Order Number 8824056

Special education and human dignity: A hermeneutic of hope

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The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1988

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SPECIAL EDUCATION AND HUMAN DIGNITY:

A HERMENEUTIC OF HOPE

by

Rebecca Ann Frazier Blomgren

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

Greensboro
1988

Approved by

David E. Purpel

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APPROVAL PAGE

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3-18-88
Date of Acceptance by Committee

3-18-88
Date of Final Oral Examination

BLOMGREN, REBECCA ANN FRAZIER, Ed.D. Special Education and Human Dignity: A Hermeneutic of Hope. (1988) Directed by Dr. David E. Purpel. 222 pp.

In directing attention toward concerns regarding human dignity, this paper addresses the revealing and concealing nature of paradigms that we unconsciously and consciously embrace as we interpret, classify, and make meaningful our experiences and relationships. In reflective examination and hermeneutic interpretation of my professional and personal experience within the field of special education, three educational visions emerged which have served to organize the analysis of human dignity.

The three-fold typological structure provides a framework within which to discuss educational theory and practice and to facilitate a conversation of what ought to constitute an educational vision that fosters hope for inclusion and enhancement of dignity. The technical rationale is the positivistically framed model, which stands as the current and taken-for-granted paradigm of educational theory and practice. This vision prizes objectivity and neutrality and is aimed at standardization, prediction, and control. The demystifying and empowering thrust of critical theory is reflected in the transformative-emancipatory paradigm and posits a vision which embraces the quest for justice in face of the uncertain. The message of the transcendent-liberatory paradigm is elusively illustrated by the prophetic tradition which seeks to recognize, in love, the awe and wonder of

being human while marveling at the mystery of existence itself. With criticism and hope this vision addresses oppressive and alienating conditions that prevent us from being free in a real and spiritual sense.

As issues of special education, primarily concerns for inclusion, and regard for dignity, specifically reciprocity and subjectivity in relationship, are filtered through these educational models, the liberating and oppressing nature of such vision unfolds. The technical rationale, although inviting of handicapped participation by means of the prescriptive behavioral objective, ultimately abolishes hope for genuine relationship thus denying dignity. Transformative-emancipation and transcendent-liberation, while offering incomplete and at times elusive visions of liberation, present a dialectic between love and justice that provides the substantial platform from which to begin to address and affirm dignity. Through this dialectic one courageously embraces the hope that the authentic questions of humanity can be illuminated. This paper embodies that hope.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to all of those who have extended their personal and professional support to me during the course of my doctoral program studies. I am especially grateful for the numerous friends, family members, and fellow graduate students who have held me in their hearts while at the same time have provided me with the intellectual encouragement which has sustained me during this journey.

I am particularly indebted to my doctoral committee members whose guidance, criticism, and vision have enabled me to embrace the discipline and responsibility necessary to seriously engage in this form of inquiry. I wish to thank Sarah Robinson, who while honestly sharing her intense quest to unveil the mystification of the handicapped population has also unfolded the deeper meaning of the student and teacher relationship. To Svi Shapiro I extend the most sincere appreciation for his enabling me to touch upon the significance of the social context. His courses and questions have allowed me to focus and take a direction which has made this paper possible. In addition, his serious and heartfelt reflection upon my work has provided me with energizing inspiration. I am especially indebted to Fritz Mengert, whose philosophical questioning has given me the framework and grounding for this study. He has openly shared his own intellectual path and in so doing has invited honest

conversation and valued participation. Further, his genuine concern and friendship have nourished me emotionally and intellectually during the course of this program.

During the entirety of this process, I cannot begin to adequately express the depth of my appreciation and gratitude for the compassionate care and guidance extended to me by David Purpel. His ability to see and hold the whole vision, while I faltered and lost perspective, has been a tremendous source of comfort. At the same time, his confidence and support has required a serious commitment and acceptance of responsibility on my part. He has lived and shared with me the humanizing and empowering process of teacher as prophet and through this unfolding has been the "chance giver" whose spiritual and intellectual vision has touched me and has inspired my own vision which has, in turn, made this dissertation possible.

Finally, my journey through this process would not have been possible without the assistance and encouragement of my family. I wish to express sincere appreciation for my mother, Una Frazier, who has spent hours typing and copying course papers, and who has been willingly available to care for her three grandchildren while I studied or attended class. I am very grateful to my husband, Peter, who had encouraged me, for years, to begin this process. Without his initial faith and support, this journey may well have

never been started. I want to recognize with gratitude the place that my three young children, Breck, Leigh, and Erica, have held in this process. Their energy and the joy of their presence have grounded and made authentic this quest; for them and for those reasons I am eternally grateful.

Lastly, a special note of thanks is extended to Mrs. Ibby Hunt, who has graciously accepted to type this paper. She has provided me with the clerical reassurance that has enabled me to meet the detail and time requirements that have given closure to this process.

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PREFACE

In my quest to illuminate the connections which shape and enrich an understanding of human being, I have turned toward a discussion of educational paradigms. These models form the typological structure which serves as the organizational mechanism for this paper and which more significantly facilitates the exploration of issues regarding human dignity. The concerns for human dignity have emerged as I have reflected upon my personal and professional experience situated within the context of special education. These reflections have been further focused and clarified as they have been filtered through the lenses of these differing educational visions.

This three-fold typological structure includes the technical rationale embodying the positivistic notions of control, prediction, and standardization which are captured by the work of Ralph Tyler and which represents the existing and taken-for-granted model of educational theory and practice. The demystifying and empowering momentum of critical theory is encompassed within the transformative-emancipatory model which is nourished by the work of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Henry Giroux. The transcendent-liberatory vision reflects the religious-prophetic impulses of criticism and

energizing as well as openness and surrender in fostering relationships of inclusion and visions of liberation. Martin Buber and Abraham Heschel have provided the metaphors and insights that have supported this paradigm.

This typology provides the structure from which to address the current state of educational theory and practice as well as to pull into the area of debate alternative discourses. As concerns for human dignity are filtered through this three-fold typology, the concealing and revealing nature of each perspective is illuminated. In examining that which is attended to, avoided, silenced, and dismissed by each paradigm, one is aided in considering what ought to be included in a vision of just and loving educational practice.

The purpose of the typological structure, in keeping with the intention of this paper, is to offer a framework within which to more concretely understand the existing educational practice--what it is and is not--in order to more securely embrace alternative discourses which may more fully reflect and encompass the authentic and genuine concerns of humanity that ought to shape our educational visions. The discussion of human dignity placed within the context of special education when filtered through these paradigms serves to touch upon the tensions that constitute the paradoxes which direct one to such discourses and questions.

The typology is intended to function as a heuristic tool that stimulates the dialogue that attends to the complexity of human dignity and education.

CHAPTER I

THE TECHNICAL RATIONALE AND CRITIQUE

Within the typological structure that I have constructed in order to further enhance the understanding of my experiences and those of others, I have considered the technical rationale as being the model that is reflective of a positivistic orientation that has aimed educational practice toward goals of control, prediction, and conformity. My professional special educational experience confirms that the values implicit in most current educational practices are those that reflect the aims of the technical rationale. I consider the work of Ralph Tyler, in the areas of curriculum planning and development, as being influential in transmitting the message of the technical rationale and in constructing the curricular framework within which to implement the goals of positivism. Thus, the values of the technical rationale will be discussed as they are reflected in the constructs of Ralph Tyler's work.

The values and constructs of the technical rationale and positivism will further be analyzed and critiqued by the insights offered by Paulo Freire and Henry Giroux. Freire and Giroux provide an understanding of educational practice that is informed by critical theory and thus provides an

alternative discourse for contemplating the theory, practice, and purpose of education.

This chapter will conclude with a discussion of the significance of alternative discourses and the ramifications these discourses hold for educational theory and practice. The phenomenological orientation of the transformative-emancipatory model will be approached from a discussion of Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic of suspicion. The discourse offered by the transcendent-liberatory vision will be regarded as an open hermeneutic, one that more closely resembles the nature of Gadamer's hermeneutic circle. These alternative discourses will be presented in an effort not only to critique positivism but in an attempt to enhance the construction of alternative educational visions.

Section I:
Ralph Tyler and the Technical Rationale

Ralph W. Tyler's model for instructional planning and curriculum development captures the spirit of the technical rationale which embodies the principles of industrial and learning psychology. The technical rationale is translated into educational practice through the production and implementation of Tyler's key construct, the educational objective. Essential to the construction of the educational objective is the requirement that a thorough analysis of needs be conducted.

For Tyler, a needs assessment is the foundation for all curriculum and instruction planning. He makes this clear in his article, "Specific Approaches to Curriculum Development," when he writes, "The main point I wish to make is that curriculum development projects must begin with an analysis of the needs or problems that have stimulated the decision to develop a new or revised curriculum" (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 243).

Further, he proposes that a needs analysis be more far-reaching than an assessment of a failed program outline. He writes,

> Related to the analysis of the relevant problems, the approach should examine the contemporary educational environments, including the home, the peer group, the larger community, and the school, in order to identify dynamic factors that influence the problem and the constraints that must be considered in designing an effective curriculum. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 243)

This type of examination enables the curriculum planner and creator of objectives to analyze the conditions that can be potentially arranged in order to more reliably predict and control a desired outcome.

With regard to what is considered to be a problem or how a need is discerned, Tyler turns to his 1949 syllabus outline, "Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction":

> The syllabus . . . comments on the use of the school's educational philosophy as a screen or set of criteria for selecting objectives, particularly for distinguishing the more important from the less important ones.

> The syllabus also points out the way in which knowledge of the psychology of learning can be used to estimate the probability of attaining a given objective under the conditions found in a particular school. It is obvious that the effort to develop learning experiences for an objective that has small likelihood of being attained will be wasted. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 248)

Thus, the school's educational philosophy prioritizes the objectives and defines the needy conditions that warrant the formulation of the objectives in the first place. Further, if the research or analysis has been thorough enough, all of the antecedent and consequent conditions will have been identified so as to maximize the chance that a particular objective will be attained under the direction and guidance of the principles of operant conditioning as discussed in applied learning psychology. Tyler neatly and appealingly reduces the dilemmas of curriculum planning to the efficient identification of needs out of which objectives are identified and sequenced in order to effectively eliminate curricular and instructional problems.

Reliable, valid, and measurable evaluation forms the mechanism for legitimization of the Tyler Rationale. Logical positivism, behavioral psychology, and the field of testing and measurement provide the sources for the Tylerian evaluation principles and structures. That which constitutes the nature of learning is fundamental for understanding the purpose and design of evaluation.

Tyler borrows from behavioral psychology his understanding of learning. Therefore he considers learning to be

observable changes in behavior which occur over a period of time. These behavioral changes are encapsulated within the construction of behavioral objectives. Consequently, the focus of evaluation is directed at measuring these changes and determining the extent to which the educational objectives have been attained.

In order for evaluation to proceed, not only must the educational objectives be stated, but the required individual behaviors and the sequenced subject content of the objective must be identified. Tyler writes, "Every kind of human behavior that is appraised for its part as an educational objective must be summarized or measured in some terms" (Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981, p. 246).

Learning becomes a reference to observable and desired changes in behavior. Educational intervention takes the form of the construction of objectives designed to maneuver an individual through a series of required and predetermined behavioral changes. All of this activity takes place at an observable level. All that we know, learn, understand, think and reflect, can and, according to Tyler, should be seen. He writes:

> The only way that we can tell whether students have acquired given types of behavior is to give them an opportunity to show this behavior. This means that we must find situations that not only permit the expression of the behavior but actually encourage or evoke this behavior. We are then in a position to observe the degree to which the objectives are actually being realized. (Giroux et al., 1981, p. 243)

The preceding discussion of the key structures of the Tylerian model, primarily needs analysis, educational objectives, and evaluation, form the boundaries within which instructional intervention can develop. The inclusion and consideration of the teacher and student are minimal within the Tylerian model but seem to be most present in his consideration of the selection and creation of the appropriate learning experiences and the organization of the learning experiences to achieve a maximum cumulative effect.

Tyler considers the selection and creation of learning experiences to be a most "artistic enterprise," one that is directed by the stated objectives and which also provides the condition within which the educational objective is attained. In order for an experience to be successful in facilitating the acquisition of the objective, it must, according to Tyler, provide an opportunity for practice, be designed in such a way that the student is capable of enacting the specific behavior, and provide reinforcement.

In order for an experience to fulfill these requirements, Tyler feels that it is necessary, at this point, to consult the participant. He writes, "In creating learning experiences, it is important to use the perspective of the different kinds of students for whom they are designed" (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 249). He continues:

> It is necessary to keep firmly in mind that human learners rarely, if ever, want to be "shaped" by others. Each one has purposes and interests of his own and utilizes much energy and effort to further his purposes and satisfy his interests. If a school activity is perceived as interesting and/or useful for his purposes, he enters into it energetically whereas if it seems irrelevant or boring or painful, he avoids it, or limits his involvement as much as he can. I have found that observing and interviewing students when they are actively engaged in learning things they think important help me to develop initial outlines for experiences that will help these students learn things the school seeks to teach. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, pp. 249-250)

Ultimately, Tyler's purpose, in gaining insight into the interests and perspectives of the student, is to know better how to implement the school's (the authorities') predetermined plan and to more reliably control the students' responses to the learning experience. It is a process designed as an extension of evaluation and needs analysis. Inquiry into a student's perspective provides a mechanism through which one more variable is reduced, thus insuring greater predictability and control.

When considering the organization of learning experiences, issues of control, predictability and reliability are central. Tyler again turns to the importance of addressing teachers and students in this connective process when he writes, "The principles can generally be selected on the ground that they furnish a sequence or an integration that is meaningful and effective with the students and teachers who are expected to use them" (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 251). However, he focuses his appeal upon the curriculum planners for development of the organizing elements. He writes:

> The curriculum makers identify major concepts that are useful in explaining and controlling phenomena and that are sufficiently complex and pervasive to enable the student to gain increasing depth of understanding and increasing breadth of application of them as he progresses from week to week and year to year in the curriculum. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 251)

Tyler recognizes that perception of meaningful connectives is an individual process and that this process can be more predictably controlled if blueprints or guides are set forth and legitimated by an external authority, in this case the curriculum planner. By centrally positioning curriculum makers as the organizers of fundamental conceptual elements which structure the principles upon which meaningful connectives are made, Tyler places the power for determining what is meaningful and how meaning is constructed in the hands of planners rather than in possession of the actual teachers and students.

In order for the educational objective to be attained, conformity to the path designed during the organization of the learning experience by the planners is crucial. Consequently, for Tyler, the curriculum makers' organizational patterns become the standards by which connectives are judged. In this way, the sequence of how something is learned and the value of the connectives can be controlled. Individuals can be directed toward more efficient and conforming learning choices. The determination of an over-arching sequence provides the teachers and students with a frame of reference and guarantees greater reliability, accountability, and predictability.

When educational intervention and participation are viewed through Tyler's guidelines provided for the selection, creation, and organization of learning experiences, the teaching-learning activities are clearly delineated. The function of the teacher in selecting and organizing learning experiences becomes one of analyzing the student's interests, understanding the curriculum maker's sequential connectives, and implementing efficiently the learning experiences. The teacher assumes the role of a highly skilled technician who organizes and implements vast quantities of predetermined information. The student's role is one of compliance in which he or she moves, more or less passively, through predetermined experiences in a designated manner. Mastery of the educational objective inherent in a particular learning experience is determined by the extent to which the student copies the outlined sequence and fulfills the imaged blueprint.

Tyler offers us a compact and simple guide for action in educational curriculum and instruction that matches and complements the technical rationale which supports this educational orientation. It is a model that has had and continues to have far-reaching impact upon current educational thought and practice. As Kleibard astutely comments:

> In one sense, the Tyler rationale is imperishable. In some form it will always stand as a model of curriculum development for those who conceive of curriculum as a complex machine for transforming the crude raw material

> that children bring with them to school into a finished and useful product. By definition, the production model of curriculum and instruction begins with a blueprint for how the student will turn out once we get through with him. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 266)

Further, in the insights provided by Macdonald and Purpel, "The Tyler rationale is essential to understanding today's curriculum planning process since it remains the fundamental and functional paradigm for the profession" (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 179).

The production model of curriculum and instruction, as envisioned by the technical rationale and articulated by Tyler, is one in which prediction and control are essential for the standardization of desired outcomes. The analysis of needs and the continuous assessment in the form of evaluation form the boundaries within which educational objectives emerge and within which the teaching-learning activities originate. These Tylerian structures support and perpetuate a view of educational practice that values control in the form of prediction in order to more accountably and efficiently transform the diversity of children's experiences into finished and standardized products.

The appeal of such a concrete, practical model for curriculum development and instructional planning is difficult to deny. In a society which values accountability and efficiency, it is not surprising to find such willing and unexamined acceptance of the Tylerian structures. The simplicity

of and the seeming effectiveness of needs analysis, educational objectives, and evaluation make us oblivious to the possibility of the existence of other models, paradigms, or visions of what the educational endeavor might be.

However, it is in the expression of and exploration of alternative conceptions of education that the inequities and limitations of production model begin to surface. In constructing visions of the educative process that do not conceive of children as being in possession of crude raw material which is in need of being transformed into a useful finished product, serious flaws in the positivistically informed Tylerian rationale emerge. In the formulation of other visions of educational practice and theory, the taken-for-granted assumptions of the Tyler Technical Rationale begin to appear. Questions regarding the purpose of the control and the interest being served by the predictions of the Tyler rationale begin to be asked.

Section II:
The Critique: Henry Giroux and Paulo Freire

Those who adhere to different visions of the purposes of education offer insights which enable one to penetrate the surface efficiency of the production ethic of the technical rationale. Henry Giroux and Paulo Freire discuss visions of educational theory and practice that concern themselves with humanization, conscientization, and empowerment rather than production. Consequently, they hold a radically different

understanding of the purposes of education and the functions of the school. I have found their writing to be especially informative to my grounding of and formulation of insights that have been vital to my construction of the questions which deal with value, power, and interest.

As the technical rationale and the Tylerian model are filtered through the perspectives of Giroux and Freire, the taken-for-granted assumptions can be criticized and examined. Tyler's use of the philosophical screen and his corresponding reliance upon objectivity, neutrality, predictability, and control serve as focal points for the beginning of such investigation and analysis. I will refer to Giroux's use of the constructs of ideology, resistance, and the hidden curriculum as they function to expose the political interest of the Tylerian model's philosophical screen. I will then turn to Freire's discussion of the "Banking Notion" of education as it provides a metaphor for further revealing the one-dimensional, manipulative, and alienating nature of educational intervention within the framework of the Tylerian and technical rationales.

As discussed earlier, Tyler depends upon the school's philosophical screen to guide the selection and identification of needs or problems out of which the educational objectives are formed. This screen organizes and prioritizes school needs and establishes the pattern for school action

which usually takes the form of educational objective development and evaluation. That which Tyler has taken for granted, failed to address, and has left to chance is the philosophical screen. That which Tyler avoids, overlooks, or approves is the power that this philosophical screen wields in contributing to and maintaining the status quo. Thus Tyler circumvents the issue of whose interest is being served as the philosophical screen is left to chance and remains unexamined.

Consequently, this oversight, regarding the non-neutral interest of the philosophical screen, enables Tyler to make the following bold statement regarding the nature of curriculum development:

> Curriculum development is a practical enterprise, not a theoretical study. It endeavors to design a system to achieve an educational end and is not primarily attempting to explain an existential phenomenon. The system must be designed to operate effectively in a society where a number of constraints are present, and with human beings who have purposes, preferences, and dynamic mechanisms in operation. Hence, an essential early step in curriculum development is to examine and analyze significant conditions that influence the construction and operation of the curriculum. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 240)

Failing to address the complexity of the philosophical screen, world view, or lens through which our realities are constructed and experience is made meaningful, Tyler is able to conveniently reduce the serious questions of interest and power in curriculum development and instructional planning to neutral, simplistic, pragmatic issues of economic and

efficient doing. It is a practice which denigrates theory and a doing which has no clearly grounded direction beyond the immediate mastery of task steps as outlined by sequenced educational objectives.

> What we have is a planning process that denies by omission and intention the essentially spiritual quality of human existence and the essential "sovereignty of the good" where development of environments for living and learning are concerned. (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 184)

Further, Giroux discusses the superficiality and blindness of such an inadequately informed theory when he writes,

> Dancing on the surface of reality, traditional educational theory ignores not only the latent principles that shape the deep grammar of the existing social order, but also those principles underlying the genesis and nature of its own logic. (Giroux, 1983, p. 75)

It is with the intent of exposing and addressing that which Tyler and traditional education have taken for granted that Giroux puts forth his analytical constructs of ideology, hidden curriculum, and resistance. In so doing, the groundwork of neutrality, objectivity, efficiency, and conformity, which forms the core of the Tylerian model, begins to crumble and reveals itself as being composed of the value-laden concepts and subtle muting mechanisms.

Giroux views traditional educational theory and practice and the positivism which informs it as being mechanisms which perpetuate and maintain the status quo. He regards positivism as being the enemy of true reasoning because it fosters a separation of fact from value allowing essence and appearance

to blend into one dimension and it undermines criticism by appealing to objectivity. In the guise of neutrality, positivism supports a rationality that values efficiency, economy, correctness, and conformity. Thus, when the analytic constructs of hidden curriculum, ideology, and resistance are placed over the Tylerian model, Giroux offers us a deeper examination of traditional theory and practice.

With regard to issues of the hidden curriculum, traditional education

> accepts uncritically the existing relationship between schools and the larger society . . . transmission and reproduction of dominant values and beliefs via the hidden curriculum is both acknowledged and accepted as a positive function of the schooling process. (Giroux, 1983, p. 58)

The traditional rationality legitimizes the taken-for-granted aspects of schooling and views the entire process as a preparation for life. Using the hidden curriculum as a critical mode of inquiry, what emerge from this critique are questions that cannot be formulated concerning issues of interest. That the hidden curriculum functions, in terms of its ideological and political significance, to sustain a class society is not mentioned. In placing hidden curriculum critique over traditional educational theory and practice, knowledge and culture stand waiting to be recognized as the political entities they are. The need to reclaim the normative and historical dimenions of culture and knowledge is revealed through hidden curriculum critique of traditional education.

The construct of ideological critique, when applied to traditional educational theory and practice, points to the same historical and normative needs as indicated by the hidden curriculum critique. Giroux writes of ideological critique:

> Ideology is a crucial construct for understanding how meaning is produced, transformed, and consumed by individuals and social groups. As a tool of critical analysis, it digs beneath the phenomenal form of classroom knowledge and social practices and helps to locate the structuring principles and ideas that mediate between dominant society and the everyday experiences of teachers and students. As a political construct, it makes meanings problematic and questions why human beings have unequal access to the intellectual and material resources that constitute the conditions for the production, consumption and distribution of meaning. . . . Hence ideology "speaks" to the notion of power by accentuating the complex ways in which relations of meanings are produced and fought over. (Giroux, 1983, p. 161)

Ideological critique examines the transmission of the taken-for-granted values, social relationships, knowledge, and messages that are present in our classrooms. Giroux refers to the process of unmasking relationships historically and personally when he discusses ideological critique grounded in the unconscious. Revealing the messages located in our taken-for-granted categories is referred to when he writes of ideological critique grounded in common sense. Ideological critique grounded in critical consciousness concerns itself with illuminating the normative basis of knowledge.

When ideological critique is placed over traditional education, the value-neutrality of knowledge and the ethical ramifications of that neutrality begin to surface. Issues

of subordination and dominance begin to emerge where once superficial values of integration and harmony stood. The coopting power of pluralism is revealed as a mechanism of social control and maintenance of the status quo. Ideological critique powerfully exposes the inequity of traditional education's removal of power from knowledge and separation of the political from the cultural. Ideological critique of traditional education points to the real bias and non-existent neutrality of claims of neutrality and objectivity as they serve to maintain the status quo.

In considering resistance as an analytical construct to be used in an examination of traditional education, several factors need to be highlighted. First, Giroux wishes to make clear "not all oppositional behavior has 'radical significance,' nor is all oppositional behavior rooted in a reaction to authority and domination" (Giroux, 1983, p. 103). Secondly, he points out that all behaviors do not automatically "speak for themselves; to call them resistance is to turn the concept into a term that has no analytical preciseness" (Giroux, 1983, p. 109). However, resistance, as an analytical tool, is re-framed and placed into political context. Consequently, oppositional behaviors and school failure are removed from functional explanations and educational psychology understandings to the political arena. Rather than being viewed as being the result of deviance,

individual pathology, and learned helplessness, oppositional behavior is viewed as having to do with moral and political indignation. Resistance, when viewed from this perspective, contains "an expressed hope, an element of transcendence, for radical transformation" (Giroux, 1983, p. 108). When resistance critique is used to examine traditional education, the actual voices of those who have not fit into the production, transmission models of traditional education begin to be heard. Once again the objective, neutral position of traditional education begins to be revealed for what it truly is, a mechanism of homeostasis that is not at all neutral but serves to maintain the status quo. Resistance critique of traditional education serves to expose the political dimension of culture and the power component of knowledge. Resistance critique seems to be the most personal and powerful component of critical theory for it calls into focus the actual lived experiences of those who have been denied access or who have felt anguished by the production, transmission pulse of traditional education. It is through these voices that we may begin to glimpse an insight into the truly alienating conditions of our human existence as manifest through the structures of Tylerian intent and traditional education.

When traditional education is viewed through the lens of critical theory by Giroux, the mystifications of objectivity and neutrality are exposed as mechanisms of social

control. Needs analysis, educational objectives, and evaluation are revealed as structures that are filtered through an "interested" philosophical screen. The invisibility of this screen further addresses the function that these myths of objectivity and neutrality have performed in silencing criticism and in maintaining the status quo. Thus, in critically examining Tyler's philosophical screen, the blemishes of the technical rationale begin to appear. This objective, production model for action begins to reveal itself as being a model that perpetuates injustice, through its appeal to neutrality in maintianing class, gender, racial, religious, and intellectual discrimination and exclusion. Through hidden curriculum, ideological and resistance critique, Giroux enables one to re-connect knowledge and culture with power and the political. Giroux offers us the language of critical theory with which to begin to articulate the questions of interest that Tyler silences.

Giroux's examination of the positivism that supports the technical rationale and the Tylerian model for curriculum and instruction, addresses the political connection between educational theory and practice. Paulo Freire, while also concerned with the implications of positivism for educational theory and practice, focuses attention upon the personally alienating and manipulative aspects of relationships that are defined by Tyler's technical rationale. Freire's

examination of traditional education focuses upon the production model of curriculum and instruction which he metaphorically addresses as the "Banking Concept" of education. His criticism of traditional education unfolds as he positions the alienating structure of a "depository" view of education beside an empowering vision of educational liberation.

The banking notion of education is one in which the students and teachers are alienated from authentic participation in the construction of meaningful knowledge. It is what Freire describes as a narrative process:

> [The teacher as narrator] leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated content. Worse, yet, it turns them into 'containers,' into 'receptacles' to be 'filled' by the teacher. The more completely he fills the receptacles, the better a teacher he is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are. (Freire, 1983, p. 58)

This view of education is that of a narrative monologue in which any two-way dialogue is muted, turning teachers and students into passive objects. It is an inhibiting, anesthetizing, alienating structure that leaves one incapable of engaging in Freire's "humanization" process, the process of praxis which fosters on emancipatory vision.

The one-dimensional, narrative nature of traditional, Tylerian educational practice is supported by its manipulative and alienating form of educational intervention. In Tyler's selection and organization of learning experiences, which constitutes the primary area in which one can participate

and engage in relatoinship, teachers and students are reduced to being cogs in a wheel, performing their predetermined roles as they support the larger educational mechanism.

Under the requirements designed by Tyler for selecting and organizing learning experiences, students and teachers are studied and observed in order to gain insights into their interests and the ways in which they organize meaningful connections. The purpose of such research is to more finely develop learning experiences that will insure conformity to and attainment of the educational objectives as they are established by the distanced planners. Consequently, the ways in which meaningful connectives can be put together are established by the curriculum planners who seem to have special access to the "ultimate" organizational principles of making meaning and who then develop a bluepirnt for teachers and students to imitate. This model represents for Freire a structure of ultimate violence. "Any situation in which some men prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence . . . to alienate men from their own decision making is to change them into objects" (Freire, 1983, p. 73).

Tylerian educational intervention takes the form of distancing and manipulation in which teachers and students act out their small roles as they mimic the behaviors that are designed by others for them to transmit. Both students and teachers are removed from any authentic participation in this

educational or learning endeavor. Learning is neither a construction of meaning nor an ownership of personal connections; it is a demonstration and evaluation of properly sequenced behaviors.

Through the lens of Paulo Freire, the Tylerian educational intervention in the form of implementing and designing educational objectives begins to appear as being a process of violent oppression in which the individual is alienated, muted, and unable to genuinely state or direct his or her own participation in and or inquiry into the construction of meaning. Freire's powerful criticism of Tyler and traditional educational practice illuminates the structures that distort relationship and prevent the personal connection to knowledge and meaning.

Giroux provides us with a criticism of the invisible theoretical constructs that inform positivism and the Tyler rationale. He articulately examines the interest served by the Tylerian rationale, namely the maintenance of an unjust cultural hierarchy. Freire, too, addresses the political aspect of pedagogy but focuses his attention upon the personally alienating nature of Tylerian educational practice. In delving into the student-teacher relationship in the "banking notion" of education, Freire locates the source of ultimate oppression in the function served by the dominant ideology in preventing the individual from making his or her own

decisions. Freire speaks to the subtle personal violence perpetuated by the structure of traditional, Tylerian educational practices.

Although Tyler has attempted to collapse the field of curriculum and instruction into a practical enterprise aimed at economic efficiency, Freire and Giroux have exposed the flaws and mystifications of this economy and efficiency. They have revealed an absence of questions that examine the what or the why of Tyler's pragmatic, progressive "how to do." Their criticisms have highlighted Tyler's failure to address the value of the boundaries established by the philosophical screen and the educational objectives. Through the perspectives offered by the criticisms of Giroux and Freire, the one-dimensional, alienating and manipulative nature of the technical rationale can be examined. As a result of such an examination, one begins to realize the limitations of understandings formulated while holding to the vision offered by the technical rationale.

