THE ROLE OF PERSONS AND SITUATIONS IN LAY PREDICTIONS OF BEHAVIOR

A Thesis
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The Role of Persons and Situations in Lay Predictions of Behavior

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Abstract

Research in attribution theory, impression formation, and personality judgment examines how people explain social events that have occurred and how people assemble behavioral information to form judgments about others, but little research has explicitly explored how information is used to predict social behaviors. The present study examines the degree to which different kinds of information guide behavioral predictions, the kind of information that people believe is relevant to behavioral predictions, and the individual differences associated with the perception and use of specific kinds of information used by people when they make such predictions. One hundred and fourteen participants completed the Attributional Complexity Scale (ACS), California Adult Q-Sort (CAQ), and the Self-Monitoring Scale (SM) and made behavioral predictions for scenarios describing a person (e.g., anxious vs. relaxed) in some situation (e.g., interview vs. chatting with friend). For each scenario, the degree to which each participant's predictions were made by using either dispositional, situational, or interactional information was determined. Predictions were more strongly associated with dispositional distinctions, but the use of situational information was also apparent. In sum, the Behavioral Prediction Assessment (BPA) tool gives a reliable measure of individual differences in which people form predictions about others' social behaviors. Future research might evaluate the meaning of these differences and their links to predictive accuracy.
The Role of Persons and Situations in Lay Predictions of Behavior

The desire for predictability may be a fundamental part of daily life, perhaps more apparent in surprise at unexpected events than in the time spent making explicit, conscious predictions. Interpersonal relationships and daily social interactions are areas in which predictions might play important and as yet unexamined roles. The current study examined the type of information that people use when making predictions about social behavior of others, if the type of information used in such predictions differs among individuals, and if those individual differences are associated with a meaningful pattern of personality characteristics.

Predicting future behavior is an issue with a long history of importance as part of psychological phenomena. People seem to have a need for prediction and control throughout their lives and within their relationships. In fact some humanistically-oriented personality psychologists suggest that people have an "existential" need for predictability and order. For example, Maslow (1970) outlines five motives or needs that must be met throughout a person's life, including the need for physiological sustenance (food, shelter) and the need to belong and to love/be loved. Maslow also asserts that a need for safety exists in which people have a basic need for security, predictability and stability in their lives. Similarly, Kelley (1955) viewed humans as scientists who seek "to predict, and thus control, the course of events" (p. 12) using what he called constructs or frameworks continuously as part of the predictive process.

Not only has the importance of predictability been acknowledged in creating a sense of control or security in peoples' lives, it has also been recognized as an important part of social interaction. For example, in a commentary on research and theory in the area of social and
personality judgment, Funder (2003) suggested that “such judgments are interesting, useful, and certainly important: they may determine further interaction” (p. 1). This implies that social information processing does not stop after a behavior has occurred, since the possibility exists that acting out or predicting future behaviors may rest on the social information processing of previous behavior.

*Research in Social Judgment*

Despite the apparent practical importance of behavioral prediction in everyday life, little social psychological research has examined the phenomenon. At least four domains of theory and research in social psychology have focused on the processing of social information and have implications for everyday behavioral predictions, although none have focused directly on the ways in which people form predictions about future behavior. One such area is attribution theory. Research concerning attribution examines how people perceive and infer the causes of behaviors (see Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Attribution theory examines the kind of information that people use to explain why a behavior occurred. For instance, if an individual observes a woman throwing a drink in someone’s face, the witness may make either a dispositional/internal attribution (she threw the drink because she is a jerk), or a situational/external attribution (she threw the drink because the man had insulted her).

Kelley (1967, 1973) developed the covariation model to explain how people use dispositional/internal or situational/external information to make inferences about the causes of other people’s behavior. According to Kelley’s model, people use three different kinds of information in order to determine if the behavior of others has a dispositional or situational cause: distinctiveness information, consensus information, and consistency information. Distinctiveness refers to whether or not the behavior is specific to one particular moment
and/or person being acted upon, or whether it appears in other similar contexts and towards other individuals; consensus refers to whether the behavior is specific to the one individual being judged, or whether other individuals within the same situation are displaying similar behaviors; and consistency refers to whether the individual behaves in a similar way each time he/she is placed in this kind of situation, or whether the behavior has only appeared in one particular situation, at one particular time. According to Kelley people tend to use distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency together in order to create a decision-making process that ends with the cause of behavior being dispositionally/internally or situationally/externally attributed. For example, people perceived to have low distinctiveness, low consensus, and high consistency would have behavior dispositionally attributed, while people with high distinctiveness, high consensus, and low consistency would have their behavior situationally attributed. Kelley’s model shows how people might use different kinds of information in order to make inferences about the behavior of others.

A second area of relevant research is impression formation, which examines the ways in which perceivers process social information to form an “impression” of the personality of other people (see Asch, 1946; Funder, 1995). For example, imagine a human resources director waiting to interview an applicant who is late for a meeting. The applicant arrives and tells the director that he was late because he stopped to help someone change a tire. The director can now make several inferences about the kind of person the applicant is; the director might decide that the applicant is unreliable because he was late, or the director might infer that the applicant is deceitful because the “late excuse” is unbelievable, or the director might infer that the applicant is kind for stopping to help another person. In general, attribution theory can be summarized as inferring what the cause of a behavior was, while
impression formation asks what the behavior implies about the person who emitted the behavior. Although these two research domains provide a theoretical basis for the current project, neither one directly concerns prediction of future behavior.

A third area of research relevant to behavior prediction is personality psychology. For example, scores on an extraversion test might be used to predict whether John will be more talkative than Bob. Personality psychology has focused more than attributional theory on the ability of instruments to predict behavior, not how the lay person processes information to predict behavior (see Funder & Colvin, 1991; Mischel, 1968).

Research concerning expectancy effects is the fourth area of research relevant to behavior prediction in that it examines how behavior may be predicted if people are given expectations. In general, people are given information on what behaviors other “target” people are likely to perform. Researchers then observe how these created “expectancies” influence participants’ behavior and attitudes toward the target person. But in a typical expectancy effect study, participants are given the predictions; they are not required to create their own predictions. For example, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) found that when teachers were given the expectation that several students were expected to soon “bloom” and do very well, intellectually, the selected students did just that — “bloom.” However, the students were chosen at random and there was no information to support the notion that they should be doing any better than any other students in the class. The expectation given to the teachers helped create the future behavior of the selected students doing better than others. Such studies (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968) begin to examine some of the ways in which predictions shape behavior, but they do not examine the ways in which lay people form predictions. Although both personality psychology and expectancy effects are related to the
predictions of future behaviors, neither directly concerns the ways in which lay people form their behavioral predictions.

**Facets of Behavioral Prediction: Judge and Information**

Although previous research in attribution theory, impression formation, personality psychology, and expectancy effects does not bear directly on behavioral predictions made by lay people, such research does raise at least two important theoretical considerations: the type of information used to make behavioral inferences and possibly predictions, and the characteristics of the individual making the inference or prediction. In order to examine these two issues within the lay person's predictions of the behavior of others, the current study asks two questions: Do different people use different kinds of information when making behavior predictions (such as dispositional or situational as seen in attribution theory), and if so, are such differences in the type of information used associated with basic personality traits or styles?

Previous researchers have recognized the importance of both information and characteristics of judges as components of social perception. For example, the Weighted Averaging Model (WAM; Kenny, 1991) identifies the factors affecting the degree to which judges agree about a target person's personality, and it highlights the importance of a judge's meaning system in behavioral perception. The meaning systems are how the judges of observed behaviors process information to form personality judgments about the target. Kenny recognized that judges differ in their interpretation and judgments about a target person's behaviors; that is, each judge may carry a "unique impression" of the target that is not affected by any information given or any behaviors of the target. Kenny's WAM is a mathematical formula that can be used to examine both consensus and accuracy in judging
others' behaviors. This model asks judges to rate target behavior on a positive and negative scale. This process eventually leads to a weighted-average, which is applied to the consensus of the judges on that particular behavior. However, accuracy can be affected by the judges’ meaning systems, as mentioned above. The judge’s impression of the target, without taking the behavior into account, can affect the judge’s final judgment of the behavior. Therefore, in the case of the WAM, social judgment can be affected by the judge, and not just the information or behavior alone.

