THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY
AND STATE BORDERS

A Thesis
by
JAMES BENJAMIN WESTMORELAND

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APPROVED BY:

_____
Renee Scherlen, Ph.D.
Chairperson, Thesis Committee

_____
Nancy Love, Ph.D.
Member, Thesis Committee

_____
Curtis Ryan, Ph.D.
Member, Thesis Committee

_____
Philip Ardoin, Ph.D.
Chairperson, Department of Government and Justice Studies

_____
Max C. Poole, Ph.D.
Dean, Cratis D. Williams Graduate School

Abstract

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AND STATE BORDERS

James Benjamin Westmoreland
B.A., College of William and Mary
M.A., Appalachian State University

Chairperson: Renee Scherlen, Ph.D.

Nations, states, and borders are constructs. They are imagined where they do

not truly exist. What a nation is fluctuates as much as the membership of people in

said nation. Yet, the nation is the culmination of the culture and beliefs of a people.

States and their borders are fluid, not permanent. Yet, the state is the essential

building block of international politics and state borders provide the structure for the

state. Is the fluctuation in national identity responsible for the change in location of

state borders? This question is answered by conducting a comparison of two case

studies using the countries Eritrea and South Sudan. Each case is compared to a

model of nation-state creation exhibited by Germany to see if the creation of a new

national identity was responsible for a new state and its new borders. The German

model is a classic model of the influence of national identity on state borders. It was

expected that the German model is true for new states where national identity is

created and then dictates border placement. The cases, wherein both Eritrea and South

Sudan utilized state borders borrowed from their colonial past, did not support this

hypothesis. The national identities, forged during the conflicts that lead to the creation of Eritrea and South Sudan, failed to materialize based on the markers of national identity used. It is likely that the German model failed to predict the method of new state creation in these cases because the European experience does not share the colonial experience found in many states, including these cases. Further examination into the effect of colonialism on the national identity of people living in former colonies might form the foundation of a new model describing the relationship between national identity and state borders.

Acknowledgments

  The research I completed is certainly within my field of study but took me to places I did not think it would go. While it represents a culmination of my studies both here at Appalachian State University and my undergraduate alma mater, the College of William and Mary, I could not have completed this work without the generous assistance from several key individuals. I would like to first offer many thanks to my advisor, Dr. Renee Scherlen, whose guidance made this research both the best possible experience and the best possible work. I also greatly appreciate the assistance of my readers, Dr. Nancy Love and Dr. Curtis Ryan, who kept my work on the right path. I thank Dr. Philip Ardoin, Ms. Katy Dewhirst, and the Department of Government and Justice Studies as a whole for providing support throughout. I also value the insight gained from discussions and camaraderie shared between my fellow graduate students in the political science program and myself. Lastly, and certainly not least, this work would not have been completed if my wife, Frederica, had not poured her heart into helping me in every way possible to achieve this goal.

Dedication

For my wife, Frederica: thanks for tolerating the mess.

For my son, Ethan: dream big.

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Introduction

Near the end of the First World War, US President Woodrow Wilson gave his

Fourteen Point speech identifying the need to separate imperial European states into smaller

nation-states to better govern and represent the people therein. He stated, "readjustment of

the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality" and

"other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted

security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development"

(United States Congress 1918). The concept and existence of nation-states prior to 1918 was

certainly not new, but President Wilson was one of the first to favor the drawing of state

borders around nations for the purpose of reducing the likelihood of future war. Growing

national sentiment was suddenly recognized to be at the forefront of causation for

international conflict and the relationship between national identity and state borders was

seen as a measure of the potential for conflict.

Typically, at the heart of any nation are common traits like religion, language, and

ethnicity. These characteristics create the national identity that reinforces the construct of the

nation by identifying who those in the nation are as well as who they are not. In this sense,

nations are as imaginary as states and their borders (Anderson 2006). Both are constructed in

the minds of those who participate. Without people participating, they cease to exist. Nations

are the essence of modern nation-states and their borders. Nations provide the backbone for

loyalty to modern states and state organization. What area people consider their homeland

serves as a basis for the state location and, hence, its borders. Nations without a state often seek to create a state for themselves.

State boundaries are found crisscrossing the globe, delineating spaces, and raising barriers to movement and trade. These boundaries that separate states from one another have multiplied so much that almost all land space on Earth is bounded. Even the uninhabited, barren wasteland of Antarctica is divided into research zones supported by territorial claims. These borders can be negligible, existing primarily on maps, or they can be tangible, such as a geographical feature or fence with checkpoints separating two states. Border placement is arbitrary. People place them as dictated by convenience. The rationale for border placement can be broad. Geography can often simplify the selection of the site of a border. A border frequently reflects military positions at the cessation of hostilities. The negotiated settlement after a conflict, or occasionally without conflict, may choose any number of reasons to place a border where it will be. This only maintains the question of why one location over another.

The effect of placing borders, especially when coupled with a physical presence at the border in the form of security forces or walls, identifies the limits of the states to which the borders belong. In the modern era, state power is no longer invested in the power of an individual, such as a monarch, but rather in the control of a territory by the state bureaucracy. Clearly delineated borders are necessary for state control. Because modern states are dependent on controlling territory, their interests often lie in expanding that territory in ways that benefit their own power. Pushing borders out, however, can come with significant costs. When the state and the nation are not the same, borders are likely to shift again.

How does national identity affect the creation of borders? This question looks at alternatives to geography or conflict as the basis for where borders are placed. Rather the

need is to understand what basis identity provides for where and why a border should be. The self-conception of a people as a nation provides a need for a state, and a modern state requires borders. Conflict alters borders, but when national identity is found at the heart of border conflict then national identity is at the heart of the creation of borders. As such, national identity provides a strong rationale for border placement. Other forces, such as economic value of land and natural geography, may be utilized to justify border placement, but they are often subservient to nationalist goals founded by changes to the national identity.

The study of national identity has only recently returned to prominence within political science (Smith 1991). The end of the Cold War has shifted focus from ideology to identity. Ideology, represented in the Cold War by national systems of economic and political policies, was used to explain state behavior rather than identity, which explains why those policies were used. The potential effect of national identity on border placement is central to the question of the origin of state power, a core concept with political science. How people spatially divide and administer themselves is perhaps the most obvious political action at the international level. Because state power is dependent on controlling territory, the borders defining the location and limits of said territory are significant for the study of power in international politics. Often, the study of borders is relegated to what role they play in international politics rather than where they are located. Yet, location of borders determines much of the politics between the states that share the border.

In order to address how national identity affects borders, this paper compares two case studies. These cases involve similar and recent state creations and thus newly created borders. A model of European nation-state creation is used to determine whether or not these states followed the German model of state creation involving the creation of a national

identity. European states are frequently seen as the origin of the modern nation-state. It is often assumed that new states will form as some states in Europe did, by aligning around a common national identity. Do newer states in the international community follow the European model, as frequently assumed?

