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Body, pleasure, language and world: A framework for the critical analysis of dance education

Blumenfeld-Jones, Donald Steven, Ed.D.
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1990
BODY, PLEASURE, LANGUAGE AND WORLD: A FRAMEWORK
FOR THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
DANCE EDUCATION

by

Donald S. Blumenfeld-Jones

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
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This dissertation is a philosophical analysis of the language of dance education. In particular the writer analyses the relation between language and body understanding.

The Introduction presents an initial metaphor of consciousness as "world". The dance classroom is characterized as a space for the negotiation of the worlds of the students and teachers. The negotiation is political with unequal distribution of influence over the formation of the classroom world, such negotiation ordinarily favoring the teacher's world. Berger and Luckmann and Rorty are major sources for the analysis.

Chapter One relates language to the formation of consciousness. Language functions to prevent us from knowing the world and enables us to come to know the world. Language is characterized as metaphorical, as a set of conflicting languages vying for social ascension and as incorporating a set of dialectical relationships. The individual consciousness is understood to be, at base, socially constructed. Nietzsche, Gadamer, Bakhtin and Jacoby are cited.

Chapter Two analyzes three seminal dance education texts, written by Margaret H'Doubler and Alma Hawkins, as cultural artifacts, setting out the major ideas and describing the language used to set the ideas out. The problematic character of
the relation between ideas and language and the cultural basis of
the texts is examined.

Chapter Three presents the author’s dance experience of
becoming a dance body, negotiating meanings with teachers,
choreographers and audiences. The concept of pleasure is used as
a conceptual framework. The author’s experience is aphorised as
"personal body" and is analyzed in cultural terms.

Chapter Four analyzes Chapters Two and Three in the light of
Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray. The
dissertation takes the position that we learn to become bodies.
Language is related to the patriarchy and bodily pleasure.
Language is found to participate in suppressing pleasure.

Chapter Five critiques the analysis and provides ideas for
further work.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation has to do with developing a framework for critically examining dance education for high school and college students in the U.S. (from now on to be called, in short hand, dance education). I will base much of my analytic framework on a critical examination of some central texts in the field. These texts provide what, for me, is a central metaphor of current dance education practice, i.e. technique. Dance education, when viewed from the perspective of examining dance education texts which purport to say how dance education ought to be, has, for the most part, been conducted in an atmosphere of technical practicality by which I mean the focus has been upon how to make good dancers so that society may have in its midst good dancers for the making of quality art dance. This practical, technical orientation has been conducted without inquiring into the basic premise that society needs good dancers and quality art dance and, in addition, without examining the implications of other premises which ground the curricular prescriptions which flow out of the basic premise. For purposes of the present study I am going to focus on these other premises, although I believe that what I will develop as a critical understanding will have meaning for the validity of the basic premise.

It would be fair to say that while the field of dance
education is dominated by a "how-to" consciousness in the texts which I will analyze attention is turned toward a more substantive examination of dance education. Of these few I am going to focus upon two of the most important figures in the field, Margaret H'Doubler (1940) and Alma Hawkins (1954, 1988) and, specifically, upon the books which they have written. These books have come to be considered classic theoretical treatments of dance education. Unlike the rest of the field, these treatments are presented as arguments in favor of teaching dance in a certain way without detailing how the teaching will be concretely manifested in the classroom. Because of their predominantly theoretical cast I do not need to surmise their premises (as I would have to do with most other texts) but can directly examine their version of their premises. There are other educators who offer some validating principles along with lesson plans (M. Turner, 1954, Pease, 1966, Lockhart & Pease, 1973, Sherbon, 1982, Hayes, 1980, and Radir, 1944, to name a few) but in not so developed a manner as do H'Doubler and Hawkins. This makes H'Doubler and Hawkins good choices for my purposes.

I have written that their works are considered classics in the field. This status of "classic" is attested to by the fact that H'Doubler's major work, Dance, A Creative Art Experience (1940), was originally published in 1940 and yet is still in print today. Hawkins's first major work, Modern Dance in Higher
Education (1954), was first published in 1954, was reissued in 1982 and is still available for purchase. Hawkins's other important work, Creating Through Dance (1988), was published in 1964, was revised in 1988 and is, according to Richard Carlin of Princeton Book Company, a major distributor of dance books, the most adopted college text in their catalogue. On the back of Creating Through Dance, Helen Alkire, a long-time dance educator, writes, "The book should be in the required reading list of all dance majors—undergraduate and graduate" (Hawkins, 1988). Succinctly put, the point here is that, despite the age of these books, 50 years, 36 years and 26 years respectively, they continue to be important sources of information and understanding for dance educators.

In the above I have suggested that, in one way or another, their discourse grounds the thinking of dance educators. It is important to understand that I am not making the corollary claim that all dance educators attempt to model their classrooms on the H'Doubler or Hawkins's frameworks. Indeed in Charlotte Irey's "Introduction" to the revised edition of Creating Through Dance (1988) she reminds the reader that this is not a how-to book, that its value is based on its conceptualizations of dance pedagogy and that these concepts must be in place in order to make dance pedagogy what it ought to be. Implied in this is the notion that dance educators have not been attending to Hawkins's point of view. So I will not claim that H'Doubler's and
Hawkins's discourse has effected the practice of dance education. What I will claim is that H'Doubler and Hawkins continue to be seminal thinkers for the field. It is their thoughts and theories in which I, and the field, are interested.

There is a metaphor which I am going to offer at this time as a way of focusing the development of a framework for critically analyzing dance education. The metaphor has to do with the relationship between teachers and students as they meet in their common space, the classroom and the metaphor begins in the notion that each person, in this relationship, brings to the relationship a world.

What I mean by "world" is similar to what is meant by "world-view" where it can be said that a person has an inter-related set of understandings by which he or she orients him or herself to all of the phenomena which constitute what can be called the world "out-there". This set of understandings, located, metaphorically, in the mind of the person, has no necessary correspondence to the world "out there" but is only one set of understandings about it (Rorty, 1989). What I am calling the world of the "mind" is akin to what Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) have called the world of everyday life. They write,

[The] world of everyday life [is] taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives. It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these. (pp.19-20)
As each person moves through the world "out there" he or she carries this world with him or her and looks out through its lens of understanding on all the phenomena which passes before him or her and uses his or her world to make sense of the shifting landscape of the world "out there". Part of this shifting landscape are the other people who also have worlds through which they make sense of the world "out there". Berger and Luckmann (1966) refer to the presence of other people as the "intersubjective world" (p.23) They write of this world,

I cannot exist in everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with others. I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural attitude of others, that they also comprehend the objectifications by which this world is ordered, that they also organize this world ... and have projects for working in it. (p.23)

On the other hand they admit that "my projects differ from and may even conflict with theirs" (p.23).

This situation of interaction and conflict between worlds in the intersubjective world is found within the teacher/student relationship. Teachers have worlds with particular specifications and so do students. Their pedagogical relationship may be understood as the interaction of their worlds as they proceed to negotiate the creation of the world of the classroom which is some sort of amalgam of their separate worlds. These negotiations may result in either unified communal life or social dissonance or some other outcome.
The possibility for being able to negotiate is predicated on the sharing of social and cultural institutions, primary among which is language. These institutions set the terms of and present items for the process of negotiation. Metaphorically, while the people may want to share a meal when they decide to eat together it is their culture or cultures which set the table with certain foods and certain utensils for eating from which they choose their meal.

I have characterized language as a primary social and cultural institution for mediating the relationship between individual worlds. What I mean by this is the simple notion that negotiation requires arriving at some sort of understanding of each other or not, of coming to understand or not, in particular, the intended meanings of the words and actions of the other. I would say, extrapolating from the work of Richard Rorty (1989), that coming to successfully understand one another necessitates coming to share a common vocabulary and constructing a common world based on the shared vocabulary. The failure to understand, on the other hand, is due to a conflict between languages. These notions of language will be elaborated in Chapter One (along with a more detailed discussion of how language functions to aid in constructing the individual’s world which is brought into the classroom).

If, as I am arguing, language is central to making worlds, then an examination of specific language involved in presenting
a world (as I would argue occurs in writing and publishing a book) ought to reveal the contours of the world presented. In the case of the texts to be examined, while H'Doubler and Hawkins do not claim to be presenting worlds, embedded in their language choices are the profiles of worlds. In Chapter Two it is the profiles of their worlds which I wish to excavate from those worlds’ unarticulated positions within the discourses. The excavated profiles are not idiosyncratic worlds but are, rather, worlds connected to the worlds of other people by virtue of sharing a common language with others. The common world of the group of people who share the language is what I would call the larger world of society and culture. In profiling the worlds of the texts I will attempt to make apparent some of the connections between the worlds of H'Doubler and Hawkins and the social and cultural world that is the context of their texts.

At the same time as I argue that a common language wields individual worlds together, in the classroom and out of it, there is yet the individual’s particularity, manifest in his/her personal biology and history, which makes specific his or her version of the common world. This individual particularity can problematize the interactions between people, between these different versions of the world, these different versions constituting individual, separate worlds. For the teacher/student relationship this problematizing comes not only because they bring different worlds to the enterprise, but that
there also exist differential influence relations between the teacher and student. I would say that influence often favors, in the classrooms with which I am familiar, the teacher’s world over the student’s world. This differential comes to be represented by the language of the classroom, the language of "teacher" and "student". The label "teacher" can automatically confer upon that person (who is, in addition, simply a whole, autonomous person) power over the person labeled "student" (also a whole, autonomous person). This power may be interpreted by the "teacher" as nurturing and caring and by the "student" as interfering, manipulative and intrusive. Subsequent negotiation between the worlds may result in the "student" coming to view the "teacher" as teacher does or the teacher coming to alter his/her definition of "teacher", or the student coming to internalize dissent or coming to openly defy the power of the teacher. The language of "teacher" and "student" initially represented the relationship and has subsequently been negotiated and come to mean specific and shifting social relations. The issue comes back to what Rorty has written about in terms of the changing of vocabularies. The individuals offer differing explanations of the world in an effort to convince each other of the adequacy of their different vocabularies used to describe the world. In Chapter Three I will explore the process of interacting and negotiating worlds with dance pedagogy by describing my own experience of the different
vocabularies which I and my teachers and peers brought to our common dance life.

The interaction of worlds, like the worlds themselves, is not idiosyncratic to particular individuals in relation to each other. As with the embedding of individual world in the social and cultural surround (as described in Chapter Three) I will in Chapter Three expose some of the cultural influences upon my own dance experience.

In terms of developing a framework for critically examining dance education, by themselves these connections made to the social and cultural surround do not constitute the critical framework which I wish to develop. What is required for that effort is to attempt to draw together the disparate threads of analysis into some point of view with which to understand the meanings of H'Doubler's and Hawkins's curricular theories and connections to their culture and society and the meanings of the problematics of my own experience. The meaning making framework (which I will develop in Chapter Four) will focus on the major issue which has arisen in my own experience and investigations into the experiences of others and that is the issue of the place of the body in dance education. By "the experiences of others" I mean that in my many meetings with other like-minded scholars we have come wonder, "Where is the body in all this discourse on dance? The body seems to be missing." This has seemed anomalous to us since dancing is
purportedly so much about the body. In a sense this
dissertation is an attempt to ascertain whether or not the body
is missing and, if so, in what sense. Thus, in Chapter Four I
will offer a framework which focuses upon a social and cultural
understanding of the body and the relation of body and language
and shall review the profiles of H'Doubler's and Hawkins's and
my own worlds in terms of this analysis.

Offering a framework cannot be the end of this work. To
do so without considering the weaknesses and problems of that
framework is, borrowing an oft-used term found in my own
readings, to over-determine the framework. No analytic
framework can thoroughly explicate all the phenomena of a
particular concrete situation but can only highlight and
prioritize certain portions of the situation. While I believe
that what I will present is important, I also know that I run
the risk of simplifying the dance education situation so that it
is no longer recognizable by the concrete individuals who
participate in it. In Chapter Five I will offer a discussion of
the problematics within the framework in an effort to loosen its
possibly totalizing grip upon my consideration of dance pedagogy
and in the hope that the framework becomes a reference point for
thinking rather than becoming thought itself.
CHAPTER 1
LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD

Introduction

I wrote in the Introduction that I am going to focus in this chapter on the function of language for negotiating the intersection of individual worlds. I will also attend to how individuals use language for making sense of and participating in the world aside from direct intersubjective negotiations. When I speak of language I mean language in all its forms, written and spoken and other forms of language such as movement language.

I am particularly interested in ways of understanding a text (the process of understanding being a process involving the intersection of worlds) since this dissertation focuses, in part, upon how to understand dance education texts. The written text presents, I believe, an ostensibly closed, complete worldview as the author has struggled to present a full articulation of his/her ideas. Whenever we read a text, we, in turn, construct a world from that reading. Both reader and writer have worlds and the process of reading is the intersection of those worlds out of which the reader's world is reconstructed. What both the reader and writer bring to the process are their individual mixtures of pre-understanding and immediate
happenstance with the writer’s pre-understandings and immediate circumstances being "frozen", as it were, within the text and with the reader’s pre-understandings and immediate circumstances being more available to change as he or she proceeds through the reading.

By pre-understanding I mean a pre-understanding we have of what the world is like and by immediate circumstances I mean responding to the immediate moment which always contains the unforeseen. In this mix of pre-understanding and immediacy we construct the world as it occurs to us. There is constant tension in the process of sense making as what bears down upon us from immediate experience must somehow be fit into or made sense of in terms of what is already known (the pre-understanding). The fit or sense may be ill-fitting or nonsensical in any number of ways and, in addition, our pre-understandings are not always consciously available to us. The unconscious pre-understandings function in unseen determinative ways out of our conscious control. Immediate external factors, not generated by our own consciousness, are also out of our control.

This examination of the process of understanding will utilize sociological/historical, philosophical and psychological modes of understanding in order to analyze the process of understanding a text. "Pre-understanding" can be understood sociologically as social acculturation, historically as the ways
in which culture is a summation of historical forces, philosophically as the issue of the origins of knowledge and the nature of truth and reality, and psychologically as the sedimentation within the unconscious of personal interaction with sociological, historical and philosophical encounters. Immediacy, in like fashion, can be understood as the outstanding sociological forces to which we are in immediate response, as historical forces which we take up in our choice-making, world-forming process, as philosophical understandings of perception and cognition and as psychological response in terms of our affective experience of our immediate situation. It is important to add to all these considerations that the location of pre-understanding and immediate experience is both in the body and the mind, that what is felt in relation to all these forces is felt in all dimensions of our being. This will be particularly important when I come to discuss the specifics of the dance education curricula and my own dance experience.

Two major questions occur within these issues. First, what are the factors of pre-understanding which give shape to the individual world? Second, and perhaps most importantly, if we say that each individual makes an individual world out of the one world "out there" (as I will claim), how are we able to intersect worlds and understand each other, able to communicate so that, in some fashion, we have the sense that we are all writing of, talking of and presenting the same one world?
The easiest answer to the last question is that because we all inhabit the same one world, the world "out there", we already possess common ground upon which to base interhuman communication. Similarly, the process of individual world-making and its factors are commonly held because we are all essentially alike. At the same time, however, there are ways in which we are indissolubly different from each other (differing combinations of genes, social history, family life) and this indissoluble otherness and the inevitable separation which grows out of it ought to suggest that commonness is complicated by difference. To what degree is this difference significant? I shall take this up when I discuss how we may make new worlds.

Language and Metaphor

I have already written that language is a primary common factor in making a world capable of communicating to others. Language is, also, one of the primary locations of pre-understanding and language functions to both bring the world and others to us and hold the world and others away from us.

By now it is a commonplace among philosophers that language determines our world. Tracy Strong describes language determination this way:

Our language...repeats, in a sort of neurotic compulsion, our history and our selves to us. Language pulls together and is the world: this language, our world. The very ability to give
names - to extend the control of language over the world - must then be a masterly trait, for it consists of saying what the world is. To name is to define and bring under control; the allocation of names creates the world in the image of he who names. Such creations are properly termed metaphors, they are artefacts which carry an intellectual process beyond the mind into the world. (99)

Strong identifies language specifically as metaphor. Here metaphor serves as a definition of all language rather than as its usual position within language as a particular rhetorical device. Metaphor, as a name or interpretation of the world beyond the mind, provides an image of the world which itself (the world) does not appear to us in its (the world's) nakedness. A metaphor is a linguistic symbol which presents the world in a pattern and design which the world does not actually possess. This linguistic symbol is (according to Sallie McFague) "a word or phrase used inappropriately. It belongs properly in one context but is being used in another" (McFague, MT, 33). She goes on to write,

[A metaphor] is an attempt to say something about the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar...Metaphor always has the character of 'is' and 'is not': an assertion is made but as a likely account rather than a definition...The point that metaphor underscores is that in certain matters there can be no direct description. (McFague, 1982,pp.33-34)

These patterns are always ambiguous due to their suggestiveness and lack of being definitional in character. The ambiguity of language is familiar as when, for instance, we become frustrated with our inability to make another understand our meaning which to us seems obvious. Language as metaphor,
not being a literal representation of reality, complicates interhuman communication as it presents individual interpretations of the world to another who must interpret the interpretations with the strong possibility that misunderstanding will occur. This is how language holds us apart from each other and how language, being an interpretation of the world holds us and the world apart. Because language is our vehicle for understanding it can be seen that it has the positive function of making the world available to us, bringing the world to us, even though it is acknowledged that this aspect of language represents a partial knowledge of the world. This "holding away" and "bringing to" provide two dimensions of language as certain kinds of politics or power in that the holding away is "power against" and bringing to is "power for". I shall first discuss "holding away" and, then, discuss "bringing to" (in terms of the potential of language for creative action).

In understanding language and metaphors as holding the world and others away from us there is a "power against" our knowing the world and others. The world is plural and dizzyingly full of unique beings, events, things. Without language and metaphors this plurality would appear chaotic, for every incoming "fact" would appear unique and different from all others and yet undifferentiated from all others in the constancy of the uniqueness. Language intervenes in this chaos,
organizing the incoming "facts" (sense facts or language facts) through the metaphorical categories already present.

It is this intervention which holds the world and others away and mitigates against our knowing the world and others. Language can only give "voice" to what is already known by it. Through language we make space for the incoming novelty of events, beings and things hitherto not encountered by finding a place for the novelty among the known categories of language. In order to do this we suppress the uniqueness of each incoming "fact" in order to fit it to the already existing schema of language (Dews, 1986).

Nietzsche understood this language reduction of the world "out there" through language as a limit case for understanding and he aphorised language as "the prison-house of language" (Jamison, 1972). Nietzsche wrote,

[U]nspeakably more depends on what things are called, than on what they are. The reputation, the name and appearance,...each being in origin most frequently an error and arbitrariness, thrown over things like a garment, and quite foreign to their essence...and even to their exterior, have gradually by belief therein and growth from generation to generation...grown on to things and into things and have become its very body. (Strong, pp.99)

Strong goes on to comment, "The metaphors which first lie on our life like a light cloak become an iron cage" (p.99). He then quotes Nietzsche again: "'Truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are'" (p.100). For Nietzsche, language imprisons us through the deception that we
can know anything and yet prevents us from knowing anything or anyone in its autonomous fullness. (The notion of autonomy is problematic for I shall attempt to show later on how all events, things and beings are interdependent necessarily and inevitably. The value of autonomy has been demonstrated by Russel Jacoby to be a particular political imposition from bourgeois culture, an argument developed from his reading of Freud and the Frankfurt School.)

The idea of language determinacy images a system which cannot absorb or encounter new events, things or beings. In addition, upon our initiation into language we seem to tread the same paths all before us have trod and upon which our successors will, also, tread. Language, in this vision, is a closed world and a world in which the idea of the multiplicity of worlds has no place. Through a common language the multiple worlds seem to dissolve into a unitary world perspective (which is still not synonymous with the one world from which we are totally separated). This is the thinking of Louis Althusser who claimed that there were no individuals in the world but only "Ideological State Apparatus" where subjectivity was an illusion and all were made into images of the state. It is also the thinking of Michel Foucault with his notion of discursive practices which feed upon preceding generations of discourse and become locations for the replenishment of discourse through the
ingestion of the established forms. Such views present a world in which nothing ever changes.

In contrast to these imprisoning descriptions of language there are those who understand language as bringing the world to us and making change possible. This occurs because language or metaphor enables us to develop new patterns of interpretation. Several theorists (among them Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1975, and Paul Ricoeur, 1970, 1976, 1981) understand language not as a limitation but as a site of messages and creativity through which we can remake our world. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) provides an image of this enabling power of language when he writes,

In reality, language is the single word whose virtuality opens up the infinity of discourse, of discourse with others, and of the freedom of "speaking oneself" and of "allowing oneself to be spoken". Language is not its elaborate conventionalism, nor the burden of pre-schematization with which it loads us, but the generative and creative power unceasingly to make this whole fluid. (1975, p.498)

Gadamer recognizes not only the formative power of language ("the burden of pre-schematization with which it loads us") but, also, the creative power of language to open up the possibilities of growth and change which "make this whole fluid." Language is a virtuality in that it provides the possibility of speech but does not limit what the speech will actualize.
Gadamer uses the metaphorical quality of language to counter the notion of language determination. Metaphors are the interplay of images and it is this quality of play which makes language productive. Gadamer writes of play:

Thus we speak of the play of colours and do not mean only that there is one colour, that plays against another, but that there is one process or sight, in which one can see a changing variety of colours. (1975, p.93)

Metaphors are the "one process" of constant shifting back and forth between images, having no determinant end. This lack of determinant ending counters the oppressive notion of language determination by refusing to yield to univocal meaning. Metaphors and language become sites for new ideas and new metaphors.

Through asserting relationship between disparate terms (two things, beings, events are like each other) the metaphor presents a new image which heuristically presents a new idea about the world which was not and could not be apparent to us prior to our consciousness of the metaphor. This new idea or interpretation becomes a focus for accounting for the shape of the world as we conceive it and provides new patterns for such conceiving.

The refusal of univocal meaning in a metaphor is also refusal to represent completion. Gadamer (1975) focuses upon the play aspect of metaphor and writes of play in general, that the purpose of playing a game "is not really the solution of the
task, but the ordering and shaping of the movement of the game itself" (1975, p.97). Metaphors do not move us towards bounded endstates but are processual means for understanding which, in their ordering and shaping, are always ongoing.

The notion of understanding is central here. Play, according to Gadamer, is self-representation which is "a universal aspect of the being of nature" (1975, p.97). The player comes to re-present him/herself to him/herself through the pretend of play as he/she adopts different persona which call out different aspects of him/herself. This representation makes the world and self constantly new and emerging. As with play, so, too, metaphors re-present the world to us, calling out different aspects of the world for re-newed and re-freshed understanding and in their universality they are our means for understanding which is the ground upon which the world is made.

The Gadamerian notion of play and the notion of metaphor which makes the whole of the world fluid rather than rigidly determined provide an understanding that language makes possible newness. M.M.Bakhtin (1981) gives some alternative ideas about the productivity of language which release ideas of language from pure determinacy. He writes of the way different languages contain differing intentions and possibilities for making meaning and goes on to write,

"All socially significant world views have the capacity to exploit the intentional possibilities of language ...in proportion to their social significance; they are capable of attracting its words and forms into their orbit by
means of their own characteristic intentions and accents, and in so doing to a certain extent alienating these words and forms from other tendencies, parties, artistic works and persons.

Every socially significant verbal performance has the ability...to infect with its own intention certain aspects of language that had been effected by its semantic and expressive impulse, imposing on them specific semantic nuances and specific axiological overtones. (p.290)

In this formulation individuals can "create" language and, as he puts it, the "languages" of heteroglossia intersect each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying 'languages'" (p.291).

An important distinction exists between the Gadamerian and Bakhtinian formulations. Gadamer (1975) invokes the naturalness and the universality of the actions of metaphor. Gadamer's images are, for the most part, either drawn from the physical world ("play of colours") or from the play of children, but not from a clearly social world. This places his discourse in a different form from Bakhtin who locates the action of language within the social construct. Bakhtin (1981) indicates that language has "intentional possibilities" which become activated via social appropriation which moves the potential meaningfulness of language into specific concrete spheres of understanding. These spheres, in appropriating language "alienate" language from the possibility of other kinds of usage. A contemporary example of this would be the appropriation of the word "moral" by the Moral Majority. Their use of that word has made it difficult for other equally moral
groups to use the word because the word has come to reference a specific form of morality.

It is at the juncture of newness and language that we can find the opening for understanding how we can construct new worlds. At this juncture new language is needed, called for, in order to bring the unforeseen into fuller view. In this process both the language accommodates and is modified to the newness and the newness is allowed in to the extent that it can be connected with the already existing world in some way. A metaphor for this might be that the novelty finds a foothold or purchase upon the face of the world and, like a seed blown by the wind to an inhospitable site, if the seed can find some nourishment and shelter it may be able to grow roots and so become part of the world. The world is altered and has been added to. The world has not merely absorbed the novelty but has given some of itself to sustaining and extending the novelty.

The process of the new is a process of accommodation from both sides, a dialectical give and take. The seed and plant may grow in specific and different ways in response to particular environments. The various plants at different sites can be shown to be of the same family of plants (have similar schemata, configurations) and yet are individualized. Or it may be that the various plants scattered among various sites do not "belong to the same family of plants". "Family of plants" is a conceptualization, a piece of language, used to subsume
differences in order to make the world comprehensible. It is a sign whose origins are not in the world but in the possibility of language which handles the world. Either way, metaphorically the plant gives up some of its individuality to be allowed to grow in this particular world and exist in the conceptual world.

Bakhtin (1981), in addition to imaging the social character of language, provides an image of language which mediates between the notions of language determinacy and creativity. He writes that language is intentional and that this intention is directed toward the objects of the world.

Discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living impulse...toward the object...to study the word as such, ignoring the impulse that reaches out beyond it, is just as senseless as to study psychological experience outside the context of that real life toward which it was directed and by which it is determined. (p.292, emphasis in the original)

"[T]oward which it was directed and by which it is determined" incorporates the use of language for coming to know the world (intentionality) and language which determines, in part, what it is possible to know. In addition Bakhtin suggests, I think, that language is for contact with other humans about and through the world.

[The] actual meaning [of a given utterance - ed.] is understood against the background of other concrete utterances on the same theme, a background made up of contradictory opinions, points of view and value judgments - that is, precisely that background that, as we see complicates the path of any word toward its object...this contradictory environment...is present to the speaker not in the object, but rather in the consciousness of the listener, as his apperceptive background, pregnant with
Discourse exists in dialogue with a "listener as his apperceptive background" and language also binds us closely to the objects of the world through the dialogical expressions about the world. And further, the objects and expressions are themselves bound together to each other in inextricable manners because it is the expressive dialogue with others that animates the objects. Knowing is predicated on the dialogue.