Another model that stresses the importance of information and the judge in social perception is the Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM; Funder, 1995). According to the RAM, the accuracy of an individual’s personality judgment depends on several moderators. Funder describes four “moderators of accuracy” of personality judgment: good judge, good target, good trait, and good information. Good judge refers to how some judges may be more sensitive to behavioral cues that assist in accurately perceiving a target’s personality because of three components: personality knowledge (in general, not specific to target), motivation, and general cognitive ability (i.e., IQ, attributional complexity). For example, extraverts might be better at deciphering nonverbal cues than introverts because extraverts have more practice in social settings and with interpersonal relationships. Good information refers to the information revealed (through speech or behavior) about the target’s personality, without considering what the judge will do with this information. The main factor that determines whether or not some information is better than other information is time; how long has the judge been watching or known the target. Funder (1995) states that the longer the relationship, the more accurate the judgments. The final two moderators of accuracy, good target and good trait, refer to how well the targets reveal their personality through their own
behavior (either in the amount of behavior exhibited over time, or the consistency of similar behavior across situations) and how available particular traits are within a target that reveals relevant behavior for personality perception (i.e., talkativeness, socialability, or nervousness). However, the two moderators known as good judge and good information are particularly relevant for the current study. That is, Funder (1995) suggests that different kinds of people may tend to make more or less accurate judgments of personality, and different kinds of information can lead to more or less accurate judgments of personality. This logic can be extended to behavioral predictions; perhaps different kinds of information (i.e., dispositional or situation as mentioned in attribution theory) are used in behavior prediction, and if so, maybe different kinds of people use different kinds of information to make those predictions, just as different kinds of people tend to make more or less accurate judgments of personality using different kinds information.

Funder (1995, 1980) not only investigated how information and judges may affect the accuracy of personality judgments; he also examined how a judges’ tendency to ascribe traits to themselves and others may be associated with the judges’ personality, rather than the target or the given information (1980). Funder (1980) hypothesized that traits ascribed to a target person by a judge may have more to do with the judge’s personality and individual differences than those of the target person. Funder (1980) did a study in which judges were asked to describe themselves, a best friend, and an acquaintance by ascribing traits from a set of 30 pairs of polar opposite traits (e.g., friendly vs. unfriendly) to each individual or saying it “depends on the situation.” Funder found that there appeared to be a “trait” of ascribing traits. That is, judges who had a tendency to ascribe many traits to one “target” also had a tendency to ascribe traits across all “targets.” These individual differences in “trait
ascription” had clear correlates with individual personality traits found in the California Adult Q-Sort (CAQ; Block, 1978). Funder (1980) used the CAQ, a 100-item personality inventory, to gather a personality assessment about each judge. Each item on the CAQ examined a different and specific trait. Funder found that judges who tended to ascribe more traits to all targets correlated with traits on the CAQ that could be described as poorly psychologically adjusted. Table 1 displays the traits that were both positively and negatively correlated with those individuals with a tendency to ascribe traits to all targets (even themselves), rather than saying it may “depend on the situation.” These were the traits that were more likely associated with individuals that could be described as being more poorly psychologically adjusted (i.e., somewhat neurotic, fussy, anxious, or thin skinned). Those who ascribed fewer traits, and more often acknowledged that it could depend on the situation were described as having better psychological adjustment. From the resulting correlates with the CAQ, Funder (1980) inferred that those with a dispositional outlook (those who tended to ascribe more traits across all targets) were more “neurotic” or less well adjusted than those who tended to have a situational outlook (those who tended to ascribe fewer traits).

Funder’s RAM and “good judge” research (1995), as well as his trait ascription patterns (poorly adjusted/dispositional outlook, well adjusted/situational outlook) provide insight into how behavior predictions might be affected by the personality characteristics of those making the predictions. Therefore, research investigating behavior prediction could take the judges’ personalities into account and investigate the possibility that different judges with different personality traits or characteristics may provide different kinds of behavioral predictions.

Funder (1980) found that the trait for ascribing traits (i.e., charming, sympathetic), or the tendency to ascribe traits to all targets, was correlated to specific traits using the CAQ. He
was able to infer, due to the correlates found, that a particular cluster of traits tended to
describe a poorly adjusted person, while the remainder of traits tended to describe a well
adjusted person. Perhaps this logic can be extended to behavior prediction; the scores of
people on the CAQ might be related to type of behavioral predictions made by the people.
That is, the differences in the types of predictions are associated with the trait ascriptions
identified by Funder (1980). I examine this possibility in the present study.

Although Funder (1980, 1995) examined how a judge may possess traits or
classifications that help in judging behaviors of others, there is the possibility that how
people judge and/or control their own behavior may impact how they judge others as well.
The concept known as self-monitoring describes how internal and external cues are used by
individuals to shape their behavior. High self-monitoring people seek external cues for
behavior and shift their behavior to match their environment and others around them.
However, low self-monitoring people use internal cues to guide their behavior and tend to
ignore the external socially appropriate environment. An individual’s level of self-monitoring
can be tested using the Self-Monitoring (SM) Scale (Snyder, 1974). This 25 true/false
questionnaire consists of three subscales (extraversion, other-directedness, and acting) and is
scored in the direction of high self-monitoring. Scale scores are used to identify individuals
who are high or low self monitors. The present study was designed to explore the possibility
that self monitoring style might be related to attributional predictions. The idea was that high
self monitors might be more likely than low self monitors to make predictions about the
behavior of others based on situational cues whereas low self monitors might be more likely
to make predictions based on perceived personality characteristics of others.
Personality traits or self-monitoring levels are not the only individual differences that can appear when judging behaviors of others. Judges may also show individual differences in the way they judge the cause of a person's behavior. Some individuals may be naïve perceivers/judges and may use simple or less complex explanations for the origin of a behavior (e.g., simply having a bad day), while others have a more complex and detailed schemata for forming behavioral causes (a bad day coupled with workplace pressures, personality flaws, and other external or internal factors). Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, and Reeder (1986) called measurable differences in the way that a person judges the cause of behavior attributional complexity. Fletcher et al. found that those with higher attributional complexity tended to have a high need for cognition/thinking/knowledge of world/information processing (i.e., problem-solving, critical thinking, etc.) and that females were more complex in attributional style than males. While interest or knowledge in the behavior being judged was significantly associated with complexity, intelligence was not necessarily tied to any particular level of attributional complexity. Fletcher et al. (1986) used a tool known as the Attributional Complexity (AC) Scale in order to examine the level of complexity in an individual's attributional style. The AC Scale was a 28 question inventory answered on a 5-point scale that also contained seven subscales. This scale was used to determine the level of complexity in someone's inferences about another person's behavior. A person with higher complexity levels would not necessarily be smarter, but would have a higher interest in behavior in general, would have a greater need for critical thinking, and would tend to seek out understanding in behavior and their world around them than a person with a low level of complexity (Fletcher et al., 1986); if an attribution style can help determine how an individual will judge others' behavior (using more or less complex causal
inferences), there is the possibility that a person’s AC level would be an important factor in behavior prediction. The present study was designed in part to examine the relationship between attributional complexity and behavioral prediction.