The first chapter explores the German model and provides necessary explanation of the factors of national identity. Previous arguments are examined and a theoretical approach is discussed. The second chapter examines the case of Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia and the resulting border creation. The third chapter examines the case of South Sudan's secession from Sudan and the creation of that border. Each case is analyzed separately according to the German model. This thesis concludes with a comparison of the result of the analysis of both cases.

Chapter One: National Identity and State Borders

This thesis explores the relationship between the creation of a modern nation-state and national identity. Peoples with similar traits conceive of themselves as a single people. This common identity is the basis of their national identity, which then gives birth to the nation. Nations attempt to create within themselves the bureaucracy needed to provide governance, which becomes the basis of the state. The state will then delineate its boundaries so as to separate itself from others and consolidate power in and over the area of the delineated space. Thus, national identity provides the rationale for the structure of state borders. The goal for many nations is to create a nation-state.

The German Model

The state is frequently used as the primary unit of observation in international relations. A state is a single government controlling a specific area (Quackenbush 2015). States are sovereign in international politics, in the sense that they alone have control over their own territory and thus have a monopoly of violence within the state's territory (Gellner and Breuilly 2008). Yet, states are not "actors." The people living within a state direct state actions. States frequently reflect the people and the perception of "us versus them."

It is customary in political science to attribute the origin of nation-states to Europe (Anderson 2006). There are two models common to Europe regarding how nation-states are created. The French model describes how a nation becomes a nation-state by way of eliminating or assimilating all other nations within the boundaries of the state. The German

model describes how a nation simply draws a boundary around itself (Vick 2002; Wilson 2007). The creation of the German nation-state provides a useful example of how nation-states emerge. Prior to the creation of Germany, multiple smaller nations existed in the area that shared a common heritage. Prussian leadership advocated for confederating into a singular Germany nation-state (Avraham 2008). People with inherent similarities created a national identity resulting in the creation of a nation-state.

Though it is a difficult term to define, a nation is a community of people with a similar culture, language, and beliefs (Anderson 2006; Smith 1991; Quackenbush 2015). This is somewhat misleading because although all in a nation share traits, no one in the nation can know all those in it to verify this idea. For this reason, the nation is seen as an "imagined political community" large enough so that no member knows all other members but is also finite in size (Anderson 2006, 6-7). Nations form around a singular identity of who those within the nation are, which is also bookended by who they are not. National identity involves a sense of belonging to a political, cultural, and linguistic community (Smith 1991; Anderson 2006).

National identity is as fluid as the culture that defines it. There is no nation that always has been or is biologically defined. National identities are created and form communities that are imagined (Anderson 2006). People identify themselves as belonging to communities and communities identify territories as their own. As people inhabit locations, the locations become a part of the identity of the people, a homeland. The conceptualization of a people as being a nation is more than just the cultural markers that make up their communal identity (Poole 1999, 68). Certain markers develop that form the cultural

separation of people before they desire the territorial separation. The most common markers of national identity are language, ethnicity, and religion.

Language

Language is one of the most obvious ways in which people separate themselves. As a marker of culture, people learn their language as they are brought into the culture of their ancestors. Language also has a locational quality based on social interaction. Language can be split into several types: vernacular, administrative, and print. The vernacular language is commonly spoken, which is to say it is spoken at home and learned from ancestors. Administrative language is the language spoken across a region for the purposes of organization. This is the language chosen to standardize business and political bureaucracy across a larger area and is the first real instance of nationalization (Anderson 2006, 41-2). An example of an administrative language would be High German for Germany, which was used over multiple related and unrelated languages spoken within the governed territory. Print language is a function of the administrative language in that it spreads the administrative language of choice (Anderson 2006, 44-6). The print language also has the effect of bending similar dialects toward the administrative language, effectively eliminating the particular language or dialect of a nearby area first within political culture and eventually altogether.

Though it was common to use natural geographic features to identify where states existed, these borders and the states bound to them did not consider the people living there. The identification of places where people spoke a similar language was a much more effective tool for identifying what was actually German land (Vick 2002, 23; Anderson 2006). What constitutes Germany, by this measure, is seen in the flexibility of the borders in relation

to the movement of German people, which caused significant problems in the twentieth century.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is sometimes considered an unlikely contributor to national identity. Though it would seem obvious to some, ethnicity is only present as a factor in what is considered the Eastern model of national identity. The Western model considers similar customs and laws instead (Smith 1991, 12). The usefulness of ethnicity as a national identifier over customs and laws is that ethnicity is a characteristic of people considered before customs and laws come into effect, specifically the relevance of family. "The nation is seen as a fictive 'super-family,'" which provides the basis for trust in each other over those who are not members (Smith 1991, 12). Customs and laws can be common to many people who do not consider themselves of the same nation. In order to create an ethnic identity, a people can identify themselves as being similar to one another and also identify themselves as being separate from others (Smith 1986; Smith 1991, 23-4).

Some states come about by way of the removal of all but one ethnicity within a given area (O'Leary 2003, 53). The result is a singular ethnic nation with an identified homeland that is bounded by state borders (Wilson 2007). Germany did not follow this route. Instead, Germany was created by design from the coalescing of multiple kingdoms of people who all shared a common ethnic background (Vick 2002, 21). The Germanic people were ethnically distinct from the French, Italians, and Poles surrounding them.

Religion

Religious community is less prominent as a source for national identity in the modern world, but it was substantially more useful in the pre-industrial world. Religion held a grip on

the organization of people that in many ways prevented the rise of any national identity (Anderson 2006, 36). It cannot be denied however that religion has organized people into groups and provided similar customs that are stronger than those gained by politics alone (Coakley 2012, 71-2).

Akin to the use of ethnicity and language for identifying German borders was a common conception of religious unity. German peoples were mostly Protestant while the surrounding states were comprised of Catholics and Orthodox Christians (Vick 2002). The Prussians, who became the force behind the creation of a German nation-state, built the concept of the German nation around the idea of the protection of state values, namely the Protestant values that they held (Avraham 2008, 528-9). Germany, as it was conceived, took on the Protestant values of those who created the German national identity. Though the German national identity did not discriminate against Catholics, at least initially, the border for Germany was drawn around Protestants and not Catholics.

Nationalism

Nationalism is the "ideological movement" of national identity (Smith 1991, vii). Though not a marker of national identity, nationalism "invents nations where they do not exist" (Gellner 1964, 169). Nationalism is the source of the sentiment that the nation and the state should be made one as a nation-state (Gellner and Breuilly 2008). Although nationalism is often the force that drives a nation to make a state for itself, behind that force is the national identity. People must first conceive of themselves as being a nation distinct from others before they can utilize that identity to strive for statehood.

Homelands and Borders

Only when homelands are discussed does national identity begin to become clearer. Inherent to most nations is the sense of a homeland, or a geographic location where the nation and all of its identity was initially created (Smith 2006). Not all nations are geographically located in a similar region, but nations tend to have a start point. If they do not, one is selected. Borders are separated from borderlands in terms of finiteness. Borders, or borderlines, are specified and mapped as lines on the ground that separate two areas (Diener and Hagen 2010). Borderlands are the areas on either side of a border, even when the border is not specifically marked. Borderlands can be especially characterized by the overlap of two neighboring states or nations. As a nation forms a national identity, a homeland is created which will inevitably have overlapping borderlands with other nations. The goal for any nation is to occupy their chosen homeland and surround themselves with borders in order to create a nation-state.