The positivistic nature of the technical rationale and the Tylerian structures allow us to know that which is on the surface. Research conducted from this perspective is limited to that which can be observed, measured, and statistically recorded. Meaning can only be discussed within the boundaries of that which is considered to be significant from a statistical and quantitative orientation.

Section III:
Alternative Discourses: Phenomenology and Hermeneutics

In recognizing that the lens through which one views the world serves to direct awareness, focus attention, and form the boundaries for what can be known, I realize the serious necessity for examining the nature of the lens. I also understand the responsibility we hold for reconstructing this lens when it prevents us from viewing or dealing with the concerns that we consider to be vital.

My concerns are directed toward a deeper understanding of who we are and what we are about. These understandings may be more fully reached in recognizing the meaning of human interaction propelled by a regard for love and justice. It is action grounded in love and justice that I feel affirms and illuminates human dignity. My research is focused upon the quest to more deeply understand human dignity and to comprehend the actions of love and justice which I feel reveal this dignity. I am concerned with ways of interpreting meaning and formulating understanding that reach beyond a surface observation of human behavior.

The framework of the technical rationale and the boundaries established by a positivistic notion of research do not allow for an authentic exploration of human relationships in which love and justice are expressed. Statistical equations and numerical significances are nonsensical in light of investigation into the realm of human dignity. Educational

practices aimed at efficient, economic production within a framework of prediction and control are offensive when considered from a perspective of love and justice.

The monologic nature of the technical rationale prevents the recognition of the validity and/or the inclusion of non-statistical understandings that are grasped through the dialogic relationships inherent in the phenomenological and the hermeneutic quests of the transformative-emancipatory and the transcendent-liberatory visions. Since my concerns are directed toward the illumination of the acts that may reveal our human dignity, I realize the necessity to explore these other modes of discourse in an effort to more fully penetrate and develop my understanding of the practices and implications of various orientations and perspectives.

In so doing, I have constructed a typological structure which is representative of three visions of educational practice as well as of three distinct positions toward exploration and research. The first, the technical rationale, has been discussed as being reflective of much current educational practice. In an examination of the constructs of this view, as presented by Ralph Tyler, one recognizes the positivistic, production orientation of such educational practice. Research conducted from this perspective is focused upon that which is observable, measurable, and quantifiable. Consequently, concerns that fall beyond such surface behaviors

go unrecognized, are dismissed as being irrelevant, or are avoided because they cannot be statistically reduced.

The writings of John Dewey, Henry Giroux, and Paulo Freire have enabled me to construct a second model, the transformative-emancipatory view. Embodied within this vision is an educational practice which embraces the concept of emancipation through an empowering action aimed at the reduction of injustice. Critical consciousness and demystification are central to this empowerment process. Contained within this educational vision is an orientation toward investigation and exploration that adheres to the confirmation of phenomenologically revealed insights.

Abraham Heschel and Martin Buber have been fundamental to the development of a third model, the transcendent-liberatory vision. Their metaphors have contributed to the construction of an educational vision that is concerned with enhancing genuine relationship within a context of love. Surrender and openness are central to the actions of this vision. The insights obtained regarding the connections that we make to one another and the world are known through an examination of the links we make between our understandings and our interpretations. Thus, the hermeneutic search for deeper connections is implicit within this vision.

The transformative-emancipatory view and the transcendent-liberatory vision grapple with the dynamics of relationship and with questions of subjectivity and subjects. Consequently,

a major thread that links these two visions and thus differentiates them from the Tyler perspective is the centrality of hermeneutic and phenomenological investigation. In order to elaborate upon this orientation, I will rely upon the work of Edward Dickenson.

Edward Dickenson's work, Hermeneutic Experience and Intersubjectivity in the Schools: On the Way Toward Meaning, has provided me with a framework for classifying my understandings of the basic structures of and distinctions between phenomenology and hermeneutics. Not only does his work provide a convenient and logical organization, but his insights resonate with my intuitive sense of the importance of addressing the phenomenological and hermeneutical perspectives.

In interpreting and summarizing the viewpoints of Gadamer and Habermas, Dickenson suggests that Habermas, Ricoeur, and the critical theorists represent a more epistemological position, one which Dickenson regards as being reflective of a phenomenological orientation. Conversely, Dickenson considers Gadamer's hermeneutic position as being one in which ontological concerns are reflected. Consequently, the phenomenological and hermeneutical perspectives, while sharing some grounds of common agreement, reveal differing approaches to and reasons for interpreting experience and arriving at understanding.

For the purpose of structuring a brief discussion of the different movements and insights reflected by the

phenomenological and hermeneutical perspectives contained within a dialogical relationship, I find the phenomenological concepts of "distancing" and "bracketing" and the more hermeneutic orientation of "openness" and "subjectivity" to be most meaningful. The phenomenological constructs which offer the greatest insight into relationship and dialogue are contained within the framework of Ricoeur's hermeneutic of suspicion. The hermeneutic concepts which provide the deepest illumination of subjectivity and relationship are found within Gadamer's hermeneutic circle. Consequently, I will refer to Ricoeur's hermeneutic of suspicion to enhance points of phenomenological distinction and to Gadamer's hermeneutic circle to enrich concepts of hermeneutic understanding.

Central to the concept of hermeneutics is the recognition of the dialectic movement between the researcher and the researched, between the interpreter and the interpreted, and between the text and the reader. It is a conceptualization of understanding which recognizes and addresses the complexity of and elusive nature of meaning. This complexity is discussed by Terry Eagleton as being a "sliding [of] the signified beneath the signifier--a constant fading and evaporation of meaning which never yields up its secrets to interpretation" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 168).

The hermeneutic task is one aimed at interpreting meaning. According to Harvey Cox:

> Hermeneutics comes from the name of the Greek God Hermes (Mercury, in the West), whose main job was to carry messages among the gods and from the gods to men. Hermeneutics is the study of messages, or more exactly, the study of how one interprets the meaning of texts. (Cox, 1973, p. 46)

This interpretive process assumes a dialectical relationship between and among the various texts being interpreted, including the text of the self initiating or participating in the interpretation. Thus, it is only within the context of the meeting of texts that interpretation, the understanding of meaning, can occur.

Further, according to Gadamer, "The effort of understanding is found wherever there is no immediate understanding, i.e., whenever the possibility of misunderstanding has to be reckoned with" (Dickenson, 1981, p. 38). Consequently, the recognition that one does not understand, and the ensuing quest to understand, are set into motion when imbalance, uncertainty, or discomfort is felt. The quest to seek understanding begins when one senses that something is incomplete and unfulfilled. However, as Eagleton points out, "there is no transcendental meaning or object which will ground this endless yearning" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 168). Thus, the hermeneutic search for meaning is an endless, dynamic journey which is never put to rest by positivistic proof or certainty.

The potential for understanding exists in the dynamic and dialogical meeting of texts. The hermeneutic task is one which is directed at interpreting and understanding the

significance and meaning of this encounter. This understanding emerges during and is shaped by the language which marks the meeting of texts. Dialogue, conversation delineates the points at which understanding may emerge.

Beyond the central position of dialogue to the concept of hermeneutic understanding is, for me, the recognition that we enter into this conversation in different ways and for varying reasons. When we engage in dialogic relationship with suspicion and distance, we will emerge from that encounter differently from one in which we entered with an open surrender. Consequently, in addition to understanding and interpreting the message of the meeting of texts, it is essential to reflect upon and interpret the meaning of why we are engaging in the conversation to begin with.

This reflection, for me, is the self-reflective turn to which Dickenson refers and which is considered by him as being the connecting link between the phenomenological, epistemological orientation of Ricoeur, Habermas, and the critical theorists and the ontological concerns of Gadamer's hermeneutic.

> The self-reflective mode for formulating questions regarding tradition has been the method of inquiry assumed by both critical social theory and philosophical hermeneutics. This methodological similarity reflects only the basic epistemological agreement that has been shared by adherents to these different theoretical traditions. In general, the disagreements concerning the value and purpose of self-reflection mark the boundaries between the epistemological critique of ideology (of critical

> social theory) and the ontological interest in a better understanding of the conditions for understanding itself (of philosophical hermeneutics). (Dickenson, 1981, pp. 50-51)

Thus, the purpose and value of the self-reflective turn form the distinctions between what Ricoeur calls a "hermeneutic of suspicion" and the hermeneutic circle of Gadamer.

The primary focus of the epistemological task set forth by Habermas, Ricoeur, and the critical theorists is one which is based upon a theory of distorted communications aimed at encouraging a hermeneutic of suspicion. Fundamental to the quest of a hermeneutic of suspicion is a phenomenological method which is utilized to disclose a false consciousness inherent in symbolic structures of expression.

> Ricoeur's approach to a hermeneutic phenomenology appears to assume that it is possible and necessary to achieve a degree of objectivity from which the phenomenal world held in one's consciousness can be analyzed and judged for its symbolic nature. (Dickenson, 1981, p. 47)

Ricoeur's hermeneutic journey is one in which the dialectic movement is a dynamic interchange between belief and understanding. The dialectical fulfillment of such belief is found in a greater conscious knowing. Further, the language which mediates the dialectic is viewed with suspicion and is regarded as representing distorted communications. Consequently, it is through a bracketed examination of such beliefs, which are expressed by distorted communications, that one begins to unravel the authentic threads of

ideological critique that reveal domination and the possibility of reconstruction and eventual emancipation.

The self-reflective questions which are brought to the conversation, as texts meet, in Ricoeur's hermeneutic of suspicion are those designed to further enhance our conscious knowing about the relationships of domination that comprise our experiences. They are the questions aimed at formulating an ideological critique. These questions emerge during the self-reflective turn of the hermeneutic of suspicion as one extricates one's self from the context in an effort to analyze the symbolic nature of our communications. This is the distancing and bracketing movement of the self-reflective turn which attempts to make the familiar strange and the strange familiar in an effort to revel a false consciousness which permeates the symbolic structures of our expression.

These questions are designed to move one through experiences by enabling one to appropriate and take from that experience those understandings that have refined our conscious knowing about the relationships of control and dominaton. This conscious knowing can then be utilized to reconstruct the experience and enable one to re-insert him/her self into a less oppressive and oppressing context.

For Ricoeur, the purpose of the self-reflective turn in formulating the questions which generate the dialogue

within a hermeneutic of suspicion, is one aimed at disclosing a false consciousness. The value of such questions rests in the degree to which distorted communications are exposed as hiding the controlling and dominating nature of many of our relationships. The dialectic relationship of a hermeneutic of suspicion is shaped by the conceptually grasping and appropriating nature of these questions. The emergent understandings are bound by the interests of domination and control reflected in the questions. The purpose of the dialectic relationship is directed at discussing oppressive authority, exposing a false consciousness and encouraging infinite suspicion in the hope that reconstruction and emancipation will be envisioned. The purpose determines the limits of the relationship as well as the boundaries for the emergent understandings.

The hermeneutic journey of Gadamer is one in which the dialectic movement is between experience and understanding and one in which the dialectic fulfillment of experience is a further openness to experience rather than a conscious knowing. Language is viewed as being non-suspect and is regarded as reflecting experience which then provides a deeper understanding of human beingness. "The hermeneutic tradition of Gadamer suggests that understanding is the particular outcome of relatedness" (Dickenson, 1981, p. 24). Further, for Gadamer, "understanding is the emergence of truth which is

conditioned by and conditions the relationship of intersubjectivity" (Dickenson, 1981, pp. 21-22). Thus, understanding is the outcome of the experience of intersubjectivity and these understandings are then conditioned by and condition those experiences of relationship.

With the dialectic fulfillment of experience being a further anticipation for and openness to experience, the hermeneutic task becomes one of finding ways to sustain that experience. As Palmer (1969) reflects,

> The encounter is not a conceptual grasping of something but an event in which the world opens itself up . . . as each interpreter stands in a new horizon, the event that comes to language in the hermeneutical experience is something new that emerges, something that did not exist before. (Dickenson, 1981, pp. 11-12)

Thus, the hermeneutic task becomes one not of analyzing the relationships of authority within an experience, but one of finding ways in which the experience of relationship can be sustained in order to understand how intersubjectivity reveals meaning (understanding which may or may not disclose oppressive relationships in need of reconstruction).

Dickenson suggests that

> The method of questioning in the dialectical experience, of finding the right questions through an openness to emerging dialogue, and the existential "preunderstanding" of our intersubjective condition are components of Gadamer's (hermeneutic) theory which are especially significant. (Dickenson, 1981, p. 47)

Thus, the self-reflective turn, in which one formulates the questions which propel the dialogue aimed at a continuation

of the relationship in which understandings emerge, is a turn in which one seeks to place him/her self into the context of his/her prejudices and preunderstandings rather than to bracket and shut out these conditions. In so doing, one can discover the preunderstandings that form and are then reformed by the experience of relationship. The questions which surface during the self-reflective turn of Gadamer's hermeneutic circle are those which originate from an affirmation of the context of our preunderstandings and ones which are further designed to invite an openness to new understandings. According to Dickenson:

> The method of Gadamer's (1975, 1976) hermeneutics can best be referred to as the "hermeneutical circle" which is an acknowledgement of the researcher's or interpreter's need to recognize the inevitability of approaching material with certain prejudices (preconceptions), or anticipations, originating in his/her own historicity, and yet retain a certain openness to the object of study (i.e., a recpetiveness to the "otherness" of the material, allowing it to speak for itself, creating a balance between prejudice and openness). (Dickenson, 1981, p. 56)

Such a delicate balance between prejudice and openness has led Palmer (1969) to regard Gadamer's dialectical hermeneutic as being a means to understanding that is "not manipulation and control but participation and openness, not knowledge but experience" (Dickenson, 1981, p. 74). The self-reflective turn of Gadamer's hermeneutic circle is designed to enable one to engage in dialogue articulating questions which reflect the sensitive balance between our preunderstanding and an openness to new understandings. These questions

are aimed at perpetuating experience, in which understandings emerge, as we participate in the dialogic relationship.

The purpose and value of the self-reflective turn mark the points of distinction between the phenomenological, epistemological orientation of Ricoeur, Habermas, and the critical theorists and the ontological interests of Gadamer. The self-reflective turn of Ricoeur and Habermas is one in which questions are formulated as one distances and removes him/her self from the context. This is done in an effort to analyze the symbolic nature of expression which further serves to construct a theory of distorted communications in which false consciousness can be examined. Understandings, which emerge from the relationship of the meeting of texts set within the framework of phenomenologically generated questions, are those which can contribute to the construction of an ideological critique within which relationships of domination and control are exposed. The purpose of such questioning is to enable us to solve the oppressing conditions which are hidden by a false consciousness.

Gadamer's self-reflective turn of constructing the questions with which to engage in the hermeneutic dialogue are formulated as one attempts to situate him/her self within the context of his/her prejudices and preunderstandings. This results in a confirmation of one's preunderstandings rather than a ridding of one's preconceptions and prejudgments.

The questioning process enables one to recognize rather than to solve. The purpose of such a self-reflective turn is to expose preunderstandings in an effort to generate questions which sustain the experience of relationship. The reciprocal nature of the giving and receiving quality of the dialogue within the experience of relationship guided by such questions is a non-manipulative, non-predictable exchange which may culminate in new and unintended understandings (Dickenson, 1981, p. 74). The emergent understandings are bound by one's ability to remain open to and inviting of the dialogue. The purpose of the relationship is to generate the conversation, within which the experience of relationship is cradled, in order to come to a deeper understanding of the conditions for understanding itself.

Thus, the process of the self-reflective turn of the hermeneutic of suspicion is an act of distancing in order to bracket and demystify oppressive and alienating conditions. The purpose of this process is to encourage and empower one to formulate the questions which contribute to an ongoing ideological critique. The value of this process is determined by the degree to which the phenomenological distancing of the self-reflective turn enables meeting texts to participate in a dialogue about experience and in so doing enrich each other's understanding of the injustices existing in that experience.

On the other hand, the process of the self-reflective turn of Gadamer's hermeneutic circle is an act of relating and coming into union with the context of one's preunderstandings. The purpose of this self-reflection is to allow one to illuminate and articulate the questions which connect our preunderstandings with our present understanding in a hope of embracing new and unanticipated understandings. The value of this connective, hermeneutic process is the degree to which the questions expressed during the self-reflective turn invite an openness to continued and sustained experience of the relationship. The degree to which this openness can be sustained contributes to the possibility of and potentiality for the emergence of understanding about understanding itself.

The phenomenologically distanced self-reflective turn of the hermeneutic of suspicion and the connective turn of the hermeneutic circle formulate a platform upon which to stand in order to interpret the meaning of and the purpose for the meeting of life's texts. In order to interpret the meaning of texts, one must come into relationship with those texts and how one enters into that relationship shapes the nature of the experience which in turn structures the possible understanding. One can enter into relationship, appropriating and utilizing the experience in order to grasp meaning and refine consciousness. Or, one can enter into relationship openly and receptively in order to further understand and to experience intersubjectivity.

In either case, the more pressing concern which forms the underpinning for questions formulated from a "distanced" or "related" self-reflective turn is that of why seek the relationship to begin with.

> Another way in which one discourse is distinguished from another which is neither ontological or methodological but strategic . . . not what the object is or how we should approach it, but why we should want to engage with it in the first place. (Eagleton, 1983, p. 210)

In contemplating why we would want to engage in the relationship with various texts in the first place, I return to my initial concerns for illuminating a fuller understanding of who we are and what we are about. These concerns, I feel, can only be reflected upon within the relationship of the meeting of texts. Consequently, it is only within the framework of relationship that we can begin to understnad the meaning of <u>human dignity</u>, a meaning that slips and flickers as texts meet, a meaning which is never fully revealed, but nevertheless a meaning toward which we are or ought to be continually striving in order to better understand this human experiment in which we are all linked.

However, I feel that this meeting of texts within which understanding emerges, reflecting the meaning of who we are and what we are about, is severely impaired by the monologic, one-dimensional structure of the technical rationale, traditional education and positivism. Consequently, it is from this perspective that I have attempted to discuss the limiting

nature of the technical rationale while at the same time suggesting a shift and restructuring of the lens. As Dickenson points out, a reexamination of the ways we interpret our experiences takes place in the face of a limitation to our understanding. He writes, "One calls forth reflection upon the theory of interpretation and the problem of understanding when some impediment to understanding draws attention to the understanding process" (Dickenson, 1981, p. 87).

In light of the discussion regarding the technical rationale, as reflected in the Tylerian model, and the criticisms offered by Giroux and Freire, the possibilities for authentic encounter and genuine dialogue are severely limited within that model. Therefore, that model and its vision pose serious barriers to the emergence of understanding that is aimed at illuminating human dignity. As has been discussed, the purpose for engaging in relationship within this model is to control the object of research or investigation in order to more predictably guarantee a conforming and satisfactory product. The entire purpose and structure of the technical rationale calls attention to an impediment to understanding that interferes with our capacity to engage in relationships in which meaning concerning who we are and what we are about is understood.

The necessity for the dialogic meeting of texts is addressed in both the phenomenological orientation of the

transformative-emancipatory vision and the contextual, hermeneutic position of the transcendent-liberatory vision. The differing ways in which each prepares to meet this encounter have been discussed as being either grasping and appropriating or surrendering and open, but each holds to a vision of the purpose for this encounter that attempts to further reveal who we are and what we are about. The movement of each vision to engage in relationship serves the purpose of further illuminating human dignity through acts of justice directed at the reduction of oppression or through acts of love aimed at sustaining relationship. Each offers a view of educational practice which attempts to address and remove impediments to the understanding of the meaning of human dignity that the technical rationale posits.

CHAPTER II

SPECIAL EDUCATION

In an effort to make more personal and meaningful the impact of these impediments to understanding that the technical rationale burdens us with, I will discuss my experience as a special education resource teacher within the context of interpreting interviews of two former special education students. I will situate these interviews within the context of a more general discussion of the field of special educational legislation, theory, and practice. In so doing I hope to reveal the power and appeal that the Tylerian model holds for the educators, students, and parents affiliated with special education, while at the same time exposing the limitations that this view poses when it is used as our greater vision of what learning and education ought to be about.

Section I:
Special Education and the Technical Rationale

In attempting to capture the essence of the hopes, dreams, and practices of special education, one can turn to the Education of All Handicapped Children Act: P.L. 94-142, which was enacted by Congress in November 1975. Briefly, P.L. 94-142 addresses the conditions and problems of a frequently excluded minority in our society, the handicapped

individual. Special education becomes the official meeting point for the educational institution and the handicapped individual in society. P.L. 94-142 has attempted to establish just and equitable practices for including the handicapped in our educational endeavors.

> It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped children have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education, and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children. [Sec. 601(c)] (Turnbull, Strickland, & Brantley, 1978, p. 3)

This is indeed a noble piece of legislation and speaks to the highest aspirations of those involved in the field of special education. At the heart of the implementation of this legislation's provision of a free and appropriate public education for all handicapped students is the IEP (Individualized Education Program). The IEP is the document which contains the guidelines for establishing the criteria for an "appropriate" program. Within the IEP framework, evaluation and educational objectives form the cornerstones upon which "appropriateness" is determined. Each IEP must include the following:

1. A documentation of the student current level of educational performance
2. Annual goals or the attainments expected by the end of the school year
3. Short-term objectives, stated in instructional terms, which are the intermediate steps leading to mastery of annual goals

4. Documentation of the particular special education and related services which will be provided to the child
5. An indication of the extent of time a child will participate in the regular education program
6. Projected dates for initiating service and the anticipated duration of services
7. Evaluaton procedures and schedules for determining mastery of short-term objectives at least on an annual basis. (Turnbull et al., 1978, p. 5)

Further insight into the value and function of the IEP is provided by Turnbull et al. when they write:

> The purpose of the IEP is to insure that handicapped students are provided with an appropriate education. Although the IEP is a legal mandate, mere compliance with the law should not be viewed as the primary reason for developing and implementing IEPs. The IEP has strong educational value, since it could serve as a catalyst to improve educational practice in a variety of ways. Some of the potential positive outcomes of IEP development and implementation include these: sequential curriculum development; coordination of programming; increased attention to the individual needs of students; specification of needed services; systematic evaluation; increased professional accountability. (Turnbull et al., 1978, p. 12)

In reading the above statements regarding the structure and purpose of the IEP, it becomes apparent that the practical application and implementation of P.L. 94-142 is informed by Tyler's production model of curriculum and instruction which reflects the positivistic vision of the technical rationale. Indeed, if Tyler represents the mainstream in curricular and instructional thought, it appears that Special Education, as framed by P.L. 94-142, is more mainstream than regular mainstream education.

With the IEP documentation of educational appropriateness, Special Education leads the way in concretizing the

essence of what education and learning are all about. The language of P.L. 94-142 as represented in the IEP closely parallels that of Tyler: needs analysis, selecting and defining objectives, selecting and creating appropriate learning experiences; organizing learning experiences to achieve a maximum cumulative effect; and evaluating the curriculum to furnish a continuous basis for necessary revisions. The language of special education has encompassed the Tylerian intent and the practice of special educational instruction has made the technical rationale manifest.

The framework provided by P.L. 94-142 not only shapes our conceptualization of the field of special education theory and practice in general but also guides our orientation toward teacher instruction in particular. Further, in understanding that the technical rationale and the Tylerian production model of curriculum and instruction form the grounding for P.L. 94-142, one begins to realize that the same vision also informs the practice of teacher instruction in special education. Consequently, the orientation of most special education teacher instructional programs revolves around the Tylerian structures of assessment, educational objectives, and continuous evaluation.

The educational programs for teachers of exceptional children are overly represented by courses in diagnostic testing and prescriptive teaching in which needs analysis

and educational objectives form a major concentration. Future techers are given lengthy lessons in "how to." How to write long- and short-term objectives, how to develop a task analysis, and how to set up reinforcement and contingency progras. The Turnbull text on Developing and Implementing IEP's catches our professional attention with a gold seal on the cover, within which is written: "A complete 'how to' guide to IEP's--plus sample referral forms, notices to parents, checklists of curriculum objectives and much more."

A central focus of learning disability courses has been a concentration on the Clinical Teaching Cycle in which a model of Assessment (diagnosis), Planning of the Teaching Task, Implementation of the Teaching Plan, Evaluation of Student Performance, and Modification of the Assessment has been presented as the guide and blueprint for future teachers to follow in organizing their own instruction (Lerner, 1985, p. 102). Diagnostic Teaching Flowcharts and Scope and Sequence Charts are set forth to guide the special educator on the path of planning and evaluation. In Educational Assessment of Learning Problems: Testing for Teaching, Wallace and Larsen clearly identify the assessment process:

> A complete educational assessment plan should be comprised ideally of four steps: (1) identification procedures, (2) evaluation techniques, (3) development of an educational plan, and (4) implementation of teaching strategies. (Wallace & Larsen, 1978, p. 15)

The clinical teaching cycle and the educational assessment plan provide the special educator with the maps needed in order to proceed.

The technical rationale as made manifest by the Tylerian model of curriculum and instruction has informed the principles upon which P.L. 94-142 is based, and has also contributed to the formulation of a framework from which to define the specific characteristics of those who are to be considered for inclusion within the handicapped population. P.L. 94-142 provides specific descriptions of who might be considered as being learning disabled, mentally handicapped, emotionally disturbed, etc. Further, specific equations, adaptive behavior checklists, and observation guides are provided by P.L. 94-142 in order to facilitate the accurate classification and placement of a specific individual. Needs analysis, educational objectives, and continuous evaluation are intrinsic to the process of determining who this handicapped population is.

Tyler provides insight as to why this particular model has become so dear to special education when he writes:

> Similarly, an analysis of this problem of individualization of learning reveals certain categories of children who devise their own individual sequence of learning and proceed at their own rate while others require a curriculum specifically designed to enable them to learn and progress sequentially. It is an inefficient use of resource design of an individualized curriculum for those who develop one for themselves. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 242)

Special education is composed of those "others" who are perceived by teachers and planners as being incapable of learning efficiently or effectively. The definition of a learning disabled individual as formulated by the National Advisory Committee on the Handicapped by the U.S. Office of Education and set forth in P.L. 94-142 is:

> Children with specific learning disabilities means those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language spoken or written, which may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical equations. The term includes such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. The term does not include children who have learning problems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, of emotional disturbance or environmental, cultural or economic disadvantage. (Lerner, 1985, p. 7)

The operational aspect of this definition continues as follows:

> A student has a specific learning disability if (1) the student does not achieve at the proper age and ability levels in one or more of several specific areas when provided with appropriate learning experiences, and (2) the student has a severe discrepancy between achievement and intellectual ability. (Lerner, 1985, p. 7)

These varying perspectives on the nature of learning disabilities lend themselves to constructing a picture of individuals who seem to be most ineffectual in initiating their own learning strategies and sequences. It becomes increasingly apparent that these individuals fulfill the requirement of the "other" as formulated by Tyler. The educationally

handicapped population seems to be composed of just those students for whom a sequentially designed curriculum is intended. They are the ones who do not appear to perform in a logical way and whose unpredictable behavior and erratic performance has interrupted the efficiency of the educational plan.

Consequently, at least initially they seem to be the ones for whom the Tylerian model makes the most sense. As Clarizio and McCoy remind us, "It must be remembered that behavioral approaches are used with people whose behavior is problematic or ineffective in some way" (Clarizio & McCoy, 1983, p. 450). Tyler offers us a needs analysis to reveal the problem, and the solution in the form of educational objectives and evaluation. The handicapped population poses a very real problem to educational practice in terms of efficient and effective production, and the Tylerian model offers us a logical resolution.

This is an exceedingly powerful and appealing model for curriculum and instruction which seems to have informed much educational practice in general and special education in particular. Tyler's constructs are logical, concrete, and clear. In adhering to this production model of curriculum and instruction one is offered a great deal of security and certainty. The ways of taking action are stated and the educational objectives serve as guides for student

identification and placement as well as teacher instruction and planning. This is a practical model for action which leaves very little space for doubt. Most educational debate within this model revolves around the questions of which is the better starting point and whether or not the sequence of objectives is correct.

The encounter or relationship within the technical rationale, as reflected in the Tylerian model, is mediated by the behavioral objective. The behavioral objective serves as the prescription which guides and controls the outcome of the interaction. The purpose of relationship within this model is to increase the probability of producing a useful product. The likelihood that such a product will be realized depends upon conformity to the prescription.

The control and conformity provided by adherence to the educational, behavioral objective become the focus of understanding. The meanings that are revealed in relationships mediated by behavioral objectives are uncritical understandings which reflect the authority of control and prediction but are oblivious to the boundaries set by such authority.

The pervasive degree to which the necessity for control and prediction has become accepted by and acceptable to this vision is further reflected by central position of prescription in formulating a vision of liberation:

> Instead of reducing an individual's ability to make choices and to freely select goals, behavioral techniques (prescriptions) seek to enhance the person's control over the environment and his own behavior. It must be remembered that behavioral approaches are used with people whose behavior is problematic or ineffective in some way. In reality, their problems limit their freedom of choice . . . many behaviorists are now interested in fostering self-management, so that the person can be more in charge of his own life and increasingly free from external control. (Clarizio & McCoy, 1983, p. 450)

There is no dialogue within this vision of liberation, only monologue and conformity to the prescription. The opportunity for authentic participation is truncated and reduced to re-action in which one's behaviors and actions are responses to an externally generated educational objective. Success is determined by the degree to which one is capable of complying to such prescription.

Frequently it is the handicapped individual who is most malleable and compliant and is the least capable of articulating the questions which might place him or her into an authentic dialogue of genuine relationship. Therefore he/she remains most vulnerable to a relationship mediated by a prescription and for whom the educational prescription, in the form of an objective, seems to make most sense. Further, in the absence of behavioral objectives, the handicapped individual has been the one most frequently excluded from participation in our schools and society in general. Ironically the prescription of the technical rationale has become the invitation to participate for the majority of handicapped individuals.