As described by Funder (1995), a second moderator of social judgment is the type of information being processed, or “good information.” Classic attribution theory distinguishes between dispositional and situational attributions. In one instance the person may make attributions according to dispositional inference, something about the actor caused the behavior (e.g., personality trait). Alternatively, a person may make an attribution about someone’s behavior according to situational inference, or behavior that was elicited by environmental forces (Ross, 1977). Kelley’s (1967) covariation model also makes use of dispositional and situational inference, but in his model judges are not simply processing dispositional versus situational information. Judges are in fact determining whether the behavior is to be based on dispositional information or situational information using three components: consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness. However, no matter which point of view is taken on attribution, both classic attribution theory and Kelley’s covariation model emphasize the eventual use of both dispositional and situation attribution when inferring the cause of a target’s behavior.

Although research in the tradition of classic attribution theory and Kelley’s (1967) covariation model focuses on dispositional and situational attributions, more recent research has focused on the use of a combination of dispositional and situational information, interactional inferences (Idson & Mischel, 2001; Zuroff, 1982). Such research suggests that people sometimes make interactional inferences. In fact, people do realize that other people may exhibit uniquely meaningful patterns of behavioral variability across situations. For
example, Zuroff (1982) had judges make predictions about emotional experience of seven target subjects in 11 situations. For each participant's ratings of each target, a person, situation, and interaction index were calculated. Zuroff found that participants' ratings of familiar others were more interactional (composed of both person and situation) in nature than their ratings of unfamiliar others, which tended to be of simpler trait or situation composition. Idson and Mischel (2001) examined the information supplied in open-ended personality descriptions with particular interest in the use of "trait" information (e.g., she is usually anxious) versus "interactionist" information (e.g., she feels uncomfortable about public speaking). Participants were asked to write open-ended descriptions of several people, varying on degree of acquaintance and degree of favorability. They found that when describing people about whom they had favorable impressions, participants used more interactionist descriptors and fewer trait descriptors for close acquaintances than for distant acquaintances. However, this difference in the use of descriptor type according to how familiar an acquaintance was not found toward people about whom the participants had unfavorable impressions. The research by Zuroff and by Idson and Mischel suggests that, at least in some instances, people adopt an interactionist perspective in the processing of social information. These studies, though, have focused on the effect of target characteristics (familiar vs. unfamiliar, favorable vs. unfavorable) on the type of information used (person/trait/dispositional vs. situational vs. interactional). The current study extends this line of research by examining the associations between personality characteristics of participants and type of information used in behavioral prediction. That is, do different kinds of people tend to use person, situation, or interactional information when predicting others' behavior?
The Current Study

The current study examined whether personality characteristics of the judge and information type given in various scenarios influenced behavioral prediction. Specifically, the study investigated the possibility that some people use certain types of information more than other people, by way of investigating the combination of judge and information components from the RAM. The current study refers to Funder's (1995) RAM in order to elaborate on both judge and information effects in behavior prediction, just as Funder examined these effects in accuracy of personality perception. In fact, Funder referred to certain kinds of judges using certain types of information as a "sensitivity" measure. Such a measure exists when some judges use certain kinds of information better than other judges. Another form of sensitivity can be seen when a judge detects the same information as other judges, but may weigh certain information more heavily than other judges. For example, a judge that can be referred to as having both good information and being a good judge, will most likely have high sensitivity and will notice behavioral cues (e.g., talkativeness, nervousness) that other judges may not notice in order to create a more accurate perception of the target. Funder's RAM implies the importance of investigating both the information used, as well as the judges themselves, when studying personality perception. The current study investigated both information and judges within the context of behavior prediction.

For the present study, the Behavioral Prediction Assessment (BPA) was created to identify the types of information people used to make predictions about the behavior of others. The BPA required participants to make a series of behavioral predictions about hypothetical persons in hypothetical situations. Participants were presented with scenarios that had manipulations of qualities of the person and qualities of the situation (e.g., "imagine
a friendly woman in an argument with her neighbor” or “imagine an unfriendly woman
having lunch with her neighbor”) and were asked to predict the person’s behavior (e.g., “on a
1 to 7 scale, how nice will the person be?”). The behavioral prediction assessment was
administered in order to identify individual differences in the use of dispositional, situational,
and interactional information.

To examine personality traits, attributional styles, and self-monitoring of judges, the
California Adult Q-sort (CAQ; e.g., Funder, 1980), the Attributional Complexity Scale (AC;
Fletcher et al., 1986), and the Self-Monitoring Scale (SM; Snyder, 1974) were administered.
Each of the aforementioned assessment tools has proved useful in examining judges in the
context of present or past behavior as mentioned earlier in the literature review. The current
study examined individual differences in judges as measured by the three personality
measures in the context of behavior prediction.

The current study investigated two distinct hypotheses along with a set of exploratory
analyses. Based on Funder’s (1980) trait of ascribing traits and the correlates found within
that study, Hypothesis 1 predicted that those individuals who tend to use more dispositional
information (have a dispositional outlook), rather than situational (outlook) or interactional
information, have personalities that can be described as being relatively poorly adjusted;
while those who tend to use more situational or interactional information, rather than
dispositional information, will have correlations with traits that describe a more
psychologically “well adjusted” individual.

Based on Fletcher et al.’s (1986) findings with the AC Scale, Hypothesis 2 predicted that
participants who tend to use interactional information, or a combination of both person and
situation information, will tend to have higher complexity scores on the AC Scale than those
who tended toward dispositional information or situational information only. I created this hypothesis based on Fletcher et al.'s findings that those with higher need for cognition, had a greater interest in thinking about behavior/personality, and had more complex explanations for others' behaviors had higher AC scores. I hypothesized that those with higher AC scores would tend to use the more complex information choice in the BPA, interactional, because of the higher need for complex explanations for behavior.

Exploratory analyses consisted of testing the psychometric properties of the newly created Behavioral Prediction Assessment. This was required in order to assure the new assessment was in fact measuring information use. The second set of exploratory analyses consisted of examining correlations between self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) levels and the use of dispositional, situation, or interactional information. Self-monitoring reflects an individual's orientation toward internal versus external forces as guides for his/her own behavior. Exploratory analyses examined how an individual's orientation may be associated with how that individual predicts others' behavior, based on the notion that perhaps a judge's tendency toward a particular level of self-monitoring will be something he/she imposes on targets as well. For example, a high self-monitoring judge might assume others are also high self-monitors and will predict behaviors based on that level of self-monitoring in others.

Method

Participants

Participants were 114 college students (18-25 years old) at a mid-sized southeastern university, who received research credit for participating in the study. The participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups counterbalanced for order in which questionnaires were completed ($n = 57$ each). All participants read and signed a consent form prior to the
beginning of each experiment session. The treatment of each participant was in accordance with the ethical standards of the Appalachian State University Institutional Review Board as well as the American Psychological Association. The study received approval from the Appalachian State University Institutional Review Board on April 9, 2003. Each participant was told he/she may quit or leave the session at any time and would receive no punishment for doing so. Each participant read and signed a consent form before proceeding with the session.

**Materials and Procedure**

The participants in the current study completed four measures consisting of three personality measures and one behavioral measure: a Likert version of the California Adult Q-Sort (Block, 1978), the Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher et al., 1986), the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974), and the Behavioral Prediction Assessment (see Appendix A) questionnaire. The CAQ, AC, and SM Scales are all copyrighted material and may be found within the copyright holder’s research, as cited. However, the BPA was specifically created for this study and can be seen in Appendix A.

Group one completed the CAQ, AC Scale, and SM Scale first (personality assessments), then the BPA (behavioral assessment). Group two completed the BPA first, then the CAQ, AC, and the SM. Each participant was told that this was a study examining how people perceive others, situations, and behaviors and that the information he/she provided would be kept anonymous and confidential. The participants were given brief instructions outlining what he/she would do during the session.