Homelands and borders are not real things but are imagined as much as national identity is. Traditional homelands are the initial glue between the nation and the creation of a state (Smith 1991). As such, whenever a homeland is identified by a nation and nationalism takes sway, the drive to create a state by bounding the homeland with a defined border is inevitable (Diener and Hagen 2010). Homelands fluctuate in size and location as the nation claiming them alters their perceptions of the space and their place in it. People seek to "extend their boundaries to the limits of their cultures" so as to consolidate their nation in a place of their own control (Gellner and Breuilly 2008, 54). People who identify themselves as separate from other peoples often seek to physically separate themselves as well.

Ironically, borders have become more precisely mapped creations in the last few centuries. The predominant reason for this seems to be the decrease in frontiers. There are more humans occupying land than previously and the space they occupy more than likely bumps up to other occupied spaces. The frontier, the vast and open unknown, has been reduced to borderlands. Borderlands give birth to borders as peoples on either side of them seek a firm separation of each from one another (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 87).

When discussing borders there is a natural inclination to describe them in terms of physical geographical features, as if natural geography alone determined border locations. If natural geography did not determine the location of borders then the alternate hypothesis for where borders are drawn is where conflicts put them. In the literature review and in the case studies, both of these alternate hypotheses are discussed and refuted as the only variables at play.

Influence of Geography on Borders

One simply cannot discuss political geography without discussing physical geography. When examining a map, it is all too easy to draw the conclusion that in many cases borders were drawn on top of convenient physical landmarks and barriers. Rivers, coastlines, and mountain ranges all make for easy borders separating people. That statement alone is why geography might provide the basis for a successful border rather than where national identities would desire it. Yet, the physical boundary is often the best option for a border because it already naturally separates nations from each other. Nations develop claims to the land they already occupy out of convenience.

Natural geography can often explain state behavior as states vie for resources and the economic power that grants them, but natural geographic features are not used as borders in

some cases. There can be plenty of reasons for this but it can often be seen that the value of the feature to a nation overrides its usefulness as a border. The land value, either for traditional reasons or mineral value, demands that a people push the border past the terrain feature. Rivers hide gold. Mountains hide gems. Canyons hide minerals. Though all of these provide an obvious division of land, there is economic value in owning both sides. Even if there are economic reasons for seizing an area, the justification for taking and holding an area is frequently best wrapped in a nation's identity. Territorial claims are manufactured and people moved to make it a reality in order to expand. The economic reasoning is not as justifiable on the world stage as national interest is.

Similarly, the value of owning a geographic feature as a tool for the defense of one's homeland provides justification for ownership in the eyes of a nation. The nation will embed within itself a natural right to the borderland as a means of self-preservation. For example, the Golan Heights overlooking the state of Israel is a strategic location providing easier offense into Israel. Israel has, in response, occupied that land as a matter of self-preservation because it is also an easily defended area though it is not considered Israeli territory. Over time, the occupation of Golan has embedded the right to the land in the Zionist identity (Lavi 2013). Continued ownership of the land has been justified for reasons of national identity, that is, the land belongs to the Jewish homeland. Though the modern occupation of Golan can be seen for defensive reasons, even the expansion into the territory can be viewed through the lens of protecting the nation as a function of the national identity.

National identity is often not just the excuse used for grabbing land for economic reasons. By using national identity as the excuse, it becomes the reason. The fluidity of national identity and yet its strength in the minds of the people makes it easy for a fabricated

claim to land to become a hotly contested area for centuries to come. This is because there are no real claims to any land. Although, the concept of a traditional homeland is strong in the creation of a national identity, homelands are as arbitrary as nations are.

The border between France and Germany has been hotly contested in many bloody conflicts. Negotiated settlements at the end of each of these conflicts have pushed the border back and forth across vast tracts of territory, such as Alsace-Lorraine. While the area contested does have valuable resources, the claim on the land by both France and Germany is rooted in the identities of both. World wars, advanced democracy, and modernity have not changed the fact that Germany believes it has a right to the territory because Germans live there and that France sees their medieval claim to the land as superseding this.

Influence of Conflict on Borders

The influence of conflicts on alterations to political geography is central to the study of states. Conflicts often result in changes to state borders. Regardless of the type of conflict, changes can, and often do, happen. The incidence of conflict can be described as being a matter of opportunity and willingness (Most and Starr 1989). Opportunity, in this case, is defined by the proximity of one state to another, which in the most common of circumstances means the states border one another. Willingness is more of interest to this research.

There are two ways of looking at the role of borders in conflict: Borders are causes of conflict or borders are sites of conflict. One of the most-used methods of describing international conflicts is describing them as dyads, or containing two parts, which in this case are states (Quackenbush 2015, 14-5). States that share borders are closer in proximity to one another and are therefore more likely to come into conflict (Starr 2005, 391). States with longer borders more likely to come into conflict because there is more over which they can

argue (Wesley 1962). There are examples of states that are close in proximity and also share a long border, but are neither rivals nor in conflict, such as the United States and Canada. Border and territory by themselves are neither necessary nor sufficient for conflict (Starr and Thomas 2005, 137). Similarly, many conflicts do not end in territorial shifts, a more common outcome in the post-Cold War world.

More important than conflict's influence is the question of what is driving conflict that inevitably results in the movement of borders. National identity serves this purpose by demanding the securing of a homeland for its people. Therefore, borders alone are not the cause for conflict, and conflict alone does not give sufficient reason to move borders. Conflicts offer an opportunity for states to move borders. Borders also provide an opportunity for conflict. The willingness comes from the needs of the nation as it creates reasons for conflict.

Perhaps the most obvious historic example of conflict waged in the name of nation is the Second World War as fought in Europe. Germany began the conflict by seeking to unify German-speaking peoples under one state controlling what was believed to be the traditional homeland of Germanic people. The annexation of Austria as well as the Sudetenland in what was previously Czechoslovakia are prime examples of state borders being shifted to accommodate the national borders. Of course, German-speaking Czechs may not have considered themselves Germans despite the linguistic difference, but the national identity of the German people required a state owning all territory inhabited by German speakers (Smith, 1986). This phenomenon is referred to as irredentism and is more common than just this well-known historical example. Even today there are numerous irredenta, or places with

territorial claims on the basis of nation. Many national borders as conceived in their respective identities overlap, causing the conflicts that frequently result in new borders.

In the case of Germany in the Second World War, the annexation of lands containing German-speaking peoples was just the beginning of a larger territorial conflict. The ultimate goal of the conflict as conceived in the minds of Nazi leadership was the expansion of German borders as far as possible to provide room for ethnically German people to live at the expense of, including the eradication of, non-Germanic peoples. The altering of borders by way of conflict was conditional on the national identity of Germans that changed to include the need for space beyond their conceived homeland.