Bakhtin gives, I think, a nice summation of the complexity of the power of language and connects with the relation between the individual and the sociality of language and images what I have meant by the intersection of and negotiation between individual worlds. He writes,

"Any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist - or, on the contrary, by the "light" of alien words that have already been spoken about it. It is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and accents. The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its expression and influence its entire stylistic profile.

The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads...it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue." (p.276)
Language as a Form of the Social and the Foundation of an Horizon of Understanding

So far I have written of language in the singular form of the noun as if all languages are the same. This formulation requires correction for there is not one language in the world but there are a multiplicity of languages, which create and present differing aspects of the world. (So, there are both multiple individual accounts of the world and multiple languages for those accounts.) Bakhtin calls this multiplicity of languages "heteroglossia". Heteroglossia presents an image of a fragmented world in which energized fragments fly about, collide, inhibit, facilitate etc. our understanding and communication processes.

There are, I would say, at least three dimensions of heteroglossia. First, of course, there are languages of different peoples. These different languages may be associated, conventionally, with certain national characteristics. For instance, the French language is often called the language of love as if love is best expressed and maintained in French. Such conventional notions, however erroneous they might be, do represent the idea that to speak a certain language is to color the way the world is seen and understood. A second kind of heteroglossia, exists within a single language. In a single language there are a multiplicity of regional dialects (vocabularies, accents, ways of forming phrases and sentences all of which effect the logic formations of the speaker/writer)
which capture and promote a particular consciousness. A third form of heteroglossia, and the one most applicable to the present study, is the specialized languages of inquiry, composed of ordinary language and special language (jargon) which bring the user to see the world in, for example, psychological, sociological, aesthetic, historical, political, literary, spiritual or religious terms (to name a few).

The function of using a particular language within the heteroglossic scheme is to carry for the user special meanings, one of which is that possession of the language permits identification by and with a particular community of like speakers/writers. This sense of membership further fragments the world in that the language acts as an exclusionary/inclusionary device for identification with the group of chose. This does not mean that a group uses words understandable only to them but that they use words in a certain way understandable to them. For instance, the English word God which is used by Christians, Jews, Moslems, atheists, Hindus, etc. but references very different concepts and relations. Membership is determined by the contextualized meaning of the word so that one knows which "God" is being referenced. The language form is not an empty vessel but is filled by cultural, social and personal contexts and the form itself is not separable from these contexts as it offers only certain kinds of culturally contextualized contoured vessels for having thoughts.
Therefore while individuals from different groups may negotiate the meanings of commonly held language formations these negotiations are, ultimately, limited by the differing contexts which can never be fully articulated. Bakhtin (1981) points out multiple contexts of meaning when he writes of the "background" of speakers and listeners against which the actual meaning of a given utterance is understood (p.281).

Bakhtin points out that the daily interaction of the heteroglossia of languages is in the form of a conflict between the dominant unitary language, consisting of culturally normative modes of expression, such as the King's English, which acts as a "centripetal" force for maintaining the unity of the community over against "heteroglossia" which acts centrifugally.

At any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified...into languages that are socio-ideological...the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work of decentralization and disunification. (p.272)

These multiple languages provide the wherewithal for a person to hold multiple group memberships and multiple contexts of meaning which may be in conflict with each other. These various contexts of meaning (multiple memberships of a person) may be understood as comprising what a number of German hermeneuts have called the "horizon" of understanding of any person and image a person as being composed of a number of fragmented individuals. A person is not a person but is many people. These many may be experienced as unified into one person or as a set of fragments.
In either case, the particular multiplicity which a person is defines his/her "horizon".

This person lives within the boundaries, metaphorically, of an horizon beyond which he/she cannot see. Horizon is similar to the concept of language determinacy (which situates what we can know of the world) but adds the dimension of uncertainty about whether or not we can know more beyond the horizon. To know that there is an horizon, a limit, is to know that there is that beyond the horizon which is, for the moment, unavailable and about which we are uncertain. Under this metaphor our individual worlds appear to be partial and limited. Heidegger (1962) uses the term "horizon" in this limit manner in Being and Time. The translators of that book write of his use of "horizon" as follows:

...the English speaking reader is likely...to think of horizon as something which we may widen or extend or go beyond. Heidegger, however, seems to think of it rather as something which we can neither widen nor go beyond, but which provides the limits for certain intellectual activities performed 'within' it. (p.1)

From this perspective we are given to understand that constructing a world depends on having a limited perspective.

Gadamer (1975), on the other hand, describes horizons as expandable.

A horizon is not a rigid frontier, but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further...[H]orizon intentionality, which constitutes the unity of the flow of experience, is paralleled by an equally comprehensive intentionality on the objective side. For everything that is given as existent is given
Gadamer envisions how the world is brought to us in a full way. He is indicating how each person exists within his/her horizon which is complete unto itself, comprehensible and whole. Within this construct experience is encountered as a unified flow.
That which is experience, the "existent" (the world taken-for-granted) comes from the world and carries with it the world horizon whose scope is global. There is a meeting of horizons which brings a person into the world (which is also by its own limited horizon, partial). Gadamer writes that Husserl conceives of this world horizon as the "life-world, i.e. the world in which we are immersed in the natural attitude that never becomes for us an object as such, but that constitutes the pre-given basis of all experience" (1975, p.218). The life-world is "an essentially historical concept" (p.218) which is always at the same time a communal world and involves the existence of other people as well. It is a personal world, and in the natural attitude the validity of the personal is always assumed. (p.219)

The Construction of the Self-World in the Light of the Other-World
I have written that people may have the taken-for-granted attitude that they comprehend the world in toto. Through the process of encountering others and their worlds, through reading or other means, this attitude is subject to shattering as people encounter that other people understand the world differently.
This shattering can bring home to people the partial nature of their individual visions, make visible their horizons and bring home to them that there is a world "out there" which they do not comprehend in its fullness.

Whatever is known of the world "out there" becomes just one model among many, a schematization upon which ongoing events are mapped into the partial, constructed world so that these new events may be made sense of. The encountering of difference can bring about the understanding that nothing is known in a transparent way. Indeed the evidence of multiple, individual worlds can tell us that, unless we are totally megalomaniac, our world is separate from and not necessarily true to the world "out there".

Reading can be one attempt to encounter other worlds. Gadamer (1975) wrote that reading is always an attempt to answer a question and that the question always is: what was the question of the author which motivated the writing which stands as an answer to the author's question. The reader queries the text to uncover the question to which the text is an answer. To come to know an author's question, Gadamer writes,

[W]e place ourselves in the situation of someone else...become aware of the otherness, the indissoluble individuality of the other person, by placing ourselves in his position. (p.272)

This suggests either an empathic connection or the "application of our own criteria" to another. Gadamer seems to focus upon how reading illuminates our own criteria as he writes that an
expansion of horizon occurs which functions to "look beyond what is close at hand - not in order to look away from it, but to see it better within a larger whole and truer proportion" (p.272). The reader is actually about coming to know his/her world better by coming to know another's world.

There is a sense, however, in which we are not necessarily aware that worlds other than our own exist even when we read. How are we brought to be aware of the existence of other worlds when reading? I will suggest, adopting Paul Ricoeur's point of view (in McFague, 1982) as to why anyone feels the need to interpret a communication, that such awareness occurs when we come to know that we have misunderstood someone's communicative action. This begins the process of having to understand. In this process the receiver of the communication is, initially passive, prodded to action by the misunderstanding. It may be that disjunction is always predicative of the need to understand, that until that moment the receiver, phenomenologically took it for granted that the speaker/writer occupied the self-same world. The disjunction dispels that image and complacency.

Having been shaken from the sleep of complacency, the receiver is forced to consider that his/her present world is incomplete. Perhaps this understanding and subsequent action may be understood as a war metaphor: the wall of consciousness is breached and must be repaired. This is certainly one
response. It is a response set on attempting to "freeze" the world as it was by restoring the old wall surrounding the fortress of consciousness. New materials may be used to replace the old which means change. While the materials are new the attempt to repair under this metaphor is to minimize the change and to reestablish the old. Another possible response to the breach is that at the breakdown of consciousness rather than repairing we seek better forms of consciousness. We may innovate by examining the cause of the breakdown and the weakness of the old consciousness and by forming responses which address the weakness and strengthen or reinforce the weakness. Or we may respond by valuing the breakdown because we gain access to a new world which by comparison is a better world. Perhaps, in this case, we expand our fortress to include the surrounding countryside (an imperialist image). These various images present a protection, adjustment response to misunderstanding. The status quo is repaired, fortified, reinforced, or domesticated through the annexation of the new world.

There are other possibilities. For instance some misunderstandings bring us to discard our original world and adopt wholly the promise of the new world. This is the process of conversion experiences. Or, some misunderstandings animate dormant sectors of our own world, altering consciousness by making available more of what we already are. This points to
the notion of individuals having multiple language communities and multiple worlds some of which may not be consciously used or dwelt in for long periods of time but which may be re-animated. In this vision of the individual as having a taken-for-granted image of completion and as having multiple worlds some of which are either dormant or temporarily suppressed or not in use, the paradox of a dialectic arises. We may sense completion but with not all of our worlds available to us such completion is partial. We are both complete (feeling unified) and partial (feeling fragmented, multiple). Awareness of completion seems to be an inevitable component of consciousness which is, through misunderstanding, brought to an awareness of the lack of completeness, the response to which is to establish a new completeness in some way.

The action of play (written of earlier in Gadamerian terms) is a central response to the re-formation of a world. This play may take the form of an examination of the breaching new world for its possibilities and trying on some aspects of that world for fit. The initiation of play may stimulate the player to further precipitate or evoke thought which departs even from the new world. The new world becomes a base upon which a still newer world might be founded. Play, as both appropriation and as imaginary, is always limited by the original horizon, the context which language provides. Selection of aspects of the world to try on begins in what is
known and is directed by what is possible within the scope of
the original world. Building upon the base of the new world
involves selecting possibilities in part from the old world.

The results of such a process, in its amalgam of new and
old, gives us a sense of continuity to consciousness. There is
no escaping the old for, in fact, to correct the above metaphor,
it is the old upon which the new is built. This very much
echoes Gadamer's emphasis upon tradition which has been much
attacked by critical theorists (Eagleton, 1983). I am not
arguing here in favor of tradition. It simply seems clear that
the old is part of the new (indeed we could not know newness
without having a comparative base which is the old) and that, to
state it more strongly, the so-called new is predominantly old,
although old made never the same. It might be said that the old
becomes reshuffled and that new connections are made among the
terms of the old. Having linked the making of metaphors with
the renewal of worlds I must remind us that under language
determinacy metaphors also invest language in a deep way in
which they motivate us without our knowing that they are doing
so. The incursion of the old upon the new shows that any
movements we make toward self-completion within an act of
understanding are modified by metaphor, by the old and that the
act of understanding is always a completion which is limited.

The notion of horizon also mediates the active
construction of the self-world. As with Bakhtin's dialogism the
possibility of knowing my own "world" is predicated not on an hermetically sealed self but on what Gadamer (1975) calls the "situation" of the horizon.

"'[S]ituation'...represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision." Within "situation" "the horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point." All self-knowledge proceeds from what is historically pre-given...because it is the basis of all subjective meaning and attitude and hence both prescribes and limits every possibility of understanding any tradition whatsoever in terms of its unique historical quality. (p.269)

Part of the making of a world must be understood within this horizon and the connections between worlds may be found within the contents of the horizoned space. It is these contents which are commonly shared, which are placed within the horizon by the commonly experienced social world.

**Dialectics**

A number of dialectical relationships emerge out of the discussion in this chapter. These dialectics are important for understanding and analyzing the texts with which I will engage in the next chapter.

**Individual/Society**

Dialectically, the knowing from within the horizon is individual and autonomous (personal) but what is known and how the knowing proceeds is commonly held and exists within language. The dialectic is between the individual and society.
in which the individual in relation to which the individual is both autonomous and not autonomous.

Language is a social construct into which we are initiated and does not arise *sui generis*. Bakhtin (1981) locates this commonality within, at least in part, the *unitary* language of a community which is "ideologically saturated, language as a world view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a maximum of mutual understanding in all spheres of ideological life" (p.271). Such ideology does not stem from the group in toto but often tends to privilege one sub-group over another or others. This idea is captured in Bakhtin's notion of *heteroglossia* in which the various languages are in conflict, particularly with the unitary, centrifugal language.

This ideological life represents social life. Gadamer (1975) utilizes the notion of "tradition" to represent a social setting in which the historical flow of understanding allowed to us by tradition permits understanding in both our daily interaction with others and our ability to understand texts from another era. How to come to a level of awareness of tradition becomes a hermeneutic problem which Gadamer puts as follows,

Are there...two different horizons here, the horizon in which a person seeking to understand lives, and the particular historical horizon within which he places himself? (p.271)

(The latter horizon is the horizon of what a person wants to come to understand.) Are horizons ever totally hermetically sealed? Gadamer answers as follows.
Just as the individual is never simply an individual because he is always involved with others, so too the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction...human life...is never utterly bound to one standpoint...The horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion...When our historical consciousness places itself within historical horizons...they constitute the one great horizon that moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of self-consciousness. (p.271)

Russel Jacoby (1975), on the other hand, writes on this point of commonality in socio-political, critical theory terms. "The individual, before it can determine itself, is determined by the relations in which it is enmeshed" (p.34). Jacoby cites Herbert Marcuse as using a term "'corporealization of the psyche' to suggest the psychic process: the translation of psychic energy into 'unconscious automatic reactions'" (p.44).

These reactions appear natural to us but, writes Jacoby,

it is not a question of pure nature. Rather it is second nature: history that hardened into nature...What is second nature to the individual is accumulated and sedimented history...Second nature is not simply nature or history but frozen history that surfaces as nature. (p.31)

This frozen history is the history of unfreedom, of physical, social and economic oppression sedimented into consciousness in such a way as to appear to be the right and proper "way the world is". Jacoby also calls this second nature "common sense", those beliefs we hold in common which are often used to validate common ways of thinking as fundamentally correct. Jacoby and Gadamer clearly differ in terms of the ideological life.
I have written that on the level of common sense we feel ourselves to be autonomous. Clearly, such "common sense" must be called into question as we may ask the typical sociology of knowledge question: whose sense are we making (Cuddihy, 1974)? It is held in common but favors one particular set of beliefs and practices over another. If we take it that a world made seems to be a common sense world to the maker on the surface of that world we may ask whether or not what the maker had made is, below the surface, of his/her own making, serving his/her own interests. Understanding that language imports into the world-making interests of some sub-group, it is clear that he/she has not made his/her own world autonomously. But more deeply, just as language is fragmented into groups which are not equally powerful in terms of setting the agenda of discourse (Bakhtin writes of this when he writes of the contest between the dominant language and all the subordinated, heteroglossia) so, too, the world-maker in question utilizes a language which may import someone else's agenda which is not meant to be beneficial to the individual world-maker.

Returning to the dialectic of the autonomous self, the individual and the common surround of culture or society, the autonomous self which seeks expansion is in dialectical relation with the historical self. The historical self demands understanding in exact proportion to its hiddeness from us. By this I mean that uncovering a particular reading, while it may
be involved with uncovering both what the reader and writer want to tell us about their world, it is also involved with what the reader and writer are unable to tell us, at least directly, about their world and their reasons for constructing the world in the ways that they do, unable to tell precisely because they did not create it, the historical self. The historical self may be in command of the reading.

This makes it important to understand the dialectic of individual and this historical self, this society in which the individual is embedded, in a strong manner. All the theorists with whom I am dealing recognize this issue, although in slightly different ways. Bakhtin (1981), for instance, attempts to counter the traditional (what Jacoby calls bourgeois) image of language utterances as a

self-sufficient whole...presuming...no other utterances...[as a] closed authorial monologue...lock[ed]...into the monologic context of a given self-sufficient and hermetic utterance, imprisoning it, as it were, in the dungeon of a single context."

(p.273-274)

Over against this, Bakhtin asserts, "we must deal with the life and behavior of discourse in a contradictory and multi-languaged world" (p.275). He writes, further, that individual writing is "dialogized heteroglosia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance" (p.272). He writes that "the nature of language" is "a struggle among socio-linguistic
points of view, not an intra-language struggle between individual wills or logical contradictions" (p.273)

Gadamer (1975) also recognizes the social nature of understanding although he does not seem to acknowledge the struggle between the historical and present selves.

"The fusion of horizons" seems a useful and important understanding which needs to be accounted for. Gadamer describes the sense of unity we feel with another when we verify our understanding of another's world. We fuse horizons with the past and lay over the past our own horizon. This raises the possibility of conflict which Gadamer does not seem to acknowledge. By fracturing language in the way that Bakhtin does (by demonstrating the differences between language groups down, even, to the social unit of the family) Gadamer's formulations become useful as first-level understandings of the
natural attitude. The sense of unity is underlain by the depths to which our selves are formed by social relations which fracture the unified sense of self into two selves, the natural and Jacoby's idea of second-nature. Second-nature, by its definition, seems to subsume nature so that it may seem, due to our introjected social relations, that we do not and cannot know our self except in the light of second-nature.

Nature/Culture

Despite the power of the "second-nature" analysis there is a feeling which people have that we possess or are possessed by nature which is within us and around us. The issue of nature cannot but bring some level of contradiction to the social construct formulation. Even Jacoby (1975) provides some insights here as he discusses the workings of biology and society, writing that a social activity is the particularized social expression of more "universal" biological needs and drives. He quotes Otto Fenichel that the "materialist advantage" of psychoanalysis is that it has shown that ideals such as truth and justice "'are not...genuine strivings but are formed out of biological needs by socially determined experiences'" (p. 96). This maintains the necessary dialectic which, on the one hand, will not release from consciousness the materials with which we are born and, on the other hand, will
make a place for them in the theory by examining how differing social contexts deal with them.

The image of nature, when placed over against the image of second-nature, suggests that there is a world "out there" which we struggle to come to know which does not come out of the social context although it is effected by that context (Rorty, 1989). This world of nature exists inside us as genes and physiology and is not socially constructed. Both genes and accidents of conception and birth bring about differences between people which individualize each of us as to, among other aspects, the individual process of language acquisition and realization. Nature can also be understood as the serendipitous event which cannot be predicted or controlled by social construction. In fact it is these very aspects of nature which cause, I believe, a rupture in the notion of second-nature, of social construction and participate in bringing about the possibilities of uniqueness and newness for which the idea of social construction cannot account. I attempted some formulation of this when I developed the seed/hostile environment metaphor which proposed an alteration of world-view through accommodation to serendipitous events.

In that metaphor difference also was imaged as the capacity to become different, the capacity for adaptation. Depending on the ability of a plant for adaptation, it may or may have survived. Some individual member of that conceptual
group might have possessed more adaptive powers than other individuals and, thus, possess more likely-hood of survival. The plants were different from each other at germination and held differing capacities for becoming different. This suggests difference which is not socially constructed.

When I wrote earlier that language powerfully determined our world I could only refer to the way language determines so that there is always the suspicion that nothing can be new for us. Nothing can be new because we re-cognize "newness" via language which carries only pre-givens. The world, in this way of thinking, is always made old. On the other hand, the idea of nature and serendipity allow for the world to be made new. To be sure it cannot ever be made wholly new for there must be some aspect of the old in the new, otherwise language could not assimilate and translate it into cognizable features.

Nevertheless, I would assert that there is a certain level of significant difference, located in personal biology and history which mediates total determination. This will be further elaborated in a later chapter on the personal. For now I will state that all of the above suggests that for interpreting both the processes of writing and reading distinctions must be sought between what pre-understandings inform texts and readings, what stands out against these pre-understandings as "new" and how this newness is tied back into the ground of the pre-understandings. In addition, distinctions
must be made between the reader’s pre-understandings and new contributions and the writer’s pre-understandings and new thinking, all the while tying the reader and writer back into each other.

Subject/Object

Underlying much of this discussion there has been a tacit dialectic of subject and object. The subject, in this case, is the speaking or writing or reading subject (person) and the object is the world which is spoken of, written of or read. There has been the assumption that there is a distinction between subject and object. I should like now to explicitly explore the concepts of subject and object on their own.

To begin with, there is the difficulty of teasing apart the subject from the object. That is, the ways in which the subject is tied into his/her world and the levels of consciousness which are informed by the world and the way the world changes as the subject moves through the world all speak of the complex interaction between subject and object. To conceptualize them as separate is to lose the dialectical dimension of their interrelationship as well as obscuring the difficulty of separating them, the one from the other. Bakhtin (1981) gives voice to this when he writes, "[I]t is often difficult to penetrate...[the] obscuring mist" of dialogisms which "envelop" the utterance (p.276). Even the personal
dimension of thought (Polanyi’s tacit knowing) is hard to come to except by distancing the knower (the subject) from the known (the object). This is indicative of an important dimension of the interrelationship between subject/knower and object/knowledge: the lack of rational control over the relationship. Rationality will neither serve to bring the relationship to light nor to bring it within our control.

To bring forth this knowledge of subject/object to a form with which we can deal, we must act like the sculptor, painter, or choreographer and step away from knowledge in order to observe it and make decisions about it. Through the lens of language determinancy when we step away what we see is that, ironically, the traditional view of knower (subject) and known (object) becomes reversed. Under language determinancy the person is the object of the subject (the knowledge, the language). By being subjected to language the knower becomes its object. Because language is so close to us, we identify with it to such an extent that it is literally out of sight and yet moves us, makes of us its object (just as the artist makes an object of his/her work) through its unseen directiveness. Conversely, to step away as the artist does and focus upon the knowledge of language is to, once again make it an object and is to allow us to become subjects to the extent that we can come to consciousness of that language knowledge. This knowledge of
which we become conscious is the knowledge of our social conditioning, our personal dimensions and our biology.

By showing the way in which we become objects and lose our subjectivity by being subsumed by the hidden forces of language I am attempting to raise up the Freudian notion of the unconscious. I gain this understanding from Jacoby. While Bakhtin and Gadamer speak from sociological (the former) or philosophical (the latter) points of view Jacoby insists on maintaining the psychological dimension. He warns against the development of sociologisms and psychologisms as a development which destroys the dialectical character of experience and understanding. He proposes that much post-Freudian psychology (Jung, Fromm, Maslow, Rogers) has abandoned the sociological implications of Freud, focusing instead upon the individual as a self-enclosed monadic subject and that much of post-Marx Marxism has fallen prey to a dismissal of the individual, focusing purely upon the sociological formation which makes the individual an object moved by objective forces thoroughly beyond his/her control.

In contrast to these tendencies Jacoby (1975) offers the critical theory (Frankfurt School) position which "sinks into subjectivity until it hits bottom: society" (p.79). "[S]ubjectivity is pursued till it issues into the social and historical events that preformed and deformed the subject" (p.79). "To bring subjectivity to objectivity entails teaching
it how to speak about what it bespeaks: society and history. Such an effort is an objective theory of subjectivity" (p.80). The "preformed and deformed" suggests the Freudian unconscious and it is to this unconscious that I refer in pointing out the lack of control we exercise as subjects in the world which is subject to heteroglossic dialogization of our utterances.

Conclusion

Our individual world-makings are never independent acts. We acquire a world though a complex interaction with other worlds. The mode of presenting a world to others is language in which exists all of our social and personal understandings of the world. It is to language that we can turn to bring this understanding to light. Doing so aids in working through (without controlling) the preformation and deformation and adding to our stock of possibilities. In the next chapter I shall analyze dance education texts in the light of these understandings.
CHAPTER 2
THREE DANCE EDUCATION TEXTS

The World and Language of Dance Education Research

Research into dance education is involved, for the most part, with studying the practice of teaching dancing to people. This research focuses upon such items as pedagogical classroom practice, the way the body functions anatomically, physiologically, medically and the psychology of learning and the psychology of art-making. Often such research is modelled either on traditional science or social science models. The former is often set within an empirical-analytic point of view. The latter may take the form of, for instance, interviewing dancers, ethnographic participant-observer research, or the setting up of psychological experimental modalities designed for testing variables.

Dance education research, being a rather new field of inquiry, has tended to work though existing modes of inquiry as can be seen in the above. There has been, more recently, a reaction to this usage in the form of a search for new approaches which can acknowledge the specific and unique way that dancing is a particular form of knowing. I see these two points of view as functioning from opposed, unarticulated assumptions. To work though existing modalities suggests that inquiry into dance is contiguous with the rest of the world,
that dancing is only another form of the basic content of the world. To seek new approaches is to suggest that dancing is separate from the rest of the world and needs its own modes of inquiry if its true contribution to the world can be understood.

Another way of understanding the split is to characterize the borrowing tendencies and the new approach tendencies as both utilizing particular languages of inquiry to forward their separate projects. Some use science language and some use other languages. I have already noted that some research is oriented toward natural science or quantitative social science and adopts, consequently, an empirical-analytic mode of discourse. Within the social sciences approach there are, also, the ethnographic studies which, tend to use more reflective, personal language into which is mixed the scientific discourse of anthropology. The new approaches attitude which seeks to understand dance as distinct and unique tends toward the use of aesthetic or phenomenological languages or the development of new language which it attempts to claim are wholly new languages (without admitting that the use of these terms appropriate well developed, socially constructed languages) (see Coros, 1988, Fraleigh, 1987, Sheets-Johnstone, 1966).

It should be clear, from the first chapter, that I consider language to be a central issue in world-making and I reiterate that stance here. The kinds of languages that are used and how they are used present specific kinds of worlds.
Different languages forward different worlds. A mixture of various languages (heteroglossia) presents a still more complex image of world-making. Awareness of the significance of language requires that we be aware of the languages in use in dance research: awareness of their sociological, historical, philosophical and psychological (personal and social) implications. In becoming aware of the implications of language we encounter the problematics inherent in dance research as we come to grips with the contradictions, conflicts and contiguities which can be found to exist among various implications.

In developing such awareness I will address two questions. What values inherent in various languages are imported into dance education research values? What are the problematics of various languages in dance education research?

At this point I need to address a problem which language analysis may encounter vis-à-vis dance education texts. Dance educators are often suspicious of language and intellectual pursuits as being inadequate to or subversive of the dance project. This attitude causes difficulty as they also seek validation within the larger world which requires the use of language and values intellectual approaches to understanding. Dance educators tend to feel forced into a system of interchange and validation which seems to run counter to how they conceive their project. The present work may be able to yield
some clarification of these issues in distinction to the usual level of disagreement in which there is mutual disregard between those dancers who reject language and intellect and those dance researchers who, in exasperation, attack the former as wooly-headed and overly romantic. Certainly the latter have some cause for concern as the Habermasian notion of communicative action and competence underscores the necessity for language if we are to have a world at all. On the other hand, hermeneutic theory also makes it clear that language distorts reality and leads interpretation, a point which I believe the anti-language dancers may tacitly perceive quite clearly.

