dependent on coalitions with small religious parties? These questions have much relevance to Israel's future ability to normalize its regional relations and therefore its ability to work out true reconciliation with its regional adversaries. The book does not raise these questions and thus falls short of answering concerns about the future nature of Israel-PLO relations.

By integrating Palestinian and Israeli perspectives and by tackling issues both sides consider vital to their concerns, the book sheds much light on the Palestinian-Israeli relationship and the potential for reconciling historic antagonisms. It has shortcomings, even some minor factual errors (Baghruthi instead of Barghouthi, p. 62; Madrid conference in 1992 instead of 1991, pp. 74 and 84), but it is not without merit as an effort to add to our understanding of a complex relationship between two peoples who are trying to change their relationship from a zero-sum game to one of interdependence.

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE


Reviewed by Curtis R. Ryan

This book analyzes the course of Israeli-Jordanian relations from the 1967 war to the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994. Lukacs emphasizes the uniqueness of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship: two states officially at war with one another nonetheless developed a strong pattern of cooperation. The title may be a bit misleading, however, since the book does not provide equal depth of coverage from both the Israeli and Jordanian sides of this intriguing and paradoxical relationship, being much stronger in its analysis of Israeli policy and providing fewer insights on Jordanian policy. Lukacs alludes to this imbalance in the introduction, noting that he conducted field research in Israel but not Jordan. He makes extensive use of Hebrew language scholarship, government documents, and newspapers but uses few Jordanian sources. Nevertheless, in the later chapters of the book, he provides a fairly comprehensive analysis of two key Jordanian decisions: the 1988 renunciation of ties to the West Bank and the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. In both cases, he includes not only the larger regional dynamics influencing Jordan but also the vital economic concerns imbedded in Jordanian policy. However, he does not take into account the important influence of domestic politics on Jordanian policy.

Although Lukacs notes that the Zionist-Hashimite relationship predates the establishment of Israel, his unique contribution is to examine the material bases for this relationship and simultaneously to explain why such a unique relationship has not existed between Israel and any other Arab state. The difference, he argues, centers on key elements of geographic and demographic interdependence. The two states are both dependent on Yarmuk and Jordan River water, and they control opposite sides of the Dead Sea, as well as neighboring ports on the Gulf of Aqaba. Lukacs argues that the most important source of interdependence centers on state security interests and the two regimes' mutual aversion to a Palestinian state between them. For all their differences, the two regimes shared the aim of containing Palestinian nationalist aspirations, especially after the 1967 war. Indeed, everything Lukacs says about the Israeli-Jordanian relationship is germane to the Palestinians who, in effect, are strategically wedged between Zionist and Hashimite states. In fact, Lukacs examines Israeli-Jordanian relations largely with regard to their impact on the West Bank. He emphasizes the role of the Palestinians as part of a broader strategic triangle between Israel, Jordan, and the PLO. Understanding the bilateral relationship, in other words, often requires a keen understanding of this triangular dynamic.

Lukacs makes a strong argument that Israeli-Jordanian relations can be understood on the basis of functionalism, that is, building cooperation on issues of low politics and steadily reinforcing them over time. The chapters methodically trace these functional arrangements by focusing in detail on such key policies as the open bridges (begun in 1967) and Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank. Lukacs makes the case that the stability of Israeli-Jordanian relations for most of the period 1967-88 had a profoundly negative effect on the regional peace process, not by triggering another major war, but rather by helping to reinforce a relatively
comfortable status quo (for the Israelis and Jordanians, but certainly not for the Palestinians). This comfort level allowed policymakers on both sides to avoid such persisting difficult issues as territorial compromise. As Lukacs states, “Israel’s indecisiveness about withdrawal guided many of its policies during the 1967–88 period. This has resulted in the maintenance of the status quo, which aimed at conflict management and the preservation of de facto peace with Jordan rather than at conflict resolution, which would have necessitated withdrawal from the territories” (p. 16, emphasis added).

The chapter analyzing the open bridges policy documents various phases in the movement of people, goods, and capital between Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan and further provides a detailed discussion about key areas of policy administration in the West Bank, from the dual legal system to the overlapping education systems. Lukacs argues that although living standards of Palestinians initially rose after 1967, the West Bank nonetheless remained largely peripheralized and underdeveloped as a result of changing and indecisive Israeli policies toward the territories. He notes that only in 1993, following the Israeli-PLO accords, did Israel begin to implement policy recommendations from the late 1960s that called for “the building of a Palestinian infrastructure as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for peace” (p. 60). Although Israel and Jordan each sought to contain the PLO, the outcome was not what either state had planned because the open bridges policy “allowed Palestinians to develop and to consolidate their nationalist movement by maintaining close ties to the Arab world and the Palestinian diaspora, which enabled them to resist the occupation” (p. 182). Although this policy provided Israel with twenty years of “relative tranquility” in the West Bank, the author argues that “Israel’s open bridges policy may have delayed the outbreak of the intifada but paradoxically contributed to the uprising” (pp. 182–83).

The intifada, followed by Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank, ends the two-decade-long phase in Israeli-Jordanian relations that is the focus of Lukacs’s book. His final chapter turns to the 1994 peace treaty and beyond. Now that Israel and Jordan have shifted from a de facto to a de jure peace, Lukacs argues, they should be able to build on their several decades of functional cooperation. Yet, he notes also that prospects for a lasting peace still depend on progress on the Palestinian leg of the strategic triangle. Overall, this is a solid contribution to our understanding of a key relationship in Middle East politics, with insights of interest to historians, political scientists, and policymakers.

SECURITY AND PEACE


Reviewed by Hanna Youssif Freij

This book, edited by Israeli scholar of international relations theory, strategic studies, and foreign policy decision-making models Zeev Maoz, is a result of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies’ attempt since 1994 to flush out some of the theoretical and practical challenges facing the Middle East peace process in the international, regional, and domestic contexts. As its title indicates, the book looks at the current security dilemma in the Middle East over several decades. Although some of the six chapters are based on mathematical models, thus limiting their utility to a narrow group of specialists, the articles by Benjamin Miller and Ben Mor are valuable for both general Middle East scholars and international relations specialists.

Maoz’s own article examines the question of regional security over the last five decades. He defines regional security as the “sum total of perceptions of national safety . . . which members of a regional system feel at a given point in time” (p. 6). It consists of the following variables: external and domestic conflicts, military allocation, and patterns of alliances. Maoz builds on previous works by third world scholars who argue that the primary security dilemma for small states is driven by severe internal conflicts of which he provides ample evidence (pp. 10–13). Maoz finds that the Middle East is no more secure today than in the past fifty years and that the region is beset by an increasing wave of internal conflicts resulting in massive increases in military allocations (p. 22) that are likely to continue in the future due to demographic and economic development trends. The article is rich in data but somewhat lacking in new insights and predictions.

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