Hypothesis

The question at hand is specifically whether or not national identity is the source of changes to state borders. By using the German model, we can test whether or not the classic European model of national identity influence on states holds true for modern states. Thus, the hypothesis is that the German model of state creation holds true for new states where national identity is created and then dictates border placement.

Theoretical Approach

It would only be natural to take a realist approach to examining state borders, as borders are a source of order that states use to ensure their own power. The presence of a border denotes the physical presence of state control. The realist tradition views states as the centers of power in the international system (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985; Mearsheimer 2001). They have the ability to negotiate with or make war on other states in order to create borders to maximize their own power. Borders are even drawn in a zero-sum style with very little land unclaimed by states. Of course, in a purely realist world, the most

power to be gained is in control over the largest territory (Mearsheimer 2001). Realism would suggest that the source of the movement of borders is the anarchy of the international system wherein states compete for the opportunity to expand and control more. If the international system is a zero-sum game, then control of territory is the physical manifestation of said game.

Realism suffers from some drawbacks with regards to this line of thought. On closer examination, not all territory is worth the same and some territory costs more to hold and control than is gained. By going to war in order to gain territory, all states wager resources they might not get back in either success or failure. The realist explanation for state conflict suggests that states would continue as able to expand by consuming other states in order to increase their power. Though many states have territorial claims on lands owned by other states, there are many states satisfied with their borders that seek power through other means. Power is not gained exclusively through territorial conquest. Changes to borders cannot be solely explained by realism.

Alternatively, institutional liberalism suggests the reliance on borders by the international system as an institution that all states recognize. A state border is something shared by two states. There are no land borders that exist without a state on either side. Therefore the border becomes a tacit agreement or partnership between the two states. Borders can be codified in terms of bilateral agreements, such as trade agreements and mutual defense pacts. Borders can also simply be reduced in importance through the rise of institutions, as in the case of the World Trade Organization or the European Union. Institutional liberalism suggests that such organizations would overshadow and inevitably erode the importance of borders (Keohane 2005). Borders persist nonetheless and continue to

influence decision-making of states. For example, identities of European states persist despite the call to form a regional, shared identity.

The use of the German model greatly influences the theoretical approach. Constructivism is the chosen theoretical approach to examine how national identity affects borders. Borders are not static nor are they permanent. Borders move, as well as come and go with the rise and fall of states. A state border, though necessary to the structure of a state, is arbitrarily drawn. This calls into question of why it may be drawn one place and not another, or why the border is fortified as opposed to open. The preferences of the people on either side of a border contribute to the role and location of the border by influencing the state to do as prescribed (Wendt 1992, 213). Through the theoretical lens of constructivism, national identity becomes the primary factor in border creation. Borders are not just tools of state power but also expressions of national identity.

Before states can utilize borders as power structures, they must first define borders as necessary to their security. This requires an understanding of the border as providing meaning to the nation (Finnemore 1996). In this sense the state and its structure become responsive to the will of the people inhabiting it. The will of a people is most accurately depicted through the imagination of its national identity. This thesis abandons the state as the primary actor in determining border locations in favor of the will of the people. The defining of a people as a nation brings forth a natural comparison to those who do not belong to the nation. The border is the tool used to physically separate the 'us' from the 'them' in any landscape.

Case Selection

The cases selected for study of national identity and state borders are South Sudan and Eritrea. These cases follow Mill's Method of Similarity in that the independent variables examined are not common to both cases but the dependent variable is. Both cases have the similar result that a new border was drawn separating the new state from the old one. While all changes to borders, including flat-out creation, can be seen as simply creating a new border, the case selection supports the specific creation of entirely new borders as opposed to altering the placement of an older border. The independent variables utilized were ethnicity, religion, language, and nationalism. Certain other variables were controlled in order to reduce their effect on the analysis. Specifically, to evaluate the continuing relevance of the European model necessitated utilizing states that are not located in Europe. Both states examined are East African states that have only recently come into existence after seceding from their parent state, Sudan and Ethiopia respectively. Both states were created by similar conflicts. Additionally, both states came into being around the same time, eliminating concerns about time difference between the cases studied.

Eritrea and South Sudan are in the same region of world and share a similar colonial background. Both cases are unusual in terms of African state creation, as most states in Africa today are continuations of the colonial states that preceded them. Most borders in Africa today were drawn on the map based on the territorial claims of colonizing Europeans. As such, these borders took into account very little of the on-the-ground reality of what was there, much less where people were already located. To see whole new states made in a region of the world with a history of minimal border alteration or state creation is an opportunity to identify the influence of national identity as separated from regional identities.

Methodology

In order to discover the influence of national identity on state borders, the two case studies described above are examined separately and compared to the German model examined above. The cases examined were selected because they share the same dependent variable that a new border was created separating the state from the parent state. As such, there should be a noticeable similarity in the creation of a national identity in the new nation-state separate from the national identity of the parent state. Any differences in the reasons for the location of their borders should be most noticeable by comparing these cases to the model. These cases, if proven to be both products of a shift in national identity, prove the utility of the German model of state border creation and provide an archetypal case of how national identity holds sway over border creation.

The cases to be studied are constructed by first describing the situation and the history behind the secession of each new nation-state from its respective parent state. The markers of national identity are then identified in relation to the physical location of the borders. From there, the new borders are defined with any available material to explain the decision to locate them where they are. Where possible, maps are used to identify the location of the markers of national identity in relation to where the borders were created. In order to separate undesired variables, conflict lines and natural geographic features are placed on maps or described as available. These independent variables, conflict and physical features, are intended to be eliminated in favor of the markers of national identity. In the absence of maps, the regions in question are described.

The markers of national identity to be used (language, ethnicity, and religion) are operationalized for this research by identifying their differences between the seceding state

and the parent state, if they exist and where they exist. The use of these markers in identifying the secessionist state as separate from the parent state within the literature prior to and during the conflict should signify the rise of a new national identity. If the new borders fall along the division of these separate nations, then the national markers will be considered as the source of the change in national identity and also the change in the borders by way of conflict.

What role does national identity play in changes to state borders? The use of comparison of these cases to the model should illuminate whether or not the model has value in describing the creation of nation-states. The imagination of a nation separate from others lies in the differences seen in the markers from one people to another. When coupled with a natural desire for territoriality, the nation becomes a state. States are created through the creation of borders. Borders must therefore be the result of the imagination of a national identity. Similarly, changes in borders are the result of changes in national identity.

Chapter Two: Eritrea and Ethiopia

While several conflicts have occurred in and between Eritrea and Ethiopia, this case study is specific to the Eritrean War of Independence that began on 1 September 1961 and ended in 29 May 1991 after 30 years of warfare. While a referendum was held almost two years later, in 1993, with actual independence recognized by the international community in the same year, these events are not necessary to describe the creation of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border or the effect of Eritrean national identity may have had on it. Similarly, the Eritrean-Ethiopian War and all of the border skirmishes that have occurred since the establishment of Eritrea as an independent country are not studied as a part of this case. As aforementioned, the focus of the case is the creation of Eritrea as a new state in the international system separate from Ethiopia.