The paradox becomes one of recognizing that the control provided by the educational prescription has given many educators the courage to reach out to a previously excluded section of humanity. This tension is further increased in observing the joy of another human being as he feeds himself for the first time, or orders a hamburger at McDonald's. It is the realization that without the prescription, this inclusion may have been denied. It is such a recognition that enhances our ability to understand the temptation to construct a vision of liberation based upon the self-management offered by adherence to the prescription.

However, the pain of this paradox is intensified as one further understands the manipulative and alienating nature of the prescription and realizes that the invitation and the participation are somehow perverse. In recognizing that the prescriptive vision of liberation is one in which there is no dialogue, but rather only monologue, one begins to understand that the relationship which is mediated by the prescription allows for neither genuine participation nor authentically constructed meanings. There is no meeting of texts, seeking understanding, consequently, there is no dialogic interchange as the individual is confronted by the prescription. There is no dynamic give-and-take between the interpreter and the interpreted. In the prescriptive vision of liberaton offered by the technical

rationale there is no reformation of or re-interpretation of the behavioral objective. The prescription is unchanging, concrete, and unquestionable. The consequence of such authority is a control which prevents the opportunity to engage in or even contemplate dialogue and which further assures adherence to the prescription.

The prescriptive vision of liberation is a closed system, one in which the educational objective forms the monologue and the control. There is only reaction to the prescription and no authentic interaction with it. The outcome of such a relationship is determined before the texts meet and there is no opportunity for dynamic reformation of the prescription as the individual re-acts to the objective. This vision offers a liberation in which to be well, whole, and healed means to be conforming, passive, and voiceless.

Section II:
Critique of Special Education

Although critics such as Giroux and Freire provide very helpful insight into the alienating and violent nature of positivism as the technical rationale meets with general educational practice, there is little such criticism among those who write in the field of special education. A helpful exception is found in Edward Milner's dissertation, Myths, Morals and Models: Implications for Special

Education. He deals with special education but does so by insisting on the importance of analyzing the field from a broader perspective of a discussion of world views.

Milner proposes a typology which resonates closely with the one which has enhanced my own interpretation and understanding of educational theory and practice. The technical rationale, the transformative-emancipatory, the transcendent-liberatory framework parallels the Modern, Greek, Judeo-Christian typology discussed by Milner.

Briefly, Milner establishes a typology with which to reflect upon the meaning, and specifically the moral implications, of educational practice. He sets forth a framework borrowed from literary criticism and theology from which he constructs three models for interpreting special educational theory and practice. Milner's Modern Model most closely parallels the content of that which I have referred to as the technical rationale. Milner observes, and I confirm his insight, that it is the Modern Model that most accurately represents the current state of special educational practice, but he discusses the other two models with reference to what they might offer as alternative visions for understanding the implications of educational practice. Specifically, the Greek view fosters the image of a practice that causes one to turn inwardly in self-examination and self-reflection for moral direction. It is a humanistic

but isolated quest for truth and meaning that evokes a fear and a pity that accompanies self-understanding in a tragic world. The Judeo-Christian vision offers a transcendent or liberating image for Milner, one in which there is a practice that embraces the dialectic between criticism and hope, compassion and judgment. Redemption and relatedness are key to Milner's Judeo-Christian model. However, for the purpose of this discussion, I will focus upon the Modern Model.

Milner's modern vision closely parallels that of Tyler's technical rationale and is informed by the same positivism:

> The Modern curriculum . . . will use one-dimensional, positivistic, or behavioristic thought. This will reveal a character whose moral qualities are heteronomous (externally directed and generated). This in turn will yield a plot that is pathetic. Action will be a literal imitation of the teacher. . . . All hope for meaning beyond appearance is banished, and despair and pathos are firmly ensconced. (Milner, 1976, p. 44)

Milner concludes his discussion of the Modern model in writing:

> The modern curriculum is clear and practical. It works. It avoids debates about reality and metaphysical questions. Since the morality of the status quo is legitimated, there are no problems of ethics either. Most importantly, the feelings of meaninglessness, pathos and despair that this curriculum engenders is glossed over by the rhetoric of success. (Miler, 1976, p. 51)

Milner regards the Modern Model as one which being informed by behavioristic, positivistic thought, contributes to the development of individuals who are externally

directed and consequently whose action will ultimately be pathetic, thus in whom feelings of despair and pathos will emerge. This modern model confirms Freire's insights regarding the oppression and alienation of those who are prevented from making their own decisions as a result of positivistic frameworks. Further, Milner touches upon the political impact of positivistic thought, and the concerns which Giroux addresses as he discusses positivism's avoidance of ontological and axiological debate. Milner provides one more lens through which to view traditional educational practice and with which to establish a platform for criticism of our taken-for-granted activity.

In Milner's clear discussion of the Modern Model's reliance upon positivism, it becomes increasingly clear that positivism itself is the source of meaningless action. Further, such meaningless activity perpetuates the despair and sadness of the modern man. Milner's insights into positivism's blithe dismissal of this despair through its "rhetoric of success" further coincides with my professional teaching experience.

Section III:
Hermeneutic Illumination of Special Education Teaching Experience

I feel that most of us who enter the field of education do so with varying degrees of awareness of an underlying impulse for care and of concern for humanity. Those

of us in Special Education seem to be at least initially very sensitive to and aware of our helping impulse. However, ironically, special educators frequently find themselves knowingly or obliviously performing the most inhumane deeds, ranging from obvious acts of violence as manifest in severe behavior modification programs to the more subtle abuses of person as witnessed in the detrimental effects of labeling. Consequently, the development of my consciousness from then to now is framed symbolically into my journey around the hermeneutic circle through the night of understanding, the dawn of symbols, the day of interpretation, and the dusk or interpretation of interpretation and is propelled by the question, "In Whose Interest?"

My first trip around the hermeneutic circle was generated by the understanding that what I was doing as a teacher in special education was ultimately in the best interest of the students with whom I was working. The question of "in whose interest?" was not consciously formulated or addressed, and my activity in the world remained almost completely unexamined. My night of understanding included an impulse for care and a concern for doing good that manifested itself in the activity of teaching which I perceived as an activity of helping.

The commonly agreed upon symbols that I chose to express my night understandings in the dawn of this

hermeneutic trip were the symbols of language used by the helping professions and special education. This language seems to have come to special education primarily from the medical model and is a language of distance and objectification. I expressed my desire to help in terms of diagnosis, remediation, prescription, and assessment. I acquired the language of special education and viewed my helping in terms of this language. I perceived my role as one of being primarily a fixer or repairer of inadequate or incomplete children. This language resulted in my viewing the children with whom I worked as having something wrong with them and that it was my responsibility to diagnose the problem, prescribe the correct educational label, and design a program that would remediate the individual.

This language allowed me to see that what I was doing as a special educator was unquestionably in the best interest of the children with whom I worked. Consequently, my unexamined assumptions in the day of my taken-for-granted world perpetuated my interpretation of my understanding that what I was doing was in the best interest of the students. I was helping them to acquire techniques and skills that would fix them or help them to compensate for their problems. I was giving them skills that would guide them to conformity so they could be as normal as possible. I was repairing them by filling them with the help that I had to offer.

As I entered the dusk of my first trip around the hermeneutic circle, my conscious interpretation of my interpretations remained at a reflective level in the sense that I continued to mirror my helping impulse in the terms of the established educational and institutional language. I also perceived the educational and institutional setting as being a fixed reality. I lacked insight into the understanding that our meaning, knowledge, and culture are humanly constructed realities. I was mystified by the educational reality that I saw as being permanent and consequently unchanging and unchangeable. It maintained an aura of authority that I felt powerless and inadequate to question. Therefore, being unable to see the social context and political interest, my energies in the dusk of my reflection were directed at self-improvement of my teaching skills and techniques. I searched for better methods, prescriptive books, and more effective reward systems. I felt that, if I could develop better task analysis outlines, my skills in imparting techniques to my students would improve. As long as my dusk remained on the reflective level, I continued to view my special education teaching role as that of being a helper and fixer of children and my professional, intellectual role as that of being a technician. Thus, my reflective examination of my understandings, symbols, interpretations, and interpretations

of my interpretations alowed me to view my action and teaching as being in the best interest of the children whom I taught.

Since the language I used to voice the understandings of my educational practice remained that of science and medicine which are also informed by positivism, my desire to help was expressed in terms of diagnosis, prescription, remediation, and assessment. In moments of doubt, this literal language resulted in a practice in which I turned to the mechanisms of behavioral objectives, task analysis, and scope and sequence charts in order to structure greater success. In spite of feelings of uncertainty, I continued to view, through this scientific, positivistic language, that my practice was in the best interest of the students whom I hoped to help. I felt that if I persisted at my task analysis, educational objective quest long enough, I would eventually be able to fix, repair, and guide my students in a direction that would allow them to be as normal and as conforming as possible. The modern model's and positivism's criteria for success enabled me to hope that, if I persevered on this course long enough, I and my students would eventually all experience this success. The modern model places hope in technology and technique. "It assumes that if the scientific process is maintained long enough, a complete knowledge of reality will be revealed" (Milner,

1976, p. 48). Thus, my doubt propelled me toward a more energetic investigation of method and technique, leaving me further frustrated and anxious in the face of those times when failure occurred.

As I searched for finer methods and reflected upon more efficient and productive teaching materials, my greater aim and goal, that of caring, was diverted. My energetic activity eventually led to frustration since it was directed at a more technical and mechanical search for successful behavioral and educational objectives. Thus the hope for a caring and loving relationship was lost in the overwhelming framework of positivism in which the prescription controlled the relationship and this control ultimately meant that there could be no authentic relationship.

In reflecting upon my experiences as a special education teacher in a public school resource center, I find that Milner's view of the modern model coincides with my understanding of the positivistic grounding of most special educational practice. Further, Milner's insights into the feelings of despair and meaninglessness that plague the Modern Man, resonate with the frustrations and doubts that I experienced as a special education teacher. However, at the time, I was unable to clearly articulate that the source of this doom and despair was an outgrowth of positivism that manifests itself as the absence of genuine relationship.

As Milner describes the plight of the individual caught within the framework of the Modern Model, I begin to connect more deeply with the source of this despair. This outwardly directed life of conformity, that Milner describes, in which one is never the fully participatory subject but the object of external authority, contributes to a pathetic view of existence in which life itself appears meaningless. The doing and success of the positivistic, technical rationale is on the surface. The doing is externally controlled and the successes are determined by an authority beyond oneself.

Eventually, if the emptiness of this activity emerges, one begins to feel the despair of such meaningless activity. As a teacher, caught up in all the "busyness," I occasionally asked myself what was the point to all these contracts, happy faces, and mastered objectives. I came to recognize that 12-year-old Barry who was still struggling with reading, "Nat a fat cat sat on a mat," even though he had learned the alphabet, would never be reading at grade level, and Felton, who had gained two years in reading comprehension, would still return to his fifth grade classroom reading two years behind his classmates. I was forced to contemplate the deeper questions of interest and purpose of my educational practice.

As I began to connect with the messages of the emancipatory writers regarding the social construction of reality,

I began to refine the lens through which I viewed the world, a lens with which I began my second trip around the hermeneutic circle. This lens has not only empowered me with the hope for re-construction, but it has brought into focus the questions which have allowed me to voice the injustice of positivism which obstructs relationship and which results in the loss of dignity.

Freire, Giroux, and Milner have provided us with a more solidly grounded and clearly focused view of the alienating and oppressive nature of the Tylerian Rationale's positivistic root. Their insights and criticisms have constructed a platform upon which to stand in order to address and resist the superficial appeal of the concrete successes offered by the technical rationale. Understanding that the despair, pathos, and meaninglessness do not reside in the failed method or the unsuccessful individual but rather in the basic tenets of positivism and modern thinking has offered an anchor that serves to further serious criticism and strengthen resistance to the appeal of success offered by the positivistic version of reality.

Thus, as my dusk became reflexive, in the sense that I began to examine my taken-for-granted assumptions of the world and the educational structure, my night, dawn, and day changed. In my reflexive dusk, I began my second trip around the hermeneutic circle. This second journey was

proplelled by the question of interest. However, it was a question that was consciously and critically formulated. Consequently, this hermeneutic journey generated a different response to the question of interest. Rather than being in the interest of the students with whom I worked, I now began to view that what I had been doing was actually in the best interest of the administrative bureaucracy and in the interest of establishing and maintaining a hierarchical structure that worked to preserve the status quo and which functioned beyond this to maintain the cultural standards of achievement, competition, success, and individualism.

This newly acquired vision changed my night understandings from ones dealing with care and help to deeper concerns for dignity and justice. I began to see that what I was doing was actually offending the dignity of the students with whom I worked and that my teaching and evaluations were acts of injustice which perpetuated and supported an inhumane, personally and communally destructive educational structure.

The symbols of this dawning reflect the language of the dialectic of the prophetic voice. Holding criticism and hope in a balance, it is a language of praxis and of critical reflection requiring repsonsible action. It is a deeper language, which when placed upon the surface language of the helping professions, makes the diagnostic,

prescriptive terminology of help appear to be shallow, superficial, degrading, and manipulative.

Interpreting my day in terms of emancipatory symbols has enabled me to see that what I was doing was not in the best interest of myself or my students. When viewed through Freire's banking notion of education and Milner's pathos of modern man, my helping impulse appeared to be patronizing. My fixing and repairing of others objectified me and those with whom I was interacting. Labeling was not in the interest of my dignity, as identifier, or the dignity of the chilren who were being identified. I viewed evaluation as an act of injustice which resulted in the dehumanization of students and teachers as it contributed to the maintenance of the school hierarchy and to the preservation of the general cultural status quo.

Section IV:
Interviews of Two Former Special Education Students

It is with the lens that has been and is still being ground by this second journey around the hermeneutic circle that I began to interpret and understand the two interviews I conducted. I entered into these interviews with the view that special education, resource labeling, and placement were damaging and unjust experiences that were offensive to human dignity. I had hoped to gain greater insight into this experience and to possibly provide a voice for all

of us who have felt the frustration and anger of being removed as our own sources of authority as a result of having been externally defined as in the cases of Dee and Kay who were labeled through educational assessment as being learning disabled.

My research of the experiences of two former special education students further confirms my connection to criticisms of the technical rationale as it is made manifest in the practice of special education and illuminated by the work of Giroux, Freire, and Milner. The subtle, yet ever present despair, the anxiety of individual failure, the hope offered by persistent allegiance to the scientific method that Milner describes are verified in the experiences of Dee and Kay. The anger and frustration that accompanies objectification as individuals are prevented from participating in their own construction of meaning and decision-making that Freire addresses are voiced by these students. The omission and absence of any conversation by Dee and Kay with regard to questioning the purpose of their educational activity, indeed their submission and conformity to the hierarchical structures that offer success, powerfully affirms Giroux's political concerns regarding the oppression and silence perpetuated by the technical rationale.

The interviews with Dee and Kay were loosely structured, tape recorded, 2-hour conversations in which each

discussed how she has remembered her special education experiences and how each perceives that this experience has affected her life. There was no predetermined format for these interviews; however, three general categories emerged that served as a guide for the organization of this research: (a) the actual school experiences involving resource room, tutoring, summer school, testing, and removal from the program; (b) relationships with peers, teachers, and family members; and (c) sense of self, before, during, and after the resource experience.

At the time of these interviews Dee was 21 years old and studying interior design at Randolph Tech in Asheboro, North Carolina, after having transferred from UNCG upon the successful completion of three semesters. Dee had been labeled as having a learning disability in 1974 and was placed in a resource room at that time. She remained in special educational programs through the eighth grade, leaving them in 1979. I was Dee's fifth and sixth grade resource teacher from 1975 to 1977.

Primarily Dee's memories of school are dominated by pictures of continuous evaluation. Evaluations that she recalls were not explained and therefore she felt were unfair. She recalls feeling extremely frustrated with a third grade standardized test, "I remember barely being able to read everything that was on there, because most of it was too

hard. . . . I felt stupid and very frustrated." She goes on to describe a hearing test she was administered in the third grade:

> At one point . . . they even tested me for hearing because they thought I couldn't hear. . . . You had to put those ear, head phones on. I was so nervous all I could do was hear my heart beat. So, they told my parents I couldn't hear.

At the conclusion of this interview, I asked Dee if there was anything else she would like to mention and she stated further her feelings with regard to testing:

> I feel like an IQ's more the experiences you have instead of all of your book learning. I think people are intelligent in different areas and you can't be perfect in everything. I guess the tests are for society's perfect persons. I don't know. . . . I just don't think the whole testing thing is fair. I mean that's something that's sort of circumstantial. I mean, everything that's been going on in your life, whether you're stressed or not, has a great deal to do with how you do, how well you do, and how you feel that day.

Although she has experienced the injustice of testing and has a sense of the discomfort it caused, she does not question the validity of the function of testing and has internalized the value for the necessity of tests designed to determine whether or not one has learned the important facts considered to be knowledge. Throughout the interview, she blames herself for her lack of success and her academic problems. She says, "If I was older and had more experience, I'm sure I could apply it, but I didn't." She goes on to say, "I was just slower and didn't put forth the effort that I really should have, in study."

She is unclear as to whether or not the resource center was helpful in providing her with assistance in remediating her reading and spelling problems, but she did feel that it offered her a pleasant escape from the regular classroom. "I felt relieved because the resource teacher was so much nicer and I really liked doing that, getting away from my [classroom] teacher." She goes on to say, however, with regard to the effectiveness of the resource center, "I don't know, I feel if I had had a private tutor early on, I would have been OK." Although she had had tutors from 4th through 9th grades, after school and during the summer, Dee felt that maybe she would not have had as many difficulties in school if tutoring had begun at an earlier point. The significance being the fact that Dee perceived herself as not being OK and that the cure required assistance from an external authority.

Dee goes on to describe herself, "I wasn't as smart as the average student. . . . I think I was as smart as the other students, I was just slower and I didn't put forth the effort that I really should have, in study, I mean I did my homework." She is ambiguous about her own ability and once again partially sees her difficulties as being her own fault. She blames herself for her problems and for her inability to solve them. Dee was unsure about the actual label that she had been given in elementary

school but remembered it as having been associated with being slow: "I was labeled, I've forgotten, they had two different labels. One meant you were just a little bit slow and the other one meant you were a little bit retarded . . . and I was the one that was a little bit slow."

In describing the actual resource center experience she commented, "I'd go down [the hall] and we'd have to have hall passes and all that stuff. I've had hall passes all my life!" The labeling process brought with it tickets of admission and identification. The "hall pass" indicated that permission was required for entrance and if denied permission, one might face the existential dilemma of remaining in the hall, therefore not being allowed to participate and at the same time wondering why. Essentially she was being placed into a position, with the hall pass, which potentially denied her admission to the conditions that enable one to construct meaning within the competitive framework existing in our schools. Those who carry hall passes are designated as marginal; they may or may not be granted permission to compete.

Feelings of being different permeate Dee's experiences and relationships. She felt most intensely alienated from the teachers for whom she perceived herself as being a structural problem in terms of causing an interruption.

> I think they [teachers] were hostile because they wanted everyone to do this, this and this, [to] be very structured. I messed up the structure because I was slower and went to the resource room, more from being slower.

She perceived herself as an interruption to the routine because she needed to have things explained and therefore she caused a problem for the efficient functioning of the classroom.

Dee also felt that the expectations of the teachers were lowered as a result of her being placed in the resource center.

> I remember Mrs. B [a sixth-grade teacher] not letting me be on my level of math because I did go to the resource room. . . . She was telling me that I needed to do this and finally I convinced her into letting me be in the, it was a little bit above average, and I did fine. . . . Her expectation was a lot lower, it was back to the math I did in 2nd grade--just addition and subtraction of single digits.

Generally her memories of teachers were unpleasant, remembering teachers as being impatient and herself as being an interruption.

With regard to feelings about herself, she recalls that throughout elementary school and junior high school she felt that she was slower than other students and that she needed more time. She felt different and stressed. She says she is still insecure about spelling and reading aloud. She also expressed insecurity with regard to encountering new situations and leaving familiar settings. She recalls the time of high school graduation as being an especially frightening period:

> When I graduated from high school, I didn't know what I would do because I felt so stupid. I had a very good GPA, and I still have one, but I didn't think I could go to college because I wasn't smart enough to do the work.

Self-doubt and feelings of inadequacy continue to be a part of her living experience. She comments that during her studies at Randolph Tech in interior design, she still experiences moments of uncertainty:

> I'm very cautious to look up words, sometimes every single word, especially when I'm stressed. [Sometimes I'll] have somebody proof-read my work before I hand it in. . . . I think I could do it in the real world, [but] before I would hand anything to a client, I would not have it written in my scribbly writing. I think that would be uncalled for.

Dee's view of school, as shaped by her experiences, seems to revolve around the idea that school is a place of much testing and that this testing transformed her into an object to be labeled and manipulated. She felt victimized by the whims of teachers who decided how she was to be grouped, what she was to be taught, and where she was to go. She also victimized herself by feeling that the problems were her fault and that if she tried harder, put forth more effort, had had tutoring earlier, she would have been "OK." She viewed herself as being a bureaucratic problem. She was an interruption to the schedule and class routine, and she interfered with the efficiency of the educational process. She has had "hall passes all her life," she is different, alienated, and removed. She requires

a "pass" in order to gain entrance into the educational game. She lives her life with the fear that the admission may be denied at any point along the way; that she may be designated to remain in the hall and that if that happens it would somehow be her own fault.

At the time of this interview, Kay was a 17-year-old high school junior who had been in special education resource programs from 1975 to 1980. She was identified as having a learning disability while she was in the first grade and was dismissed from learning disability programs after she completed fifth grade. I was Kay's third and fourth grade resource teacher. Kay's school activities included various school clubs, honor society, honor roll, track team, and theatre. She has had part-time jobs and has engaged in an assortment of physical activities ranging from bike riding to weight lifting. She was the Greensboro Optimist Club speech contest winner with a speech which focused upon the problems of the learning disabled entitled "My Responsibility: Involvement." When I called to arrange this interview with Kay, her sister commented that she was not surprised that I would want to talk with Kay, since she [Kay] is such a "success story."

Kay's school memories are also filled with recollections of extensive testing which remained usually unexplained and left her feeling like a specimen.

> I can't remember anyone ever talking to me about the tests. They probably talked to my parents, but I don't know. . . . I sort of felt like a specimen. I just felt like a guinea pig when it came to those books. You know, you look at the books or something and you say what it is. And then, not knowing whether it is right or wrong and nobody tells you. . . . I feel like they are deciding. When it comes to the things that I have to do every day, I do feel like everyone is deciding if, you know, what kind of person I am or if . . . I'm smart. . . I've been tested so much. I remember those big books. You look at them all the time. The teacher won't tell you if you've done them right or wrong. You're just sitting there all the time.

Tests are a tremendous source of anxiety for Kay and evoke waves of feelings of self doubt. She recalls the competency testing in high school as causing her a great deal of fear. She was afraid because she didn't know what to expect, and she wondered whether or not she should hire a tutor in order to do as well as the other students who would be taking the competency test. She also didn't know how to fill out the information section on the test: "I have those little decisions, should I say that I'm this special person or should I go on and act normal?" She was uncertain as to whether or not she should check the learning disabilities box. In retrospect she describes the test as having been as "easy as pie," and she is aggravated with herself for having been so nervous about it. But she says,

> So, it scares me when I don't know my results on tests and that goes back to learning disabilities. Because when I had LD, I didn't know the results. It's not like it is today, you know your results PSAT, SAT, and competency. Then I didn't know how I was doing at all.

With regard to resource class experiences, Kay doesn't remember exactly how she got into it, but does remember it as "not being that bad." Basically, she just feels that she has been through "a lot of schooling."

> They put me in a resource room and then I started improving. I don't know exactly how I got in there. I might have been tested . . . I just remember being in there and that I had to go. No one told me why I had to go. I don't remember. I don't remember, when I think back to school, I've been through so much school. When I think back, I remember going to the classroom and having different special classes and I feel I've had a lot of schooling.

She recalls that being in a resource program did make her feel different and insecure.

> I remember being in class and working and I remember one day sitting in there and it was time for me to go to the resource room and everyone asking, "Where are you going?" I felt weird because no one else had to go, except maybe a few other people. I didn't want to go, I wanted to stay in that class. I felt dumb that I had to go to a special class. I didn't want anyone to know, or to miss out on something in class and have to catch up.

In retrospect Kay considers the resource experience as having been a positive event in her life. She says, "Then it was bad, but now it's good." This is because the resource program provided her with a condition that she wanted to get away from. When she got out of the resource program, she considered it as having been the accomplishment of a goal that has given her confidence that she might not otherwise have had.

> See, I was in there but that gave me,I mean, everyone has a goal in their life, and you see, I've already accomplished one goal. You see, a lot of

> people haven't done that yet and they're 17, and that was a big goal. And so, like if anyone ever asked me, "What goal have you ever accomplished?" You know, just wondering. They [might] say, "Oh, well. . . I tried out for and made the theater." I'd say, "I made the theater, too, and made the track team, too, and I did everything you did, and I also did one more thing that you didn't do--I got out of the Resource Room!"

Getting out of the resource room was an achievement and a source of confidence for Kay. She says, "It was an achievement. . . . It was a big responsibility on a little mind, that's exactly what it was. But I'm glad I'm not in it now. Even though I've got my mind now, I'm glad I'm not in there." Part of Kay's "getting her mind" seems to be in being able to fully participate in the educational game. She seems to have fully accepted the necessity for and consequences of the hierarchical competitive structure of school. Although the evaluations inherent in competition are a source of fear and anxiety for her, she tenaciously hangs on to the unquestionable necessity for and legitimacy of competition. She has earned the right to play the game and to "act normal."

Kay was very clear about her label as that of being learning disabled and recalls:

> It was a great excuse . . . I could say, "Well, I have a learning disability, leave me alone! I'll pick it up in a minute. You might pick it up, but I'll pick it up, maybe longer." I was relieved. I was still scared that I wasn't going to do my best, but not as scared.

She views the label as providing her with a sense of relief. Before she had been labeled learning disabled, she couldn't

understand what was happening to her or why she couldn't learn in the prescribed way. "I just remember that I couldn't do anything and that I just felt dumb, and so I was just going to be dumb." The learning disability label provided Kay with a reason for her difficulties and a sense that something could be done about them. However, even though it gave her hope, it also carried with it the fear that if she didn't try hard enough, she couldn't be successful. So, in some removed way, it was still somehow her fault but not completely; she was still scared but not as scared.

Interestingly enough, although Kay considers getting out of the resource room as being one of her major life accomplishments, her actual removal from the resource room seems to have been a vague, mysterious process. She recalls, "I was getting tired of it, I didn't want to go anymore. I didn't want to be different. I was ready to get out and I got out." She remembers forgetting to attend her resource classes and the teacher deciding that she probably didn't need to come anymore. She doesn't remember any specific tests or conferences. She just remembers being told that she didn't need resource anymore. She honestly recalls that she just forgot about it and then she was told she didn't have to go. So, her achievement was accomplished through an act of passive resistance of which she is not actually conscious.

Basically, Kay regarded her peers as being smarter than she and was fearful that they would think she was dumb. She describes herself as having been friendly with other students, while at the same time feeling removed from them and different. She felt that they thought she was different, but she was even more fearful that others would get the labels confused and think even worse of her.

> I was afraid people would get confused. I don't think slow learner is as bad as mentally retarded. If they thought I was mentally retarded, I'd probably freak. I wonder what thought they'd think . . . that I was weird, strange, or different? I think they thought I was different, not strange or weird.

Kay felt alienated from her regular classroom teachers, describing them as "impatient, old bats." "I felt like some teachers were angry with me because it would take [them] longer to explain it to me." Consequently, Kay also felt that she caused a disruption of the daily school and class routine. She felt removed from the flow of the class because she was slower and needed explanations.

Kay's learning disability was considered to be a "family thing" in the sense that the other family members helped Kay. Her mother and sister also participated in local community activities that were aimed at working with the handicapped. Kay recalls that when she went to summer school her mother and sister went with her. She described her mother as being "another tutor who drilled stuff into my head." Generally she felt good about her family

involvement and support. The only major conflict that Kay had with her family was concerned with Kay's attending a summer school tutorial program the summer following her dismissal from the resource program. Kay had always resented attending this program and was extremely upset with the idea of having to continue in that program after having been removed from the resource room. Kay sensitively realized that her mother was anxious about whether or not she could succeed without the additional assistance, but Kay recalls, "I was scared, scared enough for both of us."

Feelings of being different and of being fearful permeate Kay's memories regarding herself at the time of placement in a resource room. However, she now perceives herself as being confident, more determined and responsible as a result of her past experiences. She is not concerned with whether others know that she was in a resource program because she feels that most would not believe that she had actually been in the program. She says, "It's fine with me. It makes me feel good that they can't believe I was in there." Kay feels that she has her learning disability "under control" and is determined to keep it from resurfacing. She regards herself as being an example to other learning disabled individuals. "I think I'm an example, not an exception. I don't know anyone like me, but I know there are other people about like me." In a sense, she objectifies

herself and places herself on display for others to note. She has committed herself to the rigors of competition and at this moment she is winning. However, I feel that in some ways this activity is displayed for the purpose of proving that she is "normal" or OK. Without being conscious of it, I feel that Kay senses that she is in a period of remission and that there is always an underlying fear that she might experience a relapse which would cause her disability to surface. In a sense, I view her frantic achievement oriented actions as being an attempt to construct a "buffer" in order to ward off the potential reoccurrence of the disease.