The Texts

The set of texts which I named in the Introduction belong to a particular strand of dance education, namely creative dance education which was developed in the 1930s, 40s and early 50s. I am interested in creative dance education in part because its practitioners and proponents made explicit attempts to understand dancing as a mode of education answerable to issues of general education (as opposed to being answerable to the specific vocation of a particular discipline and body of knowledge). In addition these educators seem to have been aware of issues which I would contend are important issues for dance such as the body/mind problem and the nature and place of creativity within a technical art.
The two educators and their texts, Margaret H’Doubler and her *Dance, A Creative Art Experience* (1940) and Alma Hawkins and her *Modern Dance in Higher Education* (1954) and *Creating Through Dance* (1988) are two of the most influential thinkers in dance education and their books are considered classics in the field. In terms of this study these texts are particularly useful. While most dancers avoid talking and writing about dance, these dance educators explicitly wrote these books to lead the field into improved, theoretically sound educative practice and discourse. They are recognized both for their centrality to the making of a particular dance education tradition and are, simultaneously, considered to be of contemporary usefulness as curriculum guides and inspirations.

In discussing each of these books, I shall do two things: lay out the ideational content and develop some thoughts on the implications of the language which is used to express the ideas. In laying out the ideational content I will quote extensively since the purpose of the study is to illuminate the tensions which exist between what the author seems to be attempting to say (as gleaned from the declarative and imperative styles of discourse) and what the language used conveys.

Having examined the ideas and language of an individual text I shall, finally, ask the Gadamerian hermeneutic question: what is the question of the author to which the text is an answer? In so doing I shall attempt to reorganize the text
according to how the question is answered and what implications that answer holds for both the specific creative dance education pedagogy and for the act of developing a world-view.

*Margaret H'Doubler's Dance, A Creative Art Experience*

*Introductory Remarks*

Margaret H'Doubler did not start out as a dance teacher. Initially she was a physical educator at the University of Wisconsin who attended Teacher's College in New York City to study for her Master's degree (Kraus and Chapman, 1981). When she had departed for Teacher's College she was "encouraged" by Blanche Trilling, the director of the Department of Physical Education at the University of Wisconsin, to study dance at the same time that she worked on her master's degree (Hawkins, 1954). Trilling was aware of the developments in educational dance being pioneered by Gertrude Colby at Teacher's College and by Bird Larson at Barnard College and, according to Alma Hawkins, Trilling "sensed the importance of this new dance for college women" (Hawkins, 1954, pp.7-8). H'Doubler did study dance and brought what she learned back to Wisconsin where she eventually established the first university dance major in the country and became very important to the development of dance education through extensive writing and publishing of influential texts (Kraus and Chapman, 1981).
Dance, A Creative Art Experience was originally published in 1940 with a second edition published in 1957. H’Doubler wrote three books, A Manual of Dancing, Suggestions and Bibliography for the Teacher of Dancing (1921), followed by Dance and Its Place in Education (1925) (which was an elaboration of the manual) followed by the text I am considering. This book supplanted the others in its importance to the field. It is an expression, as she puts it, of "a theory and a philosophy of dance that will help us to see dance scientifically as well as artistically" and her purpose is to present "dance from a more general point of view" (1940, p.ix).

What we have to examine, then, is what the "more general point of view" of this book is, how she elaborates that point of view and what meanings may be inscribed within her mode of elaboration. Gertrude Johnson, who wrote the Foreword to Dance, A Creative Art Experience, gives us an initial vision of this point of view. She writes that H’Doubler began to teach dance at a time when dance held literally no place or thought of place in the educational plan of any academic institution in the country...Margaret H’Doubler has been chiefly instrumental in bringing dance to its present state, where it is recognized as an educational factor in a great number of schools and colleges. (H’Doubler, 1940, pp.vii-viii)

This point of view is to see in what ways dancing is educational. As we shall see education is posited as a means to social ends.
Social Critique

H'Doubler (1940, all subsequent references will be to this book) begins by proposing to develop two specific lines of thought: 1) to (as I have already written) "set forth a theory and a philosophy that will help us see dance scientifically as well as artistically" (p.x) and 2) to show how dancing contributes to a social agenda. In terms of social agenda she asserts that "Dance...[is] of great social value" and "must [be brought] within the reach of the laity...must be a vitalizing experience to them" (p.x). Dance has a "power of civilization...as a control over life in giving artistic form to its expression" (p.x). Through these two lines of thought she hopes to "bring dance into universal use...to help in the development of a more general appreciation of human art values" (p.x).

In setting out a social agenda she also engages in social critique. She writes, for instance, "...we are overcommercial, overeager for riches" (p.27) and

Art does not come to a people while they are struggling for existence. And, likewise, the ease and irresponsibility of a too pampered life do not key to a pitch for vibrant expression. Rather they are apt to make flabby and nonresilient the sounding board of vital human responses. (p.28)

And,

Although we live in a land of great individual opportunity, we carry on a deadly conformity in the midst of our much-boasted freedom and individualism...We feel safe in conforming, in being like others. Psychologically
we are not yet mature...Conformity...quells the spirit of inquiry and the impulse to create. (p.28)

She complains that "often...education [is] defined as...no more than a means of bettering one's economic condition" (p.60). She writes of workers as being alienated from his/her work.

The detail of the office, the piece job and the assembly line rob the worker of any opportunity to identify himself with his work. He has no chance to create beauty of form or to share his aesthetic experiences through artistic creation. (p.161)

H'Doubler analyzes her world in both sociological and social psychological terms. Sociologically she analyzes human experience economically, seeing a world in which people struggle for economic existence (her attack on the pampered life and her description of the work place). In social psychological terms she sees the individual subsumed by conformist ideology referring to this subsumption of individuality in developmental terms ("we are not yet mature"). Further, For her the world is made of individuals who desire individuality, personal freedom and who quest for the spirituality of aesthetic endeavor (psychologically) but are denied these by too great an interest in physical well-being and by an economic and educational system which denies them both the skills and opportunities for fulfilling such desires and quests (sociologically).

H'Doubler offers a counter to these situations by offering the ameliorative and transformative effects of creative dance education. She enumerates the possible positive consequences of encountering a creative approach to dance education, listing
them in ascending order of importance. They are: having a "healthy mental life", "physical effectiveness", "exhilaration of vigorous physical movement", the "power to carry the individual beyond himself, into a broader world of imaginative experience and understanding", a knowledge of all the arts since all arts are fundamentally the same, cultivation of the "aesthetic attitude", the improvement of "mental life" in terms of the quality of intellect, the appreciation of great artists, and, most importantly, the "carry[ing] over [of] knowledge into a technique of artistic living" (pp.162-167). With each next value she uses contrastive language such as "even more important" and, with the last value she states "The contribution dance can make to [artistic] living is its primary value to an individual life and to society" (p.167). She argues that

To help our people mature and raise our cultural level, we must give them the same opportunity for artistic and spiritual growth that has been afforded them in other branches of education. (p.29)

This help comes in the form of the several benefits which stem from a creative dance experience.

In the above the vision of the transformation of the world into a world of "artistic living" is contrasted to a world of herd-like conformity. Artistic living is mentally healthy, exhilarating, transcendent, democratic and spiritual in contrast to a more crass economic living which is shackled to the struggle for existence, a struggle which results only in a desire for the merely physical (pampered life). In her
comparison between dance and "other branches of education" there is a desire to bring dance education into line with other educational endeavors.

This desire is the desire to reorient the teaching of dance toward the inclusion of social values and the teaching of dance to everyone. She seems very clear that her pedagogy is not oriented toward educating professional dancers, although they are important. Her concern is, rather, with the development of "a sympathetic and understanding public" (p.x). It is important to show, writes H'Doubler, that dance is available to all if they desire it and that it is an activity in which some degree of enjoyment and aesthetic satisfaction for all may be found. (p.ix)

It is not that H'Doubler desires a world without professionals. She is interested in the professional artist and is only trying to make us understand that the artist and public are symbiotic in their relationship. The professional artist needs a public "as much as the public needs the artist to realize and give back its dreams" (p.x). H'Doubler's pedagogy is meant to aid the "community" in "possess[ing]...a dance spirit [from which] many artists will rise from the ranks to carry dance to its highest unfoldment" (p.xi). It is the task of "us today to rediscover and seek [dance's] influence" (p.x).

For H'Doubler it is up to educational institutions to achieve this influence for it is through the schools that "dance can reach everyone...[for] few studios are interested
in...democratic art activity" (p.x). Schools, on the other hand, can give every child throughout his/her school experience the opportunity to experience dance as a creative art...[to] enrich...his adult life...by keeping pace with his developing physical, mental, and spiritual needs. (p.x)

H'Doubler notes that "Students bring a wealth of natural endowment to a study of movement" (p.xxvi). But, she asks What are we doing with this endowment?...Not until provision is made in the curriculum for creative activities can we hope to renew much-needed aesthetic sensitivity in our lives today and be freed from herd-like conformity. (p.xvii)

She continues,

The individual’s culture as well as the culture of the social order is dependent upon man's ability to create and produce. These are human qualities which must be saved. To release and foster creativity is one of education’s greatest challenges. (p.xvii)

The specifics of H'Doubler’s pedagogy for change rely upon psychology, physiology and anatomy for the necessary understanding of the aesthetic experience. She writes, "...the impelling force in art creation is to be explained by the psychology of feeling and by the need for communication" (p.51) and

This desire to express all feeling in order to continue pleasurable states of feeling and to relieve those which are not pleasurable has its basis in the physiological phenomena of all life. (pp.51-52)

Such physiological necessity is found literally in "all life" (she presents the amoeba as a primary example of moving toward pleasurable experience and away from unpleasantness). She
notes, "All that we have at our disposal for human development is this natural and universal setup of simple feeling" upon which "we elaborate our superior feelings which later will serve us as our preferences" (p.52). She characterizes the desire to communicate as "instinctive" (p.52), a biological metaphor. H'Doubler's world is constituted, here, as a natural one at base which has both, in valuable ways, become more cultured and civilized and, problematically, lost its way as witnessed by the loss of natural aesthetic affect as a virtue.

To rediscover the natural base H'Doubler teaches that the pedagogy must attend, in part, to "movement forms" based "on the laws of bodily motion...in all the forms characteristic of human responses" (p.65). In the chapter, "Technique and Expression", H'Doubler goes on to explicate these laws in anatomical, physiological, and behaviorist terms. Coming to an understanding of these laws and their accompanying processes of expression is very important since science "will contribute to a more truthful art" by bringing about "understanding" and "analysis of conditions" for "expression" and "consciousness of our abilities" (p.94).

On the other hand, H'Doubler warns against overemphasizing such rational understanding.

[T]oo much analysis may obscure the real significance of reality - something may escape, so that in the reconstruction there is less of substance than in the beginning. Also, we may become so engrossed in facts that we lose the vision of the finished whole, and thus the
emergence of ideas that give significant meaning and value to facts is blocked. (p.95)

But, she reassures, "There is no danger in this process if we continually realize that the real phenomena resides in the whole" (p.95). Here we can see the struggle between valuing the uniqueness of dance, a non-rational activity, and the importation into it of the value of science as an important form of rational analysis. H'Doubler is trying to mediate between them so as to develop truthfulness and yet retain the inchoate gestalt of dance. The rationalist side of the dialectic marks out her world as a place where there is truth which is knowable, concrete and immutable: "laws" and "facts". The non-rationalist side raises facts to the level of "significant meaning."

Science discovers facts and art reveals "the real significance of reality", of facts. Unable to ignore these opposed truths H'Doubler is caught within a paradox whose tensions she acknowledges.

Nature/Culture

In H'Doubler's world the metaphors of "nature" and "organic" are imaged as the ground out of which "grows" the culture of human beings. Human beings have an animal "nature" which they transcend by elaborating "superior feelings."

H'Doubler writes,

The forms of plants and the movements of animals and human beings as well as their biological functioning are the results of an inner determining activity. But man goes
further. He of all creatures is destined by the very laws of his nature to achievements of another order. Unlike the animal, he is driven by convictions and ideas of the perfect that are not innate, but are the results of experience and education. How much simpler life would be if the development of an individual...were as simple as that of the plant and animal...determined by an instinctive ordering. But the expressive forms of man’s ideals nevertheless are organically related to an inner activity...taking the raw materials of sensation...organizing and relating them, thus endowing experience with a structure and individuality of its own. (p.102)

These biological metaphors function as a language for description, explanation and, I believe, legitimation for the pedagogy. In terms of legitimation the workings of culture ("experience and education") are legitimated by metaphorizing them as "organically related to an inner activity". "Taking raw materials" is the biological ground and "organizing them" is the cultural extension out of that ground. By linking her ideas with biology she suggests, I believe, that her ideas have a facticity as inevitable as nature. They partake of the quality of biology even though they are not biology. If one were seeking truth then nature would seem to present one version of solid ground for truth. Those ideas not grounded in biology would be moving away from truth. (We have seen already that H’Doubler is interested in "a more truthful art.")

Nature also functions literally in her discourse as the basis for cultural understanding as for instance science as a form of cultural life. She writes,

The original, more instinctive form becomes conditioned by the ideal form. And only as the mind can conceive of
these new forms as related to the familiar organic forms will a true expressive style develop. The vitality of movement is subject to and controlled by deep-seated influences that are of, and for, the organism. In building technique, then, we should try...to release [deep-seated influences] in order that they may contribute to, and co-operate with, the goal-aiming efforts of the mind. (p.93)

I take this to mean that the cultural artifact called dance technique is a cultural elaboration of the natural, instinctive mode of living of the organism. "Only as the mind can conceive of these new forms will a true expressive style develop."

H'Doubler seeks a fundamental and essential truth through the mind which examines material existence (organic forms) and comes to know ideal forms through that examination.

Mind/Body

This theme of mind/body has an important role within her pedagogical world. She writes that "the educated, cultured, individual life [is] dependent upon the growth and function of the mind...to know, will, imagine, create, and execute" (p.60). Later she writes, "The success of any act...depends upon a conscious direction of effort toward the ideal" (p.91) by which she means that the direction is under the control of the mind or, as she puts it elsewhere, under the direction of the "higher mental and spiritual natures of people" (p.129).

The purpose of educating the mind is to lift the human being out of his/her primal, instinctual life. She writes of composing dances, for instance, in the following way:
Reason enters...and causes other judgments to appear...aesthetic judgment is lifted form the level of instinctual and elemental feeling to that of intelligence and understanding. (p.113)

And she writes that education

trains these [instinctive impulses] to serve the will and desires of an intellect impelled by ideas so that the individual student can bring all his powers to bear upon the life of his choosing. (p.97)

The dialectic of nature/culture is both unified (culture as an elaboration of nature) and split apart (culture is lifted away from nature to the level of intelligence and understandings which is distinct from nature.)

The relationship of the mind and body (culture and nature) is clearly hierarchical in this discourse. The organic body, the "instinctive impulses" are trained "to serve the will and desires of the intellect". Most of H'Doubler's discourse is focused upon educating the mind in its several aspects, either physiologically, intellectually or emotionally, such aspects being useful for education in the creative mode. In the one chapter more heavily involved with the body, "Technique and Expression", the language shifts from "education" to "training" signalling a different attitude toward the body and a different approach to mind education when it is directed toward the body.

In dance, as in every art, it is essential to train the mind to use some tool...In dance the body is employed as the instrument...train[ed] to use the body to reflect its condition...[and] to be responsive to the expressive mind. (p.70)
This training makes "the meaning of education as the disciplining and training of our powers and the attainment of skill in execution" (p.63). What occurs is that the "drives" of a person subjected to the restraint and directions of the intellect and executed by the physical...result in a fusion of all our energies with the focal point centered in the personality. (p.63)

Through mental activities

perception, intuition, feeling, and conception...our personalities assimilate experience and work it up into our own substance and the world of thought, emotion, and will.

Without this metabolism of experience damage is done to the emerging personality. (p.62)

H'Doubler is not unaware of the problem of the hierarchical mind/body relationship. In a footnote she writes that the "term" "mind" is "used here for convenience to designate the mental aspect of the total organism, and not to imply a separation of mind from body" (p.70). She writes that she believes in "the organic wholeness of man" (p.63) in which "the body should be given as careful a study and as high a perfection of technique as the associated processes of thought and feeling" (p.63). At other moments H'Doubler seems to be seeking both a reconciliation of the mind and body as equally important ("[t]he most completely developed person is the one who has trained all his powers with equal dignity and consideration" [p.63]). At the same time she understands them to be significantly different in terms of the needs of education
and the contribution which they can make to education. She writes that the body is the "agent" of the mind.

The body should be considered as the outer aspect of personality...the agent through which we receive impressions...and by which we communicate. The body is to be "mastered." (p.65)

The mind is valuable in the degree of strength of the stimulative and regulative processes which follow upon the perception of a stimulus...A properly functioning mind...transforms [impressions] that they may better serve its purpose. (p.71)

From all this we can see just how complicated her argument is as at first she takes one position and then another.

Her concern with the mind/body relation is that dancing will become too body oriented. The dancer must take care of uniting his/her inner (mental) and outer (body) rhythms, otherwise "the dance is likely to be too much of the body, rather than the mind through the body" (p.86). In order to guard against such an eventuality technical training of the body should function so that "[r]epeated activity becomes automatic and is finally executed with little or no thought, thus freeing the mind for the activities of artistic creation" (p.90). The mind should be free of body concerns and should not have to attend to the body which serves the mind. Later she writes that aesthetic experience...[is] primarily a feeling experience...it is upon this basic tendency to pleasurable responses that art education should be built. Mere sensation is not enough - emotional consciousness is needed. (p.114)
The term "consciousness" refers, here, away from sensation or sensing and toward awareness of a mental state, the emotions.

In making the body an agent of the mind, an agent to be mastered, and not responsible for creative activity, H'Doubler tacitly separates the body and mind in an operational relation in which the body never takes the lead except as a primitive sense organ which can nonetheless be trained to have "motor intelligence" ("Technique of the physical instrument is motor intelligence" [p.91]). In fact,

to acquire technique one must first have desire...to find out the hows and whys. Intellectual curiosity does not permit any rest until there is a solution. (p.91)

This indicates that the body cannot be skilled without the imposition of an intellectual desire and reflects the nature/culture dichotomy in which culture is an elaboration of nature. At the same time (and reflecting the complexity of the issue) H'Doubler writes positively of the intelligence of the body as dancers "tend to think in terms of images derived from movement...dancers are endowed with vivid motor imagination and memory" (p.118). This may indicate that there is a body mind (motor imagination and intelligence) distinct from intellectual or emotional consciousness.

Emotions

H'Doubler writes often that dancing is about feeling. What is meant by feeling is complex for there are "feeling states of
pure sensation" (p.116) and "feelings that accompany activity" which are "mental states that become recorded...for future reference" (p.117). The association of...feeling and movement" ("mental states" and "feeling states of pure sensation", mind and body) become relied upon by the artist to "bring about an emotional experience by recalling and experiencing the motor phase.

Like all works of art, a dance expresses emotions aroused by images, which are sensory or psychic, objective or subjective...images derived from movement...When [an] image is clearly and vividly sensed, it demands release...over the motor paths...The observable form is, therefore, biologic and organic...The sources are life itself...life forces dictate the fashioning of the expressive medium. (pp.118-119)

In the above the dancer has pure, objective sensation ("sensory...images derived from movement") which is remembered (subjectively). Subjective associations are made between objective sensations motivated by movement and mental states. Images are created out of recalled associations. The originating emotions (associated body/mental states) "dictate" the forming of the image. The image itself begins in the mind (subject) and releases into the body (object). Emotions are central to the pedagogy since they provide the possibility of images.

On the other hand, while dancing is an emotional act dancers, to be artistic, must control the emotions for expressing emotions is not art.
It is the systematizing, according to the laws of the medium, that separates art from mere accident and nature. It is only when these random yet expressive movements are subjected to the harmonizing influence of rhythm, and consciously given form, that dance comes into being as an art form. (p.56)

The difficulty with intense emotion is that it causes an audience to become self-conscious and embarrassed because of an emotional nudity which can be made presentable only by abstraction and restraint.

A dance...must be an individual thing, but not a personal thing.

A dance is an image stimulus.

[A] dancer must have the capacity for expressing human emotions without appearing to share them personally. (p.119)

In using the term "emotional nudity" H'Doubler metaphorizes a mental state with a body image. Emotions are being understood negatively and, by inference, the body also gains a negative connotation. I would say that it is possible to understand the above as saying that for art to exist the body and emotions must be left behind. Previously I wrote that the body is to become automatic and unthought. Here emotion is to lose its personal quality.

H'Doubler seems to make emotion problematic in that emotion escapes, when uncontrolled, the values of balance and harmony. For instance, in discussing the use of repetition in composing a dance the dancer must guard against the emotional build of too much insistent repetition for such a build "generates more emotional energy than can be satisfied, and
often an explosion results" (p.142). The way in which quality art can be recognized is in the quality of its emotional restraint. H'Doubler writes

    Experience tends to universalize the individual to the extent that concrete emotions and concrete dramatic situations take on a more abstract form in the art expression of them.

    [M]odified by his growing realization of the effect of his own actions...expressive movement became art dance - a form consciously pursued for its art values. (p.43)

H'Doubler prefers "balance" (p.141).

    Excess emotion also has psychological consequences.

    Every high strong emotional state which has not found its appropriate outlet causes movement by which we instinctively try to get rid of the feeling of restraint. (p.51)

Strong emotion restrains and requires an "appropriate outlet", a proper form. H'Doubler cites Yrjo Hirn to support her view that art, while it does not "serve only as a sedative for human feelings" does have, according to Hirn, "a relieving and cathartic mission...[that] bestows upon him [the human] that inward calm in which all strong emotions find relief!" (p.51).

A person would be relieved from, be without, strong emotion and this can be found in dance.

    [O]nce a reflex outlet for strong emotional pressure, dance has become deliberate creation in which the intellect and will dominate the automatic and emotional responses. There is a gain in consciousness, but no change in the essential working of biological and aesthetic processes. (p.45)

This "deliberate creation" has led to a "genuineness of feeling, which leaves little chance for superficiality" (p.44).
From this lengthy discussion of mind/body/emotions an image of the world as it is and as it should be emerges. The individual is a mind separate from a body and in order for both the individual and society to become civilized the mind must take the lead, both in understanding and governance. The more base aspects of human beings, especially unbridled emotions, must be safely relieved via proper channels ("appropriate outlet"). In addition, for the world to be cultured the personal must be eschewed in favor of universalization based on the general laws of the body and art. (Here we may note a conflict between H'Doubler's initial call for individuality, against conformity, and, here, where she values a depersonalized world in which individuals understand and obey fundamental, non-individual laws.) Further the world as it should be is a world of balance and harmony or, in other words, without conflict.

Harmony, Dance, and the Social

Limiting and controlling conflict is a clearly articulated value in the discourse. H'Doubler writes of "the harmonizing influence of rhythm", "balance", and "inward calm." She also uses the word "adjustment" extensively. These terms mark the pedagogy as moving toward a pacific state of being for both the individual and society. H'Doubler writes, "The desire to find peace within ourselves and to bring about an adequate adjustment
to the life around us is the basis for all mental and physical activity" (p.60). Life is characterized as

a series of conflicts...not only between man and his world, but within man himself - between the instinctive demands...of his complex nature...[these instinctive impulses...need to be trained to serve the will and desires of an intellect impelled by ideals...[f]inding peace...[through] adequate adjustment to...life. (p.69)

A person's "ability to adjust himself and survive depends" upon "more experience and a better understanding of his world" and "upon his mental powers rather than on physical powers alone" (p.43). Toward this end "[e]ducation should be a building toward integration of human capacities and powers resulting in well-adjusted, useful, balanced individuals" (p.60).

The achievement of harmony of such integration which results in balanced individuality occurs through the social actions of human beings. She writes,

We are social creatures...seek[ing]...one another's approval...social inheritance and training have gradually evolved socialized artistic values...[These] to a certain degree ensured agreement as to that which is pleasing, satisfying, and admirable. (p.115)

In this light

art education may be socializing...for it should free the individual to enjoy all that has been found good in the past as well as to enjoy the art creations of his own age. (p.116)

While she writes of simple feelings as the physiological basis for superior feelings she also writes, "Generally speaking, most of our feelings, except the simplest organic ones, are induced
by ideas of things" (p.126). "Ideas of things" may mean learned ideas or social ideas. It may also refer to her notion of ideal forms which she uses in conjunction with relating science and nature ("The original, more instinctive form becomes conditioned by the ideal form", p.93). Indeed she writes later, "The mind must express itself logically and can comprehend meaning only when the elements are arranged in a telling and meaningful fashion" and that "taste and standards" must be taught (p.143).

What we, as readers of H'Doubler, may take from her use of both ideas of biological determinism and social construction is a message of the dialectical interpenetration of the two.

This dialectic leads to the development of the good society. She focuses strongly upon dance as a means to that end and she struggles to free dance education from a vocational orientation toward dance (although not totally successfully as she values beautiful, perfected dance which suggests to me the art of great artists) wanting dance to be for everyone, wanting "democratic art activity" (p.x) which, I would argue, represents the good society.

On the other hand, even within a democratic valuing this good society does not discard the standards of great art. While she finds that it is true that great art can only be made by great attention to professional specialization it is just as true that a genuine appreciation and even true artistic creation are possible to all...At the same time it is necessary to maintain a real appreciation of the efforts of those who are greater artists. (p.50)
Making art, however, is important for all because developing the "art spirit" brings about a person becoming an "'inventive, searching, daring, self-expressive creature'" (quoted from Robert Henri) (p.50). A bit later she writes that while "not everyone can be an artist in the narrow sense", since everyone shares in "the nature of the original impulse" everyone "who approaches his work in a creative spirit and makes it the expression of his own vision of life is an artist" (p.53).

This implies that to have the good society requires "work". The term "work" has especial significance as she counters it to "play". Recalling Gadamer's valued use of "play" for metaphorizing the alive quality of language here we find play to be denigrated. H'Doubler writes that "art...cannot...be reduced to the play impulse" (p.51). The expression of feeling, she writes, is "in order to continue pleasurable states of feeling and to relieve those which are not pleasurable" (pp.51-52). The evolution of consciousness moves from such "simple feeling" to "superior feelings". Play is, thus, severed from superior feelings. Art cannot be "reduced" to it. The superior feelings seem to be the "experience [of] the sheer joy of the rhythmic sense of free, controlled, and expressive movement" to which every human being is "entitled" (p.66).
Conclusion: Dance and Education

Gadamer has stated that the reader of a text seeks to uncover the question to which an author's text is an answer. While the major question of H'Doubler's text might seem to have to do with dance, I will claim that it is what constitutes a viable society which interests her. I claim this because in the end what she points to is dance as a means to important social ends. In general terms her explicit answer as to how to develop a viable society is based in a valuing of individuality in an artistic sense. Every individual lives his/her life in an aesthetically creative manner in order to achieve social ends of non-alienation, etc. between people and their society. While she uses language, in discussing alienation, reminiscent of Marxist thinking (the worker is "rob[bed] of any opportunity to identify himself with his work") her solutions have little to do with politically or economically changing the conditions of the work place. Rather she relies on a personal solution or adjustment to the situation by changing the way the worker thinks.