*Behavioral Prediction Assessment.* The BPA was intended to directly assess the degree to which a respondent’s explicit behavioral predictions were based on dispositional
information, situational information, or interactional assumptions. Rather than self-reporting their "predictional preferences," a respondent makes behavioral predictions in response to a series of behavioral scenarios. Each scenario was comprised of four questions that differed through manipulation of dispositional information and manipulation of situational information. For example, one scenario included a "friendly" versus "unfriendly" dispositional manipulation and a "lunch" versus "argument" situational manipulation. Crossing these two manipulations produced four questions:

1) Imagine a friendly person having lunch with a neighbor. To what degree will the person be nice? (Rated on a 1 to 5 point scale; anchors are based on behavior being examined in each scenario; i.e., if behavior is talkative, the anchors would be "not at all talkative" and "extremely talkative.")

2) Imagine a friendly person having an argument with a neighbor. To what degree will the person be nice?

3) Imagine an unfriendly person having lunch with a neighbor. To what degree will the person be nice?

4) Imagine an unfriendly person having an argument with a neighbor. To what degree will the person be nice?

In the BPA, each participant answered these four questions twice, which allowed the variability in a respondent's predictions for this scenario to be partitioned into a "dispositional" component, a "situational" component, an "interaction" component, and an error component. An analysis of variance was done on responses separately for each participant; the total sums of squares (SS) for a respondent's eight responses to a given scenario was partitioned into a person SS component, a situation SS component, an
The Role of interaction SS component, and a residual SS component. The three substantive SS components (person, situation, and interaction) thus reflect the degree to which variability among the respondent’s eight predictions for the scenario is associated with the person distinction, the situation distinction, or an interactional distinction. For purposes of aggregation, the three substantive SS components were transformed into “proportion of variances” by dividing each by the respondent’s Total SS for the eight questions; therefore, each participant had three BPA scores (p, s, and i) representing the extent to which his or her responses to the scenarios (overall) were a function of the different sources of information in each scenario. These scores were used in all analyses involving the BPA data.

Each respondent completed ratings for 10 such scenarios (for a total of 80 responses: four questions per scenario, each question answered two times, for 10 scenarios). Thus, each respondent had 10 person scores, 10 situation scores, and 10 interaction scores, which were aggregated into an overall person score, an overall situation score, and an overall interaction score for each respondent. In essence, there were three 10-item measures: one ostensibly reflecting the degree to which a respondent’s predictions are generally based on person or dispositional information, one ostensibly reflecting the degree to which a respondent’s predictions are generally based on situational information, and one ostensibly reflecting the degree to which a respondent’s predictions are based on interactional assumptions. The psychometric properties of the BPA were the focus of the first set of analyses.

Attributional Complexity Scale. The Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher et al., 1986) was used to identify the attributional styles of participants. The scale is rated on a 5-point scale and was answered using Scantron sheets. The scale was based on seven different constructs concerning an individual’s particular style of attribution. The scales are as follows:
The Role of

a) level of interest or motivation (e.g., Item #15: I really enjoy analyzing the reasons or causes for people’s behavior); b) preference for complex rather than simple explanations (e.g., Item #2: Once I have figured out a single cause for a person’s behavior I don’t usually go any further.); c) presence of metacognition concerning explanations (e.g., Item #3: I believe it is important to analyze and understand our own thinking processes.); d) awareness of the extent to which people’s behavior is a function of interaction with others (e.g., Item #18: I think very little about the influence that other people have on my behavior.); e) tendency to infer abstract or causally complex internal attributions (e.g., Item #26: I tend to take people’s behavior at face value and not worry about the inner causes for their behavior [i.e., attitudes, beliefs, etc.]); f) tendency to infer abstract, contemporary, external causal attributions (e.g., Item #27: I think a lot about the influence that society has on my behavior and personality.); and g) tendency to infer external causes operating from the past (e.g., Item #14: I have often found that the basic cause for a person’s behavior is located far back in time; Fletcher et al., 1986).

California Adult Q-sort. The version of the CAQ (Block, 1978) used in the current study was a Likert format of a modified version by Bern and Funder (1978). The inventory is a survey of a wide variety of important personality characteristics such as evaluating the motivation of others in interpreting situations and social perception of a wide range of interpersonal cues. The CAQ was used in the present study in order to identify predominant personality characteristics (i.e., anxious) within each participant and to examine whether or not these predominant characteristics were correlated with how participants predict others’ behavior, much in the same way as the CAQ was used by Funder (1980) when examining trait ascription. A total of 100 items were rated on a 1 to 5 scale. Although the CAQ was
originally designed as a card-sorting task and typically not compiled into scales, the relatively simple Likert scale format shows properties that are highly similar to the more complex and time-consuming sorting procedure (Furr & Funder, 1999).

_Self Monitoring Scale_. The SM Scale (Snyder, 1974) questionnaire consists of 25 true/false statements that are scored in the direction of high self-monitoring. The scale has statements to which participants will agree or disagree and assess: a) concern with social appropriateness of self-presentation; b) attention to social comparison information as a cue to self-presentation; c) ability to control and modify self-presentation; d) use of this information in particular situations; and e) extent to which self-presentation is cross-situational. The scale itself has three distinct subscales: extraversion (i.e., scores high on outgoing and confident); other-directedness (i.e., moderately correlated to shyness and public self-consciousness); and acting (i.e., negatively correlated with shyness).

After completing all questionnaires, the participants were debriefed and told they had completed the experimental session and were free to leave.

Results

_Descriptions of the Personality Scales_

The SM Scale was the last of the three personality scales to be administered to participants. The sample used in the current study \( n = 114 \) consisted of undergraduate students that were comparable in sample size to those used by Snyder (1974, \( n = 192 \)) and Briggs, Cheek, and Buss (1980, \( n = 536 \)). When Snyder (1974) created the Self Monitoring Scale, he found it to be a reliable measure with a Kuder-Richardson reliability of .70 and a test-retest reliability of .83. The current study also found the complete format of the SM Scale to be reliable in both the 25-question \( (\alpha = .61) \) and 18-question \( (\alpha = .60) \) format. The
reliabilities of the three factors (extraversion, other-directedness, and acting) found within the SM Scale in the Briggs et al. study show much higher reliability ratings than those found in the current study; however, the current study did find those factors to be reliable as well. The unusually low reliabilities found may arise from the fact that the SM Scale was the third personality questionnaire completed by participants, and thus subject to participant fatigue and frustration. The means and standard deviation information for the 25-question format, 18-question format, and each subscale of the SM Scale as tested in the current study can be seen in Table 1. (Reports of analyses can be found in Tables 1 through 9.)

The AC Scale was the second personality scale participants completed in the current study. The sample used in the current study was comparable to the sample of 289 students used by Fletcher et al. (1986), meaning that both Fletcher et al. and the current study had male and female undergraduates as participants. The reliabilities found in the current study for each construct, even those that appear low such as $\alpha = .45$, are quite consistent with, and in some cases larger than those found by Fletcher et al. The current study found a high reliability of .86 for the total AC Scale. See Table 1 for all AC Scale reliabilities.

The version of the CAQ created for this study was modelled after Funder’s (1980) CAQ. Therefore, the cluster of traits he found to be described as “poorly psychologically adjusted” within his scale are the same clusters within the current study. These clusters of traits can be found in Table 2.

Reliabilities of the BPA

In order to assess behavioral predictions by participants, a new assessment tool was created for the current study known as the Behavioral Prediction Assessment. Since the BPA was designed for this study, the first issue regarded its psychometric properties. Specifically,
do individual differences in the tendency to make person-based, situation-based, and interaction-based predictions exist? That is, are the person, situation, and interaction scales of the BPA reliable? Analyses suggest that there were reliable and detectable individual score differences. The reliability of person effect was above .80, and the reliability of situation effect was above .70. The reliability of the interaction effect was clearly lower ($\alpha = .47$). (See Table 1.)