In general Kay's view of school is that of being a place which is to be approached with suspicion--a place where there is a lot of testing and where people are deciding about you and keeping the results hidden. School is a place where one is examined impersonally and made to feel like a specimen. She felt objectified by the testing process and alienated from herself and others as a result of that process. Decisions were being made about her in which she had no participation or awareness. She was labeled and officially recognized as being different. She sensed that she was somehow to blame for her problems and felt that if she tried hard enough to "act normal" that she would be OK. School is a place where Kay has learned well the

lesson of winners and losers. She has absorbed that lesson into her very soul. She views her determined acts as being the safeguards that will hopefully enable her to remain on the winning side. She senses, but does not give voice to, the possibility that this game of "acting normal" could collapse and she would once again find herself disabled.

The evolving world view of these two women, as having been shaped by their school experiences as a result of having been labeled and placed in special educational programs, seems to be one that is interpenetrated with themes of alienation and resistance. Their alienation from self and others is manifest in the fear and suspicion they experience in various concrete and abstract situations. Their fears are concretely recognized in testing situations and classroom settings in which the circumstances for successes or failure are more or less clearly established. Voiced fears of general failure, time limitations, and testing seem to be consciously recognized.

The more subtle forms of alienation seem to be more abstractly formulated in feelings of anxiety. There is a vague sense of discomfort that seems to haunt both of these young women as they move through their lives wondering where, when, or if their existing reality is going to collapse, leaving their disabilities exposed. They walk on the borderline, "acting normal" but always carrying

their "hall passes." They are extremely vulnerable to the possibility of being "found out" and consequently being denied access to commonly agreed upon conditions of competition in which meaning is constructed in our schools and our greater society. They live with an unvoiced anxiety that accompanies them in the form of doubt.

They are alienated from themselves in the sense that they doubt their authenticity and are constantly seeking validation from external sources. The ever present nagging doubt has damaged their sense of self-worth; their dignity has been diminished by doubt. They are alienated from others as a result of not being able to name themselves; they are officially recognized as being different. In Tillich's sense of the "courage to be," they have been denied the dignity which would have allowed them to construct the meaning that would have enabled them to "be as oneself." In so doing, they are denied the possibility of constructing meaning as "being as oneself" in community. They are robbed of dignity and ultimately alienated from self and others. They have been objectified and denied the opportunity of reciprocally engaging in relationships in which there is the possibility of dynamic interchange between subjects.

The theme of resistance is manifest as an attempt to hold on to one's dignity and to affirm oneself as a human

being with the right to name oneself is apparent in the few but persistent acts of not accepting the prescribed labels and placements. Although not so apparent to themselves or others, both women resisted attempts by authorities to completely determine their fate. Passively forgetting to attend the resource program, not fully recognizing the label that had been prescribed, and actively confronting teachers about academic groupings are examples of acts of resistance. In spite of the few acts of resistance, it seems that a world view dominated by a sense of alienation prevails.

Their world view is one in which the hegemony of the technocratic rationality is reflected. Dee and Kay have been perceived by others and themselves as being on the margin and, in wishing and hoping to be admitted, have not questioned seriously the existing flaws in the dominant structure as reflected in the educational system. They have not examined the value of the conditions that enable one to construct meaning or that allow one to be received into the school hierarchy. They have internalized the ethic of competition and abide by the rules of evaluation which determine one's worth. The technocratic rationality world view has contributed to their further oppression as they perceive their own problems and difficulties within a psychological framework. They are unable to place themselves within the social context by constructing a history that

is sociologically framed. They are the victims of the technocratic rationality, and they have internalized the consciousness of their oppressors. Dee and Kay are alienated in their isolation. Their acts of resistance have been precarious efforts to become a part of the dignity-denying, oppressive structure that further intensifies their anxiety and insecurity.

As for the insights I have gained through conducting these interviews and contemplating this research, they are many and still evolving. Initially, the most profound understandings pivoted around the realization of just how fragile our reality or realities actually are. The first insight deals with the implications of having our realities completely altered if our labels become confused. Our reality, our sense of who we are and what we are capable of doing with regard to the meaning we construct, is somehow tied to our label or labels. It seems to me that the possibility of having our labels confused is a very real threat to our reality. In this bureaucratically structured society dependent upon computers for organization, the science fiction scenario of getting our labels, social security numbers, credit records, etc. confused is a very real possibility. However, at an even deeper, existential level, the sense of having our realities determined by the meanings we and others attach to the labels that we choose or that are

chosen for us, leaves us vulnerable and attached to very frail realities. These realities can be changed instantaneously and whimsically, good and bad can become transposed and twisted. The very thin line between meaning and non-meaning, being and non-being becomes more fully recognized for me in thoughtfully considering the profound implications of getting "the labels confused."

The second insight regarding the fragility of our realities came to me specifically in my conversation with Kay and concerns itself with the value and seriousness of being present with ourself and others. The idea that what we say and don't say to those around us truly does affect their reality. Therefore, we need to be extremely serious with regard to our understanding of the power of the "word." Kay recalled a situation in the resource room in which she was experiencing a great deal of frustration and remembers my telling her of another student I had taught who was no longer in the resource room. It was the first time she had ever realized that she might not always be in the resource program. Kay said if I had not told her about that other girl, she would have given up hope. It seems that much of Kay's current reality is constructed upon a remark I made regarding a former student. The impact of the realization of what we say or don't say to others as having a profound implication upon the realities they construct is overwhelming to me. It

leaves me in a state of awe when considering the implications this has for the profession of teaching.

The third major understanding that has become clarified for me while doing this research is the conclusion I reached regarding the relationship of children and adults. It occurs to me that we treat our children as aliens, we objectify them and regard them with minimal respect. We talk about them but not to them. We observe them, test them, and educate them. We teach them the lessons of alienation. As educators and as adults, we are the oppressors of our children. We deny them dignity, perpetrating an injustice that handicaps us all!

The experiences of Dee and Kay and my interpretation of these experiences confirm and verify the criticisms of Giroux, Freire, and Milner in their critiques of the Tylerian, positivistic, technical rationale. Through the voices of Dee and Kay we may begin to hear the depth of their and our own despair and meaninglessness. It is with the insights that I have gained from the criticisms of Freire, Giroux, and Milner that I sense the need to more thoroughly understand the vision offered by those that I shall refer to as holding a transformative emancipatory view. It is from the feelings of anguish and despair that I touch upon when hearing the voices of Dee and Kay that I move to explore the transformative, emancipatory vision of praxis and empowerment.

Further, the urgency of this turn is intensified for me in reflecting upon Camus' The Plague, in which I connect to the plague as being symbolic of the ultimate disconnector and therefore of being, representative of positivistic thinking. This disconnection blinds us, creating a condition of unawareness which for Camus is the source of immorality and evil:

> The evil that is in the world always comes of ignorance, and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding. On the whole, men are more good than bad; that however isn't the real point. But they are more or less ignorant, and it is this that we call vice or virtue; the most incorrigible vice being that of ignorance that fancies it knows everything and therefore claims for itself the right to kill. The soul of the murderer is blind; and there can be no true goodness nor true love without the utmost clear-sightedness. (Camus, 1972, p. 124)

The soul of positivism which "fancies it knows everything" is blind and therefore potentially immoral; consequently, it (positivism) holds within it the capacity for murder.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSFORMATIVE-EMANCIPATORY VISION

The intense conversation between Dr. Rieux and Tarrou in Albert Camus' The Plague, in which Tarrou recollects memories of his youth and the horror he felt when he first realized the human plight as being that of various manifestations of the stages of plague, is a powerfully moving piece. The anger he felt as a result of the injustice of deliberate murder in the form of capital punishment, his reaction to this atrocity by joining an activist group in order to prevent such capital crimes and then to his own devastating discovery that he, too, was a transmitter of plague even in the name of social reform or in the name of what he perceived to be good, are the various stages of plague that we knowingly and unknowingly manifest. The awakening process through which Tarrou realizes that he was the murderer that he was horrified of, that he, too, had as a result of blindness and ignorance, murdered is a painful metamorphosis--one which all of us in moments of serious reflection know to be true--an admission of agony:

> I'm still of the same mind. For many years I've been ashamed, mortally ashamed, of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . . Yes, I've been ashamed ever since; I have realized that we all have the plague, and I've lost my peace. . . . I only know that one must do what one can to cease being plague stricken, and that's the only way

> in which we can hope for some peace or, failing that, a decent death. This and only this, can bring relief to men and, if not save them, at least do them the least harm possible and even, sometimes, a little good. (Camus, 1972, p. 235)

"To cease being plague stricken" is the way in which I view the praxis offered by the constructs of Dewey, Freire, Giroux, and others as they engage in educational reconstruction with an emancipatory and transformative vision. The unifying themes that seem to connect these thinkers in their quest "to cease being plague stricken" are many. However, their requisite of wakeful, critical, consciousness in the struggle for justice and their ability and need to embrace the uncertain in this endeavor seem to form the underpinnings upon which all of them take action. They reflect the philosophy of life which Dewey discusses as that which "accepts life and experience in all of its uncertainty, mystery, doubt and half-knowledge and turns that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities" (Dewey, 1958, p. 34). Consequently, the educational agenda slides radically when addressed by those who hold a world view in which uncertainty is approached and applauded rather than avoided and dismissed.

The aims and goals of the educative process shift from those of transferring a predetermined body of knowleldge for the purposes of turning out a normalized finished product to those of developing a "critical consciousness," "a disciplined mind," and to being "conscientized" through participation in praxis for the purposes of emancipation. Emancipation

rather than standardization becomes the aim, hope, and vision which guides educational theory and practice for those whom I shall refer to as holding a "transformative-emancipatory" world view. Rather than constructing their practice upon theories obtained from industrial and behavioral psychology, their practice reflects a theory which is grounded in phenomenology and embraces those tenets of pragmatism which speak to the hope that as oppressive realities are illuminated injustice will be diminished.

John Dewey and Paulo Freire seem to address most clearly the constructs of the transformative-emancipatory vision that binds theory to practice. These constructs are generated as they become useful in guiding the examination of our beliefs. It is the illumination of these unexamined beliefs that has provided the structures for Dewey's "Reflective Thought" process and Freire's "Conscientization" process. The rhythm and movement of "transformative-emancipatory" praxis becomes more fully felt in the examination of these unveiling processes.

Section I:
John Dewey and the Reflective Thought Process

For Dewey, the "reflective thought" process embodies the nature of thinking and, thus, also represents the structure toward which he feels education ought to be directed. The test of education, for Dewey, is "the extent to which

it nurtures a type of mind competent to maintain an economical balance of the unconscious and the conscious" (Dewey, 1933, p. 214). He maintains that this balance between the unconscious and the conscious, the absent and the present, the strange and the familiar contains the nature of thinking. "Where there is thought, something present suggests and indicates something absent" (Dewey, 1933, p. 223). He writes:

> The familiar and the near do not excite or repay thought on their own account, but only as they are adjusted to mastering the strange and remote. The old, the near, the accustomed, is not that to which but that with which we attend; it does not furnish the material of a problem, but of its solution . . . the more remote supplies the stimulus and the motive; the nearer at hand furnishes the point of approach and the available resources. (Dewey, 1933, p. 222)

Doubt and uncertainty present the discomfort or problems that move one to think.

> The starting point in any process of thinking is something going on, something just as it stands is incomplete or unfulfilled . . . its meaning lies literally in what it is going to be, in how it is going to turn out . . . to consider the bearing of the occurrence upon what may be, but is not yet, is to think. (Dewey, 1966, p. 146)

Doubt and uncertainty present the initial discomfort that propels one to act; however, it is in the doing and the undergoing of the consequences of the action taken in the face of uncertainty that offer the possibility for thought or "thinking as experience." An awareness of and an intentional attempt to construct or discover the connection between action and its consequences results in thinking. Dewey

discusses this when he writes, "Thinking . . . is the intentional endeavor to discover specific connections between something which we do and the consequences which result, so that the two become continuous" (Dewey, 1966, p. 145). The presence of the active and passive phases are essential to Dewey's understanding of what constitutes thought and learning:

> When we experience something we act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do something to the thing and then it does something to us in return: such is the peculiar combination. The connection of the two phases of experience measures the fruitfulness or value of the experience. . . . Experiences as trying involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected with the return wave of consequences which flow from it. When an activity is continued into the undergoing of consequences, when the change made by action is reflected back into a change made in us, the more flux is loaded with significance. We learn something. (Dewey, 1966, p. 139)

It is at the point of suffering the consequences of our actions that Dewey addresses the issue of responsibility. Thoughtful action is synonymous with responsibility in Dewey's mind, for in taking thoughtful action, one is working from the aims which emerged while contemplating the uncertain. In this way, one acknowledges responsibility for future consequences which result from the present action. The construction of aims is the acceptance of responsibility for the connection between doing and undergoing as well as the responsibility for the links between the conscious and the unconscious. The illumination of the connections between doing-undergoing and between conscious-unconscious results in unions which

address that which Dewey regards as being thought, meaning, and responsibility.

Dewey understands that "the unconscious influence of the environment is so subtle and pervasive that it affects every fiber of character and mind" (Dewey, 1966, p. 17). Thoughtful reflection and responsible construction of aims which direct meaningful action which in turn enhance understanding are at the root of Dewey's desire to unite the conscious with the unconscious and the doing with the undergoing. He writes:

> We rarely recognize the extent in which our conscious estimates of what is worthwhile . . . are due to standards of which we are not at all conscious . . . but in general the things that we take for granted without inquiry or reflection are just the things which determine our conscious thinking and decide our conclusions . . . and these are the habitudes which lie below the level of reflection and have been formed in the constant give and take of relationship with others. (Dewey, 1966, p. 18)

The importance of the above statement lies in the immorality of acting from unexamined, unconscious beliefs. For Dewey, if one is truly thinking, he/she will also be acting and acting in a morally responsible way. If one is awake, conscious of and therefore responsible for the connections, he/she will be engaging in the moral life, according to Dewey. Thinking-wakefulness then becomes the way in which one can "cease being plague stricken." He writes,

> All that the wisest man can do is to observe what is going on more widely and more minutely and then to select more carefully from what is noted just those factors which point to something to happen. (Dewey, 1966, p. 145)

Dewey's "reflective thought" process synthesizes the dynamic interaction between the certain and uncertain and organizes the stages of how one engages in the unveiling process. For Dewey, it offers the guidance for emancipation and freedom.

> Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests in the trained power of thought, in ability to "turn things over," to look at matters deliberately, to judge the amount and kind of evidence requisite for decision is at hand, and if not, to tell where and how to seek such evidence. (Dewey, 1933, p. 67)

He goes on to write, "We are free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are about" (Dewey, 1929, p. 250).

The constructs of Dewey's reflective process parallel the inductive and deductive stages of scientific research methods: (a) a felt difficulty; (b) its location and definition; (c) suggestion of possible solution; (d) development by reasoning of bearings of the suggestion; (e) further observation and experiment leading to acceptance or rejection (Dewey, 1933, p. 72). It is a double movement from the given partial and confused picture to a suggested comprehensive whole and back from the sugggested comprehensive whole to the particular facts. The backward and forward movement of this research is intended to connect the particular facts with one another and then to connect these particular facts with additional facts toward which the suggestion has directed our attention. It is an awakening and attending process which offers a "freeing"

capability. A freedom in which action is informed by a knowing examination of and responsibility for the connections.

This "reflective process" provides a structure for action in which "the problem fixes the end of thought and the end controls the process of thinking" (Dewey, 1933, p. 12). However, it is an ongoing and disciplined process and not a mechanical one. Dewey writes:

> If the situation presents something novel and hence uncertain the entire response is not mechanical, because this mechanical operation is put to use in solving a problem. There is no end to this spiral process: foreign subject-matter transformed through thinking into a familiar possession becomes a resource for judging and assimilating additional foreign subject-matter. (Dewey, 1933, p. 223)

He continues by furthering his understanding that knowledge or foreign-subject matter made familiar is not the fixed or permanent end of thinking but that it serves to enhance the process of inquiry. In fact, for Dewey, the acquiring is almost secondary to the inquiring. He writes:

> While all thinking results in knowledge, the true value of knowledge is subordinate to its use in thinking. For we live not in a settled and finished world but in one which is going on, and where our main task is prospective and where retrospect--and all knowledge, as distinct from thought is retrospect--is of value in the solidarity, security and fertility it affords in our dealings with the future. (Dewey, 1966, p. 151)

The "reflective thought process" proposes the type of discipline necessary and the direction in which to move in demystifying previously oppressive conditions. For Dewey dogmatism, tradition, the supernatural constitute the

structures of oppression because historically they have been beyond question. He writes of this oppression, "Interest in the supernatural therefore reinforces other vested interests to prolong the social reign of accident" (Dewey, 1934, p. 78). The reflective process offers a way of questioning the previously unquestionable and mystifying while inspiring an emancipatory vision. For Dewey it offers the mechanism with which to critique as well as with which to reconstruct through morally responsible praxis aimed at emancipation. Dewey's discussion of faith in A Common Faith embraces this moving and hopeful vision of the "reflective thought process":

> The ideal ends to which we attach our faith are not shadowy and wavering. They assume concrete form in our understanding of our relations to one another and the values contained in these relations. . . . The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the repsonsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant. (Dewey, 1934, pp. 86-87)

Dewey's message, although highly complex, concerns itself with social reform, transformation, and transmission. He is thoroughly committed to the necessity for the examination of our ethical, moral, and religious values so that through their investigation richer meaning may evolve. He embraces

the uncertain as being that which provides the magnetic and creative force that pulls and attracts one's awarenesses and propels one to reconstruct the meaning of given realities through the formulation of examined connections spawned of imagination and curiosity. His message is one of hope for the application of the "reflective thought process" to the social and emotional dimenisons of our experience in an effort to remove the divisions that oppress us and prevent us from realizing the meaning of our existence. His is the message of empowerment and hope made possible through the application of the "reflective thought process" to the uncertain, unconscious conditions of our existence in order to examine that which we take for granted and that which consequently mystifies us. It is the hope that we might be free to act as though we knew what we were about in our efforts to cease being plague stricken.

Section II:
Paulo Freire: The Conscientization Process

Encompassed within Freire's "conscientization" process are many of the fundamental constructs that Dewey offers in his "reflective thought process." At the core of both Freire's and Dewey's work lies their adherence to the value of the scientific method, their regard for distanced examination of reality, and their commitment to phenomenological investigation. They both share the quest for certainty by

facing the uncertain openly and hopefully. Their understandings of being and knowing are rooted in their dedication to process and inquiry. They consider the acts of becoming and of inquiry to be the vital projects that ought to consume our human energies.

Each regards process itself, rather than acquisition or completion, as forming the essence of human being. The process rather than the end, the becoming rather than the being, serve to focus Freire's and Dewey's concerns. Their beliefs that every original end prioritizes and orders the means, which then requires responsible action or praxis, and that these ends then become the means for yet unrecognized and unconstructed ends, reflects the significance of the phenomenological movement in their work.

In his conscientization process Freire clearly embraces the phenomenological notion which deals with the tension inherent in relationship, and most specifically in relationships that can metaphorically be thought of in a subject and object sense. He addresses the tension that exists in the dialectic between categories that have been thought of by many as representing the dualities of our lives, such as teacher-student, subject-object, dominator-dominated, and master-slave.

For both Dewey and Freire, experiencing the tensions that are manifest in these dualities provide the objects of consciousness. Both Dewey and Freire regard, with utmost

seriousness, the issues of consciousness. Consciousness and experience are intimately intertwined for them. Experiences offer the objects upon which consciousness is shaped and re-shaped. For both, the phenomenological method provides the distance necessary to critically examine experiences in order to be more wakeful and responsible in taking action in light of freshly gained understandings.

Paulo Freire's concept of conscientization seems to embody the elements of his theoretical and practical understandings in the ongoing process of human emancipation. An emancipation that I feel Paulo Freire and John Dewey would agree as being one in which we act knowing what we are about in our efforts to cease being plague stricken. Conscientization deals with issues of consciousness in much the same manner as Dewey's reflective thought process does. In the sense that both conscientization and reflective thought address the need to problematize and scientifically unveil our realities.

Conscientization, although not a clearly defined or even intended mechanical method, does represent several interrelated themes that merge as structures of the conscientization process. Conscientization is the process by which an individual or a group transcend non-existent or naive states of consciousness and evolve into a critical consciousness. This process is brought about only by praxis, "the authentic

union of action and reflection" (Freire, 1985, p. 87). "Conscientization is a joint project in that it takes place in a man among other men, men united by their action and by their reflection upon that action and upon the world" (Freire, 1985, p. 85). The themes that emerge during this praxis that are encompassed by conscientization include dialogue, problematization, scientific unveiling and consequent ideological critique, and the announcement of a new reality or that to which Freire refers as an utopian enterprise.

The phenomenological concerns seem to be most specifically represented by the problematization and scientific unveiling aspects of conscientization. They seem to also be the major connecting links between Dewey and Freire. The phenomenological concept of construction and re-construction permeates the conscientization process. "Comprehension of the process of conscientization and its practice is directly linked then to one's understanding of consciousness in its relation to the world" (Freire, 1985, p. 168). The construction and reconstruction of consciousness and experience depends upon objectifying the world, to distance the world so that we may appropriate or take from the context that which we find essential and that which we can utilize in order to insert ourselves more fully into the world. The purpose of this phenomenological investigation is to enable us to become participants in our world, to allow us to understand

that we are capable of more than just accommodating or adapting ourselves to our world, and thus actually inviting us to participate and reconstruct. This is for Freire and Dewey the optimism found in the scientific unveiling and the phenomenological reconstruction.

For Freire, consciousness is impossible without objectifying the "not I" and that is not possible without the world. Consciousness is constituted in the dialectic of man's objectification of and action upon the world. "[It] is never a mere reflection of but a reflection upon material reality" (Freire, 1985, p. 69). Consciousness is conditioned by the world and experience and the world and experience are molded by consciousness. Freire writes:

> One's entire consciousness is always an awareness of something toward which one has some intention. Human self-consciousness implies a consciousness of things, a concrete real world where people see themselves as historical beings in a reality they learn through their capacity for thought. Knowledge of reality is essential for developing self-consciousness and a subsequent increase of knowledge. But if it's to be authentic, this act of knowledge always requires the unveiling of its object. This does not take place in that dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity, action and reflection, practice and theory. (Freire, 1985, p. 168)

The action and interaction of subject upon object and object upon subject reveals an emerging consciousness and a greater understanding of the meaning of our experience in the world. It is this active and passive, this doing and undergoing dialectic that Dewey refers to as being the dynamic action that reveals and enables one to reconstruct those

experiences that mold our consciousnesses. Freire writes, "We must use our experience or that of other subjects in the field as the focus of our reflection, as we attempt to increase our understanding" (Freire, 1985, p. 101). Consciousness, understood phenomenologically, enables us to more fully participate in our experiences as a result of being able to recognize the dialectic quality of our experiences and the correspondingly constructed nature of these realities. Further, phenonenological insight enables one to understand that our consciousness is shaped by these very experiences and realities.

Consequently, the phenomenological dialectic between consciousness and the world in shaping and re-shaping each other is essential in understanding the emancipatory educational vision of Freire and Dewey and others who hold a transformative world view. This doing and undergoing process removes the human being from a determinate, fatalistic, passive position in relation to the world and experience to a position that enables the individual to begin to understand the contextual and personal quality of history. In understanding that history is constructed by human beings and that it does not exist beyond our experience, one can sense the powerfully illuminating concepts of an emancipatory educational vision.

The phenomenological dialectic requires that the individual become a participant and an active subject in

experiencing and naming the world. It requires the individual to re-confront reality and to analyze that reality and his/her experience of that reality. It allows the individual to reconstruct that reality so that he/she can re-enter that situation in such a way that his/her continued experiences can be affirming rather than diminishing or altogether dismissing. It requires movement from the concrete which provides the facts to the theoretical in which the facts are analyzed and back into the concrete in a new form of praxis in which the empowered individual participates in a process of his/her own liberation. In the words of Dewey, "to observe what is going on more widely and more minutely" (Dewey, 1966, p. 145) and to understand that "we are free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are about" (Dewey, 1929, p. 250). The educational praxis of the transformative emancipatory thinkers encompasses the dialectic between reality, experience, and consciousness in which the empowered individual participates responsibly in the reconstruction and reshaping of all three: reality, experience, and consciousness.

Further, Freire and Dewey adhere to the idea that consciousness and knowledge expand as one pulls into consciousness and attends to that which was at one time only intended. "Since knowing is a process, knowledge that exists today was once only a viability and it then became a new knowledge, relative and therefore successive to yesterday's existing

knowledge" (Freire, 1985, pp. 114-115). Thus the dialectic in which human reconstruction occurs not only requires participation of those who at one time may have been regarded as objects but it also addresses issues of knowledge reconstruction. This view of knowledge recognizes knowledge, not as being for the purpose of transfer and consumption, but as being for the purpose of creative responsibility and construction.

Knowledge in terms of transformative-emancipatory educational praxis is knowledge that evolves as consciousness evolves and that grows as understanding of experience widens. Thus knowledge is not external, it is something which is apprehended by the acting subject. For knowledge that is beyond the subject's experience and consciousness is of an alienating nature. The dialectic creation and expansion of knowledge requires that the knowing and participating subject be one who is also the source of his or her own authority. Thus, as in the dimension of human construction of reality, consciousness, and experience, the human construction of knowledge removes knowledge from the realm of being used as a mechanism for oppression and exclusion into being used as a tool for empowerment and inclusion.

Section III:
Reflective Thought and Conscientization Compared

Dewey's "reflective thought process" and Freire's "conscientization process" as reflected in problematization and

scientific unveiling parallel each other as each seeks to address issues of critical consciousness and responsible action. The importance that each recognizes of the reconstruction of human reality, experience, consciousness, and knowledge is addressed by Dewey and Freire within the framework of their understanding of the phenomenological dialectic. However, although Dewey discusses the dogmatism of traditional religious belief and the inequities of economic difference, he seems to be less precise than Freire about the issues of power, interest, and ideology that maintain the status quo.

Freire consistently addresses the political interest of all action. He understands that conscientization is not just a neutral pedagogic tool but that it must be attached to the political questions. Not that Dewey thought that the "reflective thought process" was neutral, or that if implemented, it wouldn't contribute to the possibility of radical social change. However, Dewey did not articulate or address the deeper political interest ramifications of this process or the vested interest of the existing social structure. Freire is much more clear about his understanding of the political significance of pedagogy.

> Whether this is done ingenuously or astutely, separating education from politics is not only artificial but dangerous. To think of education independent from the power that constitutes it, divorced from the concrete world where it is forged, leads us either to reducing it to a world of abstract values and ideals (which the pedagogue constructs inside his consciousness without even understanding the conditioning that makes him think this way),

> or to converting it to a repertoire of behavioral techniques or to perceiving it as a springboard for changing reality. (Freire, 1985, p. 170)

The fundamental difference in the perspectives held by Dewey and Freire stem in part from the contextual differences of their personal and historical experiences. Dewey, being of the era of optimism and progress that represented the mood of hopeful idealism present in the United States at the turn of the century, held understandable faith in the pragmatic mechanisms of reflective thought processes to liberate and emancipate a society experiencing diverse cultural bombardment from Europe to more genuinely embracing the tenets of democracy. Freire, on the other hand, comes to the conscientization process from a history and experience that fosters a deeper suspicion of the vested interests of the existing social structure. Facing the very real struggles for human rights and freedom in South America, Freire has faced squarely the realities of conflict between the dominant and the oppressed. Thus he approaches the ideals of democracy with an understanding that there is a tension and struggle in the world between those seeking change and those supporting permanence. Freire's suspicion enables him to scientifically unveil and problematize a concrete situation, while at the same time remaining mindful of the political interests being served by the maintenance of such a situation. While Dewey and Freire discuss the dialectic between certainty and

uncertainty in the thinking, reflective, reconstructing process, Freire moves a step further, to include the dialectic between permanence and change as it continues to expose questions of political interest. Consequently, Freire's work at its heart, represents the desire and necessity to make explicit the political quality of the tensions which exist between the dualities which empowerment, "conscientization," and "reflective thought" seek to bind.

Thus, for Freire, the guiding light for conscientization and the encompassed praxis must be the beam of political questions that potentially generates transformation. Freire's critique of ideology enables him to address that which Dewey's faith or trust in the goodness of the ideals of democracy left him incapable of recognizing. Freire understands that the knowledge of reality which is revealed in problematization and scientific unveiling or in Dewey's reflective thought process is in itself not necessarily enough to move one to transform that reality. He understands that conscientization is not just a pedagogic method but that it must be attached to the political questions. Freire makes explicit that which Dewey deals with indirectly or implicitly. Freire addresses the ideological issues of domination in maintaining the power balance which perpetuates the social structure which is transmitted by the educational institution. Central to his understanding of the role of schools in functioning as institutions

for social control by dichotomizing teaching from learning, Freire reminds us of Marx's warning: "The educator should also be educated" (Freire, 1985, p. 105).

Consequently, Freire's conscientization is both political and prophetic, in that it must include the oppressed in the denunciation of the present reality and it must announce that which is coming. Giroux powerfully distinguishes between the idealism of Dewey and the more critical stance of Freire when he, Giroux, touches upon his own utopian vision as being that which is revealed in a praxis in which we are to live displaying "civic courage" or the willingness to act as though we were living in a democracy (Giroux, 1983, p. 201). In not addressing the political interest of the educational structure in maintaining the social structure and the reverse, Dewey trustingly held to the innate goodness of democratic ideals and the clarity of scientific reasoning to transform educational and social practice in the direction of emancipation.

At the center of Freire's work is his desire to reveal and re-unit the connections between the political and the pedagogical. Freire seems to most clearly address the nature of "interest" when dealing with issues of domination and ideology. According to Freire, these political questions regarding domination and ideology emerge during the problematization and scientific unveiling processes of conscientization. As experiences are scrutinized, the individual begins to develop a

critical consciousness in which he/she recognizes that reality is immersed in a continuous series of political struggles that pivot around questions of interest. However, Freire realizes what Dewey did not, that problematizing and scientific unveiling alone do not guarantee recognition of oppressive conditions or a corresponding reconstruction. In understanding the sociological phenomenon of hegemony Freire writes:

> Correcting one's earlier perception isn't always easy. The relation between subject and object means that revealing an objective reality equally affects its subjective qualities and sometimes in an intensely dramatic and painful manner. (Freire, 1985, p. 16)

Thus Freire devotes much of his attention to the necessity of becoming politically literate, for as one participates in the process of political literacy one also travels the path of educational liberation. Freire uses the metaphor of Easter in its most profound sense in order to vividly explain political literacy: "the educator must be prepared to die as the exclusive educator of learners" (Freire, 1985, p. 105).