There are a number of ways in which her pedagogy presents contradictions to her valuing of individuality. First, she values tradition for providing a standard of quality by which to value art-making. (This valuing lays her open to the same kinds of critiques applied to Gadamer's valuing of tradition. Specifically, they both ignore or deliberately downplay the
conflictual quality of social life and the political ramifications of such conflict.) These traditional standards are those of the professional artist. Throughout the text H'Doubler utilizes the term "ideal" and similar words such as "perfection." For instance she writes "It is difficult in practice to separate the elements of physical skill in dance from its ideal essence" and she writes that the "perfection of the body...must mean...a trained, enriched attitude of the whole human being" (p.89). She writes, "[W]orking from the ordinary to the ideal causes the body to take on an abstract impersonal quality resulting in innate, unsought classical beauty" (p.94). By wanting to bring students into contact with great art and artists and into experience with their (the students's) own abilities to shape their lives in an aesthetic manner, her pedagogy is aimed at revering the tradition of great art.

Second, she calls for the development of individual and societal harmony and balance. Such balance, within the terms of her description, requires an individual to yield to the social pressures of his situation, being brought into the fold of society. In eschewing conflict, she avoids actually confronting the inequities of her day. Her social critique then appears to be not aimed at changing the material circumstances of workers. Her concern is to alter or adjust their mental lives so as to bring them individual satisfaction within the boundaries of their already spoken for lives.
Third, H'Doubler deals in biological determinism in laying out her pedagogy. If she is correct in linking human beings's biological nature with their cultural development (that human culture is an elaboration of basic biological drives) then in whatever ways that culture has developed are, essentially, correct. (Jacoby, on the other hand while ceding the notion that culture gives particularity to general biological drives, would not accept H'Doubler's tacitly held corollary notion that all cultural developments are, thereby, naturally good. He recognizes the deformation as well as the formation of cultural individuals.) For H'Doubler, the cultural development becomes incorrect only when people forget the biological underpinnings of culture and depart from following that natural strand of development. What society needs, in order to improve society, is to recall the biological necessity of artistic expression and act upon that understanding. Therein lies the solution to human social problems. (Marcuse, 1955, may be following a similar strand in his desire to liberate the primal sensuality of human beings.)

Valuing tradition, social harmony and the belief in biological determinism not only contradicts the value of individuality but may be read as being an attempt to transcend the social problems of alienation etc. themselves.

Transcendence, as a value, occupies an important place in her discourse. She opens her text by referring to people as
"laity" and calls dance a "vitalizing experience". This is religious terminology and, I would suggest, that H'Doubler is teaching that dancing experience, like some religious experience, seeks a transcendence of the mundane.

The valuing of the ideal forms which it is prescribed that we should try to find, also partakes of an attempt to transcend the mundane. H'Doubler's idealist approach seems to be reminiscent of Plato's work in a transcendental approach to the solution of mundane problems. H'Doubler directly invokes Plato, at one point, when she cites him to prove the importance of dancing. At another point H'Doubler writes that dance, no matter in what historical period, reflects "no change in the essential working of biological and aesthetic processes" (p.45).

The pleasure of obeying the impulse to move and to express in ordered movement our responses to the forces of nature and of our environment remains the same in every time and place. (p.45)

This notion of unchanging character of these processes aligns her discourse with the classical Greek philosophical position which understood history to be cyclic and repetitious. Explanations for historical change were not to be found in changing material conditions but, rather, in the natural cycle of human affairs and institutions, a cycle understandable only in the metaphysical realm of insight.

The religious and Platonist traditions exist at subtle levels in the text in that they do not get forwarded in very explicit terms although they can be found in the kind of
language she uses. Here we can see how language contains worlds sedimented within it. These worlds mediate the process of negotiation between individuals importing into the text other worlds, other contexts of understanding. This is an example, I believe, of Bakhtin's heteroglossia. On par with Bakhtin's motion of the conflictual character of heteroglossia it may be noted here that the importation of Plato's world in a discussion of democracy can be questioned as to its efficacy in promoting the values of democracy. After all, Plato did not call for a democracy as H'Doubler might think of it, calling as he did for a philosopher-king who would know the truth and tell everyone else how to act according to that truth.

ALMA HAWKINS'S MODERN DANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Introductory Remarks

Like Margaret H'Doubler, Alma Hawkins attended Teachers College for her graduate work, receiving an Ed.D. from that institution. Beyond the fact that she has taught at UCLA for many years and was Chairman of the Department of Dance, I have not been able to locate other biographical materials. What I do know is that, according to the back-cover material of her book Creating Through Dance, she has written extensively in the field.
Modern Dance in Higher Education was originally published in 1954 and reissued in 1982. In the reissue version Hawkins wrote, in a new Preface, that

I have presented a point of view about dance in education as I saw it in 1954. I believe that the basic concepts are still valid, though my approach to the implementation of certain concepts would be different today. (unpaged Preface)

She also wrote, on the same page, "I still believe that the creative development of the individual is of central importance." This indicates that one way to approach this book, in preparing to contrast it to Hawkins's second book, is to investigate the contexts and purposes of creativity in this first book and examine how her implementation of creativity changes in the next book (since she claims that a change occurred for her). It will also be informative to keep in mind H'Doubler's work since H'Doubler also claims the paramount importance of individual creativity.

Prior to beginning, however, one contextual difference between H'Doubler and Hawkins exists which is alluded to in Hawkins's book by the lack of attention she pays to this issue. H'Doubler, as Gertrude Johnson put it, brought dance into education and her struggle was to legitimate its presence in academia. Hawkins, on the other hand, was writing at a time when dance education was already established in academia. Therefore she does not write of legitimation issues and her reasons for writing her book and the struggles with which she
deals early on in the book place the book not in the sphere of an apology for dance nor establishing the worth of dance (these are part of H'Doubler's concern) but in the sphere of working out the details of how it ought to be developed now that its basic worth is already accepted. This creates a rather different mood, as we shall see.

The Rift Between Dance Educators

Alma Hawkins begins Modern Dance in Higher Education (1954, all subsequent references will be to this edition) by focusing on the rift between dance oriented and education oriented dance educators. She writes that there is a "confusion...[and] controversy...concerning the role of modern dance in education" (p.1). This confusion stems from "the spontaneous and rapid growth of modern dance programs in colleges across the country, plus the powerful influence of concert dance on these programs" (p.1) which has left little time for thinking about the proper course of development. Rather, such growth emphasized "'selling' dance" (p.1) and after all the proselytizing years,

[Dance educators] want to know what educational concepts and principles should guide the teacher of dance; they want answers to many questions raised by the conflict of various points of view. (p.2)

These conflicts arose because

[in most cases teachers based their thinking upon personal experience with dance. Discussions usually started and ended with dance - not education - as the
focus of attention. And it is not surprising that educators who had studied dance with professional artists and in studio settings had difficulty in arriving at agreement about the role of dance in education. (p.23)

Educators, in attempting to resolve their differences, failed primarily because they "spent all their effort supporting their own viewpoints" (p.22). Hawkins proposes to take the discussion out of "personal experience", to avoid the "emotional framework which complicates any discussion of problems of the dance" replacing it with "sober consideration" (p.1).

Hawkins offers to resolve the conflict and clarify the confusion by positing "an over-all philosophy of education" which distinguishes educational dance from professional dance. Such a philosophy is necessary because "the purposes of education and professional dance are different" (p.23). Hawkins stresses that the "primary difference...is in the approach used and the ultimate goals sought" (p.37). She distinguishes between these approaches.

The goal of professional dance is "perfected dance", evaluating "each dance in terms of rather absolute standards of excellence" (p.106). By "absolute standards" Hawkins means the principles of movement which embody the canons of beauty and meaning instituted in dance and to which the individual must adhere. The individual is to become as much like the standards as possible. In this situation the ends (perfected dance) justify the means.
The means of professional dance are hierarchical. There is a "leading artist" who makes all the choreography for a dance group and there are "members of the group [who] are used to produce an end product which conveys the artist's ideas" (p.107). Only a few people are able to "make a place for themselves either as second level concert artists or as members of a top level artist's dance group" (p.107). The professional artist's life is restrictive, both because of the above "highly selective process" by which people get admitted into the professional world and because "different points of view and individual movement must be shaped in the light of the final product desired by the artist" (p.107). Success "may require endless hours of rehearsal, elimination or strict limitation of many other aspects of living, and extreme conformity to the artist's ideas" (p.107). In a positive vein Hawkins believes that this process and situation "makes possible the achievement of excellent dance" and that there must be high selectivity "if the goal of professional dance is perfected dance" (p.107). The kind of dance education which grows out of this traditional point of view has been based on "mere acceptance of another's point of view and imitation as a basis for teaching" (p.2).

In educational dance, in contrast, "[i]ndividual and class experiences should be planned and guided always so as to contribute to the development of the individual, and secondarily so as to lead to good dance" (p.37). Educational dance is based
on "a true understanding of the potential contribution of dance experience to the growth of an individual" (p.2), "growth resulting in more mature and effective behavior" (p.35). In contrast to the highly selective process of professional dance which allows only a few individuals to participate, Hawkins seeks participation by all people. "The dance teacher's task as an educator is not one of producing artists and artist works but, rather, one of contributing to the education of many persons" (p.34). This is the essence of education in "our democratic society" (p.108).

That essence finds fulfillment when each student [is helped to] discover and develop his power of expression...to grow in his understanding of self and in his relationship to others and these gains will, in turn, contribute to his progress towards total development. (p.108)

Moreover, this kind of education will only come about when process is emphasized over product.

In the above we may discern hierarchically organized dichotomies. For instance, she dichotomizes "sober consideration" and "emotional framework" (and implicitly associated with emotion is "personal experience") preferring and privileging the rationality of "sober consideration" over the affective aspect of mind, "emotional framework", for use as valid criteria for making educational decisions. Whatever value the professional dancer places upon his/her experience is dismissed by Hawkins as mere personalism with no valuable force for supporting subsequent pedagogy. Thus sober "consideration"
seems hierarchically arranged over emotion and personal experience. Paradoxically, Hawkins complains of the hierarchy in professional dance and yet presents this dichotomy in an hierarchical manner. Hierarchical reasoning is so pervasive within the culture that even as she dismisses it from the content of her ideas, it reappears within the very presentation of these ideas.

Hawkins also dichotomizes "true understanding" which leads to maturity and effectiveness for the growth of individuality from "mere acceptance of another's point of view" and "imitation." "Mere acceptance" and "imitation", linked to traditional dance education (in which a student studies with an acknowledged master of the art form who him/herself studied with an acknowledged master) represents tradition within the form. In providing an antidote to tradition via the true understanding of proper dance education Hawkins implies that tradition will lead to immaturity and a lack of growth of the individual. This hierarchical valuing of her pedagogy over others also represents a developmental approach to the curriculum as she associates her version of education with "maturity". What she seeks in the growth of individuality away from the imitative conformity of professional dance is an autonomy of action on the part of the student. Maturity equals autonomy.

In order to bring about maturity, autonomy and true educational goals (as opposed to professional goals) Hawkins
identifies three areas of interest as being central to that
purpose. These interests are identified as needs: "helping
students to satisfy their needs for an adequate body, satisfying
expression, and effective human relations" (pp.108-109).

Attending to these needs will lead to

[c]hanges in understandings, attitudes and
behavior...[dance education making] particular
contribution to the development of the individual in the
area of self-realization and human relations. (pp.108-
109)

The identified needs become the organizing principle for her
pedagogical discourse. She devotes one chapter to each need.

The Body and Its Biological and Social Bases

In the "adequate body" chapter she begins by
characterizing the human being as a "biological and
social...organism" which is in "interaction within the organism
and between the organism and its environment" (p.39). She
further characterizes interaction as "adjustments", writing that
the "adequacy and quality of the organism's adjustments in this
interaction depend upon the ability of the body to function
effectively in each particular situation" (p.39). She writes
that "[t]o a large extent [adjustment] results from involuntary
motion" but, also "each individual has the ability, within
certain limitations, to develop and improve the effectiveness of
his body [through] conscious and learned adjustment" (p.40).
Hawkins presents us, then with two forms of adjustment: involuntary adjustment (the automatic biological adjustment of the body to various circumstances such as the "fight or flight" syndrome) and voluntary adjustment in the form of each individual's limited ability to "improve the effectiveness of his body". Involuntary adjustment is out of human purview and control; voluntary adjustment is both under conscious control and is learned. Voluntary adjustment is the site of educational effort.

Hawkins's value of adjustment to life-situations links her discourse, at least in this respect, with that of H'Doubler's. Seeking effective levels of functioning and response seems to parallel H'Doubler's seeking ways of maintaining a non-conflictual relation with the world. Adjustment may be taken as changing oneself in response to a changing situation rather than changing the situation to suit oneself. This will become clearer through detailing Hawkins's contexts of adjustment and effective functioning.

The contexts in which adjustment takes place are those of the biological and the social. Hawkins writes that the "desire for an effective body" which adjusts well has "biological and social bases" which she also interprets as "developmental needs and...social pressures" (p.39). Developmental needs are associated with biology, taking on the form of a natural
inevitability (similar to H'Doubler's ideas). Biological metaphors are used to discuss both biological and social bases.

Biological bases refers, specifically, to "total fitness" by which Hawkins means "[t]he functioning of all parts of the body in such a manner that the organism makes satisfactory adjustment to its environment" (p.41, emphasis added). The environment is considered to be stable and the person changes in order to adjust to it in an involuntary manner. This "total functioning and organic fitness should be considered...as a goal or purpose" (p.41, emphasis added). Goal or purpose, here, seems to refer to the goal of all living beings which then becomes a goal of education. Education supports and enhances the inevitable need for "fitness". This is only right and proper for fitness is a biological necessity ('Man is meant to be an active animal" manifested through "[t]he significant role that movement plays in the functioning of the organisms [which] makes the human being's need for activity apparent" (p.41). The biological image is further underscored by such statements as: activity "produces [physical] power needed to carry on everyday tasks" and "maintain[s] balance in the various tissues and in the organizing capacities of the tissues" (p.41).

Hawkins generalizes people into these kinds of categories by which all people are understood to be the same. In the above the category people are biological "organisms". The individual disappears, replaced by the generic body. (This categorization
makes her project paradoxical in the light of her valuing individuality.)

Hawkins also gathers people into general social categories. When she begins to write of the social bases she notes that

A realistic attempt to understand the college student's feeling of need for an effective body must take into account the social goals of youth. This is so simply because the adolescent feels and tends to interpret this need in terms of social relationships rather than of biological performances. (p.45)

Individual students become youth and adolescents in general.

According to Hawkins, biological and social bases are simultaneously in play in a person although the student tends to only focus upon the latter. The specific social bases, being concerned with the desire of the student to be accepted by his/her peers through conforming to social norms and learning how to fit in with social expectations tend to make biological needs invisible to the student. In this wise she writes that the student comes to understand that the appearance of the body...has significant effect upon his social relationships...he gives serious attention to changing the appearance and functioning of the body so that he can conform to group standards. (p.48)

For teachers it is important that they understand these social needs and "remember that man is a social animal...constantly striving to maintain a satisfactory relationship with this social environment" (p.47). She metaphorizes society with a biological image (social animal) and, similarly to H'Doubler,
she links the social with a form of biological determinism (since biology is understood as an inevitable fact of existence).

While Hawkins presents the biological and social bases separately, she also notes how the biological becomes social. She notes that "physical skills have high status value", that the college student "attaches great importance to his performance in certain [popular] physical activities" (i.e. sports) (p.48). What she understands is that when people strive to improve their bodies they often do so at the behest of social rules and roles, accepting or rejecting changes in their bodies for purely social reasons. The "natural" body with its origins in biological necessity (of which she writes) is transformed into a social body which is altered to enhance social acceptance. In this there may be a tacit recognition of the social construction of body rooted in and identified by social codes which may be read in a person's body. She writes,

[A]dolescents...constantly measure themselves against the prevailing norms of feminine and masculine attractiveness...Girls feel great pressure to be "good looking and graceful," while boys want to appear "strong and manly." According to Murphy [Gardner Murphy, Personality, NY:Harper and Brothers, 1947,p.517], physical appearance is more important for women than for men in most modern cultures and is codified to a large degree with social status ends. (p.49)

In using the terms "needs" and "drives" to characterize the students' social functioning Hawkins injects an element of inevitability to the psychological analysis. Needs and drives
are inborn to the animal and as with biological metaphors which carry the force of nature (to which we respond but which we cannot resist or change) so the psychological terms of needs and drives achieve a similar effect. Needs and drives are not psychological forces which we can choose to attend to or not, but are utter necessities which demand attention.

Hawkins's world seems circumscribed by such determinisms. Her value of adjusting to circumstances is focused upon an accommodation to the various inevitabilities of biology, society and psychology. There is not a moment, within her body discussion, when she argues for resisting them. Hawkins, at least in this section, opts both for an acceptance of the social surround and for a pedagogy which enables people to both have effective action and become adjusted to it.

Mind/Body

As with H'Doubler, Hawkins, in writing of the body, distinguishes between mind and body and tends to subordinate body to mind. She writes of "the human body as an instrument for movement and expression" (p.40) and in so doing instrumentalizes the body and subsumes it to the mind's control by having the body be an instrument for "expression". She also writes that "satisfying expression...is dependent on an instrument that can translate creative ideas into movement" (p.50). The body instrument is made to mediate between the
mind's thought ("creative ideas") and the signification of thought ("movement"). The body does not think its own kind of thoughts nor does it contribute to the shaping of the signification of thought (except as the body is adequate or inadequate to the body's function as instrument). She argues for "an intellectual base" in which "the student should understand why he is practicing a technique" (p.57), thus calling for mind activity to guide body activity. She also writes, "Best results accrue when an activity is meaningful, especially when the participant sees close relationship of the activity to something he values" (p.57). "[M]eaningful" is meant here as personally and socially meaningful and "seeking a close relationship" means understanding. Understanding is, conventionally, a cognitive, mental function and so, once again, mental activity is privileged.

It would be wrong, however, to understand Hawkins as wholly making the body a subordinate actor to the mind. In her chapter devoted to the second human need, "satisfying expression", she writes that we know the world through our bodies, through "the felt relations of the body response" (p.74). Dancing develops "a heightened awareness of body movement and its meaning" (p.74) and through dancing a person "becomes a more sensitive instrument, capable of responding to life situations with increased feeling and meaning" (p.75). Here the body of a person is capable of knowing and providing
knowledge of the world and is not only a means to other ends. The increase of feeling and meaning goes beyond the adjustment value in that it provides for meaning making beyond the immediate necessity of adjustment. She writes also that "[b]ody movement and dance are natural outlets for man's need for expression of his feelings and idea" and that "[m]ovement is familiar and meaningful." Further, man "responds" bodily to situations: "movement seems the most elemental source of response" (p.65).

In all these cases Hawkins writes of the body as a valuable connection to the world, and as a "source" and a "natural outlet" and although she continues to use language which references the mind (feeling and meaning making being mental states and activities) and writes of the body as an instrument, generally her approach seems not only instrumental but also aware of the values which are associated with body knowledge. By making the body more primary than previously Hawkins's discourse presents a complex attitude toward the body. In this way Hawkins's world which I previously described as being composed of hierarchical dichotomies now presents, also, at least one dialectically related component - the body and mind.
"Satisfying Expression" and Adjustment, Determinism and Behaviorism

The second fundamental need of human beings which Hawkins identifies is "satisfying expression". In her discussion of this value Hawkins continues her valuing of adjustment and continues to center her ideas upon a deterministic framework. She begins with psychological terminology and focuses upon individual "self-expression". Self-expression is a "strong and persistent need...[which] appears early in childhood and continues throughout life" (p.59) and she cites Carleton Washburne (Carleton Washburne, A Living Philosophy of Education, NY: The John Day Company, 1940, p.37) as averring that "satisfying outlets for expression which do not result in irreconcilable conflicts with oneself or with one's environment are essential to mental health" (p.60). She also quotes Daniel Prescott (Daniel A. Prescott, Emotion and the Educative Process, Washington DC: American Council on Education, 1938, p.102) as saying that arts release tensions in a "'mature' way thus "'avoiding less desirable emotional reactions'" (p.69).

Emotional release, a result of satisfying creative activity and expression, is for "effective functioning" and to "maintain good mental health" (p.69). In writing of the body I pointed out that Hawkins was concerned with adjusting to social norms so that conflicts would not develop between a person and his/her social situation. Here, similarly, she is concerned with developing and maintaining non-conflictual mental health.
Harmony with life's circumstances is a dominant theme for Hawkins (as it is for H'Doubler).

Adjustment is linked to the value of self and social integration. As in her body discussion in which the purpose is to integrate individuals into the existing social framework, so here her attention is upon the integration of the individual personality.

Efforts directed toward adjustment contribute to the integration of personality...[art contributes by developing skills for] logical arrangement of ideas...to arrive at generalizations...[art is] a means by which personal experience may first be clarified and then expressed...repeated creative efforts...increase understanding of a particular object or situation. (p.71)

Such appreciation also helps the individual identify himself with his contemporary culture and to understand something of the flow of culture throughout the years. (p.75)

By emphasizing "logical arrangement", the "use of symbols" and "concepts" as one of the important characteristics of the creative act, the mind is, again, made to be both the dominant force for integration as well as that which needs integration.

Biological and body metaphors are in use when Hawkins links the need for self-expression with aesthetic expression and creative experience. She writes that aesthetic expression has body implications: aesthetic expression "affords rich sensory stimulation and produces a feeling response that is satisfying to the individual" (p.61). Aesthetic experience is biologically metaphorized as being "as essential...as food and drink" (p.61). She writes further that "the desire for aesthetic experience
[is] related to the needs of man's nervous system". Psychological force is brought to bear as she labels aesthetic need as the "need for a specific form of experience", selecting "the most delightful organization" (p.61-62). Human beings have

[they urge to perceive relationships and to organize experiences into satisfying wholes...[which] strengthened as man developed...The perceiving of that which has unity produces a feeling of well-being. (p.62)

Creative experience allows for

expression of ideas and feelings...progressive symbolization...the consolidation and integration of day-to-day experiences...the achievement of a harmonious relationship with the various aspects of life as he experiences them. (p.60)

In discussing the specifics of creative activity, Hawkins uses the behaviorist language of stimulus/response. She writes that a "stimulus...produces tension within the organism" to which "the individual responds with his feelings and ideas or concepts" which are then "shaped" and "reshaped" to produce a formed response to the stimulus (p.63-64). She notes "three important characteristics" (p.64) of the creative act. These are

the self is central...concepts are essential elements. The individual sees and thinks in relation to concepts, i.e. meanings result from experiences...inner relationships, not surface ones...the product of the expressive act has form. (emphasis added, p.64)

In addition each person will make a unique dance, "his statement, which is influenced by his unique being" (author's emphasis, p.67). This behaviorist language seems to continue and deepen the determinist current of her discourse. The
stimulus/response idea posits a world in which people act by responding exclusively to influences over which they have no control. In behaviorist thought there is no self which exists apart from such influence.

"Effective Human Relations" and Determinism

Hawkins then turns to the third need, that of effective human relations and with the impact of contrasting aesthetic experience with the general culture in a negative way. She writes that "existing cultural patterns tend to stifle the free expression of feelings" (p.69) and that the arts do not (similar to H'Doubler's attack on conformity). She also writes, "Unfortunately ...the problems of human relations are often baffling and little understood, and too frequently they are simply overlooked" (p.86). The emphasis in education has been upon intellectual development but this must change. Good human relations "contribute to greater achievement in individual and group enterprises other than intellectual endeavors" (p.87) and contribute to successful intellectual work as well. Later she writes of the contribution which aesthetic experience can make to solving the world's problems. She writes, "Skill and success in working creatively may well be the greatest contribution that dance can make to the individual and to society" (p.75).

A crucial task that man faces today is the solving of his social problems. Instance after instance points up his
lack of insight and skill in handling social problems even though it is recognized that the preservation of culture and progress to a better way of life depend upon improved methods of solving these problems. (p.76)

Like H'Doubler, Hawkins understands her world as problem-filled. While H'Doubler reads the problems in economic and spiritual terms, Hawkins reads them in psychological terms as in "human relations" and in cultural terms, as in "preservation of culture". In desiring to preserve culture Hawkins basically accepts and adjusts to culture. For both she and H'Doubler the problem of human relations seems to simply lie in the interpersonal sphere of society in terms of adjusting to society's exigencies and the pedagogue's problem is how to teach so that people can relate to each other in a more satisfying manner within the rules and roles of society. While the interpersonal might seem to reference moral issues there is no moral argument utilized in this discourse.

The pedagogue responds to the social problems and recognizes the validity of the various needs and drives of her students. The teacher should "start with the student's needs and goals rather than with any preconceived plan geared to the teacher's interest" recognizing that these needs and drives are inevitable. Another consideration for the teacher is that "[educational] experiences...become meaningful only as they are related to the learner's aspirations, interests and present stage of living" (p.38). The teacher must plan educational experiences which enable the student to fulfill his/her needs
but the rate of fulfillment is determined by the developmental stage of the student. This mediation between needs and developmental stage is best accomplished through teacher-student planning, a process through which members of the group clarify their individual goals and together determine group goals and directional plans for activity. (p.54)

In terms of how worlds get negotiated within the classroom, this can be seen in the way that Hawkins wants to lead the student to an understanding of the similarity between dance and non-dance events which will lead to the student being able to "transfer" learning from dance to other activities (p.54). Over and over again Hawkins's world view calls for a world which holds still and is inevitable and for a pedagogy which brings the student into line with that world.

The teacher's job, then, in Hawkins's explicit terms is to aid in the process of accommodation by aiding the students to achieve their own goals. The teacher's contribution to this stems from his/her large background of knowledge...familiar[ity] with certain kinesiological factors...understand[ing] about behavior and the individual's response to activity...[S]kill in teaching...[put] the educator...in a position to provide experiences that will contribute to the individual's goals. (pp.55-56)

With this in mind

The educator starts with the student and aims to shape dance experiences so that they contribute to the student's development as an individual; but throughout this process he constantly strives to help the student enlarge his understanding of dance as an art form and become
increasingly proficient in technique and creative expression.  (p.37)

At the same time the educator must be concerned with developing "a sound body...for future dance experiences" (p.56). Hawkins elaborates a list of possible relationships between developing a "sound body" and general educational goals. Her list includes how dancing contributes to general physical fitness (including increased strength, flexibility, endurance, control and "heightened kinesthetic awareness"). Improvement in conscious physical control and physical appearance are important for self-regard. Such self-regard leads to improved social acceptance, thus fulfilling the need for good social relations. Creative expression teaches about problem solving and so may be transferred to the general social need for good problem solvers.

