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NATIONAL INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS IN
NIGERIAN POLITICS 1979-1984

Nigeria, a country located on the west coast of Africa, had a population estimated at approximately one hundred fifteen million people in 1989. It was a British creation, dating back to 1861, when the Royal Navy occupied Lagos, "the present capital," in its campaign against the slave trade. Nigeria emerged as a geopolitical entity only in 1914, when its northern and southern regions became amalgamated. During the gradual expansion into the interior, the British "invented" the name Nigeria. Nigeria remained a British protectorate until 1 October 1960, when it gained independence. Since then, Nigeria has endured several political crises, and fought a civil war (1967-1970). It has been argued that the dominance of the northern region, both in area and population over the southern regions, was partly responsible for the breakdown of civilian rule in 1966. Subsequently, General Yakubu Gowan's regime (1967-1975) divided the regions into twelve states. In 1976, General Murtala Muhammed (Gowan's successor) created seven new states to fulfill what he construed to be legitimate demands for self-determination.

Tables 1 and 2 reveal the ethnolinguistic categories and distribution of selected groups in 1963. Despite the existence of numerous ethnic groups, only three—the Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo—composed 58% of Nigeria's population. An additional eighteen "tribes" numbered 31.7%, and others of local significance came to 10.3%. Historically, the Hausas, Yorubas, and Ibos have dominated Nigerian politics. Under the provisions of Article 202B of the 1979 Constitution, the minority groups (42%) have been given increased political participation.

Nigeria, which became a republic in 1963, was governed by a civilian regime from 1960 to 1966, and from early 1966 to late 1979 it came under military rule. In 1979, it returned to civilian control as the Second Republic, and in December 1983 reverted to a military government. The collapse of the Second Republic may have been due to economic anarchy and social disorder, but few will deny the role of the political malaise created by ethnic politics.(1) Ali Mazrui has noted that ethnicity played a vital role in the politics of the Second Republic despite the major politicians' public disavowals.(2) This study explores Nigeria's ethnic politics *vis-à-vis* the dual processes of national integration and national cohesion, and evaluates the effectiveness of the 1979 Constitution, which was designed to address this political dilemma.

Many Nigerians regard ethnicity as a sensitive issue. Nonetheless, for the first time, the country dealt with this question in the Constitution of the Second Republic. Perhaps because of the delicacy of the topic, the words "national character" became a euphemism for ethnic composition (as for example Article 203B). The major concern of the framers of the constitution was how ethnicity could be regulated in Nigerian politics. The need to address this question in the Second Republic issued from the belief that ethnicity had tended to dominate

politics in Nigeria, a situation that was not conducive to national integration, because ethnic groups promoted their interests with little or no reference to those of the nation-state.

A cautious superimposition of a nation-state's interests over those of ethnic groups might serve as a positive step towards national integration. This is not to suggest that each group(3) might not pursue its own interests within the framework of the nation-state. Rather, special interest groups should realize that, in the final analysis, the nation-state's interests should supersede those of any ethnic collectivity. This, in turn, might encourage what Bolaji Akinyemi referred to as maximal unity, that is, "the transference of loyalties from subnational primordial units to one of [the] nation-state."(4) In other words, if the heterogeneous groups could be persuaded that they might best maximize their interests through devotion to the nation-state, their desire to support the higher polity, i.e., the nation-state, might be enhanced.

Scholars have shown an intense interest concerning this subject.(5) M. Crawford Young challenged scholars in the case of India and Nigeria to explore the hypothesis that "cultural complexity will play a positive role in national integration if the policy is so structured as to draw advantage from it."(6) Sam Egite Oyovbaire enunciated a somewhat different hypothesis: "Although the Nigerian political system is composed of multiple communities with distinct cultures and patterns of authority there is nothing *sui generis* about the political significance of these communities for the long term operation of the Nigerian political system."(7) These hypotheses might bewilder many observers of the Nigerian political system, in view of Nigeria's historical existence, in which the forces of ethnic loyalty created severe conflicts after independence, because the various authority patterns among the major groups retarded the national integration process.

Young's hypothesis suggests that cultural complexity could further national integration if the polity was "adequately" structured, but this has not yet occurred in Nigeria. Possibly, more than structural changes are needed to engender national integration. For example, superb and adequate as the Westminster parliamentary model is for the United Kingdom and Canada, and splendid as the presidential system is for the United States, both these structures failed to function in Nigeria. Ali Mazrui has noted that the parliamentary system that Great Britain transferred to the colonies did not succeed in many instances, either. In order for a political system to attain its objective, he argued, "the structure of government has to have roots and a sense of tradition."(8) In Nigeria, the parliamentary and presidential systems probably failed because they lacked longevity.

On the other hand, Oyovbaire has argued that, were the Nigerian collectivities left alone within the nation-state to function in a "laissez-faire" manner, the system would somehow regulate itself and create political stability. These hypotheses not only appear to provide contradictory solutions to the same problem, they also elucidate the complexity of the subject matter. Moreover, the recurrence of traditional sub-systems in the Nigerian polity(9) makes national integration difficult, because traditional politics tend to nourish what Walker Connor termed ethnonationalism.(10)

One of the chief concerns of ethnic nationalism, or ethnic autonomy,(11) is based on the notion that, in heterogeneous societies, the potential for conflict is heightened by the degree and size of the various ethnic groups.(12) Furthermore, in a plural society(13) competitive politics are founded on ethnic politics based on who gets what, when, and how. The struggle for the authoritative allocation of values therefore rallies groups to unite around what Clifford Geertz termed "primordial sentiments."(14) Geerts noted: "The network of primordial alliance and opposition is a dense, intricate, but yet precisely articulated one, the product, in most cases, of centuries of gradual crystallization. The unfamil-

iar civil state, born yesterday from the meager remains of an exhausted colonial regime, is superimposed upon this spun and lovingly conserved texture of pride and suspicion and must somehow contrive to weave it into the fabric of modern politics."(15)