Section IV:
Political Literacy and Educational Emancipation

The political illiterate "is one who has an ingenuous perception of humanity in its relationships with the world" (Freire, 1985, p. 103). The political illiterate is one who escapes reality by rejecting it and losing oneself in abstraction, one who is unconcerned about, for whom or for what

purposes he/she is working and who further believes in and maintains the structures which support subject and object dichotomies (Freire, 1985, pp. 102-103). Education is perceived as being for the purpose of transferring facts and values. The method of this educational practice is prescriptive. In other words, the political illiterate participates in the depository, banking notion of education as expressed by Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

Conversely, the politically literate educators and students are those who understand

> the very impossibility of theory without practice, the impossibility of thinking without a transforming action in the world, as well as the impossibility of knowledge for its own sake or the impossibility of a theory that only explicates reality and offers a neutral education. (Freire, 1985, p. 104)

The urgency with which Freire expresses his concerns for the necessity of developing and nurturing political literacy springs from his own recognition that without it critical consciousness cannot emerge.

> If we don't transcend the idea of education as pure transference of a knowledge that merely describes reality, we will prevent critical consciousness from emerging and thus reinforce political illiteracy. (Freire, 1985, p. 104)

Consequently, in the spirit of Easter, the educators as well as the students must die to their confining roles as depositors and receivers of knowledge to be reborn and awakened to the life of real educators and learners or that of being "educators of the self-educator and self-learner" (Freire,

1985, p. 105). For "without this mutual death and rebirth, education for freedom is impossible" (Freire, 1985, p. 105).

Thus, for Freire, education for political literacy provides the serious focus for all educational effort. The movement toward political literacy encompasses those aspects of the conscientization process that Dewey's reflective thought process fails to explicitly articulate, namely, critique of ideology, dialogue, and announcement of a new reality.

In analyzing issues of domination through ideological critique, Freire turns to the sociological constructs of superstructure and infrastructure in order to gain insights into the contribution of naive and shrewd attitudes in maintaining the status quo through social reform and to further understand the conditions which foster the entrenchment of hegemony. It is through the ideological critique of domination that Freire steps solidly beyond Dewey's reflective thought process and into the arena of explicit political questioning. Freire clearly reveals that the dominator's oppressive grip is much firmer than Dewey had envisioned with his critique of the dogmatic nature of tradition in A Common Faith.

Through Freire's infrastructure-superstructure lens one begins to understand that demystification and emancipation will not result from merely opening up the institutions of

tradition, i.e., religion and education, to examination by scientific unveiling or reflective thought process. The failure of Dewey's hope that the application of scientific reasoning in the form of reflective thought process would contribute to intellectual freedom and liberation is more clearly understood when viewing domination through Freire's ideological critique. In examining the political interest of the dominant traditions and institutions, Freire brings to the surface the dialectic interaction between values and action, between superstructure and infrastructure that explain the social structure itself. Freire understands that the dynamic tension between permanence and change characterizes the total social structure and that it is this very tension that needs to be examined in order to expose the interest being served. Thus, authentic praxis must embrace the political, if conscientization is to offer any hope for emergence of a critical consciousness that faces us toward emancipation.

Freire's component of ideological critique within the larger conscientization process speaks to the emergence of the politically literate individual, one who while developing a critical consciousness also penetrates the hierarchies of the existing social dualities and is empowered by his/her ability to articulate questions of interest. Thus the political literate recognizes that the maintenance of the status quo is in the interest of the dominant social class and that

the action of this class will be in the nature of assuring permanence. Understanding this enables the politically literate individual to criticize reform as being of a reactionary nature and as reflecting that which Freire characterizes as being either of a naive or shrewd attitude. In understanding the reactionary character of reform, one understands that changes made only in the infrastructure will not result in superstructural transformation. Consequently, without addressing the interest or political dynamic of domination and subordination, the oppressed remain the downtrodden, marginal, and objectified victims of social reform in which the social structure remains the same. Those possessing the attitude of the shrewd realize this and with complete comprehension of the political questions of interset support humanitarian action that ultimately slows any change in the social structure. The action of those possessing a naive attitude is directed toward changing the consciousness of the downtrodden through humanitarian works and encouragement in "other" worldly values, in hopes that a consciousness change will transform the world. However, since those possessing a naive attitude are politically illiterate, they do not address ideological concerns or issues of domination and the superstructure remains intact, reflecting the attitudes and values of the dominator.

Political illiteracy resulting in an inability to understand the infrastructure-superstructure dialectic offers the

prime condition under which hegemony is fostered. The dominated introject the cultural myths, values, and life styles of the dominator. Further:

> prevented from having a "structural perception" of the facts involving them, they do not know that they cannot "have a voice," that is, they cannot exercise the right to participate consciously in the sociohistorical transformation of their society. (Freire, 1985, p. 50)

Their voice is that of the dominator and when the dominator speaks, the dominated listen.

> This results in the duality of the dependent society, its ambiguity, its being and not being itself, and the ambivalence characteristic of its long experience of dependency, both attracted by and rejecting the metropolitan society. (Freire, 1985, p. 73)

Without a structural perception the dominated remain mystified, non-participatory, non-critical, and self-oppressed.

As the politically literate individual evolves, while grasping the significance of ideological critique, the phenomenon of hegemony begins to surface. Those who were once outcast, marginal, voiceless begin to name themselves as "oppressed," thus removing themselves from the objectified categories of marginality and placing themselves into a subjective position in which they have a voice. Once this self-naming begins, the oppressed have placed themselves into a position in which they have the potential for gaining insight into the ways in which political interest serves to structure the social context. Emancipation, empowerment, political literacy is not given, it is not earned, it is gained through

continual struggle in which praxis must be guided by reflection which scrutinizes ideology and consequently exposes the nature of the social structure and the existence of hegemony.

> Only when the people of a dependent society break out of the culture of silence and win their right to speak--only, that is, when radical structural changes transform the dependent society--can such a society as a whole cease to be silent toward the director society. (Freire, 1985, p. 73)

Dialogue is essential to the realization of Freire's conscientization process. In becoming politically literate one finds his/her voice and becomes capable of participating in dialogue. Freire writes that "authentic revolutions are undertaken in order to liberate men, precisely because men can know themselves to be oppressed, and be conscious of the oppressive reality in which they exist" (Freire, 1985, p. 89). In gaining a voice while becoming politically literate, one articulates and consequently knows himself-herself to be oppressed and addresses the oppressive nature of his or her own reality. Without a voice authentic revolution could not be possible.

Freire considers that "dialogue is the sign of the act of knowing" (Freire, 1985, p. 55). He continues that "for dialogue to be a method of true knowledge, the knowing subject must approach reality scientifically in order to seek the dialectical connections that explain the form of reality" (Freire, 1985, p. 55). Therefore, genuine dialogue is truly "word-and-action," for expression follows reflection and

the actual expression is in itself transforming. Dialogue becomes the pivotal point for reflection and action. Therefore, dialogue is an integral and continuous quality of conscientization. "Dialogue with the people, in cultural action for freedom, is not a formality but an indispensable condition in the act of knowing" (Freire, 1985, p. 163).

Critical consciousness is not an abstraction arising in theory but formed from reflection upon and articulation of concrete experiences. The meanings of these experiences emerge in the dialogue between man and man. In fact, authentic communication "implies communication between men, mediated by the world" (Freire, 1985, p. 84). Freire writes, "Dialogical relationship is a sign of the cognitive act, in which the knowing object, mediating the knowable subjects, gives itself over to a critical revelation" (Freire, 1985, p. 167). The presence of genuine dialogue, for Freire, is the indication that "conscientization" is occurring and that individuals are becoming politically literate. Dialogue is the culminating act signaling the appearance of individuals acting as knowing, responsible, participatory subjects.

The inclusion of dialogue in Freire's conscientization process seems to represent the expression, within the context of community, of Dewey's doing and undergoing quality of genuine experience. Since, for Freire, the mediating knowing object of the dialogical relationship is experience, the

relationship is propelled by the desire to more fully apprehend and clarify experience in order to capture more fully the extent to which one has done and undergone an experience. Dialogue is the expression in which one confirms, within a community, the transforming nature of doing and undergoing of experience. Dialogue emerges as knowable objects are revealed. That which is known and expressed in dialogue is the dynamic active-passive quality of experience and thus the transforming nature of dialogue and experience.

Through dialogue, Freire's final element of conscientization is disclosed, the announcement of a new reality. In keeping with the prophetic dialectic of criticism and hope, Freire's announcement of a new reality emerges through dialogue in the process of criticism and denouncement. As one denounces what is, transformation is occurring. When one is empowered to the point of being capable of expressing criticism, one already holds the kernel of possibility of what may be coming. "Humanization is their [beings of praxis] utopia, which they announce in denouncing, dehumanizing processes" (Freire, 1985, p. 70).

Freire makes explicit the requirement of this reconstructive, rebuilding action by addressing the utopian enterprise, or that toward which the conscientization process is directed.

> It [Utopian pedagogy] is full of hope, for to be utopian is not to be merely idealistic or impractical but rather to engage in denunciation and annunciation. Our pedagogy

> cannot do without a vision of man and of the world. It formulates a scientific humanist conception that finds its expression in a dialogical praxis in which teachers and learners together, in the act of analyzing a dehumanizing reality, denounce it while announcing its transformation in the name of the liberation of man. (Freire, 1985, p. 57)

For Freire, the utopian vision must be announced and constructed in order to complete the dialectic movement between criticism and hope. However, this denunciation and annunciation "cannot be exhausted when the reality denounced today cedes its place tomorrow to the reality previously announced in the denunciation" (Freire, 1985, p. 58). It is a continuous movement in which change and possibility are affirmed as steps are taken toward human liberation. Freire clearly understands that

> When education is no longer utopian, that is, when it no longer embodies the dramatic unity of denunciation and annunciation, it is either because the future has no more meaning for men, or because men are afraid to risk living the future as creative overcoming of the present, which has become old. (Freire, 1985, p. 58)

Dialogue is the vehicle through which the politically literate individual emerges during the denunciation aspect of ideological critique and the annunciation process of an utopian vision. Through dialogue, individuals participate in the explicit expression of their criticisms of their present realities and take part in the concrete construction of their visions and hopes for a new reality. Dialogue, as an expression of doing and undergoing of experience, binds denunciation with annunciation and criticism with hope.

Dewey's "reflective thought process" in lacking the connective link of dialogue remains vulnerable to being incapable of addressing the issues of ideological critique and the envisioned new realities of Freire's conscientization process. Dewey's work implicitly embodies both criticism of tradition and hope for the realization of democratic ideals. However, in not recognizing the requirement of dialogue in the emergence of political literacy, he remains mystified by his own method and by his idealistic faith in the reality of democracy. By failing to understand the deeper roots of the questions of interest, Dewey innocently pleads for the realization of justice which is inherent in our democratic principles. Further, he relies upon the logic offererd by the reflective thought process to make these ideals of freedom and equality manifest.

In spite of their historical and contextual differences that result in the above stated theoretical variations, Dewey and Freire represent, for me, the essence and attraction of transformative-emancipatory educational thinking and practice. Their message of empowerment is addressed as issues regarding the nature and quality of consciousness and experience are dealt with. The distancing and appropriating of phenomenological investigation of experience, consciousness, and knowledge form the framework within which emancipatory construction and reconstruction of reality take place. Their central

positioning of praxis and dialogue further attends to the importance of responsibility that takes place within the empowerment process. The dialogic rather than dualistic manner of approaching experiences in the face of uncertainty affirms their effort to reduce the alienating structures of hierarchy. Theirs is a message of empowerment that accompanies the demystification of oppressive realities as consciousness, knowledge, and experience are reconstructed within a greater vision of justice. The heart of their message holds the hope that we may come to know what we are about in our efforts to cease being plague stricken.

The transformative-emancipatory educational vision is one in which the struggle to realize a more just community is central. Paramount to this realization of justice are the constructs of demystification which Dewey and Freire refer to in the "reflective thought" and "conscientization" process, respectively. Critical consciousness and the social reconstruction of knowledge, experience, and consciousness provide the essential qualities of praxis that empower. Thus transformative-emancipatory educational practice embraces the freeing action of empowerment as critical consciousness and reconstruction are aimed at responsible and caring acts of justice.

Section V:
My Transformative-Emancipatory Hermeneutic Journey

My affirmation of the validity of the transformative-emancipatory message is addressed as I turn to reflect upon my own hermeneutic journies. As touched upon earlier, my first trip around the hermeneutic circle was on the level of examination of those to whom Freire would refer to as having a "naive attitude." I was unable to voice the deeper political questions of interest, for the interpretation of my interpretations remained primarily in the realm of a technical consciousness. Consequently, my taken-for-granted world was rarely questioned. Further, the generally accepted nature of my helping action, in the form of teaching, aided in preserving the very structures of the educational institution that I found to be alienating and offensive.

As my second hermeneutic journey became reflexive rather than reflective, the interpretation of my understandings and my taken-for-granted realities changed. Reflecting a more politically literate consciousness, I was able to reinterpret my teaching practice in terms that enabled me to see that much of my helping was actually contributing to the maintenance of the unjust, dignity-denying relationships that I was hoping to diminish. In the words of Camus, I was an oblivious transmitter of the plague: "The evil that is in the world always comes of ignorance, and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding" (Camus, 1972, p. 124).

A gradual demystification process began to slowly take effect as the questions of interest began to resonate with my discomfort. I began to be able to voice my uneasiness and to unite theory with practice. My second trip around the hermeneutic circle was energized by the empowerment gained through the illumination of issues of interest.

I feel that quite possibly my sensitivity to the questions of interest and my increasing discomfort with the superficial, empty nature of the positivistic, traditional technical rationale were heightened by the births of my own children. Their presence in this world has had an awesome and humbling effect upon me, an effect which has opened me to wisdom of the message of praxis. A message which addresses the urgency of the need for critical reflection upon and responsible action taken in the face of injustice and oppression. I have experienced an overwhelming sense of a loss of innocence as I have attempted to contemplate the meanings of their births. Their presence has illuminated more clearly, for me, my connections with myself and with our world. Concern for my children's beings and futures has increased my understanding of and empathy with all mothers of the world who anguish for their children's health and well-being. This has connected me at a deeper level with the quest for justice and human dignity. Therefore, I feel that perhaps I have heard more clearly than before the empty and death-dealing promises of the technical rationale.

The questions of interest, as formulated by critical theory and expressed by transformative-emancipatory thinkers, began to offer me ways of making new connections and reconstructing others. My second trip around the hermeneutic circle has enabled me to soundly question and criticize the technocratic rationale of positivistically informed educational practice. This criticism has enabled me to construct an interpretation of my world that has embraced a political understanding. I have been invigorated and energized by the realization and ownership of the understanding of social construction of reality. I have been captivated by the endless possibilities that this realization has offered in addressing and rectifying the conditions of oppression and injustice that have manifested themselves at all levels of our society.

At this point, I have connected most solidly with the messages of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Henry Giroux, who, while adhering to the ideals of democracy, deal with educational emancipation from a social transformation standpoint. Their messages of reflective thought, conscientization, and transformative intellectualism speak to action and reflection upon conditions of oppression that I had felt inadequate to address as a special education teacher indoctrinated with the technical rationale. Their work has offered me a world that can be transformed through social reconstruction; it has given me the political understanding of interest as it

is connected to questions of experience, consciousness, and knowledge. It has enabled me to firmly address the alienation created by the oppressive structures of the dominant mentality in maintaining the status quo through liberal social reform. This transformative, emancipatory vision has energized me with hope and has enabled me to criticize the structural injustice of positivistic, technical thinking. At this point I felt that through "reflective thought," "conscientization," and "transformative intellectualism," liberation would occur.

My second trip around the hermeneutic circle has filled me with a transformative consciousness that has given me a sociological orientation which has provided me with a community rather than individualistic orientation and a structural rather than personal understanding of oppression. It has enabled me to examine my taken-for-granted world through the political lens of interest. I have been empowered by Paulo Freire's "conscientization" and John Dewey's "reflective thought" processes as questions of interest and possibilities of reconstruction reveal and illuminate painful paradoxes existing in our schools and culture. Thus I have begun to develop a language which has enabled me to address injustice and oppression from a position of critical theory. The transformative consciousness of critical theory has provided me with the tools of reconstruction with which to address human

dignity through acts of justice. From the perspective offered by Reinholt Niebuhr, critical theory and transformative-emancipatory consciousness has allowed me to speak to the plight of those who have so little power that their being is almost impossible.

Yet, in spite of my own hermeneutic verification of the wisdom of the transformative-emancipatory message, I also realize that it is an incomplete vision of liberation. As I begin to examine the transformative-emancipatory vision supported by critical theory as it connects to the liberation of the labeled exceptional population, I begin to feel uneasy. That which has empowered me, that which has filled me with visions of social justice and affirmed my dignity is not going to be the same enabler for the disabled, the handicapped, and the young. Social justice and emancipation as put forth by critical theory do not adequately reach the depth needed to illuminate the human dignity of these people.

The transformative-emancipatory consciousness potentially seems to address ways of responding to conditions of injustice through the formulation of "conscientization" and/or "reflective thought" processes which can function as tools for emancipation and empowerment. However, the issues of human dignity, for the young and handicapped, as revealed through justice and love, are not fully addressed by critical theory. Consequently, the dialectic between the

transformative-emancipatory and the transcendent-liberatory seem to be vital to our hopes and visions of revealing who and what we are as human beings.

With the emphasis of emancipation placed upon "conscientization," "reflective thought," and "political literacy," the transformative view regards intellectual and literacy abilities as being necessary prerequisites for empowerment. One cannot appropriate if one's reasoning skills are not relatively intact. Thus, the capacity for critical exploration is an essential ingredient for emancipatory thinking. Consequently, the young and the severely handicapped are unable to participate in this emancipatory process and remain vulnerable to the benevolent and potentially patronizing and oppressive intentions of the emancipated. Love, that which for me cannot be left to chance, that which cannot be manipulated and appropriated, is not necessarily brought forth by the transformative consciousness of critical theory.

As my questions change from those of interest, which I perceive as addressing justice, to those of that which cannot be left to chance, which I consider as dealing with issues of love and relationship, I begin a third trip around the hermeneutic circle. This journey is propelled by the concern for how we are to respond to one another or how we are to understand love. At this point I turn to the philosophical and spiritual insights offered by Martin Buber and Abraham Heschel as they respond to the questions of love and relationship.

CHAPTER IV

THE TRANSCENDENT-LIBERATORY VISION

The educational vision of the transcendent-liberatory orientation is one in which human dignity is confirmed and illuminated through serious acts of love. Mutuality, reciprocity, and subjectivity form the core of the transcendent-liberatory vision. The educational mission is a calling to participate in relation in such a way that we do not diminish our capacity to confirm and be confirmed. The educational mission and calling require action that passionately propels us to engage in the mystery. Such engagement leaves us with awe and wonder. Awe enables us to become aware of the mystery but awe never results in our comprehension or revelation of the mystery. Heschel writes:

> Awe is an intuition for the dignity of all things, a realization that things not only are what they are but also stand, however remotely, for something supreme. Awe is a sense for the transcendence, for the reference everywhere to mystery beyond all things. . . . What we cannot comprehend by analysis, we become aware of in awe. (Heschel, 1965, pp. 88-89)

The transcendent-liberatory vision of educational practice and purpose embraces the mystery rather than the uncertain. Their quest becomes one of awe-inspired wisdom rather than curiosity-sparked knowledge. The aim of the transcendent-liberatory mission is guided toward a heightened conscience

in which one becomes aware of his existential guilt and existential indebtedness rather than a critical consciousness which enables us to reconstruct reality. The spiritual dialectic rather than the dialectic of praxis encompasses the tensions of the transcendent-liberatory vision. The spiritual dialectic is molded by the struggles of good in the face of evil which shape that which is "between man and man," namely relation, dialogue, love, and spirit.

This vision concerns itself primarily with how one responds to that which is required. Consequently, how one faces himself, the world, and God constitute the focus of the transcendent-liberatory practice. Insights from Buber and Heschel provide the sources for constructing such an educational vision of the spiritual dialectic. It is a dialectic in which existential guilt and existential indebtedness provide us with the intimation of how one engages in life and the mystery.

In responding to the "how," the transcendent-liberatory vision of educational practice encompasses the relation between good and evil and attempts to consistently name the destructive powers of evil, namely exclusion and alienation. In so doing, the transcendent-liberatory mission calls one to take direction, make decision, and act in love. This calling is one of surrender and inclusion, it is one done in wholeness, it is the potentiality of our mutually bringing one another to presence during encounter by confirming and being confirmed.

Martin Buber offers insights into good and evil, relation, and consciousness that provide the basic tenets upon which the transcendent-liberatory vision rests. Abraham Heschel offers reflections upon dignity and reciprocity which further contribute to the foundations of the transcendent-liberatory mission. Together Buber and Heschel provide the theological and philosophical orientation upon which the transcendent-liberatory vision is founded.

Section I:
Martin Buber: Distance and Return

In contemplating the dynamics of human being and becoming, Martin Buber offers the metaphorical distinctions between an I-It self-consciousness of ego and an I-Thou self-consciousness of person. In so doing, he attempts to address the crucial elements of distance and return as they form the conditions for the possibility of all genuine relationship as well as the potential for impairment to the formulation of relationship. He discusses this distancing and relating as being the two-fold movement and principle of human life. For only when something has been set at a distance, can the possibility of relation exist. However, the distancing is only the presupposition for relation and not the guarantee of it.

In the distancing, man is provided with his situation, and in the relating he is given the possibility of becoming in that situation. Buber writes:

> The facts of the movement of distance yield the essential answer to the question, How is man possible; the facts of the movement of relation yield the essential answer to the question, How is human life realized. . . . Distance provides the human situation; relation provides man's becoming in that situation. . . . This difference can be seen in two spheres, within the connection with things and within the connection with one's fellow men. (Buber, 1965, p. 64)

The complexity of this dynamic is further illuminated in understanding that man is the one creature who is capable of distancing the whole as a world rather than only cutting out that which he needs. Consequently, man is capable of entering into a relationship which reveals his whole being and becoming and which transcends the relationships of utility and experience.

> Rather is this the peculiarity of human life, that here and here alone a being has arisen from the whole, endowed and entitled to detach the whole as a world from himself and to make it an opposite to himself, instead of cutting out with his senses the part he needs from it, as all other beings do, and bring content with that. This endowment and this entitlement of man produce, out of the whole, the being of the world, and this being can only mean that it is there for man as something that is for itself, with which he is able to enter into relation. (Buber, 1965, p. 63)

Further, it is in the distancing that language emerges as the link for possible relation. The distancing movement evokes the word which attempts to connect that which has been distanced. Buber writes,

> To speak to others is something essentially human, and is based on the establishment and acknowledgment of the independent otherness of the other with whom one fosters relation, addressing and being addressed on this very basis. (Buber, 1965, p. 68)

The word that is spoken, from this distanced position, has the capacity for placing us into authentic relationship or for preventing genuine encounter. If one speaks "it," then one enters into a relationship mediated by and concerned with experience. Experience remains between man and man preventing actual relation. However, if one says, "Thou," one is offered the possibility of coming into being through the event of relation.

Thus the distancing movement is vital to our very being. In the distancing, I become an "I" in the world, I exist, I have a world. As an "I," I am capable of return. The questions I formulate, as I exist and am distanced, offer the opportunity to return with either an ego self-consciousness of it or a person self-consciousness of thou. Distance offers the possibility for becoming, it is a presupposition for being but not the source of the realization of being. The appearance of distance gives space for the relation. In addition, the way in which I distance further contributes to my capacity for saying "it" or "thou." If I appropriate and cut out that from which I distance, if I do not distance from the whole, I am unable to relate or return as a whole. That from which I distance offers the potentiality for who I can become and how I am capable of returning. I am who and how I am, based upon how I distance and what I speak while distanced.

Distance is the presupposition for relation as well as for evil. Therefore, the way in which we distance, whether what is over and above us is the whole or an appropriated and selected portion of the whole, determines what we are able to enter into relation with. How we conduct ourselves while distanced, the types of questions we formulate, the words that are spoken, direct the kinds of relationships we may enter into. Do we speak "it" and enter into a relation of experience and utility, or do we say "thou" and potentially enter into pure presence and being?

The return is not a guarantee of the realization of being, for in returning one is either saying "it" or "thou." Thus one returns either as the "subject" of further subject-object relationships or as subjectivity with the potentiality for mutually bringing oneself and the other to presence.

> The longing for relation is primary, the cupped hand into which the being that confronts us nestles, and the relation to that, which is a wordless anticipation of saying You comes second. (Buber, 1970, p. 78)

Thus the yearning for relation precedes the word that is spoken and in our desire for return we may either say "it" or "thou."

Even, in longing for relation and in returning while saying "Thou," one is still not guaranteed of being or becoming, for actuality is given in grace. Buber writes, "When we walk our way and encounter a man who comes toward us, walking his way, we know our way only and not his; for his comes

to life for us only in the encounter" (Buber, 1970, p. 124). He continues:

> Our concern, our care must be not for the other side but for our own, not for grace but for will. Grace concerns us insofar as we proceed toward it and await its presence; it is not our object. (Buber, 1970, p. 124)

The will that constitutes our side of relation is the will to attach our power, energy, and actions toward becoming. Thus "will" is the will to respond to God's command, that of performing the essential deed. Man's essential deed and supreme duty require him to return, in spirit, to the distraction of the world. Risking to say "thou" with his whole being, surrendering his power to determine and control the possible outcomes of an encounter, and being able to exclusively and completely confront the one who is before him are the sacrifices and risks that the essential deed involves.

> What is required is a deed that a man does with his whole being: if he commits it and speaks with his being the basic word to the form that appears, then the creative power is released and the work comes into being. (Buber, 1970, p. 60)

We cannot "will" our selves into being by following a prescription for relationship. As Heschel writes, "My own existence is not the result of my will to exist" (Heschel, 1965, p. 98). However, our responsibility is to know our side of this relationship. We must know our will and it must be directed toward the two-fold electing and elected nature of relationship. We must always be going forth, reaching

toward encounter, while at the same time being prepared to say "Thou" at any moment. Our "power" needs to be concentrated upon going forth and remaining open while our "will" should be directed at speaking "Thou." "Man's will to be cannot be separated from his ought to be. . . . Being is obedience, a response. 'Thou art' precedes 'I am.' I am because I am called upon to be" (Heschel, 1965, p. 98).

For Heschel, the "characteristic of human existence is the mutual involvement of being and meaning" (Heschel, 1965, p. 98). Further, the concern for meaning is the core which constitutes the truth of being human. Thus, "Man may be characterized as a being in quest of a meaning of life" (Heschel, 1965, p. 54). This meaning is ultimately found in mutuality, reciprocity, and unity. Heschel writes, "The cry for meaning is a cry for ultimate relationship, for ultimate belonging" (Heschel, 1965, p. 73). To "be" means to be human which means to be concerned for the meaning of human being. This meaning can be touched upon only in relationship. Thus, the insights we gain, the momentary flickers of meaning, are illuminated only in the reciprocity of relationship. Meaning is received in encounter and being is a response to the command that we engage in these relationships that reveal the meaning of our being human. Meaning and being are received as we engage in relationships. We are indebted to the other for the opportunity to engage in relationship, for being able to glimpse

meaning and for illuminating our being. "Man cannot think of himself as human without being conscious of his indebtedness" (Heschel, 1965, p. 108).

In the genuine relationship, which is given in grace and for which we are eternally grateful, we recognize our indebtedness. Upon such a recognition, meaning and being are illuminated. Only in the reciprocity of relation can we glimpse the nature of our being and the meaning of our being human--a meaning which intimately recognizes its indebtedness.

Therefore, the act of will is not one in which meaning and being are objects and outcomes of the will's determination and power. But meaning and being emerge and are illuminated as the intentionality and control of "will" are surrendered to the sacrificing and risking "will" to engage in the essential deed. The essential deed, to speak "Thou" with one's whole being, is not performed for the purpose of self-realization and self-actualization but because it, the essential deed, is required of man. The essential deed is one's supreme duty, and it is the way in which one is commanded to live. Buber writes of this command and essential deed:

> Here the You appeared to man out of a deeper mystery, addressed him out of the dark, and he responded with his life. Here the word has become life, and this life, . . . is teaching. Thus it stands before posterity in order to teach it, not what is and not what ought be, but how one lives in the spirit, in the countenance of the You. And that means: it stands ready to become a You for them at any time opening up the You-world; no, it does not stand ready; it always comes toward them and touches them. (Buber, 1970, p. 92)

We cannot know the other side which is given in grace, but we must proceed toward its presence with a full understanding of our side and our responsibility. "Man's will to profit and will to power are natural and legitimate as long as they are tied to the will to human relations and carried by it" (Buber, 1970, p. 97). Our concern is with the way in which we encounter, in truth, and with authenticity, every real event in this world and this means to "will" to risk and "will" to sacrifice in order to engage in the "essential deed."

In the returning moment, the will to say "thou" or the will to say "it" do not emerge from the same self-consciousness. Buber writes, "The I of the basic word I-You is different from that of the basic word I-It" (Buber, 1970, p. 111). He continues, "The I of the basic word I-It appears as an ego and becomes conscious of itself as a subject (of experience and use)" (Buber, 1970, pp. 111-112). Conversely, "The I of the basic word I-You appears as a person and becomes conscious of itself as subjectivity (without any dependent genetive)" (Buber, 1970, p. 112). In becoming either ego or person, the "I" establishes its mode of existence in the world. He writes, "The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being" but "the basic word I-It can never be spoken with one's whole being" (Buber, 1970, p. 54).