There is a paradox which informs Hawkins's entire book. While she attempts to escape from the influence of professional dance by focusing on dance as an education tool for solving social problems she, nevertheless, leaves innumerable traces of the standards of professional dance within her discussion. For instance, Hawkins envisions good quality dance even in the educational setting, valuing the development of physical strength, flexibility and other professional dance qualities. (While it can be acknowledged that anyone could benefit from such bodily qualities, the benefits, in this case, are tied into making good dance.) She writes,
This point of view does not imply that dance in education cannot be taught as good dance. Dance is an expressive art form and should be considered and taught as such. (p.37)

She also understands that a person desires perfection, "fitness of parts", "harmonious relationships" and Hawkins lays down principles for guiding the creative act (p.62). Her interest in "good dance", her call for teaching the student to be interested in the art form or technique per se and her call for the development of a "sound body...for future dance experiences" seems outside her focus upon educational goals. The educational values which I have characterized as corresponding to professional dance values cloud her distinction between professional and educational dance. Where she has, early on, strenuously argued against the values of professional dance here she makes them part of the goals of educational dance.

It may be that, for her, the difference between educational and professional dance lies in the degree to which their goals are pursued. She does write that the difference in the dance forms lies within their disparate goals. Yet she uses the word "adequate" to discuss the desired outcomes of education, writing that one of the needs of people is to possess an "adequate body" (p.109) and she writes of people's need for adequate social relations. The words "adequate" and "good" (good dance in educational settings) are comparison adjectives which require something else against which to compare the words that they modify. By focusing upon quality dance I would
suggest that the comparison point for her project is professional dance, representing as it does excellent body and excellent dance. Educational dance can be understood as suffering by comparison. In the rest of her discourse it is clear that she does not think of her educational goals as merely second-best, as adequate, but as important to the project of this country, a project in which the good of the individual ought to take precedence over excellence of a particular activity. Her world seems marked by a substantial paradox.

A complementary paradox exists between valuing dance for its own sake and valuing dance for the sake of educational goals. At some points Hawkins calls for students and teachers to jointly plan classes based on student needs. (She readily admits that students' plans will not often include a need to become "proficient dancers" [p.46].) She also writes that only by linking dance to the learner's needs will "[educational] experiences...become meaningful" (p.38). At the same time she also writes, "Dance is an expressive art form and should be considered and taught as such" (p.37). Seeing the educator's job as constantly striving "to help the student enlarge his understanding of dance as an art form" (p.37) dance interests seem to displace educational interests since Hawkins makes no arguments for how understanding dance as an art form contributes to social adjustment or adequate body or any of the other values she so tirelessly develops.
The contrast between dance interests and her other values raises a problem for the call for joint planning of classes based on student needs. Hawkins writes about students' "aspirations" guiding the pedagogy yet emphasizes the need of the educator to promote the art form then the teacher leads as Hawkins writes about the teacher "shaping" student experiences, planning them since students are not knowledgeable about the art form. Students can only be followers in this situation, a mode of learning which Hawkins decries when describing professional dance.

Conclusion: Hawkins and H'Doubler

As with H'Doubler's discussion I would ask what dominant question informs the creation of Hawkins's text. While H'Doubler engages in an attempt to broadly critique society and offer an alternative vision, Hawkins more narrowly focuses upon the world of dance educators and rather than criticizing social life, offers many ways to accommodate to it. Hawkins's question seems to be not, "How do we change the world" but, rather, "How do we change the individual to fit the world?" Where H'Doubler appears to be utopian, Hawkins appears to be pragmatic. Where H'Doubler appears to spiritualize human activity and experience, Hawkins appears to value the mundane. H'Doubler seems to desire to transcend problems. Hawkins appears to accommodate to them.
This is not to say that they are altogether different. They both identify certain inevitable characteristics of life, for instance biological inevitabilities. They also both envision a non-conflictual world as the desirable world. They both believe that fostering creativity leads to such a world and that dance creativity is a matter of the mind and is underpinned by proper body understandings. They both speak to the value of the individual and the need to pedagogically focus upon individuality and the value of connecting the individual to human traditions as a way of ameliorating social problems.

Where they depart from each other is on the point of how to understand the relationship of the individual to society. H'Doubler criticizes and wishes to transform society, taking a transcendental attitude. Hawkins seems to accept society and wishes to learn how to accommodate to it by delving into the practical realities of social living.

The origins of Hawkins’s accommodation ethic are not easy to identify by looking at this particular discourse. What we can note is that most of her citations are from psychologists who have a clear bent toward controlling the psychological life of the individual so that he/she is neither too much in one psychological direction nor too much in the other. This might also be characterized as an adaptation ethic whose purpose is for survival. When Hawkins writes of improving effectiveness it
appears to be a matter of successfully surviving within the social setting.

To write that she is interested in survival is to suggest that there is a psychology of concern over whether or not survival is possible. The difficulty in locating the evidence within the text of such a concern is that she provides no explicit statements to this point. We might surmise, though, that the psychology of her society was, at that historical time (the late 40s and early 50s), focused upon survival. This would be logical considering the war-footing of the country, the immediate fear of atomic war with Hiroshima and Nagasaki being recent memories, the U.S. engagement in the Korean conflict, and John Foster Dulles and others promoting a belligerent and fearful attitude toward the Eastern bloc and China. There is no mention of these concerns and so I can only suggest them as possible conditions which can account for a survival ethic placed in social adjustment concerns.

There is also the possibility that Hawkins was influenced by the functionalist sociology of her day. This sociology posited that a healthy society was a non-conflictual one in which all groups agreed to participate in a consensual manner. Conflict was viewed as aberrant behavior (Himes, 1980). All of these arguments suggest that Hawkins was a member of her culture. Such a statement is similar to pointing out the Platonist qualities of H’Doubler’s discourse. H’Doubler was
also a member of her culture and tended to focus upon an aspect of that culture different from Hawkins. What I have tried to do in both these cases is locate the ways in which their discourses reflect particular aspects of their culture. It is an open question, at the moment, as to why they chose different aspects of their culture upon which to focus.

As we turn away from Hawkins's first book it is worth recalling that she wrote in the 1982 reissue of this book that she still believed in the basic tenets of the book. These tenets, as I read them, are, in sum, the necessity of adjusting to society in order to become a functioning member of society and the value of creative experience for enriching social and more personal interactions as well as for solving the problems of society. The basic change unit of society is the individual who both changes in accord to and helps to bring about change in the social surround.

Alma Hawkins's Creating Through Dance
Introductory Remarks

Alma Hawkins wrote Creating Through Dance in 1964 and it has recently been revised (1988). This revision seems to consist, in the main, of adding photographs and a new Introduction by Charlotte Irey. In terms of the book's importance to dance educators, I am informed by Richard Carlin of Princeton Book Co., Publishers that it is the most adopted
book for classroom use of their entire list. Since that company is the major seller of dance books we can gauge just how valued this book is. Modern Dance in Higher Education, in contrast, is important more for its place as an historically important moment and in raising issues which have yet to be resolved. Its relevance is clear from it being reissued nearly 30 years after its publication. Hawkins is known, now, however primarily by Creating Through Dance.

I wrote that Hawkins, in Modern Dance In Higher Education, seemed concerned with accommodating to the social surround. In Creating Through Dance (1988) she moves slightly away from this position in two directions. First, she makes statements akin to H'Doubler's social critique and, like H'Doubler, makes the individual the location of social change. Unlike H'Doubler she does not criticize the material problems of society but does criticize the loss of an individuality which she would, through her pedagogy, restore. Thus, second, she focuses upon creativity education for the individual as the basis for social change (an interest which is less explicit in her first book). To be sure the book is primarily a book on creativity education but the social focus is used to introduce the creativity agenda. The following is an overview of the book.
Overview

She starts out writing that her primary purpose in this book is to contribut[e] to the idea that the vital and persisting core of dance is creativity and that every aspect of the dance experience has a significant relationship to creative development of the individual. (p.vii)

More specifically her project is to give thought...to the phenomenon of creativity and its relation to the study of choreography...[and to] the relationship between the creative aspects of dance and the development of the dance instrument. (p.vii)

Her reason for her concern with creativity stems from her concern about the "ever-expanding technological developments that place greater and greater emphasis upon specialization" (p.7). This "trend towards specialization and segmentation" causes people to lose their "feeling of wholeness" (p.7). The individual [has been] encouraged to conform rather than transform...to reflect and re-produce rather than to create...to take in and receive rather than to give out and contribute. (p.7-8)

Hawkins has written this book "with the belief that those of us interested in creative dance have an obligation to give serious attention to the art of movement as a whole" (p.vii). Hawkins presents the present situation as being very serious. "Today, as never before, educators must be concerned with..." (p.7) indicative of her sense of the direness of the situation and she underscores this when she writes

Surely an essential part of the educator's task is to develop people who are creative and have confidence in themselves as individuals of worth and integrity. (p.8)
In order to counter the problem of specialization and segmentation

the human being needs experiences that aid him in achieving a feeling of wholeness...he must find adequate sources of communicating with his fellow man...communicating and sharing that result in a sense of unity and belonging. (p.7)

The educator's job is to "assist him [the student] in becoming an integrated personality capable of relating to others and to his environment" (p.7). The student needs "a sense of adequacy and uniqueness " in order to "function effectively" (p.7). This can be achieved by

[t]he involvement of students in meaningful experiences that provide a counterbalance for the high value now placed on technology, mechanization, and materialism...

(p.8)

Hawkins characterizes this as "the challenge of our day" (p.8). In this there is the strong element of accommodation modified by her criticism of conformity. We can see this in her joining of the words "adequacy" and "uniqueness". By "adequacy" she may mean "success" (the student needs "a sense of success and uniqueness") but she does not use the word "success".

"Adequacy" is weak, by contrast, and connotes some level of ambivalence or accommodation toward the "challenge of our day" as in, perhaps, "If you cannot be successful at least you can be adequate". I take "adequacy" to, therefore, contrast with "uniqueness" and further to cancel the effect of uniqueness.

"Adequacy" can reference norms to which a person accommodates and "uniqueness" can represent how a person defines him/herself
outside of norms. Hawkins takes the naturalistic determinism of her first book and discusses how the natural becomes transformed into art by the abstracting process in which what the creator makes is an "illusion" of the everyday and the natural, making an "objectification of human feeling" (p.49). Dance differs from the everyday in that "everyday gesture...is distorted or removed from the natural and transformed into art" (pp.4-5). Her pedagogical prescriptions for achieving these ends center on the psychology of creativity and the need for developing a body and its attendant senses and sensations which will yield to the creative necessity and, also be a partner in the creation of formed art works.

She addresses herself exclusively to the dance teacher, dividing the educational world into the two camps of teacher and learner. She metaphorizes the teacher as guide, efficient manager of a classroom, and motivator and stimulator of learner creativity. The learner is a person who is supposed to alter his/her behaviors (p.133), stimulated towards ever-increasing amounts of autonomous and self-directed creative activity.

In this we can see a particular type of negotiation between the world of the teacher (a world which needs to be guided, managed and controlled) and the world of the student (characterized by, implicitly, too much dependence and a world which the student needs to give up in order to become autonomous). The teacher is instructed by Hawkins in the ways
and means of most efficiently and expeditiously facilitating each individual's growth and change in the direction of autonomous creativity. These ways and means center around pre-planning of educational activities, modes of stimulating autonomy and creativity, and means of assessing (evaluating) and measuring (grading) the learner's progress. This last is in aid of the learner understanding realistically what has been learned and developed and what may still be missing from his/her education.

Values and Metaphors

From this sketch of the contours of her curriculum and pedagogy a difference appears between it and her previous book. In her first book Hawkins (1954) argued for developing an educational philosophy which attended to, essentially, social needs ("adequate body, satisfying expression and effective human relations"). She wrote of the "total development" of individuals and linked such development with democracy. In this present book she focuses almost exclusively upon the dance art.

This shift towards dance can also be seen in the way she writes, reassuringly, that her focus upon developing students according to their individuality does not sacrifice dance values. This stress on the student...does not imply that the content or subject matter is unimportant. On the contrary, the quality of dance experience is of utmost significance...The richer the dance experience, the greater the opportunity for individual gains. (p.119)
In her first book she attempted to caution against concern over the quality of dancing. Here she makes quality dance central to the success of her project. In her first book she criticized the rift between professional and educational values, declaring professional values to be inappropriate for education. At the end of this book she writes of the split between educational modern and professional modern dance "in recent years".

Such a differentiation seems unfortunate...[I]t would be more accurate and desirable to think of dance as an art experience that is basically the same in an academic or a professional setting. The difference lies in the specific goals and the adaptation of the activity that is determined by the uniqueness of the situation. (p.121)

These statements are similar to her first book (the difference between professional and educational dance being a matter of differing goals) and yet they are also different. Whereas previously all professional dance was inappropriate now she makes space for all dance by relying on a situational frame of reference and in the adaptation to whatever kind of dance is involved in a situation. This is a more flexible and accommodating framework that reveals a softening of her position toward professional dance.

Her valuing of nature and psychology which pervades this book more than it does her previous book, is used to validate her focus upon creativity and also to ground the methods of evaluating the kind of dancing which should result from the pedagogy. She consistently calls for dances to be organic, the unity of the "materials" of dance being "organically related".
(p.93). In discussing developing aesthetic awareness she writes that the teacher seeks "full responses and movement which is organic in the true sense" (p.41). (Hawkins uses the word "true" throughout her discourse, referring to "the true dance" and "true awareness." ) The term "organic" becomes a technical term within the scope of her pedagogy as it becomes a criteria explicitly employed for evaluating dances.

Great value is placed on wholeness and unity. These metaphors are applied to all the areas of her interest. She calls for unifying and integrating the individual, planning curriculum so that the elements are unified, planning individual lessons which have a unifying theme and in which "every class should give the learner a sense of arriving and concluding" (p.120). She writes,

> Surely the wisest approach is based on beliefs and principles that are related to the concept of wholeness in the day-to-day learning situation...[because of] the learner’s overall situation. (pp.119-120)

In writing of wholeness she provides two mathematical metaphors. She writes that the "total concept and feel of dance is the matrix from which he reaches out and to which he relates new experiences" (p.120) With new experiences "the matrix expands and his insight and sensitivity for the next encounter are increased" (p.120). She also describes

> the dancer as a figure surrounded by a circle that represents his dance world. As each new idea, element, and skill is differentiated, related, and finally integrated with other experiences, the circle expands. (p.120)
With both these metaphors there is great stress upon the value of dance per se.

These two metaphors have a particular quality which is reminiscent of the way Hawkins presents a circumscribed world of biological and social inevitability in her first book. The matrix may be understood as a map of previous knowledge upon which new knowledge is mapped. In similar fashion the figure/circle metaphor images a person bound inside the geometry of the dance world. The figure is "surrounded" by the circle and the circle which surrounds expands but the figure does not expand. Both of these metaphors are suggestive of the way previous experience bounds and guides present experience and future activity (not unlike the notion that the self is socially constructed). Hawkins states as much when she writes, in discussing creativity, that freedom is set within a framework. "Within this framework the learner should be free to select and develop his own ideas. He should sense that boundaries are flexible, not rigid" (p.17). Hawkins's words can be understood to raise up the dialectic of freedom and discipline (the framework of dance knowledge and skill).

The dialectic of freedom and discipline is one which, in this case, begins by stressing discipline (studying problems and movements provided by the teacher) and moving progressively toward what Hawkins calls "self-direction" or what I would call freedom. In terms of what I think she would mean by freedom she
writes, "The essential in each [creative] experience, exploring or forming, is an opportunity to be self-directed" (p.18). She contrasts such self-direction with an imitative pedagogy (excessive discipline) in which the student merely imitates the teacher. She claims this will not develop creativity because for creativity to occur "the self must direct the action response" (p.19). What Hawkins seems to mean here is that the teacher does not demonstrate but describes and suggests, the student then choosing the actual movements in response to the descriptions or suggestions. In writing of the sequencing of improvisational activities she suggests moving from structured problems (the structure being designed by the teacher and which represents discipline) "toward the open and less structured ones" (which allow for greater student self-direction and represents freedom). (p.23) Much later on she writes, "The human being's self-actualization is accompanied by great capacity for self-direction" (p.106). This suggests that increasing self-actualization is accompanied by increasing self-direction. This self-direction, however, needs guidance. It is mediated by skill. Through developing "understanding and skill...self-directed activity will not be aimless and will become more meaningful and mature" (p.18).
Teacher Directed Pedagogy

Hawkins’s call for self-direction is set within a pedagogy that is strongly oriented toward teacher directed activities. In her chapter called "Increasing Aesthetic Awareness" the teacher is instructed in all the things he/she should tell the student to do. She writes, "Without the right leadership the experiences...could be a waste of time. With skilled leadership the experiences can further self-direction" (p.22). Later she writes "[The teacher] should try to surround and immerse the learner with stimulation that causes creative action" (p.29). Here it seems as if the student is placed within a carefully contrived situation from which he/she will emerge with what the teacher wants. Still later she writes that the teacher needs to find a better way than imitation pedagogy to "get inside the learner" (p.37). In the chapter "Presenting and Evaluating the Dance Experience" the teacher’s work is to "stimulate the learner" (p.134) so that the learner can "alter his behavior" (p.133). In evaluating the student’s work "[t]he teacher establishes criteria and guides the evaluative discussion in accordance with the pupil’s level of development and the needs of the group" (p.140). The teacher’s work is about "getting students to think...and feel...stimulating the learner to create...[which] causes him to perceive...and experience" (p.140).
In the above Hawkins appears to be in direct contradiction to her first book where she called for joint teacher-student planning based on the student’s interests (although those interests are based in the common and inevitable needs of biology and society, thus making all student interests essentially alike). She appears to be, here, highly interventionist calling for an active and directing teacher who is involved in getting students to do this or that, in causing their activities. Such an interventionist approach may be understood as making the teacher the author of the students. I would say that Hawkins, here, is functioning in an authoritarian mode. This authoritarian approach, however, does not seem to be based in a desire to control but, rather, is characterized in caring and nurturing terms. Hawkins writes that the teacher should be "understanding and accepting of students" (p.31), that the teacher "opens the way for understanding" (p.30) and that the teacher needs to empathize with the students. "There is only one way for the teacher to identify such readiness [for being self-directed - ed.] and that is through his empathy with the student’s creative activity" (p.28). And she writes that "[I]n the early dance experience the student still needs to be led out cautiously" (p.19). These show concern for the student’s psychological well-being. Indeed she calls for a psychologically safe and affirming atmosphere as most conducive for fostering creativity.
The calls for self-direction and teacher-directed pedagogy present a paradox. It seems clear that, through her disavowal of imitation, she does not mean total teacher control. It is, also, clear that she does not mean total student self-direction on the part of the student since she writes that some self-directed activity can be aimless, meaningless and immature. And it seems clear that she cares about the well-being of the student. I would say that the problem of their joining is "solved" through recognizing that Hawkins, like many other dance teachers, posits the necessity of developing skillful, normed activity (which can only be learned from a teacher who knows the norms) in order to have successful self-direction (which can only come from the student). If skill is required to make self-direction meaningful and mature and if that skill comes to the student from the teacher then we can speculate that the skill taught is informed by what the teacher understands to represent meaningful activity and maturity (notwithstanding the possibility of alternative understanding on the part of students). The relationship between teacher information and student self-direction is paradoxical because of these difficulties. If the teacher's information and the student's self-direction were to be dialectically related then the reader might expect teacher direction to be presented as both promoting and not promoting student self-direction and might expect that student self-direction would inform teacher direction as well as...
vice versa. Instead what is presented, here, is a functional and uni-directional relationship, exemplary of the situation whereby, in the negotiations of world-views of the teacher and student, the teacher's world prevails.

Skills and Norms

Hawkins presents the development of skill in a neutral fashion as merely functional for creativity.

The body instrument and movement material is made functional for the imaginative work in dance when man's creative spirit is working with a high degree of consciousness and kinesthetic awareness. (p.70)

She writes that "understanding of...basic concepts [movement principles] frees the creator to control and mold movement in his own image" (p.64). This knowledge creates a "foundation" for expression (p.71). Understanding the proper structural relationship [between body parts]...provides a homebase or functional framework from which the dancer can proceed to experimentation that is more demanding. (p.72)

In one of her summaries she writes,

Obviously the dancer must discover certain norms in balance and movement, explore movement possibilities, and learn basic principles that govern efficient movement. (p.81)

Norms represent socially agreed upon ways of doing and being. Norms are group criteria. A tension exists here between such criteria and "mold[ing] movement in his own image." Norms are about being in the group's, not the individual's, image. It
is important to examine what kinds of norms are meant to inform the individual.

She writes that dance movement is aesthetically "motivated" movement that is specifically "sparked" by "sensory experiences and feeling responses" (p.63).

[MOVEMENT]ION movement becomes dance because it is impregnated with abstracted feelings...Dance is both physical and emotional. These...are interwoven and never exist in isolation. Physical movement is transformed so that it creates an illusion of feeling state. (p.64)

The physical aspect of dancing should focus upon movement in which "energy is used efficiently" (p.66). "[E]fficient and economical [movement] must...become habitual. Then and only then can the balanced instrument become functional" (p.67) so that the dancer develops "adequacy of the instrument" and "creative freedom" (p.78). The physical norms here are efficiency, economy, habits and balance. These norms present an image of the body which is workmanlike and held in check (balance) and in which the body is instrumentalized, made into a tool in the same category as a hammer or saw.

While Hawkins instrumentalizes the body she also writes that "dance is both physical and emotional" and in avowing wholeness as an integral part of her pedagogy she is attempting, I believe, to not characterize the physical in a merely instrumental way. She writes of the value of awareness (both physical and emotional) and she writes, in discussing how to teach, of the question of how teachers can "help students
unleash feelings and imaginative responses" (p.118). She writes,

The dancer is not convincing when he moves in a mechanical and imitative manner. Only [his]...full awareness...conveys sincerity and conviction...to produce an honest projection of images and feelings. (p.64)

[M]any of [the dancer's] motivations spring from images and feelings that cry out for movement that is precariously balanced and irregularly shaped...Within the play of gravity [always present in precariousness - ed.]...tension must be maintained in order to keep these [body] parts in balance...so that balance is stabilized. (p.69)

In the above we can see how the emotions, like the body, must be controlled in order to have good self-directed art. She begins with motivations which "cry out for movement" (a highly charged emotional image) and she ends with a body which is "in balance" and "stabilized". Emotions, like the body, are placed within a framework and brought under control. The question is: how can strong emotions and body sensations be stabilized and yet maintain "sincerity and conviction"? In the light of understanding that Hawkins describes dance as the "objectification of human feeling" (p.94) which are "removed from the natural and transformed into art" (p.5) it is difficult to understand what is meant by either the unleashing of feelings, sincerity, or honesty. A central norm, then, is for body and emotions to be controlled and circumscribed and this is manifested through skillful activity.

Also normative is the value of illusion. She writes of dance as an "illusion of feeling state" and writes that the
"illusion" of art conveys "the essence of human experience" (p.6). She writes that dance "possesses a magic quite different from the utilitarian activity of everyday life" and that the dancer "must transform movement in such a way that the dance takes on a magic quality" (p.64). She writes that there is a "mysterious quality of dance...[which] cannot be conveyed through verbal explanations or any other method" (p.79). And she writes that "helping the student unravel the complexity of his art still remains somewhat of a mystery" (p.119).

Illusion, magic and mystery mark the discourse with a sense of the limits of Hawkins's own knowledge. That which is mysterious is not fully knowable. These words are also meant, I believe, to convey an excitement about and awe of the dance experience. (In this vein she calls improvisation a "flight into the unknown" [p.22].) But they are also norms and as such they represent a group understanding which might inform the pedagogy. In light of the emphasis upon teacher direction of the pedagogy it seems to me that the teacher's (as a representative of society) understanding of these ideas can define them within the classroom.

Hawkins's understanding of magic is located in her description of the "illusion of art. She writes

Movement is removed from the world of actuality and transformed so that the inherent force relationships create a world of magic and, at the same time, evoke felt meanings that are associated with life experiences. (p.6)
She is saying that we must move away from life to see life. In prescribing what experiences will foster the development of an aesthetic sensibility, Hawkins provides a list for valuable experiences outside of the classroom: "art exhibits, concerts, the theater, good literature and nature" (p.34). Noteworthily absent from this list are daily, social, ordinary experiences.

This absence is noteworthy because I take it that daily, social ordinary experiences are the mundane world and, by their absence, leave room only for their opposite that of transcendent values. Hawkins is espousing, I would argue, transcendent values of art (reminiscent of H'Doubler). Transcendence may also be noted in how Hawkins relates various activities of her pedagogy. She writes, in the same chapter, that "exploring and improvising are stepping stones that lead toward the discovery of the full creative act" (p.28). A stepping stone is under the foot and of the earth. Improvisation is described as a "flight into the unknown." Since stepping stones are of the earth and improvisation, a flight, leaves the earth destined for creativity, creativity itself must be understood as being of heaven. The mundane is transcended.

When Hawkins writes that dance is emotional, in the light of transcendence it may be that emotion, too, may be transcended. The honest portrayal of emotion might be falling down and wailing. But abstraction and illusion lead away from this. At one point Hawkins is quite explicit about the problem
with being very personal while dancing. She writes, "As the illusion [of art] is lost the experience becomes personal rather than aesthetic" (p. 5). And she writes that art occurs when "[p]hysical movement is transformed so that it creates an illusion of feeling state" (p. 64). In sum, the norms of illusion and magic can be seen to function so as to remove both the student and the audience from the actual experiences of their lives.

Another important norm is that of efficiency. This norm is promoted for educating the body and has an important presence within how the teacher ought to manage classroom activities. In prescribing the use of lesson plans Hawkins writes that the unit plan "is a device...[which] will save time in later planning and will insure better teaching" (p. 125). Transitions from activity to activity within a class period should be "smooth and efficient" (p. 129). She wants to avoid "wasting time" and "avoid wasteful repetition" (p. 134) and wants to use time wisely.

The emphasis on time efficiency metaphorizes the dance classroom in terms of industrial life. There is a common adage in the culture that "time is money", which informed the activities of time study experts who studied worker motions and assembly line activity in order to prescribe new motions and new factory activities and environments which would take less time and produce higher production output. It is the managers of the
factory, or of any work place for that matter, (and not the
workers) who are concerned with efficiency. This metaphor
suggests that dance teachers be efficient managers of their
classrooms.