The key, then, to the success of ethnic nationalism is that it must offer the ethnic nationalists easy access to mobilize the group in the struggle for the national distribution of goods and services. Robert Kearney agrees with this view: "The community frequently is the most inclusive group possessing a claim on the loyalty of the individual and with which he can readily identify. An individual is born into a community, and membership in that community and exclusion from all others remain with him throughout his life...."(16) As A. Rabushka and K. A. Shepsle have noted, a sense of communal solidarity tends to intensify ethnic preference, so much so, that in the struggle for political power to promise less for one's group in the name of harmony and accommodation was equivalent to betraying that group's interests.(17) This is not only true in the politics of developing countries, but also in developed states or nation-states such as Canada(18) and the Soviet Union.(19)

Ethnic nationalism has been defined as that unity which is common among peoples of a particular group. Such a unity could be social or political. It is said to be social if it involves in part the promotion of the cultural, linguistic, racial, and caste affinities of a group of people. It is political if it implies political allegiance or political loyalty to one's collectivity that has the propensity of creating micronationalisms(20) within a nation-state. For example, G. Almond and J. S. Coleman's study on political socialization in Africa observed the existence of particularism,(21) *i.e.*, the belief that a specific group had the right to promote its own specific interests without reference to those of any larger or more inclusive entity. The latter attitude, argued Basil Davidson, destroyed any organic unification.(22)

The birth of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria predates the postcolonial era, although its significance gathered momentum before and after independence, when the struggle for power and the survival of each group became the rallying cry of the area's political leaders. Indeed, the British had emphasized fortifying the Nigerian tribal groups' ethnic walls. Governor Sir Hugh Clifford's assertion before the Nigerian council on 29 December 1920, underscored this policy: "....It is the consistent policy of the government of Nigeria to maintain and support the local tribal institutions and the indigenous forms of government...which are to be regarded as the natural expression of [African] political genius....I am entirely convinced of the right, for example, of the people of Egbaland...or any of the great emirates of the North...to maintain that each one of them is, in a very real sense, a nation....It is the task of the government of Nigeria to build up and fortify these national institutions."(23) Clearly, Governor Clifford regarded the creation of an integrated Nigerian entity which would bring the diverse ethnic elements together into a closer union as politically unfeasible—at that time perhaps a justifiable viewpoint.

He wondered, furthermore, if it was possible to unite the various groups, and if so, what would be the consequences of such a unity in Nigeria. "Assuming...that the impossible were feasible—that this collection of self-contained and mutually independent Native states, separated from one another, as many of them are, by great distance, by difference of history and traditions and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers, were indeed capable of being welded into a single homogeneous nation—a deadly blow would be thereby struck at the very root of national self-government in Nigeria which secures to each separate people the right to maintain its identity, its individuality and its nationality, its own chosen form of government; and the peculiar political and social institutions which have been evolved for it by the wisdom and by the accumulated experiences of generations of its forebearers."(24)

Many observers might dismiss this statement as mere exaggeration of the political reality in Nigeria, and note that in Europe and North America, except in a few cases, cultural diversities have not proven centrifugal. Indeed, many have pointed to the enriching characteristics of diversity in the United States and elsewhere. But how true it is within the Nigerian context that cultural and ethnic diversities do not impede national integration? This, of course, remains one of the central foci of this study.

However, Governor Clifford's affirmation should not be dismissed without an allusion to the idea that it served as a self-fulfilling prophecy. This was so because it launched each collectivity on its path, pursuing its own interests at the expense of national unity. Thus, few were surprised when in 1947 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, one of Nigeria's founding fathers, underlined the problem of ethnic differences: "Nigeria is not a nation [that is a single united nation-state]: it is a mere geographic expression."(25) Also, in his lecture at St. Pancreas Townhall in London, he emphasized, *inter alia*, "that Nigeria is a British creation; that Nigeria consists of a multiplicity of races who are as different from one another as [the] races of Europe; [and] that for about 43 years, the British have striven to unite these diverse peoples..."(26) Although the first two points appear logical, noted Victor Olorunsola, the third point, he contended, was overly stressed. But such an idea, which many Nigerians shared, probably impelled the secessionist *Putsch* by the former eastern Nigeria that culminated in the temporary creation of the Republic of Biafra and triggered the ensuing civil war in the 1960s.

Following independence, many Africanists suggested that because Africa had many ethnic groups, national integration would become a major objective for the newly independent states.(27) This, allegedly, would help to mitigate the "evils" of ethnic politics and create political stability. For the past several years, however, observers of African politics have become disillusioned. They claim that national integration is perhaps not the proper solution to the political problems confronting African states. Consequently, they have suggested national cohesion as a better tool for the analysis of the issue of African ethnic cleavages.(28)

Scholars have been seriously reassessing the concept of national integration. As they examine African politics they wonder about its validity.(29) They have been seeking an alternative framework to national integration. Conceptually, a political system is said to be integrated if the units, that is, its individual political sectors, develop, in the course of political interaction, a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behaviour patterns legitimized by these norms.(30)

For Ernest Haas, this concept means "a process whereby political actors in distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institution possesses or demands jurisdiction over pre-existing Nation-states."(31) J. Coleman and G. Rosberg conceived national integration as the "progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant community."(32)

Henry Teune, on the other hand, asserted that national integration was a psychological notion and consequently defined the concept in the following psychological dimensions: (1) the degree to which the national government is a relevant set of stimuli for the individual, that is, whether there is some minimal level of knowledge about the national government; (2) the degree to which the individual considers the national government capable of influencing his welfare or is important in his every-day activities; (3) the degree to which the individual responds favourably to the national government; and (4) the degree of the individual concern for the people living within the same country but outside of his immediate environment.(33)

Leonard Binder conceptualized national integration as the process of cre-

ating intra-state consensus, especially the bridging of the élite-mass gap.(34)
Karl Deutsch perceived national integration in a roughly similar sense.(35) In
the case of Africa, at least, Richard Sklar noted that "in so far as national in-
tegration contemplates the creation of higher loyalties that supersede parochial
loyalties to subnational communities (tribes), language groups, or regions, it is
a universally acclaimed goal of the African renaissance."(36)

It is nearly three decades since the independence of Nigeria was proclaimed.
Yet, ethnic loyalties have not withered away, and national integration has not
been attained.(37) The basic problem of national integration in Nigeria has
two dimensions: (1) How to elicit from subjects deference and devotion to the
claim of the state. This means converting ethnic nationalism to nation-state
nationalism; and (2) how to increase normative consensus governing political
behaviour among members of the political system.(38) This means that the
problem of national integration entails developing a political culture and urging
the people's commitment to it.