If we have distanced ourselves from an appropriated and cut-up portion of the whole, we are unable to become a whole

being and are incapable of speaking anything other than "it." When that which is over and above us is the whole, and when the other is exclusively and completely the other, only then can we speak "Thou" and participate in the possibility of becoming. Buber writes:

> Whoever stands in relation, participates in an actuality; that is, in a being that is neither merely a part of him nor merely outside him. All actuality is an activity in which I participate without being able to appropriate it. Where there is no participation, there is no actuality. Where there is self-appropriation, there is no actuality. The more directly the You is touched, the more perfect is the participation. (Buber, 1970, p. 113)

It is the penetration and concentration of the "I" during these distanced moments in which the comprehension of experience is grasped or in which the event of relation is integrated and turns the I toward the world with either an appropriating or participating attitude. However, these attitudes do not reflect two distinct types of individuals but rather a dynamic oscillation between two radically different ways of being in and greeting the world. Buber writes, "There are not two kinds of human beings, but there are two poles of humanity" (Buber, 1970, p. 114). He continues, "No human being is pure person, and none is pure ego; none is entirely actual, none is entirely lacking in actuality" (Buber, 1970, p. 114).

Section II:
Buber: The I Self-consciousness of Ego

The I-It self-consciousness of ego becomes conscious of itself as a subject which sets itself apart from other egos for the purpose of utilizing, experiencing, and possessing those distanced objects of observation (Buber, 1970, pp. 111-114). The self-consciousness of ego is refined in the subject-object dynamic in which the subject acts upon the object and is, in return, acted upon by the object. This doing and undergoing of experience allows the ego to comprehend, or understand, more and more or less and less of the object in question. In other words, understanding takes place in the meeting of texts as the subject is able to apprehend the object.

The purpose of the dynamic interchange between subject and object in the I-It mode of existence is to know, to make stable, and to possess more of the object. It is the phenomenon of which Dewey and Polanyi speak when they refer to making that of which we are aware that to which we attend, so that what we attend to will eventually embrace or make more certain that of which we were at one time only aware. The dialectic of the subject and object in the I-It mode of existence is for the purpose of refining and reforming the subject so that the subject is capable of having finer and more comprehensible experiences. Unfortunately, as Buber points out, as our skills for living in the I-It world improve, our

ability to live in the I-Thou decreases. He writes, "The improvement of the capacity for experience and use generally involves a decrease in man's power to relate--that power which alone can enable man to live in the spirit" (Buber, 1970, p. 89).

The refinement of experience and improvement of living in the world of utility are further understood as impediments to the power of relation as one recognizes the self-deception that the ego devises as it lives in the world of experience. Buber writes:

> The ego becomes conscious of himself as a being this way and not that . . . ; the ego says, "That is how I am" . . . To the ego it ("Know Thyself") means: know your being-that-way. By setting himself apart from others, the ego moves away from being.
>
> The ego . . . wallows in his being-that-way a fiction that he has devised for himself. For at bottom self-knowledge usually means to him the fabrication of an effective apparition of the self that has the power to deceive him even more thoroughly. (Buber, 1970, pp. 113-114)

The I-It self-consciousness of ego is one of appearance and seeming which ultimately distorts and prevents the opportunity for authentic dialogue in which one is capable of saying Thou, of confirming the other, or of being confirmed by another. The mask of appearance that the ego fabricates stands in the way of giving or receiving the event of relation. Consequently, the ego "knows himself as a subject, but this subject can appropraite as much as it wants to, it will never gain any substance: it remains like a point,

functional, that which experiences, that which uses, nothing more (Buber, 1970, p. 114).

In brief summary, by living in the world of experience one becomes accomplished at the skills of appropriating and utilizing. These skills enable one to construct a vision of himself as being-a-certain-way in the world. These images of the self as a utilizer or experiencer formulate a mask of appearances which enable one to more successfully and efficiently engage in the refinement and transformation of experiences. However, these same self-images are the very masks which ultimately diminish, distort, and prevent one from participating in relation because they conceal and dull the whole being of the person. Thus the masked ego actively appropriates and experiences the world but does not gain spiritual maturation or substance. The ego does not participate in or receive any actuality. "The more a human being, the more humanity is dominated by ego, the more does the I fall prey to inactuality" (Buber, 1970, p. 115).

The penetration and concentration of the I of the ego self-consciousness is one in which the I integrates finer and more efficient ways of possessing and experiencing greater portions of the objects of the world. During the moments of distance, the I of the ego self-consciousness cuts out and appropriates to itself those objects of experience which when related to, upon encounter, enable or empower the

ego to be more fully and critically conscious of the dynamics of that particular experience. The distancing and returning movements of the ego self-consciousness of the I-It are designed to enable the ego "I" to become more skillful in appropriating, utilizing, and experiencing the objects of contemplation. The I-It self-consciousness of ego does not distance from a unified whole but rather from a selected portion of the whole, thus the ego is incapable of coming into relation with his whole being. Since the I-It ego distanced itself from an appropriated piece of the whole, it is unable to relate with its whole being and is consequently incapable of saying anything other than "it." "The basic word I-It can never be spoken with one's whole being" (Buber, 1970, p. 54). The penetration of the I of the ego self-consciousness provides the mask of appearances which enables and prepares the ego to effectively appropriate and to efficiently experience.

In saying "I" the ego self-consciousness sounds tragic, pitiful, terrifying, embarrassing, or disgusting. These are the sounds which signal the inauthenticity of the "I" or the speaker. These are the tones which alert one to the distortion or possible betrayal of relation. These are the sounds of appearance. Buber writes:

> How dissonant the I of the ego sounds! When it issues from tragic lips tense with some self-contradiction that they try to hold back, it can move us to great pity. When it issues from chaotic lips that savagely,

> Heedlessly, unconsciously represent contradiction, it can make us shudder. When the lips are vain and smooth, it sounds embarrassing or disgusting. (Buber, 1970, p. 115)

Section III:
Buber: The I Consciousness of person

The I-Thou self-consciousness of person, on the other hand, does not deny the world of experience and utility but recognizes it as being a fundamental mode of meaningful existence. Buber writes, "This does not mean that the person 'gives up' his being-that-way, his being different; only, this is not the decisive perspective but merely the necessary and meaningful form of being" (Buber, 1970, p. 114). Buber powerfully makes the distinction between living in the I-It self-consciousness of ego and the I-Thou self-consciousness of person when he writes, "And in all the seriousness of truth, listen: without It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human" (Buber, 1970, p. 85).

"How much of a person a man is depends on how strong the I of the basic I-You is in the human duality of his I" (Buber, 1970, p. 115). The I-Thou self-consciousness of person is one in which the I becomes conscious of itself as subjectivity. "Persons appear by entering into relation to other persons" (Buber, 1970, p. 112). Further, "The purpose of relation is the relation itself--touching the You . . . as soon as we touch a You, we are touched by a breath of eternal life" (Buber, 1970, pp. 112-113). Buber writes:

> The person becomes conscious of himself as participating in being, as being with, and thus as a being. . . . The person says, "I am"; . . . "Know thyself" means to the person: know yourself as being. (Buber, 1970, p. 113)

The I-Thou self-consciousness of person is apparent in the being of the free man who responds by entering into relationship with his whole being and "risks" to live in the spirit. Of the free man Buber writes:

> The man to whom freedom is guaranteed does not feel oppressed by causality. He knows that his mortal life is by its very nature an oscillation between You and It, and he senses the meaning of this. It suffices him that again and again he may set foot on the threshold of the sanctuary in which he could never tarry. Indeed, having to leave it again and again is for him an intimate part of the meaning and destiny of this life. There, on the threshold, the response, the spirit is kindled in him again and again; here in the unholy and indigent land the spark has to prove itself. What is here called necessity can not frighten it; for there he recognized true necessity: fate. (Buber, 1970, pp. 101-102)

The free man encounters, with his whole being, that which he goes forth and reaches toward.

> He listens to that which grows, to the way of Being in the world, not in order to be carried along by it but rather in order to actualize it in the manner in which it, needing him, wants to be actualized by him--with human spirit and human deed, with human life and human death. (Buber, 1970, p. 109)

The free man, who has the self-consciousness of person, distances from a unified and whole world, making that from which he distances exclusively and completely whole, thus he is capable of going forth with his whole being--the task of the free man. Further, he is capable of saying "Thou" with his whole being--the essential deed of the free man.

The person does not utilize, appropriate, or experience. He "sacrifice[s] his little will, which is unfree and ruled by things and drives, to his great will that moves away from being determined to find destiny" (Buber, 1970, p. 109). The person attaches will and power to being which sustains and engages in the event of relation. The little will is sacrificed in order that the great will is freed to say "Thou" and in order that power be concentrated on going forth and remaining open. The going forth, while remaining open and saying "Thou," in hope of encountering another person and touching the eternal-Thou, are the duties of the free man who in saying "I" means the I-Thou self-consciousness of person.

The concentration and penetration of the I of the person self-consciousness is one of spiritual maturation in which the I apprehends the duality of association and distance. The I, of the person self-consciousness, matures spiritually as it participates in the two-fold movement of human life. "What confronts us comes and vanishes, relational events take shape and scatter and through these changes crystallizes, more and more each time the consciousness of the constant partner, the I-consciousness" (Buber, 1970, p. 80).

The I-consciousness of person understands that, during the moments of departure and distance, in which the event of relation vanishes, actuality is not lost but remains as a living potentiality. Buber writes, "But the I that steps

out of the event of the relation accompanying that, does not lose its actuality. Participation remains in it as a living potentiality" (Buber, 1970, p. 113). Buber continues by writing:

> This is the realm of subjectivity in which the I apprehends simultaneously its association and its detachment. Genuine subjectivity can be understood only dynamically, as the vibration of the I in its lonely truth. This is also the place where the desire for even higher and more unconditional relation and for perfect participation in being arises and keeps rising. In subjectivity the spiritual substance of person matures. (Buber, 1970, p. 113)

The I-consciousness of person is shaped and reformed by each event and departure of relation. Although the lessons of the actuality and latency of these encounters cannot be articulated and set in place for further utilization, they are an indication or sign of the world order. An order which has at its heart the a priori of relation. "The encounters do not order themselves to become a world, but each is for you a sign of the world order" (Buber, 1970, p. 83).

The formation of the I-consciousness of person does not enable one to experience, utilize, or determine the event of relation. The intimations of the event of relation are felt, leaving the person ready for and open to the potentiality of future encounters which offer the person the opportunity to speak "Thou" with his entire being. Buber writes of the intimations of the event of relation:

> The man who steps out of the essential act of pure relation has something More in his being, something new has grown there of which he did not know before and for

> whose origin he lacks any suitable words. . . . Actually, we receive what we did not have before, in such a manner that we know: it has been given to us. (Buber, 1970, p. 158)

The distanced, loneliness of the concentration of the I-consciousness of person is not an empty, isolated, autonomous self-reflection. The inmost growth, "the more," that has been given and received, is the presence of energy that is known only as a result of the actual and genuine encounter. The growth that takes place during the lonely moments of distance is possible only insofar as the human person has participated in relation and further prepares himself to continue to participate again in the event of relation when the moment of encounter is offered in grace. As Buber writes, it is not autonomous, self-reflection, and self-affirmation which concentrates the I-consciousness of person:

> For the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished, as people like to suppose today, in man's relation to himself, but in the relation between the one and the other, between men, that is pre-eminently in the mutuality of the making present--in the making present in his own self by the other--together with the mutuality of acceptance, of affirmation and confirmation. (Buber, 1965, p. 71)

Although the concentration of the I-consciousness is a lonely process, the self-consciousness of person takes shape during the encounter and in the participation of relation. Actuality, during the event of relation, penetrates the I leaving it with "more" than it had before the encounter, but also giving the "I" something which is beyond the grasp of

verbal expression. This loneliness is discussed by Buber when he writes:

> You can not come to an understanding about it with others; you are lonely with it; but it teaches you to encounter others and to stand your ground in such encounters; and through the grace of its advents and the melancholy of its departures it leads you to that You in which the lines of relation, though parallel, intersect. It does not help you to survive; it only helps you to have intimations of eternity. (Buber, 1970, p. 84)

It is not a loneliness that fosters independence and autonomy, but a solitude which heightens our sense of dependence upon the reciprocity of relation.

With spiritual maturation, the I-consciousness of person, of the free man, is penetrated and concentrated with a presence and an energy which transcends the concrete. Unlike the I-consciousness of ego which is concentrated and focused upon formulating a mask of appearances which enables the "I" to savor and contemplate the richness of experience, the I-consciousness of person is integrated in order that the meaning of relation, that has been received, can be put into practice. The spiritually mature I-consciousness of person is propelled to engage in the two-fold nature of man's life with man, "the wish of every man to be confirmed as what he is, even as what he can become by men; and the innate capacity in man to confirm his fellow men in this way" (Buber, 1965, p. 68). It is the action of going forth and saying "Thou"--the practice and command of the free man!

Spiritual maturity of the free man, whose I-consciousness is integrated by a self-consciousness of person, is not one of passive satisfaction upon finding God and resting within the presence of His eternal "Thou-saying," but rather it is a call to action in which participation and response are commanded. "For this finding is not an end of the way but only its eternal center" (Buber, 1970, p. 128). Upon touching the eternal threshold, we are energized and strengthened by the wisdom of relation; however, our mission, our responsibility, is to respond and return. "The meaning we receive can be put to proof in action only by each person in the uniqueness of his being and the uniqueness of his life" (Buber, 1970, p. 159). Further, "As we have nothing but a You on our lips when we enter the encounter, it is with this on our lips that we are released from it into the world" (Buber, 1970, p. 159).

The encounter is a two-fold movement in which we reach out and go forth saying "Thou," and if by grace we find--in an encounter--that we have been made mutually present, we return from that event of relation reaching out, going forth and saying "Thou." The relational event in which the meaning of reciprocity and mutuality is actualized and made present is the core, the center but not the end. The strength and energy received demands that the meaning of this reciprocity be enacted in the world. Buber writes of this responsibility:

> It is not the meaning of "another life" but that of this our life, not that of a "beyond" but of this our world, and it wants to be demonstrated by us in this life and this world. The meaning can be received but not experienced; it cannot be experienced, but it can be done; and this is what it intends with us. The guarantee does not wish to remain shut up with me, it wants to be born into the world by me. (Buber, 1970, p. 159)

Consequently, for Buber,

> All modern attempts to reinterpret this primal actuality of dialogue and to make it a relationship of the I to the self . . . as if it were a process confined to man's self-sufficient inwardness, are vain and belong to the abysmal history of deactualization. (Buber, 1970, p. 133)

In finding God and in being satisfied to rest at that point, one distorts the command and betrays the meaning of reciprocity. Buber writes, "The encounter with God does not come to man in order that he may henceforth attend to God but in order that he may prove its meaning in action in the world" (Buber, 1970, p. 164).

Every encounter and subsequent revelation is a calling and a mission. He continues,

> Revelation does not pour into the world through its recipient as if he were a funnel: it confers itself upon him, it seizes his whole element . . . and fuses with it . . . and to sound means to modify sound. (Buber, 1970, p. 166)

The urgency of the mission and the intensity of the command are further illuminated as Buber discusses the essence of reciprocity by simply stating, "You need God in order to be and God needs you--for that is the meaning of your life" (Buber, 1970, p. 130).

Consequently, in the lonely distanced moments, the I-consciousness draws away from an encounter with the memory of either objects of experience or events of relation. During these moments, the I-consciousness of the constant partner is re-penetrated and re-concentrated in such a way that it re-turns to the world with either an ego-appropriating attitude or a person-participating attitude, and with either an "it" or a "thou" on its lips. The I-consciousness is penetrated in such a way as to further enhance the fabrication of masks which enable the ego to smoothly function in the world of experience and use, or it is concentrated in such a manner as to illuminate the subjectivity of the person as it ventures forth carrying within it the true meaning of reciprocity. The "I" freezes and thaws as it vibrates between the world of experience, utility, and appropriation, and the world of relation and the spiritual dialectic. The spiritual dialectic being the recognition of the tensions present in the process of spiritual maturation in which the practice of openly going forth while speaking "Thou" is informed by the intimation of the meaning of reciprocity.

Buber reminds us that the way in which one prepares to say I places him/her either into the world of experience or relation. He writes:

> The way he says I--what he means when he says I--decides where a man belongs and where he goes. The word "I" is the true shibboleth of humanity. Listen to it! (Buber, 1970, p. 115)

"I" is the watchword which signals whether we are encountering one another as ego or as person. The I in its autonomous distance, when penetrated by the it-world, focuses upon cultivating its ego and increasing its skills for experiencing and utilizing that world. The I, in its lonely solitude, when concentrated by the thou-relation, integrates its person and opens itself to the potentiality for being and becoming in the world. As Heschel writes, "My view of the world and my understanding of the self determine each other" (Heschel, 1965, p. 88). My self-consciousness as ego perpetuates my saying I and meaning and receiving "it." My self-consciousness as person enhances my opportunity to say I, meaning and receiving "thou." The "I" is the clue, the watchword the crux for understanding the emergence of either monologue or dialogue. The "I" reveals the hopes and despairs, the vulnerabilities and frailities of humanity.

The I-Thou and I-It exist in a dynamic oscillation between the events of relation during the thaws of the I-self-consciousness of person and the appropriation and utilization of experience during the frozen moments of the I-self-consciousness of ego. The "I" vibrates between thaws and freezes with the memory of concentrated wholeness during the event of relation or the recollection of an appropriated exclusion during the occurrence of experience. Thus the self-consciousness of person is one in which the I feels the

intimations of wholeness while the self-consciousness of ego is one in which the I remembers appropriation. The I that retains an inkling of unity speaks differently from the I that recollects partiality. The manifestation of these different voices provides a way of understanding the relation of good and evil.

Section IV:
Buber: Good and Evil

Buber offers insights into good and evil that go beyond considering them as being "two poles, two opposite directions" (Buber, 1952, p. 121). Good and evil may be more clearly understood in their relation to one another as the human soul moves through the two existent stages of human reality. The first stage "begins with the experience of chaos as a condition perceived in the soul" (Buber, 1952, p. 125). In the human being's quest to understand the meaning of his life, he may enter into relation with this chaos which either distorts or illuminates this meaning. The second stage of living reality corresponds to "man's endeavor to render the contradictory state, which has arisen in consequence of his lack of direction and his pseudo-decisions, bearable and even satisfying, by affirming this state" (Buber, 1952, pp. 139-140). In man's attempt to understand his incompleteness and distraction he removes himself from the necessity to confirm and receive confirmation and turns to the perversion of self-affirmation,

an affirmation made in the distraction of incompleteness which further freezes him into the "It-world."

The first stage of living reality in which evil is possible correpsonds to man's attempt to overcome the chaotic state of his soul, "the state of undirected surging passion" (Buber, 1952, p. 139). In the midst of chaos, the soul of man seeks to understand the meaning of his being. In so doing he recognizes the "chaos of possibilities of being," which becomes transformed into the "chaos of possibilities of action" (Buber, 1952, p. 126). This means that "It is not things which revolve in the vortex, but the possible ways of joining and overcoming them" (Buber, 1952, p. 126), that offer the possibility for either unification or distraction. Consequently, the first stage presents us with a chaos which prompts us to take action. This action can be either an authentically directing action or it can be one which lacks direction. It is the distraction and the lack of direction that presents itself as evil during this first stage of living reality.

In seeking the unity of his soul, man "slips" into evil when he passionately but randomly seeks unification with various objects and in such a way that these relations are ultimately incapable of rendering wholeness to the soul. Buber writes:

> The soul driven round in the dizzy whirl cannot remain fixed within it; it strives to escape. If the ebb that leads back to familiar normality does not make its appearance, there exist for it two issues. One is repeatedly offered it: it can clutch at any object, past which the vortex happens to carry it, and cast its passion upon it; or else, in repsonse to a prompting that is still incomprehensible to itself, it can set about the audacious work of self-unification. In the former case, it exchanges an undirected possibility for an undirected reality, in which it does what it wills not to do, what is preposterous to it, the alien, the 'evil'; in the latter, if the work meets with success, the soul has given up undirected plenitude in favour of the one taut string, the one stretched beam of direction. If the work is not successful, which is no wonder with such an unfathomable undertaking, the soul has nevertheless gained an inkling of what direction, or rather the direction is--for in the strict sense there is only one. To the extent to which the soul achieves unification, it becomes aware of direction, becomes aware of itself as sent in quest of it. It comes into the service of good or into service for good. (Buber, 1952, p. 127)

In exchanging undirected possibility for undirected reality, the soul is attempting to acquire wholeness and unity. However, in its effort to acquire such unity, it falls into evil and slips further away from the direction with points to and means that unity. Buber refers to this first image of evil as being that of the "motif of becoming-like-God . . . but is brought to an ironic conclusion" (Buber, 1952, p. 120). This image of becoming-like-God is one in which man attempts to become a unified soul. However, the tragedy and irony of such intention and effort is that it results in the opposite--that of a distracted and a disintegrated soul. Consequently, good may not be done, for good can only be done with one's whole soul. The soul that wills its unification can never be whole.

Thus, in the first stage of living reality as one attempts to overcome the chaos, evil emerges as the soul wills its unification but lacking direction attaches itself to objects in such a way that unity and wholeness are impossible. "Evil is lack of direction and that which is done in it and out of it as the grasping, seizing, devouring, compelling, seducing, exploiting, humiliating, torturing and destroying of what offers itself" (Buber, 1952, p. 130). In the first stage, one slips into evil as one attaches to objects which, lacking direction, throw one further into the chaos.

The second stage of living reality in which evil can become a possibility is one in which man attempts to make the contradictions of his It-world bearable by affirming his lack of direction and his pseudo-decisions. Man "chooses himself, in the sense of his being-constituted-thus or having-become-thus" (Buber, 1952, p. 140). Once slipping away from direction by randomly and frantically choosing objects in an effort to grasp meaning and quell the chaos, man, in the second stage of the living reality, affirms the willed disharmony of the soul. Buber writes:

> In the second stage evil grows radical, because what man finds in himself is willed; whoever lends to that which in the depths of self-awareness was time and again recognized by him as what should be negated, the mark of being affirmed, because it is his, gives it the substantial character which it did not previously possess. (Buber, 1952, p. 140)

Man congratulates himself and further seeks to fabricate the masks of his ego in this second stage of living reality.

He affirms himself as being a certain way. In affirming himself, man places himself above the need for confirmation from others as well as beyond the necessity to confirm others. In this state, evil grows and man sets himself in the position of being his own creator. "Being-like-God, dominates the scene in the last image of the second series" (Buber, 1952, p. 120). Becoming his own creator, man need only decide for himself what he shall become, he becomes autonomous and is blinded to being confirmed or confirming. He decides to say only "it." Buber writes:

> By glorifying and blessing himself as his own creator, he commits the lie against being, yea, he wants to raise it, the lie, to rule over being, for truth shall no longer be what he experiences as such but what he ordains as such. (Buber, 1952, p. 138)

The two stages of living reality, chaos and contradiction, provide the conditions which determine the manifestation of evil as the human being attempts to come to terms with the meaning of his being in these states. In the first, man finds himself slipping into the occurrence of evil, and in the second he descends into evil as he decides for and affirms the contradictions of the ego and the It-world. Although the character of evil changes as the two stages of living reality emerge, the character of good retains "the same momentum which may occur at either the first or second stage" (Buber, 1952, p. 139). There is only one beam of direction and one true decision. "Good is direction and what

is done in it . . . is done with the whole soul" (Buber, 1952, pp. 130-131). This one directive and decisive beam penetrates both stages of the living reality.

The good is the direction, the decision, and can be thought as being in service of the goal of creation. The good is direction and decision which are attached to human being in such a way that:

> In decision, taking the direction thus means: taking the direction toward the point of being at which, executing for my part the design which I am, I encounter the divine mystery of my created uniqueness, the mystery waiting for me. (Buber, 1952, p. 142)

One goes forth openly, confirming. Good is that which is and can only be done with one's whole soul, "so that in fact all the vigour and passion with which evil might have been done is included in it" (Buber, 1952, p. 131). Evil, the lack of direction and indecision in the face of chaos and contradiction, is done with the distracted, appropriated and unwhole soul. Consequently, the whole soul includes that which was at one time incomplete and in its wholeness, passionately embraces and overcomes the evil urge in love. Consequently, good and evil are not the antithesis of one another but rather good presupposes evil and the energy of direction and decision encompass that which may have been incomplete and undirected.

In the face of chaos of the first stage of the living reality, good, direction, decision remain the same, one goes

forth openly, saying "thou." In the face of chaos one does not grasp objects seeking to utliize them for the purpose of comprehending experience and to devour them hoping for unity, but one faces the chaos and seeks relation with it for the purpose of relation itself. In so doing, it may or may not find unification; however, it will have glanced an intimation of the direction and be concentrated in such a way that it will be readied for future encounters.

In the face of contradiction in the second stage of living reality, the good, the direction, the decision remain the same; one goes forth openly saying "thou." One confirms, and in grace is confirmed; the order of being and relation are not ruptured. In the face of contradiction, one attempts to evoke the memory of person rather than affirming the masks of ego which destroy the possibility of relation. One decides to participate, not to appropriate. In the face of contradiction, good names the contradiction as being that which distorts relation. In the face of contradiction good does not affirm the disharmony and disintegration caused by the actual contradiction.

In the face of chaos, contradiction, indecision, and lack of direction, that which is humanly right and good remains the same. I encounter in my unique way, openly and completely, that which is before me and in grace, may be given a moment of understanding of my own and the other's becoming. Buber writes:

> My uniqueness, this unrepeatable form of being here, not analysable into any elements and not compoundable out of any, I experience as a designed or performed one, entrusted to me for execution, although everything that affects me participates in this execution. That a unique human being is created does not mean that it is put into being for a mere existence, but for the fulfillment of a being-intention, an intention of being which is personal, not however in the sense of a free unfolding of infinite singularities, but of a realisation of the right in infinite personal shapes. For creation has a goal and the humanly right is service directed in the One direction, service of the goal of creation which we are given to surmise only to the extent necessary within this scope; the humanly right is ever the service of the single person who realises the right uniqueness purposed for him in his creation. (Buber, 1952, pp. 141-142)

Although the I-It world and the I-consciousness of ego are not intrinsically evil, they do provide the context within which evil may flourish. Buber warns us to listen to the I of the ego reminding us of its dissonance. The tragic lips that move us to great pity as we listen to the plight of modern man in all his alienation; the chaotic lips that make us shudder with fear as we listen to the hatred and evil released by the Hitlers and the Napoleons of our time; the vain and smooth lips that evoke disgust as we listen to the patronizing confidence of the Grand Inquisitors of our political and spiritual well-being; these are the clashing sounds of ego that impair, distort, and betray genuine relation and actuality. These are the dissonant sounds of the ego and the "it"-world which establish the ground within which evil may take root.

Any injury to the possibility for the occurrence of genuine relationship constitutes the presupposition for evil.

The genuine I-Thou relationship is of a two-fold nature; it is a being elected as well as electing. Therefore, injury may occur in either the active or passive state of relationship. Evil becomes a very real possibility when the human being is unable to openly go forth or is unable to speak "Thou." When our power is detached from our longing for relation and our will is directed away from speaking Thou, injury to our being becomes a very real possibility. Buber writes, "There is no evil drive until the drive detaches itself from our being" (Buber, 1970, p. 97). When our will to power is directed away from going forth and speaking Thou, the potentiality for evil lurks.

The seeds for evil are sown in doom, for doom is the belief that one cannot return from the It-world of the ego self-consciousness. "Nothing can doom man but the belief in doom, for this prevents the movement of return" (Buber, 1970, p. 107). The inability to return from or move out of the I-It world presents us with the feelings of doom and the conditions of alienation in which evil may grow. The I-It self-consciousness of ego, in which objectification and appropriation result in impersonalization and deactualization, provides fertile ground for the growth of "seeming" and "imposition." "Seeming" and "imposition" are acts of the ego which diminish our capacity to confirm and be confirmed and which consequently threaten our very being. Seeming and imposition interfere with and ultimately prevent relation.

Seeming is the pretense or appearance of being; it is the inauthenticity of the human element of relation. Seeming enables one to ignore the responsibility of being brought into being by another as he says "thou." To "seem" rather than to "be" enables one to avoid the intensity and responsibility of the living relationship. Never participating, never becoming fully human, the "I" of the ego self-consciousness can live in the security and safety of the "It" world. Buber writes of this cowardice:

> It is no light thing to be confirmed in one's being by others, and seeming deceptively offers itself as a help in this. To yield to seeming is man's essential cowardice, to resist it is his essential courage. (Buber, 1965, p. 78)

The I-consciousness of ego is intimately tied to seeming and the "It" world. The source of injury to relation occurs as the I-consciousness of ego sets itself apart from others in order to more efficiently use and experience those others as objects. As the "I" of the ego self-consciousness emerges it fabricates the masks which enable it to see itself as "being" or "seeming" a particular way. These masks further enhance the capacity of the ego to appropriate from experience that which is desirable. It knows itself as an appropriating and experiencing subject. The I-consciousness of ego is a manifestation of "seeming," it pretends to "be" as it actively savors and experiences life, but it is shallow and superficial, it never really penetrates into relationship

that requires it to be fully present in saying "thou" and thus it never recognizes itself in the process of mutually becoming present.

Imposition represents a condition of violence and provides further ground within which evil may grow. To impose requires manipulation, use, and control. Imposition is interested in knowing or encountering the other only in order to control and exploit him. Buber refers to this as propaganda and writes:

> This kind of propaganda enters upon different relations with force; it supplements it or replaces it, according to the need or the prospects, but it is in the last analysis nothing but sublimated violence, which has become imperceptible as such. It places men's souls under a pressure which allows the illusion of autonomy. Political methods at their height mean the abolition of the human factor. (Buber, 1965, p. 83)

The propagandist imposes himself using special methods, because he doesn't trust his cause to attain itself. Since it is not a mutual or reciprocal relationship, political or special methods are necessary in order to assure that the subject's interst will prevail. In winning power over the other, the other is depersonalized. This, objectification of the other, violates the possibility of relation because the depersonalization and deactualization remove the potentiality of being confirmed or for confirming.