The efficiency value is problematical in the face of the
individuality value of the pedagogy. Efficiency in the factory
involves stream-lining, standardizing and the elimination of
what is extraneous. Standardization jeopardizes the development
of unique individuals. It is the differences between
individuals which cannot be accounted for by efficiency.

In sum, then, Hawkins's curriculum contains the following
values. She values the development of physical and emotional
skill in order to make quality art. These skills are the norms
of dancing. Normatively, physical and emotional skill is
represented by restrictiveness and control. Both the body and
emotions are instrumentalized to the purposes of making art.
Art, itself, is, normatively, illusion and magic, and, to be
successful, the art should seem organic and life-like. Art
succeeds when the mundane is transcended in favor of illusion
and magic. To successfully achieve these skills and norms the
body and emotions of the dancer and the teaching of the teacher
must aspire to efficiency.
Mind/Body

As in the other two books discussed Hawkins, again, subordinates the body to the mind and, on occasion, understands the body as being a valued knower in its own right. These two approaches create a tension with the text.

In terms of valuing the body Hawkins writes early on, "We use movement as a means of experiencing and knowing" (p.4). Improvisational experiences should be kept "at a kinesthetic level" (p.23). She makes the body primary when, in discussing improvisational exploration, she emphasizes permitting the body movement "to expend itself" rather than "stopping the action" by which she means intervening arbitrarily before the body has completed its actions (p.39). She writes that "experiencing and feeling" are the primary sources of learning (p.47) and that "felt [spatial] tension evokes a kinesthetic response that makes possible the perception of meaning in a work of art" (p.51). The body (kinesthetics) allows for meaning. In writing of teaching rhythm Hawkins avers that it would be "more logical for the dancer to...develop kinesthetic awareness and understanding...before the intellectual concepts and symbols of music" (p.54).

This last almost makes an hierarchy of the body over the mind. She seems to wish, at some points, to be clearly understood as not valuing the mind too strongly. She quotes Andre Malraux's description of creativity ("'creating means
seeing, reducing, and ordering” [p.11]) and follows this with the statement that she and Malraux do not mean ‘seeing’ in the usual sense, which motivates an act of cognition and verbalization - in other words, a mental act. Seeing...involves experiencing and perceiving by the whole person with a high degree of inner and outer awareness. This seeing is more than recognizing and reporting. (p.12)

She is distancing herself from intellectualization, attempting, perhaps, to widen the scope of what is normally thought of as valued understanding encapsulated by the metaphor of "seeing". This can be further understood when she writes that through improvisation a student develops "a new awareness...of the integrity and rightness of the movement when you let it just happen rather than arrange it" and when she writes that, in improvisation, "[a]ctions go easily, and each new action sets off another one, which extends and expands the experience" (p.22).

On the other hand the mind is also valued strongly, perhaps over the body. For instance, experiencing the quality of movement "contributes to a functional understanding of quality as an aesthetic element" (p.39). Bodily experience is valuable in that it functions for creativity, is instrumentally and not intrinsically good. She writes that "the choreographer’s success...depends on his ability to conceive...and control...imaginatively" (p.43) and that "[d]ance form... must follow motivation not precede it" (p.45). Motivation and imagination are, conventionally, psychological (i.e. mind)
language and are made to lead the creative process. The task of forming a dance depends on having an "idea", of "abstracting the essence" of "sense data", of transforming, manipulating and projecting "qualities from their everyday setting into an artistic form" (p.96). Art may begin in the body (kinesthetic awareness) but seems to end in the mind dominating the process.

Conclusion: Wholeness, Harmony and Repression

In this book wholeness is the central value of the pedagogy. It may be said that the basic question of the book is "How can wholeness of the individual be achieved?" Wholeness of a person is marked by the integration of all aspects of a person and such wholeness is visible in the successful creative act. She draws most of her ideas on wholeness from the third-force psychology of self-actualization. This is evident from her extensive citations of Carl Rogers and from a book called Creativity and Its Cultivation (ed. H.H.Anderson,1959). In this wholeness the physical, emotional and intellectual aspects of a person join together in a unified way to present the individual as a smoothly integrated system. No one aspect overawes the other aspects. The values of this are harmony and balance (as with H'Doubler and Hawkins's earlier book).

I would say that harmony and balance are achieved by repressing certain aspects of a person's being. The emotions are to be abstracted, leaving out personalisms. Balanced
emotions are valued which eschew strong, out of balance emotions. Efficiency means not paying attention to the unique attributes of individuals which means that their wholeness is jeopardized. Freedom is understood in terms of a dancer's ability "to be himself and to create in his own way" (p.17) in creative situations. This cannot be taken to mean that the dancer should be him/herself in a whole way since there are many aspects of self, some of which would surely escape the limits of toleration for the teacher or other students. Wholeness is clearly a matter of balance. I recall a student whose choreographic assignment was to make an outrageous dance. She proceeded to throw a bucket of water on her teacher as part of a dance composition. In doing so she got water on some important audio tapes and the teacher angrily instructed the student that this was totally inappropriate. A contradiction existed between asking for the outrageous and expecting decorum, control, balanced sensitivity to appropriateness. Clearly, the wholeness of emotions and individual action are not valued here, but only certain selections of them. "Wholeness" may be simply an ill-defined term requiring either definition or the use of another term which is more accurate within the scope of the discourse. 

The term "wholeness" seems to me to be rather a grand term. Of the three books which I have discussed, both H'Doubler's and this book are marked by a kind of grand approach to theory in which the books appear to be as much apologies for
the approach as they are contributions to pedagogical understanding. Through H'Doubler's book there are references to the spiritual dimension of dancing and she presents most of her prescriptions without definitions as if the reader, of course, knows what, for instance, the "art of living" means.

In Hawkins's case "wholeness" lends an air of grandeur to the discourse as it is a global concept which is unmediated by considerations of the greater complexity of the subject. She also engages in hyperbole as for instance when she writes of improvisation that

\[ \text{at the end of the experience, or during a fleeting moment...the creator feels a great sense of joy, a kind of ecstasy. Suddenly everything seems integrated and he senses a unity that is profoundly satisfying.} \]  

(p.22)

In invoking magic and illusion, in calling improvisation a "flight into the unknown" there is a feeling of language almost too strong for the event.

Such hyperbole may also have a political function, used as a way of promoting dancing which has been long denied a validated place within the culture. At the very end of her book she writes of the grading process and writes,

One may feel that [grading] contradicts everything we say about evaluating dance and seems to be in direct violation to all that we believe about ways to further creative growth of the individual. But until a different system of grading prevails, the dance teacher has no choice...Some people suggest that students in the arts would be marked pass or fail, thus avoiding a dilemma; but such a policy would only create another dilemma. If dance and other arts have a justified place in the academic world, then the dance student's achievement would be recognized and receive grade points in the same manner as achievements in
other areas of learning. With the increased emphasis on quality in all phases of education, the dance teacher must lift his sights and constantly enrich and improve the quality of the dance experience. This goal can be attained without violating the true concern for creative development of each individual. (pp.151-152)

I have the sense of struggle here as the teacher struggles to find acceptance within the system and also remain true to her values which seem in opposition to the system. Hawkins's call for the dance teacher to accept the status quo by accepting the grading system in order to receive validation from the institution. She tries to rationalize this acceptance with the hope that the teacher can also accomplish her goals. It has been said that when Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote "In Defense of Poetry" he overstated the case because Romanticism was under such attack. It may be that Hawkins writes in her strong manner for precisely the same reasons.
CHAPTER THREE
PERSONAL BODY

Introduction

In Chapter 2 I presented three examples of dance education prescriptions and worlds, three examples which provide idealized versions of how dance education ought to be and what kind of ideal world is achieved through such education. As is the case with any idealization there are distinctions to be made between the idealization and the reality to which it is addressed. These distinctions represent the process of negotiation between the teacher and the student as to what kind of world will exist in the classroom.

I would say there at least three kinds of distinctions. First, a distinction may be made between what the ideal implies and what actions are actually possible or actually occur. For instance, were these authors to prescribe as essential to their pedagogy the teaching of four hour daily dance classes in a university setting, the reality of the university setting would exclude the possibility of successfully forming the prescribed world. Second, a distinction may also be made between what is idealized as definite results of the pedagogy and what may actually result. Creative dance education might, in reality, not provide any of the stated results or might, as an example, result in greatly lowered individual creativity than expected.
Its predictions and results might not match. Lastly, a distinction may be made between the beginning assumptions in the ideal about how the world is for these educators (which they wish to change) and how the world is for others. When H'Doubler decries the alienation of workers, is she decrying her own perceptions of their situations or their perceptions? Perhaps they do not feel alienated.

In this chapter I will focus on this last distinction, i.e. between assumptions and realities. As a way of gaining insight into this area I want to present my own dance educational activity and experience as one example of the disjunctur which may occur between the ideal and concrete individual reality and the negotiations of teachers and students.

Personal Body

I began dancing at the age of twenty-one, a late age for most aspiring professional dancers. At the time of my beginning I did not have such aspirations. I came to take a dance class at the behest of a male friend who wanted to take class but did not want to be the only man there. At the time of my agreement to go I did not know why I had agreed. I surprised myself in this regard.

Prior to that time I had never considered myself to be a "body" person. I did not do well at sports; I never played on a
school sports team; I viewed my body as inadequate to physical success. My view of my body represented certain cultural facts. First, I viewed sports as the only body possibility in deciding what constituted a legitimate outlet for a desire to move. Second, I viewed myself as inadequate to a sports endeavor because the culture defined what an athletic body was; I did not have such a body. Third, I came from a family which valued intellect and devalued physical activity. Whatever aspirations I might have had in a sports direction would have been met with at least disinterest if not outright scorn by my family. I did, in fact, have such aspirations, but I was too small (according to the culture) for the sport I wanted to play (football) and not good at the sport I tried to play (tennis). I was hemmed in by a variety of cultural situations.

In addition I was acculturated into believing that social issues were of paramount importance. Artistic and body endeavors (two ideas associated with dance) were extraneous to this value. Contrary to this acculturation, however, I wanted to be an artist. This may be understood from two perspectives. My oldest brother was distinguished in languages and history; my middle brother was distinguished in mathematics and science. In part, in order for me to find something in which I might be distinguished, I gravitated toward the arts. In addition, ever since my eighth grade English teacher had praised my use of words I had decided that writing was my strength and, in
particularly, poetry which appeared to be more purely focused upon language itself (as opposed to story). I enjoyed the praise and enjoyed the construction of writing, the working with the resonance of language and meaning in order to produce a response on the part of another.

Despite my gravitation toward art I felt a conflict existed between this interest and my social conscience. A way of characterizing this conflict is to understand the artistic desires as having personal or private relevance and importance and to understand the social conscience as having public or external relevance. What I had learned was that the public, external matters were more important than personal or private matters. Engaging in private, personal pleasures required a justification in public, socially responsible terms.

Despite this conflict and despite the fact that I tried but was hard pressed to ever discover or construct a "good" socially useful argument for either writing poetry or enjoying body activities I continued to do both. I continued to write (which had a certain social legitimacy because I could conceive of a career in it) and engage in moving activities (which had little or no social legitimacy because it had little career potential, another reason for valuing an activity). I believe that I kept at body activity because it seemed almost native to me to move, so irrepressible was my desire to move.
This irrepressible urge manifested itself in various ways.

I was constantly in motion in the house, much to my mother’s chagrin. I enjoyed going into the backyard and running incessantly from one end to the other, ending each run with what I later learned to call a tour jete, also much to my mother’s chagrin. I played neighborhood tackle football and liked carrying the ball and fighting off tackles with my body contortions and manipulations. I especially liked being praised in those games by one of the neighborhood boys who did play on the high school football team. I felt vindicated in my feelings of capability which put in question my not being allowed by school rules to play. I liked to play badminton and I especially liked the way my body felt when we volleyed for the purpose of keeping the shuttlecock in play.

As a freshman in college I was on the Freshman Fencing Team. This experience exemplifies some of the shortcomings with my body in culture by which I never even contemplated a body career. I loved warming up and learning to fence and disliked the in-class competitions at which I was not very good (i.e. winning bouts). The person who won most of the bouts was very aggressive, showing a fierce desire to inflict pain but little or no finesse or technique. I recall resenting what I perceived as a dual standard on the part of the coaching staff. We were encouraged to develop technique but when it came to the point of competition only winning, at any cost, prevailed. I
recall, also, that this person was very large and, according to
convention, should have fenced with the largest of the swords,
the épée, yet was allowed to continue with the foil, a sword
usually reserved for smaller people (e.g. me). Because of my
failure in fencing class, I was not allowed to participate in
intercollegiate competitions. I resented my exclusion yet also
knew that what I valued did not happen in such competitive
situations. My conclusion was that physical endeavor was not
for me.

Upon taking my first dance class, however, all of my
memories of the good parts of these disparate body activities
and experiences, seemingly unconnected and extraneous, suddenly
coalesced into a meaningful whole and received a name, dance. I
came to believe that in my earlier life activities I had been
dancing. I had been moving my body for the pleasure of that
alone, for the feelings that arose in me when I thought through
my body in those activities in which I pursued skillful bodily
action. These feelings were of strength and competence, of the
pleasure of envisioning certain movements and then aspiring to
refining my actual activity. My most pleasurable moments were,
for the most part, not when I had to come up against another for
the purpose of defeating him, but when I sought to refine the
activity of my own body. The exception was the neighborhood
football games. There I found a vindication of my resentment of
my social exclusion. On the other hand I recalled that inside
the feelings of vindication was also a realization of how well I thought in my body, how aware I was of sensation and how responsive I was to the changing physical conditions of a run through the line.

This is what I realized as I took that first class. All of these memories came back to me in a speedy flood and I was surprised and delighted by this understanding of myself. My best moment in that class was when the teacher praised me because I had straightened my leg as it was in back of me while doing what is known as "Graham circle walks". I took great pleasure in that moment of skillful execution, I had taken great pleasure in attempting to do the movements during the rest of the class and I took great pleasure in the recognition I had received. In addition I saw dance as a perfect amalgam of my two interests, my body pleasure and poetry. I could make art with my body.

This was fortuitous since I had already begun to doubt that poetry was my forte. I did not have the abiding interest in words as did a poet friend of mine who read the dictionary for fun. Using him as a definition of poet I felt I did not have the discipline or interest to fully pursue poetry. In addition my poetry teacher doubted the quality of my poetry, feeling that my readings gave more quality to the poems than they actually possessed lying inertly on the page. Dance
presented an opportunity to be an artist and utilized something I had long decided to devalue (but unsuccessfully so): my body.

There are a number of important elements in this narrative. First, my own prior experiences gained both coherence and legitimacy by subsuming them under a name which already had legitimacy: it was a culturally accepted category of activity into which I could fit my activity. This category gave me a legitimate form and position through which I could fit myself into the world. Because of this, I altered my horizon of understanding and re-made my world to include and value dancing. Second, to do this required legitimate forms against which to measure my capabilities. I gravitated toward writing in part due to my socially legitimate eighth grade English teacher's encouragement and provision of the knowledge of a proper writing form (poetry). Later I doubted my ability as a poet because I construed a definition of poet into which I could not fit my activity and because my socially legitimate poetry teacher (published and teaching the writing of poetry) doubted my ability. I accepted dance because, in part, it was a legitimate social form and I had been praised by my socially legitimate teacher. The best moment in the first class was a moment of personal external affirmation. Had the teacher not praised me I would not have known that I was doing it "well". I was doing it "well" according to external standards. I was aware that I was supposed to straighten my leg because the teacher had said so.
She provided an officially sanctioned template against which to measure an activity which I believed I could not satisfactorily measure myself. Third, the pleasure in attempts at skill (as defined by the standards of skill) and skillful execution dominated my consciousness. The valuing of skill is not a merely personal value but is coextensive with a cultural surround which so values it and provides definitions of what is considered skillful and what forms of activity can be judged in skill terms. The naming, external praise and value of skill all illustrated the social dimension of legitimating personal experience via socially constructed values.

While this social dimension is connected with pleasure in my success, the pleasure which I took in moving cannot be fully explained by naming, public judgement and skill because I also had taken pleasure in bodily experience when it was neither named nor externally validated (when I ran back and forth in my backyard). There is a dimension of pleasure which I take to be personal and not social.

I returned to class the next week. I was apprehensive about doing so. Something so massive had occurred inside me the week before that I was not quite sure whether or not this was a good thing to be doing. I was also apprehensive because this was an activity not becoming to manliness because I associated dancing with homosexuality which I did not consider to be manly. I felt the need to rationalize my return in some way that would
make sense to me (perhaps educational terms or improving my writing poetry or some such thoughts) but, personally, I only felt a pleasure which did not fit with whatever attempts I might make to rationally understand my return. Pleasure was, simply, not a good enough reason, yet I could find no other.

Throughout my subsequent dance life I have carried my social and rational consciousness with me, seeking reasons why dancing is a valuable endeavor. I have, along with many dancers, cited the Greek ideal of healthy mind and healthy body or I have argued that creative activity (making your own art works) has a salubrious effect upon behavior and/or produces the ability to live life more effectively and the like. When presenting such ideas to those close to me (both dancer friends and non-dancer friends) I have often received the response that my efforts at justification seem strained at best. My friends would ask if I wasn’t dancing simply because I liked to do it. I would admit that I did like it but such admissions discomforted me. Pleasure has continuously been too frivolous a reason for doing anything.

This discomfort with pleasure in general and pleasure in my body reveals more cultural consciousness at work. Ours is not a culture which has traditionally valued physical pleasure. This is the common sense way of putting what many dancers have asserted: that Paulist and Medieval Christianity’s rejection of the earthly in favor of attaining transcendent heaven has had
much to do with the lack of development of dancing as a legitimate art until the last two centuries (when the legitimating force of Christianity has been on the wane). (H'Doubler discusses this in her Survey of Culture chapter and Kraus and Chapman discuss this in their text on the history of dance and dance education.) I do not want to enter into a history of the body except to note that our cultural mind/intellect orientation has meant an historically concomitant lack of valuing the body.

After about the third class I attended I was prevailed upon to perform in the spring concert. When I had begun dancing a few short weeks earlier I had done so for myself. Now I was being asked to dance for others. At first I said no. It seemed to me that such a move was uncalled for since I was not even quite sure why I was dancing. Although I now realize that dancing for others is analogous to writing poetry for others to read, at the time I did not want to jeopardize the fragile attachment which I had to dancing. Dancing was personal, not public. This personal attachment could be damaged by allowing myself to be publicly scrutinized before I had confidence in my skills. Perhaps I only wanted to dance for my own personal pleasure, part of which was external affirmation by a teacher but not by an audience and part of which was the sensual pleasure of moving in a skilled manner. To agree to perform, then, would be to give me a reason for dancing which was not
mine alone. Nevertheless, I accepted their seemingly greater wisdom and, although I was reluctant and afraid, in the end I agreed to perform.

This agreement changed my feelings about dancing, placing me under a pressure to perform on stage (that is, to produce a quality product for an audience) which depended less on my own feelings and more on the needs of others. At this point I had begun down the path toward professionalization of my activity, a path on which the sensual pleasure of dancing was to be less and less valued and the naming and external valuation were to become more and more important.

There are two instances in my experience which exemplify the ways in which sensual personal pleasure became separated from professional dancing. One instance is from early in my career, one from much later when I was a skilled dancer.

A year after I had begun dancing I was talked into going into New York City on Saturdays to study at a professional studio. I was placed in a small intermediate level technique class with the woman who was to become the major influence on my professional development. At the end of the first class with her we were asked to do solo improvisational dances. My dance was a wild fling though the space, a vigorous and sensual body explosion. Her comment, derisively put, was that I looked very Spanish to her. That would have to change. I would have to get in control and calm down. I took it that the kind of pleasure I
exhibited was illegitimate. It was not that it had not been skillful in the sense of an awareness of what my body was doing and being but that the exhibited pleasure was not valid for dancing (although valid, I suppose, for a Dionysian rite).

The second incident occurred years later while dancing for a choreographer whose style was very different from mine. She was dry and narrow, very specific in what she wanted, very linear and quite controlled in a minimalist manner (much stasis in the body). She requested over and over again that we not show any roundness or expansiveness in our movements. "Please, don't lush out." I felt as if I were dancing in a straitjacket. On the premiere night of the dance I asked my wife and others how I looked. They said I looked narrow and pinched, not at all like who I was to them. The choreographer herself was unhappy with how the piece looked although she thought the dancers were being obstructionist. (There was a good deal of political tension within the group. This was a joint concert involving two companies who were, essentially, at war with each other but who were trying to make peace with each other.) The next night I decided I could not dance as she asked for. I recovered my own pleasurable way of dancing (without marring the essential material of her choreography). My wife and others were pleased. I shone. The choreographer was ecstatic with my performance. Again, pleasure and professional dancing had been
made into enemies. Pleasure was recovered and validated post hoc.

It is important in this instance to note that my interest was in how I looked more than in how I felt. The distinction between valuing sight and valuing other senses is a distinction that has been made quite sharp in recent years by feminist film theorists who write of the male gaze which fixes images so that the gazer imposes an image of a woman onto the actuality of the woman. She is made to be his woman. One way in which this occurs in everyday life is by forcing women into being visually sexually alluring if men are to pay attention to them. Extrapolating this toward a general theory of gaze I would say that the gaze may be criticized as a way of controlling another by forcing him or her into categories of value in which all parties agree to the value of being looked at. Michel Foucault writes, in *Discipline and Punish* (1979), of the panopticon, those total institutions (prisons, hospitals, schools) which were designed architecturally so that the inmates could be controlled at all times via the administration being able to view them at all times. In allowing the gaze to be so dominant, the parties to the gaze have come to "voluntarily" put the panopticon into place without the need for specialized architecture. I believe the issue of the gaze is applicable to both women and men. The gaze also causes problems when sight becomes privileged over other senses. When I turn to a
discussion of "social body" I shall discuss Luce Irigaray's notion (1980) that what is lost in privileging sight are the plurality of sensations available to a truly *jouissant* woman.

While I am not a woman I would say that my experience of initial discomfort with performance is an example of both not wanting to be looked at in a certain way, of not wanting to be fixed in an image and of wanting to value my non-visible experience while dancing (a value at odds with being gazed at). My subsequent dance education was very much about teaching me to be looked at and fixed. The last dance experience described is an example of such fixedness and of socially, culturally mediated pleasure. I placed pleasure within the boundaries of another's images (the choreographer’s movements and gaze) and I agreed to live within the externally imposed constraints of the visual pleasure of others.

The gaze carries with it legitimation: worthy of being looked at. Where the gaze takes place can be as important to legitimation as the activity. During my first dance class, in accepting my pleasure in bodily activity as dancing I allowed myself pleasure within the setting of a school. Had someone praised me outside of the socially legitimated activity (and institution, the school setting) I would, quite likely, have rebuffed those praises.

The gaze may also be understood to fix gender. A woman may feel less womanly if she is not stared at by men because she
identifies womanliness with the ability to attract a man's gaze. My gender was fixed by how people saw me, as manly or not. One of the reasons that I had never considered dancing as a legitimate outlet for my physical pleasure was that I associated it with homosexuality. I was repelled by this. A friend in high school was taking ballet classes and I recall that I felt estranged from him after learning that, assuming that he was homosexual. On the other hand, I was attracted to the dancing of Fred Astaire and Gene Kelly films. They, it will be understood, always danced about and with women.

My homophobic attitudes about myself dancing, when I took that first dance class, were overcome by the presence of other men in the class who were heterosexual. Because of their presence I could feel like a man with the right orientation and still dance. (I recall thinking these thoughts at the time.) The materials of this class, Graham movement with strong and muscular activity also probably helped me distance myself from what I took to be the effemines of ballet which was clearly associated, in my mind, with homosexuality. If I claim that it was pleasure which motivated my return to class, that pleasure could only be safe within the socially safe boundaries of correct sexuality. I did not want people looking at me strangely.

The issue of homosexuality did not disappear with my entrance into dance. As a teacher of dance I was constantly
confronted with the assumption that I was homosexual. On one occasion I was taunted by some boys who were in another room while I was teaching a class. When teaching in public schools with the dance company for whom I worked I was often kept out of the gym classes because the boys felt embarrassed by taking dance with a person they perceived as homosexual. Even in the professional school where I studied one of the gay dancers insisted that I must be gay and attempted to force an admission. Through all of this harassment I maintained my love of dancing and continued in my profession. Despite my coming to believe that sexual orientation and dancing were not intimately connected, I continued to suffer under misapprehensions which angered me, partly because I did not want to be seen as homosexual (my homophobia still in place) and partly because it prevented people from participating in and enjoying what I had come to see as so valuable.

Clearly, in terms of the way people perceived me when they knew that I was a dancer, I was participating in a profession that made me seem different. This perception of difference was another perception against which I railed. I wanted to be ordinary: to be married, to have children eventually, to be a man who went to work which happened to be dancing. I often asked myself "Why can’t dancers have lives like everyone else’s?" I fantasized ordinary existence.
The notion of ordinariness was in conflict with the facts of life of being a dancer. I rehearsed seven days a week, danced eight to nine hours a day and lived on a very small salary (when rehearsal money was available) and on unemployment insurance. I had been taught that to be a fine dancer I could not have other responsibilities which might vie for my attention. The desire to live a life like others, with enough to eat, a decent shelter and clothes and the happiness of family and friends conflicted with the all-consuming nature of dancing. To have a family and friends meant responsibilities outside of dancing and yet to dance meant full devotion to dancing. Nevertheless I wanted to achieve non-dance objectives within the frame of a dance career and I knew there were few models for me to emulate.

Other dancers, male and female, whom I knew did not seem to experience these conflicts. They seemed to revel in the difference which being a dancer bestowed upon them. For one thing most of the men were gay. For another, when we were on tour and at a reception, often the rest of the company would disdainfully stand in the corner with each other, laughing at the sponsors and their guests who had arranged this reception for us. They wanted to dress differently, act differently and be treated with a kind of awe at their special status. All of this I resented. I felt that the people who had gone to all the trouble of preparing a reception for us deserved our attention
and were worthy human beings. My difficulties with my colleagues' behavior exacerbated my conflicts.

In this sketch of my life in dance several conflicts emerge which are not merely idiosyncratic issues but exist in the dance texts I have already discussed, in the dance sphere in a more general way and in the culture which is the context for educational dance.

The conflicts may be understood, in the most general terms as an uneasy relationship between the personal and the public, metaphorically between an internal situation and an external situation which modifies the internal. For instance, when I began to dance I took pleasure in the dancing which, in part, was a purely personal pleasure in moving. This personal pleasure was not a sufficient reason for me to continue dancing. I sought reasons in what appeared to me to be the more socially acceptable avenues of developing a career or rationalizing my dancing on the basis of teaching others to dance for socially valuable outcomes. The relationship between my personal pleasure (internal, private) and external pressures (make a career, be socially responsible) was uneasy because they tended to mutually obliterate each other. To be for my own pleasure was to be just for myself in a socially unfettered, non-rational, non-responsible way. The purpose of justifying my dancing with socially responsible arguments was to avoid admitting to pleasure, to replace pleasure with good reasons.
This same tension exists within the H’Doubler and Hawkins’s texts. They both put forward social responsibility arguments for justifying dancing. The arguments rest on the ways they can forge a more harmonious public life through the use of dancing. At the same time they desire to promote an individual existence of pleasurable creativity which is its own justification. I sense my own struggle between pleasure and social responsibility within these texts.