Background

The Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples were at one point a part of a single kingdom with a similar culture throughout. While there are obvious cultural differences between those peoples living in the highlands and those living in the lowlands of the Horn of Africa, the Aksumite Kingdom that existed in the region near the beginning of the Common Era was comprised of all of these peoples. The introduction of Christianity and Islam to the region also had minimal effect on delineating the region into smaller nations.

The defining moment in the history of the region was the conquest of the coastline by the Italians in the late nineteenth century. Though Africa was divided by the European

powers into colonies, not all areas were conquered. Eritrea was under Italian rule, separate from what would become modern-day Ethiopia. As a colony, Eritrea developed faster than Ethiopia. At the end of World War II, Britain took over trusteeship of Eritrea until the United Nations combined it with Ethiopia in 1952 in a federation (Tronvoll 1999, 1043; Tareke 2009). The Ethiopian state caused many problems for Eritrea over the next decade as it continuously interfered in Eritrea's loose ability to rule itself. The Ethiopian government had difficulties allowing an important province to create policy frequently against the wishes of the central government. These problems ended with Ethiopia annexing Eritrea and assuming all governmental control in 1962, beginning the war for independence (Tronvoll 1999, 1043).

The conflict would last about 30 years as both Ethiopia and Eritrea dealt with internal power struggles and conflicts with other neighbors. Ethiopian forces were able to occupy large parts of Eritrea in the early 1960s, as Eritrean forces were slow to mobilize into a single unified fighting force. Eritrean resistance began with the creation of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1960 and morphed over time until the sole remaining organization prosecuting the war was the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1970. The collapse of the Ethiopian regime in 1974 coupled with the liberation of the Eritrean capital of Asmara in 1991 resulted in negotiations toward the establishment of Eritrea as an independent state in 1993.

National Identity

Language

Prior to the war for independence, there was no single language common across Eritrea. Tigrinya speakers were the largest group but not by much. The plains areas inhabited by the Tigre slowly adopted Arabic for religious use, but even Arabic did not have

substantial penetration aside from the use in affairs by Muslims. Italian was also spoken but it was the common language across all the ethno-linguistic areas in Eritrea rather than the preferred language of use (Tareke 2009). The ELF made the key decision to run the war for independence by splitting Eritrea into ethno-linguistic zones, each run by its own leadership (Tareke 2009, 61). These groups would organize and prosecute the war on their own with vague oversight from the ELF until the EPLF took over. The EPLF maintained some basic semblance of this arrangement but fragmented groups further into cell structures similar to the Vietnamese. The ethno-linguistic organizations were reduced to the smallest element to fight Ethiopia. Each village was now its own unit with assistance from the greater EPLF, which centered in the Christian highlands, home to the Tigrinya (Tareke, 2009).

In Ethiopia, just across the border from Eritrea, are large groupings of Tigre and Afar speakers. Yet, the national language of Ethiopia was Amharic from the Amharan people, who held the ethnic majority. When Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia, Amharic was made the official language there too. It was to be used in all government and business practices as well as taught in schools over all other languages. As seen in Figure 1, there are no identified Amharic speakers in Eritrea. That ethno-linguistic group exists predominantly in the central and northwestern regions, to include the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, Eritrean forces under the control of the EPLF never adopted a singular national language. Though they fought Ethiopian forces that utilized a singular language, Eritreans sought to maintain their right to speak a language of their choice.

Figure 1. Eritrean Ethno-linguistic Groups

Source: Tronvoll, Kjetil, and Daniel R. Mekonnen. 2014. *The African Garrison State: Human Rights & Political Development in Eritrea.* Rochester, NY: James Currey, p. *x.*

Ethnicity

The greater Horn of Africa is home to a myriad of ethnic groupings. Eritrea itself is home to several major ethnic groups. In this sense, there are no Eritrean people. Eritrea is a territory inhabited by the Tigrinya, Afar, Saho, Tigre, Beni Amer, and Kunama peoples (Tronvoll 1999, 1054). Eritrea is a multi-ethnic place that shares these ethnic groups with Ethiopia. Though other nearby provinces rebelling against Ethiopia were ethnically

homogenous, only Eritrea was successful in gaining its independence from Ethiopia, but not due to any singular ethnic difference.

The victory over Ethiopia created the Eritrean state at the same time that it destroyed the Eritrean nation. Eritreans saw themselves in a fight against Ethiopians. The states involved served the role that ethnicity might as a matter of 'us versus them' as it would in other cases (Tronvoll 1999, 1055). The defeat of Ethiopia ended the tentative peace between ethnic groupings that was maintained in order to fight the bigger threat: Ethiopians.

Religion

Eritrean and Ethiopian history is unique from a religious perspective in that the Kingdom of Aksum, the fledgling kingdom located in the area at the beginning of the Common Era, was one of the first to adopt Christianity as its state religion. Since then, and due to the close proximity of the Islamic world across the Gulf of Aden, Islam had spread across parts of Eritrea and Ethiopia. Prior to the move to secede, there was almost no difference in the religious make up between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Makki 2011). Christians and Muslims were settled in both areas with Christians outnumbering Muslims only slightly in both states.

As Eritrea separated itself from Ethiopia, the relationship between the state and religion played a role in galvanizing the perception of the differences between the states. Ethiopia and Eritrea both had a large number of Christians and Muslims in their populations. Yet, the treatment of the religions was different in each, which provided a reason to rally to Eritrean nationalism. Eritrea recognized equal rights for its Muslim population to its Christian population where Ethiopian Muslims were considered second-class citizens to the Christian Ethiopians (Tareke 2009, 57). Italian rule in the area had brought a secularist

outlook in governing Eritrea that was absent in Ethiopia. Ethiopia still held onto its Christian Aksumite history though Muslims were numerically larger than ever.

Nationalism

The rise of Eritrean nationalism was the result of a vacuum of power that led to the EPLF taking sole charge for the liberation of Eritrea from Ethiopian forces (Tronvoll 1999). The EPLF was not an ethno-nationalist organization and Eritrean was never an ethnic category (Tronvoll 1999, 1054). Though there is a distinct and unique quality of being Eritrean from that of Ethiopian, the difference lies with the colonial past. Eritrea had a different history than Ethiopia as a colony of Italy. As such, it had more modern infrastructure and its bureaucracy was developed in the image of Italy's while Ethiopia still relied on the trappings of the old monarchy. Ethiopia's national identity was a function of the ethnic culture of the largest group (Deng 2008, 35). Eritrea never developed such a tie.

The Border

The border between Eritrea and Ethiopia is a near perfect match to the provincial border used by the Italians when they occupied Eritrea and administrated Ethiopia, as seen in Figure 2. This border was affected in large part by the frontlines of the fight between Italian colonial forces and Ethiopian forces. When the fighting ceased, Italy took ownership of the area they had occupied (Negash 1987). The border they used crossed ethnic, linguistic, and religious areas in the region.

Figure 2. African Colonization

Source: Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 69.