The seeming of I-consciousness of ego represents the possibility for evil that occurs when will is detached from being. It results in a way of existing in the world when

the will to say "thou" is replaced by a will to say only "it." Imposition and propaganda, on the other hand, represent the sources for potential evil that result when power has been diverted from our power to remain open, and has been directed toward our power to control, manipulate, and utilize. Seeming and imposition result in the penetration of an I-consciousness of ego that views the world through appropriating, manipulating eyes. These eyes become dulled to the real possibility of being as the It-world deceptively appears to offer life--a life of experience. The security of the life of experience fosters the feeling of doom in which the I-consciousness of ego looses its memory of person and forgets the fate of return. Evil lurks in such doom and doom becomes manifest during times of seeming and imposition in which the truth of relation is forgotten.

Love and decision are the counter forces of seeming, imposition, and doom. Thus, love and decision offer the hope that subdues the roots of evil. Love and decision are the actions of good that connect will and power to being. They are the actions of the spiritual dialectic that demand responsible action in the world as will is connected to saying "thou" and power is directed at openly going forth toward the other. Love and decision are the actions that awaken the I-consciousness of person, concentrating it to the core, so that it speaks "thou" with full recognition of the truth of reciprocity.

Love and decision are the antidotes to the possibility of evil, love being the responsibility of an I for a Thou. It is the agape love that goes beyond the acknowledgment of the other person as a person and which seeks reunion with the other. For Tillich agape love is the absolute moral principle and is the basic principle of justice. He writes:

> Its greatness is that it accepts and tolerates the other person even if he is unacceptable to us and we can barely tolerate him. Its aim is a union that is more than a union on the basis of sympathy or friendship, a union even in spite of enmity. Loving one's enemies is not sentimentality; the enemy remains an enemy. (Tillich, 1967, p. 108)

It is the responsibility of my being wholely present and saying "Thou," for the other in such a way that "Thou" may be spoken by him. In assuming the responsibility for a Thou, the I-self-consciousness of person establishes the ever-present possibility of relationship.

The capacity for decision can only be made by those who have known the love of an I for a Thou. "Only those who know relation and who know the presence of the You have the capacity for decision" (Buber, 1970, p. 100). The decision is the decision of the free man who, upon stepping up to the threshold of eternity, is rekindled with the energizing spark, the power, to go forth receptively and openly to relation. It is the decision to return. This is the decision which can potentially set one into relation and therefore remove one from the doom of the It-world.

Buber writes, "If there were a devil he would not be the one who decided against God but he that in all eternity did not decide" (Buber, 1970, p. 101). The devil would be the one who, knowing the actuality of relation, never participates, never returns, never moves from the It-world. He would be the one who having been confirmed never risks confirming. One who having known the actualization of relation remains frozen in form and therefore never says "thou." "Yet whoever hates directly is closer to a relation than those who are without love and hate" (Buber, 1970, p. 68). Having chosen not to decide, it is decided for him, his neutrality is a decision to remain distanced and in the realm of It. The crushing causality of doom freezes him into the ego self-consciousnesses of seeming and imposition. He remains neutral and objective, no love or hate sets him toward relation. He exists, but is not human. In his neutrality, he has decided not to be.

Love and decision present the possibility for will and power to become re-attached to being. Love, being the responsibility of an I for a Thou, which enables us to will to say "Thou" in the process of potentially bringing each other into "being." Decision, being the responsibility to return to the world carrying the spark and holding the energy that gives us the strength and power to remain open to the possibility of encounter. Love has the capacity to awaken the person self-consciousness and to diminish the ego self-consciousness

of "seeming" by empowering us with the will to say "thou." Decision reduces the grip of the ego-consciousness of imposition by replacing the strength of the power to control with the energizing power to remain open to the possibility of relation and thus jogs the memory of person self-consciousness.

Empowerment, liberation, the reattachment of power and will to being through love and decision, requires a spiritual dialectic which enables us to and demands that we address the It-world by its real name, "its true nature: the particularization and alienation" (Buber, 1970, p. 107). We must name the It-world as being one of alienation and impersonalization; one in which an ego can exist but a person can never become fully human. The educational task is one of a spiritual dialectic in which the I-consciousness of person is awakened and energized in such a way so that it can penetrate the power of doom, imposition, and seeming in order to thaw the I-consciousness of person to the power of relation and to freeze the inevitable I-consciousness of ego in such a way that it retains and remembers its true destiny--that of returning to person.

Section V:
The Transcendent-Liberatory Educational Vision

My third hermeneutic journey has been propelled and energized by the Buberian insights regarding I-Thou self-consciousness of person, the two-fold principle of human life:

distance and return, and the relation of good to evil. As my questions changed from those of political interest to those of that which cannot be left to chance, namely love, my symbolic language of the dawn changed from that of critical theory to that of the prophetic religious tradition. Rather than dealing with experience, the uncertain, and knowledge, the platform shifted to grappling with relation, the mystery and wisdom.

The day of my interpretation changed from an interpretation of help and care situated in justice to a concern that encompassed justice within the broader spectrum of love. Further, the dusk of my interpretation of my interpretations shifted from the scrutinizing lens of "in whose interest?" to a deeper interpretation penetrated by "what is required of me?" Thus the night of my understandings deepened to include love in addition to justice.

The educational task and challenge expanded from concerns for empowered reconstruction, emancipation from oppression and social justice to include the more pervasive regard for decision and direction aimed at good in the illumination of human dignity revealed in acts of love. Thus my third hermeneutic journey has filled me with the necessity to attempt to pull together a third educational vision, one which addresses the concerns of how we are to understand one another and to relate with one another in light of such understanding. Consequently, I have borrowed from Buber and Heschel

constructs which touch upon such questions and which I feel further expand the educational vision.

The educational task, as envisioned by the transcendent-liberatory view, is one in which Buber's and Heschel's insights into relation, good, evil, and love are central. It is a vision in which evil is addressed in its dynamic relation to good; and one in which the confrontation of evil in relation to good offers the possibility of illuminating the liberating action of the "free man." The free man being one who is engaged in the process of the "spiritual dialectic" in which the essential deed is performed.

The educational task becomes one of struggling with the existence of evil while engaging in the good, which is recognized as being that of decision and direction. The educational mission becomes one of recognizing and participating in the struggle and realizing that it is the only engagement worthy of our energy and our passion. For it is in this struggle that we must participate, in order that we might glimpse the meaning of being human. In understanding this meaning, one recognizes that "Man exists . . . not in his isolation, but in the completeness of the relation between man and man; what humanity is can be properly grasped only in vital reciprocity" (Buber, 1965, p. 84).

This engagement, this struggle, this action is energized by love which permeates the educational task of the

transcendent-liberatory vision. This is the decisive and directed action of good in the face of evil. The educational mission of the transcendent-liberatory vision maintains its focus by continually holding to the conditions of seeming and imposition which perpetuate the "ego" penetration of the I self-consciousness. Such conditions further heighten the anxiety of doom in the frozen moments of the It-world. The transcendent-liberatory vision retains a memory of the conditions of evil in all of its love propelled decision and direction.

Held within this vision is the recognition that the most fundamental question to live by is not "What is being?" but rather "What is required of me?" (Heschel, 1965, p. 107). Further, in contemplating the significance of this question, the transcendent-liberatory vision responds with: it is not what is required of me, or ought to be required of me but how I respond to the requirement. Buber writes:

> Thus it stands before posterity in order to teach it, not what is and not what ought to be, but how one lives in the spirit, in the countenance of the You. And that means: it stands ready to become a You for them at any time, opening up the You-world; no, it does not stand ready, it always comes toward them and touches them. (Buber, 1970, p. 92)

Thus the educational mission of the transcendent-liberatory vision becomes one of dealing with how one prepares himself to go forth to the world. The how, the process, the action, is the direction and decision that can be made and

taken only with one's whole, unappropriated being. It is the call to live in the spirit, as a free man performing in his unique way the essential deed. However, it is more than just the technique or process of going forth and speaking "thou" that composes this question of how. The how includes a deeper trust in existence itself that can only be touched by the act of relation. Consequently, "It is not insight into process but trust in existence that enables us to enter into genuine meeting with the unique reality that accosts us in the new moment" (Friedman, 1986, p. 84). The educational calling of the transcendent-liberatory vision is founded on a trust in which the response of love is required.

The how of the transcendent-liberatory vision is answered with, but not satiated or finalized by, the response of love. It is not a sentimental response, limited to sympathy or friendship, but one that accepts and tolerates the unaccepted, the enemy, with the aim of unity in spite of aversion. As Buber writes:

> I become aware of him, aware that he is different, essentially different from myself, in the definite, unique way which is peculiar to him, and I accept whom I thus see, so that in full earnestness I can direct what I say to him as the person he is. . . . I affirm the person I struggle with . . . if I thus give to the other who confronts me his legitimate standing as a man with whom I am ready to enter into dialogue, then I may trust him and suppose him to be also ready to deal with me as his partner. (Buber, 1965, pp. 79-80)

One prepares oneself by opening up to and facing completely the one who confronts him.

Further, this opening and facing serves no utilitarian purpose other than that of relation itself. The encounter, the relation, may, in grace, reveal our mutually bringing each other to presence, but it is not for that purpose that we come into relation. The other is not to be regarded as the object which may be consumed in our impatience to come into being and meaning. Buber discusses this delicate balance when he writes,

> The only thing that matters is that for each of the two men the other happens as the particular other, that each becomes aware of the other and is thus related to him in such a way that he does not regard and use him as his object, but as his partner in a living event. (Buber, 1965, p. 74)

This opening up to the other, in granting him his position as partner, while at the same time not observing him or utilizing him as the object or means with which to acquire being, addresses two major conditions within which human dignity may emerge. "The dignity of human existence is in the power of reciprocity" (Heschel, 1965, p. 46). Thus, in granting the other, his position as partner, through openly facing him, in spite of his unacceptableness, the potential for reciprocity and thus the illumination of dignity exists. Further, "If I use a person as a thing I myself lose my dignity as a person" (Tillich, 1967, p. 94). Therefore, in recognizing that one cannot use the other as a means for achieving being, without further distorting the potentiality of such becoming, one opens up the possibility of enhancing human dignity.

In the contemplation of how one prepares to meet the world, the transcendent-liberatory vision of the educational mission responds with love. This response of agape love informs the spiritual dialectic which works to go forth openly and to speak "thou." In so doing the spiritual dialectic illuminates dignity by addressing issues of reciprocity and objectivity.

The spiritual dialectic is not the dialectic of praxis in which subjects and objects are formed and reformed by the tension of "doing" and "undergoing." The tension of the dialectic of praxis is one in which subjects become objects and objects become subjects in a dramatic and dynamic, interchange and inversion. Rather, the spiritual dialectic is shaped by the tensions within the "between." The spiritual dialectic grapples with that which is "between man and man," not in an effort to transform that which is between us, but in a hope to participate in it in such a way as to illuminate the meaning of our being which is found only in the "between." The spiritual dialectic is propelled by that which exists in the "between," that of love, dialogue, and spirit. The tensions of the spiritual dialectic are felt in subjectivity as one attempts to and participates in relation. It is the "living event" rather than the "living experience" that constitutes the dynamic of the spiritual dialectic. Rather than dealing with the phenomenological clarification of the tensions

between subjects and objects in an attempt to reconstruct experience, the spiritual dialectic is propelled by the tensions of subjectivity which are further understood in contemplating Buber's insights regarding "existential guilt" and Heschel's understandings concerning "existential indebtedness."

"Existential guilt" being that which goes beyond feelings of guilt that one experiences upon transgressing the taboos of our society, rather, "existential guilt occurs when someone injures an order of the human world whose foundations he knows and recognizes as those of his own existence and of all common foundations" (Buber, 1965, p. 127). This guilt arises from the knowledge that one has contributed to the rupture or injury of relationship. Guilt is the evil of indecision, inaction, and lack of direction which turns one away from relation and, through seeming and imposition, blocks one's going forth to confirm and to be confirmed. The task of prophetic criticism rests in the recognition of "existential guilt." It is in a recognition of existential guilt that one understands that it (real guilt) "arises out of his being and for which he cannot take responsibility without being responsible to his relationship to his own being" (Buber, 1965, p. 135). This responsibility to his own being is indeed a recognition of reciprocity and that his being and meaning are intimately and vitally linked to relation.

In naming and criticizing the core of "existential guilt," namely the distortion of relation, one is energized

by the recognition of his existential indebtedness and moved to act in love. "Man is never guilty toward himself alone" (Friedman, 1986, p. 74). Thus, in healing the injury to relation he assumes a two-fold responsibility. Man must face his guilt and at the same time recognize his guilt toward other beings. He must realize his responsibility and that this responsibility is indeed action, and further, he must understand that when such action, decision, direction is not taken, he denies life not only to himself but to others. He must address his existential indebtedness upon the realization of his existential guilt, for his own being is nothing without relation.

"Existential indebtedness" being that which recognizes the necessity of reciprocity and understands that meaning lies only in such reciprocity. Thus, one is indebted to the other, the one that faces him and with whom he struggles for the very meaning of his life. The cry for meaning is the call for relationship and that called for meaning lies in the reciprocity. Imbedded within the existential indebtedness is the prophetic energy of hope that, in responding to this indebtedness, one will actualize the authenticity which addresses and transcends the evils of exclusion, alienation, seeming, and imposition. In embracing and acting out of our indebtedness, we are energized by the possibility of relation and in such relation one is graced with hope.

As John Merick (the Elephant Man) screams "I am a human being!", one is painfully awakened to the anguish of the rupture of relation. When one is excluded from the possibility of coming into and participating in being and meaning, everyone is diminished. We are all "existentially guilty." In denying reciprocity human dignity is abolished. In perceiving the other as an object of amusement, pity, sympathy, or horror, human dignity is blighted. The elephant man reminds us of our existential guilt and courageously challenges us to embrace our existential indebtedness. The task of the transcendent-liberatory educational vision faces such a challenge.

The educational task of the transcendent-liberatory vision is of a two-fold nature, that of meeting the other and that of meeting oneself within this process of teaching. However, at both stages the dialectic between "existential guilt" and "existential indebtedness" exists. The two-fold nature of the educational mission is permeated by the naming of evil in the face of good. At both stages the prophetic dialectic of criticism and energy are present. Both stages contain the memory of Walter Brueggeman's grief work:

> There is work to be done in the present. There is grief work to be done in the present that the future may come. There is mourning to be done for those who do not know of the deathliness of their situation. There is mourning to be done with those who know pain and suffering and lack the power of freedom to bring it to speech. The saying is a harsh one, for it sets this grief work as the precondition of joy. It announces that those who have not cared enough to grieve will not know joy. (Brueggeman, 1978, p. 112)

Those who do not recognize their "existential guilt" are unable to respond authentically to their "existential indebtedness" and are consequently not fully human.

In retaining the memory of Brueggeman's grief work messages, while holding to the reciprocal and subjective nature of human dignity, the challenge of transcendent-liberatory educational practice becomes one of meeting and unfolding that which confronts us and that which we must encounter. Tarrou's response: "That's my job in life--giving people chances" (Camus, 1972, p. 142) could appropriately stand as the claim and requirement of transcendent-liberatory education. In seeing himself as a helper of the actualizing forces, the educator becomes a chance giver:

> The educator who unfolds what is there believes in the primal power which has scattered itself, and still scatters itself, in all human beings in order that it may grow up in each man in the special form of that man. He is confident that this growth needs at each moment only that help which is given in meeting, and that he is called to supply that help. (Buber, 1965, p. 83)

In believing that "A man cannot really be grasped except on the basis of the spirit which belongs to man alone . . . the spirit which determines the person" (Buber, 1965, p. 80), it becomes the mission of the educator to encounter that other person in such a way that he is able to foster reciprocity and provide the chance for the other to come into being. Thus the transcendent-liberatory vision becomes one of "meeting" rather than "teaching" and of "unfolding" rather than "prescribing."

This unfolidng process is one of healing aimed at repairing and strengthening relation. Further, the educator who participates in such healing, meeting, and unfolding is one who "lives in a world of individuals, a certain number of whom are always at any one time committed to his care" (Buber, 1965, p. 83). The educator perceives of each of these individual students as being "in a position to become a unique, single person, and thus the bearer of a special task of existence which can be fulfilled through him (the student) and through him alone" (Buber, 1965, p. 83). Thus, in the face of evil, in the forms of imposition and seeming, the educator perceives himself as a helper of the actualizing forces. "He knows these forces; they have shaped and they still shape him" (Buber, 1965, p. 83).

The major task of the transcendent-liberatory educator is to place himself, as one who has been shaped by the actualizing forces, at the disposal of those students within his care "for a new struggle and a new work" (Buber, 1965, p. 83). Further, the educator may not impose upon his students the wisdom and goodness of reciprocity and subjectivity. Buber writes of imposition:

> He cannot wish to impose himself, for he believes in the effect of the actualizing forces, that is, he believes that in every man what is right is established in a single and uniquely personal way. No other way may be imposed on a man, but another way, that of the educator, may and must unfold what is right. (Buber, 1965, p. 83)

Further, this meeting and unfolding is not a passive and humble process that just happens when teachers and students meet, but one that requires that the educator think consistently and work exactly. The educator, in recognizing "existential guilt" and understanding "existential indebtedness," must guide his students to the place where they, too, may be afforded the opportunity to participate in the spiritual dialectic which embraces both guilt and indebtedness. This guiding is not done by one who has an end in sight but by one who knows the actualizing forces and with this wisdom is propelled to act in love. This love manifests itself as influence but not imposition.

> The desire to influence the other then does not mean the effort to change the other, to inject one's own "rightness" into him; but it means the effort to let that which is recognized as right, as just, as true . . . through one's influence take seed and grow in the form suited to individuation. (Buber, 1965, p. 69)

Therefore, the teacher cannot determine how the good or the right will unfold or develop. The teacher's mission remains one in which he is required to "guide it (the student) to where essential help of the self, a help till now neither willed nor anticipated, can begin" (Buber, 1965, p. 131). Further:

> It is neither given the therapist (teacher) nor allowed to him to indicate a way that leads onward from here. But from the watch tower to which the patient (student) has been conducted he can manage to see a way that is right for him and that he can walk, a way that it is not granted the doctor (educator) to see. (Buber, 1965, p. 131)

The educator's serious mission is and can only be that of always furthering the healing but it can never be one of offering the solution or salvation. Further, this healing and unfolding can only take place within the meeting.

The way in which we prepare to meet or encounter the student becomes the message and mission of the transcendent-liberatory vision. The unfolding process reveals that which is right, or the way in which one meets that which confronts him and that which he must encounter. The healing process is that which places one on the path or into relation in a decisive, directed, and active way--a way in which good is addressed in its relation to evil. The healing and the unfolding processes of the transcendent-liberatory vision retain the memory of "existential guilt" and are energized by the hope which emerges as one anticipates the possible repair of relation upon the recognition of "existential indebtedness." The meeting is shaped by the spiritual dialectic which struggles with the tensions of guilt and indebtedness.

In order to meet the other in a healing and unfolding way, one must first have been able to meet and encounter himself. The teacher is uanble and incapable of placing himself at the disposal of his students without first having prepared himself. This preparation constitutes the second dimension of the transcendent-liberatory educational

vision. Buber writes of the doctor but it could well be said of the teacher:

> The doctor can only conduct him (the patient) to the point from which he (the patient) can glimpse his personal way or at least its beginning. But in order that the doctor shall be able to do this, he must also know about the general nature of the way, common to all great acts of conscience, and about the connection that exists between the nature of existential guilt and the nature of this way. (Buber, 1965, p. 133)

The teacher must know the actualizing forces and must recognize the dynamic relation of existential guilt to existential indebtedness. In order to persevere in the good, one must attend to himself. "One cannot do evil with his whole soul, one can do only good with the whole soul . . . only when he has first attained his own self does the good thrive through him" (Buber, 1965, p. 136). The preparation of the teacher within the transcendent-liberatory vision is of a three-fold nature--that of self-illumination, perseverance, and reconciliation.

Self-illumination and perseverance being the self-educative acts which focus upon the penetration of the I-consciousness of person rather than of ego and which further deal with the recognition of existential guilt as its criticism moves one to respond. The response is that of reconciliation. Reconciliation addresses the return movement of the teacher, who upon educating and preparing himself, reaches toward and meets the world. Reconciliation

is the action taken upon recognition of one's existential indebtedness. Thus the three-fold nature of the process of teacher preparation rests upon a two-dimensional movement in which the distancing movement requires coming to terms with "existential guilt" through self-illumination and perseverance; and the returning movement deals with an understanding of "existential indebtedness" with the response of reconciliation.

Self-illumination is the illumination of the I-self-consciousness of ego in which one begins to recognize the guilt that he bears as a result of his responsibility for the injury to relation. He has perpetuated this injury while existing in an It-world with an I-self-consciousness of ego. Self-illumination is the heightened awareness of the intentional and unintentional acts of ego which have maintained an It-world and have blocked the possibility of relation. Self-illumination jogs us into recognizing the dooming powers of evil as manifest in the conditions of imposition and seeming. Self-illumination further connects us to our part in maintaining these life-denying conditions. Buber writes,

> The "opening door" of self-illumination leads us . . . into the interior of the law . . . the law of man . . . the law of the identity of the human person as such with himself, the one who recognizes guilt with the one who bears guilt. (Buber, 1965, p. 147)

Buber continues by writing, "The hard trial of self-illumination is followed by the still harder, because never

ceasing, trial of persevering in this self-identification" (Buber, 1965, p. 147). It is the perseverance of the whole person in light of that which is right. Perseverance is the process of holding on to this newly received humble recognition of self, as person, while retaining the memory of the imposing and seeming ego which was revealed by self-illumination.

Further, "If man were only guilty toward himself . . . he would need to take . . . one road from the gate of self-illumination, that of persevering" (Buber, 1965, p. 147). However:

> A man is always guilty toward other beings as well, toward the world, toward the being that exists over against him. From self-illumination he must, in order to do justice to the summons, (that meets him at the height of conscience) take not one road but two roads, of which the second is that of reconciliation. (Buber, 1965, p. 147)

It is not enough to recognize one's guilt and the destructive nature of ego self-consciousness. It is not enough to persist in a newly gained understanding of person. Reconciliation means action, action taken in love to restore, repair, and reuinite the relation that was injured and ruptured during ego existence. Reconciliation is the essential deed, Buber writes:

> Reconciliation means here, first of all, that I approach the man toward whom I am guilty in the light of my self-illumination acknowledge to his face my existential guilt and help him, in so far as possible, to overcome the consequences of my guilty action. But such a deed can be valid here only as reconciliation if it is done

> not out of a premeditated resolution, but in the unarbitrary working of the existence I have achieved. And this can happen, naturally, only out of the core of a transformed relationship to the world, a new service to the world with the renewed forces of the renewed man. (Buber, 1965, pp. 147-148)

Reconciliation is the going forth openly, saying Thou, and encountering that which confronts him. One goes forth with his whole being in such a way that with the grace of the eternal Thou, meaning and being might be revealed. Thus the new service to the world is that of restoring relation by the renewed man who has been energized and hope-filled by the very relation. Reconciliation is the deed and the source of energy which propels the transcendent-liberatory educator.

The transcendent-liberatory educational vision of teacher preparation is a three-faceted event which embraces the spiritual dialectic tension between the relation of existential guilt to existential indebtedness. During self-illumination, existential guilt is felt as one recognizes his contribution to the impairment of relation. During this self-illumination, ego-self-consciousness is exposed as a consciousness that furthers lack of direction and indecision which then impede relation. Perseverance follows self-illumination as one persists in holding to his new self-identification, that of being a person. However, the teacher preparation does not rest with self-illumination and confirmation of self as person but requires the return, in the form of reconciliation, in which the newly transformed person turns

to face all of those who have been injured by his former lack of direction and indecision.

The reconciliation stage of teacher preparation prepares one to confront the other and more precisely requires and demands that one encounter the other. Self-illumination and perseverance are the dimensions of teacher preparation in which the I-consciousness of person is illuminated and embraced so that during the inevitable moments of the It-world, the I self-consciousness of person re-emerges and the ego self-consciousness remembers its true destiny--that of returning to person. In the returning to person, reconciliation is the response of the person-teacher who has attended to self-illumination and perseverance. Reconciliation is the new service toward the world, a service which is ministered to by the renewed man who has been revived by the renewed, rekindled forces of relation itself.

The person-teacher is one who has prepared himself in such a manner that he recognizes the forces of actualization. With such a recognition, he understands his teaching as a mission and a calling. The person-teacher decides, takes direction, and acts. He heroically goes forth, calmly and persistently holding on to his self-identification as person. The person-teacher has discovered his essence, and his essential deed is his response. Buber writes:

> Those are great moments of existence when a man discovers his essence or rediscovers it on a higher plane; when he decides and decides anew to become what he is and, as one who is becoming this, to establish a genuine relation to the world; when he heroically maintains his discovery and decision against his everyday consciousness and against his unconscious. (Buber, 1965, p. 130)

Only when the teacher has prepared himself through self-illumination, perseverance, and reconciliation is he ready and capable of deciding and acting. Only upon careful and excting preparation can the person-teacher place himself at the disposal of the students in an effort "to find and further in the soul of the other the disposition toward what he has recognized in himself as the right" (Buber, 1965, p. 82). In order to know what one knows as right, one must have prepared himself in this exacting and demanding manner so that the teaching and the deed are one.

> What counts is not the extent of spiritual possessions, not the thoroughness of knowledge, nor the keenness of thought, but to know what one knows, and to believe what one believes, so directly that it can be translated into the life one lives. (Herberg, 1956, p. 321)

His discovery of the essential deed and the decision to take direction are known so completely that the teaching and the deed are eternally linked. The deed and teaching are transferred into the life one lives in such a way that they require no special methods of imposition or manipulation in order for them to be actualized.

The task of the transcendent-liberatory educator is to return to the world renewed by and in the service of these

actualizing forces. The person-teacher, through penetrating preparation, is energized by this preparation to courageously and heroically go forth to the world. It is his calling and passion; it is that which he cannot otherwise do and remain human. Buber writes:

> "He who studies with an intent other than to act," say the Talmud, "it would have been more fitting for him never to have been created" (Pal. Talmud, Shabbat 3b). It is bad to have teaching without the deed, . . . the simple man who acts is given preference over the scholar whose knowledge is not expressed in his deeds. . . . "He whose deeds exceed his wisdom, his wisdom shall endure; but he whose wisdom exceeds his deeds, his wisdom shall not endure." (Herberg, 1956, p. 321)

The requirement is action, direction, and decision. The essential deed commands that action to restore, repair, and heal relation be taken. This action requires courage to criticize the existence of evil and vision to energize the directed and decisive acts of love which reconcile and restore.

The preparation of self-illuminaton, perseverance, and reconciliation provides one with "conscience-vision" and "conscience-courage" which Buber regards as being the truly great but yet unrecognized task of education:

> The vulgar conscience that knows admiringly well how to torment and harass, but cannot arrive at the ground and abyss of guilt, is incapable, to be sure, of summoning to such responsibility. For this summoning a greater conscience is needed, one that has become wholly personal, one that does not shy away from the glance into the depths and that already in admonishing envisages the way that leads across it. But this in no way means that this personal conscience is reserved for some type of "higher" man. This conscience is

> possessed by every simple man who gathers himself into himself in order to venture the breakthrough out of the entanglement in guilt. And it is a great, not yet sufficiently recognized, task of education to elevate the conscience from its lower common form to conscience-vision and conscience-courage. For it is innate to the conscience of man that it can elevate itself. (Buber, 1965, p. 135)

Just as love must be elevated beyond sympathy and sentimentality, guilt and conscience must transcend feelings of guilt connected to taboos and move beyond this to a conscience, that recognizes the ground and abyss of guilt, namely rupture to relation and the personal responsibility for such injury. Thus, through self-illumination, perseverance, and reconciliation, existential guilt and existential indebtedness are linked to relation. In full maturity, freedom, and heightened conscience the human being is prepared to embrace a conscience-vision of love, hope, indebtedness and reconciliation, as well as to maintain a conscience-courage which enables one to look into the abyss, face the ego, make decision, and take direction in the face of such realization.

The educational vision of transcendent-liberation faces itself toward the exacting tasks of conscience-courage and conscience-vision in an effort to arrive at a "heightened" conscience. This vision embraces the spiritual dialectic which is propelled by the tensions of the "between," specifically the dynamic relation of good to evil. In the recognition of such relation of good and evil, the seeds

of understanding existential guilt and existential indebtedness are sown. Further, the prophetic task of criticism and energizing lies within the recognition of such guilt and indebtedness. Thus the educational mission becomes one of embracing the spiritual dialectic, while engaging with and encountering oneself and the other in an effort to unfold the actualizing forces that enable and direct one toward the event of relation. The educational calling is a prophetic mission requiring conscience-courage and conscience-vision which is aimed at a liberating heightened conscience.

