elderly parents alive (102). They have underdeveloped social instincts, and neighboring tribes are constantly at war (108). They lack altruism and benevolence (110-1). Crimes such as murder might be punished within tribes, but they are encouraged against other tribes. Some savages delight in the suffering of strangers (117), and women and children in certain North American Indian tribes aid in torturing captives, Darwin writes. They can also take “horrid pleasure” in cruelty to animals. “... humanity is an unknown virtue,”
Darwin writes (118). Darwin attributes their “low morality” to a lack of sympathy, weak reasoning, and lack of self-control (119). If primitive people adopt some of the trappings of civilization, they might be only superficial. As Darwin says, “Apes are much given to imitation, as are the lowest savages ...” (129). He further develops this association between savages and lower animals with an ominous prediction:

At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilised races of man will almost certainly exterminate, and replace, the savage races throughout the world. At the same time the anthropomorphous apes ... will no doubt be exterminated. The break between man and his nearest allies will then be wider, for it will intervene between man in a more civilised state ... instead of as now between the negro or Australian and the gorilla (156).

Darwin’s hybrids, therefore, face disarticulation the same as Wells’ and Stevenson’s. And just as these “savages” were constituted as monstrosities through rhetoric, their destruction would also be facilitated by rhetoric as imperialists justified their domination, conversion, and modernization. It seems significant that the most visible example of colonialism in the late nineteenth century was the partitioning of Africa, as the European powers figuratively cut the continent into pieces and divided it among themselves.

As Darwin tries to make primitive people seem less human in *The Descent of Man*, he tries to make animals seem more human. As William Irvine writes, “He (Darwin) may more readily be accused of making animals too human, than of making men too animal” (196). Darwin compares “lower animals” to humans on many points in chapters III and IV in *The Descent of Man*. In chapter III, he writes, “My object ... is to shew that there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in
their mental faculties” (66). Animals such as dogs, cats and apes experience emotions—a fact that Darwin says is so well established that he offers few specifics. They display suspicion, deceit, courage, timidity, anger and sulkiness. Higher animals are capable of such “complex emotions” as love, emulation, pride, shame, rage, humor and dread. They experience wonder, boredom and curiosity (71). Darwin writes at length about a series of human characteristics and abilities that he believes animals possess to some degree, offering numerous examples. They are imitation, attention, memory, imagination, reason, abstract thought, general conceptions, self-consciousness, mental individuality, language, a sense of beauty, and religion. James Rachels explains:

Part of Darwin’s argument was that we find similar rational capacities in other animals; echoing the language of the Cartesians, he rejected the idea that animals are merely ‘animated machines.’ ... Darwin did not deny that human rational abilities far exceed those of other animals. But he insisted that the difference is only one of degree, not of kind. (132-3)

*The Descent of Man* was not the only work in which Darwin explores the similarities between man and animals. He followed up with the well-received *The Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals* in 1872. Janet Browne describes the book’s success: “It turned out to be the most successful and readable book he had produced up to that point, selling some nine thousand copies in the first four months, many more than the *Origin of Species* had done in a similar span” (*Charles Darwin* 368). Browne writes that “Darwin regarded the book as a crucial part of his lifelong evolutionary project” (368). It resonated with nineteenth-century readers who were increasingly interested in animals’ inner lives, their intelligence and their emotions.
Browne explains: “The subject of expression brought his anthropological cycle to a conclusion, seeking to demonstrate a continuum between the mental life of human and animals” (368). Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde posit a similar continuum between human and animal bodies.

**Moreau’s Rhetoric**

Darwin’s concern with the animal-human boundary informs the character of Moreau as declaimer and vivisectionist. Like Dracula, Moreau presents audiences with multiple strands of rhetoric. Moreau’s explanation and defense of his project constitute what is essentially a forensic oration, while Prendick’s transformation due to his contact with the Beast People suggests epideictic. Wells’ concern with rhetoric is signaled early in the novel when Prendick discovers “Latin and Greek classics” in Moreau’s compound (194). Moreover, after what he believes is his first successful use of vivisection in humanizing an ape, Moreau wants to write about the project for other scientists. He tells Prendick that he “was in a mind to write an account of the whole affair to wake up the English physiology” (227). But the project, like all of Moreau’s others, fails when the gorilla he has vivisected reverts.

Moreau’s role as declaimer becomes clear in Chapter XIV, in which he explains his project to Prendick. Even though Moreau does not fully convince Prendick of the practicality and benefit of his work, he does win Prendick’s uneasy acceptance that he is not experimenting on humans, only animals. This rhetorical performance occurs after Prendick has fled from Moreau’s compound, driven by his terror that doctor may be vivisecting humans. “Could it be possible, I thought, that such a thing as the vivisection
of men was possible?” Prendick wonders (208). He fears he will be next. After Moreau and Montgomery pursue Prendick through the jungle and onto the beach, Moreau convinces the suicidal Prendick to return to the compound only after gaining his trust by giving him two loaded pistols with which to protect himself. Although he is an aging man, Moreau is described as incredibly strong. As declaimer, he is imperious and larger than life. He reflects Debra Hawhee’s assessment that ancient Greek orators had to be prodigious men to deliver their speeches to large assemblies. When Moreau throws a curious Prendick out of his laboratory, the narrator says, “He lifted me as though I was a little child” (208). Prendick’s earlier descriptions of Moreau conveys the man’s presence. “He was a powerfully built man,” Prendick recalls, “with a fine forehead and rather heavy features” (189). His aging skin was “drooping,” giving him “an expression of pugnacious resolution” about his mouth (189). Prendick also observes that Moreau is at last six feet tall (190). His physical power is paralleled in his rhetorical power, as he rather quickly wins Prendick’s confidence, if not his acceptance. As a surgeon, Moreau’s project involves controlled violence to the bodies of animals. As a declaimer, he faces uncontrollable violence to his own body and disarticulation, similar to Cicero and to Dracula. Moreau’s death comes after the puma that he has been vivisecting escapes from his lab. Moreau pursues the animal into the jungle, where it partially dismembers him. Prendick finds Moreau’s body face down. His body is “mangled” (249). “One hand was almost severed at the wrist, and his silvery hair was dabbled in blood,” Prendick recalls (249). They drag his body back to the compound, where Montgomery fears he will have “his bones picked” by animals (250). Prendick contemplates the orator’s still, silent body:
“his massive face, calm even after his terrible death, and with his hard eyes open, staring at the dead white moon above” (251).

In his presentation to Prendick, Moreau lays out his work and his rationale for it. Prendick says, “He was very simple and convincing” (222). Through Moreau’s explanation, Prendick also begins to see that he and Moreau have similar beliefs.

“Presently I found myself hot with shame at our mutual positions,” Prendick says. Through his project, Moreau says that he has “humanized animals” and that they are “triumphs of vivisection” (222). “You forget all that a skilled vivisector can do with living things,” says Moreau, who discloses that some of his procedures involve grafting skin and bone (222). When Prendick calls the Beast People monsters, Moreau does not protest. “‘Yes,’” he says. “‘These creatures you have seen are animals carven and wrought into new shapes’” (222). Moreau says that his interest in the field began with blood transfusions and grew:

You begin to see that it is a possible thing to transplant tissue from one part of the animal to another, or from one animal to another, to alter its chemical reactions and methods of growth, to modify the articulations of its limbs, and indeed to change its most intimate structure? (223)

The difficulty with the assertion embedded in Moreau’s question is that he has not been entirely successful. Prendick observes that the creatures still bear many of the physical and behavioral traits of animals. They tend to have short legs and deformed hands. Moreau also suggests that he has used hypnotism as a sort of mental grafting: “‘Very
much … of what we call moral education is such an artificial modification and perversion of instinct…’” (223).

Through surgery, Moreau is practicing a radical version of the artificial selection that Darwin uses as an analogy for natural selection in his *On the Origin of Species*, and he is doing so in a surgically invasive way. Moreau’s fallacy, however, is assuming that animals are evolving toward humanoid forms, and he is tries to accelerate evolution. “Neither Darwin nor Huxley, nor Wells after them … believed that progress was inevitable,” write Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie. “It was simply urgently desirable. And both Huxley and Wells were plagued by haunting doubts whether in fact it would occur” (56). Moreau’s failed experiments are proof of the unreliability of evolutionary progress. It is not surprising, then, that Moreau’s argument falters when he confesses to Prendick that he has no real reason for choosing the human form as a model for his creature, other than its aesthetic appeal to him (223). However, when Prendick challenges Moreau to justify the pain he inflicts during vivisection with some practical application, Moreau turns the tables on him and accuses him of being a “materialist” due to his obsession with pain. Prendick protests: “‘I am not a materialist!’ I began hotly” (224). But Moreau continues: “‘… I tell you, you are an animal, thinking a little less obscurely what an animal feels’” (224). Prendick believes Moreau’s argument is specious, but has no real response: “I gave an impatient shrug at such sophistry” (225). However, there is more truth in Moreau’s assessment that Prendick is an “‘animal’” than Prendick recognizes, and it becomes apparent upon analysis of the epideictic effects of the novel.
Continuing his declamation, Moreau turns to the effects of somatic change on the body. He says that pain—a basic animal-human response—is useless, and that many organisms do not experience it. He predicts that pain will eventually be “‘ground out of existence by evolution’” (225). Moreau also privileges his branch of science over Prendick’s, which he dismisses as “‘collecting butterflies’” (225). As Moreau’s discourse continues, he grows increasingly animated, speaking of his “‘intellectual passion’” and the “‘delight of these intellectual desires.’” In this state, Moreau says he does not see the “‘thing before’” him as “‘an animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem’” to be solved. “‘I wanted … to find the extreme limit of plasticity in a living shape,’” Moreau says (225). When Prendick utters his last protest, that Moreau’s work is an “‘abomination,’” Moreau responds, “‘To this day I have never troubled about the ethics of the matter. The study of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature’” (225). Moreau’s rhetoric thus points toward a Darwinian theme in the novel: the bestializing of humans and the humanizing of beasts. This theme informs the epideictic, the sublime rhetoric of the novel, which is largely embodied in the forms of Moreau’s Beast People.

**Epideictic in Moreau: No “Islands of the Blessed”**

The best place to begin this study of epideictic in *Moreau* is Plato’s *Menexenus*. In this dialogue, Socrates, either facetiously or earnestly, remarks on the power of Athens’s epideictic orators to alter his perception of self and place and transport him to the “Islands of the Blessed” (951). Prendick does not find the “Islands of Blessed” on Moreau’s island, but on this distant shore he is definitely changed at an essential level. And in many ways, that is what epideictic is about, essentialism, the belief that people are
born with certain characteristics that shape their identity and culture. As Socrates suggests, epideictic identifies those traits and praises them. If we dive too deeply into humankind’s essence as expressed in late-Victorian horror fiction, however, we risk finding something inhuman and unrecognizable. This is the lesson of Prendick’s experience and Jekyll’s experience.

Studying epideictic in Moreau first requires readers to set aside any expectations of a formal speech like a funeral oration. We do not have a Pericles praising the Athenian war dead or a Dracula praising his own lineage. What we find instead is Prendick’s record of his animalization through the discourse embodied in Moreau’s Beast People. Three times readers are told that the Beast People had a “persuasion,” and it is clear that he uses the word to mean “influence” rather than a “belief.” Moreau tells Prendick that when he first modifies his animals, “they seem to be indisputably human beings. It’s afterwards, as I observe them, that the persuasion fades” (228). Prendick writes that as he observes the Beast People, he loses his ideas that their bodies are deformed and begins to feel that his own body is inadequate: “...at last I even fell in with their persuasion that my own long thighs were ungainly” (231). Later, Prendick writes that he saw the human condition in the Beast People: “A strange persuasion came upon me, that, save for the grossness of the line, the grotesqueness of the forms, I had here before me the whole balance of human life in miniature, the whole interplay of instinct, reason, and fate in its simplest form” (241).

These suggestions that the Beast People embody some sort of discourse have a precedent in Cicero and his observation that bodies have their own language (Da Oratore
However, they would mean little if Prendick did not undergo such a profound change on Moreau’s island. He is transformed from “a private gentleman” (174) to “an animal tormented” (268). At the same time, the Beast People lose all traces of the humanity forced on them by Moreau. Significantly, these beings produced by rhetoric and cutting also begin to lose the ability to walk upright and the power of speech in yet another instance of disarticulation. Prendick recalls their “growing coarseness of articulation”: “Can you imagine language, once clear-cut and exact, softening and guttering, losing shape and import, becoming mere lumps of sound again?” (262).

Even before Prendick’s first contact with the Beast People, his humanity is pressured. His story begins when the boat he is traveling on, the Lady Vain, collides at sea with another vessel and sinks. He escapes the shipwreck in a dingy with two other men. Here, the challenge to Prendick’s humanity begins, as starvation and thirst set in, and the men decide to resort to cannibalism in desperation. Prendick initially resists, but gives in. The plan ends when the two other men fight and fall overboard (176). Prendick drifts in the dingy for an “endless period” before he is rescued from the bloody boat and taken aboard the schooner Ipecacuanha. On board the ship, human and animal are housed together. There are dogs, a puma, a llama, and rabbits. “Is this an ocean menagerie?” Prendick asks (181). Prendick also encounters the first of the Beast People: a deformed man with a black face and animal-like features, including glowing eyes. “The thing came to me as stark inhumanity,” says Prendick, adding that the face recalled his “forgotten childhood horrors” (185-6).
Ironically, Prendick’s dehumanization is already under way, and the animal-human antithesis begins to be erased. To aid in Prendick’s recovery, Montgomery, who is delivering the animals to the island, gives Prendick a “dose of scarlet stuff” to drink. “It tasted like blood, and made me feel better,” Prendick says (177). Montgomery also serves Prendick meat. “I was so excited by the appetizing smell of it,” Prendick says (179). Like most humans, Prendick is a carnivore, and he will soon learn the he is not much different than the Beast People on Moreau’s dangerous island. Prendick eventually learns that Moreau has vivisected one hundred and twenty animals. By the time Prendick arrives on the island, about sixty-seven of the experiments are still living in the jungle, their instincts somewhat checked by the Law they repeat and the litanies they chant, including “Are we not Men?” (215). They are the rhetorical descendants of the Victorian ape-man trope. They include an Ape Man, as well as a Hyena-Swine, a Leopard Man, an ape-goat Satyr, an Ox Board Man, Bull Men, Swine Folk, Wolf Folk, an Ocelot Man, a Bear-Bull, a Saint Bernard Dog Man, and a Vixen Bear Woman. That they embody some type of argument is evident when Prendick reflects on them and says, “A strange persuasion came upon me that … I had here before me the whole balance of human life in miniature, the whole interplay of instinct, reason, and fate, in its simplest form” (241).

Prendick’s changing attitudes toward the Beast People are markers of his dehumanization. At first, he is unnerved by them, a response seen in his reaction to the Beast man M’Ling on the schooner. After being driven out of Moreau’s enclosure by the Puma’s tortured cries and the “emotional appeal of those yells” (198), Prendick encounters the Leopard-Man in the jungle, a “grotesque half-bestial creature” (200). He
also describes a small group of Swine Folk that he spies on as “grotesque human figures” (201). “Never before had I seen such bestial-looking creatures,” Prendick says (201). He observes their behavior as if he is an anthropologist conducting an ethnographic study and they are primitive human beings engaged in their customs. They sway and “gibber in unison,” circle, wave their arms, and chant “‘Aloola’ or Balola,’ it sounded like” (201). He notes their features, including the “abnormal shortness of their legs and their lank clumsy feet” (201). Gradually, however, Prendick’s feelings toward the Beast People change. For most of the time he spends on the island, he is with them (260). Although he never completely loses his aversion for them, he begins to accept them. “At first I had a shivering horror of the brutes … but insensibly I became a little habituated to the idea of them…” (232). He says he was influenced by Montgomery, who “had been with them so long that he had come to regard them almost as normal human beings” (232). But Montgomery’s familiarity with the Beast People, and his decision to get drunk with them after Moreau’s death, prove fatal for him. Prendick observes that Montgomery is “half akin to these Beast Folk” (252). And, when Montgomery, wants to drink with them, Prendick says, “‘You’ve made a beast of yourself. To the beasts you may go’” (250). But Prendick also expresses sympathy for the Beast People, saying they were at one time normal animals but now they have “stumbled in the shackles of humanity” (241), leading a “mock-human existence” (242).

At this point, Prendick has completely rejected the dead Moreau’s defense of his project, saying that “my fear of the Beast People went the way of my fear for Moreau” (242). After the deaths of Moreau and Montgomery and the destruction of their
compound, Prendick has little choice but to go and live among the Beast People in their huts. That they live in a ravine, a low point on the island, is symbolic of Prendick’s degeneracy. “In this way I became one among the Beast People in the Island of Dr. Moreau,” he says (258). Prendick says that this part of his experience is so unpleasant that he chooses not to chronicle the majority of it. In what is possibly a reference to sexual bestiality, Prendick says that he is horrified at the memory of the “quasi-human intimacy” he descended into out of “loneliness” (262). A concern about unrestrained sexuality is underscored in the same chapter when Prendick notes that as the Beast People lose the traces of humanity that Moreau grafted onto them, the female creatures “began to disregard the injunction of decency—deliberately for the most part,” and others “attempted public outrages upon the institution of monogamy” (262).

Prendick is also bestialized when he is stalked like prey; but by the end of the novel, he has become a jungle predator and a prolific and remorseless killer of his fellow animals. Prendick encounters his first Beast People when he sees M’Ling on board the *Ipecacuauna*, followed by the Bull Men on the beach. But they are largely domesticated and under Moreau and Montgomery’s control. Prendick’s first encounter with one of the Beast People in the wild is when he meets the Leopard Man in the jungle: “…a man going on all fours, like a beast!” Prendick exclaims (199). The Leopard Man apparently has just killed an eaten a rabbit, giving in to his instinctual taste for blood and thereby breaking the law of Moreau’s jungle. The punishment for such an offense is a return trip to the doctor’s “House of Pain,” apparently for torture. Prendick tries unsuccessfully to communicate with the Leopard Man, but the monster runs away, only to return later to
stalk Prendick. He is in terror at the realization that he is being followed and watched, and that he is lost in the jungle. “I listened rigid, and heard nothing but the creep of the blood in my ears,” says Prendick (204). He saves himself from the Leopard Man’s final charge only by hitting him in the head with a rock. Later in the novel, Prendick flees from the enclosure once again, this time afraid that Moreau intends to vivisect him and turn him into one of the Beast People’s “Comus rout” (208). As Prendick flees through the jungle like an animal, Moreau and Montgomery track him with hounds. It is at this point that Prendick first enters the world of the Beast People in their forest settlement. He asks them for food. Thinking he has come to live with them, they try to teach him their Law.

The harmony between Prendick and the Beast People is short-lived, as they eventually become his prey. Ironically, he kills his first monster, the Leopard Man, out of pity after cornering him and not wanting to see him returned to Moreau’s lab for torture (240-1). He has already heard Moreau refer to the Beast People as having “souls” (228). And Predick himself has observed that “They talk, build houses, cook. They were men” (221). But Prendick’s motives for killing change. The next monster he kills in the jungle in defense of himself and others (248). Later, on the beach, when Prendick fires his revolver at a group of retreating Beast People, he does so in “excitement” (253) and not in defense of himself or others, as Montgomery and M’Ling have already been killed or fatally wounded in a drunken riot. Prendick also seizes the moment to try to kill his nemesis the Hyena-Swine, but his shot misses (256). This killing in a state of excitement and heightened power forecasts Prendick’s stalking of the Hyena-Swine in his jungle lair (261). He believes one of them must die. “But I did not mean to die,” Prendick says
In this way, Prendick embodies Huxley’s famous observation that “For his successful progress, throughout the savage state, man has largely been indebted to those qualities which he shares with the ape and the tiger…,” including “his ruthlessness and ferocious destructiveness when his anger is roused by opposition” (“Evolution and Ethics” 314).