The existence of such problems in Nigeria and elsewhere probably prompted
Crawford Young not only to reevaluate the condition for national integration
but also to wonder "if the pathway to nation-building is not simply longer and
more tortuous than was initially supposed, or is it perhaps a cul-de-sac?"(39)
Egite Oyovbaire also challenged the traditional mode of definitions. He ar-
gued instead that they were loaded with value premises and contained a variety
of meanings that were difficult to discern, at least in the Nigerian case. Did
national integration necessarily have to engender peace, stability, and harmo-
nization of interethnic relations in a nation-state? Better still, could national
integration *ipso facto* eliminate national conflicts in a polity, if interethnic antag-
onisms were primordial? Oyovbaire then suggested that, conceptually, national
cohesion was a better tool for analyzing the Nigerian case: "First, definitionally,
cohesion means simply the existence of a normative or value basis for a people
to keep together—a tendency or demonstrated willingness to hold together in
order to maintain and foster complementary interests in existence as a commu-
nity. Therefore, unlike national integration, national cohesion does not presume
harmonized or integrated interests....Regardless of how in the first place people
came or were brought together, national cohesion is simply an acknowledge-
ment of the minimum need to resolve the problems of collective actions in order
to achieve some presumed or agreed common goals with an increasing degree
of trust and predictability. Secondly, the theoretical value of the concept of
national cohesion is that it opens up a much better basis for evaluating the
manner in which successive governing classes in Nigeria have come to view and
articulate politics and the country's political process."(40)

This argument may be visualized in two ways. First, as long as a num-
ber of ethnic groups compose a nation-state, there may be clashes of interests,
which may induce these units to exhibit certain antagonistic behaviour pat-
terns. But since they inhabit an identical milieu, they must seek mutual toler-
ance. A good example of such a social accommodation by ethnic groups is the
relationship among Yugoslavia's various nationalities (Bosnians, Herzegovini-
ans, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbians, and Slovenians).(41) Al-
though these groups maintain various forms of ethnic autonomy, their rela-
tionships are generally marked by mutual cooperation.(42) Furthermore, this
view approximates what sociologists term social pluralism, *i.e.*, a political sys-
tem in which different ethnic, racial, and religious groups reside under a simi-
lar cultural system, while maintaining and respecting each others' peculiarities
and cultural identities.(43) Second, it could be argued that national cohesion
formed part of a metamorphic process that started during the period of an-
ticolonial solidarity and nationalism and has continued to the present among
colonial peoples; and that national integration might be the ultimate goal or
utopia, perhaps in the same sense as communism beckoned to the socialist states
of eastern Europe. Thus, one may represent the historical transformations in

the following sequence: nationalism-independence-ethnic nationalism-national cohesion-national integration.(44)

Conceptually, national cohesion may be observed against the background of traditional African societies, in which ethnic units fought to maintain their "sovereignty" and ethnic identities. It was fundamentally in the realm of trade and commerce that interethnic relations were marked by mutual cooperation. However, in precolonial and colonial times, the drive for territorial claims resulted in antagonistic behaviour patterns among ethnic groups.(45) In many cases, such conflicts spilled over into the postcolonial periods. Furthermore, the colonial powers and administrators did little to foster a sense of identity with the new territorial entities among the diverse collectivities.(46) In fact, in some cases the colonial powers incited interethnic conflicts by playing off one group against the other, in order to check the actions of a recalcitrant group.

What has made it difficult for national integration to occur and national cohesion to persist, stems from the socialization process within the various groups. The socialization process underscores the basic mechanisms and rituals required for the group's security and survival. For example, Victor Olorunsola's study of traditional political systems among the Hausa-Fulani, Ibos, and Yorubas of Nigeria discovered that, within the political mix, the Hausa-Fulani political system was despotic, theocratic, and authoritarian; the Ibo was republican, equalitarian, individualistic, and achievement-oriented; and the Yorubas basically preferred a constitutional monarchy.(47) For many years their socialization patterns continued to support the system within their various regions. These characteristics, therefore, tended to reinforce the groups' non-centripetal pulls in the period before and after independence. The outcome of the socialization process would be reflected in the structure of the political parties.(48)

L. Rubin and B. Weinstein have alluded to Western political scientists' ethnocentric approach to the study of political systems in Africa.(49) They noted that these scholars refused to study non-Western societies because they did not observe anything resembling the Western-type institutions in the non-Western world. Thus, the strategy was to amalgamate the various African groups as entities lacking political institutions.(50) Little wonder, then, that following independence, many political leaders, especially within the pan-Africanist movement, portrayed traditional African society as being homogeneous. The argument for this approach, according to C. Potholm, was based on the claim that these societies shared identical assumptions about the nature of human collectivities.(51)

Perhaps it was such an assumption regarding African homogeneity that prompted the late President Sekou Touré of Guinea to offer an optimistic prognosis of the Guinean case after independence. He said: "in three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much damange to our country and its politics."(52) Similarly, after independence in Uganda, the government's official policy proclaimed that ethnicity no longer existed.(53)

To some degree, the process of colonial "socialization" made it difficult for the newly appointed or elected leaders to comprehend the extent of ethnic loyalties that created problems with regard to their abilities to govern their polities. This was manifested in the attitude that Western-educated leaders were capable of remedying the effect of ethnic cleavages with respect to ethnic interests. But the drive towards cultural pluralism prompted C. Potholm to contend that "...the diversity of traditional African political forms and the basic political pluralism that characterized African political thought in its traditional settings is both manifest and considerable....Often ethnic strife has been exacerbated or in some cases muted precisely because of the nature of the traditional political system of that subnational unit. In other words, the basic pluralism of African political systems remains a fact of life, one that the statesmen and politicians

ignore at their peril."(54)

The argument posited here with respect to the national cohesion framework for analyzing the Nigerian case stems from the assumption that African traditional social patterns tended to mitigate the national integration process. This is so, because the traditional socializing process underscored parochial loyalties. The advent of independence in Nigeria and elsewhere did not dissolve ethnicity. If anything, it strengthened the ethnic walls as the various groups competed for socioeconomic and political powers in the modernization process.(55) For now, at least, it was an illusion to assume that ethnic loyalties would wither away, not because of the undesirability of such an event, but because of the impracticalities inherent in the politics of Nigeria.