Pleasure itself can be understood within the dyad of personal/public. I have written of the kind of free, personal pleasure which was not permitted in my dancing experience. The legitimate form of dancing is public performing for an audience. The pleasure to be derived from such dancing is a pleasure mediated by the presence of others. This makes the pleasure dependent on an external source of validation. The external source (represented in the classroom by the teacher) determines the socially acceptable forms of dancing. What is not acceptable to this external eye is an unconstrained spontaneity. Spontaneity must exist within an already determined definition of dance which can be explicated in definite, rationally understood terms. When studying with my teacher, she could explain exactly how my spontaneity should be calmed down, how I could find form in the openness of an improvisational situation so that the dancing became legible to others. I worked hard
over may years to develop the skill to discern emerging form quickly and develop the form with the improvisation.

My teaching experiences have also been informed by the personal/public dyad. It was my own students many years later who pointed out the tensions between the personal and the public when they questioned how I could question their movement choices within an improvisational situation which they understood to be dancing freely as they saw fit. I answered them that there was skill involved with improvisational performance toward which I could guide them. What I had not understood in their questions was the implicit critique of always teaching dance from the point of view of public performance, of the skill of dancing for others.

Again, years later in an improvisational situation with no audience I asked students of mine to simply explore movement possibilities. The dancing was not skilled in any usual sense and could have been dismissed as trivial and impossibly bad (perhaps not even dancing at all). This is what I mean by the public obliterating the personal. In this situation I chose not to dismiss the personal because their own personal experiences as communicated to me afterwards made of this a valid dance experience, no matter how unskillfully they had danced. The difficulties with defining what is dancing and what is quality, skilled dancing in these situations points out the tension between dancing in a purely personal way and the consciousness
of dancing for someone else, between the internal and the external, between the private and the public.

Skill may be used to metaphorize the internal/external, private/public, personal/social dialectics. The problem found in these dialectical dyads may be found in asking some questions of skill.

What is the value of skills in the face of personal pleasure? This question is asked in the face of the kinds of skills valued in my own dance education. The skills I developed were the skills for being socially acceptable and legitimate within the social institution of dance by learning to fulfill the proper dance forms. While developing these skills I was taught to sacrifice the personal (family, physical comfort, friends, all of which carry their own sense of wanting to be socially legitimate) in favor of dancing. I was also taught to sacrifice the sensually pleasurable in favor of the proper dance forms. At the same time I maintained a core of personal body pleasure from my pre-dance days based in a seemingly unmediated sensuality which I attempted to hold on to as I danced "correctly".

Elaborating the above question: what is the relationship between the socially physical acceptable skills and a seemingly primary sensuality and what is the relationship between social acceptance in career (dancing) and the legitimacy of personal life (family, friends, comfort), metaphorically between work
place and family place, the latter being seen as less valuable than the former? In the H'Doubler and Hawkins texts I showed that skill had an important place in achieving the goals of the pedagogy. In my own life I have shown how an emphasis on skill could be understood to interfere with pleasure. All of these skills fall under the rubric of form and discipline: learn good dance form in order to dance well. A person can achieve such form through disciplining the body, emotions and sensations of pleasure and subordinating them to the needs of the aesthetic, creative situation. As we shall see in the next chapter, form can present a social and cultural, as well as personal, problematic.

This problematic comes in the guise of the meanings which cultures associate with such an emphasis on skillful activity. What are the meanings? In the next chapter I will also elaborate a way of understanding how meanings of such values are formed and what meanings predominate in relation to bodily pleasure and skill.
CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIAL BODY

Introduction

I began this dissertation by discussing how language and the world intersect. Implicit in that discussion was the notion that language provides a framework for social relations and that language comes to represent an individual to him or herself as he or she comes to know him or herself. This knowing of self is mediated by the language of the culture so that, for example, the ability to feel pleasure at fulfilling movement is channeled into associating the term "pleasure" (of knowing what gives a person pleasure) with certain kinds of activities.

The ability to feel pleasure may also be a general biological attribute which may have certain more or less natural outlets for a person. The culture, however, may not provide opportunities for such outlets. For instance, there may be pleasure to be had in doing something well. Specifically, an individual may be born with an ability to move his or her body well. He or she is not able to think well in mathematical concepts. This person lives in a culture devoid of valuing moving but replete with mathematical pleasures. In this case, the individual will be stymied in seeking his or her pleasurable experiences. Possible responses to this situation are that the individual may come to know him/herself as illegitimate or may
feel marginalized in his/her pursuit of pleasure or may abandon pleasure or may come to forget pleasure or may come to understand pleasure as not for him or her, only others, or may rebel and attempt to change the culture to enable new kinds of pleasure. The culture has provided a particular repertoire of pleasures and the individual has come to define him or herself vis-à-vis the cultural repertoire via the agency of the representative term "pleasure".

The choice of "pleasure" as an example is neither, as I have said, an idiosyncratic nor a gratuitous choice. This choice is motivated from two sources. The first source is my perception that pleasure is a human capacity which is particularly circumscribed in dance education (which many dance educators wish to see as serious work versus frivolous endeavor, e.g. see M. Turner and E. Pease). The second set of sources are my readings in certain French feminist theorists (Julia Kristeva, 1986, Luce Irigaray, 1980a, 1980b and Hélène Cixous, 1980a, 1980b) whose work in what they term jouissance (roughly translated as "pleasure") has particularly influenced my own thinking.

In particular I am drawn to their work with the disjunctive experiences of woman (as a category or persons) and of concrete women (individuals) as they feel alienated from the dominant culture. Disjuncture is also a characteristic of my own experiences in dance and of the teacher/student scenarios I
have outlined. (I know that the teacher/student relation may also be characterized as consensual. My thrust here, however, is to emphasize the disjunctive.)

The disjunctive occurs between what a person feels of and for him/herself and how society may expect that person to feel. Under this dialectic a person may be understood as both an independent, unique individual and as a product of society. The "Personal Body" chapter presented the idea of the individual and this chapter presents the idea of "Social Body" as an image for "society". By "personal body" I meant the individual as he/she experiences the interaction between his/her body and the culture. Such experiences are mediated by prior cultural influence but this cultural influence is taken up in a personal way in that each individual's experience is a unique complex of circumstances, different from all others. "Social body" aphorises the notion of cultural influence. "Social body" is that body which is experienced as being categorized by social and cultural definitions. I use the term cultural influence to carry a connotation of not becoming totalized by the culture, of leaving a space for the dialectic of the individual and society.

In the chapter on "personal body" "social body" was a constant companion because, in fact, these two bodies are not really separable. That is why I discussed how and with what meanings I became socialized and acculturated into dance. In discussing "social body" separately, I shall not leave personal
body out. I will accomplish this inclusion by using social
theory to analyze certain aspects of my own dancing and from the
dance education texts and then center "social body" upon
"personal body". This provides the image of inseparability for
which I am striving.

Social Body

To begin with I will state that we never experience
pleasure without social understandings. We always have pleasure
of something and we learn to have pleasure. The available
objects in which we may take pleasure are culturally
legitimated or not. Our culture presents us with a limited set
of choices from which to choose.

If we take a sociological approach to this issue we learn
that pleasure (sensuality) has play within society to the extent
that it is properly put to the service of society. Bryan S.
Turner (1984), a sociologist of the body, asserts that society
faces four problems: the reproduction of the population, the
regulation of the social space, the restraint or directing of
sexuality and the representation of persons (people must be re-
presented to themselves so that they may know their places
within the social fabric). Society's problem is to fit pleasure
into the solutions of these problems.

Julia Kristeva, a psycho-analyst, literary and cultural
theorist, links pleasure with language and we may take it that
society in part uses language to solve the above problems. She begins with the term *jouissance* (1986c). By *jouissance* she means a pleasure which is a primordial sensuality which is not merely sensual in the ordinary sense of, for instance, smelling, tasting or eating with gusto. *Jouissance* is connected with, for Kristeva (and for other féministes whose work I shall use a bit later) with the act of coitus and all the events and experiences which involve a woman's sexual anatomy. Kristeva also specifically associates mothers with *jouissance*. Kristeva proceeds to set *jouissance* against the symbolic order of language which is "a system of signs...which are organized into logic-syntactic structures whose aim is to accredit social communication as exchange purified of pleasure" (Kristeva, 1986a, p.150). Kristeva calls language the Symbolic Order and also the Law of the Father. Language has literally belonged to and privileged men via "a system of speech that involves an increasingly logical, simple, positive and "scientific" form of communication" (Kristeva, 1986a, p.151). Central here is her assertion that the Symbolic Order is "purified of pleasure" and that men and their privilege are linked with a particular system of speech.

While Kristeva (1986a) describes the Symbolic Order in patriarchal terms she also asserts that there is an "underlying causality" of language. She writes that this metaphor is being used to
designate that 'other scene': the unconscious, drive-related and transverbal scene whose eruptions determine not only my speech or my interpersonal relationships, but even the complex relations of production and reproduction which we so frequently see only as dependent on, rather than shaping, the economy. (1986a, p.153)

This scene is in opposition to the rules, taboos, inhibitions and prohibitions which rule not only the symbolic order but all aspects of our social existence. The underlying causality is repressed "in order that I may enter the socio-symbolic order" (1986a, p.153). At the same time this causality also shapes the economy (as well as being shaped by it) and in so doing has the capacity of "blowing up the whole construct" (1986a, p.153).

Turning to dance Kristeva's ideas aid in analyzing H'Doubler and Hawkins. Kristeva's description of the symbolic order is reminiscent of the thought of H'Doubler and Hawkins who attempt direct, simple, positive prescriptions and rest much of their argument on scientific findings (social science surveys, anatomy, physiology, psychology). This kind of language used for such discussions is a language, as Kristeva (1986a) would have it, "stripped of all stylistic, rhythmic and 'poetic' ambiguities" (p.151), which I take to refer to the sensual pleasures of language. In these ways some language can function to be antithetical to pleasure.

Returning to Kristeva's ideas, in addition to the Symbolic Order stripping away pleasure, it may also be understood to function to determine both what it means to be a certain gender and how genders are placed in society. According to Kristeva
(1986a) particularly womanly attributes are defined by "patrilinear society."

[W]oman is a specialist in the unconscious, a witch, a bacchanalian taking her jouissance in an anti-Appollonian, Dionysian orgy. (1986a, p.154)

Woman is made into woman in this way and her binding to particular qualities can be understood as a way of keeping a woman in her place.

If a woman cannot be part of the temporal symbolic order except by identifying with the father, it is clear that as soon as she shows any sign of that which, in herself, escapes such identification and acts differently, resembling the dream or the maternal body, she evolves into this "truth" in question. (1986a, p.154)

Truth becomes truth as society has circumscribed her. The patriarchy (the male-controlled world) has not been available to women as their jouissant selves. A woman may gain access to participation in the symbolic order only by repressing her jouissance. She does so, according to Kristeva (1986a), in either an ecstatic or melancholic mode stripping jouissance of its maternal qualities and disallowing the bearing of children.

In other words, pleasure and participation in the dominant mode of living are opposed to each other. Kristeva presents us with a complex, dialectically composed reality both made by and constructive of a woman's bodily reality.

All of this may also be asserted about men. They, too, are defined by the Symbolic Order, even if the specific attributes are different from women's attributes. The result of such defining, however, does not leave men and women equal.
There is a power differential between men and women. The symbolic order's determining of gender sets up a particular economy of power. Men in the patriarchy, have the power to decide the course of events.

According to Bryan Turner (1984) this power resides, in particular, in elder males as the rulers and attempts to deny participation to both women of all ages and young males. A cultural myth is that with age comes wisdom. In order for women and young people to accept their position of inferior power they would, first, have to agree that with age comes wisdom so that without age they cannot have wisdom.

For women this would mean, in part, that they would have to be convinced to disavow the value of their aging. Indeed, they are taught a constant denial of aging through the marketing of creams, salves, hair colorings, medical interventions and life-style manipulations to retard the aging process. They are taught that the successful woman is the seductive woman who is seductive only when young. Spending large amounts of attention on these goals leaves them much less available attention on developing an intellectual maturity equivalent with dominant men.

Applying the above to dance, in dance we can see the way that youthfulness functions. Dancers are encouraged to maintain youthful bodies to the extent that in ballet companies women are maintained deliberately in a pre-pubescent state (Vincent, 1979
and Kirkland, 1986). This naive state may make them much less able to question the decisions of their employers.

In my own dancing story not being a woman I was not expected to remain youthful or powerless in the same sense. I entered dance with the expectation of eventually having my own dance company, of being in charge and giving the orders: in a word, becoming a "man". But when I came to the decision to strike out on my own, my leaving was resented. Part of the message of this resentment was that I should not grow up but should remain a dancer for someone else, a child under the tutelage of my teachers.

Youthfulness in dance is connected with an idealization of the body to fulfill an athleticism accessible only by young bodies. This idealization comes, in part, in the form of specific movements and movement knowledge. Dancers are presented with fundamental movement principles and understandings which are the ideals of knowledge. These ideals represent what the dancers ought to look like.

The idealized images can be also understood, to use a Wilhelm Reich term (1972), as body armor composed of formalized images. The dancer is asked to give up the love of body in order to achieve dancing images. This is seen in the dance literature which has identified bulimia and anorexia as two illnesses associated quite commonly with much dance pedagogy, two illnesses which are strongly based in a severe lack of self-
love (Vincent, 1979). It is also seen in the ideas which dancers have about their bodies as being inadequate and ugly (Stinson, Blumenfeld-Jones & Van Dyke, 1989). The general culture promotes this lack of self-love in its valuation of slimness and youthfulness of which I have already written. Hawkins (1954), in her first book, suggests the alteration of bodies for social acceptance as a valuable outcome of dance pedagogy. People’s bodies are possessed by the culture of dance and the culture in general (social body) to the detriment of people possessing their own bodies (personal bodies).

Another way in which women are defined and then made to be second-class citizens is through the emotions. Women are associated with emotions which are contrasted with intellect and devalued in this culture (B. Turner, 1984) and, thus, women (of emotions) are, naturally not women of maturity (of intellect). In the dance education texts we find that Alma Hawkins rejects the value of emotions when she argues against conventional dance thinking, that it is emotional and, therefore, immature and invalid. Hawkins is participating in the hierarchilization of intellect over emotions.

In order to accomplish the transformation of personal pleasure into publicly acceptable pleasure for the dancer Kristeva’s ideas suggest that the dancers must suppress emotions and their primal sensuality in order to attend to the ideals. She writes that the "role of the 'mother' [is] (the repressed
element)" and writes that what is repressed is the "pre-Oedipal phase" which "is still full of pleasure and not yet detached from the mother/child continuum" (Kristeva, 1986a, p.151). She writes, "From the beginning, then, we are dealing with a training process, an inhibition, which...fully asserts itself with language learning" (Kristeva, 1986a, pp.150-151) and no less with learning the language of dance. It seems to me that this is part of the meaning of my stories about pleasure in dancing. I was asked to suppress personally important qualities of my action and experience in order to achieve dancing.

The forms of movement may be understood as providing, then, vehicles for inhibitions. Luce Irigaray (1980) writes of form in a way that sharpens this critique. She uses the distinctiveness of women's pleasure (distinct from men's) to formulate a critique of form. She writes,

Woman’s desire most likely does not speak the same language as man’s desire, and it probably has been covered over by the logic that has dominated the West since the Greeks...In this logic, the prevalence of the gaze, discrimination of form, and individualization of form is particularly foreign to female eroticism. Woman finds pleasure more in touch than in sight. (1980a, p.101)

The discrimination of form with its associated logic is seen as being against jouissance. She critiques Western thought for promoting a philosophy of form, of identity and unity rather than recognizing the multiplicity of consciousness and of sex. "Indeed she has many more than that. Her sexuality, always at least double, is in fact plural...woman has sex organs just
about everywhere. She experiences pleasure almost everywhere" (1980a, pp.102-103). Irigaray presents the idea that woman's sexuality lies in her touch rather than her sight. This also makes her sexuality plural and "everywhere". There are only two eyes but there are innumerable and separate receptors all over the body. The significance of this is that form and jouissance, deep pleasure are made antithetical to each other. Although Irigaray withholds the possibility of jouissance from men it can be argued that the move toward plurality and diffuseness over against the singularity of the symbolic order offers a possibility for both men and women.

Hélène Cixous offers some space for the interpretation of women's sexuality as being equivalent to diffuseness and diffuseness being a counter to the symbolic order of forms. She uses, according to Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtrivron, jouissance "to refer to that intense, rapturous pleasure which women know and men fear" (Marks and de Courtrivron, 1980, n.6,p.95). Marks and de Courtrivron further state that jouissance is marked by "a giving, expending, dispensing of pleasure without concern about ends or closure" (1980, n.8, pp.36-37), and is about "fluidity, diffusion, duration" (1980, n.8, pp.36-37).

The dance education theorists whose texts we have examined can be understood to present a similar tension. Theirs is the tension between, on the one hand, a desire for fluidity and lack
of concern for closure (in the valuing of open creativity and there being no finally correct answers to aesthetic problems) and, on the other hand, a practice focused upon correct body form and image. The latter is not fluid in the conceptual sense, presenting, rather, a final and static image of correctness, especially found in the fundamental body understandings necessary for good dancing.

The relationship between non-closure and fluidity, on the one hand, and imaging and finality, on the other is not a simple alternative, but, rather a political one in which differential power is distributed through it. Cixous’s contention is that the "movement by which ...opposition is set up to produce meaning is the movement by which the couple is destroyed" (Cixous, 1980b, p.91) and that one side of the couple is vanquished through the hierarchalization of the relationship. For closure to be present, fluidity must be absented in a forcible way. It is through this force that difference is established.

What Cixous (1980b) argues is that the development of Western society has relied upon dualisms (reified hard distinctions) as the prime mode of understanding the way the world works (and that these dualisms have been used to privilege men over women). She writes,

Thought has always worked by opposition,
Speech/Writing
High/Low
By dual, hierarchized oppositions. Superior/Inferior...Wherever an ordering intervenes, a law organizes the thinkable by (dual, irreconcilable; or mitigable, dialectical) oppositions. And all the couples of opposition are couples...

Theory of culture, theory of society, the ensemble of symbolic systems - art, religion, family, language - everything elaborates the same system. And the movement by which each opposition is set up to produce meaning is the movement by which the couple is destroyed. A universal battlefield. Each time a war breaks out. Death is always at work...

And we perceive that the "victory" always amounts to the same thing: it is hierarchized. The hierarchization subjects the entire conceptual organization to man. A male privilege...between activity and passivity. Traditionally, the question of sexual difference is coupled with the same opposition activity/passivity...woman is always on the side of passivity. (Cixous, 1980b, p.91)

Cixous writes "woman is always on the side of passivity."

The relegation of women to passivity has been accomplished through repression, violence, conflict, and privilege through, as I have already described, dissociating them from the Symbolic Order (which privileges men) and by associating them with debased nature and with heart, sensitivity, emotions and body.

Dancers are passive in the sense that they face dance forms and knowledge which, as I have written, are closed and final. Passive represents here passive in the power to determine their own activity and its quality. The static body images of the dance fundamentals hold the aesthetic power and are enacted by people who, when they are dancing in someone else's creative work, are passive in the face of the orders given by the choreographer in charge. It can be said that the choreographer (and the teacher who teaches in a directive
manner) are active as they move the dancers, as they move from aesthetic project to aesthetic project (or pedagogic practice to pedagogic practice) out ahead of the dancers who do not know, necessarily, what is coming next. In following the choreographer’s and teacher’s leads, the dancers do not act but reenact. It is in the reenacting rather than acting (the re-creating of other’s ideas rather than the creating of one’s own ideas) that the bodily pleasure and activity of the dancer is suppressed. The Father’s knowledge takes over the child’s body. This may be an important meaning of the valuing of skill in dance pedagogy. Valuing skill is useful in concentrating power in the tradition and out of the reach of dancers.

For men the situation is a bit different. While they also engage in reenactment they also have role models (many male choreographers) for seeing themselves transcending this passive role. The presence of historically important women in dance (Martha Graham, Hanya Holm, and Doris Humphrey) notwithstanding, there are presently few living active world-famous female choreographers at work although the situation is beginning to shift.

Admittedly, in the pedagogies discussed in this dissertation, the authors struggle against this situation of passivity. This is why they propose pedagogies predicated on individual creative activity. Nevertheless, I have tried to
show how their pedagogies also contain contradictions to this desire for fostering creativity.

The problematics of form are linked to the problematics of the gaze, which I discussed earlier. The forms of dance are the signs and visible action of dance. Kristeva (1986e) writes of an addiction to the visible in Western culture as "merely one more indication of the impasse in which his or her desire finds itself with regard to the other sex" (p.231). Kristeva is dealing here with the subject of hysterics and with obsessional beings, the latter being an excellent description of many dancers. I have already noted that dancers are subject to obsessional illnesses such as anorexia. I myself was so obsessed with dancing that I could not conceive of existence without dancing. If I stopped dancing I would disappear forever. Dancers, being obsessional beings, are people who, often being deeply involved with the production of forms, are obsessed at the possible expense of bodily pleasure, sensuality and jouissance.

Returning to "social body", the culture places value upon virginity (which is linked with the value of youthfulness). There is also a value of virginity at play in the culture. The issue of virginity is analyzed by Kristeva. She writes that women in the West, for the most part, have been defined by the monotheistic Christian order which demands of women that they remain virgins if they are to be associated with the symbolic
order. Failing being virgins they can atone for their carnal jouissance with their martyrdom. The economic system which is associated with the Christian symbolic order demands, indeed needs, for children to be produced (B. Turner, 1984, pp.13-14) but this production, for the woman, censures "the fact that she has experienced jouissance in an act of coitus, that there was a 'primal scene'" (Kristeva, 1986a, p.146). The symbolic Christian community valorizes "childbearing and procreation in the name of the father" (Kristeva, 1986a, p.146) and does so literally since the child is conventionally given the father's last name. In so doing jouissance is again removed from the woman. Child-bearing is only another form of social production, the child only another sign in the endless chain of signifiers.

Virginity is also connected, according to Kristeva, in "Stabat Mater" (1986d), with death as the Christian Church has traditionally associated sexuality and death. She writes that these two things were understood as concomitant and that with the development of the cult of the Virgin, "Mary was contrasted with Eve, life with death," (1986d, p.165) Mary representing life and Eve representing death. Kristeva points out that Mary is made parallel, in Christian dogma, with Christ. One of the ways this is accomplished is by expanding the theme of immaculate conception, inventing a biography of Mary similar to that of Jesus and, by depriving her of sin, to deprive her of death: Mary leaves by way of Dormition or Assumption. (1986d, p.164)
Conception without sexuality is conception without sin and only sin leads to death. Eve sinned and so lost immortality and was given the fate of death. The sinful body is severed from ideal living. The untouched body is contrasted to the naked, sexual body. The human hubris of Eve is associated with her downfall. Her chain of signifiers (hubris, body, naked, sexuality) is made to stand for that against which society strives so that society may progress toward an idealized state. If Eve had not wanted knowledge she would still be in a state of grace. Knowledge, therefore, is subtly implicated in the chain and is not banished but looked down upon. Mary is innocent and Eve is knowledgeable.

At this point in my discussion the issues begin to accumulate and intermingle. The issue of power becomes a constant as life and the idealized state of a person (idealized forms of movement, ideal youthful virginal body, male intellect as a knower of ideals) are contrasted to and valued over death and body knowledge (the woman's part in culture as she called down death upon the whole of humanity by her desire to know). The "gaze" of which I wrote in "personal body" fixes a person within defined limits of idealizations. Life predicated on the idealizations will have power over death only when ideal forms and bodies and minds will take ascendancy over earthy, concrete bodies and emotions. Men have access to the former and women to the latter. "Naturally" men should have dominion over women.
This is the form of argument which Kristeva, Iragaray and Cixous claim has dominated Western culture.

These values, in the forms of virginity, pre-pubescence and youth, have sway in dance and those female dancing bodies are not only to appear youthful, etc. but also to not appear to be womanly or capable of bearing children. Men are not immune from the value of virginity in dance. In ballet companies the men are referred to as boys, even when they are in their twenties. This keeps them in a kind of virginal state of mind if not body. Emphases is upon youth and virginity which deny the passage of time and allow power to fall into the hands of mature men.

To write of power which falls "into the hands of mature men" is to raise the question of what is meant by "men" in the dance context. When thinking about dancing it is impossible not to deal with the issue of homosexuality.

In society's terms homosexuals are aberrations of gender. They are neither men nor women. They cannot participate, referring back to Bryan Turner, in solving the sociological problem of reproducing the society. Michel Foucault (1980) asserts that society works to control sexuality in order to preserve familial alliances (p.108). The alliances are preserved through the defining of sexuality as a specific social category which can be made into a medical and psychological problem which society then addresses and controls. This has
been traditionally accomplished through declaring that there are both normal, legitimate sexuality and abnormal, illegitimate sexuality. In this traditional context sexuality outside of the procreation and preservation of the family unit must be cured for the sake of the continuation of society. Such sexuality is seen as an illness curable through medical and psychological scientific interventions (Aries, 1985). While there are studies which assert that the status of the homosexual male is changing (Pollack, 1985), it is nevertheless the case that traditionally the homosexual has been socially marginalized.

Despite this marginalization the way in which dance history is conceived places all dancers, including homosexual dancers, back within the bounds of legitimate society. This is accomplished through telling the history of dance via aesthetic genealogies using a genealogical metaphor to delineate the development of the art. As with any family tree, there are households. The dance head of household is the master artist who takes responsibility for the development of the art. Teachers, too, may be understood as participating in this family metaphor in the way that they represent, in the classroom, the master's art, teaching the correct way of dancing. In this sense the creative dance education texts participate in the family structure of dance. Their books (and most dance education books) are teacher, not student texts. The teacher studies the teaching of dancing in books. The student studies
the learning of dancing by doing. The source of information for the student is the teacher. The teacher represents and mediates the continuing flow of knowledge from the past to future generations, intervening to select and control the knowledge.