Prendick finally has his chance to kill the Hyena-Swine after it attacks and begins devouring Prendick’s companion, the Saint Bernard Man. Coming upon the gruesome scene, Prendick describes the Hyena-Swine’s “glaring eyes,” “red-stained teeth,” and menacing growl. He says, “It was not afraid and not ashamed; the last vestige of the human taint had vanished … The brute made no sign of retreat” (264). Prendick could just as easily be describing a mirror image of himself. Like the Hyena-Swine, he has a figurative thirst for blood, no fear, and no intention of retreating. He describes matter-of-factly advancing, drawing his pistol, and shooting the charging Hyena-Swine between the eyes, killing it in mid-leap (264). After living for months in the jungle and watching the Beast People recede from the image of humanity that Moreau forced upon them, Prendick has also devolved: “I must have undergone strange changes,” he says, describing the rags he wears, his weathered skin, and long, matted hair. He has also developed the eye of the beast that he first noticed on board the Ipecacuanha. “I am told that even now my eyes have a strange brightness …,” Prendick says (263). One is reminded here of Hawhee’s discussion of the flaming eyes of Greek vision and how rhetoric—and more specifically epideictic—has given Prendick “an altogether new body” (178). It is a body as hybridized as those Moreau created through vivisection and rationalized through rhetoric. Upon
returning to civilization, Prendick learns that society can no more burn the beast out of
him than Moreau could the animals he vivisected (228). Like Moreau, he learns that the
old animal traits return, and he sees the “bestial mark” (267) in all of the human faces and
shapes that surround him. His rhetorical vision thus reshapes their bodies.

**Rhetoric in *Jekyll and Hyde***

Wells’s Beast People are the descendants of Stevenson’s Hyde in ways other than
their hybridized forms. Like the Beast People that succeeded him, Hyde embodies a
rhetorical discourse about humans’ place in nature and their duality as rational creatures
and sensual brutes. As monster, Hyde is the locus of the epideictic. The characters who
meet him are affected at an unconscious level and are unable to explain their disgust with
him. With his simian characteristics, Hyde is readily identifiable as ape-man, a powerful
cultural trope that captured the Victorian struggle between religion and science. What
seems to be missing from *Jekyll and Hyde*, however, is anything resembling a formal
oration. There is nothing like the creature appealing to Victor Frankenstein to create a
mate for him, or Van Helsing trying to prove the existence of vampires, or Moreau
defending vivisection. In its place is a fragmented discourse mainly interested in *ethos*,
which Aristotle called the “personal character of the speaker.” He says that, for a speaker,
“character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses”
(2:2155). The discourse takes the form of a third-person narrative focusing on Gabriel
John Utterson, attorney, and his efforts to determine the nature of the relationship
between his client Jekyll and his disturbing protégé Hyde. Yet another of the novella’s
rhetorical interests is the declamation of performative reading, as the mystery of Hyde is
ultimately solved by letters left by Jekyll and his rival scientist, Hastie Lanyon. Read by Utterson, these letters recreate the men’s presence and figuratively reconstitute their bodies, which have been destroyed largely as a result of their rhetorical confrontations over science.

Set against the backdrop of nineteenth-century Darwinism, *Jekyll and Hyde’s* main narrative sets up Utterson as finder of facts, the arbiter of truth, in the matter, while it also pits Jekyll and Lanyon against one another as embodiments of the new and old science. Although Jekyll may not necessarily be an orator, it is important to remember that he is a member of the medico-juridico-scientific establishment and that rhetoric is of enormous importance to the members of this community. Moreover, Jekyll is scientist involved in a dispute with Lanyon, another scientist. Readers are not told the exact nature of the dispute, only that it is significant enough to have caused a rift between two men who had known one another for many years. Utterson says to Lanyon, “I suppose ... you and I must be the two oldest friends that Henry Jekyll has?” (14). Later, Utterson says to Lanyon, “‘We are three very old friends ... we shall not live to make others’” (29). On his side, Lanyon says that he had a falling out with Jekyll ten years earlier. He says that “‘Henry Jekyll became too fanciful for me. He began to go wrong, wrong in the mind.’” He condemns Jekyll’s work as “‘unscientific balderdash’” (14). For his part, Jekyll acknowledges that Lanyon is a “‘good fellow’” but calls him a “‘hide-bound pedant’” alarmed by what he believes are Jekyll’s “‘scientific heresies.’” He is “‘an ignorant, blatant pedant. I was never more disappointed in any man than Lanyon’” (20). Utterson believes that there is nothing personal in the dispute between Jekyll and Lanyon. He
thinks, “They have only differed on some point of science” (14). However, he regards himself as a man of “no scientific passions” (14), and he does not recognize the greater significance of the schism between Jekyll and Lanyon as a struggle between the new science and the old science. Viewed from this perspective, Hyde as monster is the offspring of the new science. He fulfills the prophecy of Adam Sedgwick, Darwin’s geology teacher at Cambridge, “who growled that the new sciences coupled in an ‘unlawful marriage’ and spawned a hideous monster; it would be merciful to crush ‘the head of the filthy abortion, and put an end to its crawlings’” (qtd. in Hellman 82).

Utterson also makes nothing of Lanyon’s remark that Jekyll had gone “wrong in the mind.” This proves to be an important error, considering that Jekyll’s inability to reconcile his private character and public image contributes to the novella’s main conflict. Jekyll’s ethos is fractured even before he creates Hyde. His self is already divided.

Jekyll’s bisected ethos looms large in a novella in which reputation is so valued. In the medico-juridico-scientific world depicted in the Jekyll and Hyde, ethos is everything. It is a world of homosocial bonds formed in boarding schools, colleges, medical facilities, law offices, courtrooms, charity functions, and dinner parties. So restrictive are these bonds that they entirely exclude women from the text. Like Moreau, Jekyll and Hyde has no major female characters. There are no girlfriends, fiancées, wives, mothers, daughters, aunts, or grandmothers to compete for the men’s interest and possibly compromise their professional identity and integrity. Indeed, Jekyll and Hyde seems deeply troubled by the idea that a man’s private character may be in opposition to
his public image. Hyde figures that idea. As Jane Rago argues, Hyde is threatening not because he is other, but because of his ties to Jekyll and by extension London’s homosocial world: “The professional medico-juridico-scientific world of the text is enmeshed in the gentlemanly rituals of authoritative discourse. It is precisely this discursive regime that Hyde threatens….” At stake are standards of “deviance and normativity” defined by the medico-juridico-scientific establishment (Rago n.pag.).

Jekyll’s concern with ethos, it can be argued, gives birth to Hyde. He wishes to live as two different people, one good and the other bad, and he achieves this dissection of character through chemistry. Utterson—who upon Jekyll’s orders revised his will to leave all to Hyde—worries about the nature of the relationship between the two men, not discovering until the end of the novel that they are the same person. Like his “distant kinsman” (8) and walking companion Richard Enfield, Utterson at first believes that Hyde must be blackmailing Jekyll over a youthful indiscretion. “He was wild when he was young,” thinks Utterson (19). He does not consider the possibility that Hyde may be the result of a more recent transgression. After all, Jekyll is a solid member of the medico-juridico-scientific caste, with his credentials as a doctor of medicine, civil laws, and law. He is also a fellow of the Royal Society (13). Enfield notes that Jekyll is a man of “proprieties” (10). His “large handsome face” reflects benignity and virtue (20). And he is a popular party “guest and entertainer … known for charities” (29). After Hyde’s absconision, Jekyll also finds religion (29). Jekyll’s ethos is such that when Utterson presses him to confirm the suspicion that Hyde is blackmailing him, Jekyll is able to turn the tables and get Utterson to promise to shepherd Hyde in the event of Jekyll’s death.
(20-1). So convinced of Jekyll’s integrity is Utterson that after Hyde kills Carew and disappears, he covers up the link between Jekyll and Hyde. He continues to do so even when he strongly suspects that Jekyll has forged a letter for Hyde—a letter that lifts suspicion from Jekyll and redeems his reputation. ‘‘Henry Jekyll forge for a murderer!’’ thinks Utterson (28). And on the final night of the narrative, having found Hyde dead from suicide in Jekyll’s home and Jekyll missing and possibly dead, Utterson still has the doctor’s servants wait two hours before summoning the police. ‘‘O, we must be careful,’’ Utterson says. ‘‘I foresee that we may yet involve your master in some dire catastrophe’’ (41). Care for reputation in *Jekyll and Hyde* apparently trumps personal safety and the law.

Although there is no formal oration in *Jekyll and Hyde*, an element in the novella that suggests a concern for declamation is pedagogical reading. For the purposes of this study, pedagogical reading will take two basic forms: imitative reading, in which a student listens to and echoes a teacher or more skilled reader; and performative reading, in which a speaker reads a famous speech in the persona of the individual who originally delivered the speech. Pedagogical reading was central to elocutionist Thomas Sheridan’s program for controlling the body through its voice and expressions. The exercise was also believed to mold and shape students’ character. It trained students in socially acceptable speech and also taught them how to control their emotions, which Sheridan—like other rhetors before him—believed would ‘‘have powerful, long-term effects on the dispositions of students’’ (Harrington, ‘‘Remembering the Body’’ 80). Dana Harrington points out the classical origins of imitative reading in Plato, who praises the study of
poetry and the eulogies of great men as crucial to character development. On the other hand, Plato believed students should be discouraged from imitating bad men, women, and the insane (80-1). Through Socrates, Harrington writes, Plato expressed that imitative reading was a way to control the mind and body as well as speech. Socrates asks, “Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle into habits and (second) nature in the body, the speech, and thought?” (qtd. in 81). Imitative reading was intended not only to help students identify with great characters but also to absorb their ethics. Harrington points out that Quintilian later presented reading as a process that “engaged the entire body,” teaching a student such lessons as when to breath, when to pause, how to inflect his voice, and when to speed up or slow down (82).

Imitation in rhetoric was part of a pedagogical program that, Sharon Crowley explains, aimed for “most of Western history” to “produce a citizen-orator, the ‘good man speaking well’” who could serve his community when it faced difficult political or legal decisions or sing its praises to celebrate its “uniqueness” or boost its “morale.” The focus was to produce students who were “highly literate” and “aware of the power and responsibility” they held through their mastery of linguistic and discursive skills (318). They were expected to participate in their communities and “conduct their lives” well to give them an “authoritative voice” in debates over “legal and moral questions” (318-9). The intent, therefore, was not just to teach oratory but also to shape and control bodies and lives. Crowley repeats a commonplace when she says that this approach to education faded in the nineteenth century, when rhetoric as a “coherent discipline” disappeared from mainstream Western thought, displaced by the “scientific mode of thought” (320).
Pedagogical reading shapes the narrative of Jekyll and Hyde after Utterson comes into possession of two letters, one from Jekyll and the other from Lanyon. The letters promise to solve the mystery at the heart of the novella, but he is sworn to open and read the letters only after both men have died. Simply reading the letters, however, is not sufficient. He has to read them correctly. Therefore, he is instructed in Jekyll’s note to “first read the narrative which Lanyon warned me he was to place in your hands; and if you care to read more, turn to the confession” of Jekyll (41). Moreover, Utterson does not read the letters in front of Jekyll’s servants. Instead, he goes to his office to read them alone, thereby perpetuating the secrecy so crucial to constructing and maintaining the ethos of his professional class. Utterson’s act of reading the letters shifts the novella from third-person to first-person. While multiple viewpoints are used in other novels included in this study, the shift in Jekyll and Hyde is especially meaningful considering the pattern of transformations in the novella. Both Lanyon and Jekyll undergo physical transformations that lead to death. Having lost control of his drug-induced transformations, Jekyll is trapped in the grotesque body of Hyde, where he dies by suicide. Likewise, readers never see Utterson again after his readings of Lanyon’s and Jekyll’s letters. The novella ends with Jekyll’s confession. It does not pivot back to the third-person narrator that shadowed Utterson for the first two-thirds of the book. Readers are not shown the aftermath of the case and its effects on Utterson. The act of reading in the novella is so profound that it wholly consumes Utterson’s character. He seemingly dissolves in the final instance of disarticulation in the text. And, just as Utterson recovers the textualized bodies of Lanyon and Hyde by reading their letters, the third-person
narrator recovers Utterson’s textualized body by the telling the tale. The loss of the third-person narrative makes *Jekyll and Hyde* similar to *Frankenstein*, which seems complete but is actually missing a crucial corner of its frame: Margaret Saville, Walton’s sister and the recipient of his letters containing not only Frankenstein’s fantastical and tragic story but also Walton’s account of meeting the creature. How does Saville react to the narrative? How does reading it affect her? Hers is perhaps the most significant absence in English literature.

What happens to Utterson one can only speculate. But it is clear that contact with Hyde is destructive to the body. It is disarticulating. Both Jekyll and Lanyon suffer physical decline leading up to their deaths. Lanyon is first described as a “hearty, healthy dapper, red-faced gentleman, with a shock of hair prematurely white, and a boisterous and decided manner” (13). He is “theatrical,” and he bounds out of his chair to greet Utterson (13). Lanyon is later described as having undergone “swift physical decay.” He is said to have his “death warrant written legibly upon his face. The rosy man had grown pale: his flesh had fallen away” (29). Lanyon’s body seems to be dissolving, and a week later he is dead (30). Likewise, Jekyll is described as “deathly sick” and greeting Utterson with a “cold hand” (25), whereas before it “was large, firm, white and comely” (54). The lawyer says he believes Jekyll is “seized with one of those maladies that both torture and deform the sufferer” (36).

In reading Lanyon’s and Jekyll’s letters, Utterson assumes their personas. Most importantly, their written words reconstitute Jekyll’s body. As Lanyon writes after witnessing Hyde’s transformation, “‘…there before my eyes—pale and shaken, and half
fainting, and groping before him with his hands, like a man restored from death—there stood Henry Jekyll!” (47). Stevenson makes similar moves in “The Body-Snatcher.” At his surprise reunion with Macfarlane, Fettes is like a “man ... risen from the grave” (203). More frightening is the resurrection of Gray’s slain body after its mutilation. Like Lanyon, the body-snatchers Fettes and MacFarlane are shocked that the body that they have just stolen from a country graveyard turns out not to be the woman they thought but Gray, whom Macfarlane had presumably murdered and then sold to an anatomist to cover up the crime. Macfarlane even helps orchestrate the dissection of Gray’s body by his classmates, including cutting off the head and giving it to a student with a special interest. In life, Gray had been a monstrous character. He had played the tyrant, insulting and controlling his acquaintance Macfarlane. “He issued order like the Great Bashaw,” or Pasha, says the narrator (211). He was also a glutton and drunkard, “coarse, vulgar, and stupid” (211). After a night of dissipation, Fettes is astonished when Macfarlane brings in Gray’s transgressing body to the anatomist the following morning: “To see, fixed in the rigidity of death and naked … the man whom he had left well clad and full of meat and sin upon the threshold of a tavern, awoke … the terrors of conscience” (212-213). Another parallel between “The Body-Snatcher” and Jekyll and Hyde is that of a body undergoing a metaphysical transformation. When Fettes and Macfarlane snatch the body of the farmer’s wife from its dark grave near the end of the story, they are certain it is a woman, based on its size and contours within the sack that conceal it. But its size and shape change as they travel through the countryside: “… some nameless change had befallen the dead body…,” the narrator says. Silent and hidden in a sack, the body
nevertheless addresses them through its form: “A nameless dread was swathed, like a wet sheet, about the body … a fear that was meaningless, a horror of what could not be, kept mounting to his brain” (221). When Fettes and Macfarlane pull back the covering they find “the body of the dead and long-dissected Gray” (221).

The transforming corpse in the denouement of “The Body-Snatcher” affects Fettes and Macfarlane in much the same way that Hyde affects the other characters in *Jekyll and Hyde*. The terror they inspire lies partly in their alteration from something knowable and familiar to something strange and inexplicable. In this way, the bodies “speak” without uttering a word. Hyde’s altered body figures prominently in the statements of both Lanyon and Jekyll. Lanyon’s greatest concern is controlling Hyde, who is a terrifying curiosity to him. Reflecting on his meeting with Hyde, which Jekyll has arranged to obtain chemicals to create his potion, Lanyon notes his small size, disturbing visage, and his clothes of “‘rich and sober fabric’” that were “‘enormously too large for him’” (45). Hyde’s grotesque body and his more refined clothing and manner of speech are incongruous. Lanyon wonders about the “‘man’s nature and character’” as well as “‘his origins, his life, his fortune and status in the world’” (45). He describes Hyde’s impatient manner. “‘My visitor was … on fire with somber excitement,’” Lanyon notes, adding later that Hyde was “‘wrestling against … hysteria’” (45). When Hyde touches Lanyon on the arm to shake him, Lanyon feels an “‘icy pang’” and pushes him away. He also attempts to exercise control over Hyde by inviting him to sit down, and then showing him how to do it properly. Hyde’s excitement grows as he finally obtains the ingredients for the potion. Lanyon’s descriptions hint at Hyde’s lack of self-control:
"I could hear his teeth grate with the convulsive action of his jaws; and his face was so ghastly to see that I grew alarmed both for his life and reason." He urges Hyde to "Compose yourself" (46). Lanyon’s ultimate effort to control Hyde is to affect scientific detachment and observe the effects of his potion, which distorts and alters his body: “…his face became suddenly black and the features seemed to melt and alter…” (47). The horror of gazing on Hyde’s transformation not only disrupts the scientific pose Lanyon has assumed, but it also alters his own body. “My life has been shaken to its roots…” (47). Honoring Hyde’s request, Lanyon views the change from the standpoint of a medical professional. Therefore, he is oath-bound not to reveal what he sees (46). From Hyde’s perspective, Lanyon’s desire to gaze upon him is the result of “‘greed’” (46). Hyde warns Lanyon about the horror of what he will witness, saying it will “‘stagger the unbelief of Satan’” (46). But Hyde also promises Lanyon “‘a new knowledge and new avenues to fame and power’” (46) and an opportunity to liberate himself from his “‘narrow and material views’” through the “‘virtue of transcendental medicine’” (47). The rhetoric here is Faustian, with Hyde offering Lanyon—the highly regarded professional who has seemingly reached the pinnacle and limit of materialistic knowledge—the chance to enshrine the body through occult experience. However, Lanyon’s encounter with the monstrous Hyde’s embodied rhetoric is disarticulating, destroying his body and silencing his voice. Again we see an example of rhetorical vision creating a new body in what Hawhee calls “epideictic agonism” (177). She cites Martin Jay’s observation that Greek vision “entailed ‘…a potential intertwining of viewer and viewed’” (qtd. in 178).
Jekyll’s statement is also characterized by its numerous references to the body. Previously noted were his discoveries of the incorporeality of the body (49). However, these observations conflict with the physicality of his own body and Hyde’s. Jekyll begins his statement with his birth, the moment his body appears. His chief fault, he says, was the hidden pleasure he took in the flesh (47-8). Jekyll also describes the creation of Hyde’s body after he consumes his potion, which, Lanyon says in his narrative, has an ingredient which resembles blood (43). Jekyll’s transformation into Hyde is marked by the “‘most racking pangs’” and a “‘grinding in the bones, deadly nausea, and a horror … that cannot be exceeded at the hour of birth or death.’” But Jekyll is fascinated by the body the process creates: it is “‘younger, lighter, happier.’”; filled with “‘sensual images’”; “‘wicked’”; and smaller than his own (50). He undergoes the same torture to reverse the transformation (51). In Hyde’s body, Jekyll can enjoy “‘pleasures’” which are “‘undignified’” and eventually “‘monstrous’” (53). He notes that Hyde takes “‘pleasure with bestial avidity from any degree of torture to another.’” He is “‘relentless like a man of stone’” (53). Jekyll says he deals with Hyde’s acts by dissociating himself from his doppelgänger and by making amends where possible (53). This approach is no longer possible as Jekyll loses control of his transformations and becomes trapped in Hyde’s body: “…I was slowly losing control of my better self, and slowly incorporated with my second self” (55). Moreover, the two are never really separate entities, as indicated by Jekyll’s consistent use of the first-person in his statement. He and Hyde share a body and a consciousness that are simply reshaped into two identities.
Epideictic: “The Dark Influence of Hyde”

While the rhetorical concerns of ethos and imitative reading factor prominently in *Jekyll and Hyde*, the most intriguing is epideictic. The locus of the epideictic is the monster, Hyde, whose grotesque body causes a reaction deeper than fear in other characters. He also brings about their transformation, soul and body. Other details that point toward Hyde as epideictic are the sub-rational space he occupies in characters’ consciousness and his link to human origins in prehistory. As an ape-man, an evolutionary throwback, Hyde was a powerful symbol within Victorian culture as it struggled to understand human origins and their implications for social order.