The low interaction effect reliability indicates that the tendency to make interaction-based predictions was not as stable across scenarios. This reliability indicates that subjects who made relatively person-based (or situation-based) predictions in one scenario were likely to make relatively person-based (or situation-based) predictions in other scenarios. A quantitative source of the differences in reliability may lie in the means and standard deviations of the three effects. Person effect had the greatest degree of variability, with situation and interaction effects having respectively less variability. The relative lack of variability in situation and particularly interaction may have attenuated the observed reliabilities. These results indicate that, on average, participants made person-based predictions, but showed the greatest variability in this effect. Despite the relatively low reliability of the interaction effect, these results suggest that individual differences in the tendency to make person-based and situation-based predictions exist and are detectable.

**Individual Differences in Person Effect**

Hypothesis 1 stated that those individuals who have a tendency to use person-based information will tend to have correlations with personality traits that could be described as “poorly adjusted.” Hypothesis 2 stated that those tending to use more person-based or
situation-based information would have lower attributional complexity scores than those using a combination or interaction information.

According to the first hypothesis, I hoped to find the same cluster of correlating traits that Funder (1980) found, meaning those with a high dispositional outlook or use of dispositional information correlating with “poorly adjusted” traits. However, the hypothesized pattern of trait correlations with information was not observed. Table 3 presents correlations between person effect and scores on the CAQ. Although two correlations are consistent with the hypothesis (item 59, “concerned with functioning of own body” positively correlated with person effect; item 87, “interprets situations in complicated way” negatively correlated with person effect), the overall set of correlations provide no support for Hypothesis 1.

Table 4 presents positive correlations between person effect and scores on the AC scales, however, the table reveals no significant or sizable correlations to match the hypothesis based on Fletcher et al.’s (1986) findings with the AC Scale. Table 5 presents correlations between the person effect and the Self Monitoring scales. Again, this table shows no significant or sizable correlations.

**Individual Differences in Situation Effect**

Hypothesis 1 was based on the assumption that individuals who tend to use more situation or interaction information would tend to have correlations with personality traits that could be described as more “well adjusted,” based on Funder’s (1980) correlations with traits and poor psychological adjustment. The current study hoped to find a pattern of correlations with information use and traits that could be described as psychologically well adjusted (i.e., charming, sympathetic, interesting). Hypothesis 2 stated that individuals who
The Role of

used situation-based or person-based information, without a tendency to use a combination of information (interactional) would have lower attributional complexity scores than those using interactional information. This was based on Fletcher et al.’s (1986) notion that higher AC scores would demonstrate a need for complex explanations for causes of behavior (in the current study’s case, the interactional information), and lower AC scores would demonstrate a tendency for more simple explanation for causes of behavior.

Table 6 presents correlations between situation effect and the CAQ. This table examined Hypothesis 1, and although two items show some consistency with Hypothesis 1 (Item 68, “nervous” negatively correlated with situation effect; item 73, “sees situations as having sexual content” negatively correlated with situation effect), the overall set of correlations did not show strong support for the hypothesis. The pattern of trait correlations on the CAQ with information use on the BPA did not create the pattern of well adjusted traits (charming, interesting, sympathetic, etc.) that Funder (1980) seemed to find in people that tended to have a situational outlook when judging a target’s personality.

Table 4 presents correlations between situation effect and AC Scale scores. The correlations revealed that both the total items and the level of interest/motivation were positively and significantly correlated with situation information use. However, no other correlations between the situation effect and the AC Scale were significant or sizable. Hence, the correlations show little support for Hypothesis 2. Table 5 presents correlations between situation effect and the SM Scales. As with the person effect, these analyses show no significant or sizable correlations.
Individual Differences in Interaction Effect

Hypothesis 1 stated that individuals who tended to use more interactional or situational information would tend to have correlations with personality traits that can be described as more "well adjusted," as was reflected in Funder's (1980) research. He found that individuals who tended to have situational outlooks in personality perception tended to correlate with traits on the CAQ that could be described as more well adjusted (charming, cheerful, sympathetic). Hypothesis 2 states that individuals with a tendency to use more interactional information would have higher complexity scores on the AC Scale than those using only person or situation information. Hypothesis 2 was based on Fletcher et al.'s (1986) research, stating that individuals having higher AC scores would have/use more complex explanations for other targets' behaviors.

Table 7 presents correlations between interaction effect and the CAQ scores. The overall set of correlations does not provide a pattern toward well adjusted traits similar to Funder's (1980) research that would provide support for Hypothesis 1.

Table 4 presents correlations between interaction effect and AC Scale scores. Table 5 presents correlations between interaction effect and SM Scale scores. Neither set of analyses revealed significant correlations.

Multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine if scores from the AC Scale, SM Scale, and CAQ were related to kind of information presented (person, information, and interactional). Types of information were thought of as the predictor variables; person effect, situation effect, and information effect were the three predictors. The hypothesized relationships between the scale scores and the types of information were not supported by these analyses.
Table 8 presents regression analyses examining associations between subscale scores from the SM Scale (separate analyses for each of the eight SM subscales) and the AC Scale (separate analyses for each of the five SM subscales) and type of information; the person, situation, and interaction effect were predictors. Although some predictors were related to AC subscales [i.e., person and situation were associated with scores from the “awareness of the extent to which people’s behavior is a function of interactions with others” (coded behfintr) subscale], the other associations were not as strong as predicted or were not consistent with predictions. The SM Scale scores were not associated with the predictor (person, situation, or interaction) values.

Table 9 presents regression analysis for the CAQ (separate analyses for each of the 100 CAQ items). As in the case of the AC regression analyses, some predictors were found to be associated with particular traits; however, the strength and pattern of associations was not consistent with hypothesized predictions.

Discussion

One purpose of the present study was to identify the types of information people tend to use when making behavioral predictions. Attribution theory was utilized to describe the kinds of information that people use to explain why others behave as they do in social situations (Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). The theory stipulates that an individual will explain the past behaviors of others using dispositional or situational information. The present study examined the possibility that people might use this type of information to make predictions about how others will behave in future social situations.

The BPA scale was used to determine the extent to which people rely on situational or dispositional information to make predictions about how others will behave in future social
situations. Response patterns to items on the test could also be analyzed to determine if a person was using a combination of situational and dispositional information to make their predictions overall, known as interactional information. Analyses of data from this scale suggest that individuals do show tendencies to use one particular kind of information more so than another (situational vs. dispositional) when making predictions about the behavior of others. There was little evidence, however, of people who could be characterized as having a tendency to use a combination of information throughout the scenarios or interactional information when making behavioral predictions. Either people do not use a combination of both types of information to make predictions about the behavior of others or the assessment instrument was not sufficiently sensitive to pick up this use of combination information when responding.

A second purpose of the current study was to examine the possible relationship between the type of information used in behavioral prediction and individual differences. Would scores on the BPA, a measure of the types of information used when making predictions, correlate with specific traits or with attributional complexity? Utilizing two different personality scales (CAQ and AC), the current study hypothesized that type of information used in behaviour prediction would be related to poorly adjusted traits or well adjusted traits, as well related to high or low AC scores.

Hypothesis 1, which examined the possibility that the tendency to use a specific type of information (person, situation, or interaction) in behavioral prediction would be related to personality traits and/or psychological adjustment, was not strongly supported by the current data. Correlations between the person effect and the CAQ, as well as the situation effect and the CAQ, were examined. Although two person effect correlations and two situation effect
correlations were found that were consistent with Hypothesis 1, other predicted correlations were not statistically significant. This pattern of correlations does not provide convincing support for Hypothesis 1. The interaction effect hypothesis could not be examined because there was little or no BPA score evidence for an interaction type of responding. These findings suggest that either the type of information people tend to use when making behavioral judgments (person, situation, or interaction information) is not related to specific personality traits measured by the CAQ, or that the personality types measured by the CAQ were the wrong ones; there was no solid evidence that having a "well adjusted" or a "poorly adjusted" personality is related to the specific type of information used in making behavioral predictions.