The quest for a solution to the national integration problem prompted the Nigerian government to confront the issue with the 1979 Constitution. In a way, this approach indicated the complexity of the matter and demonstrated the difficulty in resolving it by other means. The 1979 Constitution presented a structural approach to solving the question of ethnopolitics in Nigeria. This was, for example, reflected in the party structure.(56) In reality, it represented an attempt to control the centrifugal forces of ethnicity, with a view to establishing a viable democracy in the country.

The spirit of the Constitution may be best summarized within the assumptions and hypotheses propounded by James R. Scarritt and William Safran. They note that ethnic political mobilization and ethnically-based control of political institutions would be less likely to hinder further modernization or significantly strain democracy, and may facilitate both, if they

> 1. ...occur within, exist alongside, or help produce several institutionalized, powerful interest groups which draw their members from all or most ethnic identity groups in the society in sufficient numbers that these interest groups are popularly identified as cross-ethnic or non-ethnic;
> 2. ...occur within, exist alongside, or help produce one or more cross-ethnic, institutionalized political parties or stable coalitions among parties which are able to control government, usually through controlling a majority of seats in the legislature; [and]
> 3. ...occur in the presence of or help produce a cross-ethnic leadership cadre of politicians and civil servants who are perceived by themselves and by the public as able to work together effectively in spite of ethnic differences without compromising any member's standing in his or her own ethnic identity group....(57)

Indeed, one of the problems of the First Republic's constitution was that it embraced the zero-sum game, especially with respect to the legislative structure and its dominant executive. In this constitutional framework, the loser was almost totally "frozen" out of the political process and denied the prestige that comes with being in power. Since the political parties were formed on the basis of ethnic cleavages, election results were often contested. The outcome was generally disintegrative, which created problems of legitimacy.

The constitution of the Second Republic, however, attempted to eschew these dimensions by introducing the presidential system with three centres of relatively equal powers (legislative, judicial, and executive).(58) Also inserted in the constitution were appropriate provisions designed to assuage the fears of various minority groups in Nigeria.(59) In this case, encouragement of crossethnic participation of all groups in national politics, while each maintained its ethnic identity, became accentuated. Chapter 2, Article 15 (2-3) of the 1979 Constitution, recognized that national cohesion may be part of a metamorphic process that thrived during the colonial era and that national integration might be anticipated in the resulting political change: "Accordingly, national inte-

gration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited...." The Constitution also stated in Chapter 1 that Nigeria would remain a federal republic and an indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state. But it was not quite clear what function the federal structure would play in the process of national integration.

Theoretically, federalism has served as a technique for aggregating large areas under one government for a common objective. In his study on the opportunities and problems of federation, A. H. Birch defined a federation as a "constitutional system in which there is a division of legislative powers between one general and several regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is a coordinate with the others, and each of which acts directly on the people through its own administrative agencies."(60)

In a real sense, a paradox exists when the nature of the federal system of government *vis-à-vis* national integration is considered. Henry Teune has noted that both federalism and decentralization were relational terms, having reference to characteristics of subunits of government, each of which was related to a general government.(61) In the case of Nigeria, the discussion of federalism issued from the "autonomy" of the nation-state subunits.(62) Such an autonomous posture of the regions (or states) would tend to undermine any unity that was anticipated in a system that attempted national integration because of possible centrifugal aspects of their interests.(63)

Carl Friedrich has also stated that the idea of a compact was inherent in federalism, and that the constituent power which made the compact took the place of the sovereign.(64) The complexity of the federal system, therefore, may lie in the nature of the compact. For example, was the compact to be based on a political system that opted for a centralized form of federalism offering more influence and power to the leaders of the federation than to the rulers of the governments of the subunits? Would it be based on a political system that adopted a peripheral federalism in which more power was offered to the rulers of the subordinate governments, who then would possess superior influence over the functions of the entire society than the leaders of the federation? In theory, the 1979 Constitution emphasized a centralized form of federalism, but historically, the central government has had problems with this structure on a number of occasions.(65)

The creation of states in Nigeria should be seen against the backdrop of Carl Friedrich's explanation of the purpose of a federation. A federation, according to Friedrich, is a union of group selves united by one or more common objectives, but retaining their distinctive group-being for other purposes. Federation is on the intergroup level. It unites without destroying the selves that are uniting, and is meant to strengthen them in their mutual relations.(66)

By creating thirteen states, the Yakubu Gowan administration attempted to address the concern of minority groups and to strengthen the federation. Furthermore, it was an effort to deal with the issue of the "Biafra" secession and to eliminate the minorities' fears of being dominated by the larger ethnic groups. The movement for the creation of states on the basis of ethnic groupings dates to the preindependence period, but gathered steam after the Civil War, when the number of states reached nineteen under the Murtala Muhammed administration.

Article 15(3) further addressed the issue of Nigerian national integration. For the purpose of promoting national integration it shall be the duty of the state to (a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the federation; (b) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the federation; (c) encourage intermarriage among persons from different religions, ethnic or linguistic associations or ties; and (d) promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic,

linguistic, religious, or other barriers. These strategies for attaining national integration might prove to be inadequate for the purpose for which they were formulated.