As in *Moreau*, there is no ceremonial oration in *Jekyll and Hyde* that can be easily identified as epideictic. A “funeral oration” is mentioned, but the term is used in a figurative sense to describe the barking of newsboys as they try to sell papers bearing headlines of Carew’s bludgeoning death (27). Locating the epideictic in *Jekyll and Hyde* requires readers to look first for its effects and then trace them back to their source. And the source in the novella clearly is Edward Hyde. One of the early indications of Hyde as epideictic is his appearance in Utterson’s subconscious. Utterson begins to dream about Hyde before he ever meets him, having been told about Hyde by Enfield. Utterson is anxious over Hyde’s association with Jekyll, but also over descriptions of Hyde’s unsettling appearance and his amoral conduct in trampling a small child which Enfield witnessed. “… it was hellish to see,” Enfield says (9). The report affects Utterson deeply, transforming him into a hunter who intrepidly stalks Hyde through London’s nocturnal streets. “If he could but once set eyes on him, he thought the mystery would
lighten and perhaps roll altogether away, as was the habit of mysterious things when well examined,” the narrator states (15). At this point, Hyde has invaded Utterson’s unconscious. Enfield’s words become “a scroll of lighted pictures” in Utterson’s dreams, where he see Hyde run over the child, stand menacingly by the bed of the sleeping Jekyll, and then “glide” through the city’s “sleeping houses” to “crush” other children (14-15). Prendick expresses a similar irrationality in *Moreau* when he says that glancing into the eyes of one of the Beast People “struck down all of my adult thoughts and feelings, and for a moment the forgotten horrors of childhood came back to my mind” (186).

Like epideictic, Hyde is difficult to define. Characters struggle to describe his appearance. Words also fail them when they try to relate the feelings that Hyde inspires in them. Although Utterson prowls the streets of London after dark, there is no mention of fear in him until he finally meets Hyde. Hyde had already been described for Utterson as a deformed man who inspires fear and loathing in the people he meets. In one account, Hyde causes a doctor to “‘turn sick and white with the desire to kill him’” (9). Hyde has a “‘black, sneering coolness … really like Satan.’” He is a “‘damnable man’” (10).

However, witnesses have a difficult time explaining Hyde’s exact deformity and what seems so disturbing about him. Enfield says:

> He is not easy to describe. There is something wrong with his appearance; something displeasing, something downright detestable. I never saw a man I so disliked, and yet I scarce know why. He must be deformed somewhere; he gives the strong feeling of deformity, although I couldn’t specify the point. He is an extraordinary looking man. (11-2)
When Utterson finally meets Hyde, he startles him, and Hyde hisses at him like an animal. The narrator describes Hyde as “pale and dwarfish,” giving “an impression of deformity without any nameable malformation.” After parting with Hyde, Utterson says to himself, “‘God bless me, the man seems hardly human! Something troglodytic, shall we say? … or is it the mere radiance of a foul soul that thus transpires through, and transfigures its clay continent?’” Continuing, Utterson exclaims in an apostrophe to Jekyll, “…if I ever read Satan’s signature upon a face, it is on that of your friend’” (17). In his narrative, Lanyon describes Hyde as small, “‘with something abnormal and misbegotten in the very essence of the creature … something seizing, surprising, and revolting …’” (45). Poole, Jekyll’s servant, says that glancing at Hyde’s face makes the hair stand up on his head (36), and when he sees Hyde leaping in the laboratory, “‘it went down my spine like ice’” (37). Jekyll, in his final statement, attributes Hyde’s small stature to the idea that his evil side was less developed, having been held in check for years by “‘effort, virtue and control’” (51). He is also younger than Jekyll, and he has evil “‘written broadly and plainly on’” his “‘face.’” His body is marked by “‘deformity and decay’” (51).

Exactly why Hyde inspires such disgust is left open to speculation. Jekyll suggests one possibility when he says that Hyde is the only being who is “‘pure evil’” (51). The possibility that Hyde is a supernatural entity summoned by Jekyll is suggested by his confession that his “‘scientific studies’” tended more “‘towards the mystic and the transcendental’” (48). Yet another interpretation is that as a hybrid commingling human and ape characteristics, he is abhuman. Kelly Hurley writes that the abhuman is a
commonplace in *fin-de-siècle* Gothic fiction. She defines it as “a not-quite-human subject, characterized by its morphic variability, continually in danger of not-itself, becoming other” (3-4). Mikhail Bakhtin also recognizes this grotesque potential: “…man receives the birth seeds of every form of life. He may choose the seed that will develop and bear fruit. He grows and forms it in himself. Man can become a plant or an animal, but he can also become an angel and a son of God” (364). Hurley writes that contact with the abhuman undermines human sense of self, leading to “anxiety often nauseating in its intensity” (4). Hyde most certainly qualifies as abhuman. Thinking of Hyde’s face, Utterson experiences “a nausea and distaste of life” (18). Part of the horror of the novella is Jekyll’s awareness that he is transitioning fully into Hyde and can do nothing about it except end his life. Hyde, however, carries far greater meaning than many other abhumans in late-Victorian Gothic fiction in that he is a symbol of human evolution. Like Lanyon’s description of Hyde as a “‘creature,’” Utterson’s observation that Hyde resembles a caveman, a human ancestor, and Hyde’s later clubbing of Carew with a “heavy cane” (21) are all significant. The inexpressible deformity that Hyde exudes and the disgust he inspires can be traced to the idea that he is a human-ape hybrid. He is man, devolved both physically and morally. Contrary to the comparisons to Satan, Hyde is no angel, not even a fallen one, for he was not created by God. Like man in the Darwinian universe, Hyde is the product of natural selection. He is “savage” intermediary with the potential to become fully human. In a nod to Victorian sensibilities, Stevenson does not disclose the atrocities Hyde commits during his nocturnal ramblings, but there is little doubt that he is immoral and animalistic. As a fugitive, Hyde is exposed: “Much of his
past was unearthed, indeed, and all disreputable: tales came out of the man’s cruelty, at once so callous and violent, of his vile life, of his strange associates, of the hatred that seemed to have surrounded his career” (28). It is not until Carew’s murder that Hyde is described as inhuman. Unprovoked, he attacks the defenseless Carew with “ape-like fury” (22). Poole, Jekyll’s butler, tells Utterson that Hyde is a “masked thing like a monkey” (37). In his statement, Jekyll describes Hyde’s ape-like hands: They are “lean, corded, knuckly, of a dusky pallor and thickly shaded with a swarth growth of hair” (54). Again, Jekyll says that Hyde’s hands are “corded and hairy” (58). Considering Hyde’s unnatural birth, it is significant that he destroys a picture of Jekyll’s father and, symbolically, Jekyll’s parentage. He accuses Hyde of other “ape-like tricks,” such as defacing his books and burning his letters (61). Jekyll describes Hyde as the “animal within me licking the chops of memory” (58). He also imagines the “inorganic” Hyde’s spontaneous generation from the “slime of the pit” to become “dust” that “gesticulated and sinned” (60).

Foregrounding Hyde’s simian aspects is crucial to understanding his epideictic and, indeed, his full rhetorical dimensions. These details about his appearance and behavior link him to the powerful Victorian symbol of the ape-man and the divisive debate it represented over man’s origins, the relationship of science and religion, and the body and spirit. As Victorian ape-man, Hyde is the progenitor of Wells’ Ape-Man, with whom Prendick feels an early connection. “I did not feel the same repugnance towards this creature that I had experienced in my encounters with the other Beast Men,” Prendick says (210). The Ape Man points out that they share basically the same hands: they both
have five fingers, whereas many of the other Beast People have “malformed hands” (210). Both Stevenson and Wells were influenced by the debate over evolution, and each man had his own special connection to it. A student in one of Huxley’s training schools for teachers before flunking out, Wells prided himself on his knowledge of science. He was stung by biologist Peter Chalmers Mitchell’s criticism in the pages of *Saturday Review* that the science of *Moreau* was unsound (Bergonzi 25). Wells, who had studied science for a year under Huxley, replied to Mitchell many months later by writing a letter to the *Saturday Review* in which he cited a recent article in *The British Medical Journal* reporting on the successful grafting of nerve tissue from a rabbit to a man. Clearly, Wells took Mitchell’s review seriously, and the fact that Mitchell’s opinion was repeated in other publications made it even worse. He writes that Mitchell’s opinion “was to my discredit” and an “implication of headlong ignorance.” Wells questions the authority on which Mitchell based his opinion, stating “that he was making the rash assertion and not I.” He goes on to state that he was “unable to replace the stigma of ignorance” that Mitchell had given him until he found the evidence he needed, the published report in *The British Medical Journal* (Letter, 5 Nov. 1896).

Like Wells, Stevenson had more than a gentleman’s interest in science. In her 2006 book *Robert Louis Stevenson, Science, and the Fin de Siècle*, Julia Reid writes that few scholars have fully recognized Stevenson’s scientific credentials nor the extent of his engagement with science, particularly in the 1880s when he wrote *Jekyll and Hyde*. Reid points out that Stevenson studied engineering at Edinburgh University, where his interests included the construction of lighthouses (4). In 1871, however, Stevenson gave
up engineering, partly due to his interest in evolutionary science and ethics. Years later, he would describe his 1887 essay “Pulvis et Umbra” as a “Darwinian Sermon” (4). Reid writes that Stevenson had “lost his faith as a young man following his exposure to Herbert Spencer’s scientific naturalism” (4). Spencer, a philosopher, also developed a theory of evolution and used the expression “survival of the fittest” in 1852, years before Darwin (Altick 232). Stevenson’s interest grew in the 1880s, when he traveled in the South Pacific and frustrated his wife with his Darwin-inspired efforts to write scientifically about the natives and languages of the South Sea islanders (Reid 1-2).

Fanny Stevenson felt her husband’s time would have been better spent writing adventure stories. Reid writes that Fanny Stevenson had more confidence in her husband’s literary genius and ridiculed his interest in science (2). Reid points out that Stevenson resisted the efforts of Huxley on the one hand and Matthew Arnold on the other to separate science and humanism (2). According to Reid, Stevenson is representative of the idea popularized by Thomas Kuhn in his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions “that science is a product of culture rather than simply a transcription of nature …” (3). Reid writes that the nineteenth century is a particularly valuable period for the study of the discourse between science and literature (3). And, she argues, “Stevenson and the evolutionary scientists were engaged in a creative dialogue—one marked by dissonance as well as consonance” (6).

As part of that dialogue, the Victorian ape-man trope achieved perhaps his highest profile in the great Oxford evolution debate. One point that must be made about this key moment in dialectic between science and religion was that it was not actually a “debate”:
it was a discussion period following a presentation at the thirtieth annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science at Oxford University in June 1860. And the discussion period became an occasion for rhetorical performances by the men remembered as the primary antagonists: Samuel Wilberforce, the eloquent bishop of Oxford, and Huxley, Darwin’s “bulldog” and chief apologist. The enduring narrative of that debate has revolved around these two legendary orators dueling over the theory of evolution before a packed audience of about seven hundred. At some point in the debate, Wilberforce supposedly asked Huxley whether he was descended from apes on his mother or father’s side, implying that Huxley was part ape. By popular but perhaps apocryphal account, Huxley later stood to deliver his famous retort, that he would rather be descended from apes than from a man who used his god-given talents in the service of ignorance.

One problem with this scene is that it probably did not happen quite that way. In the wake of a 1978 BBC series about Darwin that cast Wilberforce as the villain in a Victorian melodrama, several historians revisited the Oxford debate and came to similar conclusions: the story of the debate that has been handed down through the generations has been embellished to some degree, making Huxley seem the triumphant hero. In attempting to analyze the Oxford debate, one faces the challenge of scrutinizing a dialogue for which no transcript exists. No one knew that a debate would take place, and no one had the foresight to make an official recording of what was said at the meeting. Researchers must instead collect scattered, incomplete, and biased accounts to assemble
what seem to be plausible narratives, and then analyze those narratives with the qualification that they are most likely inaccurate.

It is uncertain if Wilberforce and Huxley said exactly what has been attributed to them. One of the earliest sources for the popular legend of the debate declaring Huxley’s victory is a *Macmillan’s Magazine* article from 1898, thirty-eight years after the encounter (Lucas 313). Journalists were present at the debate, but their accounts are inconsistent. There was a single mention in *The Press* of Wilberforce’s “monkey” comments (166). As for Huxley, *The Press* simply reported that he took Wilberforce to task for making an inappropriate joke (168). Also missing from the accounts of two of the journalists who covered the proceedings for *The Athenaeum* and *Jackson’s Oxford Journal* is Huxley’s withering response to Wilberforce (315).

If Wilberforce made some remark during the Oxford debate about the human-ape lineage, and it seems likely that he did, he would have been invoking a common but powerful tropological argument in the nineteenth-century debate surrounding evolution. Ian Hesketh writes, “Connecting Darwin’s theory of evolution with the image of simian ancestry was a widespread strategy among anti-Darwinians because it challenged the respectability of evolution itself” (96). As common as the trope was, it was still considered vulgar and out of place in a genteel setting like the Oxford meeting. If Wilberforce crossed the line of gentility and used the trope in connection with Huxley’s grandmother, it would help explain the tumult that some observers described in the audience that day. According to a number of observers, a lady fainted in the audience during the famous exchange between Wilberforce and Huxley. Lucas refers to
Wilberforce’s fallacy as an “ad feminam” (329). Hesketh cites Frederic William Farrar, Bishop of Durham, who recalled that while he believed the scientific issue at the heart of the debate had been a draw, Huxley scored a victory of “‘good manners.’” Wilberforce, Farrar said, “‘had forgotten to behave like a gentleman’” (qtd. in 84). Writing to Huxley’s son and biographer, Leonard Huxley, Farrar said, “‘You must remember that the whole audience was made up of gentlefolk, who were not prepared to endorse anything vulgar’” (qtd. in 96). By questioning if Huxley was descended from apes through his grandmother, Wilberforce was suggesting that Huxley’s grandmother had sex with an ape. Speaking to the general use of the ape-man trope in Victorian discourse, Hesketh writes that they may have been humorous, but they were considered “vulgar.” Not only did it appear to “debase humanity itself,” but it also implied that such a creature was not produced via evolution but via sexual relations between humans and apes” (96). Hesketh cites a “sexualized cartoon” in an 1873 issue of Punch. In the cartoon, two gentlemen are discussing evolution when one cracks a joke about the other’s great-grandmother having sex with an ape. In her article “Darwin in Caricature: A Study in the Popular Dissemination of Evolution,” Janet Browne also explores how “Darwin’s work became part of the richly varied world of nineteenth-century popular culture” (497). Namely, she studies cartoons depicting Darwin as an ape and reflecting the general influence of his work.\(^6\) Significantly, one of these cartoons appeared the month before the Oxford debate. A May 1860 issue of Punch featured a drawing of a gorilla and the caption “Am I a Man

\(^6\) See figure 2.
and a Brother?” (Browne, “Darwin in Caricature” 500). Aside from its inspiration in *On the Origin of Species*, the cartoon would have been a gibe at Darwin on another level: He was an ardent abolitionist, and the same question appeared on a famous medallion that Darwin’s uncle, Josiah Wedgwood, created in the 1830s with a depiction of an importuning African slave with raised hands. In a cartoon from 1861 that seems even more of a precedent for Hyde, a gorilla in a tuxedo presents himself for entry into a dinner party. The servant who greets him is so horrified that his hair stands up on his head. The servant announces the newly-arrived guest as, “Mr. G-G-G-O-O-O-RILLA!” Commenting on these cartoons, Browne writes that they drew “on age-old themes of metamorphosis and the beast that invariably resides in mankind” and “created a genuinely alternative way of commenting on the implications of Darwin’s theory” (501). The same could be said of *Jekyll and Hyde* and *Moreau*.

It is interesting to read both *Moreau* and *Jekyll and Hyde* alongside the popular account of the Oxford meeting and speculate that the same cultural forces were at work in shaping all three narratives. In this analysis, the Oxford “debate” is a literary production that can be analyzed as a work of historical fiction with elements of a *fin-de-siècle* horror story. It incorporates rhetorical themes, including a shocking animal-human hybrid whose very existence questions human origins; it aggravates the antagonism between science and religion; and it strains the relationship of body and spirit. Among the scattered accounts of the meeting, one can even find evidence of disarticulation. Supposedly, as

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7 See figure 3.
Wilberforce was about to yield the floor, he said he expected that Huxley would soon rise and “tear” him “to pieces” (Jensen 176). The presence of these elements in a semi-apocryphal narrative of the Oxford meeting lends support to Vincent Bevilacqua’s proposal that “historically there has been a wider and more pervasive reliance on the verbal and conceptual idiom of rhetoric” in the arts, including literature (343). The locus of the epideictic in the Oxford narrative is the figure of the ape-man, which registered at a deeper level with audiences than the rational for-and-against arguments that were made that day not just by Wilberforce and Huxley but by other speakers as well. The semi-mythical version of the meeting as a debate between Wilberforce and Huxley has persisted, resisting the efforts of historians to introduce factual complexity into the narrative. If students are introduced to the Oxford story at all, they are most likely presented with the semi-apocryphal version and then, perhaps, the historical. Therefore, an awareness develops that what is being displayed in the popular narrative is not entirely accurate. This sets up the twin strands of discourse and metadiscourse described by Richard Lockwood as characterizing the epideictic. At the center of this relationship is the reader—not an “objective historical reader” but a reader constructed by the reflexive epideictic text. The “epideictic … pays much attention to reflecting on its own speaking,” Lockwood writes (25). The reader’s role is not to choose between the two discourses, but to be altered by them. “It is because being offered that choice transforms the reader,” Lockwood writes. The “reader’s position must be seen as itself dynamic, unstable, transformed, and transforming by the utterance, and not simply by mutation into two separate stable poles” (27). In this reading, the apocryphal Oxford debate is tolerated
because it meets some emotional and rhetorical need of the audience. As an example, Lockwood cites the “tremendous investment adults have in developing and preserving the idyllic illusion” of Santa Claus. It is obvious that the “illusion exists not for the children alone, but for” the parents “as well” (28). The apocryphal Oxford debate emerged because it eliminated the gray areas in a complex dialectic. It spares students from the inconvenient facts of churchmen like Wilberforce, an amateur ornithologist who challenged Darwinism on its own terms (Lucas 317), practicing science; and Huxley and his followers waging class warfare against elitist universities that they believed had excluded them due to their social origins (Jensen 175). The “history” of the debate did not begin to take shape for a generation or two after it ended. One of the first times it appeared was in a Macmillan’s Magazine article from 1898, thirty-eight years after the encounter (Lucas 313). By that time, however, Huxley and his allies had prevailed in the larger cultural war ignited by Darwin’s theories. The epideictic of the semi-apocryphal narrative they promoted celebrated their triumph.