Hypothesis 2 examined the possibility that an individual's use of information type would be correlated with scores on the AC scale. Only 2 of the possible 24 correlations between BPA and AC scores were statistically significant ($p < .05$). This hypothesis predicted that the use of situation or person information would be correlated with lower AC score. Contrary to this prediction, positive correlations were found among the person effect and situation effect. This hypothesis concerning the relationship between the use of interactional information and AC scores could not be tested as there was no evidence that people used interactional information.

Exploratory analyses were done in addition to the analyses intended to test the two hypotheses stated above. The first set of analyses investigated the possibility of a correlation between the specific type of information used when making behavioral predictions and an individual's level of self-monitoring as measured by the Self-Monitoring Scale. There were
no statistically significant correlations between self-monitoring levels and person, situation, or interaction effects.

A second set of analyses involved assessing the reliabilities of the BPA. The reliabilities for the BPA were strong, showing that individual differences in the type of information used to make behavioral predictions do exist and are detectable using this measure. Previous research has not examined the possibility of the existence of these particular types of individual differences. Individual differences in attributional style and social cognition have not been examined extensively, nor has prediction of behavior in general received a great deal of investigation. The reliabilities for person (α = .84) and situation (α = .72) information were strong. The reliability for interactional information (α = .47) was weak. There does not seem to be a single or clear explanation for this pattern of results. Further research is needed to determine if there is an interactional component associated with predictive attribution or if the failure to find such a component is a weakness of the BPA.

There are several possible explanations for the failure to find results consistent with the proposed hypotheses. One explanation may be that the BPA scores are not psychologically meaningful. Another possibility could be that the individual BPA effects (person, situation, and interaction) are meaningful themselves, but as a set reflect a "predictional coherence." This would mean that when person, situation, and interaction effects are grouped together in the format of the BPA scale, the group effect shows a tendency for information use in behavioral prediction that no single individual effect would display if examined alone. It could also have to do with the make up of the scenarios in the BPA itself. Perhaps the information that was manipulated through the BPA was biased in the direction of person information. For instance, there were some bits of situation information that tended to have
terms in them like "friend," "neighbour," or "used car salesman" that may have had more to do with person in the participants thinking, rather than situation. A fourth possibility is that the current study simply did not include the set of variables that were associated with the BPA effects. It is also possible that the BPA itself was too artificial in the types of scenarios it presented. It is very seldom that target behaviour is as simplistic as what is given in the BPA. Perhaps more realistic scenarios or a more overall engaging BPA would provide more realistic feedback and possibly more correlations with research-tested personality assessments, such as the AC Scale.

The current study examined what scenarios or information influenced behavioral predictions, while another issue is what people believe is relevant to making those predictions. Examining the individual differences in these beliefs in terms of the degree to which judgments in social processing is determined by internal or external forces, or possibly how both cognitive and affective factors interact to form these predictions may be the next issues that are relevant in this area of research. In fact, this area of research is already receiving attention. Mischel and Shoda (1995) have proposed a Cognitive-Affective Personality System in which the interrelation of cognitive (beliefs, expectancies) and affective (emotions, feelings about oneself) "mediating units" or components influences the level of behavioral consistency across situations. Perhaps the cognitive and affective "mediating units" are correlated with a judge's individual differences (e.g., locus of control, decision-making tendencies, self-perception) that have yet to be captured within a personality assessment tool and may later be correlated with the BPA.

In conclusion, the preceding study allowed the creation and examination of a new assessment tool (BPA) that was found reliable and warrants further investigation. Although
the two hypotheses were not supported by the results of the investigation, the lack of support
does generate possibilities that the direction of future research should, or in some cases
should not take, in order to gain further insight into the new tool. The lack of support for
correlations between the three personality assessments and the BPA may in fact lead research
to find that the BPA is valuable in other venues rather than personality psychology. The first
step is to refine the BPA in order to create stronger reliabilities and use the new assessment
tool in order to examine other facets of psychological research and how it may or may not
affect behavioral prediction. The newly created BPA is simply the first step in establishing a
larger foundation of research in the vein of behavioral prediction.
References


Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social*


Table 1

*Descriptive Statistics of the BPA, AC, and the SM Scales*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BPA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interaction</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actotal</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>4.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motiv</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prefcomp</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metacog</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behfintr</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compintl</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compextl</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interaction</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smtot25</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smtot18</td>
<td>10.33</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extra</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Role of

| otherdir | 5.40 | 1.95 | 0.53 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| acting   | 2.48 | 1.43 | 0.58 | 0.00 | 5.00  |
| person   | 0.65 | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.94 |       |
| situation| 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.53 |       |
| interaction| 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.25 |       |

Note. \( BPA = \) Behavioral Prediction Assessment, \( AC = \) Attributional Complexity Scale, \( SM = \) Self-monitoring Scale; actotal = AC total of all subscales, motiv = level of interest or motivation, prefcomp = preference for complex rather than simple explanations, metacog = presence of metacognition concerning explanations, behfintr = awareness of the extent to which people’s behaviour is a function of interaction with others, compintl = tendency to infer abstract or causally complex internal attribution, compextl = tendency to infer abstract, contemporary, external causal attributions, time = tendency to infer external causes operating from the past; smtot25 = 25 question test total, smtot18 = 18 question test total, extra = extraversion, otherdire = other-directedness; \( BPA N = 129, AC N = 129, SM \) smtot25-acting \( N = 114, SM \) person-interaction \( N = 129. \)
Table 2

Cluster of Traits that can be Described as "poorly psychologically adjusted" (Funder, 1980)

Q-sort Correlates of Total Trait Ascription

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items positively correlated to trait ascription</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pushes/stretches limits; sees what she/he can get away with</td>
<td>.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feels lack of personal meaning in life</td>
<td>.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thin skinned/sensitive to criticism</td>
<td>.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guileful and deceitful</td>
<td>.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not cope well under stress; brittle ego defense</td>
<td>.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxious</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fastidious; fussy</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned with own adequacy as a person</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-defensive</td>
<td>.32*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items negatively correlated to trait ascription</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responds to humor</td>
<td>-.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personally charming</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathetic and considerate</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calm and relaxed</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheerful</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoys aesthetic impressions</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interesting, arresting person</td>
<td>-.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arouses liking and acceptance</td>
<td>-.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has warmth</td>
<td>-.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait</td>
<td>Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appears straightforward and candid</td>
<td>-.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delays/avoids actions</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values own independence and autonomy</td>
<td>-.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellious and nonconforming</td>
<td>-.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prides self on being objective and rational</td>
<td>-.29*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: All p’s are two tailed. (Funder, 1980); * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*
Table 3

*CAQ correlations of person information use with the Behavioral Prediction Assessment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item #</th>
<th>California Adult Q-Sort Item</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td>giving</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008</td>
<td>intelligent</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>071</td>
<td>ambitious</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>096</td>
<td>values own independence</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>070</td>
<td>ethically consistent</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>059</td>
<td>concerned with functioning of own body</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>051</td>
<td>values intellectual manners</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>080</td>
<td>interested in the opposite sex</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>088</td>
<td>personally charming</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>002</td>
<td>dependable</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>072</td>
<td>concerned with own adequacy as a person</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>075</td>
<td>internally consistent personality</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>026</td>
<td>productive</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>063</td>
<td>creates and exploits dependence in people</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>064</td>
<td>perceptive to interpersonal cues</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>087</td>
<td>interprets situations in complicated ways</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>051</td>
<td>values intellectual matters</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>059</td>
<td>concerned with functioning of own body</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>050</td>
<td>unpredictable</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>048</td>
<td>keeps people at a distance</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note. CAQ = California Adult Q-Sort; $N = 129$; $* p < .05$, $** p < .01$, $*** p < .001$
Table 4