This is a vision that confirms and affirms that our meaning and being are to be found in the "between" and thus in relation. By placing meaning into this realm, it becomes possible for all to actualize this meaning. It is a vision of inclusion, no one is excluded from the potentiality of coming into being and into meaning. Further, this vision understands that every single human being has been given a special and precious gift which he, and he alone, is capable of illuminating during the event of relation. Thus, as Buber powerfully and movingly reminds us:

> That you need God more than anything, you know at all times in your heart. But don't you know also that God needs you--in the fullness of his eternity, you? . . . You need God in order to be, and God needs you--for that which is the meaning of your life. . . . The world is not divine play, it is divine fate. That there are world, man, the human person, you and I, has divine meaning. (Buber, 1970, p. 130)

The transcendent-liberatory vision responds to the divine fate. Its mission is that of reconciliation, one of unfolding the actualizing forces that reveal our precious gift, our divine spark. The trancendent-liberatory vision aims at care, love, decision, direction, and inclusion in a hope that we may nurture and reveal ourselves, each other, and our God. The courage and vision of this educational view is a courage that is turned toward diminishing, as much as possible, the injuries to human dignity, so that our vision may enbrace a present and a future in such a way that our divine sparks are not extinguished.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In attempting to more completely and deeply understand the significance of my experience as a special educator, I have placed my experience within the context of three visions. These perspectives have evolved from the reflective critique and examination of my own theoretical framework and have been based upon my interpretation of three distinct yet connected hermeneutic journies. The first hermeneutic trip is symbolized by the technical rationale embodied within the Tylerian constructs of educational curriculum development and planning. The second hermeneutic journey, the transformative-emancipatory vision, is representative of the orientation set forth by the demystification, empowerment and reconstructive momentum of the critical theorists. The third journey, the transcendent-liberatory vision, is reflective of the criticizing and energizing thrust of the prophetic and religious traditions.

These three ways of thinking live within me and are dialectically interconnected. The dynamics of these visions narrow and expand my world and my consciousness.

> Consciousness, far from being transparent to itself, is at the same time what reveals and conceals; it is this relation of conceal/reveal which calls for a specific reading, a hermeneutics. (Reagan & Stewart, 1978, p. 215)

My hermeneutically interpreted journies have served as lenses through which I have examined and reflected upon educational and teaching experiences. Each has functioned to bring to the surface and to submerge understandings as special educational practice and concerns for human dignity have been filtered through these visions.

Further, these three journies have been utilized to organize a typological structure which represents three distinct educational visions. This connection of my personal framework to the larger educational structure has enabled me to move my insights and understandings regarding my personal and professional experience into the broader arena of educational concerns and perspectives. Thus my private and personal hopes and fears can be expressed in a more public and communal way. My professional criticisms and personal alienation can be situated within a larger structural and social context. My personal and professional experience confirms the criticism of critical theory and responds to the energy and hope of spiritual and religious inroads into education.

The typological structure serves to categorize existing visions and educational perspectives as well as to envision possible educational platforms. In order to create new platforms, as Decker F. Walker points out, one must include "an idea of what is and a vision of what ought to be, and

these guide the curriculum developer in determining what he should do to realize his vision" (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 185). Further in constructing new platforms, one needs to be sensitive to the revealing and concealing nature of the platform and the new vision. As Macdonald and Purpel reflect, "We must be concerned with both the limiting and liberating power of the metaphors that shape our ideas on what education is to be" (1987, p. 184).

With this in mind, I interpret the three-fold typological structure as representing what education is, in the form of the Technical Rationale, and what education ought to be, as shaped by the transformative-emancipatory and transcendent-liberatory visions. In attempting to analyze the constructs of each vision, it is hoped that further scrutinization of these major themes can serve to enhance a deeper understanding of what each vision reveals and conceals. In filtering my special education experience and my concerns for human dignity through the visions of the technical-rationale, transformative-emancipatory, and transcendent-liberatory orientations, I can, with deeper insight, clarify what I consider educational practice as being and what it ought to be. With a further regard for what is, and cannot be, left to chance, and with a greater understanding of what is dismissed and included in each of these visions, I can

illuminate the urgency I feel for the necessity to shift paradigms from what is to what ought to be.

Section I: The Technical Rationale

The work of Ralph Tyler captures the essence of the technical rationale, his basic constructs of needs assessment, educational objective development and evaluation feed the larger production ethic of the Technical Rationale and stand as the dominate platform for educational pratice. "The Tyler rationale is essential to understanding today's curriculum planning process since it remains the foundational and functional paradigm for the profession" (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 179).

As my special educational experiences are filtered through the technical rationale, my responses and interpretations are paradoxical and complicated. On the one hand, the orientation of Ralph Tyler and the technical rationale makes the most sense for the vast majority of moderately and profoundly handicapped children. This is not only because it is the accepted and currently practiced orientation, but is due to its remarkable success in introducing and acclimating large numbers of previously excluded and forgotten individuals to school and society. The diagnostic-prescriptive orientation of the technical rationale has been enthusiastically embraced by special

educators not only because it is the taken-for-granted position, but because it has provided a bridge that extends itself to a population that has been unreached by public education.

As has been discussed earlier, the Tylerian constructs form the core of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act: PL 94-142. This particular legislation has done more than any other legal act, social reform, or humanitarian intent, to include the physically, mentally, socially, and emotionally handicapped person within the scope of public education. The behavioral objective is at the heart of this legislation, and the diagnostic-prescriptive structure of PL 94-142 has given many educators and parents the courage to reach for and to embrace their handicapped child in ways that they may have never done before. The direction and guidance of the prescription has given many educators and parents a hope and an energy that they otherwise may not have been able to muster. In many cases, the behavioral objective and the prescription have served as the actual invitations for the handicapped to participate in the educational endeavor. As a result of the behavioral objective and the prescription, educators and parents have the courage to engage, with their handicapped child, in the hope of a more inclusive vision offered by PL 94-142. The behavioral objective and the diagnostic prescription have become the "chance givers" of the technical rationale.

The prescription has provided a vision of liberation or emancipation that at one level appears to be very sound. Through the diagnostic-prescriptive structure of task analysis, severely handicapped children are aided and guided through various stages of independence, such as self-feeding and dressing, to more advanced skills of managing a simple shopping list, being able to ride a bus, and ordering food at McDonald's. All of these are certainly not significant and casually dismised accomplishments; they are impressive achievements that have been aided by behavioral objectives and motivated and propelled by the larger legislative act. In one sense of the word, they are emancipatory; they have enabled a lage number of previously excluded handicapped individuals to participate in the life of the greater social community. The behavioral objective has served as an invitation to and the bridge by which many isolated and ostracized individuals have come to engage in the larger society.

On the other hand, the painful paradox presented by the success of the Tylerian constructs in special education becomes apparent as regard for human dignity is filtered through the vision held by the technical rationale. In considering reciprocity and subjectivity as being the crucial qualities of human dignity, one can turn to a re-examination of the constructs of the technical rationale--specifically the behavioral objective and the prescription. As one

analyzes the behavioral objective and the diagnostic prescription for their capacity to encourage relationship and to enhance subjectivity, the empty superficiality of the technical rationale's vision of emancipation begins to emerge.

As students, teachers, and the curriculum meet, within the confines of this technical rationale, it is for the purposes of defining, guiding, and determining behavior. The behavioral objective and the prescription that evolve, during the needs assessment and development of the educational objective, constitute the meeting points within which interpretation and meaning may evolve. This meeting is of a one-dimensional and one-directional nature. The understandings that may emerge during the meeting of students, teachers, and the curriculum are organized and determined by the prescription and the behavioral objective. Consequently, as texts meet to interpret meaning in the form of understanding, the revealed understanding concerns itself with the meaning of the behavioral objective and with the adherence to the prescription. There is no dialogue concerning the interpretation or the intention of the prescription; there is no awe or curiosity regarding the meaning of the behavioral objective. There is only a "top down" monologue and certainty that are directed and controlled by the prescription. The technical curriculum concerns

itself with "a series of 'shoulds,' mastery of which will purportedly lead students to be 'good' persons, to live a 'good' life, and to make a 'good' society" (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 183).

As students and teachers come into contact within the context of the technical rationale, it is for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of the educational objective, within which each participant carries out his predetermined and prescribed role: teachers as transmitters of the valued body of knowledge and students as the receivers of such facts and skills. The prescription controls the flow, direction, and content of the conversation between students, teachers, and curriculum. The non-dynamic nature of the prescription results in a monologue rather than a dialogue and thus stunts the possibility for any authentic relation, encounter, or genuine understanding. As Macdonald and Purpel point out,

> Technical curriculum planning does not respond to this human potential . . . there is no moral grounding for the Tyler rationale--no affirmation of basic beliefs, no reverence for life, no concern for compassion, or worrying about justice. (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 183)

The control exerted by the prescription and the behavioral objective in distorting dialogue further abolishes the possibility of any genuine meeting. Consequently, the technical rationale is void of authentic relationship and therefore lacks the capacity for confirming, affirming,

or sustaining human dignity. Further, in compliance with the behavioral objective, all who participate in fulfilling the mandate of the prescription are reduced to objects. Teachers, students, parents all carry out their particular role--a role and a reaction which has been predetermined by the prescription. The technical rationale supports a system of objects and objectivity rather than subjects and subjectivity.

Consequently, when the technical rationale is viewed through the focus of human dignity, the limitations inherent in the prescription and the behavioral objective surface as being restraints that contribute to the perpetuation of a structure that denies relationship and which stifles subjectivity. The initially liberating capacities of the behavioral objective and the diagnostic prescription are seen as the actual mechanisms which support an alienating and dignity-denying vision. The real concerns for human dignity can not be addressed by the vision of educational practice held by the technical rationale. Since there is no possibility for authentic relationship within this vision, issues of reciprocity and subjectivity are muted and cannot be mentioned. Consequently, regard for human dignity is disregarded.

Upon a deeper and more critical examinaton of the technical rationale, it appears that relationship and the

consequent concern for human dignity that is covered within this reciprocity and subjectivity have been concealed. This dismissal and disregard for human dignity cheapens and invalidates the seemingly emancipatory strides made by the success of behavioral objectives.

That which this vision does not leave to chance is the predictable control of human behavior but it is at the cost of relationship, subjectivity, and human dignity, which this vision does leave to chance. Macdonald and Purpel further reflect upon the serious inadequacies of this view when they comment, "We believe that the metaphors of control, certainty and elitism implicit in the Tyler rationale are not appropriate for questioning for our highest human aspirations" (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 187).

Thus, the omissions of the technical rationale present us with the serious and pressing need to know what our educational practice is in order to move to what it can and ought to be. As Macdonald and Purpel remark:

> An enormous amount of critical and imaginative work must be done in order to forge powerful and compelling alternatives to the existing technical orientation. It is not just that this work would be a useful and interesting task but that we see such efforts as a metaphor for the urgent and critical task of freeing ourselves from the narrowness of the existing mechanistic and control-oriented paradigm that shapes so much of our culture. (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 192)

In regarding human dignity, relationship, and subjectivity as being those things which the educational endeavor can not leave to change, I turn to consider the perspectives of the transformative-emancipatory and transcendent-liberatory visions. Centrally positioned within each of these visions is the concern for liberation which, as Macdonald and Purpel point out, ought to constitute the goal of education.

> The most fundamental and highest goal of education then becomes human liberation, in both a negative and positive sense. Negatively, liberation means being free from unnecessary constraints and barriers to human dignity and potential such as those that come from being poor, frightened, misguided, ignorant and unaffirmed--in a word controlled. Human liberation in a positive sense refers to the capacity for full consciousness, fulfillment, joy, integration--in a word freedom. (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 187)

As the goals of education shift from productive transmission, conformity and standardization, to goals of personal and social liberation, the questions regarding reciprocity, subjectivity, and human dignity assume a central position. Such human dignity contemplations and questions constitute that which cannot be left to chance within the visions offered by transformative-emancipation and transcendent-liberation.

As the transformative-emancipatory and transcendent-liberatory visions are filtered through my experience as a special educator and further sifted through concerns

for human dignity, the limiting and liberating capacity of these visions becomes more refined. Such refinement enables us to more clearly articulate what is, what can be, and what ought to be our greater educational metaphor.

Section II: The Transformative-Emancipatory Vision

The transformative-emancipatory vision is one in which the message of empowerment is central. The core of this empowerment rests in one's capacities to develop critical consciousnesses in which oppressive and unjust conditions are demystified. This demystification process, when emancipatory, empowers one to engage in socially responsible action in the quest to diminish injustice.

The demystification process of this model is one in which the taken-for-granted nature of experience is investigated through phenomenological distancing and bracketing. This examination lends itself to the formulation of questions of interest which evolve during authentic dialogue and which may contribute to the revelation of oppressive and alienating conditions and relationships which press upon our lives in destructive and manipulative ways.

The themes of the transformative-emancipatory vision are reflected in the works of Dewey, Freire, and Giroux whose reflective thought process, conscientization, and transformative intellectualism concern themselves with critical consciousness, empowerment, praxis, and justice.

The educational practice offered by this vision is one in which both teachers and students engage in the process of empowerment as critical reflection upon the world and experience, results in emancipating and transforming social and personal action.

Through its regard for social liberation and justice, concerns for human dignity are addressed by the transformative-emancipatory vision. Concerns for reciprocity and relationship are central to the constructs of critical consciousness and empowerment. Such consciousness and empowerment evolve as subjects meet to reflect upon experience within a dialogical framework. As teachers, students, and the curriculum meet, for the purpose of understanding meaning within a transformative-emancipatory vision, the dialogue is mediated by a reflection and analysis of experience. There is a dynamic quality to this meeting in which, as one reflects upon experience, he is in turn shaped by his reflection of that experience. There exists a dialectic process within the reflection that is captured by Dewey's sense of the "doing" and "undergoing" quality of experience. Consequently, there is a dynamic rather than a static interchange that takes place as teachers and students meet; dialogue rather than monologue pervades the atmosphere of the meeting.

As teachers, students, and the curriculum meet and through inquiry investigate the uncertain, experience is

made more certain, and the previously mystifying situations are demystified and brought into the realm of the knowable. Once demystified, a particular situation may serve as the basis for taking empowering action in which one emancipates oneself from the oppression of the particular condition. This social liberation forms the core of the transformative-emancipatory vision and serves as the source of the illumination of human dignity through acts of justice. Dialogue directed at demystification and empowerment can only take place within relationship as texts meet to reflect upon experience. In the quest for justice, the transformative-emancipatory vision locates human dignity within the relationship that is required in order to demystify, through dialogue, the conditions of oppression.

Although the regard for reciprocity, which is central to the confirmation of human dignity, is solidly positioned within the transformative-emancipatory vision, the "subjectivity" requirement of human dignity is not as fully addressed. As Paul Tillich reflects, "if one uses a person as a thing . . . loss of human dignity results" (Tillich, 1967, p. 94). The subject-object tension that exists in the doing and undergoing of experience requires that there be a continuous shifting of the positions of subjects and objects. Although the reflective object of the transformative-emancipatory vision remains, for the most part, experience, there is a

very real risk that human beings may be included within the objectification of any particular experience. A person may come to be objectified and used as a thing which results in a two-fold loss of dignity, that of the objectifier and the objectified. The requirement that one never be used as an object is more precariously positioned within the transformative-emancipatory vision.

A more perplexing dilemma, however, than that of the delicacy of the balance of subjectivity for the transformative-emancipatory vision is brought to the surface as the issues of special education are filtered through the lens of this vision. The requisites of a critical consciousness and an active reconstruction of experience which depend upon one's ability to appropriate, take from, a demystified context those things which can be utilized to reposition one's self into a more liberating circumstance, requires a certain and a high degree of intellectual ability, without which one is incapable of gaining the necessary critical consciousness required by the reflective thought process and the conscientization process to become liberated.

There exists within the transformative-emancipatory vision a subtle yet existing hierarchy which can ultimately function as a sorting and excluding mechanism. Intellectual reasoning skills constitute the source of one's ability to engage in the reflective thought and the conscientization

processes. Intellectual reasoning, rather than the behavioral objective, becomes the invitation to participate in relationship in which meaning is understood. One cannot demystify, appropriate, or engage in empowering relationships if one is inarticulate as a result of age or emotional, social, or intellectual impairment. The transformative-emancipatory vision when encountered by special education leaves exposed, vulnerable, and excluded the young, the old, and the handicapped.

As the transformative-emancipatory vision faces special education it becomes apparent that social liberation and emancipatory praxis alone will not reach deep enough to illuminate the dignity of the many individuals who will be left still oppressed when the good works of conscientization are completed. The young and the handicapped remain in the precarious care of the emancipated. They may be excluded or objectified by transformative-emancipation which may or may not view them affectionately. That which cannot be but is left to chance in this vision is the very real possibility that the dignity of these persons may be left unaffirmed. A praxis informed by the regard for social liberation and social justice does not reach far enough to touch the vulnerable population of the handicapped, the young, and the old who, lacking the intellectual and emotional capacities necessary to participate in the empowering relationship and the emancipating dialogue, remain excluded and voiceless.

Consequently, as the transformative-emancipatory vision is focused by issues regarding human dignity and special education, it emerges as certainly a vision whose concerns are located in the right place, i.e., human dignity, but whose stipulations for participation result in an incomplete picture of liberation. Relationship is at the core of this vision, but the intellectual requirements forming the guidelines for critical reflection upon experience constitute the barriers by which many are prevented from fulfilling its goal of liberation. The limitations of the transformative-emancipatory paradigm are brought into focus by its exclusion of the handicapped. By bringing to the surface issues and concerns of special education, the transformative-emancipatory vision appears as only a partial, although vital, reflection of liberation.

Section III: The Transcendent-Liberatory Vision

The third metaphor, the transcendent-liberatory vision, is probably the most elusive of the three visions and is further plagued by the concerns which Purpel and Macdonald express regarding their turn to a paradigm situated within religious language. "Our fear has been that our language might seem sentimental, fuzzy and pious, thereby repelling many of our readers" (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 186). The transcendent-liberatory vision is one in which the essence of relationship and subjectivity, which have

been more familiarly discussed by spiritual and religious writers, attempt to gain their voice and position within the educational realm. In referring to the work of Heschel and Buber, a vision of education has been set forth in which issues of subjectivity and reciprocity form the core of its practice.

With an understanding of the dialectical movement between Buber's I-It and I-Thou and with insight into sources and roots of good and evil, this vision embraces as its metaphor the "spiritual dialectic," in which the tensions of subjectivity oscillate. The goal of this vision also rests in freedom and liberation in which the "free" man is liberated to perform the "essential deed," that of going forth to the world speaking Thou. This is the act of reconciliation which can be undertaken as one illuminates his "existential guilt," recognizing his responsibility for impairment to relationship, and as one embraces his "existential indebtedness," understanding his dependence upon the other for his very existence.

The teaching deed of this vision occurs in the meeting as the teacher makes possible the unfolding of the precious essence of each student. This unfolding takes place within the event of relation as the teacher also reveals the forces which have constituted and actualized him/her (the teacher). The preparation of the teacher rests upon the self-educative

tasks of self-illumination, the bringing to surface acts which have prevented relaton, and perseverance, the maintaining the true and wise course upon the realizations made possible through self-illumination. Finally the act of reconciliation, or return, completes the three-fold nature of teacher preparation. The teacher, upon the recognition of guilt and indebtedness, turns to encounter that which he must encounter, his fellow man, in such a way as to do no further damage to relationship and that means to perform the essential deed of Thou-saying. The act of Thou-saying is the manifestation of love.

Love, liberation, and freedom become the goals of the transcendent-liberatory vision and constitute those essentials that can not be left to chance. As issues of human dignity and special education are filtered through the lens of this vision, goals of liberation are more completely addressed.

As students, teachers, and curriculum meet in this vision, it is for the purpose of understanding understanding, itself. Consequently, the meaning that is illuminated is meaning about understanding, an understanding that embraces the a priori of relation. In placing understanding about understanding as the reason, goal, and purpose for the meeting, rather than in placing reflection upon experience as the focus of the meeting, the transcendent-liberatory vision

eliminates the subtle and blatant hierarchical ordering that occurs among meetings for the purpose of critical reflection upon experience.

The old, the young, and the handicapped are all equally capable of engaging in relationship; each possesses full capacity for meeting. Once the requirement of critical reflection upon experience is removed, the barrier to relation is also removed. Within the transcendent-liberatory vision, the meeting is for the purpose of enhancing reciprocity, illuminating subjectivity, and engaging in the dialogue (the Thou-saying) which enables us to be made fully and mutually present. The purpose of relation serves to address the reciprocal and subjective dimensions of human dignity. Thus, when filtered through the concerns for human dignity, it appears that these concerns constitute the heart of the transcendent-liberatory perspective.

With the heart of the transcendent-liberatory vision being located within relation which openly embraces reciprocity and subjectivity, the requirement of an invitation and a need for a bridge by which to participate are eliminated. The issues of inclusion which dominate the concerns of special education vanish. There is no need for technical rationale's behavioral objective or transformative-emancipation's requirement of critical reflection. The transcendent-liberatory vision exposes the dignity-denying

nature of the behavioral objective and the exclusionary function of critical consciousness. It leaves us with a paradigm that has centrally positioned the regard for human dignity within a context of love, and it is from this position that we can begin to construct a vision of what education ought to be as its practice is directed toward the goal of liberation.

The dialectic between justice and love can be symbolically represented by the movement between the transformative-emancipatory and the transcendent-liberatory visions. Although examination of the transformative-emancipatory vision through the focus of special education has revealed critical consciousness as being elitist, the good works of conscientization cannot and should not be dismissed. Niebuhr's reflection in Moral Man and Immoral Society, regarding those who have so little power that they have forgotten the essence of being, constantly reminds me that social liberation, emancipation, and justice must be held in balance with personal liberation, transcendence, and love. It is the dynamic movement to which Buber refers between the I-It and the I-Thou. His further insight regarding the realization that "without it a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human" (Buber, 1970, p. 85) resonates with my understanding of the vibration between the transformative-emancipatory and transcendent-liberatory visions.

Section IV: Beyond the Typology

Although the three-fold typological structure of this paper has enabled me to organize and clarify my experience as well as to illuminate my despairs and hopes, I realize that in order to avoid the temptation of reducing the typology to a technique, it too must be transcended. As Milner paraphrases Immanuel Kant in stating "experience without typologies is blind, typologies without experience is empty" (Milner, 1976, p. 38), it becomes apparent that the value of the typology is in its heuristic contribution and not in its ability to stand as a method or a solution to a problem.

The technical-rationale, the transformative-emancipatory and transcendent-liberatory visions have functioned to form a typological structure which has enabled me to make sense out of my personal and professional experience and which has further stimulated critical examination of that experience. However, insights gained and understandings illuminated only intensify the dilemma of dealing with such issues as human dignity within the context of special education. These reflections are not enough to address the complexity of the human condition; in fact, the surfacing of these understandings only points to the gap or the void that appears as one attempts to grapple with these concerns, especially within an educational setting.

More specifically, each vision offers a hope and an action which attempts to address freedom and alleviate the suffering of humankind. However, the solutions differ radically ranging from prediction and control to critical consciousness and performance of the essential deed. The hopes for humanity and the visions of freedom that constitute these paradigms are equally divergent.

The typological structure has contributed to the clarification and criticism of the visions, but vision itself does not seem to reflect the deepest issue. It becomes apparent, as I analyze the insights gained from the typological framework, that there is not a lack of vision or even an absence of understanding regarding the value of living in a good and just world, but there is disagreement as to what constitutes that goodness and justice. More pervasively, there exists a difference in the direction in which one's vision is turned or aimed in order to illuminate that goodness and justice. It seems to be a matter of direction as well as vision.

In attempting to transcend the confines of this vision-oriented typological structure, I turn to the Allegory of the Cave, in which Plato points out that it is not a lack of vision but rather the issue of misdirection that must be addressed. As Plato aptly states:

> "But our reasoning indicates," I said, "that this power (understanding) is already in the soul of each, and is the instrument by which each learns; thus if the eye could not see without being turned with the whole body from the dark towards the light, so this instrument must be turned round with the whole soul away from the world of becoming until it is able to endure the sight of being and the most brilliant light of being: and this we say is the good, dont' we?"
> . . .
>
> "Then this instrument," said I, "must have its own art for circumturning or conversion, to show how the turn can be most easily and successfully made; not an art of putting sight into an eye, which we say has it already, but since the instrument has not been turned aright and does not look where it ought to look--that's what must be managed." (Rouse, 1956, p. 317)

It is the turning of the soul toward the good rather than the construction of a vision which surfaces as presenting the deeper tension. Plato understands that the power of vision or understanding resides within us all; however, the challenge emerges as one further realizes that direction of the vision points one's understanding toward goodness or evil. Plato comments that

> The virtue of understanding everything really belongs to something certainly more divine, (than the virtues which are put in place by habits and practice) as it seems, for it never loses its power, but becomes useful and helpful or again useless and harmful, by the direction in which it is turned. (Rouse, 1956, p. 317)

Consequently, the educational task becomes one of addressing the good, wise, and just and of taking action in which one turns the soul toward this authentic being. One can not be allowed to direct his or her vision toward the shadows or even the hand-made images. The responsibility

of the educator is to turn one toward that which is real, the brilliance of the sunlight. This of course is not done without risk, pain, and confusion, but it remains as being the action which can and must be taken if we intend to or hope to deal sensitively and authentically with issues of human dignity.

Plato offers us an image of turning the eyes toward the real light of being or or directing our efforts at understanding toward genuine being rather than toward shadows and images. The educational task becomes one of directing understanding toward authenticity rather than one of filling the eyes with vision. I suggest that this aspect of the Allegory of the Cave be interpreted as representing the dialectic between love and justice. Specifically, I consider that the action of turning the soul be regarded as the responsibility of an I for a Thou or the enactment of love. The turning of the soul is performed in light of the responsibility one has for another and this turning is an action of love. Further, the turning of the soul is not to be done aimlessly but must be directed at the good which I regard as being the justice set forth in the beatitudes. The educational task becomes one of lovingly turning the soul toward justice. The mission becomes one of wisely addressing that justice and of initiating that love. It is not a matter of convincing another of what

that goodness and justice are, but of directing another's vision and/or understanding toward this goodness and justice. It is not a matter of imposing justice upon another but of guiding, influencing, and directing another's understanding toward that goodness and justice so that it may be revealed in the unique way made possible by that very individual.

The gaps that are illuminated by the structure of the typology are those that emerge in contemplating Plato's understanding that it is not vision but rather direction which rests at the heart of the educational endeavor. Thus the responsibility becomes one of not only lovingly turning the soul, but of openly and critically articulating the good, the just, and the beautiful. It becomes a matter of wisely knowing the direction in which one is turning and of further being grounded in a wisdom of the goodness and authenticity of the direction. It is a responsibility that requires us to be as wide awake as possible, to be suspicious that our vision and understanding may have been aimed at the shadows, and to be clear about the goodness and the justice.

The educational mission requires that we address the good and the direction. However, as Purpel and Macdonald have indicated, if that vision of the good and the direction by love are couched within religious language, one

runs the risk of being dismissed or accused of being sentimental. In spite of this, I feel that this risk needs to be faced, for otherwise the educational response to issues of human dignity seems empty, superficial, and aimless. In addition, this turning toward the religious metaphors is not done for the purpose of seeking fundamental resolve of the questions of goodness and justice, but with the desire of recognizing the awe and mystery that humbles us as we attempt to contemplate the complexity of these questions.

The process of writing this paper has been a humbling and at times overwhelming project. The intensity of the issues, the gravity of the concerns, and the paradoxical tensions present in the emergent understanding of responsibility have all contributed to the difficulty of addressing the dilemma of human dignity within a special educational context. I am further humbled by the prospect of finding my own voice and articulating a statement of the good.

In addition to the humbling recognition of the necessity of addressing the good comes the understanding that I must also relinquish my quest for solution and certainty which have contributed to the construction of the original typology. In going beyond the framework, I turn to the realization that it is the struggle, not the solution, that constitutes the educational endeavor as one is faced toward love, justice, dignity, and goodness. In transcending the solution orientation of visions, I arrive at a level of

the recognition of and affirmation of direction. The reflections and insights gained during the effort of constructing solution-oriented visions points to the necessity and urgency of addressing the tensions that prompted the quest for a solution in the first place. Although the solution evades grasp, the direction of the quest emerges as the struggle over the issues evolves. As one attempts to keep oneself directed toward the illumination of the good and the just, the genuine and authentic debate regarding human dignity can take place.

As I find myself turning toward the religious traditions for my understandings of the good, I am cautioned by the criticisms of Dewey, Giroux, and others who have exposed the mystifying and oppressive nature of traditions grounded in religious dogma, authority, and institutions. But as I attempt to deal with human dignity, inclusion, and the disenfranchised, I find myself compelled to turn to concepts of love, justice, and goodness as they are illuminated in the religious context, not for the authority they present but for the richness of possibility they offer.

I am especially touched by the understanding of agape love in which it seems that love and justice merge requiring the difficult and paradoxical task of naming the enemy and embracing him. The handicapped population in a sense crystallizes this paradox for education. We cannot just

name and identify but we must embrace. In the embracing, the handicapped must not be allowed only to gaze upon the shadows, because that is what they are most capable of doing, but in love they must be turned toward the good, the just, and the beautiful. Their human dignity and ours will not be affirmed until this is included within the spectrum of educational concerns.

As Plato reminds us, we all contain the capacity to understand, and through the act of love our souls may be turned in such a way that our understanding illuminates, in our own unique way, the goodness toward which we have been turned. From the religious traditions I have gained a sense of the good and an inkling of the direction. However, I remain cautioned by the tradition of suspicion that reminds me that I may have been turned toward the shadows. I seem to embrace the paradox that Sharon Welch addresses as she speaks of infinite hope, undying suspicion, and faith:

> The value of Christian faith may be that it gives us the ability to live with that tension. If the life of faith is one of absolute commitment and inifinite suspicion, the ground of commitment is neither rationalistic nor authoritarian. It is possible to avoid both the intellectual certainty of rational explanation and the mysterious certainty of an authoritative revelation and faith. (Welch, 1985, p. 91)

This paper has enabled me to establish an order which has contributed to my clarification and criticism of experience and has allowed me to more thoroughly analyze conditions of human dignity. As I have worked through

the typology I have been further humbled by the immensity of such an undertaking and have been pushed to loosen my hold upon the structures that first empowered me to turn my vision toward such an endeavor. I am left paradoxically in a more vulnerable and precarious position but am filled with a hope that enables me to endure the uncertainty and the confusion. In this confusion, I embrace the challenge and aspire to touch the source of courage that would enable me to act with the sense of responsibility that Ross L. Mooney refers to as he writes:

> Here we seek
> to meet the night
> in ways
> that bring the dawn. (Mooney, 1976, p. 104)

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