This study does not seek to overturn theories that present science’s displacement of religion as the root cause of literary monstrosities in nineteenth-century horror fiction, as some critics argue. Instead, the focus is on the use of common rhetorical patterns to fashion literary monstrosities and how those monstrosities are linked to greater cultural concerns about the objectification of the body as symbol, resource, and medium. This chapter has aimed to advance readers understanding of these claims in a number of ways. Although Jekyll and Hyde was published first, I have examined Moreau first in the hopes that the books’ shared themes could be studied in greater relief in the earlier, more
obscure text. The central rhetorical performance in Moreau is Moreau’s declamation to Prendick explaining and defending his animal vivisection project. Less clear is the presence of epideictic, which emanates from Moreau’s monstrous Beast People and transforms Prendick. He regresses to man at an earlier stage of evolution. Disarticulation occurs in the novel with the death of Moreau, who is killed by one of his monstrosities, partially dismembered, and silenced. Although Jekyll and Hyde seems fragmented compared to Moreau, it incorporates many of the same rhetorical elements. First, Jekyll and Hyde focuses on a male professional class whose members are formed and promoted by rhetorical education and performance. They owe their existence and status to rhetoric. Their foremost concern is for ethos, or reputation. Second, the text depicts a rhetorical struggle taking place in the field of science between Jekyll and Lanyon, which mirrors the struggle taking place between old and new science in the late Victorian period. Third, epideictic also plays a significant role in Jekyll and Hyde, and it centers on the monstrous, hybridized body of Edward Hyde. The character most deeply affected by Hyde’s epideictic is Utterson, who is primitivized into a nocturnal hunter bent on defending his medico-juridico-scientific clan by tracking and exposing Hyde. Disarticulation occurs in the novel with the dissolution of Utterson’s character and the loss of his voice in the shift from third-person to first-person narration. This leads to novella’s main rhetorical performance: Jekyll’s posthumous confession, which must be brought to life through the declamatory exercise of performative reading. In this way, Jekyll’s transgressing body is reconstituted after its ruin. The overarching concern of both books is dissection and vivisection, activities which sought to enlarge medical science but
whose coercive methods inspired horror and controversy throughout the nineteenth-century. While vivisection is clearly part of the premise of Moreau, it must be inferred in Jekyll and Hyde. It occurs when Jekyll vivisects himself not with a blade, but with chemicals. The animal-human boundary is depicted in both books, but it is largely erased through Darwinian gradatio and the figure of the ape-man, a familiar trope which reduced the complexities of evolutionary theory ad absurdum. Although Stevenson and Wells were not scientists, they both had backgrounds and avid interests in science. Ultimately, their achievements in Jekyll and Hyde and Moreau were as popularizers of science who linked debates about humanity’s origins and divided nature to cultural concerns about dissection and vivisection through rhetorical patterns common to other works of horror fiction in the late nineteenth century.
Figure 2. 1871 Editorial Cartoon Showing Darwin as Ape (“File: Editorial Cartoon Depicting”).
Figure 3. “Mr. Gorilla” Goes to a Party in 1861 Cartoon (“The Lion”).
CHAPTER VI

THE AESTHETICIZATION OF THE CORPSE IN DORIAN GRAY

Oscar Wilde wrote his last book from beyond the grave. As absurd as this statement seems, it was the subject of serious debate in 1924 in the pages of Occult Review journal between Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who argued for the legitimacy of a spiritualist’s claim to have used “automatic writing” to channel Wilde’s ghost into the book Oscar Wilde from Purgatory: Psychic Messages, and C.W. Soal, who argued that the book was a hoax (Gomel, “Oscar Wilde” 74). Soal was almost certainly correct; but Doyle’s willingness to believe that Wilde continued writing after his death in 1900 is perhaps understandable considering the nature of the monstrosity constructed in his novel The Picture of Dorian Gray: the living corpse.

While Dorian Gray may seem intrinsically different than the other works examined in this study, it traffics in the same themes. Indeed, Wilde’s novel may contain the finest expression of disarticulation in late-Victorian horror fiction, based on its concern with the manipulative nature of rhetoric and the destruction of the body. One could even argue that, in Dorian, Wilde handed his fellow Irishman, longtime friend, and rival Bram Stoker a virtual blueprint for the character of Dracula as living corpse. Like Dracula, both Dorian Gray and “The Canterville Ghost” have clear rhetorical and bodily concerns, and, along with Wilde’s drama Salome, they reflect long-practiced legal
traditions related to disciplining, dismembering and vivisecting transgressing bodies. But the significance of Wilde’s work—what sets it apart from the other literature examined in this study—is its depiction of the aestheticization of corrupt bodies. Like the other monstrosities considered in this study, Dorian is a hybrid clearly fashioned by rhetoric—not a hybrid of human and animal but a hybrid of human and art. He is a Paterian monstrosity: undead and immoral, with no purpose other than pleasure. Although, as monster, Dorian is also involved in an epideictic performance that transforms other characters; however, the primary rhetorician in the novel is Sir Henry Wotton. The rhetoric of both characters is quite clearly Platonic, with Henry’s metaphorized as vivisection and Dorian’s involving an actual blade. The cutting of the body is a fundamental image in The Picture of Dorian Gray as well as Salome and “The Canterville Ghost.” The main interest here, though, is the aestheticization of the body in Wilde’s writing—a pattern also detectable in Salome and “The Canterville Ghost.” An aestheticized body is one that is used as a model for art or one that is used as a medium of art. As an intervention in nature, aestheticization attempts to resurface and conceal the grotesque body and its corruption. This aestheticization links Wilde’s narratives to larger cultural concerns about the uses of the human body for artistic and funerary purposes.

This study has drawn heavily on Plato’s Menexenus in establishing rhetoric as one of the points in a triangulation that also includes monstrosity and dismemberment. These three elements effect disarticulation, or the destruction of the human form and the faculties of speech and reason invested in it. Wilde seems even more indebted to Plato and his negative attitude toward rhetoric in Dorian Gray than the other writers included
in this study. The relationship between conduct and the soul is one of the novel’s themes.
Although it is possible to read Wilde’s frequent references to the soul as generic, the
novel’s Hellenism and the author’s classical education point to Plato’s *Gorgias*, with its
scrutiny of rhetoric and its interest in justice and the welfare of the soul.

Wilde was deeply engaged with the classics. In 1878, he graduated from
Magdalene College, Oxford, with a double first in classical moderations and *literae
humaniores*, also known as the “Greats” or the classics (Edwards). The honors tests
required not only a rote knowledge of ancient texts such as Plato, Aristotle, and
Heraclitus, but also the ability to apply them speculatively (Shuter 259). At Oxford,
Wilde was inspired by two great classicists, Walter Pater and John Ruskin:

> Pater and Ruskin shaped Wilde’s thought and its expression: they did not
originiate it. Initially he brought their ideas and his glosses into the market place in
lectures on aesthetics in the UK and the USA. Thereafter he embedded them,
begirt in his own wit and charm, in fictions such as *The Happy Prince and Other Tales*
and *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. To Wilde ideas had to assert themselves
dramatically.... (Edwards)

Shuter points out that Wilde also projected the Greats into his critical prose, most notably
“The Critic as Artist” and “The Decay of Lying.” Wilde directly addresses dialogue as
“that wonderful literary form” and says that “creative critics … have always employed”
it, including Plato. Shuter explains that dialogues allow writers to both “‘reveal and
conceal’” themselves and examine issues from many points of view. “‘Dialogues always
fascinate me,’” Wilde writes (qtd. in Shuter 263).
Study of Plato’s dialogues was “central to the Greats school” at Oxford (Shuter 263). The influence of the dialogues on Wilde’s writing was noted by Pater in his review of *Dorian Gray* in 1891 (264). Perhaps the most significant of Plato’s dialogues in an examination of the novel is *Gorgias*, which suggests a relationship between rhetoric and the preservation of the soul. One of Plato’s targets in *Gorgias* is Sophists. According to Bizzell and Herzburg: “Plato viewed the Sophists as moral relativists who … had no reason not to be manipulative, deceitful, or downright corruptive in their use of discourse” (81). In the dialogue, Socrates interrogates Gorgias, a celebrated rhetorician, and two of his admirers, Polus and Callicles. They agree that rhetoric and dialectic are different: one is display, and the other discussion. Through his questioning, Socrates also establishes that rhetoric, unlike other disciplines, has no subject of its own, and that it achieves its ends through speech, which is “ambiguous” (90). When Gorgias explains that his definition of rhetoric includes the ability of speech to persuade judges, statesmen, legislators, and general audiences, Socrates says, “I think now…you have come very near to showing us the art of rhetoric” as “a producer of persuasion,” which is “its whole business and main consummation” (90). Gorgias acknowledges that the power of rhetoric can be abused, and later in the dialogue Socrates asserts that rhetoric may have nothing to do with truth:

…there is no need to know the truth of actual matters, but one merely needs to be discovered some device or persuasion … he does not know what is really good or bad, noble or base, just or unjust, but he has devised a persuasion to deal with these matters so as to appear to those who know who, like himself, do not know better than he who know. (95)
Socrates argues that rhetoric could be used for unjust ends, and that it can be reduced to “producing … gratification,” placing it in the same branch of “art” as “cookery” (97). He goes on to argue that rhetoric is not really an art, but a “habitude” or “knack” of “clever dealing with mankind” (97) in the pursuit of power. In this way, “orators” can become indistinguishable from “despots” (100). Polus finds Socrates’ ideas “shocking, nay, monstrous…” (99).

In *Dorian Gray*, Henry epitomizes Plato’s low opinion of the Sophists and the danger of their rhetoric. And at least some of his words are supplied by the principal figure in the Aesthetic movement, which held that art had no purpose other than producing pleasure. Examining the link between aestheticism and horror, John Paul Riquelme acknowledges Wilde’s use of Pater’s words in Henry’s dialogue—a feature that Pater notes and objects to in his otherwise positive review of *Dorian Gray* (611). However, Riquelme writes that Pater’s review is misleading, as a muted debate was taking place between the two men through their writings. He writes that by the time Wilde wrote *Dorian Gray* he had shifted from an “enthusiastic, admiring response to Pater’s writing and to aestheticism at Oxford toward his later, more critical stance…” (612). Dorian, therefore, can be seen as the monstrous fulfillment of the Aesthetic creed: he exists for no other purpose but to give pleasure. Pater, however, sees Dorian as a “‘beautiful creation’” but a “‘quite unsuccessful experiment … in life as a fine art’” (qtd. in Riquelme 613). Riquelme says that “Pater could not have missed the novel’s challenge to his own attitudes” but that he chose not to consider the meaning of Wilde’s story in
relation to his art criticism: “Pater does not want to admit the bearing that Wilde’s Gothic rendering has on his own ideals” (612).

When Henry says that all influence is “immoral” because “to influence a person is to give him one’s soul” (21), Wilde establishes one of the book’s most significant themes: the transformative power of rhetoric. Indeed, the entire novel seems a cautionary tale about the dangers of manipulation and its risks to the soul. Henry fits a profile previously established in this study. Like Frankenstein, Dracula, Jekyll, and Moreau, he is the rhetorical monster that engenders monstrosity. Riquelme writes, “As a detached experimenter with human lives, Wotton ... produces an ugly, destructive double of himself” (616). And monstrosity in fin-de-siècle horror fiction seduces and transforms its audience through epideictic. Henry’s seduction of Dorian begins during their first meeting. He sets out intentionally to corrupt Dorian, despite Basil’s admonitions. Central to Henry’s rhetoric is the body. As an orator, Henry is physically attractive to Dorian. “He could not help liking the tall, graceful young man…,” the narrator says, penetrating Dorian’s thoughts. “His romantic olive-colored face and worn expression interested him. There was something in his low, languid voice that was absolutely fascinating” (24). His voice is “musical” (22), which enhances its appeal to Dorian, a pianist. However, it is Henry’s words that enthrall him: “Words! Mere words! How terrible they were! How clear and vivid, and cruel! One could not escape them. And yet what a subtle magic there was in them!” (23). Through his words, Henry flatters Dorian, remarking on his “‘red-rose youth and…rose-white boyhood’” (22). He says, “‘Yes, Mr. Gray, the gods have been good to you’” (25). But what causes Dorian to wish away his soul is Henry’s
warning that his youth and beauty are passing: “‘What the gods give they quickly take away. You have only a few years to live really, perfectly, and fully’” (25). Henry continues:

When your youth goes, your beauty will go with it, and then you will suddenly discover that there are no triumphs left for you … Every month as it wanes it brings you nearer to something dreadful. Time is jealous of you, and wars against your lilies and roses … Youth! Youth! There is absolutely nothing in the word but youth! (25-26)

Dorian cannot resist Henry’s epideictic. He listens “open-eyed and wondering” (26) and is transformed. Gazing at his competed portrait, Dorian says, “‘How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this picture will remain always young … If it were only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young, and the picture was to grow old! … I would give my soul for that!’” (29). A distraught Dorian threatens to kill himself if he grows old, and he says that he resents all things that do not age. Dorian’s wish marks the moment in the novel when he becomes a living corpse. Later in the novel, Dorian will remind Basil of the wish he made before the portrait. It is one of the last things Dorian says to Basil before he kills him. “Long before the book’s final chapter, Dorian has become undead, still living but not alive as a human being,” Riquelme writes (627). In the studio, Basil’s reaction to Dorian’s distress marks the change that Henry’s rhetoric has effected on the young man: “‘This is your doing, Harry,’ said the painter, bitterly” (30). It is a role that Basil will play again, when he criticizes Dorian’s callousness after Sybil Vane’s suicide, and when he confronts directly Dorian about his scandalous behavior.
That Henry sets out to seduce Dorian to his hedonistic philosophy is made plain in the text. Like an accomplished orator, Henry knows when to be quiet and let his words do their work: “With his subtle smile, Lord Henry watched him. He knew the precise psychological moment when to say nothing. He felt intensely interested. He was amazed at the sudden impression that his words had produced …” (23). Later, Henry thinks to himself that he will “dominate” Dorian, “had, already indeed half done so. He would make that wonderful spirit his own” (40). As he converses at a luncheon before an “audience,” Henry becomes aware that Dorian is watching him: “He felt that the eyes of Dorian Gray were fixed on him ...” (44). In his mind, Henry reflects on his performance: “He was brilliant fantastic, irresponsible. He charmed his listeners out of themselves, and they followed his pipe laughing” (44). His epideictic is irresistible to most listeners, including Dorian, who does not want it to end. As they leave lunch to go to the park together, Dorian says, “And you will promise to talk to me all the time? No one talks so wonderfully as you do” (46).

A disturbing aspect of Henry’s rhetoric—and the one that makes it not only declamatory but also sophistic in character—is that he cares little for the consequences of his words, beyond the immediate gratification they give him and his audiences. Repeating aphorisms, he exudes moral relativism and ambivalence. “I never approve or disapprove of anything,” Henry says (76). Accused of being insincere, he does not deny it. Responding to Henry’s cynical comments on his marriage, Basil says he believes Henry is actually a good husband but is just embarrassed for people to know the truth. “You never say a moral thing, and you never do a wrong thing,” Basil says. “Your cynicism
is simply a pose.” Henry does not dispute this. He only says, “Being natural is a pose, and the most irritating pose I know” (8). When Henry says that he hopes Dorian will love and leave Sybil Vane, Basil says, “You don’t mean a single word of all that, Harry. You know you don’t. If Dorian Gray’s life were spoiled, no one would be sorrier than yourself” (76). Even Dorian says Henry talks “nonsense” (81). The novel, therefore, equivocates the meaning of posing with both bodily posing and rhetorical posing. Bodily posing involves sitting for a portrait. In this sense—and in the context a discussion related to the concept of the living corpse—it also evokes the cultural oddity of Victorian corpse photography. These pictures sought to create the allusion that the recently deceased were still alive—often by posing them in lifelike positions and sometimes with living family members. This custom has been sensationalized in many online articles. “In this dark era, people didn’t call for the coroner after a loved one died,” one article exaggerates. “They called for the photographer first” (“People in the 1800s”). On the other hand, rhetorical posing involves assuming a stance that may or may not be hypothetical. In Wilde’s novel, Dorian poses like a model, and Henry poses like a declamer.

Henry is involved in declamation in that he orates from an assumed posture. From a Socratic standpoint, however, the most insidious aspect of Henry’s rhetoric is not necessarily his insincerity but his dissuasion of Dorian from seeking the justice that Plato believes is necessary for the purification of the soul. The link between agency and soul is one that Henry deeply considers:
Soul and body, body and soul—how mysterious they were! There was animalism in the soul, and the body had its moments of spirituality. The senses could refine, the intellect could degrade. Who could say where the fleshly impulse ceased, or the physical impulse began? How shallow were the arbitrary definitions of ordinary psychologists! (61)

The meditation reads like an apology for Henry’s sensualist philosophy, which he espouses to anyone who will listen. During his first meeting with Dorian, he theorizes that man may return to the “‘Hellenic ideal’” of “‘something finer, richer, that the Hellenic ideal’” by setting aside “self-denial” and living an unrestrained life (22). His notion that “‘sin’” as an “‘action is a mode of purification’” (22) is a distortion of Socrates’ idea that justice purifies the soul. Henry’s concern is the body, not the soul: “‘The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible,’” he says (25). He later remarks, “‘To get back one’s youth, one merely has to repeat one’s follies’” (43). Dorian adopts Henry’s sensualist philosophy, but questions it after he has killed Basil: “To cure the soul by means of the senses, and the senses by means of the soul.’ How the words rang in his ears. His soul, certainly, was sick to death. Was it true that the senses could cure it? Innocent blood had been split” (182).

In Gorgias, Socrates asserts that rhetoric can mislead audiences and subvert justice. This interest in justice runs throughout much of the dialogue and stems from its concern about the potential abuse of rhetoric in the courtroom. It is particularly relevant to Dorian Gray, for Socrates advances the idea that rhetoric is “base” and that it uses “flattery” to make the worst of two alternatives appear the better. This “sort of thing is a disgrace … because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best…,” Socrates says (98).
He uses bodily analogies to make this point. The best known is “cookery” passing for “medicine” because “boys … or men and foolish as boys” can be easily persuaded that foods that taste good are better for the body than “sound and noxious foods” (98). The other analogy, and the one most relevant to Dorian Gray, is that “self-adornment” can pass for “gymnastic.” In other words, the body can be made to appear fit even though it is not. Socrates says:

self-adornment personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colors, polish and dress, so as to make them, in the effort of assuming extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic. (98).

Dorian, with his unnaturally preserved body and handsome appearance, emblematizes Socrates’ argument. He is not what he seems. Flattery makes him attractive but not virtuous. He looks good, but he is not good. More importantly, however, Dorian’s portrayal is informed by Socrates’ argument in Gorgias that justice cures a wrongdoer’s soul. In this view, a person is better off to be caught for or to confess to committing a crime and pay a penalty than to escape justice and persist with a guilty, “sick” soul. Socrates says, “… the justice of the court reforms us and makes us juster, and acts as medicine for wickedness” (107). Later, he says, “… to do wrong and not pay the penalty … takes the first place among all evils” (108). Again, Socrates says, “… pleading in defense of injustice … rhetoric is no use to us at all….“ He continues by asserting that “instead of concealing an iniquity” a man ought to “bring it to light in order that he may pay the penalty and be made healthy” (108-9). Polus is dubious: “What a strange
doctrine, Socrates, you are trying to maintain!” (103). It is a “strange doctrine,” but it is one readers see dramatized in *Dorian Gray* as Dorian destroys others’ lives and agonizes over the condition of his soul, which is reflected in his cursed portrait.

This care for the soul is exhibited the day after Dorian berates his fiancée Sybil for her poor acting performance and breaks off their engagement. It is a point in the text at which Dorian has begun a debauched lifestyle but still retains a measure of innocence. He feels regret for his treatment of Sybil and writes a letter of apology, unaware that she has killed herself. It is his first effort at reformation, and he hopes this portrait will be his guide. “‘I want to be good,’” he tells Henry. “‘I can’t bear the idea of my soul being hideous’” (97). Dorian intends to follow through with his engagement to Sybil, and he tries to preempt the cynical objections of Henry’s rhetoric. “‘Harry, I know what you are going to say, something dreadful about marriage. Don’t say it. Don’t ever say dreadful things of that kind to me again,’” Dorian says (98). It is Henry who breaks the news of Sybil’s death, and then casually invites him to the opera. It seems significant that Henry wants Dorian to avoid the inquest, which might produce some justice by at least exposing Dorian’s identity and his harsh treatment of Sybil (98). Dorian, on the other hand, frets that he has “‘murdered Sybil Vane’” and fears for his soul: “‘You don’t know the danger I am in, and there is nothing to keep me straight. She would have done that for me’” (100). Henry consoles Dorian by telling him that Sybil was his social inferior, that the marriage would have failed, and reminding him that “‘Good resolutions are useless attempts to interfere with scientific laws’” (100). Henry’s words have the immediate effect of numbing Dorian’s conscience. He says he “‘cannot feel this tragedy’” fully.
Dorian compares Sybil’s death to a Greek tragedy—a comparison to drama that Henry exploits, finding an “exquisite pleasure in playing on the lad’s unconscious egotism” (101). Henry carries Dorian’s comparison to a conclusion by convincing him that Sybil, like a Shakespearean character, did not truly exist: “Mourn for Ophelia, if you like. Put ashes on your head because Cordelia was strangled. Cry out against Heaven because the daughter of Brabantio died. But don’t waste your tears over Sybil Vane. She was less real than they are” (103-4). Henry’s rhetoric leads Dorian to a moment of decision. Instead of seeking atonement, he chooses sensation: “He felt that the time had really come for making his choice … Eternal youth, infinite passion, pleasures subtle and secret, wild joys and wilder sins—he was to have all these things. The portrait was to bear the burden of his shame…” (105).