*AC Scale Correlations of Person, Situation, and Interaction Information Use with the Behavioral Prediction Assessment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info Type</th>
<th>AC Total</th>
<th>Motiv</th>
<th>Prefcomp</th>
<th>Metacog</th>
<th>Behfintr</th>
<th>Compintl</th>
<th>Compextl</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interaction</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* AC = Attributional Complexity; *N* = 129; *p* < .05, **p** < .01, ***p*** < .001; actotal = AC total of all subscales, motiv = level of interest or motivation, prefcomp = preference for complex rather than simple explanations, metacog = presence of metacognition concerning explanations, behfintr = awareness of the extent to which people's behaviour is a function of interaction with others, compintl = tendency to infer abstract or causally complex internal attribution, compextl = tendency to infer abstract, contemporary, external causal attributions, time = tendency to infer external causes operating from the past.
Table 5

*SM Scale Correlations of Person, Situation, and Interaction Information Use with the Behavioral Prediction Assessment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info Type</th>
<th>Smtot25</th>
<th>Smtot18</th>
<th>Extra</th>
<th>Otherdir</th>
<th>Acting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interaction</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* SM = Self-Monitoring; N = 114; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; smtot25 = 25 question test total, smtot18 = 18 question test total, extra = extraversion, otherdir = other-directedness.
Table 6

*CAQ correlations of situation information use with the Behavioral Prediction Assessment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item #</th>
<th>California Adult Q-Sort Item</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>050</td>
<td>unpredictable</td>
<td>0.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>039</td>
<td>thinks in unusual ways</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>028</td>
<td>arouses liking</td>
<td>-0.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>045</td>
<td>brittle</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>021</td>
<td>arouses nurturant feelings</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>060</td>
<td>insight into own motives and behavior</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>075</td>
<td>internally consistent personality</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>088</td>
<td>personally charming</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>068</td>
<td>nervous</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>073</td>
<td>sees situations as having sexual content</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. CAQ = California Adult Q-Sort; N = 129; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
### Table 7

**CAQ correlations of interaction information use with the Behavioral Prediction Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item #</th>
<th>California Adult Q-Sort Item</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>091</td>
<td>power oriented</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>087</td>
<td>interpret situations in complicated way</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>042</td>
<td>avoids action</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>080</td>
<td>interested in the opposite sex</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>089</td>
<td>compares self to others</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td>giving</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>051</td>
<td>values intellectual matters</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>066</td>
<td>enjoys aesthetics and art</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008</td>
<td>intelligent</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* CAQ = California Adult Q-Sort; $N = 129$; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$
Table 8

*AC and SM Subscale Scores as a Function of Type of Information Used to Make Behavioral Predictions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>person</th>
<th>situation</th>
<th>interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attributional Complexity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actotal</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>0.34**</td>
<td>0.34**</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motiv</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prefcomp</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metacog</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behfintr</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.38**</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compintl</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compextl</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self Monitoring Scale</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smtot25</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smtot18</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extra</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>otherdir</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acting</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Reported coefficients are standardized regression coefficients; $AC =$ *Attributional Complexity Scale, SM = Self-Monitoring Scale;* $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$; actotal = AC total of all subscales, motiv = level of interest or motivation, prefcomp = preference for
complex rather than simple explanations, metacog = presence of metacognition concerning explanations, behfintr = awareness of the extent to which people's behaviour is a function of interaction with others, compintl = tendency to infer abstract or causally complex internal attribution, compextl = tendency to infer abstract, contemporary, external causal attributions, time = tendency to infer external causes operating from the past; smtot25 = 25 question test total, smtot18 = 18 question test total, extra = extraversion, otherdire = other-directedness
Table 9

*CAQ Subscale Scores as a Function of Type of Information Used to Make Behavioral Predictions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>California Adult Q-Sort item</th>
<th>Predictors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All three significant</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>096 values own independence</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>person and situation significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008 intelligent</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>043 facially/gesturally expressive</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>051 values intellectual matters</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>056 responds to humor</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>061 creates/exploits dependence in people</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>086 denies unpleasant thoughts or conflicts</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>person and interaction significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022 lacks personal meaning in life</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>042 avoids action</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 does not vary roles</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation and interaction significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only person significant</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>017</td>
<td>sympathetic or considerate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>018</td>
<td>initiates humor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>026</td>
<td>productive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>050</td>
<td>unpredictable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>053</td>
<td>unable to delay gratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>059</td>
<td>concerned w/ functioning of own body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>070</td>
<td>ethically consistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>072</td>
<td>concerned w/ own adequacy as a person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>097</td>
<td>emotionally bland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Only situation significant**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>044</td>
<td>evaluates motivation of others</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>045</td>
<td>brittle</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>046</td>
<td>fantasizes</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>069</td>
<td>sensitive to demands</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>073</td>
<td>sees situations as having sexual content</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>084</td>
<td>cheerful</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>092</td>
<td>socially poised</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>098</td>
<td>verbally fluent</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Only information significant**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>089</td>
<td>compares self to others</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Reported coefficients are standardized regression coefficients; * p < .5, ** p < .01, *** p < .001;*
Appendix A

Behavioral Prediction Assessment

1. Imagine a shy person sitting in class.
   How talkative will that person be?
   1  2  3  4  5
   not at all  extremely

2. Imagine an anxious person interviewing for a job.
   How easy going will that person be?
   1  2  3  4  5
   not at all  extremely

3. Imagine an imaginative person writing a love letter.
   How creative will that person be?
   1  2  3  4  5
   not at all  extremely

4. Imagine a friendly person in an argument with a neighbor.
   How warm will that person be?
   1  2  3  4  5
   not at all  extremely

5. Imagine a dependable person going to work.
   How punctual will that person be?
   1  2  3  4  5
   not at all  extremely

6. Imagine an extrovert at a bar with friends.
   How sociable will that person be?
   1  2  3  4  5
   not at all  extremely

7. Imagine a calm person driving in heavy traffic.
   How upset will that person be?
   1  2  3  4  5
   not at all  extremely

8. Imagine a rigid person debating politics.
   How open minded will that person be?
   1  2  3  4  5
   not at all  extremely
9. Imagine a cynical person doing a favor for a family member. How suspicious will that person be?
   - 1 2 3 4 5
   - not at all extremely

10. Imagine an impulsive person studying for a test. How spontaneous will that person be?
    - 1 2 3 4 5
    - not at all extremely

11. Imagine an outgoing person sitting in class. How talkative will that person be?
    - 1 2 3 4 5
    - not at all extremely

12. Imagine a relaxed person interviewing for a job. How easy going will that person be?
    - 1 2 3 4 5
    - not at all extremely

13. Imagine an unimaginative person writing a love letter. How creative will that person be?
    - 1 2 3 4 5
    - not at all extremely

14. Imagine an unfriendly person in an argument with a neighbor. How warm will that person be?
    - 1 2 3 4 5
    - not at all extremely

15. Imagine an undependable person going to work. How punctual will that person be?
    - 1 2 3 4 5
    - not at all extremely

16. Imagine an introvert at a bar with friends. How sociable will that person be?
    - 1 2 3 4 5
    - not at all extremely

17. Imagine a tense person driving in heavy traffic. How upset will that person be?
    - 1 2 3 4 5
    - not at all extremely
18. Imagine a flexible person debating politics. 
How open minded will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely 

19. Imagine a trusting person doing a favor for a family member. 
How suspicious will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely 

20. Imagine a self-controlled person studying for a test. 
How spontaneous will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely 

21. Imagine a shy person going to a party. 
How talkative will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely 

22. Imagine an anxious person chatting with a friend at work. 
How easy going will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely 

23. Imagine an imaginative person writing a memo. 
How creative will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely 

24. Imagine a friendly person having lunch with a neighbor. 
How warm will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely 

25. Imagine a dependable person going to a party. 
How punctual will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely 

26. Imagine an extrovert studying with friends at the library. 
How sociable will that person be? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all extremely
27. Imagine a calm person walking through a park.
   How upset will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

28. Imagine a rigid person brainstorming for a group project.
   How open minded will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