Figure 3. Map of Eritrea

Source: Makki, Fouad. 2011. "Culture and Agency in a Colonial Public Sphere: Religion and

the Anti-colonial Imagination in 1940s Eritrea." *Social History* 36, no. 4: 418-442.

Perhaps the easiest way to tell that natural geographic features were not the basis for

the border is the presence of straight lines on the map. Straight lines do not exist in nature but

humans can imagine them. Though the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia follows the Setit River for a while, it makes a leap to the Mereb River via a straight line, as depicted in Figure 3. Of course, in examining the rest of the border from West to East, there are sections that do not follow rivers, mountains, or depressions as might be expected.

Near the end of the conflict, Ethiopian forces held positions deep in Eritrean territory. The guerilla campaign that eventually led to the success of the Eritrean war for independence did not rely on solidly identifiable frontlines as would be expected, or even as seen in European conflicts. Instead the Ethiopian military was forced to fight a counterinsurgency until the point at which they had been weakened enough that Eritreans could win battles in the open (Tareke 2009; Reid 2011). The border as it exists does mimic the frontline in the Italian conquest of the region when they ceased operations and sought peaceful coexistence with their Ethiopian neighbors. Conflict clearly played a part in determining where the border would end up but not the conflict in question. Rather the old provincial border from Italian colonial days, which was a product of military conquest, had become engrained in the minds of Eritreans as delineating their national homeland. Hence, they reverted to that border at the end of the conflict.

Analysis

The basis for what made Eritrea a nation is predominantly its colonial past. While there were fewer distinctions between Eritrea and Ethiopia in terms of ethnicity and religion, Eritrea fell under direct occupation and control of colonial Italian authorities while Ethiopia did not. Even later when Ethiopia was administered by Italy, it was not controlled by Italian authorities the way Eritrea was. Eritrea developed faster than Ethiopia. Its government was secularized and did not favor any ethnicity. Ethiopia's government, even as evolved, never

let go of its Christian Asmaran past. When Ethiopia annexed Eritrea and attempted to enforce its customs, Eritrea became a nation whose identity was borrowed from its Italian colonial past. What sustained Eritrea throughout the war for independence was a conceptualization of being Eritrean versus being Ethiopian.

Given the relevance of Italy's ownership of Eritrea to its national identity as it fought for independence, it should not be surprising that the administrative border used by Italian colonial authorities was utilized as the border of choice upon Eritrea gaining independence. The border had been used to delineate Eritrea from Ethiopia since Italy conquered Eritrea. Eritreans became the civilized people to the barbarian Ethiopians (Negash 1987). The border was maintained under British trusteeship following World War II and maintained again when Eritrea and Ethiopia were federated by the United Nations. Eritreans had come to view the border as the extent of their homeland.

Unlike Germany, which organized itself around a singular administrative language common to all, Eritrea remained fractured among its ethno-linguistic groups. German peoples could all make a claim to being of Germanic decent, a central ethnic grouping separate from those surrounding them. Eritrea shares ethnic roots with Ethiopians as well as being divided within itself into multiple groups. Germans aligned themselves religiously as a Protestant group separate from the Catholic nations nearby. Eritrea and Ethiopia shared an equal mix of Christian and Muslim peoples. Eritrea only preferred secularization to the Christian government in Ethiopia.

Eritrea fails to meet the standard proposed by the German model of national identity as the source of state border creation. The core markers of national identity are still being negotiated even today in Eritrea. Due to the fact that there was no single ethnic group that

stood out as the victors in the fight against Ethiopia, there is continued ethnic tension in Eritrea that leadership has attempted to fix by resorting to mandatory national service in the military in order to artificially create Eritrean nationalism (Tronvoll & Mekonnen 2014).

The borders Eritrea shares with its neighbors, specifically with Ethiopia, are still contested. In some ways this case can be seen as a deviation from the proposed model where the borders are the source of national identity rather than national identity being the source of borders. The only marker that aligns in any way is that Eritreans viewed their homeland of Eritrea, as conceived by their Italian colonial administrators, to make them separate and unique from Ethiopia, with whom they actually share many characteristics. The border used today is the border Italy created and what it is to be Eritrean is a function of living on one side of that border.

Chapter Three: South Sudan and Sudan

South Sudan began its quest for independence long before Sudan was even an independent state. It was only after the Second Sudanese Civil War lasting from April 1983 to January 2005 that South Sudan was able to achieve some measure of independence. True independence came about after a referendum in January 2011 with statehood occurring in July 2011. The case involving the secession of South Sudan from Sudan occurred simultaneous to and in relation to conflicts Sudan had with other peoples, including both Eritrea and Ethiopia. No international action occurs uniquely by itself without influence from and on other events. This case, similar to the case involving Eritrea, focuses on just the creation of South Sudan and the conflict that brought about the newly independent state. The conflict in Darfur, Blue Nile, and border skirmishes are not addressed unless they offer information specific to the case at hand.

Background

Sudan has been home to multiple conflicts for decades. Like most of the African states, Sudan was a colonial holding. British colonial forces occupied Sudan as a part of their colonial occupation of Egypt. When Egypt gained independence, Sudan remained a British colonial holding only until Egypt also removed its claims to the land and allowed Sudan independence. Sudanese independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom was achieved in 1956.

South Sudan was first created as a province of Sudan at independence in 1956. The capital of Sudan and the northern regions became predominantly Arab and Muslim as opposed to the African and Christian South. The First Sudanese Civil War from 1955 to 1972 was a result of religious and ethnic tensions as the South attempted to maintain some measure of regional autonomy. South Sudan was allowed to operate autonomously from the North as a part of the agreement that ended the first civil war. The Second Sudanese Civil War from 1983 to 2005 was fought for similar reasons as Islamic fundamentalists gained power in Sudan and terminated the autonomy of South Sudan in 1983 (Woodward, 2013). The agreement at the end of the war guaranteed autonomy for six years after which a referendum for independence would be held. The referendum was passed with an overwhelming majority voting for independence in 2011.

The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which created the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1983, was the primary organization that fought the Second Sudanese Civil War for the independence of South Sudan. Their goal was to regain the autonomy lost when Islamic fundamentalists gained control of the government. The SPLM/A fought not just in South Sudan but operated as a rebel group throughout all of Sudan, claiming to fight for all oppressed Sudanese (Lesch 1998). When the fighting ceased in 2005, the SPLM/A removed itself from the problems of the other regions in Sudan to focus on developing South Sudan as a state.

National Identity

Language

Prior to the independence of South Sudan, Sudan was in the process of replacing indigenous languages with Arabic by suppressing the use of those languages. Arabic became

the dominant language spoken by being the only accepted language used in business, government, and school (Lesch 1998). The North had substantially higher majorities of Arabic speakers than the South though several northern provinces had sizable minorities of indigenous language speakers. Nevertheless, Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, was nearly completely Arabic speaking and its political leaders enforced the use of Arabic as the official language of Sudan (Lesch 1998; Idris 2013). The development of the Sudanese national identity as Arab-Islamic precluded the use of other languages, including English that was utilized during British colonial occupation. To northern nationalists, not adopting Arabic was in a sense opposing "the will of God" as Sudan developed as an Islamic state (Idris 2013, 73). Arabic was the national language of Sudan and a part of the national identity of northern Sudanese. It was not within the identity of southern Sudanese.