Cleary, Henry is monstrous in his use of rhetoric as vivisection. And his rhetoric transforms Dorian into a monstrosity. Monstrosity engendering monstrosity through word and deed is a pattern already outlined in the other novels included in this study. Riquelme describes this pattern as a “symptom of a darkness within both culture and the mind,” and he locates it not only within Dorian Gray but also Jekyll and Hyde and Dracula (611). Linking Henry to the other monstrous orators examined in this study is his cutting of the body. However, unlike Dracula, Van Helsing, Harker, Moreau, Jekyll, and Macfarlane, Henry cuts with words, with rhetoric. Through Henry, Wilde expresses perhaps more clearly than any other writer the concept of disarticulation. One of Henry’s noteworthy characteristics is his longstanding fascination with “natural science,” which he links to vivisection. Henry recalls that “he had begun by vivisecting himself” and “ended by
vivisecting others. Human life—that appeared to him to him the one thing worth investigating. Compared to it there was nothing else of any value” (60). Henry considers Dorian an interesting subject for such a study (60). By requesting Dorian’s portrait from Basil, which becomes his double, Wotton is symbolically claiming Gray as an anatomical subject. He says, “‘You had much better let me have it, Basil. This silly boy doesn’t really want it, and I really do’” (31). Through Henry’s rhetoric, the painting becomes Dorian. It is a transformation that is finalized in Henry and Basil’s banter near the end of Chapter 2 when they playfully confuse Dorian with his double, the portrait. Figurative dissection is foreshadowed earlier in the chapter when Basil determines to destroy the painting with his artist’s palette knife because it has upset Dorian. Dorian stops him: “‘Don’t, Basil, don’t!’ he cried. ‘It would be murder!’” (30). It is a “murder” that Dorian will ultimately carry out at the end of the novel, using a knife similar to the palette knife that Basil is going to use the slash the portrait in Chapter 2, and which Dorian uses to slay Basil in Chapter 14. The description of the palette knife makes it seem more like a surgical instrument or weapon than an artist’s tool: it has a “thin blade of lithe steel” (30).

Wilde did not invent the intersection of art and vivisection/dissection. It had been established earlier in the century by critics who disparaged the paintings of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. Ironically, for many audiences, these paintings have become representative of Victorian art, but at the time of their creation they were generally considered ugly and offensive. The critics’ chief complaint was that the bodies in the paintings looked too real compared to the “conventional norms of beauty and grace mirrored in art” (Casteras 13). Writing in 1852, David Masson restated critics’ censure of
the Pre-Raphaelites, saying that artists appeared to take delight in the grotesque, in
“figures with heads phrenologically clumsy, faces strongly marked and irregular, and
very pronounced ankles and knuckles” (qtd. in Casteras 13). Indeed, the feet of subjects
in some subjects in Pre-Raphaelite paintings look dirty, their hands look calloused, and
their arms sinewy. Some subjects are also painted in irreverent and undignified poses,
such as the nun digging a grave in *The Vale of Rest* by John Everett Millais. A second
nun stares unnervingly out of the painting at viewers, as if reminding them of the final
destination of all lives. Susan P. Casteras writes that Pre-Raphaelite paintings “reveal
underlying concerns with disease and deformity, ugliness and vulgarity, conformity and
nonconformity” (14).

An anonymous reviewer in 1850 attacked Pre-Raphaelite paintings as the “‘mere
handmaiden to morbid anatomy’” and, as such, “‘it is no longer Art, but an administrator
to science’” (qtd. in 16). The reviewer wrote that the figure of Joseph in Millais’s
painting *Christ in the House of his Parents* looked as if it had come from a “‘dissecting
room’” (17). Other critics made the same connection between deformity, disease,
dissection, monstrosity, and Pre-Raphaelite art. Casteras writes: “The barely concealed
subtext was that of the critical reception of the painting was that it depicted
unmentionable symptoms in such graphic detail that the work was cumulatively too
intense and revolting for many critics and spectators” (17). A reviewer for *Punch* mocked
Millais’s *Christ in the House of his Parents* as a study of pathology, writing that the
subjects—with their “‘emaciated bodies, their shrunken legs, and tumid ankles’”—
display “‘well known characteristics of that morbid state of system’” (qtd. in 17). The
reviewer also comments that the bowl-bearing child\(^8\) depicted in the painting looks like he has rickets, and the figure of the boy Christ in the center appears to have postmortem mottling of the flesh in his face (17). The reviewer also states that bodies look unwashed (18), and that the “‘drawing of the figures evinces minute study in the demonstration room’” (qtd. in 17). Among the harsh critics of the painting was Charles Dickens, who wrote that the figure of Mary was a “‘Monster’” that would stand out even in the “vilest cabaret in France or the lowest gin shop in England” (qtd. in 18). Overall Dickens wrote that the subjects looked like derelicts, “an irreligious assembly of under-fed low-life types such as ‘might be undressed in any hospital where dirty drunkards, in a high state of varicose veins are received’” (qtd. in 18).

Similar criticisms of Pre-Raphaelite art continued into the 1880s, when Wilde was socializing not only with Millais, but also with Edward Burne-Jones, another Brotherhood painter. Considering these connections, it is interesting to view Basil’s portrait of Dorian as degenerating from the idealized art that Millais, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, and William Holman Hunt rebelled against under Sir Joshua Reynolds at the Royal Academy in the 1840s into a realistic Pre-Raphaelite work displaying all of the incongruities, uncleanness, and pathological grotesqueries attacked by critics. As a monstrosity, Dorian is related to the others already analyzed in this study: he is abhuman. However, he is not a human-animal hybrid: he is a human-art hybrid. Dorian’s tragic parentage—rooted in his mother’s elopement with a man of lower social status who is

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\(^8\) The child with the bowl in Millais’s *Christ in the House of His Parents* is John the Baptist.
later skewered in a duel plotted by his disapproving father-in-law (36)—allows his identity to be revised throughout the novel. He is transformed into a monstrosity ironically referred to as “Prince Charming,” whose attractive exterior belies the putrefaction of his soul. In addition to being repeatedly referred to as “Prince Charming” (57, 64, 87, 187), Gray is called “‘Adonis,’” “‘Narcissus’” (7), and “‘Apollo’” (212), before becoming the “‘type of … the age’” (213). Dorian’s unstable identity also makes him vulnerable not only to Basil but also to Henry, who sees him as a body to be “posed” (39). These are not the only markers of disarticulation. One of Dorian’s monstrous characteristics becomes his detachment, his suppression of human feeling. His emotionless response toward Sybil Vane’s suicide causes Basil to exclaim, “‘Why, man, there are horrors in store for that little white body of hers!’” (107). Exactly what Basil means is unclear. However, under the Anatomy Act of 1832, which was still in force in the 1890s, Sybil’s body could be dissected if her mother, also a poor actor, does not have the money to bury her. Even if Basil is not referring to dissection, Sybil’s body will still be violated by an “‘inquest’” (98, 110), and later by the grave. Dorian’s cruelty toward Sybil is the first indication of a monstrous nature that is fully realized when he murders Basil.

Through rhetoric, Dorian’s body becomes an object of art that is morally decadent but resistant to age and physical corruption, like an embalmed and beautified corpse. This is the source of his epideictic: the audience’s awareness that he is art on the surface and decomposing human body underneath. The decay is simply projected onto his portrait and hidden from the world. He embodies the changing notions toward the body as
nineteenth-century anatomists achieved greater detachment and their procedures lost much of their transcendental significance. Nevertheless, corpses remained central to certain modes of artistic expression. Quite literally, bodies were transformed into visual art. Among those competing with anatomists for snatched bodies in the dissection era were artists and sculptors (Richardson 58). They were seeking models or raw material.

In this regard, *Dorian Gray* reflects a synthesis of art and anatomy with a long history in Europe. Many artists were no doubt inspired by Leonardo da Vinci, whose anatomical drawings were not revealed until the late eighteenth century (32). At the time of his death in 1519, Da Vinci was planning a comprehensive work on human anatomy. He had performed about thirty dissections, produced 240 drawings, and written 13,000 words of notes. Another artist who studied anatomy was Rembrandt (Coddon 74). And Mikhail Bakhtin writes that Rabelais performed a public dissection of a hanged man in 1537 (360). It was a time in Europe when medicine was the center of natural sciences and the humanities (359). Had Da Vinci published his treatise, he would have rivaled if not surpassed the younger Andreas Vesalius, who is credited with revolutionizing anatomy in Renaissance Europe (Sooke). In both Vesalius and Da Vinci, body, rhetoric, and art merge. Richardson writes, “Each of these men’s work represents a unique fusion of anatomical knowledge and artistic genius” (32). The best starting point for understanding this synthesis and the new aesthetics it created is 1528, the year translations of Galen’s medical treatises began appearing in Europe. In 1543, Vesalius, a

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9 See figure 4
professor of anatomy at the University of Padua, published his *De Humani Corporis Fabrica*, a tome that would revolutionize the conduct of dissections. Vesalius’s text challenged Galen’s authority and eventually helped displace him. Vesalius had a grand vision of anatomy that incorporated but transcended the physical bodies of the dissector and his subjects. This vision included the merger of anatomy and art that suggests the living corpse. In so many of Da Vinci’s drawings and Vesalius’ illustrations, cadavers in various stages of dissection appear to be animated, capable of motion and speech. These drawings reflected a supernaturalism that Vesalius encouraged by mythologizing anatomy, linking it to Apollo and his son Asclepius, the god of medicine and healing. Apollo delivered Asclepius by Caesarian birth from the womb of his dead mother, the nymph Corinus. In this way, Vesalius expresses his hopes of founding a “new, heroic empire of anatomy” based on what he called a “‘reborn art of dissection’” (Park 243). Park writes:

Vesalius’ new approach will replace the old, degenerate medical order of earlier centuries, riddled with errors and misconceptions regarding the human body that had arisen as physicians increasingly distanced themselves from the world of matter and the body and by delegating manual operation, especially surgery, to lower practitioners and retreating to the world of disputation and books. (244)

It is important to note here that Vesalius—a twenty-nine-year-old upstart with limited experience dealing with live patients—had more in mind than promoting anatomy: he was also promoting himself as physician to Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, a

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10 See figure 5.
position he obtained in 1543 after dedicating his *De Fabrica* to Charles (239). Vesalius’s work, therefore, had a rhetorical purpose beyond promoting the new anatomy.

The bodily rhetoric associated with dismemberment and dissection was further developed by the methods of Vesalius and his followers and the surgical theaters in which they operated. Before Vesalius, Galen was still recognized as the authority on anatomy throughout Europe (Fleck 300), and Medieval and early Renaissance anatomists largely lectured from his work while students and other underlings carried out the actual dissections. But Galen’s work was limited, partly because he had to extrapolate human anatomy from that of animals (303). Vesalius challenged Galen’s teachings by emphasizing the “empirical study of the human body” (300). Rather than teaching from a podium, Vesalius lectured to his students while performing anatomies, explained his findings, and pointed out Galen’s errors (300). He “wrested his knowledge from the matter itself,” Park explains (218). And he was “equally adept at manipulating the scalpel and the pen” (252). In this way, flesh became word, and body became text: It is an ancient conceit that Browning adopts in the 1863 poem “Apparent Failure” when “gazers” in a Paris morgue view the bodies of three suicide victims as “the sermon’s text” (ll. 19-21). Vesalius and his successors stressed the importance of what they saw with their own eyes during their investigations of the human body rather as opposed to what had been printed in an ancient text. “*De Fabrica* revolutionized Western perceptions of human anatomy, replacing the inaccurate medieval rote descriptions with careful observations from real dissections of the body,” Richardson writes (32). Through the efforts of Vesalius and his successors, the reformed study of anatomy spread throughout
Europe, gaining acceptance and importance. Aiding in this transformation was Vesalius’ book, which was illustrated with images created from woodcuts. Park writes that it is clear that “the *Fabrica* was the production of an intimate collaboration the anatomist and various artists, both draftsmen and woodblock cutters, and that Vesalius was involved at every stage in the preparation of the woodcuts for which the book is famous” (211).

Although Vesalius built his reputation on the objective study of the human body, his *De Fabrica* is marked by the subjectivity of certain of its elements. It is a work of art which, at the time of its creation, was seeking a genre. The famous illustrations, for example, show scenes that are clearly emblematized. Perhaps the most familiar illustration is the front piece showing Vesalius conducting an anatomy on the body of a woman who had been hanged. In the image, Vesalius stands lecturing beside the opened body in a tiered theater filled with spectators.11 Park writes that as part of Vesalius’s campaign to become Charles’s physician, he manipulated the scene to reassign the traditional roles of the dissector and the criminal body. In Christian iconography and lore, cadavers had long been associated with Christ or saints. Indeed, churches often hosted anatomies on a temporary basis. And, in Italy, members of the San Giovanni Evangelista della Morte confraternity ministered to condemned prisoners before execution, encouraging them to identify with Jesus and the Christian martyrs and accept divine justice (212). In the illustration from Vesalius’s front piece, however, he identifies the dissector with the saint (234). The significance of the scene goes beyond Vesalius’s self-

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11 See figure 6.
representation as religious icon. Seated among the spectators is a skeleton, clearly intended as a *memento mori*. Among the many other faces is one that resembles Dante.

“Clearly, this is not a representation of an actual anatomy lesson taking place,” Sawday writes (69). The effect of Vesalius’s iconography is to bridge the gulf between life and death and to encourage viewers to contemplate the brevity of existence as well as man’s place in the universe. Sawday writes that the Renaissance anatomist’s goal was not scientific detachment but meaning and understanding on multiple levels. The link to art here is quite strong. “Anatomies were performed … as ritualistic expressions of often contradictory layers of meaning, rather than as scientific investigations in any modern sense,” Sawday writes (63). In other words, there was a certain amount of drama involved in public dissections. This drama derived in part from the confrontation between three authorities: the ancient text, heritage, the cadaver, and the anatomist. As time passed and the Galenic heritage faded, the confrontation between the body and the anatomist became more direct (64-5). The drama of dissection was coded into Europe’s anatomy theaters. For example, the anatomy theater constructed after 1589 at Leiden University in the Netherlands, modelled on the Paduan theater, featured “moralizing (Latin) inscriptions familiar to a Renaissance reader”: “Know thyself.”; “We are dust and shadows.”; and “We are born to die” (72). In London, an anatomy theater for the Barber-Surgeons was designed in 1636 by Inigo Jones, also known for his collaborations with Ben Jonson on numerous royal masques. Jones also used the Paduan theater as a model of the London venue, following continental theories that “stressed … the human frame as the basis for architecture” (76). The theater was ornamented with iconography similar to

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the theater in Padua, with human male and female skins representing Adam and Eve, a flayed male corpse, and numerous skeletons (76). “The Renaissance anatomical theatre combined elements from a number of different sources … to produce an event which was visually spectacular,” Sawday writes (64). The anatomical theater was also a space where authorities sought to reassert “the order of creation, the harmony of the universe, and the wisdom of God” after the “carnivalesque” and riotous scenes at the gallows (62).

Closer to Wilde’s era, artists also found ways to use bodies in their creations, as media and as models. Carol Christ recalls how in 1801 Pierre Giraud, a French architect and revolutionary, described a procedure from a seventeenth-century German inventor to cremate corpses and turn them into a durable glass that could be used to make memorial objects of the deceased. The glass was not “fluid” enough to create busts of the deceased, so Giraud instead opted for medallions. He estimated that one body could produce two medallions, one for mourners to keep and the other to display at the cemetery (Christ 391). In 1776, William Hunter, professor of anatomy at the Royal Academy of Arts, was so impressed with the musculature of a hanged man that he used the criminal’s body to create a cast rather than dissecting it (Reisz). The man’s body was first posed and allowed to stiffen. Hunter and his students then flayed the corpse to expose its muscles and used it as a mold. The cast is still on display at the Royal Academy as the “flayed hanged man from Tyburn Tree” (Richardson 37). Hunter’s students nicknamed the man “Smugglerius,” impressed by the classical pose and assuming that the dead man had been a smuggler (Reisz).
However, the most common artistic productions involving corpses were also the most commercial: funerals. Like artists and sculptors, tradesmen in the seventeenth century also wanted access to cadavers on which to practice undertaking. These included butchers, tailors, and waxchandlers, all of who “seem to have had a more than passing interest in obtaining bodies to develop the (lucrative) skills of embalming” (Sawday 57). Paul Fritz writes that embalming began to be practiced more frequently in the early eighteenth century, but it was controversial because it was unclear who should practice it: surgeons or undertakers (245). By the late nineteenth century, to fulfill middle-class demands for more elaborate funerals, undertakers were not only using embalming but also “artifice, theatrical makeup, and clothing” to create the appearance of life in a corpse. They were essentially reconstructing bodies, in an odd parallel to the work of Victor Frankenstein. “Undertakers injected dyes into embalming fluid to create a ‘healthy’ glow to the cheeks,” Jani Scandura explains. “They stuffed cotton into sunken eye sockets and cheeks; sewed jaws shut, false teeth in place; and jerked joints … into appropriate ‘natural’ poses” (15). Scandura writes that undertakers exploited middle class desires to maintain social boundaries, even in death, and assert their “superior morality.” “Death itself became a performance and Victorian funeral grand theater,” she asserts (3).

Tensions between death and art over the human body can be located in Dorian Gray and its unnaturally preserved title character. He is the human-art hybrid comically forecast in “The Canterville Ghost,” which substitutes artist’s paints for human blood (15). But among Wilde’s works, Salome is the one that seems so obsessive in aestheticizing the body, largely through use of the blazon. Salome is similarly hybridized,
as she is conflated with the moon and its changing appearance marks her mood shifts.

The Young Syrian says in the first line of the play, “How beautiful is the Princess Salome tonight!” In the next lines, the Page of Herodias observes the moon and interjects death and corruption into the blazon, saying, “She is like a woman rising from a tomb. She is like a dead woman. One might fancy she was looking for dead things” (3). When the infatuated Young Syrian replies, he is presumably describing the moon, but his words could be applied to Salome as object of art, considering his references to the “veil” and “dancing.” “She is like a little princess who wears a yellow veil, and whose feet are of silver. She is like a princess who has little white doves for feet. One might fancy she was dancing” (3). Later, the Young Syrian says that Salome has “little white hands … fluttering like doves … they are like white butterflies” (7). As Iokanaan is brought to the curious Salome, the Page of Herodias again comments on the moon, saying that it is “Like the hand of a dead woman who is seeking to cover herself with a shroud.” The Young Syrian adds, “She is like a little princess, whose eyes are eyes of amber. Through the clouds of muslin she is smiling like a little princess” (13). Love and death, therefore, hang eerily over Salome, and merge in the character of Salome, whose affections kill. Her first victim is the Young Syrian, to whom she has promised her attention, if not affection, in exchange for fetching Iokanaan from his prison (12-13). The Young Syrian, whom Salome calls Narraboth, kills himself as he witnesses Salome’s efforts to seduce Iokanaan. Salome’s identification with moon is consummated when the Page of Herodias says, “I knew the moon was seeking a dead thing, but I knew not it was he whom she sought” (13). Salome hybridizes Iokanaan with art in similar ways, saying, “He is like a
thin ivory statue. He is like an image of silver. ... His flesh must be very cold, cold as ivory” (14). She continues aestheticizing his body, comparing him to “lilies”; “snows that lie on the mountains” and “roses.” “There is nothing in the world so white as thy body,” she says (16), adding later, “Thy mouth is like a band of scarlet on a tower of ivory” (17).