In these senses, while my own experience as a teacher was that I had to deal with a society which wanted to make me illegitimate by calling me "homosexual" (consequently to reject my art), yet my experience as a dancer within that world was an experience of reproducing the dominant, male culture. I was taught my genealogy. I was expected to pay great respect to my masters. I have always, to myself, called my teachers my "Dance Father" and "Dance Mother" and "Dance Uncle". This is not by accident. We acted, in my education, very much like a family, with all of the attendant family difficulties and joys. The dancer who wanted to force me to admit to homosexuality may be understood to have been attempting to reinforce my ties to the family. Once I proved myself to be loyal to the family even though I was not homosexual, he ceased his pressure and we became good friends. What I can understand from examining the family structure of my dance experience is that the homosexual overlay of much of my dance experience struggled to be legitimated by participating in a dominant cultural value, that of family. The Family as representative of the Symbolic Order can be seen to be setting the terms of how we participate in the
dance culture and how we seek legitimation within the general culture.

There is yet another interpretation which may emerge from reflecting upon the values of life, youth and death as they exist within the culture. They may be taken to represent the more general problematic of time as a cultural construct. Kristeva (1986f) offers a critique of this time as a differentiation between men and women. The time of the male, patriarchally dominated world is a linear time, a procession of before, now and after. The symbolic order as represented in language is also linear and the use of language is most often dominated by the rules of conventional narrative time (beginning, middle, end). This kind of time denies the timelessness of bodies and denies women's time as Kristeva (1986f) writes that

female subjectivity would seem to provide a specific measure that essentially retains repetition and eternity from among the multiple modalities of time known through the history of civilizations. On the one hand, there are cycles, gestation, the eternal recurrence of a biological rhythm which conforms to that of nature and imposes a temporality whose stereotyping may shock, but whose regularity and unison with what is experienced as extra-subjective time, cosmic time, occasion vertiginous visions and unnameable *jouissance*. On the other hand, and perhaps as a consequence, there is a massive presence of a monumental temporality, without cleavage or escape, which has so little to do with linear time (which passes) that the very word "temporality" hardly fits. (p.191)

This is the time of biological processes which lie outside of human intention. It is these times, repetition and monumental,
which the patriarchy in its simplistic linearity cannot abide and feels the need to subjugate.

Kristeva is not alone in linking time with gender and with associating women's time with repression. Malcolm Ross in "You are the Music" has written that, in terms of schools,

in a work-oriented, sexist society such as ours, the arts in education suffer primarily because their image is, essentially, illegitimate...The arts subjects, I believe, are discounted in schools because they conform to the illegitimate play/female category [of value] ...as long as the arts are perceived as [female] in a [male] world they will continue to have a bad time. (Ross, 1981, pp.152-153)

Throughout this dissertation, the interaction of individual and society has been at play. This last point about time indicates that the interaction needs also to be understood in terms of interacting categories, in this case those of male and female, categories into which individuals both fit themselves and into which they are fit. The process of world-making has been mediated through the dialectic of individual/society but also through the dialectic of such social categories. I have tried to show how the individual in the dance education texts, in my own life story, in feminist critique and in language theory struggle to find a place within the social construct and also find the categories which are appropriate to their construction of a personal world.

Struggle seems to be the operative verb. A set of dialectically related nouns which would be, I believe, equally applicable would be those of "resistance" and "accommodation".
World-making is a process of resisting the imposition of another's world and an imposition of categories and, simultaneously, a willingness to accommodate to the other's world and to categories. I believe that possible motivations for being willing to so accommodate are the desire to enlarge one's own world and the desire not to be alone. When we read books perhaps it is this desire not to be alone which is at play. Perhaps H'Doubler and Hawkins can be understood to be offering worlds into which many can enter so that the many will no longer exist in a state of alienation, either from themselves and their activities or from each other. My own experience in dancing was a struggle toward acceptance by the powers of dance so that I might dance with them. Once I decided to dance, I did not want to dance alone. It was, in part, the desire to be accepted into their world which motivated my persistence. To be accepted meant functioning in their order, not my own. The struggle was to make their world mine and at the same time find my own world which was different from theirs. H'Doubler and Hawkins try to present pedagogies through which one becomes initiated into the accepted processes of creativity in order to get beyond them. This paradox may summarize the process of world-making.
CHAPTER 5
THE PROBLEMATICS OF THE FRAMEWORK

As I wrote in the Introduction, offering a framework for dance education cannot be the end of this work. I must also consider the complex issues implied in the framework as issues which exist within a state of problematics and irresolution if not contradiction. In contradistinction to a framework which reifies ideas, subsuming all the phenomena of a field of inquiry to its purposes, I see this critical framework as an active investigation which is never complete or capable of explaining or describing fully the phenomena which it is used to investigate. This is because there are internal ambiguities which accompany any attempt at dialectical thinking. Due to the joining of opposites there is inevitably a tension which exists between the opposites so that they maintain their distinct characteristic from each other, rather than falling into a sameness. The following is offered to provide some ideas of the meanings and difficulties of some of the major issues of the framework.

A major feature of the framework is the positing of a "personal body" over against a "social body". The question arises: who is a person aside from his or her social existence? The distinction between personal and social tends to posit, by the personal, an unmediated existence, an independent "I". This
can be seen in my discussion of language in Chapter One as I presented Jacoby's reading of Otto Fenichel that social activity is the social expression of "universal" biological needs and drives. This posits a biological "I" which is given, via society, a form into which to mold the "I", as if the "I" is a kind of undifferentiated plasma prior to socialization. It can also be seen in Chapter One where I wrote that the dialectic of nature/culture (biological "I"/social "I" dichotomy) could be maintained by recognizing the "materials with which we are born" and, simultaneously, making a place for them in the theory of the subject by "examining how differing social contexts deal with them."

In all of this the problem is: is there an entity, an "I", which is separable from social influence. Julian Henriques, Wendy Hollway, Cathy Unwin, Couze Venn and Valerie Walkerdine (1984) provide a substantive critique of the kind of dualism implied in my splitting of the personal and social. The critique is two fold.

On the one hand, for those theorists who attempt to explain the socialization process as a matter of internalizing social lessons, the status of the individual prior to socialization remains untheorized and he/she is either taken-for-granted as "a pregiven psychological subject, a rational individual" or is not thought to have any existence at all and has no effect upon the process. (Henriques et al., 1984, pp.17-
On the other hand, there are those theorists who attempt to avoid an empty subject by positing a person born with predispositions, abilities and an innate drive for structure (for becoming socialized) or "varying *ad hoc* formulations to bring content into the individual" (pp.20-21). "The core, presocial individual which remains intact in these accounts still rapidly reduces to the biological" (p.21). By acknowledging the presence of a pre-social presence such theories undermine the notions of external influence and socialization processes by positing an individual who could, by bringing his/her pregiven intentions to the process, simply evade the mechanisms of socialization. What Henriques et al. (1984) are trying to avoid is this dualistic tendency.

The point that we are making is that whilst we should avoid founding a theory of subjectivity on a taken-for-granted biological origin, we cannot construct a position which altogether denies biology any effects. The only way to do this without granting either term of the biology-society couple the status of pregiven categories is to reconceptualize them in such a way that the implicit dualism is dissolved in favour of stressing the relational character of their mutual effects. (p.21)

I take it that my own discourse lies also within this difficult and problematic relation of self and society, biology and culture in several ways. One of the difficulties is trying to maintain a dialectical consciousness toward the issue yet do so through the linear, rational mode of discourse of this culture which I have employed for the sake of cultural clarity. Linear clarity, as a stylistic value, tends to betray the
dialectical quality of the relation by being able to write of only one term at a time and by tending toward a reified separation of two terms. Form is not a minor issue but images the difficulties of maintaining a dialectical consciousness. Form is its own politics.

The dialectic (of mutually influential terms) is also difficult to maintain when thinking through issues. For instance, as an example of the difficulties of conceptualizing, I have argued, in the autobiographical chapter, that I possessed a predilection for moving in a certain way which was distinct from how I learned to move in my professional education. I attempted to imply that my mother's disapproval of my moving was a demonstration of the biological foundation of the seeming predisposition (because I seemed to have a need which transcended her disapproval. The difficulty with this is that the disposition can be taken as ad hoc, a convenient but empty category, in order to maintain the split which I attempt to establish. How do I know that the need was not the result of some earlier or more subtle socialization? As another example of the complexity of the dialectic of individual and society, when discussing the neighborhood football game and my feelings about not being allowed to play football in high school, there was a description of an "I" taking pleasure in moving because of the social meaning of the movement and, simultaneously, other kinds of pleasure not mediated by a social consciousness. In
the light of the dialectics can these two categories be
separated? These are but two examples of the strains which
exist in attempting to both conceptualize biology alone, society
alone, and biology and society in concert in a culture which
tends to value either/or statements (it is either biology or
society but never both) over both/and statements. Can it be all
of these possibilities? To be clear, it is not simply a matter
of more clearly defining the independent "I" but a matter of
avoiding the either/or and the origins issue: which influences
which and which came first, individual or society.

The difficulties of the individual/society and biology
(nature)/culture dichotomies are increased in another major
feature of the framework, namely the thought of the French
féministes. In particular these difficulties arise in their use
of the notion of difference and in the place of nature in their
thinking and the difficulties have a political cast (as opposed
to what may appear to be only epistemological issues of how a
woman knows).

The féministes, as do all feminists, according to Moi
(1987), begin their work with the premise that men and women are
different from each other in fundamental ways.

The problem of sexual difference is central to any kind of
feminist politics or theory, since the very reason why
women as a social group are oppressed is that they differ
from men. The question is what that difference consists
in, how far it extends, and how it is constructed in
relation to power. (p.4)
As can be seen in the previous chapter, Iragaray (1980a) locates
difference in the womanly versus manly body. Moi (1985) writes,

Iragaray's theory of "woman" takes as its starting point a
basic assumption of analogy between woman's psychology and
her "morphology". (p.143)

Cixous (1980a) also seems to take the woman's body as her
starting place, while Kristeva involves herself in writing of
pregnancy as a way in which women come to defy the patriarchal
order of things (see Kristeva, 1986d).

These theorists have been accused by some theorists
(Jones, 1985 and Moi, 1985) of participating in the very system of
oppression from which they seek relief, thus maintaining the
political status quo. Such critique of these feminists takes
the position that women have been oppressed in the culture by
being identified with nature which the culture has split off
from itself as a primitive form of life which has no place in
culture. Succinctly, if there would be culture there cannot be
nature and so women, positioned as antithetical to culture,
are, consequently, socially and politically marginalized.

The celebration of the bodies of women, of which the
féministes are accused, places women directly back into the
subordinate position to which they have been relegated by
theorizing the body as if it is "a simply physical context" and
loses sight of the understanding that "sexual identity ...never
takes shape in isolation" and that there is "no essential
stratum of sexuality unsaturated with social arrangements and
symbolic systems" (Jones, 1985, p.92). Jones (1985) argues that these féministes have lost sight of the historical and specific character of sexuality and asks of them,

[I]s women's sexuality so monolithic that a notion of a shared, typical femininity does justice to it? What about variations in class, in race, and in culture among women?...How can libidinal voice...speak for all women? (p.93)

In addition, to appropriate the patriarchy's definition of feminine as a definition worth celebrating plays into the designs of the patriarchy. For example, Moi (1985) writes of Cixous,

In her eagerness to appropriate imagination and the pleasure principle for women, Cixous seems in danger of playing directly into the hands of the very patriarchal ideology she denounces. It is, after all, patriarchy, not feminism, that insists on labelling women as emotional, intuitive and imaginative, while jealously converting reason and rationality into an exclusively male preserve.

(p.123)
And Jones (1985) writes,

Materialist feminists...are suspicious of the logic through which féminité defines men as phallic - solipsistic, aggressive, excessively rational - and then praises women, who, by nature of their contrasting sexuality, are other-oriented, empathetic, multi-imaginative. Rather than questioning the terms of such a definition...féminité as a celebration of women's difference from men maintains them. (1985, p.93)

Moi and Jones claim these féministes do not deal adequately with the social meaning of difference but expend energy romanticizing the power of the body and dismissing the power of the social. Indeed, Cixous, for example has been accused of writing "a full-blown metaphysical account of writing
as voice, presence and origin" (Moi, 1985, p.119). That is she writes of the body as if it did not exist in concrete, historical reality.

The association with nature which can be used to subordinate peoples and activities is not, admittedly, rejected by the femenistes. But they opt for accepting the association and understanding its positive values. Kristeva (1986d), for instance, does not reject the value of pregnancy (a natural body state) but, rather embraces it and recognizes its status as natural and jouissant. Similarly Annie Leclerc (1987) writes,

It was not man who decided to allot to me the painful burden of procreation, but it is he who has done all he can to make my lot a painful one. Likewise the division of labour into male and female tasks was determined in accordance with principles other than those of virile oppression; but once this division of labour was established, accepted, man did all he could to make sure it is perceived as a division between a bad and a good role; on the one hand all the vile tasks, and on the other all the prestigious ones; on the one hand, all at once and cleverly enmeshed, the proof, the sanction and the cause of female inferiority; on the other, all at once and cleverly enmeshed, the proof, the sanction and the cause of masculine superiority. (p.74)

What is presented here is not a rejection of nature (which might be expected if women and dancers were to wish to release themselves from oppression) but a rejection of the interpretation of the relationship between nature and legitimacy. What is rejected is a particular set of social meanings and attendant power relations. This would seem to undermine the critiques of Moi and Jones.
The problem with the nature issue for the framework that I have developed is that by appropriating these theorists's work I am also forced to accept the problematics of their theories. For my own part, I would agree with Moi and Jones that it is important to remember that whatever it is that people possess as natural bodies is always influenced by the social and cultural surround. The danger with strongly valuing a search for a non-socially mediated body, an essential female or male body, a metaphysical body is that we forget that our bodily possibilities are presented to us by both the world out there and the world inside the body which has been powerfully shaped by the world out there. Attempting to gain freedom from this social historical construct is not possible. People cannot be without social constructs.

I believe that the French feminist theorists whom I have cited are not unaware of the social construct. They do not fix upon difference as wholly biologically predicated. They are quick to make clear that difference is not automatically associated with male and female biology, that difference is also a social construct. Cixous (1980b) states that her differential categories are "organized by...an entire immense system of cultural inscription readable as masculine or feminine" but that "there are men who do not repress their femininity, women who more or less forcefully inscribe their masculinity" (p.93). Further, she asserts that we must take care not to "support the
awesome thesis of a 'natural', anatomical determination of sexual difference-opposition", for to support such a thesis is to "implicitly support phallocentrism's position of power" (p.93).

Of phallocentrism, Cixous (1980b) writes that 'it "is the enemy...of everyone. Men stand to lose by it, differently but as seriously as women" (1980b, p.96). What is lost is the ability to invent "whether it be philosophical or poetical" (1980b, p.97). The ability to invent comes from

[a]dmitting the component of the other sex [which] makes [men and women] at once much richer, plural, strong, and to the extent of this mobility, very fragile...there is no invention possible, whether it be philosophical or poetic, without the presence in the inventing subject of an abundance of the other, of the diverse...a certain homosexuality interplay therefore of bisexuality making in me a crystallized work of my ultrasubjectivities. (1980b, p.93)

Kristeva (1986f) delineates a feminism which will, hopefully and eventually, outstrip the category of sexual difference and uncover the category of individual difference, whether male or female. This outcome will be achievable by

an interiorization of the founding separation of the socio-symbolic contract, as an introduction of the cutting edge into the very interior of every identity whether subjective, sexual, ideological, or so forth...which characterize each identity, each subject, each sex. (1986f, p.210)

Kristeva's desire is to

bring out...the singularity of each person and...the relativity of his/her symbolic as well as biological existence, according to the variation in his/her specific symbolic capacities. (1986f, p.210)
This practice will afford "them the possibility of jouissance, for various productions, for a life made up of both challenges and differences" (1986f, p.211).

Kristeva and Cixous do not eschew difference but call for a new kind of difference (between individuals rather than between social categories). For Kristeva the wrong criteria for difference has been historically in place. For Cixous, the strong repression of one term of difference prevents the ability to invent, which, I believe, we may take to mean inventing the world, society and social relations in a richer and stronger way than heretofore.

These theories might be labeled theories of sameness and theories which re-establish bourgeois individualism and they might run the risk of supporting the status quo and of losing their dialectical logic. I recognize that Cixous (1980b) critiques the dialectical approach as supporting male domination. She seems to assert that a feminine logic would avoid these categories which inevitably reinforce hierarchy. I believe however that she is wrong in applying this argument to all forms of dialectical thinking. As they dismiss a certain form of difference and favor sameness they continue to participate in the very hierarchization which they critique. In addition, the metaphors of "richer", "stronger", "battlefield" and the like, used by Cixous (1980b), may be taken as masculine
metaphors which, ironically, may further betray the project of a new difference by perpetuating old language.

I would add to this that while hierarchy seems to be totally dismissed as a value such dismissal fails to account for the dialectical face of hierarchy. It is possible that only through the tension of unequal distribution of attributes (hierarchy) does life proceed. Equality among all entities may be taken as a metaphorical death. In physics theory, for instance, entropy is the process whereby, for instance, an energy system loses its coherence through progressive loss of energy. The various entities within the system all with their own energies become, in terms of their energies, more and more like each other, all moving less and less until the system becomes static, death ensues and the system no longer exists. For a system to continue to live it must receive new energy from outside. In biological bodies (considered as systems of energy) the new energy is food which represents not only new energy but coherent, differentiated energies, different from the body into which they are ingested, which infuses the biological system/body with new coherence, preventing the biological body from falling into undifferentiated entropic death. The human body requires this difference if it is to flourish and survive. Difference may not be a negativity but a necessity. On the other hand, difference in social practice has been predominantly
used to forward oppression and marginalizations of others. Difference is dialectically constructed.

Yet another featured issue of the framework centers upon the critique of valuing form in dancing. This critique of form should not be understood as a prescription for curing society's ills through the simple return to sensuality, sexuality and pleasure over against form. Neither should the critique of form in dance be taken as a prescription for rejecting image and form in dancing which might seem to be the stumbling block for pleasure. Kristeva (1986c), as a psychoanalyst, notes how her patients are patients in this culture because they have been unable to appropriate, in the conventional way, the symbolic order, language. In their pre-Oedipal state they have not separated from the Father power of the symbolic order. They are in conflict with the need to separate (in order to become a subject in the world, a being who can act on his or her own creatively and with personal power). They will not be cured and brought out of marginality by coming to value the qualities which have been imposed upon them by the insistent power of the Symbolic Order. Kristeva argues, for instance, in "Women's Time" (1986f), that women coming to emphasize their difference and creating a language only they can understand (Cixous, for instance, proposes Ecriture Féménine) only further marginalizes themselves within the power structure since the power structure has already accepted them in that guise. A similar critique can
be made of dancers who value their body orientation and silence which they claim is voluntarily chosen and transformative. They do not understand how their silence prevents them from coming to understand their position. Kristeva (1986c) presents a version of a cure which does not lose sight of the Symbolic Order. Moi writes that Kristeva writes that what is necessary is producing subjects who are free to construct imaginary fantasies (or works of art), to produce a new language, precisely because they are able to situate themselves in relation to the Law. (Kristeva, 1986c, p.18)

Another issue for any framework is the effect which it has upon the subject of investigation (Henriques et al., 1984). Henriques et al. (1984) are not only referring to how one may study such effects as I have done in discussing the effects of practice of creative dance education upon individuals, but are referring to the effects of an investigation itself upon the subject and how this alters and intervenes in the knowledge which is generated. The historical circumstances of investigation both on the level, in this case, of the internal mechanisms of the pedagogy and of the mechanisms of investigations upon the subject require an historical awareness.

For the social sciences these effects are not separable from the practices of administration to which these sciences are tied. This means that in examining how and why psychology has come to be what it is, it is crucial to account for the effects inside it of historically specific circumstances that refer to social practices and to other discourses centred on the individual. (p.92)

They go on to elaborate how the practices of psychology function in concert with economic practices and social stabilization
practices, the result of which are psychology as a social technology for achieving particular ends: the maintenance of the social power structure. They contrast this description of psychology with the usual descriptions which center upon psychology as a science in which the truth about human beings is sought. They argue that psychology is produced through the action of the social and that it has little to do with discovering truth. Similarly, in dance pedagogy, it is necessary to come to understand how its truths are social productions, effects of social life. Critically, also, I think it is important that the investigator not avoid his or her own status as a social effect nor avoid acknowledging that the knowledge which develops out of a particular investigation is also a social product.

It seems to me that much work remains in the first area, that of historically accounting for the kinds of choices made in these pedagogies, accounting for the presence of particular pedagogical practices which are tied to other kinds of social practice. Hawkins provides a good starting place for such investigation as, in Modern Dance in Higher Education, she references educational sources. H'Doubler similarly references psychological sources in Dance, A Creative Art Experience as does Hawkins in Creating Through Dance. Inquiry into these sources would yield ideas about dance education as an analysis
of their historical and social nature is linked back into the dance pedagogy.

An example of this work would be the examination of the Tyler Rationale for curriculum. Briefly, this rationale has had great influence upon educational thinking. The work which has been done on this rationale (Macdonald and Purpel, n.d.) has shown how its kind of thinking is highly related to an industrial consciousness, importing the values of productivity and efficiency into education. The rationale can be seen at work in Doubler and Hawkins as well as in other dance education texts. What is necessary is to show how the industrial consciousness is also at work in those discourses, thus showing how they participate in the thinking of their times. Further, the meaning of thinking in that way needs to be developed to show how the pedagogies are bent in a certain direction.

I should like, at this point, to discuss the basis for further work which might flow out of this dissertation. As I have worked on it and read more and more I have come to understand, in greater specificity, the meaning of such a concept as the cultural surround, the meaning of Jacoby's assertions about the place of society in consciousness and the meaning of language as a site of embedded social understanding. In this dissertation I have engaged in an act of "deconstruction" vis à vis the dance education texts and my own
dance life in order to reveal the sociality of the situation.

Henriques, et al. (1984) present one kind of understanding of this act of "deconstruction" which suggests the implications of such an act. They write,

What this kind of deconstruction asserts is that any given body of statements, whether in everyday conversation or a scientific paper, depends on a number of other bodies of statements, some of which carry deeply entrenched convictions and explanatory schemas fundamental to the dominant form of making sense of the world at any particular period in a culture. Deconstruction retraces the system of "dependencies" of a discourse. At the same time, it also has a positive foundation, in that it reconstructs a history which accounts for how a discourse or practice emerged, for the conditions of its emergence and constitution (discursive, material and historical) and for how it comes to be what it is at the present. Foucault calls this kind of history a genealogy: a trace that reconstitutes the present from its traces in the past. (p.104)

I have begun a nascent genealogy on dance education texts by suggesting the origins of some of their concepts, some of the social situations which might have brought them to theorize dance in the ways that they did including the use of expert information from educational and psychological theorists and the meanings of those theorists particular approaches to education and psychology. I have also indicated some of the historical situations (such as WW II for Hawkins) which might have brought a thinker's consciousness (along with those of the other members of her society) to think about education in a certain way. I have treated my own story as a kind of discursive practice, locating that practice in the contested domain of bodily pleasure, contested as much in terms of how the concept of
pleasure was defined by my teachers and by myself as in what was permitted to occur, in practice, both in the classroom and on the performance stage. The practices were significantly intermingled with the discursive in the ways that pleasure was conceptualized through the actual classroom and stage experience. The choreographer who didn't want us to "lush out" gave up that concept when she brought it up against the reality of our dancing, up against other conceptualizations of what good dancing and dance were. These alternative concepts were embodied in what she was not seeing in practice but what she hoped for in fantasy. Only in practice could she "know" this but she, also, already knew this by her own knowledge, her own presence as a location of discursive practices taken up by her in a distinctive manner mediated by her biology and personal history.

The issue of biology remains a fairly unvoiced issue both in this dissertation and in the field in general. As a hint of what I mean by biology, I would suggest that the way my body was and developed as a body directed the kind of dancing forms I could, socially, take up. I do not, for instance, have a "ballet body", a particular physical structure for which ballet is designed. Had I not been homophobic, had I found ballet beautiful and had I wanted to dance ballet, I still would not have been allowed to pursue it professionally for lack of the proper body and ability to properly do the movements.
It seems that the development of such genealogies and such biological understanding is necessary in order to begin to establish a firmer basis for understanding what is going on in dance pedagogy. It is not, to be sure, a basis firm in Truth but, rather, a basis firm in the convictions of the investigator who is biased toward seeking certain kinds of understandings based on certain values whose existence it is necessary to make explicit. As Henriques et al. (1984) put it,

Genealogy is a history of the present in the sense that it finds its points of departure in problems relevant to current issues and finds its point of arrival and its usefulness in what it can bring to the analysis of the present. (p.104)

In similar fashion I have appropriated H'Doubler and Hawkins and seen them both as historical precedents for my own story and present practices and as consciousnesses sedimented into the present. In a word, H'Doubler and Hawkins are still very much with us. To examine them is to examine the present. My status as examiner has a strong effect on this. It is very much to the point to ask who is doing the determination of relevance and why particular determinations are made. These all point to the value-laden character of this inquiry as well.

Despite the kinds of problems which I have delineated I would assert the strength and importance of this framework on two grounds. First, I have presented as rigorous an analysis as possible about ideas which I think are important and to which I want people to respond and with which I want them to engage. I
strongly believe that the issue of bodily pleasure is central to an understanding of why people dance and that pleasure is quickly forgotten as a value. More important than this phenomena is that people are separated early on in their dance education from what they already know about their bodies. They are presented with the canons of dance and, almost invariably, those canons are not them. What they do know must be unlearned. Ironically, what is often asked of the mature dancer is a great deal of individual interpretation, unique character and an ability to apply life-experience to various dance roles. If we take it that such individuality is based on what people know individually then the removal of individuality in favor of the canon is problematic. It is not, to be sure, that what people know about themselves is, invariably, worth maintaining. Initial body understandings require investigation as much as the more developed body understandings dealt with in this dissertation. The chance for such investigation is eliminated when individuality is eliminated.

Concurrently with the devaluation of what is already known, dance students are encouraged to remain in a state of child-like innocence toward both the art and those who teach and "create" the art. This emphasis on being child-like debilitates their ability to confront and think through the issues at hand or even to perceive that there are issues with which to deal.
This is especially true when the teacher and/or choreographer is cast in a powerful parental role: Father, Mother or Master.

Lastly, these problems are visited on all dance students, not only those who aspire to a professional career. I ask myself and other dance educators to consider: what is the place of dance in the world via education and what kind of dancing is appropriate? I think these questions have yet to be adequately addressed. In addition the thorny problems of form and technique cannot be attended to without developing answers to important questions about the formation of people in a personal and social way. The féministes have proposed that the insertion into the Symbolic Order is a central fact in the construction of gender. How does the insertion into dance language (form and technique) consort with this construction? What are the real results of creative dance practice on the students of that practice, as opposed to the idealizations of the practice which, in my estimation, mar these important and estimable texts? I believe that we must enable both ourselves and our students to interrogate dance education practice on the fronts presented in this study.
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