South Sudan spoke a number of indigenous languages, as seen in Figure 4. They also retained the use of the common language of English, against the influence of Arabic spoken by most of the North as well as the Sudanese government. The resistance to the use of Arabic in schools and business was one of the problems that led to the Second Sudanese Civil War. Southern leadership saw the enforcement of Arabic as a denial of Sudanese multiculturalism in favor of a singular ethno-linguistic heritage. Northern nationalists taking over the government in Khartoum upon independence from Britain and Egypt created a fear of what southern leadership considered "internal colonialism," where the North was attempting to colonize the South through culture (Idris 2013, 76). The North sent government officials to enforce the use of Arabic and Islamic law in the South. South Sudan did not rally behind a single language in order to create a national identity in competition with the North's national

identity. Their national identity recognized multiculturalism as a rejection of the North's

aggressive national identity.

Figure 4. Sudanese Ethno-linguistic Groups

Source: Lesch, Ann M. 1998. *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*. Bloomington, IN:

Indiana University Press, p. 16.

Ethnicity

Though the North is considered Arab-Islamic, Sudan's ethnic makeup is actually

Arabized groups of other ethnicities (Lesch 1998, 15). This is a result of the Arab culture

being absorbed by the lower Nile areas as it was in Egypt. The ethnic background of South

Sudan is comprised of many African tribal groups with few external groups due to cultural

infusion and colonization. As seen in Figure 4, the South featured great ethnic diversity in

comparison to the North. Hundreds of smaller groups existed across the South that had

different ethnic heritages from one another. This striking difference in groups in the South

did not affect British policy towards the South as the British lumped all these groups together.

During their rule, the British colonial authorities crafted their 'Southern Policy' specifically

to segregate the African South from the Arab North (Schomerus, de Vries, and Vaughan

2013, 5). This policy served as the basis for the origin of a border between the two regions.

When the Sudanese government attempted to create for itself a singular national

identity in line with a singular ethnic identity, they "excluded, demarcated, and demonized

the people of Southern Sudan" (Idris 2013, 67). The North continued to grow more

homogenous as Arabism became more engrained in society. This was not so in the South.

Though the SPLA originally advocated for a united Sudan that without any ethnic

prioritization, the Arab northerners saw them as African barbarians invading. The Arab

northerners were ethnically opposed to southerners because they were black, where black

was considered to be "of low social status and origin" (Idris 2013, 72). Southern leadership,

especially in the SPLA, continued to push for an egalitarian and unified Sudan, ignorant of

the ethnic tension building in the North (Johnson 2013, 149). Though the concept of a united

Sudan was attractive to some in the North, secession became a more realistic solution.

The resulting ethnic nationalism from before and during the Second Sudanese Civil

War was not on the side of South Sudan. The South never developed a core ethnic identity.

Quite the opposite was true for the North, where a very firm Arab ethnic identity developed

that informed their decision-making. Arab became synonymous with civilized and cultured

(Idris 2013; Schomerus, de Vries, and Vaughan 2013). The South's national identity was

born from being marginalized and not from any common ethnic background (Woodward

2013, 89). Though the North saw the South as lowborn blacks, southerners did not conceive

of themselves as sharing even the common blackness ascribed to them.

Religion

Islam was one of the unifying factors for the North. Arab culture and the Arabic

language became commonplace across most of Sudan through the adoption of Islam. It was a

homogenizing force that created a nation within Sudan (Idris 2013, 68-9). That nation

excluded those living in what would become South Sudan. The government of Sudan in

Khartoum, controlled by northern Sudanese, had more in common with its northern

neighbors in Egypt than it did with its own southerners and the rest of Africa to the south.

When Sudan gained independence, the British transferred authority to the Arab-Islamic

groups in charge in the capital (Lesch 1998, 212; Idris 2013). The Arab-Islamic nationalists

in the capital utilized their power to attempt to further homogenize Sudan by marginalizing

the rights of other religious groups, specifically Christians (Sørbø and Ahmed 2013, 6-7).

The South was geographically different from the North and more out of reach to the

British colonial authorities. Missionaries more easily penetrated the South and brought

Christianity with them. Christianity also overflowed into the region from neighboring

Ethiopia during the era of the Aksumite Kingdom, a Christian-African kingdom (Lesch 1998,

17-8). Prior to the infusion of Christianity in South Sudan, numerous animist traditions

existed, some of which still are practiced today.

The religious aspect of the conflict is perhaps the most salient to the issue of national

identity in the case of South Sudan. The conflict was framed in opposition to the government

in Sudan attempting to enforce Islam as the state religion and sharia law as the religiously

based code of law (Lesch 1998). Yet, despite more South Sudanese practicing Christianity

than traditional religions native to the area, the SPLM/A did not frame their conflict in terms

of restoring their right to practice Christianity over Islam. There was little combativeness in

their messaging as they promoted a united Sudan that allowed for the practice of both Islam

and Christianity equally. Southern leadership rejected the use of Islam exclusively. South

Sudan did not adopt a singular religious identity.

Nationalism

The Second Sudanese Civil War, which led to the secession and independence of

South Sudan, relied solely on the belief of the SPLM that the use of Arabic and Islam as

mandated by the state was an infringement on the rights of the majority to maintain their own

unique cultures. They "rejected the concept of fixed religious, linguistic, or ethnic majorities

and minorities" arguing instead that their "basic rights" to individual culture must be

maintained (Lesch 1998, 23). The rise of a national identity in South Sudan relied heavily on

identifying who they were in opposition to the identity the North developed. Sudan itself was

much more homogenous and sought a homogenous identity for the whole of the state in

becoming Arab-Islamic (Idris 2013, 64). South Sudan had aspects of a common identity from

which to draw upon in the conflict but resorted instead to rallying against Sudanese identity instead.

The Border

The border between South Sudan and Sudan first came about in 1956 as a result of a decision to split the North and South along a provincial line used by the British during their administration of the area. The British never actually divided the North and the South through the use of a formal border (Schomerus, de Vries, and Vaughan 2013, 5). An assumed provincial divide was used informally. Over time, this informal border became a reality as the people began to separate themselves across the borderlands. The borderlands between the two Sudans remain informal since South Sudan's independence and as fighting has erupted over resources and ethnic enclaves.

Figure 5. Political Map of South Sudan

Source: Schomerus, Marieke, Lotje de Vries, and Christopher Vaughan. 2013. "Introduction: Negotiating Borders, Defining South Sudan." In *The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives*, edited by C. Vaughan, M. Schomerus, and L. de Vries, 1-22. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

The North and the South are vastly dissimilar in geographical terms. The North is predominantly settled only along the fertile coasts of the Nile River. Nomadic groups live sporadically in the Saharan Desert on the western side of the Nile. The South is covered in wetlands, lakes, forests, and mountainous highlands. The border utilized is not located on the border between the sahel, grasslands adjacent to the desert, and the Saharan Desert. Instead, the sahel is presently divided by the border between Sudan and South Sudan. Additionally,

South Sudan claims ownership of portions of the Nile including both banks of the river rather than utilizing that natural feature as a natural border. The extent of their ownership of both banks does not include all of the arable land, which could be used as another natural border.