Salome’s rhetoric mortifies Iokanaan’s body: “It is like whited sepulcher,” she says. (16). Her blazoning of that body—including the hair (16-17)—conveys passion and foreshadows dismemberment. Salome achieves both when she demands Iokanaan’s decapitation as her reward for dancing for Herod and then kisses Iokanaan’s the mouth of his severed head (45).

Salome’s dalliance with Iokanaan’s head is reminiscent of Fulvia’s legendary mutilation of Cicero’s head in the rhetorical tradition discussed in the previous chapter. Like Fulvia, Salome focuses her attention on the mouth of her victim. While Salome kisses Iokanaan’s mouth, Fulvia shoves pins in Cicero’s tongue. Both victims are desired and punished for their rhetorical performance, which helps constitute their characters.

Salome says to Iokanaan, “Thy voice is as music to my ear” (15). But both Iokanaan and Cicero are monstrous. Although Iokanaan is said to be “gentle” (6), he is also a savage from the “desert” who eats “locusts and wild honey” and wears “camel’s hair” (7). “He was very terrible to look upon,” says the First Soldier (7). He later tells Salome that some believe Iokanaan is a reincarnation (10). For Herod, Iokanaan’s ethos is also built on reports that he has “seen God” (24) and that he is a prophet associated with a “Man” who can raise the dead. But Iokanaan’s most terrifying feature is his speech, which is filled with monstrosities and composes its own epideictic. “Sometimes he says things that
affright one…,” the First Soldier says. Iokanaan speaks of monsters—a “dragon” (6); “centaurs” (9); a “basilisk” (11); “abominations” (13, 14); and the “angel of death” (18). Cicero, on the other hand, is a different type of monstrosity, a character similar to Herod in Wilde’s play. Although the “Death of Cicero Tradition” springs from his execution and the hands of his political enemies, he earlier played the tyrant as Roman consul and ordered the executions of five conspirators without trial after the Second Cantilinarian Conspiracy. Critics such as Anthony Trollope were also disturbed by the duplicity of Cicero and other orators displayed in their ability to argue convincingly without regard for truth or consequences. Trollope writes in his 1880 biography of Cicero,

The mind rejects the idea that it be the part of a perfect man to make another believe that which he believes to be false … [Cicero] had not acquired that theoretic aversion to a lie which is the first feeling in the bosom of a modern gentleman…. (qtd. in Rosner 171)

Salome would seem to agree when she condemns all Romans, saying, “Ah! How I loathe the Romans! They are rough and common, and they give themselves the airs of noble lords” (9). So brutal are the Romans that the Cappodocian in Salome says that they drove the gods from his country and possibly caused their deaths (5). The greatest monstrosity in Salome, however, is Salome herself. It is her perverse sexual appetite for Iokanaan that drives the play. He calls her “Daughter of Sodom” (15) and “daughter of Babylon” and speaks to her as if she is the devil of the New Testament, saying, “Get thee behind me!” (16). Throughout the play, Salome is also treated as something not to be gazed upon at the risk of misfortune, like Medusa. The Page of Herodias warns the Young Syrian
several times not to look at Salome. “Something terrible may happen,” he says (4). Herodias also tells Herod not to look at Salome (30).

Salome’s lovemaking to Iokanaan’s severed head is so “monstrous” (44) that Herod orders her immediate crushing (45). It is just one of the moments in Wilde’s writings that reflect the European tradition of torture and execution. Indeed, upon further examination, one is struck by the variety of punishments that Wilde included in his works. These moments are suggested in Plato’s Gorgias, when Polus describes the torture, mutilation, and execution of a criminal through the rack, castration, eye-gouging, crucifixion, and burning in pitch. “You are trying to make my flesh creep…,” Socrates responds (104). Salome’s form of execution, crushing, corresponds to pressing, was actually a form of torture under English Common Law intended to force a plea, although it sometimes resulted in death (Thompson n.pag.). According to Irene Thompson, a plea was necessary before a trial could be held, “so it was common for those arrested to be ‘pressed to plea.’” Thompson writes that the procedure involved tying down the prisoner and then piling “heavy iron, stone or lead weights” on the chest. Prisoners who

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12 In Salome, Wilde can be seen as drawing not only on the erotic “Song of Solomon” from the Old Testament but also the long tradition of the severed head as object of sexual fetish in Western literature and history. Earlier in the century, Washington Irving used it in his story “The Adventure of the German Student.” Keats tapped into the tradition in his poem Isabella, or The Pot of Basil, based on a tale from Boccaccio’s Decameron. Sir Walter Raleigh’s widow was said to have preserved his severed head and kept it until her death twenty-years later (Thompson, “Beheading”). In The Revenger’s Tragedy, Vindice broods over the skull of his murdered Gloriana and uses it in a plot against her killer, the Duke, luring him to his death through his own sexual hunger. One could also argue that the tradition is also at work in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, since one beheading and the threat of another set the stage for Gawain’s flirtation with Lady Bertilak.
confessed were “hanged, which in those days was a lingering and painful death.” The prisoners faced death either way, but if they were pressed to death “they would die unconvicted, thereby saving their families from penury.” Thompson presents the example of Giles Corey, an accused witch in Salem who chose pressing so that his “wealth would not be taken by the colony but passed on to his heirs” (n.pag.). Iokanaan’s beheading—a form of execution typically reserved for the privileged (Thompson n pag.)—is familiar to audiences from the New Testament. But Wilde’s story transfers responsibility for the prophet’s beheading from Salome’s mother to Salome. Salome’s actions are made even more disturbing since, as Thompson points out, the head lived on for a short period after its separation from the body. Simon Webb writes that in 1906 a French surgeon named Dr. Ronald Marcoux performed an experiment on the severed head of a murderer and found that it responded to his voice and was able to open and close its eyes “for at least fifteen or twenty seconds after it had been cut from the body.” Marcoux had received official permission to study guillotined criminals; but the authorities were so unhappy with Marcoux’s findings that they forbade him from conducting anymore experiments (Webb, Execution ch. 1).

Wilde depicts another form of execution in “The Canterville Ghost” by having Sir Simon de Canterville sealed up in a secret room by his in-laws for having murdered his wife. Thompson refers to this method of punishment as walling in, saying it was a “variation on burying alive” that was performed mainly in Germany or Switzerland. Thompson writes that one of the most notorious victims of walling in was Erzcebét Bánhory (n pag.). Bánhory was the Early Modern Hungarian countess who killed more
than six hundred women, allegedly to use their blood to achieve immortality and eternal youth and beauty. Of course, murder, signified by fake blood, is what leads to Sir Simon’s immortality. However, his immortality is a punishment associated with his imprisonment through living entombment.

The destruction of Basil’s body is the most lurid detail in the plot of *Dorian Gray*, and it suggests additional forms of execution. After the crime, Dorian pleads with an acquaintance, a scientist named Alan Campbell, to destroy the evidence. ““Alan, you are scientific,”” Dorian says. ““You know about chemistry, and things of that kind. You have made experiments. What you have got to do is to destroy the thing that is upstairs—to destroy it so that not a vestige of it will be left”” (166). His appeal to Campbell includes references to human dissection as a scientific practice productive of medical knowledge. He asks Campbell to approach the deed as a scientific experiment and consider the detachment he has in the presence of the dead. ““You go to hospitals and dead-houses, and the horrors that you do there do not affect you,”” Dorian says. ““If in some hideous dissecting room or fetid laboratory you found this man lying on a leaden table … you would simply look at him as an admirable subject”” (167). He says that ““to destroy a body must be far less horrible than what you are accustomed to work at”” (168). The text makes clear that Dorian and Campbell have been estranged for some time, and when Campbell refuses to destroy Basil’s body and save Dorian from detection, Dorian blackmails him. Faced with exposure for some offense that it is not divulged in the story, Campbell destroys Basil’s body in Dorian’s home through a combination of burning with fire and acid. The process takes about five hours. Exactly what Campbell does to the
body is not revealed. But readers are told that the body is gone and the “horrible smell of nitric acid in the room” (172). The destruction of the transgressing body through corrosion and burning is a process Wilde revisits in *The Ballad of Reading Gaol*, in which the corpse of a hanged murderer is covered with lime and buried:

And all the while the burning lime
   Eats flesh and bone away,
It eats the brittle bone by night
   And the soft flesh by day,
It eats the flesh and bone by turns,
   But it eats the heart away. (ll. 463-8)

Near the end of the poem, Wilde says that this same “wretched man” has been “Eaten by the teeth of flame” and that he lies “In a burning winding sheet” (ll. 39-40).

This disintegration of bodies in *Dorian Gray* and *Reading Gaol* suggests two legal punishments: burning and boiling. Irene Thompson writes that societies have used burning since the “dawn of civilization” to destroy their enemies and criminals. In antiquity, it was practiced by Babylonians, Hebrews, and Romans. It was a common sentence for people found guilty of heresy during the Inquisitions. Burning was used because it avoided the shedding of blood, which was banned under Roman Catholic doctrine. The Inquisitions also practiced *auto-da-fé*, which was the mass burning of heretics. “Bloody Mary” had almost three hundred Protestant men, women, and children burned as a result of her Counterreformation during her short reign as queen of England.

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13 Among the historical Dracula’s alleged misdeeds were mass executions involving the boiling of six hundred men and the burning of 400 boys in 1458 (Goldberg and Itzkowitz 90).
In addition to heresy, treason was also punishable in England by burning alive. Burnings in London ended in 1790 due to the objections of businesses and residents. When burning was practiced by religious authorities, it often carried the significance of the purification of its victims. In the context of late-nineteenth century Victorianism, Basil’s transgression is his homoerotic desire for Dorian, which Basil expresses clearly in the 1890 edition of the text. Sharing his secret, Basil says to Dorian, “I quite admit that I adored you madly, extravagantly, absurdly” (228). Basil’s homoeroticism was toned down and largely encrypted in the 1891 edition, where instead of love for Dorian he expresses love for the idea that Dorian represents for him. “I worshipped you,” Basil says (228). So, idolatry replaces homosexuality as an offense punishable by burning.

Closely related to the punishment of burning is boiling, which Thompson writes was “a legal punishment … right up until the eighteenth century” (n.pag.). Like burning, boiling was also practiced in antiquity and it is mentioned in the Old Testament story of the Maccabees. Like burning, boiling could be used as a torture and punishment for religious offenses. Thompson points out that Christians in Roman times “were often boiled to death for their beliefs.” In the Middle East, oil was substituted when there was a shortage of water, “which made the suffering even more intolerable as oil has a much higher boiling point” (Thomspn n.pag.). Boiling prisoners became a legal option for punishment in England under King Henry VIII in 1531, when a cook was boiled to death for poisoning seventeen people, killing two of them (Thompson n.pag.). And boiling alive is the fate suffered by the villainous Barabas in Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta. A possible objection to this reading of Dorian Gray is that Basil is already dead.
when his body is destroyed; but as Joel Harrington points out in *The Faithful Executioner*, “alive” was a relative term: executioners sometimes had the option to kill a prisoner—by strangulation, for example—as an act of compassion before beginning the destruction of the body. In fact, Harrington opens his book with the story of a counterfeiter who was sentenced to be burned. Although the executioner had planned to strangle him in secret before the burning, the strangulation was botched and the man was roasted alive as he screamed to heaven for help (xix). Moreover, even after Basil has been killed, his body remains seated in a chair by a table as if he is alive: “Had it not been for the red jagged tear in the neck, and the clotted black pool that was slowly widening on the table, one would have said that the man was simply asleep” (157).

Basil’s murder is perhaps the most disturbing of the cutting deaths depicted in Wilde’s writings. Audiences are better prepared for Iokanaan’s beheading in *Salome*: Wilde is revising a story from the New Testament, though responsibility for Iokanaan’s execution is transferred to Salome in Wilde’s play. Salome’s mother simply approves when Salome repeatedly asks for Iokanaan’s head. When Herod finally agrees, Salome grows impatient with the executioner. She complains that he is afraid of Iokanaan. When the executioner enters with Iokanaan’s head on a platter, “Salome seizes it” (43). Her mockery makes it clear that she was motivated not only by her lust and scorn but also by Iokanaan’s rhetoric. “Thou rejectedst me,” she says “Thou didst speak evil words to me” (43). While no acts of cutting are depicted in “The Canterville Ghost,” Sir Simon regularly carries a “rusty dagger” (8), which he brandishes “in the midnight air” (9). And one of his performances involves him stabbing “himself three times in the throat” (8). His
The murder of his wife involves the spilling of her blood (3). This is the act that has damned him, and he confesses to it; but, ironically, little is said of it. On the other hand, Basil’s stabbing death sets the stage for Dorian’s epideictic performance. The slaying occurs after Basil, preparing to visit Paris to sequester himself and work on painting for six months, seeks out Dorian to confront him with the “dreadful things” that people are saying about him (147). He tells Dorian that he has defended him, but he wonders if he really knows Dorian at all. “Before I could answer that, I should have to see your soul,” Basil says (150). The comment inspires Dorian to invite Basil to look at his “‘soul,’” claiming it is the artist who made it (150). “‘Come: it is your own handiwork,’” Dorian says (151). Basil is killed moments after he views the painting. He is appalled and bewildered by the transformations that have taken place and is barely able to recognize his work.

Basil’s reaction leads to the novel’s clearest expression of the epideictic, which springs from Dorian as living corpse, a monster the painter is implicated in creating. The narrator states:

An exclamation of horror broke from the painter’s lips as he saw in the dim light the hideous face of the on the canvas grinning at him. There was something in its expression that filled him with disgust and loathing. … it was Dorian Gray’s own face that he was looking at! The horror, whatever it was, had not yet entirely spoiled that marvelous beauty. … He seemed to recognize his own brush-work, and the frame was his own design. The idea was monstrous, yet he felt afraid. (154)

His reaction is similar to what Sophia Andres says “Victorian spectators” experienced when they first saw Pre-Raphaelite art work: they “were often repulsed, perplexed, and
unsettled by the fears and anxieties the unorthodox Pre-Raphaelite vision disclosed.” The paintings confused categories in a disorienting way: “conventional beauty in unconventional ugliness, feminine fragility in masculinity, and masculine strength in conventional femininity” (n.pag.). Dorian’s painting confuses yet another category: living and dead. As Basil struggles to find meaning in the decaying painting, Dorian reminds him of how he and Henry “‘flattered’” him when he was a “‘boy’” and taught him vanity and the “‘wonder of beauty.’” Dorian recalls wishing in Basil’s studio that he could give his soul to stay young to stay young while painting aged. Basil recalls the moment but rejects it as “‘impossible,’” seeking instead an explanation in “‘mildew’” or “‘poison’” paints (154). Basil also rejects Dorian’s suggestion that he meant to create a monstrosity in the portrait, stating, “‘There was nothing evil in it, nothing shameful. You were to me such an ideal as I shall never meet again.’” Basil’s figuration of Dorian as monstrosity includes his statement that the portrait has “‘the face of a satyr’” and “‘the eyes of a devil.’” He notes that the surface of the painting is “undisturbed” and that the “foulness and horror had come” from “within.” He seems to recognize the nature of Dorian’s monstrousness when he says, “‘The rotting of a corpse in a watery grave was not so fearful’” (155). In terms of unnatural preservation, Dorian is similar to Lucy Westenra in Dracula. The bodies of both are preserved by supernatural agency rather than by an undertaker’s hand.

Basil’s realization of the horror in Dorian’s portrait—a portrait he created but can longer recognize as his own—is another allusion to Pater, Riquelme writes (625-6). In his essay “Leonardo da Vinci,” Pater writes that there is “something sinister” (Pater 70) in
the painter’s *Mona Lisa*, or *La Gioconda*, with its beauty and “unfathomable smile” (69). Hers is a “beauty, into which the soul with all of its maladies has passed.” She is expressive of Greece and Rome, and the “return of the Pagan world …” Pater writes, “She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire, she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave” (70). The vampire analogy is fitting, for Pater’s Gothicized art does not reflect life: it drains and replaces it with a monstrous copy resistant to age and scrutiny. Edgar Allan Poe perhaps best expresses this concept in “The Oval Portrait,” the tale of a young woman who dies while her mad artist husband paints her picture. The wounded narrator finds the head-and-shoulders portrait after seeking shelter in the couple’s abandoned chateau. He is captivated yet “appalled” (298) by its “absolute *life-likeness*” (569), and at one point wakes up staring at the portrait and believing it to be “the head … of a living person” (569). The woman in “The Oval Portrait” is therefore similar to *Mona Lisa*, which Riquelme relates to the “*Medusa* of the Uffizii” (626), a sixteenth-century painting in the style of the Renaissance Italian painter Caravaggio but perhaps based on a lost original by Da Vinci. Pater writes that Da Vinci “alone realizes” that Medusa’s head is the “head of a corpse, exercising its powers through all the circumstances of death” (60). Riquelme writes that *Dorian Gray* is informed by Pater’s aestheticism and its “potential for dark doubling and reversal” (609). One of the novel’s most significant reversals occurs between Dorian and his double, his portrait, as he becomes living art and living corpse and his portrait becomes a “rotting … corpse” (Wilde 155). This realization accounts for at least part of the terror Basil experiences as he gazes upon Dorian’s “accursed” image in the portrait (155).
Despite Basil’s harsh words, Dorian does not kill him until he pleads with Dorian to ask for God’s forgiveness. With a sudden and “uncontrollable feeling of hatred for Basil Hallward” and an inhuman loathing, Dorian picks up a knife and attacks the seated painter, stabbing him repeatedly in the neck. “He … dug the knife into the great vein that is behind the ear, crushing the man’s head down on the table, and stabbing him again and again,” the narrator says (156). The representation of violence here rivals anything in *Dracula*, and the violence dehumanizes Basil from artist to medium. In Dorian’s eyes, he no longer flesh and blood but a “dreadful wax image” (158). Paint and wax are significant in the novel, for they are among the supplies of the undertaker. They amplify the novel’s concern with the aestheticization of the body. Basil’s wounding in the neck also seems meaningful, for as Scandura writes, arterial embalming through the carotid artery at the base of the neck “became widespread in England during the 1890s” (9). As previously stated, Scandura is concerned with embalming practices as they are suggested in *Dracula*, but her ideas are just as applicable to *Dorian Gray*. Scandura points out that Dracula does not just drain the blood of his victims, he replaces it with “toxins” (9). One is reminded of Basil’s suggestion that the oils he used in painting Dorian’s portrait contained “poison” (154). Scandura writes that embalmers promoted their services by playing on “Victorian fears of decomposing corpses and unsanitary graveyards …” (11). However, their success at preserving bodies created a certain anxiety among Victorians, whose doctors sometimes had difficulty determining when a person had actually died and become a corpse. This difficulty led to anxieties about premature burial, or vivisepture. So concerned were Londoners about premature burial—and the possibility that it might
lead to vivisection—that they formed an association in 1896 to raise awareness (Behlmer 207). And the counterpart of the live burial is the living corpse. “After all,” writes George K. Behlmer, “the notion of the corpse that is not yet a corpse conjures up an image of the world as grotesque” (207). This is the essence of the dread captured in *Dorian Gray*. Simply put, decay was good in that it indicated that the deceased was truly dead. Intervention in the process was confusing and frightening. “The sign that was prized,” Sacandura writes, “was the deteriorating body—the body in the process of falling apart. The embalmed body was frightening because it was whole and undisintegrated, because it looked too life-like, because it would not properly disintegrate into dust” (14-15). It was one of the few times when an intrusion of the grotesque was welcome. Bakhtin writes that in the “system of grotesque imagery…death is not a negation of life … but part of life as a whole—its indispensable component, the condition of its constant renewal and rejuvenation.” He continues, “…the grave is related to the earth’s life-giving womb” (50). However, the nineteenth century was also the period in England when urban planners and architects began to reform graveyards from the fields of putrescence and contamination into the park-like spaces we know today.¹⁴

Dorian’s career as living corpse comes to a violent end when he stabs his portrait in the novel’s ultimate example of disarticulation. When servants later find Dorian’s body, the knife he earlier used to kill Basil is stuck in his heart, and the process of decay that had been suspended by rhetoric and art has resumed. In fact, Dorian’s unstable,

transgressing body is so deformed by age, sin, and corruption that the servants recognize him only by his rings. “He was withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of visage,” the narrator says. The Dorian in the portrait “in all the wonder of his exquisite youth and beauty,” on the other hand, has been restored (220). It is no longer a “loathsome” object (218).