Interregional movements of peoples have been proceeding since time immemorial in Africa. In Nigeria, migration from one region to another will continue regardless of any legislation. But what is particularly important is whether the group that exchanged one milieu for another would shed its ethnic identity and adapt to the culture of the dominant group. In other words, is it possible, for example, for the Hausa-Fulanis who migrate from the north to the south to adopt the southern culture, so that they become, in effect, culturally integrated into the new milieu? Incidentally, migrants to the southern cities have tended to protect their identities by living exclusively among their kin in residential segregation. The same may be said of the Ibos who migrated to the north prior to the Civil War. Such segregation promotes cultural pluralism and retards social contacts deemed significant for improving the various groups' mutual understanding and behaviour patterns. Increased mutual understanding, one might argue, would promote integration.

As Abner Cohen has noted, there appears to be a paradox in the sociocultural intercourse among Africa's ethnic groups. This paradox stems from what he terms two contradictory phenomena: one group that surrenders its cultural identity and adopts the values and customs of other groups, and the other is one that maintains its cultural identity and emphasizes its exclusivity.(67) Possibly, the 1979 Constitution aimed more at the former. However, the latter appears to be the prevailing attitude in Nigeria. Max Gluckman has also noted that cultural survivability is significant in any society, and thus "when people from one cultural group migrate to towns they retain a great deal of their culture even without necessarily forming a corporate political group."(68) He contends that they therefore form ethnic categories.

The encouragement of intermarriage among persons from different places of origin as an integrative factor is tenuous, although not unimportant. In reality, intermarriage had long been common before colonialism but was not really a melding factor among ethnic groups. Cynthia Enloe has noted that in terms of socioeconomic advantage intermarriage might be helpful, because it could result in the upward mobility of either party, based on social status.(69)

Nigerian society is basically patrilineal and patrilocal.(70) The female spouse is expected to become part and parcel of the man's group. In fact, she may have to give up her former ethnic identity. And in terms of politics, the male spouse would be gaining a convert, who in most cases must necessarily join the man in the political struggle for power. This refers to the rural, social, political, and cultural norms. Although the rural population forms the grassroots of the political system, its members are those who least understand the national integration process.

Two major problems stem from this constitutional demand. First, it is difficult to legislate interethnic marriages, because it is a very sensitive and personal matter. Second, even when interethnic marriages take place, the political effect in terms of integrating two or more ethnic groups may be too infinitesimal to have any major impact on national integration.

The last factor in article 15(2-3) deals with the promotion or encouragement of association formation that transcends ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other sectional barriers. This, in particular, relates to the functioning of the political parties. Since the operation of the political parties in the Second Republic was relatively short-lived, their impact as vehicles for national integration could not be fully measured.

The function off political parties as forces for the mobilization of the masses is well known.(71) The purpose for which parties mobilize the people could make

or break the system, especially in plural societies. This was particularly the case in Nigeria during the period preceding independence and after, when the political parties were ethnically based. In part, this arrangement contributed to the political malaise and the crisis of 1967–1970. The problem stemmed from the manner in which the political parties were aligned. Claude Ake has noted: "One way of determining empirically the level of integration of a political system is to analyze its political alignment pattern. The major emphasis here is based on the extent to which political parties are cut across tribal and ethnic groups. If this analysis reveals, by and large, that the major competing political organizations draw their support from a diversity of socio-cultural and regional groups, the political system is likely to be highly integrated."(72)

According to this formula, then, the preindependence and post-independence Nigerian political system was not integrated. In order to address this issue, the political parties were constitutionally charged with the task of bringing about unity in their patterns of political recruitment. This was necessary if the political parties wished to become national in scope and character. Article 14(2) of the constitution states "That the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies."

This constitutional provision served as the basis for the following guidelines, especially as they concerned the need for the political parties to assume a national character: (a) Membership of political parties must be open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic group; (b) Names, emblems, and mottos of parties must not contain ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the parties are limited to the geographical areas of the country; (c) The headquarters of parties must be located in the country's Capital Territory [so that their activities could be closely monitored by the Federal Electoral Commission]; and (d) The constitution of political parties must ensure that members of executive committee or other governing body reflect the federal character of the country....

During the First Republic, the constitution of the National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns was framed in such a way that membership in the party was more readily open to groups (tribal unions and labour unions), and less to individuals. The argument in favour of the political parties was national in scope and character. It rested on the assumption that it would help eliminate or at least reduce the effect of symbols that marked the politics of the previous party system. It was evident that if the parties remained open to all Nigerians, then they would permit members of any ethnic group to join the political party that best suited the group's or individual's political interest and philosophies. As soon as ethnic symbols were eliminated and political parties became headquartered in the country's capital, chances were that "cytoplasmic" or peripheral allegiance would be minimized, and "nucleotic" allegiances encouraged.

The concept of nucleo-cytoplasmic allegiance is relevant in Nigeria's political matrix.(73) This is so because of Nigeria's relatively low literacy rate.(74) Symbols and personality rather than policies or ideology sometimes become the rallying cry of ethnic politicians. This necessitates the need to "nationalize" symbols.(75) The question is not whether politicians subscribe to the views of a particular party, but whether they see the national parties as representing national interests and indirectly theirs, even when the political party they support is not in power. If and when this becomes at least the perception of most Nigerians, then the path towards maximal unity would have been paved.

The issue of ethnic politics in Nigeria and elsewhere (the Basque in France and Spain, the Irish, Welsh, and Scots in the United Kingdom, to name a few)

may never disappear.(76) Yet Nigeria remains a regional power, and a genuine political force on the African continent.(77) This makes the search for a viable democracy and political stability a major task for the government. Nigeria has a peculiar situation, however, in that it has three dominant ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba) and numerous smaller groups. Attempts to reconcile the interests of these subnational groups can be very difficult sometimes, and the outcome can result in centrifugal tendencies.

So much has been written by so many, yet so few seem to have provided a major solution to the problem of ethnic politics and national integration. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the subject matter is complex, and hence intimidating. In fact, Larry Diamond's disquieting conclusion on ethnicity, with respect to the 1983 Nigerian elections, epitomized the gravity of the problem that it poses for democracy and national integration in Nigeria.(78) On the one hand, national cohesion permits each collectivity to function "autonomously" by allowing social and cultural advancement, while simultaneously recognizing the existence of a higher polity (the nation-state). Constitutionally, on the other hand, national integration still remains the elusive objective of Nigerian leaders.