The conflict between Sudan and South Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War had no bearing on the placement of the border. As aforementioned, the border chosen was the 1956 provincial border, as it was understood to exist at that time. The SPLA occupied a sizable portion of the southern half of Sudan, including most of South Sudan. Their direct control did not extend across all of South Sudan as Sudan managed to capture most of the major cities in South Sudan. When a ceasefire was called in 2005, negotiation began between the Sudanese government and the SPLM. The negotiated settlement ignored all military conquest from either side.

Analysis

One of the main aspects of the imagination of South Sudan as a separate nation from that of Sudan is in the inherent otherness that Sudan represented. Though Sudan was a multiethnic state with numerous languages and religions, its government organized into an Arab-Islamic state with Arabic as the state language, Islam as the state religion, and sharia law as the legal code. All of these were objectionable to those living in what would become South Sudan. South Sudan was made up of African peoples who commonly spoke English and mostly practiced Christianity. Despite these differences, South Sudan created its identity as opposition to the Arab-Islamic North rather than utilizing the African-Christian South identity. The independence movement began as an attempt to remain united under acceptable terms rather than to separate entirely. While this identity as being in conflict with the Arab-Islamic North was enough to justify the war for independence, its result since independence

has been conflict between the ethnic groups that inhabit the new state. South Sudan's national identity prior to victory was built solely on opposition to the North and never coalesced around any specific traits.

The border utilized to separate South Sudan from Sudan was the provincial border used by the British during their administration in 1956, which Sudan used as well since independence. The old 1956 border simply delineated where the British thought the divide between the North and South should be. The British colonial administration never actually truly delineated the provincial border as used. Instead, roughly where the provincial border existed and the international boundary exists today, the British assumed a soft border that only became more formal through the natural separation of Northerners and Southerners. There is now concern that utilizing the 1956 border is not representative of where South Sudan truly is, creating border conflict since 2011. People who consider themselves South Sudanese have been caught on the wrong side of the 1956 border. This serves to further the point that the border was not created with respect to where national identity might have placed it at the time of state creation. In fact, the border was placed according to the older agreement rather than reflecting where national identity existed at the time of demarcation.

Nationalists in Sudan prior to Sudan's independence imagined themselves as an Arab-Islamic nation like their Egyptian neighbors to the north. In doing so they segregated themselves from the South, which was more classically colonial Africa. South Sudan considered itself to African in comparison to Sudan being Arab. It spoke English to Sudan's Arabic. The majority of its people practiced Christianity to Sudan's Islam. Yet, none of these characteristics became the traits used to identify what was South Sudanese as opposed to Sudanese. Because the conflict was wrapped in the message of freeing South Sudan from the

oppressive northern culture, there was no single national identity to develop out of the markers used in the German model. South Sudan instead developed a national identity based on conflict with the North, which crumbled when that conflict ended. As such, it fails to match the German model. The border followed the inherited colonial border rather than any sense of national identity on the part of South Sudan.

Conclusion

When creating an identity, one must invariably determine what one is not as a part of the process of determining what one is. This creates an automatic dichotomy between those who are and those who are not. National identity is no different in its construction and application, but is applied to a broader grouping of people. Because of the strength of national identity in creating a desire for a homeland for similar people, there is reason to believe that national identity is the source of the need to create territorial borders dividing nations, and ultimately creating nation-states. This research attempted to identify points where a surge in national identity might have resulted in the creation of new state borders that respected the geographical division of nations.

The use of Germany as the model for how nations are imagined and then translated into states follows the common conception of the Europeanization of state creation. Europe divided conveniently into nation-states in one of two ways: constant warfare or imagined community. Constant warfare eventually eliminated for many states the other groups that lived within them until only a single nation remained to own the state, what might be considered the French Model. Germany serves as an example of the alternative where the state is built around the conception of a nation that previously was not. Modernity prohibits the constant warfare seen in European history (Herbst 2000). If states are created today, the common belief is that they will follow Germany's example.

The case studies of Eritrea and South Sudan indicate that the German model for state creation does not hold for all examples. The bounding of Germany based on a common ethnic, linguistic, and religious background, though similar, is not the same as the bounding of Eritrea or South Sudan. Their experiences did in fact imagine themselves as separate from their parent state but that adversity is in large part the source of their identity. Neither was able to create a singular national identity based on a common ethnic, linguistic, or religious background.

The other result of importance is the relevance of the colonial history of Eritrea and South Sudan to their national identity. If national identity is created from a shared history then the colonial experience of each should be included. Their colonial heritage both played into their national identity during conflict leading to independence and then was abandoned after independence. This interaction as a whole should not be surprising as national identity is described by Anderson as originating in Latin American colonies and not the European colonial powers (2006, 50-1). Colonialism has an important role in how identity is formed and utilized by a budding nation-state or national movement. What was not expected in the research was the degree to which the colonial past played a role in segregating the new state from their parent state. Both Eritrea and South Sudan utilized borders given from their colonial past. In this sense, the identity is borrowed from the colonizer but not the model.

As the German model is not capable of explaining how these states split from their parent states, there is a need to explore a new model for the ideation and creation of new state borders. National identity undoubtedly plays a role, as both cases found some degree of the belief in the difference between one side and the other. This does not provide the sole rationale as neither case sustained a new national identity to continue justifying the new

border into the future. Other cases that share the colonial heritage could be compared to these to see if they share other variables as well that might have more of an impact on the result. Regardless, the example set by Europe in creating new nation-state borders is not shared by former colonies based on the cases presented.

Modern borders can often be categorized as either 'hard' or 'soft' in terms of their permeability. 'Hard' borders are specifically delineated on the map as they are in practice. Fences are built and guards are stationed. 'Soft' borders are usually on a map but in practice are often traversed by peoples on either side with some frequency. Research into the permeability of borders has often coincided with research into national identity as the flow of people across borders alters the nature of both the border and the identity of the people on either side. How diasporas affect the resiliency of borders as indicators of nations is worth examining in future research and may shed light onto why African states cling to colonial borders rather than creating state borders that respect national boundaries.

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    Nation Building in South Sudan." *Middle East Report* no. 259: 36-39.

Vita

James Benjamin Westmoreland was born in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1985. He and his family were highly mobile during his formative years. He returned to his hometown for undergraduate studies at the College of William and Mary in Virginia. In 2008, he was awarded the Bachelor of Arts degree with double majors in Government and History. After a brief stint in corporate America, he began study toward a Master of Arts degree at Appalachian State University in Political Science. He simultaneously enrolled into the Appalachian State University Reserve Officers Training Corps, Mountaineer Battalion. The M.A. and a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Army of the United States of America were awarded in May 2015.

Lieutenant Westmoreland will commence training at Fort Lee, Virginia, after graduation. His wife and son will join him.