Dorian’s growing disillusionment with his life of excess leads to his suicide. Dorian makes a final effort at reform; but, once again, Henry tries to dissuade him, through flattery: “‘There is no use your telling me you are going to be good,’ cried Lord Henry … ‘You are quite perfect. Pray, don’t change’” (206). Experience, however, has made Dorian resistant to Henry’s rhetoric. He says he has already embarked on his new life of “‘good actions’” (206). When Henry suggests that Dorian is simply seeking pleasure in a new way, Dorian is adamant: “‘I don’t care what you say to me. … Don’t let us talk about it anymore, and don’t try to persuade me that the first good action I have done in years … is really a sort of sin’” (207). Later, in response to one of Henry’s hyperbolic flatteries, Dorian says, “‘ … you must not say these extravagant things to me’” (213). The change in Dorian is registered in his rhetoric, and it perhaps parallels Wilde’s parting with Pater. Whereas Dorian had previously listened passively and was influenced by Henry’s rhetoric, he now engages Henry in dialectic, or disputation, and exceeds him. He has also become Platonic, saying to Henry, “‘The soul is a terrible reality. It can be bought and sold, and bartered away. It can be poisoned, or made perfect. There is a soul in each of us. I know it’” (211). When Dorian hypothetically confesses to murdering Bail, Henry does not believe him. He sees Dorian instead as assuming an ill-fitting persona, of declaiming: “‘I would say that … you were posing for a character that does not suit
you,”” Henry says (209). He has, perhaps, forgotten Dorian’s earlier words: “‘I cannot help telling you things. You have a curious influence over me. If I ever did a crime, I would come and confess it to you’” (55).

Like Basil, Henry fails to comprehend the full monstrosity they have created through their separate arts: images and words. In an example of one of the many ironic statements about Dorian’s “‘fine’” nature (79) and “beautiful soul” (61), Henry says, “‘You are the type of what the type of what the age is searching for, and what it is afraid it has found’” (213). Henry’s persistence in praising Dorian’s goodness and beauty suggests that a reversal has taken place in the course of the novel. While Henry begins as the Platonic epideictic speaker, flattering Dorian and altering his sense of self and reality, Dorian’s monstrosity has assumed that role by the end of the book. Readers see Henry under the spell of Dorian’s epideictic, unable to see his friend for what he truly is: a soulless living corpse whose body is preserved by rhetoric and art. Only Dorian recognizes his own monstrousness when he gazes on the portrait. He knows that he has gotten away with murder; he wants a “new life” (217). However, he is shocked to find that his portrait looks as grotesque as ever, if not more grotesque, even after his decision to reform and his first good deed. He wonders: “Does it mean he should confess?” He shudders at the consequences, including execution. “Yet it was his duty to confess, to suffer public shame, and to make atonement” (218). Here, echoes of Gorgias seem especially clear. Realizing that the portrait has “been like conscience to him” (219), he decides to destroy it. He attacks it with the same knife he used to kill Basil: “It would kill this monstrous soul-life, and without its hideous warnings, he would be at peace” (219).
In Dorian’s contemplated destruction of his portrait and its epideictic power, Wilde expresses the idea of monstrosity as an admonitory display involving the body. Disarticulation ends the performance.

The rapid aging that Dorian experiences at his death is similar to Dracula’s demise about five years later in Stoker’s novel. It is just one point on which Stoker seems to have been influenced by Wilde’s aesthetics and their recipe of rhetoric and bodily destruction. Dorian, for example, leads a vampire-like existence, socializing—and lurking—at dark and sleeping late into the day. His trip to an opium den in one of London’s mean districts in Chapter 16 is one example. Undertaken at night, the trip leads Dorian not only to Adrian, an old acquaintance ruined by their dissipation, but also to a prostitute akin to Stoker’s vampire women. Like Dracula, Dorian spurns the woman, shoving money at her and saying, “Don’t ever talk to me again” (186). “Two red sparks flashed for a moment from the woman’s sodden eyes …” says the narrator (187), who also alludes to the “rebel” Satan (188). Henry has given Dorian a philosophy of women that can be read into the interaction between Dracula and his castle. “I am afraid that women appreciate cruelty, downright cruelty…. ” Henry says. “They have wonderfully primitive instincts. … They love being dominated” (103). The prostitute—who says that Dorian “made me what I am” (190), calls him “the devil’s bargain” and mocks him by his pseudonym of “Prince Charming” (187), revealing him to Sybil Vane’s brother, James. Their confrontation in the street reminds readers of another similarity between Dorian and Dracula: Dorian does not age. His youthful appearance confuses the pistol-wielding James Vane, for it does not seem possible that Dorian could have been the same
man who drove his sister to suicide eighteen years earlier. “He seemed little more than a lad of twenty summers,” the narrator says (189). Yet another way Dorian and Dracula are similar is in how they choose to use the idle moments of their eternity. Both are students. Dorian, however, is motivated by mere “curiosity” (127) to study religion, mysticism, evolution, perfumes, music, and jewels (131-135). Dracula, in contrast, studies English culture in preparation for conquest.

Dorian’s nocturnal existence, his abuse of women, his preternatural youth, and quest for knowledge all suggest that he was a model for Dracula. However, Dorian is not the only inspiration for Dracula to be found in Wilde. Samuel Lyndon Gladden notes the national, educational, and personal ties between the writers before moving on to their literary similarities. Both were Irish, studied at Trinity College, and courted the same woman, Florence Balcombe. Even after Balcombe married Stoker, the men remained friends. They lived in the same London neighborhood and, with their wives, entertained together. Gladden’s study focuses on the similarities between Wilde’s popular play, *The Importance of Being Earnest*, which debuted in 1895, and Stoker’s *Dracula*, which was published in 1897 about a month after Wilde was released from prison after serving a sentence for gross indecency. Gladden’s theory is that Stoker tried to “demonize” Wilde in *Dracula*, and he tries to support it with a study of the number of times Stoker uses the words “wild,” “earnest,” and their variations. Talia Schaffer, in her article “‘A Wilde Desire Took Me’: The Homoerotic History of *Dracula*,” makes a similar argument about Stoker and Wilde. One of Schaffer’s claims is that while Stoker tried to efface his rival Wilde from his life, Stoker wrote Wilde into his fiction. Focused on manifestations of
Wilde in *Dracula*, Schaffer strains even harder than Gladden to make connections. Her main area of concern is Jonathan Harker’s imprisonment in Dracula’s castle, which she equates with Wilde’s imprisonment for gross indecency. “Harker’s imprisonment follows Wilde’s model,” Schaffer writes (405).

What Gladden and Schaffer overlook are the many connections between “The Canterville Ghost,” which Wilde published in 1887 around the time he and his wife were socializing with the Stokers in London, and *Dracula*. These connections offer even more material on which to base speculation about Stoker and Wilde’s personal relationship. But, more importantly, they show how much Stoker was influenced by Wilde’s aesthetics of the body and rhetoric, and how much he was able to import from Wilde’s fiction. The interest here is that Stoker apparently was so deeply impressed by Wilde’s depiction of a supernatural figure using declamation and self-fashioning in the creation of monstrosity that he borrowed from it, either consciously or unconsciously. Sir Simon can be considered a prototype of Dracula in a number of ways. Some of the similarities are obvious. They are close in age: Simon, readers are told, is about three hundred years old. And, if the historical Dracula’s birth year of 1431 is accepted, the literary Dracula is about 466 at the time of the events depicted in the novel. Both proudly live in ancestral lands. Simon has the “brave old Canterville spirit” (10), while Dracula traces his family lineage back to Attila the Hun (34). Simon roams his ancestral home at night; he listens for the “cock crew,” and he sleeps in a “coffin” (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 11). Dracula has similar habits. Some of the dialogue in Wilde’s story even seems to be echoed in *Dracula*. For example, the housekeeper Mrs. Umney’s greeting of the Otises
with the statement “‘I bid you welcome to Canterville Chase’” (3) sounds very similar to Dracula’s greeting of Jonathan Harker. “‘I am Dracula; and I bid you welcome….’” (Stoker, Dracula 22). Moreover, Simon’s statement about the difficulty in procuring blood in modern times seems revised and repeated by Dracula. Confronted by Virginia for stealing her paints and using them to replenish the notorious “blood” of Canterville Chase, Simon defends himself, saying, “‘It is a very difficult thing to get real blood nowadays…’” (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 16). In a similar vein, Dracula laments the scarcity of blood, saying, “‘Blood is too precious a thing in these days of dishonourable peace …’” (Stoker, Dracula 35).

While interesting, these similarities are superficial. “The Canterville Ghost” and Dracula are linked by deeper concerns. First, Simon and Dracula are the same type of monstrosity: the living corpse. Some may object that they are essentially different: Simon is a ghost and Dracula is a vampire. But, like Dracula, Simon has a body that occasionally dissipates. On one occasion, the Canterville ghost escapes from the Otis twins by “hastily adopting the Fourth Dimension of Space … he vanished through the wainscoting” (Wilde 5). He changes to “mist” and slips through the Otises as the father holds him at gunpoint (7). Fleeing from the twins on another outing, “he vanished into the great iron stove, which, fortunately for him, was not lit …” (13). At other times, Simon has a body is material, clumsy and vulnerable to injury and pain. Like Dracula, Simon has a fearsome appearance firmly linked to his identity. When Hiram Otis sees Simon in a moonlit corridor for the first time, the ghost is “an old man of terrible aspect. His eyes were as a red as burning coals; long grey hair fell over his shoulders in matted
coils, his garments, which were of antique cut, were soiled and ragged . . . ” (5). Compare this description to Jonathan Harker’s description of an enraged Dracula: “His eyes were positively blazing. The red light in them was lurid, as if the flames of hell-fire blazed behind them. His face was deathly pale, and the lines of it were hard like drawn wires; the thick eyebrows that met over the nose now seemed like a heaving bar of white-hot metal” (Stoker Dracula 43). In bodily form, Simon has misadventures. He bangs his knee on a suit of armor, and he experiences “acute agony” (Wilde, “The Can te rville Ghost” 7). He falls “on his winding sheet” while fleeing the dummy ghost the twins set up to mock him (11). He trips in the dark over strings the twins have pulled across the hallway. He experiences a “severe fall” by “treading on a butter-slide” the twins set out for him and falls down stairs (12). They also perch a water jug above a door, which soaks him “to the skin” when he enters the room (12). He also gets “weak and tired” (11) and becomes almost an “invalid” (14).

Another similarity between Dracula and Simon is their ability to refashion their bodies. Simon changes himself into “a large black dog” to frightening effect (8). Likewise, Dracula takes the form of an “immense dog” to leap from the schooner Demeter after it is driven ashore in England by a violent storm (Stoker Dracula 78). It is also clear that when Simon assumes his favorite personas to frighten mortals, the roles involve more than the costuming and makeup he mentions: he removes his head (Wilde, “The Can te rville Ghost” 13) and grotesquely distorts his unstable body to become characters such as “Dumb Daniel, or the Suicide’s Skeleton” (9), who scuttles around the room as a pile of bones with a dangling eyeball; or “Jonas the Graveless, or the Corpse
Snatcher of Chertsey Barn, one of his most remarkable impersonations” (13). Like Dracula’s rhetoric, Simon’s rhetoric is largely embodied. The sense readers get that Dracula—a detailed planner as far as his relocation to London is concerned—is engaged in careful self-presentation and a certain amount of theatricality is made plain about Simon in “The Canterville Ghost.” The story’s third-person narrator reveals Simon’s thoughts, his self-consciousness, his preparation for the roles he plays, and his memories of how well his past performances succeeded in frightening audiences. This observation leads to yet another similarity between Simon and Dracula: their cruelty. Simon’s cruelty is displayed in his reminiscences of haunting his descendants at Canterville Chase, along with their servants and acquaintances, and destroying their health, sanity, and lives. Dracula’s depraved cruelty is displayed when he feeds a living child to his vampire women (Stoker, Dracula 43). Although Simon terrifies male and female, some of the more tragic stories involve attractive women, such as Lady Stutfield, who drowned herself (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 6); and Lady Barbara Modish, who “died of a broken heart” after her lover was shot in a duel linked back to her fear of Simon and her refusal to marry into the Canterville clan (12). Lydia Reineck Wilburn makes a case for an even more sinister possibility, that Simon sexually initiates Virginia after they disappear into the spirit realm. She writes, “Wilde handles the sexual goings-on between the Ghost and Virginia so discreetly that they have remained hidden from audiences within the story as well as most readers of the story” (n.pag.). Wilburn argues that numerous details supporting this reading are coded into the story, the most significant being Virginia’s refusal to talk about her ghostly experience with her new husband, the
duke. Simon’s victimization of women is a behavior repeated by Dracula, who targets Lucy Westenra and then Mina Murray Harker. “The Canterville Ghost” and *Dracula* also end with similar scenes of harmony between the sexes. In “The Canterville Ghost,” the duke muses about the children that he and Virginia will have together as man and wife. And in *Dracula*, Jonathan and Mina Harker take a pleasure trip to Transylvania with their child.

There are additional connections between “The Canterville Ghost” and *Dracula* through *Dorian Gray*. Two of Simon’s most successful personas were vampires. One of them was “Gaunt Gibeon, the Blood Sucker of Bexley Moor” (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 6). And, playing the part of “The Vampire Monk, or the Bloodless Benedictine,” Simon frightened “Lady Startup” to death in 1764 (14). Indeed, in terms of the fear, suffering, and tragedy they inflict on the living, Simon and Dracula are roughly equal. However, Simon’s epideictic fails for his nineteenth-century audience, making his story a comedy, while Dracula’s succeeds, making his story a horror tale. The vampire hunters—led by Van Helsing—in *Dracula* take the count seriously and seek to inconvenience, fight, and destroy him. The Otises do not dread Simon, as Basil learns to dread Dorian just before Dorian stabs him to death. At least part of the answer as to why Simon’s epideictic fails lies with his audience. Dracula and the vampire hunters—excepting Quincy Morris—at least have a common Old World heritage. Despite America’s roots in the Old World, Simon and his audience are estranged. Wilburn notes this same disconnect between Simon and his audience, writing, “Unlike their English neighbors, the upstart Americans refuse to take the Ghost seriously; instead, they satirize and parody his
stunts and horrors. This response eventually depresses the Canterville Ghost” (n.pag.) Simon, therefore, recalls what Bakhtin refers to as the “funny monstrosity” of the early Renaissance. He argues that this concept of “laughter … in macabre images …” was almost completely lost by the nineteenth century. He writes, “The bourgeois nineteenth century respected only satirical laughter, which was not actually laughter but rhetoric” (51). Simon reveals his attitude toward the Otises when, in trying to compliment Virginia, he says that is unlike the rest of her “‘horrid, rude, vulgar, dishonest family’” (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 15). This is why “The Canterville Ghost” can be read as a study in the contrasts between American and British cultures. While the British are depicted as mired in issues of tradition, ancestry, inheritance, class, pessimism, and decadence, the Americans are depicted as iconoclastic, upwardly mobile, egalitarian, optimistic, and wholly invested in the industrial-commercial system that Englishmen like John Ruskin found inimical to Northern European history. Wilde ironically remarks on the differences between the two cultures when he writes that upon moving to England, Lucretia Otis does not affect the “European refinement” of “chronic ill health. Instead, “she was quite English, and was an excellent example of the fact that we have everything in common with America nowadays, except, of course, language” (2). Language, however, is key to epideictic, and epideictic is about its audience. Socrates says in Menexenus that epideictic is all about flattery: “… when you’re performing before the people you are praising, being thought to speak well is no great feat” (952). Lockwood writes that “At heart, epideictic oratory is simply a form of flattery.” He cites Aristotle’s belief that “The speaker may flatter the listeners and obtain their approval by including them … as the
objects of praise” (Lockwood 101). Simon’s vexation with the Otises’ modernity in the form of their household products—Pinkerton’s Champion Stain Remover, Paragon Detergent, and Tammany Rising Sun Lubricator—is one of the comic indicators of his lack of common ground with his audience. Dracula shares the same vexation with modernity in the form of mirrors, shorthand, and phonographs, but his response is much different than Simon’s: the count destroys these technologies. Simon, on the other hand, mocks the Otises’ products before he grudgingly adopts the lubricator to oil his chains. He is “a little humiliated … but afterwards was sensible enough to see that there was a great deal to be said for the invention, and … it served its purpose” (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 12). The reaction Simon inspires in his new audience is not terror but sympathy and pity. It is an emotional response, but not the one he had hoped for. Hiram Otis indicates his willingness to share the house with the ghost, whom he acknowledges has been there longer, but says they will have to take his chains if he refuses to oil them. He also warns the twins that it is impolite to harass the ghost (7). Meeting the ghost, Virginia says, “I am sorry for you....” Hearing that the ghost was starved to death, Virginia offers him a sandwich. And when he says he has not slept in three hundred years, Virginia looks into “his old withered face,” and says, “Poor, poor Ghost” (16). Simon is able to gain the family’s sympathy and Virginia’s agreement to plead for him before the Angel of Death despite the terrible crime he has committed in murdering his wife. Simon does not even say he is sorry for killing her. In fact, he sounds as if he believes he was justified in killing her because she was a bad housekeeper and cook. He says that “it was a purely family matter” (15). However, Virginia’s sympathy for Simon
is strong enough for her to overlook his transgressions and to face her own fear of death. The discovery of Simon’s bones in his secret prison and his proper burial signals that nature has been restored. As Scandura states, it is the “sign that was prized” among Victorians (14). Simon’s deteriorated body—like Dorian’s rotting flesh and Dracula’s disintegration into dust—signals that the natural cycle of life and death has been restored. The destroyed body marks the end of Simon’s rhetorical performance, as it does the performances of Dorian and Dracula. The terrors of the living corpse and live burial have been dispelled.