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Résumé — L'auteur analyse les difficultés de réaliser l'unité nationale, la démocratie et la stabilité politique en Nigéria, étant donné les intérêts des ethnies. La constitution de 1979 a apporté une solution partielle: elle a donné l'autonomie politique à chaque unité ethnique, tout en reconnaissant l'éxistence de la nation-état nigérian. L'unité nationale reste le but des dirigeants nigérians.

1. Olatunde J. B. Ojo, "The Impact of Personality and Ethnicity on the Nigerian Elections of 1979," *Africa Today*, 28, No. 1 (1 June 1981), 47-58. See Larry Diamond, "Nigeria in Search of Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, 62, No. 4 (Spring, 1984), 905-927. Diamond attributed the downfall of the Second Republic to economic mismanagement and some of the politicians' political "naivete."

2. PBS Documentary, "In Search of Stability." *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (18 November 1986), Part 6.

3. For analytical convenience the terms nationalities, ethnic groups, and subnational groups are being used interchangeably.

4. Bolaji Akinyemi, "National Unity Within the Context of Regional Relations: The Nigerian Experience," in D. R. Smock, ed., *The Search for National Integration in Africa* (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 72.

5. M. Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), p. 12. Young's characterization of cultural pluralism includes the following: (1) Plurality is within a relationship to an authoritative arena, the sovereign territorial state (*i.e.*, polity or political system), which provides sharply demarcated boundaries within which groups define themselves and each other and their interaction occurs; (2) Two or more socially and politically significant aggregates, through differentiation by cultural criteria, may be identified by both analyst and actors, whose competition, interaction, and conflict constitute one important ingredient in the overall pattern of political transactions in the polity; and (3) The basis for these solidarity groupings are commonalities or affinities of ethnicity, language, race, caste, assumed blood tie, custom, and/or territory. In the case of Nigeria, ethnicity, language, religion, and region are some of its basic characteristics.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 275-276.

7. Sam Egite Oyovbaire, "Structural Change and Political Process in Nigeria," *African Affairs*, 8, No. 326 (January, 1983), 14.

8. See PBS documentary, "In Search of Stability."

9. Ojo, "The Impact of Personality and Ethnicity," 48.

10. See Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, No. 1 (1973), 1-23.

11. Raymond L. Hall, ed., *Ethnic Autonomy-Comparative Dynamics: The Americas, Europe and Developing World* (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1979), p. xi. See also Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Nigeria, A Country Study* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1982), pp. 90-111.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 255. Hall contends that in the developing countries the absence of ethnic conflict in states with numerous ethnic groups was the exception rather than the rule.

13. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. xxiii-xxiv. In their attempt to make a distinction between a plural society and a pluralistic society, Glazer and Moynihan stated that in a plural society most objective interests are pursued by people in the context of ethnic groups, boundaries between groups are quite rigid, and each group has a fixed place in the stratification. On the other hand, ethnic groups in a pluralistic society differ in wealth, power, occupation, and values, but in effect an open society prevails for individuals and for groups. Over time, substantial and rough equalization of wealth and power may be expected even if not attained, and each group participates sufficiently in the goods and values of social life of a common society so that all accept the common society as good and fair. There is competition among groups, as among individuals, but it is muted, and groups compete not through violence but through effective organization and achievement. Groups and individuals participate in a common society. Individual choice, not law and rigid custom, determines the degree to which any person participates, if at all, in the life of an ethnic group, and assimilation and acculturation proceed at a rate determined in large part by individuals.

14. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 104-157. Primordial sentiment describes societies that are characterized by "mechanical solidarity," in which individuals have no identities outside the ethnic group; they derive their sense of security and power from membership in it. Primordial sentiment is "nourished" by what James S. Coleman, in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 259, referred to as pan-tribal sentiment, brought about by the interaction which modernity makes possible.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 119. See A. Epstein, *Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 1-112; and F. Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little Brown, 1969), pp. 9-57.

16. Robert N. Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 6.

17. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 66.

18. See John Porter, "Ethnic Pluralism in Canadian Perspective," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 267-304.

19. Richard Pipes, "Reflections on the Nationality Problems in the Soviet Union," in Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity*, pp. 435-465.

20. Basil Davidson, *Can Africa Survive?* (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), p. 56.

21. Almond and Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas*, pp. 252-260.

22. Davidson, *Can Africa Survive?*, pp. 56-58. For example, writing about the British policy in West Africa, Davidson alluded to the remark made by a British critic in 1953: "it could equally be argued that it [British policy] creates a situation in which the maximum encouragement is given to tribal nationalism, and any political adventurer who proclaims himself a champion of the natural rights of the Yorubas, Ibos, or northerners can expect to succeed."

23. James Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 193-194. This sort of situation was fostered by British policy, which in some cases made traditional rulers more powerful than they had been in precolonial times.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 194. See Richard Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, eds., *Nigeria: Modernization and Politics of Communalism* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971), p. 56. Sklar suggested that the complexity of the Nigerian case was exacerbated by British colonial policy. This view was also held by Dennis Austin, who noted that there was always a hidden conflict, a constitutional tug-of-war, between Indirect Rule, which tended to accentuate differences within and among regions, and the developing system of Crown Colony government, which, in the reforms of 1922–1954, had to reconcile such conflicts at the centre. See Dennis Austin, *West Africa and the Commonwealth* (London: Penguin Books, 1957), p. 82. Elsewhere, Richard Sklar underscored the significance of the regions rather than the Nigerian nation-state: "the regional party leaders operated highly effective systems of patronage dispensing jobs, contracts, commercial loans,...and scholarships. Young people in all parts of the country were pressured in various ways to support the regional government parties....Opinion followed interest, and many young adults furthered their careers by adopting regionalist principles and tribalist ideologies. See Richard Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," *Government and Opposition*, 2, No. 4 (1967), 524-539.

