Does Signalling Solve The Lemons Problem?

ASU Author/Contributor (non-ASU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Timothy Perri PhD, Professor Emeritus (Creator)
Appalachian State University (ASU )
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Abstract: Maybe. Lemons and signalling models generally deal with different welfare problems, the former with withdrawal of high quality sellers, and the latter with socially wasteful signals. Absent signalling, with asymmetric information, high productivity workers may not be employed where they are valued the most. If one’s productivity is known in alternative employment, signalling that overcomes the lemons problem will only occur if it increases welfare.

Additional Information

Perri T. Does Signalling Solve the Lemons Problem?. Applied Economics Letters [serial online]. April 2016; 23(4-6):227-229. Available from: EconLit with Full Text, Ipswich, MA. Publisher version of record available at:
Language: English
Date: 2016
Asymmetric Information, Information, Productivity, Signals

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