29. Imagine a cynical person making a deal with a used car salesman.
   How suspicious will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

30. Imagine an impulsive person watching the superbowl.
   How spontaneous will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

31. Imagine an outgoing person going to a party.
   How talkative will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

32. Imagine a relaxed person chatting with a friend at work.
   How easy going will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

33. Imagine an unimaginative person writing a memo.
   How creative will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

34. Imagine an unfriendly person having lunch with a neighbor.
   How warm will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

35. Imagine an undependable person going to a party.
   How punctual will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely
36. Imagine an introvert studying with friends at the library. How sociable will that person be?
   not at all          extremely

37. Imagine a tense person walking through a park. How upset will that person be?
   not at all          extremely

38. Imagine a flexible person brainstorming for a group project. How open minded will that person be?
   not at all          extremely

39. Imagine a trusting person making a deal with a used car salesman. How suspicious will that person be?
   not at all          extremely

40. Imagine a self-controlled person watching the superbowl. How spontaneous will that person be?
   not at all          extremely

41. Imagine a shy person sitting in class. How talkative will that person be?
   not at all          extremely

42. Imagine an anxious person interviewing for a job. How easy going will that person be?
   not at all          extremely

43. Imagine an imaginative person writing a love letter. How creative will that person be?
   not at all          extremely

44. Imagine a friendly person in an argument with a neighbor. How warm will that person be?
   not at all          extremely
45. Imagine a dependable person going to work.  
   How punctual will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely

46. Imagine an extrovert at a bar with friends.  
   How sociable will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely

47. Imagine a calm person driving in heavy traffic.  
   How upset will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely

48. Imagine a rigid person debating politics.  
   How open minded will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely

49. Imagine a cynical person doing a favor for a family member.  
   How suspicious will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely

50. Imagine an impulsive person studying for a test.  
   How spontaneous will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely

51. Imagine an outgoing person sitting in class.  
   How talkative will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely

52. Imagine a relaxed person interviewing for a job.  
   How easy going will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely

53. Imagine an unimaginative person writing a love letter.  
   How creative will that person be?  
   1  2  3  4  5  
   not at all  extremely
54. Imagine an unfriendly person in an argument with a neighbor.
   How warm will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

55. Imagine an undependable person going to work.
   How punctual will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

56. Imagine an introvert at a bar with friends.
   How sociable will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

57. Imagine a tense person driving in heavy traffic.
   How upset will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

58. Imagine a flexible person debating politics.
   How open minded will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

59. Imagine a trusting person doing a favor for a family member.
   How suspicious will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

60. Imagine a self-controlled person studying for a test.
   How spontaneous will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

61. Imagine a shy person going to a party.
   How talkative will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

62. Imagine an anxious person chatting with a friend at work.
   How easy going will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely
63. Imagine an imaginative person writing a memo.  
How creative will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]

64. Imagine a friendly person having lunch with a neighbor.  
How warm will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]

65. Imagine a dependable person going to a party.  
How punctual will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]

66. Imagine an extrovert studying with friends at the library.  
How sociable will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]

67. Imagine a calm person walking through a park.  
How upset will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]

68. Imagine a rigid person brainstorming for a group project.  
How open minded will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]

69. Imagine a cynical person making a deal with a used car salesman.  
How suspicious will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]

70. Imagine an impulsive person watching the superbowl.  
How spontaneous will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]

71. Imagine an outgoing person going to a party.  
How talkative will that person be?  
\[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ 
\text{not at all} & \text{extremely} \\ 
\end{array} \]
72. Imagine a relaxed person chatting with a friend at work.
   How easy going will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

73. Imagine an unimaginative person writing a memo.
   How creative will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

74. Imagine an unfriendly person having lunch with a neighbor.
   How warm will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

75. Imagine an undependable person going to a party.
   How punctual will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

76. Imagine an introvert studying with friends at the library.
   How sociable will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

77. Imagine a tense person walking through a park.
   How upset will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

78. Imagine a flexible person brainstorming for a group project.
   How open minded will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

79. Imagine a trusting person making a deal with a used car salesman.
   How suspicious will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely

80. Imagine a self-controlled person watching the superbowl.
   How spontaneous will that person be?
   1 2 3 4 5
   not at all extremely
Appendix B

Consent Form

This study is designed to examine how people predict behavior. You will be asked to complete three personality inventory questionnaires and one behavioral prediction questionnaire. In addition, you will be asked to provide some basic demographic information (i.e., age and gender).

Your participation in this study is strictly confidential and anonymous and will take approximately 1 hour to complete. You will receive 1 hour of research credit for participation. Your name will in no way be associated with the information you provide. All data will be kept in a secure, locked location. Although there is minimal risk of discomfort associated with this study, your participation is entirely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any point of the study, for any reason, and without any penalty. You are welcome to skip any questions that you feel uncomfortable answering.

If you agree to participate in this study, please sign this consent form and begin. Your signature will be taken as informed consent. If you do not wish to participate, you may feel free to leave the study with no penalty and no effect on research credit.

If you have further questions about this study or your rights as a participant, you may contact the principal investigator, Kristin Saunders, or Dr. Michael Furr at 262-2718 or the chair of the Institutional Review Board, Dr. Robert L. Johnson at 262-2130.

Name

Date

Researcher:
Kristin Saunders
Department of Psychology
Office: 112-D Smith-Wright Hall
Office phone: 262-2718
Email: kristinsaunders77@hotmail.com
TO: Ms. Kristin Saunders  
Psychology  
Dr. Michael Furr  
Psychology  

FROM: Robert L. Johnson, Chair  
Institutional Review Board  

DATE: April 10, 2003  

SUBJECT: Institutional Review Board Request for Human Subjects Research  

REFERENCE: "Behavioral Prediction"  
IRB Reference #03-110  

Initial Approval Date – April 9, 2003  
End of Approval Period – April 8, 2004  

Your request for Review of Human Subjects Research has been approved.  

OHRP Guidelines stipulate that projects may be approved for a maximum of one (1) year. During this period, you should contact this office to:  
1. report any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others,  
2. request modification in the approved protocol,  
3. request an Extension beyond the one (1) approval, and/or  
4. inform the IRB of the completion of the project.  

Best wishes with your research.  

RLJ/lab
TO: Dr. Michael Furr
Psychology
Ms. Kristin Saunders
Psychology

FROM: Robert L. Johnson, Administrator
Institutional Review Board

DATE: April 2, 2004

SUBJECT: IRB Expiration

REFERENCE: “Behavioral Prediction”
IRB Reference #03-110
Initial Approval Date - April 9, 2003
End of Approval Period – April 8, 2004

This is a reminder that your approval for human subjects research will expire April 8, 2004.

OHRP Guidelines stipulate that projects are approved for a maximum of one (1) year. Please notify this office once your project is completed or to request an extension beyond the initial one (1) year approval.

You may contact Lisa Bingham at binghamla@appstate.edu or ext 2165 if you have further questions or concerns.

Thank you,

RLJ/lab
VITA

Kristin M. Saunders was born in Salisbury, NC on December 14, 1977 and continued to reside within its borders until August 2000. While in Salisbury, she graduated from Salisbury High School in May 1996, and received her Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology from Catawba College in May 2000. Upon graduation from Catawba College, she became a graduate student within the Psychology Department at Appalachian State University. While attending, she was a co-Editor for the Southwest Journal on Aging, taught two semesters of introductory psychology courses, and worked part-time at the University Bookstore.

Kristin is a member of the national chapter of Psi Chi and has appeared in two volumes of Who's Who Among American College and University Students. She now lives in New York City with her husband and three pets. She works as an Editorial Coordinator for the Department of Urology at Weill-Cornell Medical College of Cornell University and is an active volunteer with City Critters, Inc. Her parents, Tim and Nita Saunders, and younger brother, Steven Saunders, continue to reside in Salisbury, NC.