25. Obafemi Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1947), pp. 47-48. This assertion, although taken out of context, reflected Awolowo's major concern at that time. In later years, Awolowo played an unsuccessful role in an attempt to reconcile the conflict between Nigeria and breakaway "Biafra," and even warned that if "Eastern Nigeria was allowed to secede then the West may also secede."

26. Cited in Victor A. Olorunsola, ed., *The Politics of Cultural Subnationalism in Africa* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 12.

27. James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, *Political Parties and Political Integration in Tropical Africa* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 8-9. Coleman and Rosberg noted that the concept of national integration had a variety of meanings which were not always clearly identified. However, they observed that "national integration may be regarded as a broad subsuming process, whose two major dimensions are (1) political integration, which refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on

the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community, and (2) territorial integration which refers to the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogeneous territorial political community." Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 12-13, also asserted that "national integration deals with a process very similar to...political integration." For analytical convenience, in this study, national integration and political integration are being used interchangeably. Furthermore, in order to maintain consistency and symmetry, national integration is used.

28. See, for example, Rafiq Khan, ed., *National Integration: Its Meaning and Relevance* (Varanasi: Gandhian Institute of Studies, 1970).

29. M. Crawford Young, "Nationalizing the Third World State: Categorical Imperative or Mission Impossible?," *Polity*, 2 (Winter, 1982), 164-166.

30. Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration*, p. 3. Ake utilized such indices as legitimacy, extra-constitutional behaviour, political violence, secessionist demand, alignment pattern, bureaucratic ethos, and authority scores to measure the degree of national integration. The outcome, using these indicators, was that very few, if any, of the African states may be said to be integrated.

31. Ernest Haas, *The United States of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.

32. Coleman and Rosberg, *Political Parties*, p. 9.

33. Henry Teune, "The Future of Federalism: Federalism and Political Integration," in Valerie Earle, ed., *Federalism: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice* (Itasca, IL: Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 223.

34. Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 57. No. 3 (September, 1963), 622-663.

35. Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, ed., *Nation Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 6-7.

36. Richard Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration—A Radical Approach," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5 (May, 1967), 2.

37. Colin Legum, "Tribal Survival in the Modern African Political System," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 5, No. 1-2 (January-April, 1979), 102. Legum, among other remarks, suggested that tribalism was Africa's natural condition and was likely to remain so for a long time to come.

38. Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration*, p. 1.

39. Young, "Nationalizing," 165.

40. Oyovbaire, "Sructural Change," 45. It would appear that since national cohesion does not presume harmonized or integrated interests in a plural society, the method of governing such a polity may rest on a consociational relationship among and between the élites of the ethnic groups. A. Lijphart explained consociational relationship as a mutual consensus building device among the élites of diverse groups for the purpose of successful governing. See Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 1. For an in-depth discussion, see chapters 2-7. See also Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965), Ch. 3. It has been suggested that the thirteen West African states discussed in his work may be best governed using the consociational model.

41. Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity*, p. 16.

42. See Pedro Ramet, "Political Struggle and Institutional Reorganization in Yugoslavia," *Political Science Quarterly*, 99, No. 2 (Summer, 1984), 290. See also Jim Seroka, "Yugoslavia Between East and West: Will the Tito Legacy Endure?" *International Studies Notes of the International Studies Association*, 10, No. 4 (Winter–Spring, 1983–1984), 3-4. Seroka noted that the nationalist-inspired riots and demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, although serious, were skillfully resolved in such a way that they did not disrupt the political system.

43. Martin N. Marger, *Elites and Masses: An Introduction to Political Sociology* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1981), p. 37.

44. This only represents an attempt to trace sequentially the political developments in Nigeria prior to independence and after.

45. Elechi Amadi, *The Great Ponds* (London: Heineman, 1969). Amadi, in depicting life in segmented societies, described the clash between the village of Chiolu and Alaikaro over the right to fish in the pond.

46. Audrey C. Smock, *Ibo Politics: The Role of Ethnic Unions in Eastern Nigeria* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 202.

47. Olorunsola, *Politics of Cultural Subnationalism*, pp. 5-43.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-32. See also Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 164-166. The membership and structure of the major political parties in Nigeria prior to independence in 1960 would attest to the notion that the pattern of recruitment practiced by the political leaders enhanced ethnic solidarity. This may be illustrated by the composition of the leadership of the three key political parties in 1958. The NPC had 51.3% of its membership drawn from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group and 6.8% from Yoruba and none from the Ibo ethnic group, whereas 42.8% represented other groups. The NCNC had 49.3% of its leaders drawn from the Ibo ethnic group, 26.7% from the Yoruba, and 2.8% from the Hausa-Fulani group, whereas 21.1% were from other groups. The AG was made up of 68.2% from the Yoruba ethnic group, 4.5% Ibo, and 3.0% from Hausa-Fulani, whereas 24.3% were drawn from other ethnic groups.

49. Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, *Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 8.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 11. This view was, however, refuted by the works of such anthropologists as M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, whose studies of African societies led them to the conclusion that fundamentally, there were two categories of African political systems—one with government and one without. For a further discussion of the two types of systems, see M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 5-6.

51. Christian Potholm, *The Theory and Practice of African Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1979), p. 7.

52. Sekou Touré, *Toward Full Reafricanization* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1959), p. 28.

53. Olorunsola, *The Politics of Cultural Subnationalism*, p. 50.

54. Potholm, *The Theory and Practice of African Politics*, pp. 6-7.

55. Robert H. Bates, "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa," *Comparative Political Studies*, 6, No. 4 (January, 1974), 457-482. Bates argued that modernization promoted potentially disintegrative forces in developing areas, and in particular, often gave rise to powerful ethnic groupings.

56. See Art. 202 and 203 of the 1979 Constitution.

57. James R. Scarritt and William Safran, "The Relationship of Ethnicity to Modernization and Democracy: A Restatement of the Issue," *International Studies Notes of the International Studies Association*, 10, No. 2 (Summer, 1983), 19. See especially hypotheses 7, 8, and 11.

58. There were problems in adjusting to the presidential model, especially since many of the politicians and legislators were schooled in the parliamentary system that demanded party discipline. The presidential model was marked, among other factors, by the system of checks and balances, which many legislators found to be alien and confusing.