This chapter began with the observation that while Dorian Gray may seem intrinsically different from the other novels examined in this study due to its lack of a classical monster like Frankenstein’s creature, Dracula, Edward Hyde, or Moreau’s Beast People, it is actually quite similar. Dorian’s monstrosity is more refined. Like the other monsters, Dorian is a hybrid, but he is a hybrid of human and art, not a hybrid of human and animal. The application of art to the human body creates a monstrosity referred to as the living corpse. Equally terrifying to Victorians was the living corpse’s counterpart, the live burial. Dorian is constituted as monster through rhetoric. The novel’s main orator is the sophistic Henry Wotton, whose epideictic on youth and beauty—coupled with Basil Hallward’s creation in art of Dorian’s double—transforms Dorian into a living corpse that embodies its own epideictic. Although Plato’s Menexenus is applicable to Dorian Gray, the most significant dialogue is Gorgias and its concern with the relationship between rhetoric and the soul. Gorgias also raises the issue of execution in its critique of sophistic rhetoric, and Wilde incorporates disarticulation in Dorian Gray through
images—some of them coded—of torture and execution, and vivisection and dissection. Disarticulation can also be found in at least two of his other works: Salome and “The Canterville Ghost.” The most significant element connecting Dorian Gray, Salome, and “The Canterville Ghost” is the hybridization of the body, which involves a figurative cutting of the body to create a new form. Pointing toward this figurative cutting in all three works are instances of the cutting of the body—or at least its suggestion—within their plots. The concept of the human body as work of art connects Wilde’s writings to the growing Victorian interest in funeral science and the use of corpses as an artistic models and media. The terror of corpses being used as artistic media is evident in critics’ attacks on Pre-Raphaelite art and its anatomical realism, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Underlying these concerns is the idea, suggested by Edgar Allan Poe and later by Walter Pater, that art is a vampiric force that drains and replaces its subjects with monstrous imitations. This anxiety coincided with the Victorian dread of the dead body that showed no signs of decay as something unnatural and monstrous. All of these cultural interests, concerns, and fears converge in Dorian Gray and point toward Dracula.
Figure 4. Sketches from Leonardo Da Vinci’s Anatomical Studies ("Leonardo da Vinci Anatomical Drawings").
Figure 5. Drawing from Andreas Vesalius’s *De Humani Corporis Fabrica* (“File: Vesalius Fabrica”).
Figure 6. Emblematic Frontspiece of Vesalius’s *De Humani Corporis Fabrica* (“De Humani”).
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: RHETORIC, MONSTERS, AND RENEWAL

As I was writing the last pages of this study, the literary world was awaiting the publication of “Romantic Outlaws”: The Extraordinary Lives of Mary Wollstonecraft and Her Daughter Mary Shelley. Asked about readers’ “enduring fascination with Frankenstein,” the author of the forthcoming dual biography, Charlotte Gordon, mentions “the dangers science and technology” but traces the monstrosity of the book to “a world without mothers.” Gordon elaborates, “All the chaos and the violence in that book ensues (sic) because there’s no nurturing, there’s no mom, there’s no maternal love” (Russell D6). Much the same could be said of every novel examined in this study, with their lack of significant female characters, with the possible exception of Dracula. Exactly how much scholarship Gordon would devote to a thesis about the absence of mothers as inspiration for Victor Frankenstein’s creature was uncertain. However, her comments point toward the powerful impulse among critics of nineteenth-century British horror fiction to speculate about the origins of its monstrosities, as if defining them gives us some mastery over them. Many such interpretations have been advanced over the years along a spectrum that extends from biography and history to culture and science. Marshall Brown, for instance, sees Frankenstein as an expression of the “unhappy yearnings” of Mary Shelley’s childhood (145), while Denise Gigante interprets John
Keats’s *Lamia* as a reaction against Newtonian physics and materialism (433-5). Meanwhile, Sherryl Vint’s feminist reading of *The Island of Dr. Moreau* critiques male-dominated scientific ethos through the lens of animal vivisection. And Stephen D. Arata argues that *Dracula* and other fin-de-siècle horror and science fiction can be read as expressions of anxiety over imperial decline and reverse colonization (623). These thought-provoking analyses and countless others are illuminating and offer readers new ways to understand and appreciate the texts they examine. In my study, I have not sought to counter any of these origin theories. Instead, I have tried to add to the dialogue by offering a reading of the creation and destruction of nineteenth-century literary monstrosities that focuses on a largely overlooked source: rhetoric.

**Reading Monsters Rhetorically**

I began my study by challenging claims that rhetoric perished in nineteenth-century England. On the contrary, it can be found alive and well—or at least undead and unwell—in an unexpected place: late-Victorian horror fiction. The primary claim here is that the writers of four well-known works of fin-de-siècle horror fiction used classical rhetorical forms and patterns transmitted by the elocutionary movement in formulating characters and plots. Rhetoric is used here in the sense of oratory, and this study considers *Frankenstein* by Mary Shelley as a foundational work in the examination of rhetoric in nineteenth-century horror fiction due to its depiction of a monster declaiming. The main works analyzed in this study have been *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* by Robert Louis Stevenson, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* by Oscar Wilde, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* by H.G. Wells, and *Dracula* by Bram Stoker.
All of these works were produced in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when Victorian notions of a stable, proper human form had largely faded and capital punishment as a corrective for transgressing bodies had been removed from the public arena, replaced by news accounts and readers’ imaginations. By the time Stevenson published *Jekyll and Hyde*, England was less than a generation removed from public executions. And Hyde, we recall, is very much concerned about hanging from the gallows. Such spectacles would have still been vivid in the collective memory of Britons, for whom public executions served as cathartic form of entertainment that strengthened community bonds while at the same time assuring them that the law still had force. This opportunity for closure and the psychic relief it offered was largely denied the people when the spectacle was taken away. The French went through a similar withdrawal one hundred years earlier. Foucault explains that when the guillotine was instituted in France in 1792 as a more humane and democratic form of execution, people complained that the new technology obscured their view of executions. They wanted their gallows back: “The right to be witnesses was one that they possessed and claimed,” Michel Foucault writes (*Discipline and Punish* 58). My claim is that late-Victorian horror fiction is basically nostalgic, expressing a longing for the spectacle of public execution by refracting and incorporating some of its primary elements, namely its rhetorical pronouncements, its destruction of monstrosities to avenge the state and admonish witnesses, and the awareness that sanctioned violence could spill into audiences and draw them into the performance at the scaffold.
Late-Victorian horror fiction’s development in the wake of this loss of capital punishment as a spectacle helps explain the literature’s distinctive fin-de-siècle quality. Audiences at that time would have brought a different set of historical circumstances to their reading of the literature. They would have interpreted it differently and seen more of themselves in the pages. Writers must have understood this awareness, even if on an intuitive level. Their urge to satisfy readers’ deep-seated need to witness the destruction of the monstrous in a ritual incorporating rhetorical and dramatic elements contributed to the formation of an aesthetics of that depicted the sundering of bodies—bodies that are figured as corrupt, like criminal bodies, in need of regulation, coercion, or destruction. A pattern running through all four fin-de-siècle works examined in this study is the cutting of the body in relation to declamation, to rhetorical performance or display. The monsters in these texts are depicted as being fashioned or self-fashioned through rhetoric, and as using rhetoric. The medical term this study borrows to define the configuration of oratory and bodily destruction is disarticulation. In a medical sense, disarticulation refers to amputation. In a literary sense, it is a trope that figures rhetoric as a coercive form of discipline seeking to normalize and control corrupt bodies. Its methods include execution, torture, and dismemberment, which were examined in chapter four on Dracula; morbid dissection, which are central to the scientific romances of Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde; and the aestheticization of the body, which factors heavily into Dorian Gray.

Disarticulation, however, does not fully explain the fear produced by late-Victorian horror fiction. Another concept that this study has considered has been epideictic. One of Aristotle’s three branches of rhetoric, epideictic is ceremonial speech.
The famous example is the funeral oration, which praises the dead and, through the orator, allows the dead to speak to the living. In Plato’s *Menexenus*, Socrates speaks of the skill of Athenian funeral orators in praising the war dead and how they are able to transform the souls of their audiences and send them into a state of euphoria. In these moments, epideictic appeals to audiences’ notions of their essential, common identity, encourages patriotism, and creates social cohesion. Socrates even rhapsodizes in the dialogue that epideictic can physically alter audience members. He is speaking figuratively, but his words take on new meaning in the context of late-Victorian horror fiction, with its monstrous hybrids. And epideictic has its dark side. Aristotle writes that just as it can be used to praise, it can also be used to place blame. Therefore, it can effect division and dread. When this happens, the shared essentialism between speaker and audience is lost, identities are obscured, and community breaks down. Although epideictic can be located in *Frankenstein*, I have examined it primarily as a fin-de-siècle phenomenon centered on the monstrosities depicted in the four novels. It is directly associated with Dracula, who delivers a Socratic epideictic oration, but it is also present in characters’ confused reactions to Moreau’s Beast People, Edward Hyde, and Dorian Gray.

Epideictic’s censorious potential was well-suited to late-Victorian horror fiction. Even though the public enactment of capital punishment had been abolished, there was not a consensus among Britons that they were safer at home and that their empire at large was moral, thriving and ascendant. Indeed, the fin-de-siècle period is often defined by its doubt, pessimism, and obsession with degeneracy. These attitudes have helped label the
fin de siècle as *decadent*, an aesthetic term from the Latin *de cadere*, which means “falling away.” A decadent society is one that had “decayed, falling from a state of health and prosperity to one of physical and ethical ruin” (Denisoff 33). Arata points out that 1897, the year *Dracula* was published, was Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee. However, it was a year “marked by considerably more introspection and less self-congratulation than the celebration a decade earlier” (622). Contributing to the perception that Britain’s position was eroding were its loss of overseas markets, the rise of the United States and Germany as world powers, unrest in the colonies, and growing uncertainties about the morality of imperialism. All of these factors worked to undermine “Victorian confidence in the inevitability of British progress and hegemony” (622). These anxieties bled into the fiction of the *fin-de-siècle*. Arata writes, “Late-Victorian fiction ... is saturated with the sense that the entire nation—as a race of people, as a political and imperial force, as a social and cultural power—was in irretrievable decline” (622). These attitudes, however, did not characterize the entire *fin de siècle*. Co-existing with fears of decline was optimism about new the “limitless generative power of the British nation” in the areas of imperialism, women’s rights, journalism, science, and technology (Ledger and Luckhurst xiii). Much about society was old and in decline, but much was new and promising. A new millennium was imminent. Sally Ledger and Roger Luckhurst point out that “the *fin de siècle* has come to be identified as the moment of emergence” for new cultural trends (xiv).
Dismemberment and Renewal

The reconsideration of the *fin de siècle* as a time of optimism and renewal linked to social and scientific progress over pessimism and decay linked to imperial and human decline recalls the opening paragraphs of this study and Don Paul Abbott’s summary of elocutionist Thomas Sheridan’s beliefs that oratorical instruction based on Greek and Roman precedents held forth the promise of England’s national, cultural and religious renewal (117). As I pointed out in my introduction, though, Abbott leaves open the question of exactly how Sheridan believed oratory would reinvigorate literature. My argument has been that the rhetorically-constructed monstrosities of late-Victorian horror fiction—so deeply informed by elocutionary pedagogy—can be seen as participating in Sheridan’s project. Reading them this way, however, forces us to read these monstrosities as more than boogey-men, and it gives them far more depth and meaning than they may initially appear to have. They become archetypal figures functioning within *fin-de-siècle* myths of quest, death, and rebirth. Jerusha McCormack identifies Dorian Gray as just such a character. McCormack argues that Wilde’s intentions in writing his novel were not strictly literary but also mythic. His purpose was to “retell a story whose end is known; a story as old as that of the dying gods, Dionysius and Christ, or of those who sought themselves to appropriate their power, Adam and Faust” (111).

McCormack’s observations about Dorian could be applied to the other literary monstrosities examined in this study. Their mythical significance is clarified through archetypes of the grotesque body and their links to the cyclical creation, destruction, and renewal of the world as defined by Mikhail Bakhtin in his analyses of Rabelais’s writing.
Bakhtin argues, “The entire field of realistic literature of the last three centuries is strewn with the fragments of grotesque realism, which at times are not mere remnants of the past but manifest a renewed vitality” (24). His remarks cover the nineteenth century, which he asserts was frightened by the concept of the grotesque body that could be altered through experience and consumption, even though its functions in the Middle Ages were festive and comedic. Beginning with the Neoclassicists and Romanitcs, Bakhtin claims, the grotesque “ceased to be a joyful and triumphant hilarity. Its positive regenerating power was reduced to a minimum” (38). The links between fin-de-siècle monstrosities and the grotesque are numerous. One of the first is what Bakhtin calls the “double body,” or the body that encompasses death and life in the act of creation (318). It parallels the pregnant body, although it is not limited to the female and the birth of a child (308). The double body looms large in late-Victorian fiction. In Dracula, the undead count’s interests include fashioning for himself a new, English body, out of his undead body. In Moreau, the doctor’s animals are surgically altered and given new bodies that are later abandoned by their creator and aborted by nature. In Jekyll and Hyde, the doppelgängers share a consciousness but have distinct bodies, until Jekyll irreversibly transforms into Hyde. In Dorian Gray, Dorian is given a second body in his portrait, which suffers the effects of sin and aging. And in Frankenstein, the creature’s desire is the formation out of dead matter a second body to become his mate.

A second link between fin-de-siècle monstrosity and grotesque is Bakhtin’s observation that grotesque figures are defined by their degradation, or the reversal of their upper stratum and lower stratum (309). Simply put, degraded characters become their
bowels and genitals, the body parts involved in digestion and procreation. All of the \textit{fin-de-siècle} monsters are sexualized to varying degrees. Foremost among them is Dracula, whose attacks on Lucy and Mina are connoted rapes. Hyde’s nocturnal activities are hidden until rumors begin circulating after Carew’s slaying. Two years after the publication of Stevenson’s novella, Victorians quickly linked the fictional Hyde to Jack the Ripper, who can be seen as another sexualized Victorian monster constructed by the sensational media through disarticulation (Joyce 502). Among Moreau’s Beast People is the doctor’s final project, the puma woman, whose treatment has been likened to sexual bondage and torture (Vint 91-2). And a drug-addicted prostitute in an opium den accuses Dorian—the avatar of the bisexual in \textit{fin-de-siècle} literature—of having caused her ruin (190). This sexualization also can be found earlier in \textit{Frankenstein}, as the creature gazes on the sleeping Justine Moritz before effecting her ruin and destruction, and then kills Victor’s new bride Elizabeth in her bed after he is denied his own mate.

By far, the most significant link between \textit{fin-de-siècle} monstrosities and the grotesque for this study is bodily dismemberment. Bakhtin identifies dismemberment as one of the motifs of grotesque realism, along with “copulation, pregnancy, birth, growth, old age, [and] disintegration” (25). Dismemberment takes two basic forms in Bakhtin. The first type is punishment carried out by the “diablerie” of medieval mystery plays who burn, mutilate, and tear apart heretics in hell. “We have here a grotesque dismemberment, an anatomization,” Bakhtin states (347). The more crucial form of dismemberment, however, has to do with the sundering of giants within myths of creation. These myths relate how the parts of dismembered giants were used to form the landscape. “Most local
legends,” Bakhtin explains, “connect such natural phenomenon as mountains, rivers, rocks, and islands with the bodies of giants ...” (328). Later, Bakhtin contends that these features inspire “cosmic terror, the fear of the immeasurable, the infinitely power.” It is “the fear of that which is materially huge and cannot be overcome by force” (335). Thus, it is akin to the sublime as well as epideictic in fin-de-siècle horror fiction, which fills characters with confusion and dread. In addition to giants, other mythical figures also seed the earth and renew creation. Bakhtin points out that Abel is the first man to die in the Bible, and in Pantagruel Abel’s blood renews the “earth’s fertility” (327). Human myths are filled with such stories of the sacrifices of such characters and the renewal these slayings bring to the earth. Among them are the Egyptian Osiris, whose dismemberment ensures the fertility of the land, and the Greek Orpheus, whose lyre and severed head continued singing the songs that soothed nature. Likewise, the New Testament Gospels contain all of the elements of disarticulation, as well as those of the living Outside of the context of religion, raising the dead is monstrous. Wilde’s Herod reminds us of this when he says, “It would be terrible if the dead came back” (Salome 28).

The claim that some connection can be found between the monstrosities of late-Victorian horror fiction and myths of the earth’s creation and renewal finds more support in the sympathy they are able to elicit from readers. At times, these characters are pathetic excuses for monsters, and their deaths become tragedies rather than triumphs. Dracula, for example, has to do his own cooking and cleaning at home in his castle in Transylvania. His reading material is dry and dull, made up of the British parliamentary
reports, almanacs, and the train schedules he consumes to become an Englishman.

Despite his fearsomeness, he sees to Harker’s safety in the castle. Even worse, perhaps, is that the women in his vampire harem mock and laugh at him, telling him he is unable to love. Emotionally wounded by their taunts, Dracula feebly replies, “Yes, I too can love” (43). As if to add injury to insult, Dracula must also bring home food—a living child—for these hardhearted, insulting women. Even Mina, who has been sexually assaulted by Dracula, pleads with the men sworn to the count’s destruction to have sympathy for his “poor soul” for he “is the saddest case of all” (269). Just after Dracula’s head has been nearly severed, and just before his body disintegrates, Mina describes an unimagined “look of peace” on his face (325). In Jekyll and Hyde, Hyde becomes the victim of Jekyll’s guilt and poor decisions. His creation was unsolicited, and after murdering Carew, he fears hanging. Before his death, he begs Utterson for “mercy” from inside a locked room and emits a “dismal screech ... of animal terror” before poisoning himself (39). Likewise, Moreau’s Beast People were victims of the doctor’s unethical science. Their plight generate pathos even in Prendick, and he kills the Leopard Man who had stalked him earlier in the novel rather than let the monster be captured and returned to Moreau’s “House of Pain” for more torture (240). In Dorian Gray, Dorian’s infatuation with the actress Sybil Vane makes him seem more like a teenage boy and less like an immortal terror. Dorian’s cruelty to Sybil is the first indication of his monstrous nature, but he tries to make amends by choosing not to deflower a country girl he falls in love with later in the novel. Readers fear for Dorian when Sybil’s vengeful brother, James Vane, threatens to shoot him, but Dorian’s cunning nature saves him. What innocence
that survives in Dorian’s character is displayed when he tries to stop a hunter from shooting a rabbit on an outing at Selby Royal in the English countryside. On the other hand, when his new nemesis James Vane is accidentally shot and killed during the same outing, Dorian feels “joy” (205). By this time, Dorian is looking forward to the end of the world. “I wish it were fin du globe,” he says. “Life is a great disappointment” (177). The Bakhtinian significance of this desire is underscored when Dorian’s death ironically resets the natural cycle of his life and his body rots. Of all the monstrosities examined in this study, Frankenstein’s creature is the only one that can be said to approach gigantic stature. Throughout the novel, it is unclear if readers are to believe the creature’s reckoning of himself as essentially good. However, readers can finally feel sympathy for the monster at the end of the novel. Speaking over the lifeless body of his creator, the monster shares his death wish with Walton and relates his demise to nature: the heavens, the winds, the trees and the birds. His plan is to immolate himself. He imagines “dying in the agony of the torturing flames” and his “ashes” being “swept into the sea by the winds” (179). Around the time that Shelley was working on her 1831 revision of Frankenstein, she also wrote the story “The Mortal Immortal,” which ends with the main character, Winzy, saying that to escape the curse of immortality he accidentally brought on himself he will commit suicide by “scattering and annihilating the atoms that compose my frame…” (326). Within the rubric of the creation myth in grotesque realism, the giant’s disintegrated body seeds the earth and renews creation. However, the only novel in which there is a perception of change in the earth is Dracula. In a journal entry about his family’s “summer” trip to Transylvania, Harker recalls that “Seven years ago we all
went through the flames...” He has his “vivid and terrible memories” of the place, but the horror has been “blotted out” (326). The monster has been dismembered, fertility has been restored, and the landscape has been altered from darkness to light.\footnote{Bakhtin writes that the Romantic grotesque is oriented toward darkness: “It is in most cases nocturnal” (41).}

Hopefully, this study will help other critics find new approaches not only to late-Victorian horror fiction, but also to other nineteenth-century texts that do not feature supernatural characters and situations. For example, this study mentions Robert Browning’s poem \textit{The Ring and the Book}, but it has not pointed out that Guido Franceschini is constructed as monster in the text and that he is also the orator in two of the poem’s twelve books. Likewise, Mr. Creakle’s teaching with a cane in 1850’s \textit{David Copperfield} is metaphorized as “cutting” (Dickens 82). In the same novel, there is Mr. Dick and his eccentric obsession with King Charles I’s beheading. And, then, there is John Keats’s 1820 poem \textit{Isabella, or the Pot of Basil}, in which the grieving title character cuts off her murdered lover’s head as a macabre keepsake after he speaks to her in a dream. However, rather than looking back, perhaps the best direction to look to apply this critical approach is forward to the Modernist era and its seminal poet, T.S. Eliot. Disarticulation promises fresh insights into poems such as \textit{The Waste Land}, in which tensions between creation and destruction are captured in images of death and rebirth, and barrenness and fertility. The poem certainly features mutilation and dismemberment, with allusions to Philomel in “A Game of Chess” and Phlebas the drowned Phoenician sailor whose bones are picked clean by whispering currents in “Death By Water.” So,
when one of the speakers in “The Burial of the Dead” asks, “‘That corpse you planted last year in your garden, / Has it begun to sprout?’” (I.71-2), readers can no longer be certain that is a botanical reference to a reeking flower. Has the earth been seeded with the grotesque body? Perhaps the ever-allusive Eliot understood disarticulation and was drawing on an extensive horror tradition, one that constructed bodies as grotesque and subjected them to the social controls of rhetoric, violence, and refashioning to produce order, knowledge, and art.
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