59. Art. 15(4) of the Constitution stated: "the states shall foster a feeling of belonging and of involvement among various peoples of the Federation to the end that loyalty to the nation shall override sectional loyalties." Allegedly, this would, in the final analysis, lead to the bridging of ethnic chasms.

60. A. H. Birch, "Opportunities and Problems of Federation," in C. Leys and P. Robson, eds., *Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems* (Nariobi: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 9. This is an abridged version of K. C. Wheare's definition.

61. Teune, "The Future of Federalism," p. 222.

62. See John P. Mackintosh, "Federalism in Nigeria," *Political Studies*, 10 (1961–1962), 239. On a number of occasions the late Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Nigeria, was said to have issued foreign policy statements while on trips abroad, only to be refuted by Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Even during the Second Republic, the UPN did not fully recognize the NPN government following the controversy that surrounded the election of President Shehu Shagari.

63. William H. Ricker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 7. Little wonder, perhaps, that Sir Ivor Jennings and C. M. Young have argued that "federation is an extravagant and inefficient form of government to be justified only where a closer form of organization is politically impracticable." See W. I. Jennings and C. M. Young, *Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 343.

64. Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and Americas* (Waltham, MA: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 188-226.

65. Ume O. Eleazu, *Federalism and Nation-Building: The Nigerian Experience, 1956–1964* (Devon: Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1977), pp. 84-91.

66. Mackintosh, "Federalism in Nigeria," 232.

67. Abner Cohen, *Customs and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrant in Yoruba Towns* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 1.

68. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 4.

69. Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Potential Development* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), p. 28.

70. Victor H. Uchendu, *The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 49-70. See also Bello Daura, *Hausa Customs* (Zaria: Northern Nigeria Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 12-23.

71. David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 182-187.

72. Ake, *The Theory of Political Integration*, pp. 8-16.

73. The nucleo-cytoplasmic allegiance alluded to here represents an attempt to borrow from biology. In this case, the cell represents the nation-state. The cytoplasm represents the regional and local governments of the natio-state (cell), and the nucleus the central government. Nucleo-Cytoplasmic reaction, therefore, refers to the intricate and complex interaction among these bodies within the cell (nation-state). Just as the nucleus can hardly survive without the cytoplasm, so it would be difficult for the central government to exist without regional support. Thus, in order to survive as an entity, the central (nucleus) and the regional (cytoplasm) organs within the nation-state (cell) must exist in harmony.

74. The assumption here is that there is a correlation between education or literacy and support system by the citizens. Since the literacy rate in Nigeria is still relatively low, support for the system may be said to be low, too. Attempts to improve the literacy rate was started recently under the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme.

75. One must be cautious here. The intention of a constitution, like that of law, is to govern a polity. But sometimes the tenets of a constitution are "wrongly" interpreted. A good case in point was the perception that many Nigerians had of Decree no. 39, promulgated by the Aguyi Ironsi regime, which, among other provisions, declared Nigeria to be a unitary state. The argument then was that this would help knit the fabrics of the regions together and therefore further national integration. But when the announcement was greeted by audiences in different, even opposite ways, the aftermath was catastrophic, in that it led, *inter alia*, to the assassination of the head of state, General Ironsi, by elements in the army who found the decree to be repugnant.

76. N. Kofele-Kale, *Tribesmen and Patriots: Political Culture in a Polyethnic African State* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981), p. 7. Note in particular his basic assumptions: (1) which states that attachment to ethnic group values—tribesmen so-called—holds true for the majority of people living in polyethnic societies; and (2) which states that these values are held onto by ethnic man regardless of environmental variations (education, job, or position); *i.e.*, ethnic man remains ethnic whether domiciled in a rural village or in an urban centre.

77. Emeka Nwokedi, "Sub-Regional Security and Nigerian Foreign Policy," *African Affairs*, 84, No. 335 (April, 1985), 195-209.

78. Larry Diamond, "A Tarnished Victory for the NPN?," *Africa Report*, 28, No. 6 (November–December, 1983), 18-22.

TABLE 1

MAJOR ETHNOLINGUISTIC CATEGORIES
(in per cent of total population)[1]

Ethnolinguistic Category[2]	Per cent
Hausa	21.0
Yoruba	20.4
Ibo (Igbo)	16.6
Fulani (Fulbe)	8.6
Kanuri	4.1
Ibibio	3.6
Tiv	2.5
Ijaw (Ijo)	2.0
Edo (Bini)	1.7
Anaang	1.2
Nupe	1.2
Urhobo	1.2
Igala	1.0
Idoma	.9
Ebira (Egbirra)	.8
Gwari	.7
Ekoi (Ejagham)	.6
Mumuye	.5
Alago	.4
Ogoni (kana)	.4
Isoko	.3
Subtotal	89.7
Others[3]	10.3
Total	100.0

Source: Based on information from Nigeria. Federal Ministry of Information,
Nigeria: 1978 - 1979 Official Handbook (Lagos, 1979), pp. 273-274.

Adapted from Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Nigeria, A Country Study* (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1982), p. 291.

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[1] All categories listed comprised 200,000 persons or more in 1963, the year of the last official census.

[2] Names in parentheses are commonly used alternatives.

[3] An additional fifteen ethnolinguistic categories, each comprising between 100,000 and 200,000 persons in 1963, constituted about 4% of the population.

Table 2

SELECTED ETHNOLINGUISTIC CATEGORIES

DISTRIBUTION BY STATES

Ethnolinguistic Category	State
Hausa	Niger, Sokoto, Kaduna, Bauchi, Borno, Gongola, Kwara, Kano Benue, and Plateau.
Yoruba	Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, and Bendel.
Ibo	Anambra, Imo, and Cross Rivers.
Fulani	The six northern states: Sokoto, Kano, Borno, Kaduna, Niger, and Bauchi.
Kanuri	Bauchi and Borno
Ibibio	Cross Rivers
Tiv	Benue and Plateau
Ijaw	Rivers and Bendel

Source: *Walmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Africa* (New York: Walmark Press, 1984), p. 236.

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